APPENDIX 5: THE PROVISIONS OF THE ECB
REGULATION[208]
· The conferral on the ECB of specific tasks
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions.
· All Euro area credit institutions regardless
of size or business model would be included. The ECB would therefore
have prudential supervisory responsibilities for the 6000 or so
deposit-taking banks located in the euro area.
· The ECB would have 'exclusive competence'
for a list of prudential supervisory tasks:
o the authorisation and licensing of credit institutions;
o the assessment of acquisitions and disposals
of holdings in credit institutions;
o ensuring compliance with EU capital, liquidity
and related requirements and, in cases specifically set out in
Union acts, setting higher or additional requirements;
o applying capital buffers, including setting
countercyclical buffer rates and other measures aimed at addressing
systemic or macro-prudential risks;
o overseeing robust and sound internal governance,
internal assessment and risk management arrangements, strategies,
processes and mechanisms;
o carrying out supervisory stress tests;
o carrying out consolidated supervision over
credit institutions' parents established in participating Member
States;
o participating in consolidated supervision in
relation to parents not established in a participating Member
State;
o participating in supplementary supervision
of financial conglomerates;
o early intervention in a credit institution
that did not meet or was likely to breach prudential requirements,
in coordination with relevant resolution authorities;
o coordinating and expressing a common position
of the competent authorities of participating Member States in
EBA decision-making contexts for issues relating to the tasks
conferred on the ECB;
o performing host state supervisory responsibilities
in relation to euro area branches of credit institutions established
in non-participating Member States.
· The ECB would be equipped with supervisory
and investigatory powers for the purposes of carrying out the
tasks conferred on it. The ECB would also have the power to impose
administrative financial sanctions. The ECB would have the same
rights and obligations as national competent authorities under
EU law with respect to the exchange of information.
· Pending the conferral of resolution powers
on a European body, the ECB would be expected to coordinate
with national authorities to ensure a common understanding about
respective responsibilities in a crisis.
· The ECB and the national competent authorities
(i.e. bank prudential supervisors) would together form the Single
Supervisory Mechanism.
· National competent authorities would remain
responsible for supervisory tasks that were not transferred to
the ECB.
· National competent authorities would be
required to assist the ECB in the areas in which it would have
exclusive competence and must comply with the ECB's instructions.
It would be for the ECB to define the framework and conditions
under which prudential supervision was conducted at a national
level. The ECB could arrange for the exchange and secondment of
staff.
· The ECB could levy proportionate fees
on credit institutions.
· The ECB would be required to budget separately
for the carrying out of supervisory tasks.
· The objectives that the ECB would be required
to pursue in carrying out its supervisory tasks would be the promotion
of the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability
of the financial system, with due regard for the unity and integrity
of the single market.
· The ECB would be required to ensure due
separation between the supervisory and monetary policy functions.
An ECB Supervisory Board would be set up to achieve separation.
The membership of the Supervisory Board would comprise representatives
of the ECB and of the national competent authorities. The Supervisory
Board would be responsible for planning and executing the supervisory
tasks conferred on the ECB. The Governing Council of the ECB might
delegate to the Supervisory Board clearly defined supervisory
tasks and related decisions about an individual institution or
set of institutions. Subject to this possibility of limited delegation,
the Governing Council would be ultimately responsible for decision-making
with respect to supervision.
· The ECB would be required to act independently
in carrying out the tasks conferred on it. It would be accountable
to the European Parliament and to the Council, and would be required
to report annually to the Parliament, the Council, the Commission
and the Eurogroup. The Chair of the Supervisory Board could be
required to appear before relevant Committees of the European
Parliament. The ECB would be required to answer questions put
to it by the European Parliament or the Eurogroup.
· A non-participating Member State and the
ECB could enter into 'close cooperation'. The Member State would
be required to meet certain conditions, including undertaking
to abide by and implement relevant ECB acts. When a close cooperation
arrangement was in place, the ECB would be required to carry out
its supervisory tasks in relation to credit institutions established
in that Member State. A representative of the relevant Member
State's competent authority would be entitled to take part in
the activities of the ECB Supervisory Board.
208 COM (2012) 511, op. cit. See EMs 13682/12,
13683/12 and 13854/12, op. cit. Back
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