Conclusions and Recommendations
68. Containment of piracy has to remain the primary
aim of the current mandate of Operation Atalanta. Nonetheless,
elimination must be the longer term goal. This can be achieved
only through the stabilisation of Somalia. The new EU Horn of
Africa strategy and its CSDP missions are a welcome, but modest,
step towards that goal. (Paragraph 11)
69. We welcome the growing involvement of African
institutions, such as the African Union (AU), in the resolution
of regional issues and we call on the EU, through its Head of
Mission and Special Representative, to continue to build a strong
relationship with the AU. (Paragraph 12)
70. It is widely recognised that Operation Atalanta
has been a success, but under current political conditions in
Somalia, any reduction in effort will quickly result in a renewed
upsurge of pirate activity. There is therefore a need for sustained
commitment by the EU. (Paragraph 19)
71. The mandate of Operation Atalanta should
be extended beyond December 2014. This would send a clear signal
to those organisations and individuals that organise piracy that
the EU will not walk away from confronting piracy in the Indian
Ocean. (Paragraph 20)
72. Despite the evidence we received recommending
that Operation Atalanta should undertake greater protection of
Somali fishery grounds, we do not believe that the mission can
undertake this additional role as well as protecting shipping.
This task should be taken up by another organisation. (Paragraph
21)
73. Although most of the Committee's previous
concerns about capability shortfalls have been addressed, problems
remain about the Operation's ability to conduct surveillance over
such a vast area, given that the piracy has spread so far into
the Indian Ocean. We commend in particular the role of the Seychelles
in making that broad operational cover far more effective than
when we published our earlier report. (Paragraph 22)
74. However, the speed with which intelligence
gathered in operational centres is transmitted to interested parties
is a problem. This must be remedied. (Paragraph 23)
75. We note with satisfaction the high degree
of practical cooperation which has evolved since our last report
between the very varied international anti-piracy operations and
national navies in the Indian Ocean. This includes Russia, China
and India. (Paragraph 24)
76. We welcome also the strong spirit of practical
cooperation between different international operations located
in operational centres such as the Seychelles. This should act
as a model for military cooperation in other theatres, especially
EU-NATO cooperation. (Paragraph 25)
77. Given the appreciation of the UK's leadership
of this naval operation we recommend strongly that the Government
should continue in this role at the next review. UK leadership
of Atalanta is effective and it brings credit to the UK. (Paragraph
27)
78. It would be desirable for the UK to increase
its contribution of vessels to Operation Atalanta. However, we
recognise the financial constraints and consider that its command
role is a compensation for its limited contribution of vessels.
(Paragraph 28)
79. We welcome the EU Atalanta attack on the
pirate land base as an effective demonstration to the pirates
that they are not invulnerable on land. (Paragraph 32)
80. We have revised our view on the carriage
of armed guards on ships in the light of the fact that no ships
carrying armed guards have so far been successfully pirated and
violence has apparently not escalated. We now believe that this
practice should continue, provided that the guards are properly
trained to a high standard to avoid accidental injury to innocent
seafarers, and accredited. The Government and the EU High Representative
should so advise all EU Member States. (Paragraph 38)
81. The programme of agreements for judicial
process with countries of the region has been successfully initiated,
but now needs to be pursued vigorously. The Seychelles appears
so far to be bearing a heavier burden than other countries and
steps should be taken to ease the pressure on the Seychelles.
(Paragraph 47)
82. We have some doubts about the wisdom of transferring
sentenced pirates back to Somalia. This policy should be pursued
with caution, ensuring that all pirate prisons are staffed by
personnel who are properly trained and equipped to prevent breakouts.
The EU should work with the UN to monitor these prisons. (Paragraph
48)
83. We have concerns about the difference in
quality between UN constructed pirate prisons and local prisons,
which must lead to problems for the countries concerned, but we
see no way of avoiding the problem as the international community
is unlikely in the foreseeable future to pay to upgrade all the
prisons in the countries affected. (Paragraph 49)
84. We accept fully that imprisonment should
be seen as a very real deterrent but the agencies involved should
introduce some measure of rehabilitation for those convicted for
piracy, particularly for younger prisoners. (Paragraph 50)
85. We reiterate our previous conclusion in our
2009 report that those involved in assembling ransoms in the United
Kingdom have a duty to seek consent for its payment and that not
to do so, if necessary by filing a Suspicious Activity Report,
may result in the commission of a criminal offence. We request
that the Government now respond substantively to this recommendation.
(Paragraph 51)
86. We welcome the involvement of China in countering
piracy off the Horn of Africa as evidence of their increasing
cooperation with the international community. (Paragraph 54)
87. We believe that a greater effort should be
made to involve the Gulf States in solving the problems of both
piracy and the situation in Somalia, given their close links with
Somalia and their evident interest in keeping the shipping lanes
clear. (Paragraph 55)
88. We commend the High Representative's efforts
to formulate a comprehensive plan for the EU's activity in the
Horn of Africa by encompassing all the EU's activity under the
Strategy for the Horn of Africa. (Paragraph 59)
89. The EU's Training Mission for Somali security
forces in Uganda (EUTM Somalia) has produced useful results and
should be continued. The EU should pay attention to the retention
of these forces with continuing stipends for those who have been
trained. (Paragraph 60)
90. The aim of the new EUCAP Nestor mission to
improve the capabilities of the coastal states of East Africa
will be one of the most significant developments in combating
piracy from the land. It should be built up to strength as soon
as possible and supported in its development. EUCAP Nestor could
and should be the gateway to a permanent solution to Somali piracy.
(Paragraph 61)
91. The EU's development aid will continue to
be necessary for the foreseeable future. It should focus on providing
alternative livelihoods for the Somali people to assist with reducing
the need felt by some Somalis to resort to piracy. It should also
aim to develop Somali capacity, thereby reducing aid dependency
in the longer term. (Paragraph 66)
92. We commend the support given by the EU to
AMISOM, which is aiming to remove the threat of Al Shabaab and
improve the security of the Somali people. (Paragraph 67)
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