Women on Boards - European Union Committee Contents


Chapter 7: Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

147.  The case for pursuing a greater representation of women on boards is an overwhelming one. There is a strong public interest in ensuring that opportunities are available to all, regardless of gender, that women entering the labour market are able to fulfil their potential, and that we make full use of the wealth of talented women in the United Kingdom. Importantly, there is also a clear benefit to businesses from a more diverse boardroom. A diverse board is more reflective of its customers, offers greater challenge to established thinking, and demonstrates to staff that an organisation is committed to developing all of its talent regardless of gender. We support the Government's engagement with this agenda and urge that it continues. (paragraph 21)

148.  It is important that the case for action is made to businesses in a strong and positive manner. However, this case must also be intellectually defensible. Thus far, though we are convinced of the beneficial behavioural and social impacts of a more diverse board, we are not convinced by the evidence put forward for a direct link between gender diversity and financial indicators of business performance. Unless further research bears out the assertion as to financial benefit, such a claim should be discarded and the case for action made on the other compelling grounds identified. (paragraph 22)

149.  Gender equality in the labour market is a core objective of the European Union and is embedded within its Treaties. It is therefore proper for the EU to play its part in improving the representation of women on boards. The Commission should be bold in showing leadership on the issue and in maintaining the high profile of the issue across Member States. (paragraph 33)

150.  The Commission should be prepared to act where it can drive the agenda forward more effectively than Member States acting alone. Although we acknowledge that there are arguments that can be made concerning subsidiarity and the proportionality of EU action, the EU does have competence to take some form of action in this sphere. The better course for those with concerns is to engage pragmatically with any proposals from the Commission rather than simply asserting that the EU has no power to act. (paragraph 34)

151.  The ultimate aim is for women to be represented at senior levels in terms broadly proportionate to their levels of participation in the labour market. This would be a clear signal that opportunities are available fairly to both sexes. The best way to assess the achievement of this goal, in terms of board appointments, is to assess the rate of increase in the number of women on boards over time and its sustainability. However, we accept that broader targets for female board memberships can help to ensure engagement with the issue by companies and policymakers and thus we support their use. (paragraph 42)

152.  The best target to use is that 30 per cent of board memberships should be held by women, the "critical mass" level identified as a catalyst for cultural change in the boardroom. This would stretch governments and companies to deliver sustainable change, whilst remaining achievable in the present climate. At a national level, the Government should institute a 30 per cent target to be reached by 2017, whilst striving to achieve a 30 per cent level of representation as early as possible. In Europe, the Commission should adjust its 40 per cent target for 2020 downwards to 30 per cent, whether in binding or voluntary proposals in this area. In both cases, judgment against the target set should be informed as much by the rate of change and the context of action as by the raw data of representation levels, with proper account taken of meaningful progress in Member States and companies starting from lower bases. (paragraph 43)

153.  We oppose the use of quotas to increase the representation of women on boards, except as an option of last resort. Though able to achieve statistical change, quotas do not address the underlying cause of gender inequality: the lack of progression of a consistent stream of women into senior positions. A quota would also be unpopular with many of the women it would seek to help, and would risk fostering the perception—though entirely incorrect—that women on boards were not there by merit. A voluntary, business-led approach is the better vehicle for long-lasting change. However, if the business community is not able to put its own house in order and deliver sustainable change, quotas are a legitimate final option to redress the present gender imbalance on boards, including at European level as far as EU law allows. (paragraph 70)

154.  In the past there has been an endemic failure to address gender inequality on boards. Since 2010, though, following the work of Vice-President Reding in Europe and Lord Davies of Abersoch in the United Kingdom, the issue of gender diversity has been placed high on the political agenda, and businesses have taken significant steps to improve the situation. We commend these developments. We acknowledge that progress has been variable across Europe, with some Member States moving backwards. However, there has been a clear and encouraging improvement in the number of female board members in the EU as a whole and particularly in the United Kingdom. We are therefore not convinced that self-regulatory efforts have been shown to be beyond repair. This is particularly so when too little time has elapsed to assess fully the impact of quotas in Member States, such as France and Italy, which have been instituted in the intervening period. (paragraph 71)

155.  So, whilst Member States are free to pursue quotas nationally, the case has not been made for an EU-wide measure and we urge the Commission to refrain from introducing any proposal that would seek to institute quotas. To take legislation forward would jeopardise self-regulatory efforts in countries, like the United Kingdom, where business communities are strongly opposed to quotas, and would undermine the goodwill accrued as a result of EU leadership on the issue so far. We would also have to consider carefully the adherence of any legislation to the principle of subsidiarity, in the light of the extensive efforts made domestically, and would urge the Government to oppose any such measure strongly. (paragraph 72)

156.  Instead of a quota Directive, the Commission should issue a non-binding Recommendation to Member States that urges strong action to address gender diversity on boards. The Recommendation should outline a range of recommended policy developments and a voluntary target of 30 per cent of EU board posts being held by women five years after it is issued. The Commission should review progress against this Recommendation after three and then five years. Goodwill towards self-regulation is not, and should not be, unlimited. Should there be a clear failure to address gender inequalities on corporate boards, the Commission should reserve the right to legislate on the issue at either stage. This would put the Commission in a stronger position in future negotiations and would allow Member States to demonstrate the effectiveness of other options. (paragraph 73)

157.  Robust EU-wide information is essential to assessing progress made by companies in addressing issues of gender inequality in the labour market; it must be collected more comprehensively and rigorously than it is today. The Commission should, in any legislation it introduces, require companies to report on the proportion of women at every level of their workforce. Data should be collected at a national level by each Member State. (paragraph 81)

158.  At a minimum, companies should be required to report on the number of women on the board, in executive positions and in the organisation as a whole. In the United Kingdom, we support the Government's proposals to introduce such reporting standards in October 2013 for large and medium-sized companies, to ensure that as much of this data is available as soon as possible. (paragraph 82)

159.  These figures should be monitored on an annual basis by the Commission, to determine whether sustained progress is being made and to inform possible policy responses. The information should be used by policymakers and the media to identify and promote examples of best practice, as well as to draw attention to poor performers. (paragraph 83)

160.  Governments should be scrutinised for their actions to improve gender diversity in the labour market, to keep up the pressure for change. Comparing the actions taken in different Member States enhances this scrutiny and offers the possibility of exchanging best practice. The Commission should therefore expand its reporting work on women's involvement in economic decision-making in a style similar to the reporting process in the European Semester economic programme. In short, Member States should provide more detailed policy information and statistics on progress made in improving gender diversity, and the Commission in turn should provide individual national and comparative European analysis on the work being done. Such assessments should then be brought within formal national parliament scrutiny processes and form part of the evidence base when considering the future case for any legislative action in this sphere. This would establish a rigorous and accountable assessment framework at all levels. (paragraph 87)

161.  The Commission should also be bold in taking action to promote gender diversity through changes to corporate governance rules. Action would demonstrate leadership, foster EU-wide engagement, and ensure that accountability on improving gender diversity is at the heart of corporate scrutiny across the EU. It would also enable companies to understand better what was expected of them, minimising variation in reporting standards and compliance costs. (paragraph 99)

162.  We recommend that the "comply or explain" approach to gender diversity policy, as used in a number of Member States and bolstered in the United Kingdom Corporate Governance Code in October 2012, be seen as a good practice example for reference. The Commission should consider including an analogous system by amendment into the draft consolidated Directive on accounting standards currently making its way through the ordinary legislative procedure. If this is not possible, separate legislation should be introduced. (paragraph 100)

163.  This reporting system should require that each listed company disclose, in its annual report, the measures that it has taken on diversity, as well as to report on the balance of its board, taking into account gender diversity in both instances. Furthermore, companies should be encouraged to set non-binding targets for female representation and to report on progress against these objectives where they have been set. This would establish a strong governance regime with the means to allow effective scrutiny by shareholders, the media and policymakers alike, without interfering unnecessarily in national governance structures. (paragraph 101)

164.  A more accountable corporate governance regime for companies must be allied to a more engaged approach by shareholders than we see at present. In this respect, we welcome the establishment of a Stewardship Code in the United Kingdom. We also welcome the efforts made thus far in the institutional investor community, such as the establishment of clear voting policies based upon gender diversity. The Government should foster these developments alongside their work with the companies themselves. (paragraph 109)

165.  Those institutional investors often have portfolios that extend well beyond a single country, indicating a possible role for the EU in encouraging best practice. We recommend that the Commission explores, in its forthcoming Communication on company law and corporate governance, how to improve the engagement of shareholders across the EU. Such efforts should be on a voluntary footing, based on the principles of transparency, engagement and accountability that also underpin the Stewardship Code in the United Kingdom. This should be taken forward in conjunction with the Institutional Investor Committee and other European investor associations. We urge the Government to support such efforts. (paragraph 110)

166.  Executive search firms play an important role in the process of board appointments in the United Kingdom, and markets for their services are emerging elsewhere in the EU. We welcome the establishment of a voluntary code of conduct in the United Kingdom. It strives for a greater degree of transparency and rigour in a process that is too often narrow and opaque, and sets out key principles of merit-based, open and fair recruitment. It is right that this is being taken forward on a voluntary basis at present. Search firms, and the boards who hire them, should be given the opportunity to demonstrate their engagement with gender diversity before any formal intervention is considered. (paragraph 122)

167.  We consider, though, that there should be a more widespread code. To start, the principles of the United Kingdom code could be implemented on a voluntary basis across the EU. Any code should encompass firms in emerging markets as well as United Kingdom firms placing candidates on boards in other Member States. We support the work of the Association of Executive Search Consultants in rolling out a code across its partners in Europe; the Government and the Commission should support this work as a priority. (paragraph 123)

168.  The Government and the Commission should also work with the executive search community to seek to strengthen the provisions of the existing code to ensure that it is a robust guide to best practice. We recommend that the code be amended to include a more detailed statement of what constitutes an intrinsic characteristic, encouraging companies to look beyond the subjective "fit" of a candidate for a board position. It should also include a requirement for firms to report on the numbers and percentages of female candidates making the transition from longlists to shortlists. If the results of such reporting are not satisfactory over the course of the next three years, the Government and the Commission should work with the search community to amend the code to introduce a requirement for there to be a specified percentage of female candidates on shortlists, on a "comply or explain" basis, to ensure that change is sustained. (paragraph 124)

169.  It is imperative through all of this work to develop a sustainable supply of talented women who are ready and able to take on board positions. Training, mentoring, networking and visible databases of female board candidates all help to boost confidence and ensure that capable women are not ignored. These efforts are central to improving the participation of women in executive board roles and in the highest levels of management, where there are such stark imbalances at present, and to improving gender diversity in the boardroom on a sustainable basis. (paragraph 143)

170.  The development of this supply should be led by the business community. This ensures that businesses are engaged and able to see the benefits of the work, furthering their commitment to the agenda. The Government should use their influence to support the expansion of the best initiatives that emerge, such as the FTSE 100 Cross-Company Mentoring Programme, filling gaps in funding where appropriate. They should also work with the Cranfield School of Management to expand its database of talented women to encompass a wider span of female managers and sectors. We do not propose a particular form. (paragraph 144)

171.  The Commission should respect this voluntary approach and focus on highlighting best practice. The best vehicle for these efforts is through its existing, excellent work on women in economic decision-making. The Commission's role would be enhanced if this work was expanded, as we recommend elsewhere (see paragraph 160). In particular, the Commission should use its influence to develop initiatives that operate on a pan-European basis, such as the European Roundtable of Industrialists' database of female talent. (paragraph 145)

172.  Developing a sustainable supply of female talent may also require broader cultural reform of working practices. A detailed consideration of such changes is beyond our remit. Nevertheless, we welcome the broad focus at both national and European level on these important issues, as part of a sustained effort to deliver a more equal and effective world of business. (paragraph 146)



 
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