Media plurality
Chapter 1: Introductionthe case
for a media plurality policy
What is media plurality?
1. The call to define, or at least describe,
media plurality elicited the strongest consensus we encountered
in this inquiry.[1] The
clearest expression of its generally accepted meaning came from
Ofcom:
- "Plurality is not a goal
in itself but a means to an end
a well-functioning democratic
society."[2]
- "Plurality contributes to a well-functioning
democratic society through the means of:
(a) Informed citizensable to access and
consume a wide range of viewpoints across a variety of platforms
and media owners.
(b) Preventing too much influence over the political
processexercised by any one media owner."[3]
2. The existence of a strong consensus around
this description came as no surprise; a number of prominent publications
have remarked on it before:
"There is no definition of media plurality
in statute; however, in advice to the Department in 2012, Ofcom
provided a useful definition of the desired outcomes of a plural
market
Lord Justice Leveson noted in his report that this
approach to both the diversity of views available and the influence
wielded seems to be generally accepted."[4]
3. We add our voice to this consensus: the twin
elements of Ofcom's formulation both represent important "desired
outcomes of a plural market."[5]
They describe what plurality is for and by doing so define plurality
as the state of the media which successfully brings these outcomes
about.
The case for a plurality policy
4. A less clear-cut matter than finding an agreed
description of media plurality is the question: why do we need
a media plurality policy at all? Curiously, this is less clear-cut
not because it was an area of significant dispute between witnesses
but rather the opposite: the answer appears to be taken largely
for granted: yes, a policy is required and all that remains is
to determine what that policy should be. We agree on the need
for a media plurality policy, but we also think that the basic
case for onein the most general terms, rather than for
a specific proposalshould be made at the outset. This has
proved a more difficult task than we imagined.
5. The definition of the problem naturally frames
the range of credible solutions. Ofcom's description contains
two different but related outcomes of media plurality. If the
case for reform rests more heavily on one than the other, this
will have an effect on the relevance of any solution. For example,
if the purpose of a media plurality policy were defined in terms
of preventing too much influence over the political process, then
the solution could include measures designed to rein in democratic
imbalances of power and access in the most general sense. Alternatively,
if its purpose were defined in terms of the ability of citizens
to access and consume a wide range of viewpoints, then the focus
is more likely to be on the way the industry's regulatory framework
can stimulate the availability of diverse editorial voice. The
hierarchy of these two elements must clearly be set. Accordingly,
across chapters 2-4, we explore each approach to media plurality
policy put to us in evidence together with its version of the
case for one.
6. Having said that, there are one or two preliminary
points to be made about the case for a media plurality policy
which are neutral with respect to the approach any policy might
take. These arise from considering the implications of having
no plurality policy at all: what would its absence mean in practice?
7. First, there is a regulatory context to media
plurality policy which we do not, generally speaking, regard as
being part of plurality policy itself,[6]
e.g.:
· Broadcast
standards including due impartiality;
· Positive
obligations on PSBs, e.g. to show an appropriate amount of national,
international and regional news; and
· Restrictions
on TV/radio licences being granted to particular types of person
whose influence might cause concern, e.g. advertising agencies.
8. The case for these interventions does not
rest solely on their effect on media plurality. Indeed, the only
provisions which are very specifically an implementation of a
media plurality policy are the "20/20 rule"[7]
and the Public Interest Test.[8]
Both of these provisions relate to media ownership. As such, not
having these provisions would allow shifts in media ownership
to proceed unchallenged, other than by the normal processes for
assessing their impact on competition by the competition authorities.
9. This prompts a more precise question: would
it matter if there were no policy on media plurality such that
decisions on media ownership were made strictly on competition
grounds? To this, our emphatic answer is: yes. There is a fundamental
difference between the interests of competition and the consumer
on the one hand, and the interests of the citizen and media plurality
on the other; in matters of media ownership, both need to be considered.
Robin Foster explained this point:
"Plurality is not the same thing as competition,
although they are linked. Competition law helps protect the economic
interests of individuals as consumers and acts to secure a reasonable
level of choice and value in any commercial market. Insofar as
competition law can prevent the emergence of monopolies, it will
also have some positive effect on plurality. Society as whole,
however, may take the view that the outcome of a competitive market
does not fully serve the interests of individuals as citizens.
For example, markets might provide high quality news to only the
most commercially attractive segments of a population, society
would prefer all to benefit. Markets might focus only on the most
popular types of news; society would like a much deeper and more
diverse range of news and views to be widely available, reflecting
minority as well as majority viewpoints. Markets might tend towards
an oligopolistic structure (with only a few big suppliers) while
society would prefer a larger number of different suppliers"[9]
10. Professor Martin Cave helped explain
these differences further:
"Plurality is basically a social and collective
goal
That means that, as with many collective endeavours,
the definition of the goal and the metrics for the goal have to
be set top-down
I interpret competition policy as being
essentially an individualistic analysis. What we are trying
to do is take the customer
and try to ensure that that
customer is able to exercise, without constraint, their own choices
as to what they consume. We are not really interested so much
in the outcome of what they consume; we are interested more in
the ability of the customer to be able to make choices in a way
that constrains firms from raising their prices. That is fundamentally
it
But when somebody is trying to achieve pluralistic objectives
they may observe a situation, for example, in which people
make consumption decisions of their own free will and without
any presence of market power, but the outcome turns out to be
very unpluralistic. For example, suppose everybody chose to read
the same newspaper. That would be, in competition terms, in the
absence of market power and in the absence of any kind of abusive
behaviour, quite a satisfactory outcome
It is the best
newspaper so people buy it. But in terms of achieving the objective
for pluralism, which is to ensure that a broad range of opinions
are consumed and that no proprietor or owner is in a position
to exercise power by virtue of his or her capacity to determine
what is in those newspapers, that objective will not be achieved."[10]
11. Competition and plurality policy are clearly
separate but parallel policies, and one way this can be seen is
in outcomes which would be satisfactory in a competition assessment
but unsatisfactory in a plurality assessment, or vice versa. Therefore,
without prejudice to any particular solution, a case can clearly
be made for a media plurality policy in the most general sense.
This rests on the unsatisfactory situation from a civic perspective
which would arise in the absence of such a policy, with decisions
on media ownership made solely on competition grounds.
12. In the following three chapters we analyse
the proposals which we received on plurality policy. In chapter
2 we consider different ways to define its scope. In chapter 3
we evaluate various models for how to approach assessment and
intervention and in chapter 4 we assess different ways to allocate
institutional responsibility for any decision. In chapter 5 we
set out our own proposal on media plurality policy, including
a set of principles and mechanisms which will be fundamental to
the Government's current and ongoing work. A description of the
existing arrangements for media plurality is contained in Appendix
4.
Acknowledgments
13. We would like to thank everyone who gave
evidence to us, both at oral evidence sessions, which we held
between June and November 2013, and in writing.[11]
We also wish to thank our Specialist Adviser, Tim Suter, whose
expertise greatly enhanced our work.
1 It would be remiss, however, not to mention that
this consensus was not universal. Some witnesses claimed that
Ofcom's description should explicitly embrace social and cultural
dimensions of plurality as well as the democratic one. We turn
to this question which relates to the scope of media plurality
policy in the following chapter, Scope. Back
2
Ofcom. Back
3
Ibid. Back
4
Department for Culture, Media and Sport: Media Ownership and
Plurality Consultation, July 2013. Available online:https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225790/
Media_Plurality_Consultation_2013.pdf Back
5
Ofcom, 6 June 2012. Measuring media plurality: Ofcom's advice
to the Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport.
Available online:
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/measuring-plurality/statement/statement.pdf Back
6
Further detail on the regulatory context to media plurality can
be found in Appendix 4. Back
7
This prohibits a newspaper group with more than 20% of national
newspaper share from holding a Channel 3 licence or a stake in
a Channel 3 licensee that is greater than 20%. The restrictions
apply to both licensees/newspaper owners and persons controlling
licensees/newspaper owners, the participation threshold being
20%. Back
8
Enterprise Act 2002, section 58(2B) and (2C)(a). Back
9
Robin Foster. Back
10
Q 288. Back
11
See Appendix 2 for a list of all those who submitted evidence. Back
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