Chapter 5: Our proposal on media plurality
policy
194. In the previous chapters, we set out our
analysis of the different models proposed in evidence for the
scope, approach and decision-making arrangements of a plurality
policy. In this chapter, we put forward our own view on the best
way to proceed.
Overview
195. In overview, our proposal is for a framework
of two key elements. The first, which is new and similar to Ofcom's
proposal, is the undertaking of a plurality review on a predictable
periodic basis, which should set the context for the second: a
significant modification of the existing arrangements for a review
of specific transactions which occur in the interval between one
periodic review and the next.
The periodic plurality review
196. The centre-piece of our approach is that
the Government should introduce a statutory periodic review of
the plurality of the media markets to be undertaken by Ofcom on
a 4-5 yearly basis, which will reshape the role for Government,
Parliament, regulator and competition authorities in protecting
the public interest.
197. This approach is uniquely able to live up
to the principle, stated in Chapter 3, that the assessment of
plurality should drive the decision about which remedy or intervention
is appropriate, not the other way around. Other approaches put
to us were unable to meet this principle. For example, consider
intervention based on statutory caps or on a hybrid model incorporating
caps. It is inherent to these approaches that the decision about
which remedy or intervention is appropriate (for its proponents,
a cap) drives the way in which plurality should be assessed (an
arbitrary and potentially misleading single metric in whose terms
the level of the cap has to be set). In such approaches, the decision
about how to assess plurality is hamstrung by a commitment to
a particular intervention.
198. The scope of periodic reviews should be
as described in the chapter on Scope, summarised in the box below:
Box 2
Recap of conclusions from chapter 2 on
scope
| Periodic plurality reviews …
· should be able to take into account media enterprises based in the UK as well as those outside UK jurisdiction to the extent that they are consumed by UK audiences if this is considered relevant to the overall assessment;
· should encompass both local and regional media as well as national media in the devolved nations and UK-wide media enterprises.
· should be limited to the activities of media enterprises engaged in news and current affairs content.
· should not be limited by the media channel through which content is primarily delivered: print, broadcast and content delivered over the internet may all be relevant, as could be the influence of digital intermediaries on the consumption of this content It should, therefore, be open to an assessment of plurality to determine which media channels should be in scope based on whether they are relevant to the overall assessment of plurality at the time.
· should take into account both the supply and consumption of content
· should be flexible enough to take into account both the wholesale and retail provision of news and current affairs content. It should establish an approach to determining how to attribute content to media enterprises operating at different points in the value chain. This determination will require the location of editorial control in the value chain to be identified in each case.
|
199. Ofcom's periodic assessment of plurality should be
based on a limited number of different measures which address
availability, consumption and impact.
200. There should be a role for Parliament
in setting guidance for this new framework of assessment, but
the metrics themselves to be used in assessing plurality should
not be set down in statute. Instead, there should be flexibility
for Ofcom to interpret statutory guidance, design the assessment
framework and select appropriate metrics according to the circumstances
at the time of the review, but with an emphasis, wherever possible,
on longitudinal consistency of the measures applied.
201. The Government's stated intention, in their
recent consultation on Media Ownership and Plurality, is to "commission
the development of a clear measurement framework, to be worked
up in partnership with industry."[195]
The Minister clarified the potential risk, however, of setting
this in stone while also recognising the need for market certainty:
"As you quite rightly say, a set of measurement
frameworks put together in 2014 may not be adequate even in 2016
or 2015, given the pace of change of technology. At the same time,
I think the people working in this industry want an element of
certainty."[196]
202. We agree with the Minister's view. An important
principle for any plurality policy is that the framework of assessment
strikes a balance between providing certainty to the market as
well as flexibility to the regulator—both are important.
Flexibility is required to ensure that plurality is measured and
promoted in the way that makes sense as the media market changes
over time. It is unrealistic to expect to find a fixed measurement
framework which can adequately assess the sufficiency of plurality
as media enterprises' products and consumers' and citizens' behaviours
change. However, the work which the Government plan to commission
could very usefully inform Ofcom's decisions at the time of the
first periodic review. At that point, market certainty can be
provided by giving the responsibility to Ofcom, as far as possible,
to strive to maintain longitudinal consistency in the measures
it applies. This should not only provide the greatest possible
certainty to the market but also serve the secondary purpose of
making useful comparative analyses possible between successive
periodic reviews.
203. The work which the Government intend
to commission relating to the development of a clear measurement
framework should not seek to find a 'right way' of measuring media
plurality which can then be set in stone. Instead its output should
provide Ofcom with a starting point and input to the decisions
it will have to make, at the time of the first periodic review,
about how to design the assessment framework and select appropriate
metrics in a way most likely to balance the twin objectives of
delivering certainty to the market and sufficient flexibility
for a proper assessment of plurality at the time.
204. Ofcom should select the metrics to be
used in a plurality assessment which are most likely to assist
it, given the state of the market at the time of each periodic
review, in reaching defendable conclusions about the following:
· the
sufficiency of diversity of viewpoints available and consumed
across and within media enterprises; and
· the
extent to which any one media owner or voice may have too much
influence over public opinion and the political agenda.
205. The periodic plurality review report
should contain both a narrative assessment of the sufficiency
of plurality in specific media markets and across media; and a
clear indication of where plurality may be under threat, which
will guide the decisions over intervention in the event of any
transaction.
206. In producing the narrative description
of the degree of sufficiency of plurality, Ofcom should be able
to rely on new guidance relating to the definition of sufficient
plurality to be set down in statute. This guidance should be qualitative
and descriptive rather than quantitative and tightly prescriptive.
207. The content of this guidance should be
clearly stated in statute and might include certain key elements
such as a diverse range of independent news voices; high overall
reach and consumption with consumers actively multi-sourcing;
sufficiently low barriers to entry and competition to spur innovation;
economic sustainability and no single organisation accounting
for too large a share of the market.
208. The Government could, as part of the
next phase in their work programme on media plurality, also begin
to develop statutory guidance relating to the meaning of sufficiency
of plurality upon which Ofcom can rely in making an assessment
of plurality at the time of a periodic review.
209. For the most part, we do not expect periodic
reviews to result in any direct market intervention. Only in
the most extreme circumstances should interventions in the interests
of plurality be imposed outwith the context of a transaction.
210. Not to respect this principle would create
a risk of retrospectively penalising acquisitions and other past
decisions made by media enterprises on an entirely legitimate
basis. However, there is nonetheless a clearly identified need
to correct the absence in the current arrangements of a mechanism
to defend against severe plurality concerns which can arise through
organic growth, entirely outside the context of transactions.
211. Where immediate and pressing concerns
resulting from organic change are discovered in a periodic review,
it should be possible for Ofcom to order a media enterprise to
divest. The bar for this imposition should be high and hinge on
a demonstration of the following:
· That
there is a real problem now;
· That
the specific proposed divestment measure is the only way to remedy
the problem;
· That
the specific proposed divestment measure will be effective in
remedying the problem.
212. Before making the recommendation that
a media enterprise should be ordered to divest, Ofcom must ask
those players affected to submit representations, in which they
can put forward their own divestment measures in lieu of Ofcom's
initial recommendation. Ofcom can then make a final recommendation
if, in light of these representations, Ofcom believes there is
a divestment measure, either of its own or of the media enterprise's
design, able to pass the tests above.
213. In a nutshell, Ofcom's task in conducting
the periodic review will be to identify plurality concerns which
exist in relation to specific media markets and across media,
or with particular players. One sensible way in which Ofcom might
do this is to list them in one of three categories, indicating
an escalating level of concern. Of course, not being placed in
any of these categories might be taken as good news, as an indication
that Ofcom found no reason at the time of the review to express
a concern.
(1) Moderate concern. Describing a market or
a media enterprise in this way would mean that Ofcom judges that
any further consolidation would be a potential concern. A plurality
review of any transaction either in this market or with the named
players between the present and next periodic review could be
merited.
(2) High concern. Describing a market or media
enterprise in this way would mean that Ofcom judges that any further
consolidation would be very likely to result in a material lessening
of plurality. A plurality review of any further transaction either
in this market or with the named players between the present and
next periodic review is all but guaranteed.
(3) Severe concern. Placing a media enterprise
in this category means that Ofcom's recommendation is that the
enterprise be ordered to divest immediately. There must be a high
bar to justifying this measure, as set out above in paragraph
210.
214. There are three aspects to the rationale
for setting out the review's conclusions in this way. First, it
would send very clear signals and guidance to all concerned about
the prospects of future possible transactions. Second,
it provides a mechanism for dealing with organic change that has
resulted in unacceptable concentration but creates a significant
hurdle for the regulator to cross if they wish to recommend it.
As such, it is able to deliver some of the benefits which proponents
argue in favour of a statutory cap: a way of being able to say
that a level of consolidation identified in the review is such
a severe concern for democracy that there may be an appropriate
basis on which to oblige divestment. Finally, it provides a running,
longitudinal account of the state and sufficiency of media plurality
in the UK, ensuring so far as possible the definition of sufficiency
does not become removed from the realities of a changing industry
and is able to evolve in a way around which there can be consensus.
215. The first of these points—that the
review should act as a form of forward guidance—deserves
emphasis. The report to result from the periodic review should
be written so as to limit the need for transactional plurality
reviews, by sending very clear signals and guidance to all concerned
about the prospects of consolidation in future possible transactions
before they are formally proposed.
216. As suggested in Chapter 2 on Scope, although
it is conceivable that a periodic review could conclude that there
are concerns with respect to the influence of digital intermediaries
on plurality, there is a question about whether digital intermediaries,
generally speaking, are within the jurisdictional reach of any
remedies or interventions which the regulator could impose. We
considered a similar issue in our previous Report on Media Convergence,[197]
and recommended there that Ofcom should be required to establish
and publish on a regular basis the UK public's expectations of
major digital intermediaries. The rationale for this approach
is contained in that Report, but lies inter alia in applying positive
pressure on digital intermediaries to take responsibility to work
with the Government and regulators here to help achieve our wider
societal goals. As Robert Madelin, DG Connect, European Commission
put to us during that inquiry:
"if the big players have a view as to how
much regulation they would like, they ought to embrace the opportunity
to take responsibility. It is then up to us; it is up to legislators
and societies around the world to decide whether that is good
enough."[198]
217. Ofcom should publish in its periodic
plurality report any plurality concerns associated with digital
intermediaries. Indeed this might be the vehicle through which
Ofcom could on a regular basis express the UK public's expectations
of major digital intermediaries, as recommended in our previous
Report on Media Convergence.
218. Finally, once complete, Ofcom's report
on the periodic plurality review must be submitted to the Secretary
of State.
219. The process for agreeing a final report
should proceed as follows: The Secretary of State should have
an obligation to accept the content and recommendations of the
periodic review report or publish good reasons for not doing so.
Ofcom should be permitted to submit an amended report in the light
of the reasons given by the Secretary of State but should not
be able to submit a third report. If agreement cannot be reached,
the Secretary of State should have the final say, and accordingly,
if this arises, the Government rather than the regulator should
revise and publish the final version of the periodic plurality
report.
220. There are a number of reasons why Ofcom
should submit its review to the Secretary of State. First, it
ensures a high bar is in place should Ofcom choose to recommend
divestment of any media enterprise, as these recommendations can
only proceed with the Secretary of State's approval. Second, it
ensures politically accountable endorsement and weight is given
to the signals Ofcom's conclusions send to stakeholders; that
there is as wide an acceptance as possible and political authority
behind Ofcom's narrative description of media plurality and its
categorisation of specific media enterprises. Finally, it provides
a mechanism for the Secretary of State to have a say about media
plurality, and to be accountable for doing so, outwith the often
more contentious context of evaluating specific media transactions.
221. This represents an evolutionary development
of the Levson hybrid described in chapter 4. The rationale for
the Leveson hybrid is as stated in that chapter; it provides a
mechanism by which democratic accountability can be combined with
appropriate transparency and expert advice. The rationale for
our development is simply to allow for the possibility that Ofcom
might wish to acknowledge the Secretary of State's reasons for
challenging the report, and see fit to clarify or amend its report
in that light.
222. Finally, although we haven't heard this
expressed in evidence, we note the legitimate possible concern
that periodic plurality reviews could entail an additional public
cost. However, we would expect Ofcom to approach this in a way
that limited costs beyond what is already incurred by them in
other data gathering exercises and so on.
The transactional review
223. The periodic plurality review should send
clear signals to all concerned about the prospects of future possible
transactions. Still, when any such transactions arise, a process
must exist for determining its specific impact on plurality as
well as of course on competition, and hence whether it is in the
public interest overall for it to proceed.
224. For this, our proposal is for a review to
be undertaken on specific transactions which occur in the interval
between periodic plurality reviews. This transactional review
should consist of two distinct processes: one concerned with plurality,
to be conducted by Ofcom, the other concerned with the competition
aspects of the transaction, to be conducted by the competition
authorities. In reality, we would expect this to be an infrequent
occurrence.
225. The Government should revise the present
system of transactional reviews, in order to clarify the relationship
between competition and plurality policy when dealing with specific
transactions.
226. To that end, plurality assessments and
competition assessments of transactions should be conducted as
two distinct processes, by regulators with the appropriate set
of priorities, expertise, methods and ultimately ethos for each.
Competition authorities should remain responsible for the assessment
of a transaction's impact on competition, but Ofcom should be
given a new statutory responsibility for the assessment of a transaction's
impact on plurality.
227. This separation of the competition assessment
from the plurality assessment is a notable difference between
our proposal and the existing arrangements for the evaluation
of a media transaction engaging plurality concerns. Our argument
for this separation begins with the observation we made in Chapter
1: that competition policy and plurality policy are actually different
concepts, quite radically so. While a competition assessment will
promote the interest of the consumer, a plurality assessment must
focus on the interest of the citizen.
228. There are two reasons to think Ofcom better
placed than the generalist competition authorities to promote
the interests of the citizen: first, its statutory obligation
to further the interests of the citizen, not just the consumer;[199]
second, and by extension, its expertise in regulating the media
not only to serve legitimate commercial but also important social
and collective ends. The rationale, therefore, for separating
the competition assessment from the plurality assessment lies
in the fact that this allows each to be undertaken by a regulator
with the appropriate set of priorities, expertise, methods and
ultimately ethos.
229. While the plurality and competition assessments
of a transaction should be made distinct and be undertaken by
appropriate reviewing bodies, this is not to say that that either
assessment need necessarily be undertaken on any single transaction
at all. With regard to competition assessments, we have heard
no evidence to suggest that the decision as to whether these proceed
or do not proceed should be taken in a different way than at present.
Currently, transactions falling beneath certain thresholds set
out in the Enterprise Act 2002 are not investigated. We have,
however, heard evidence to suggest that the way in which the competition
assessment is conducted should be modified, and we address this
below under the heading: the "Kent Messenger Group scenario."
230. The plurality assessment of a transaction
should proceed on the basis of a judgement by Ofcom. Right at
the outset, Ofcom will have to form a reasonable belief prima
facie that a specific transaction may be expected to result in
a material and unacceptable lessening of plurality, and that it
therefore merits closer assessment.
231. In reaching a decision about whether
there may be a material and unacceptable lessening of plurality
as a result of a transaction and therefore whether to proceed
with a plurality assessment, Ofcom should draw on the most recent
periodic plurality report, and consider the relevance of any readily
observable changes to plurality in the UK since.
232. In most cases, it should be straightforward
for Ofcom to decide not to investigate further.
233. In conducting a plurality assessment
of a specific transaction, Ofcom should reach a decision about
whether or not the transaction should go ahead based on an assessment
of the likelihood of its leading to a material and unacceptable
lessening of plurality as compared to a scenario in which the
transaction does not go ahead, taking into account in both scenarios:
· the
sufficiency of diversity of viewpoints available and consumed
across and within media enterprises; and
· the
extent to which any one media owner or voice may have too much
influence over public opinion and the political agenda.
234. The final step in the transactional review
should be the submission of the competition assessment and the
plurality assessment to the Ofcom Board who should be responsible
for reconciling the recommendations of the two reports and implementing
them as a single Public Interest Decision.
235. We recognise that, having undertaken the
plurality assessment, Ofcom will need to ensure that its board
is open to consider both competition and plurality reports without
any kind of conflict and we address this point below.
236. Where the two reports reach the same
conclusion, the Ofcom Board must be responsible for ensuring the
implementation of the regulators' mutual view either to block
or allow the transaction, but there must be a clear mechanism
in place for resolving potential conflicts between plurality and
competition assessments of transactions.
237. Further, this mechanism should be designed
to resolve such conflicts on the very clear principle that, where
plurality is concerned, the citizen interest should have greater
weight than at present in relation to the consumer interest, and
a democratic and informed society should have greater importance
than at present when weighed against the cost of advertising.
238. Responsibility for resolving such conflicts
and as such for making a final Public Interest Decision should
therefore be given to the Ofcom Board, rather than the competition
authorities, as at present.
239. The Ofcom Board, mindful of its twin
statutory duties to further the citizen and consumer interest
should publish this Public Interest Decision, having weighed up
the merits of each case and determined whether overall it is in
the public interest for the transaction to proceed.
240. The rationale for giving responsibility
to the Ofcom Board for the resolution of potential conflicts between
plurality and competition assessments is straightforward: it should
have the effect of promoting, more than has been the case, the
role of the citizen's interest in these decisions. At present,
these challenging judgements, in which the public and citizen's
interest must be weighed with the consumer interest, are made
based on recommendations from the competition authorities. The
competition authorities have no founding statutory duty to the
citizen's interest. By contrast, Ofcom has statutory duties to
further and thus balance both the citizen and consumer interest.
The transfer of the responsibility for making these challenging
judgements from a body without these duties to one with them should
have the effect of promoting, more than has been the case, the
role of the citizen's interest in reaching a final decision. Its
twin duties mean that the Ofcom Board is better placed to make
a judgement about how the public interest will best be served.
241. There are two possible concerns about handing
this role to the Ofcom Board: first, the conflict of interest
in weighing recommendations made by Ofcom against those made by
another regulator; and second, the level of independence of the
Ofcom Board from Government. On the latter point, Dr Tambini,
for example, told us that:
"Ofcom would have to think hard if it were
going to take on more of the discretion that the Secretary of
State has, with advice from Ofcom and the Competition Commission,
currently. Ofcom would need safeguards on its independence …
It may need a specialist media plurality panel within Ofcom, with
security of tenure and some independence of operation, for example.
This is not something that Ofcom could take on without thinking
about it seriously and being reformed in some way."[200]
242. This concern is founded, presumably, on
the appointment mechanisms in place for the Ofcom Board. The Board's
Non-Executive Members including the Chairman are appointed jointly
by the Secretaries of State for Business, Innovation and Skills
and for Culture, Media and Sport, while the Chairman and other
non-executive members of the Board appoint the Chief Executive
subject to the approval of the Secretary of State and also appoint
any other executive Board members.
243. The recent debates over press regulation
and the independence from Government of a "recognition body"
to oversee it have revealed a rich array of mechanisms and notional
intermediary bodies by which independence might be secured. We
are not persuaded that these are required in this case, but we
do note that such mechanisms can be introduced should they prove
to be.
244. With regard to the concerns which might
be raised about a conflict of interest on the Ofcom Board, there
are two ways in which it should be possible to guard against this.
First it will be important, for the Ofcom Board Members to have
had no involvement with the team conducting Ofcom's transactional
plurality assessment, and for the Executive Members of the Board
to remove themselves from the Public Interest Decision if they
have. Second, it will be important for the Ofcom Board members
to be mindful of the potential for judicial review; and we expect
that this should act as sufficient stimulus for the Ofcom Board
to conduct its responsibility towards the final Public Interest
Decision on media transactions in an appropriate manner.
245. We note that one conspicuous difference
between our overall approach to the transactional review and the
current arrangements lies in the role of the Secretary of State.
In our model, there is a justifiable role for the Secretary of
State in approving the periodic plurality review report which
represents the centre-piece of our proposal, and sets the context
in which media transactions are proposed and assessed. The absence
of a role for the Secretary of State in exercising discretion
over specific transactions follows from the discussion on this
point in Chapter 4 on Decision; the evidence we have received
points clearly towards the conclusion that it is impossible for
the Secretary of State to do so without the appearance of being
influenced by political motives. By contrast, the Ofcom Board
should be in a position to reach a defendable Public Interest
Decision on specific transactions for the range of reasons we
have already given. Accordingly, we have concluded that revisions
to plurality policy should be guided by the following statement
of principle:
246. As a whole, plurality policy should be
revised to strike a new balance between the regulator and Government
in terms of decisions to be made about intervention: there should
be accountability for politicians where appropriate but the onus
should be on Ofcom to balance the consumer and citizen interests.
The 'Kent Messenger Group scenario'
247. Where a transactional review does arise,
there is a scenario to guard against which is potentially problematic
with regard to plurality: how to avert what might be called a
"Kent Messenger Group scenario;" see Box 3 below.
Box 3
The relevance of the Kent Messenger Group
case
| The current arrangements for a transactional competition assessment prescribe a two phase process. Phase 1 involves a decision by the OFT about whether to refer a case onto the Competition Commission for Phase 2, a full investigation. In 2011 the OFT was faced with a decision about whether to refer the proposed acquisition in 2011 of the Northcliffe titles in Kent by the Kent Messenger Group. To help inform this decision, the OFT asked Ofcom to provide a Local Media Assessment (LMA), a formalised way for Ofcom to assist the OFT in its assessment of mergers involving local media.
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248. From a public policy perspective, the issue that arose
in the case of the Kent Messenger Group's proposed acquisition
of the Northcliffe titles in Kent in 2011 boiled down to what
appears to be the underweighting of the local media plurality
concerns and the advice given in Ofcom's LMA, especially on the
relevant counterfactual, in the decision about whether to refer
the case onto a full Phase 2 investigation by the Competition
Commission. Further it did not seem to be a relevant consideration
that the costs which this sort of investigation imposes on local
media enterprises may have to be drawn from resources, the lack
of which provided the impetus for consolidation in the first place.
249. We believe that a clear principle should
guide the development of a solution: the interests of the citizen
should have greater weight than at present in relation to the
interests of the consumer; and the interests of plurality and
a democratic and informed society should have greater importance
than at present when weighed against the cost of advertising.
We have considered a number of routes to realising this principle
in the context of transactional competition assessments. It seems
to us that the most proportionate response at this stage would
be to give greater weight than is presently the case to Ofcom's
Local Media Assessment (LMA), the mechanism by which Ofcom is
able to feed into the competition authorities' decision about
whether to refer the case onto Phase 2.[201]
In view of the fact that only two LMAs have been produced, and
this procedure is clearly still a relatively new one, the competition
authorities should be given an opportunity to show they have learned
from the past before more radical measures are considered.
250. Ofcom's Local Media Assessment (LMA)
should be given greater weight than at present in the competition
authorities' decision about whether to refer a specific local
media transaction onto a full Phase 2 investigation. The competition
authorities should make this change clear in their guidance on
mergers, before the new competition authority, the Competition
and Markets Authority, comes into existence, at present anticipated
in April 2014.
251. We note that this recommendation bears
a striking resemblance to one we made in a previous Report, The
Future of Investigative Journalism, paragraph 161. We urge
the competition authorities, in cooperation with Ofcom, to make
greater progress towards implementing this recommendation following
the present Report. Should the competition authorities fail to
act on this recommendation, we urge the Secretary of State to
consider the introduction of a measure by which the relevant section
of the competition authorities' merger assessment guidance would
have to be approved by the Secretary of State.
252. Following on from this, we note the possibility
of other media markets emerging, for example, perhaps online,
in which moving a competition assessment from phase 1 to phase
2 could be so onerous on its players as to deter transactions
which may be in the public interest. We, therefore, make the following
recommendation:
253. One of the outcomes of Ofcom's periodic
plurality review might be a consideration of whether there is
a case for the more in-depth assessment of media-specific considerations
provided by the LMA procedure to apply more widely to players
in other fragile or emerging media markets.
254. In overview, the model we put forward for
a transactional review is summarised in the graphic below.
Figure 2
Transactional Review
Other features of the 'plurality
landscape'
255. One feature of the 'plurality landscape'
which we have not yet addressed in this chapter is the "20/20"
rule. We discussed the merits and demerits of its removal in Chapter
3 and conclude, with the evidence, that there may be weakening
arguments to keep it in place. Indeed it would appear as something
of a curiosity and an anachronism within the approach we are arguing
for because its formulaic automaticity succumbs to the criticism
we have made on caps. However, as long as an approach able to
live up to the principles we have set out in this Report remains
unimplemented, it seems sensible to keep the "20/20"
rule in place as a safeguard.
256. We do not recommend the removal of the
"20/20" rule, but equally would not argue for its retention.
Were the Government to implement a revised plurality policy which
lives up to the principles contained in this Report, there may
be a case for its removal. However, absent such a policy, it remains
a potentially important safeguard which should be kept in place.
257. Finally, during the course of this inquiry
we have found that certain policies and interventions which may
be seen by some to have an indirect bearing on the core concerns
of plurality policy but which are, as a matter of fact, separate
policies can become unhelpfully entangled in discussion of plurality
policy.
258. The relationship should be clarified
between the public interest and plurality as we have defined it
in our Report and other related but separate policies and interventions
such as licensing, PSB reviews, fit and proper person tests and
so on.
195 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, July
2013. Op. Cit. Back
196
Q 424. Back
197
Select Committee on Communications, Media Convergence (2nd
Report, Session 2012-13, HL Paper 154). Back
198
Ibid. Back
199
Communications Act 2003, section 3(1). Back
200
Q 9. Back
201
Ibid. Back
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