House of Lords - No Country is an Energy Island: Securing Investment for the EU's Future

No Country is an Energy Island: Securing Investment for the EU's Future - European Union Committee Contents

CHAPTER 2: investments and costs

The scale of investment required

15. The European Commission indicated in 2010 that, by 2020, investment of around €1 trillion[20] would be required across the EU's energy system (generation, transmission, distribution and demand) to replace obsolete capacity, modernise and adapt infrastructure and to cater for increasing and changing demand for low carbon energy.[21] Our witnesses supported this estimate, and it was even described by Mr Martin Wolf as "rather low" in the context of the EU's overall economy, a view echoed by EDF. Mr Wolf estimated the suggested investment to be less than 1% of the EU's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over that period.[22]

Investing in energy at a time of economic crisis

16. Dr Robert Gross and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) were in agreement that the current economic climate ought to be a favourable time to raise money cheaply for secure investments.[23] Mr Wolf concurred. Both he and Mr Dimitri Zenghelis explained that there are excess savings "of an extraordinary scale" in the economy at the moment. According to Mr Zenghelis, those resources, if invested, could attract a substantial multiplier effect. Professor David Newbery agreed, observing that holding other investment constant and increasing energy investment specifically by shifting to less carbon-intensive solutions should stimulate an under-employed economy.[24]

17. While the economic crisis has in one way created an ideal climate for investment, the Commission highlighted the related sovereign debt problem in EU countries as an obstacle. Financial institutions had indicated to the Commission that, until the debt problem was resolved, they would not invest in at least 12 of the 27 Member States.[25] BNEF warned that regulatory changes to the financial sector introduced to tackle the crisis, such as the Basel III rules on the amount of liquidity that must be held,[26] may restrict the amount of available finance. In its recent Green Paper on long-term financing of the European economy, the Commission agreed with this point, highlighting prudential rules for banks and for the insurance sector as particular obstacles.[27] As part of the solution to overcoming the economic crisis, the EU has introduced the European Semester, a system which allows the Commission to make annual recommendations to Member States on their economic and fiscal policies. Recommendations are formulated on the basis of the Commission's annual growth survey, setting out in general terms the priorities on which Member States should focus in their economic and fiscal policy. These recommendations have included energy-related suggestions, particularly on energy efficiency.[28]

18. We recommend that the Commission includes energy policy within its annual growth strategy and that Member States be encouraged, through the European Semester, to consider how their fiscal policies can contribute to unlocking investment in the energy sector.

19. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) took the view that meeting the three key energy priorities of security, decarbonisation and keeping costs competitive was in itself good for growth: "by investing in energy you do not just get the general benefits of investing in the economy; you also get a more growth-positive environment in Europe".[29] ScottishPower agreed that "efficient investment" in energy should have a beneficial impact on the economy and create new jobs, making the distinction that investment in expensive forms of renewable energy, for example, was less efficient than investment in cheaper methods.[30]

20. As a sector in which to invest, the Committee heard from the Commission and others that it can offer steady returns with low risk and offers a very stable credible yield. Life times of assets can range from 30 to 60 years.[31] Mr Zenghelis acknowledged that energy investment was not a panacea but thought that it was certainly part of the solution. He observed that investment in infrastructure tended to have a stronger domestic effect than other investment as "a lot of it goes into domestic employment and a lot of it goes into domestic supply chains".[32] Mr Wolf considered that "it would be incredibly sensible to focus on investment in general, and energy investment in particular, as one way of generating growth-oriented policies in the [eurozone] countries that are now in difficulty".[33] He argued that, "without a supply of reasonably cheap energy, future growth will be seriously constrained", an argument supported by ABB Limited.[34] This point was further illustrated by an Ernst & Young report for Energy UK, in which it was noted that "a pound spent on investment in this sector has a larger indirect effect on the rest of the economy than most others".[35] The only note of scepticism was struck by Mr Peter Atherton, who questioned the contribution that energy investment could make to boosting growth and argued for better macro-economic analysis to support the debate about that contribution.[36]

Low carbon energy investment

21. The Committee heard a substantial amount of evidence to suggest that greater investment in low carbon energy in particular could add economic value. Various reports, referenced by our witnesses, have pointed to the added value of wind over gas. Research by Cambridge Econometrics on behalf of World Wildlife Fund (WWF) estimated that large-scale investment in offshore wind energy as opposed to a power system more heavily dependent on gas would increase UK GDP by 0.8% by 2030 (an additional £20 billion).[37] The added value to be derived from a technology such as wind energy compared to gas depends on the level of imported gas, with the advantage of wind increasing as the proportion of gas that is imported increases. This was the clear conclusion of an Ernst & Young report for RenewableUK, which concluded that, in all European countries analysed (UK, Spain, Portugal, France and Germany), investment in wind creates more GDP than gas. There was a marked difference, though, between countries such as France, which imports 98% of its gas, and the UK, which imports 37% of its gas.[38]

22. According to the Cambridge Econometrics study, the added value of wind to the economy, compared to gas, also depended on the location of the wind power equipment supply chain.[39]The Scientific Alliance observed that wind turbines were increasingly being sourced from China. Consequently, argued Mr Atherton, "the vast bulk" of the money spent on the initially high capital costs (see Appendix 7) to construct wind farms "will go overseas anyway". Mr Antony Froggatt acknowledged this issue but emphasised that installation and maintenance would remain local.[40]

23. The Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) and EDF believed that low carbon generation has the capacity to deliver a significant boost to economic growth.[41] The CBI agreed that an investment benefit could be derived from investing in low carbon energy domestically rather than fossil fuels, the prices of which are volatile and are currently rising.[42] EDF brought to our attention a report by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) on behalf of EDF, which found that new nuclear capacity could boost UK GDP by between 0.04% and 0.34% per annum for 15 years, depending on the cost and timescale.[43]

24. Sustained competitiveness of the EU economy requires adequate investment and innovation to facilitate a competitive, well-priced set of supply-side inputs, such as energy, to a growing economy. We therefore agree with the evidence presented that the time is right for infrastructure investment, including in energy, because it can have a multiplier effect, it can provide secure energy at a stable cost and it can boost technological advance. Low carbon generation and system infrastructure in particular can provide domestic energy production for decades at low and stable operating costs but at a high capital cost. We conclude that such investment is particularly appropriate at a time of historically low interest rates and recession. The potential to utilise underemployed financial resources, at low financing costs, while providing a secure indigenous supply for future growth means that investment, particularly in low carbon energy, could make a material and enduring contribution to European economic recovery.

25. In terms of jobs, the IPPR report on nuclear energy estimated that the delivery of additional nuclear energy capacity could result in an extra 32,500 jobs in the UK. We heard that the numbers employed in the renewable energy sector across the EU are predicted to rise to two million by 2020 and to three million by 2030. In the UK alone, the renewable energy sector could support 400,000 jobs by 2020 according to the Renewable Energy Association.[44]

26. There is, however, a lack of data on the extent to which low carbon energy investment can create net new jobs. On the one hand, the Ernst & Young report cited above found that wind energy creates 21 job years per million Euros invested compared to 13 for gas. On the other hand, Scientific Alliance and Professor Newbery considered that many low carbon jobs come at the expense of existing ones and may be relatively short-term in nature, such as the erection of turbines or installation of insulation. BNEF agreed that jobs in renewable energy tend to be available during construction but not during the life of the plant.[45] A wind turbine manufacturer, Vestas, addressed this issue and drew our attention to a report[46] on the employment effects of the operation and maintenance of offshore wind farms. This found that, if the expected 20.5 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind power were to be installed in the UK by 2020, 4,000 long-term jobs would be created, along with a further 3,000 indirect jobs. Most of these jobs would be in economically fragile coastal areas, where the additional employment would be welcome.[47]

27. It was put to us by Mr Stephen Tindale that "the most sensible job rich approach is energy efficiency" rather than renewable energy. BNEF and the Commission agreed that energy efficiency could be an important source of new jobs, although they offered no analysis as to the extent to which they might be net new jobs.[48] The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers (CIBSE) and Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) did not discuss jobs specifically, but considered that further stimulation of energy efficiency has the potential to maintain a significant contribution to economic growth.[49] Dr Karsten Neuhoff added that grid infrastructure development, leading to greater connectivity, could have a positive impact on jobs.[50]

28. Investment in low carbon energy will undoubtedly create jobs, but we caution that the case is not yet clear as to the extent to which net new jobs will be generated in the EU. We recognise the significant job creation potential of energy efficiency and energy connectivity developments.

Financing

29. As highlighted in paragraph 15 above, at least €1 trillion needs to be invested in the EU's energy system over the period to 2020. It was clear from our witnesses that the bulk of that would need to be sourced from the financial markets, with an important leveraging role for the public sector.

30. We heard that the investment challenge is an issue relating not to finance, but to risk. The Commission has indicated that institutional investors[51] hold an estimated total of €13.8 trillion of assets.[52] Financing is therefore theoretically available, but there is caution about investing.[53] The CBI noted that money was available on the global financial markets, but the challenge was to attract it to the UK and EU.[54] Mr Atherton warned that the share prices of European utilities had tumbled since 2008 (see Appendix 5) and planned capital expenditure by utilities companies was low, which was confirmed by the energy industry. ScottishPower told us, for example, that its parent company, Iberdrola, had committed to investing £3.5 billion in the UK, an amount which represented 42% of its global investment over the period 2012-14. While helpful, this did not amount to the "many billions of pounds", which ScottishPower acknowledged were required from the investment community.[55]

31. According to Mr Atherton, bonds were particularly important due to reduced capital expenditure by industry.[56] BNEF and Mr Wolf noted that pension and bond funds were keen to identify investments yielding more than the maximum 2% currently available for 10 year UK Government bonds, although pension funds lacked appropriate knowledge. It was considered that policy makers could make it easier for the industry to construct bonds and pool investments.[57] In its Green Paper on long-term investment, the Commission also observed that there was a lack of skills to support investment decisions and suggested that it may be necessary to consider initiatives designed to pool financial resources and to structure financing packages according to different phases of risks.[58] New long term investment funds could be of some assistance in this regard.

32. The importance of using public funds to engage in risk sharing in order to leverage private investment was highlighted. Mr Froggatt asserted that "how the EU and Member States can use their funds in a coherent way to leverage greater investment" would be crucial.[59] According to witnesses, this could be through European Investment Bank (EIB) lending and the new Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). Both the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and Mr Wolf observed that the EIB can offer comfort to investors and encourage engagement in higher risk projects.[60]

33. The EIB signed loans in 2011 for energy and energy-related lending of €12.8 billion. Since then, it has been decided to increase the Bank's capital by €10 billion, allowing it to spend an additional €20 billion in each of the next three years. Its priorities derive from the policy priorities of the Member States. One of the six priorities is a competitive and secure energy supply. In addition, 25% of its lending should be towards climate action, which includes renewable energy. Any coal plants financed must be capable of being retro-fitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS) (see Chapter 3 and Appendix 4). A policy consultation on the EIB's criteria for supporting fossil fuel-fired generation is currently underway, a development which was welcomed by WWF.[61]

34. Some of our witnesses considered that the EIB could make an important contribution through the new Project Bonds Initiative (see Box 2).[62] While acknowledging that this was still at an early stage, the EIB confirmed interest by a number of institutional investors, notably pension funds and insurance companies. The EIB was confident that the degree of credit enhancement available would be sufficient to take a project with a borderline investment grade[63] (such as BBB) to a higher grade, "so achieve a two to three-notch" uplift in the credit quality of those bonds. Evidence suggests that a single A rating is the "sweet spot" in terms of the balance between risk and reward for the institutions. Initial projects under the pilot phase would be limited by the relatively small amount of available Commission funding and by the requirement that projects be completed by the end of the pilot phase.[64]

BOX 2

EU Project Bonds Initiative[65]

A pilot phase (2012-13) of the Project Bonds Initiative was agreed by the European Parliament and Council in July 2012.[66] Project Bonds are private debt issued by the sponsor(s) of a project—either a private company or a 'special purpose vehicle', created by one or more companies to finance a specific project. The EU project bonds initiative will provide credit enhancement for projects in order to make it easier for their sponsor(s) to attract private financing.

The debt issued by the sponsor(s) will consist of both 'senior' and 'subordinated' tranches of debt. Initial losses will be incurred on subordinated debt and it has been decided that the EIB will take up the subordinated debt, up to the value of 20% of the senior debt. The credit standing of the senior debt is in this way enhanced because it carries less risk. The EIB's contribution will be supported by a contribution from the EU budget. In the energy sector, that will amount to a total of €10 million, from which the EIB can then raise a further €120-140 million.

If successful, the pilot phase will be followed by an operational phase during 2014-2020 under the EU's CEF at a larger scale.

35. The CEF is the EU's new instrument over the period 2014-20 to finance new energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure identified as Projects of Common Interest (PCI). At the European Council meeting of 7-8 February 2013, it was agreed that the budget for PCI in the energy sector over the period 2014-20 will be €5.1 billion. The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, the Rt Hon Mr Edward Davey MP, expressed satisfaction with this decision, though it should be noted that spending for 2014-20 might still be agreed between the Council and the European Parliament.[67] This funding will partly support the operational phase of project bonds (see Box 2), but will also support grants and other financial instruments. Several of our witnesses identified the CEF as very important, but Dr Neuhoff warned that its relatively modest size suggested that it should focus on innovative projects.[68]

36. A number of obstacles to the provision of finance were raised. The most significant of those was considered to be uncertainty over the future direction of EU energy and climate policy. According to witnesses, investment would not be forthcoming without some clarity as to what policies the EU would put in place beyond 2020.[69] Mr Zenghelis emphasised that the policy framework must also be credible to the private sector in order to ensure confidence in the framework.[70]

37. Inconsistency by governments in regard to the fiscal environment was an additional aspect of uncertainty raised by Mr Wolf.[71] The UK Government taxed oil companies making what the public considered to be excess profits when bills were also rising.[72] U-turns in Spain and Bulgaria in relation to financial support to the solar industry were other examples of governments causing financial uncertainty.[73] As a result, Mr Atherton argued that investors were now suspicious that future governments may choose to continue this destabilising practice.[74]

38. We conclude that there is a crisis of investment, which needs to be overcome if the estimated €1 trillion of investment required in the EU's energy system to 2020 is to be released. The balance sheets of utility companies have slumped. Public funding can make a small but catalytic contribution. The bulk of the financing will therefore rely on institutional investment.

39. We recommend that the Commission and Member States work urgently with investors, including pension funds, to ensure their awareness of the opportunities, to identify obstacles and to propose solutions, such as the development of instruments to allow the pooling of resources in order to mitigate risk and encourage investment. Initiatives such as the EIB's Project Bond Initiative should be appropriately financed and promoted within the investment community. The EIB has a particular role in that promotion, but responsibility falls also to the Commission and Member States.

40. It is evident to us that a clear and credible EU energy and climate change policy through to 2030 is a pre-requisite for attracting investment and must therefore be adopted as a matter of urgency. Failure to invest, or investment at high financing costs due to perceived policy risk, could push up the overall cost of energy to consumers.

Costs and pricing

41. The Commission was clear that there was growing political interest in energy prices as a factor in competitiveness, a position reflected in the Conclusions of the March 2013 European Council.[75] It has also risen to political prominence recently in light of the fall of the Bulgarian government, a consequence of high energy costs.[76]

42. Comparing the energy costs of different technologies is complex. Nevertheless, a 'levelised cost' can be established, representing the average cost over the lifetime of a plant, per megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generated. This takes into account the fact that certain technologies, such as renewable energies and nuclear, are capital intensive while others, such as coal and gas, are fuel-intensive. These calculations are based on a high degree of uncertainty but they are nevertheless helpful to illustrate potential trends between technologies. Recent levelised costs published by the UK Government are set out in Appendix 7.

43. Key uncertainties in the levelised costs include the cost of fuel and capital. The IEA found in its World Energy Outlook 2012 that fossil fuel price rises would be likely over the period to 2035 in a Business as Usual scenario, and that they would be likely to stabilise if a low carbon path is taken. Similarly, the cost of capital will depend on the cost of lending to support the investment, a particularly important concern for renewable and nuclear energy. We were told that the extremely low running costs of nuclear and renewable energy mean that, in short-run competitive markets, they can induce periods of very low wholesale energy prices when the output from low carbon sources is sufficient to meet all electricity demand. This is known as the merit order effect.[77] Whilst an attractive proposition for consumers, this in turn risks undermining the investment case.[78]

44. It was clear from our evidence that costs evolve with innovation and industrial development, as illustrated dramatically by the swift expansion of shale gas exploitation in the US (see paragraphs 8 and 73). US gas prices dropped from a June 2008 high of $12.69 per million BTUs[79] to a low of $1.95 in April 2012, and had risen to $3.33 by February 2013.[80] We heard from BNEF that industrial development has led to a 50% reduction in solar photovoltaic costs over the last three years. The offshore wind industry is confident that it can reach a levelised cost of £100 per MWh (see paragraph 42 above) for projects contracting in 2020, from a price of around £130-140 per MWh at current prices. That objective assumes further technological development and the creation of a stable market and regulatory environment.[81]

45. Some witnesses considered that, while the internal market was containing prices, bills were likely to rise, at least in the short-term. The extent of that rise would be dependent on a range of factors, including energy mix, but particularly on the ability to attract low cost investment into the energy system and on levels of energy efficiency. Sir Donald Miller warned of consumer bill rises of up to 58% by 2020 if no changes were made to energy policy.[82] Statistics on energy prices across the EU are only available until the second half of 2011 (see Appendix 8). They demonstrate that prices paid by industrial customers were significantly lower than those paid by domestic customers, a point highlighted to us by Mr Froggatt in relation to Germany.[83] The levels of taxes applied had a significant impact on the differences between Member States.

46. All of the Commission's Energy Roadmap 2050 scenarios involve a substantial move towards renewable energy. It is therefore interesting to assess the German experience, as Germany is already moving in that direction. Germany subsidises producers of renewable energy such as solar and wind power in part by imposing a supplement on household electricity bills. As the industry has grown, demand for the subsidy has increased, driving the surcharge up. In January 2013, the surcharge, which amounts to about 14% of electricity prices, almost doubled to €5.28 per kilowatt hour (KWh). The German government has proposed to put a cap on this surcharge until the end of 2014 and then restrict any rise in the surcharge after that to no more than 2.5% a year. It also plans to tighten exemptions, which would force more companies to pay the surcharge, thus helping to balance out the burden between industry and consumers.[84] Dr Neuhoff explained that, in 2013, German consumers "will pay on average about 2.5% of their expenditure bill for their power", compared to an average expenditure of 2.3% for power in the mid-1980s.[85]

47. In examining the extent to which industrial and consumer bills may need to rise, we noted that fossil fuel and network costs still account for the great majority of the electricity price in almost all Member States (see Appendix 8). This demonstrates that the price of the commodity affects the majority of the bill, with the remainder consisting of costs to cover distribution, transmission, storage and margin. If, therefore, surcharges were to be applied to bills to cover the costs of a transition to greater renewable energy or development of CCS, its impact would be small compared to the impact of changes in commodity prices. A number of witnesses emphasised that a move towards low carbon generation and away from volatile fossil fuels could certainly stabilise bills rather than force increases,[86] particularly if the costs of extraction of fossil fuels rose dramatically in future years.[87] WWF cited a study by Oxford Economics for the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), which found that the impact on UK economic output from fossil fuel price shocks could be reduced by around 60% in 2050 through the introduction of climate policies, such as a greater focus on energy efficiency and the large-scale deployment of renewable energy.[88]

48. The risk of fuel poverty[89] as a result of rising energy bills was explored with some witnesses. The Commission was clear that the issue "fully justifies" Member State intervention. Indeed, EU internal energy market legislation allows Member States to define vulnerable groups of consumers and to regulate prices for those consumers. Several witnesses pointed to energy efficiency as an important part of the solution to fuel poverty.[90] In its Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission noted that specific measures needed to be defined at national and local levels to avoid energy poverty. One such example was that of Flanders, where consumers unable to pay their energy bills are supplied by the energy distributors on the basis of an agreed payment plan.[91]

49. Energy pricing is, rightly, attracting attention as a factor of competitiveness and affordable energy should certainly be a goal of policy makers. The impact of the required energy transformation on retail bills, for industry and consumers, is uncertain. Ultimately, retail bills depend on a combination of taxation, energy efficiency and, most significantly, potentially volatile energy costs driven by business cycles and uncertainty. Policy makers cannot totally control volatility but their actions can mitigate its impact. We consider that bills are more likely to increase long-term if delays in developing a clear policy framework fail to ensure adequate and timely investment, including and particularly relating to low carbon sources which do not depend on global fossil fuel markets.

50. Failure to stabilise bills could provoke a serious political backlash. This underlines the need for governments and energy suppliers to convey a transparent and credible narrative to their consumers about the objectives of energy policy. As recommended by the Commission, specific measures must be defined at national and local levels to tackle fuel poverty.

20 1 trillion=1,000,000,000,000 Back

21 COM(2010) 639 Back

22 Q 57, Q 178, Q 194, Q 211, DECC Back

23 Q 94, Q 176 Back

24 QQ 206-207, Professor David Newbery Back

25 Q 265 Back

26 Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, December 2010 Back

27 COM(2013) 150 Back

28 Q 179, Q 236 Back

29 Q 305 Back

30 Q 189, Q 192 Back

31 Q 64, Q 182, EESC, SEC(2011) 1565 Back