CHAPTER 3: constitutional implications
for the uk state |
Legislation required for negotiations
29. There are two elements to the question of
whether legislation would be needed to enable negotiations to
begin: whether legislation would be necessary to enable the Scottish
negotiating team to be established; and whether it would be necessary
for the rest of the UK negotiating team.
30. The Scotland Act 1998 devolved legislative
competence to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government.
That Parliament and Government are empowered to pass legislation
in any area which is not reserved. The Union is amongst the reserved
matters. Hence the
necessity for a statutory instrument to be passed which conferred
on the Scottish Parliament power to legislate for the referendum
This was done by way of a "section 30 order".
Such orders enable a reserved matter to be devolved; they are
made by the UK Government with the approval of both Houses of
Parliament and the Scottish Parliament.
31. This raises the question of whether it is
within the competence of the Scottish Government to negotiate
for independence and the Scottish Parliament to legislate for
32. Lord Mackay of Clashfern, a former Lord Chancellor
and Lord Advocate, stated that, if there were a vote for independence,
he "would expect the UK Parliament to introduce legislation
as a preliminary stage to set up the machinery for the negotiation".
Lord Hope of Craighead, a former Deputy President of the Supreme
Court, thought such legislation would be necessary, though it
might be possible to begin negotiations and then legislate later.
33. Professor Tierney, on the other hand, thought
that both governments would consider a "yes" vote a
mandate to negotiate and if further authority were needed they
could rely on the Edinburgh agreement. That said, he thought it
would "make sense for both parliaments to pass paving legislation,
appointing negotiating teams, setting the respective remits for
negotiations, and setting out principles to guide the negotiators."
34. Professor Boyle said that UK "constitutional
law does not require enabling legislation for negotiations to
take place ... there is no precedent for Parliament to legislate
on negotiations rather than the outcome of those negotiations."
However, he thought it "may be necessary" to empower
the Scottish Government to negotiate, and that a section 30 order
"could presumably be used for that purpose."
35. The Secretary of State for Scotland, Alistair
Carmichael MP, thought it would "probably be sensible"
for there to be legislation establishing the negotiations; although
the UK Government regularly negotiate agreements and treaties
with their existing powers, "this would be an agreement of
a very different stripe".
The Advocate General for Scotland referred to the possibility
of a legal challenge to the competence of the Scottish Government
to negotiate, and thought that a section 30 order or primary legislation
may be needed to put the matter beyond doubt.
36. The difficulty with devolving legislative
competence for establishing negotiations to the Scottish Parliament
by way of a section 30 order would be that such an order may itself
be subject to legal challenge. As it is secondary legislation
made by a minister it could be judicially reviewed, including
on the ground of vires. It may be that any such review
would have little chance of success; but it would create uncertainty
and may prevent negotiations from beginning.
37. It would be important for any independence
negotiations to have a clear legal basis. The evidence we received
suggested that the UK Government are likely already to possess
legal power to negotiate, but the Scottish Government may not.
In the event of a "yes" vote, this should be put beyond
doubt. In that event, soon after any such vote, a bill should
be introduced to the UK Parliament which would establish the negotiating
team for the rest of the UK and devolve power to the Scottish
Parliament to establish a negotiating team for Scotland.
Legislation to deliver independence
38. The evidence we received suggests that the
legislation needed to deliver independence itself, although important,
may not need to be large in scale. Professor Tierney told us:
"[In] the event of a negotiated agreement
[between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom] the Westminster
Parliament would presumably pass legislation formally recognising
that agreement and Scotland's independent status. This could also
serve to acknowledge that Scotland no longer forms part of the
39. Any legislation should deal with the Treaty
and Acts of Union that created Great Britain in 1707. The Secretary
of State for Scotland told us: "The union was constituted
by a treaty followed by two Acts. If it is now to be dissolved,
it would presumably need that at the very least."
The ratification of an agreement (following negotiations) between
Scotland and the rest of the UK followed by legislation in each
Parliament would be a symbolic act, echoing the Treaty of Union
in 1706 and the 1706-07 Acts of Union.
40. There is an issue of whether further legislation
would be required. The process of colonies and dominions becoming
independent was obviously very different from the separation of
part of the United Kingdom into a new state.
However, it is useful to remember that when certain colonies and
dominions were granted "fully responsible status" by
the UK Parliament, provisions in the relevant Acts stated that,
after independence day, the "Government in the United Kingdom
shall have no responsibility for the government of" the country
in question, and that "No Act of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom passed on or after the appointed day shall extend, or
be deemed to extend, to [the country] as part of the law thereof."
Such recognition of the end of Westminster's jurisdiction over
Scotland would be necessary in the event of Scottish independence.
41. It might be that an Act of the UK Parliament
could simply state the cessation of that Parliament's ability
to legislate for Scotland,
make any consequential provision and provide any transfer of powers
that was required.
This would fit with the Scottish Government's position that "the
key legislative steps towards independence should be taken by
the Scottish Parliament".
42. Our witnesses agreed with the Scottish Government
that UK legislation applying to Scotland at the point it became
independent would remain the law of Scotland unless and until
repealed or superseded by Acts of the Scottish Parliament.
This is referred to as "continuity of laws".
43. Beyond delivering independence, legislation
is likely to be required to enact the outcome of post-referendum
negotiations. There would probably also need to be legislation
to ensure that the rest of the UK's statute book was consistent
with the reality of a UK that no longer included Scotland. This
could be a substantial task, as was the case with the changes
to the role of the Lord Chancellor in 2005, when significant legislative
amendments were required.
44. UK legislation to facilitate Scottish
secession from the Union may not need to be extensive. Its primary
purpose would be to recognise independence for Scotland and the
end of the UK Parliament's legislative competence over Scotland.
However, it is likely that extensive consequential legislation,
and legislation to implement any agreement reached between the
two governments, would be necessary.
The UK Government after a "yes"
45. A "yes" vote in the referendum
in September would put the UK Government in an unusual position.
Scotland would still be in the Union until the date of secession,
but its people would have stated their desire to be ruled from
Holyrood exclusively rather than, as now, Westminster and Holyrood
46. The Secretary of State for Scotland, in his
opening statement to the committee, described what would happen:
"If there were to be a yes vote in the referenduma
scenario that I hope and believe the people in Scotland will not
allow to happenit would mean that people in Scotland had
given a mandate that they no longer wished the United Kingdom
Government to act in their interests
[this] would mean
that the interests of Scotland on the one hand and the interests
of the continuing United Kingdom of England, Wales and Northern
Ireland on the other would diverge."
47. He then set out the implications for the
"Unless and until the people of Scotland
decide otherwise, the United Kingdom must act in the interests
of all parts of the United Kingdom, including Scotland. That is
why the UK Government are not making plans for the implications
of a yes vote
Unless and until the people of Scotland vote
otherwise, the UK Government will continue to act on their behalf
and on behalf of the interests of people across the UK."
48. The implication was that, were a "yes"
vote to be delivered in the referendum in September 2014, from
that date the UK Government would no longer seek to act on behalf
of the people of Scotland. This would have implications for international
representation and domestic governance.
49. In terms of international representation,
David Lidington MP, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, said during a media briefing in March 2014:
"The key point is this: now, and right up
until referendum day, every United Kingdom ministerwhatever
responsibility they holdis thinking about and representing
the people of Scotland as much as any other part of the UK. If
Scotland votes for independence, from that time on ministers in
the UK Government will have a responsibility for people of the
rest of the United Kingdom.
It would be for ministers in Holyrood in those
circumstances to make the case for Scotland. In those circumstances,
ministers in the UK Government would be working all the time and
thinking all the time about the people who elect us in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland. If the people in Scotland chose a
different way that's fine, but that changes our outlook."
50. In Scotland's Future the Scottish
Government set out their view of how a transition in preparation
for independence would work:
"Existing constitutional arrangements in
Scotland will provide the basis for the transition to independent
statehood, with additional powers transferred as soon as possible
after the referendum, giving the Scottish Parliament the ability
to declare independent statehood for Scotland in the name of the
sovereign people of Scotland ...
This early transfer will also enable the Scottish
Parliament to extend the devolved competences of the Scottish
Parliament and Scottish Government into all policy areas, including
those currently reserved to Westminster, for the purpose of making
preparations for independence.
The transitional period will also see the necessary
foundations laid for Scotland's engagement with the international
It will also enable Scotland to move to a position
of full participation in the international community. The arrangements
will provide for the continuing application to Scotland of multilateral
and bilateral international agreements and treaties with other
countries and international organisations and enable Scotland
to negotiate membership of international organisations."
51. As a matter of law Scotland will remain part
of the United Kingdom unless and until it becomes an independent
country. A "yes" vote would not itself alter the legal
status of Scotlandthis would change only following formal
independence or as the consequence of Westminster legislation
passed in preparation for formal independence.
As a matter of political reality, however, the UK Government may
feel less legitimate in acting on Scotland's behalf were Scotland
to have voted to leave the United Kingdom.
52. If the ministers' statements were acted upon,
Scotland would be left without international representation in
the period between a "yes" vote and Scotland assuming
full control over foreign affairs.
53. In domestic affairs, the UK Government would
still govern the whole of the UK, including Scotland, until such
time as Scotland became independent. However, after a "yes"
vote the legitimacy of the UK Government continuing to govern
Scotland may be questioned, especially in cases where their policy
diverges from that of the Scottish Government.
54. Decisions would have to be taken by the UK
Government on reserved matters that affect Scotland, such as on
economic and fiscal policy. Given that independence would be on
the way, transition arrangements would have to be established.
We note that neither the UK nor the Scottish Government have explained
in detail what they imagine such arrangements may look like.
55. In domestic affairs it may be appropriate
for the UK Government to adopt a practice broadly similar to that
in the pre-election "purdah" period. Under the "purdah"
convention ministers observe discretion in initiating any new
action of a continuing or long-term character (such as announcing
major policy decisions or entering into large contracts). If such
decisions cannot wait (for example, if delay would waste money),
they are taken after consulting the opposition.
Although the parallels are not exact, were an analogous practice
to be introduced, decisions by the UK Government on reserved matters
with long-term impacts on Scotland could be dealt with in this
period after consulting the Scottish Government.
56. The UK Government's apparent positionthat
they would cease to represent the interests of Scotland immediately
after a "yes" vote was returnedmay create a constitutional
limbo for Scotland. Scotland would still be part of the United
Kingdom, but the UK Government would cease to act in Scotland's
57. On international representation, we recommend
that an agreement be reached between the two governments immediately
following a "yes" vote to clarify the basis of such
representation for Scotland in the period between that vote and
58. On domestic governance, we recommend that,
if Scotland votes for independence, the UK and Scottish Governments
should agree how any transfer of powers prior to independence
day should take place. In addition, an arrangement should operate
between the referendum and independence day whereby the UK Government
take long-term decisions on reserved matters relating primarily
or solely to Scotland only after consulting the Scottish Government.
Effect on the House of Commons
59. Fifty-nine MPs represent Scottish constituencies
in the House of Commons. A "yes" vote in the referendum
would have significant implications for them and for the House
of Commons as a whole. There are three aspects to this: the status
of Scottish MPs
between the referendum and independence day; the question of when
Scottish MPs would leave the House of Commons; and the position
of Scottish MPs in negotiations. We address the latter aspect
in the next chapter (on negotiations).
60. The clear consensus amongst our witnesses
was that, in the event of a "yes" vote, Scottish MPs
should remain members of the House for as long as Scotland remains
part of the UK. Professor
Boyle said, "Scotland would still be part of the United Kingdom
and they would still be entitled to participate in law that was
going to apply to Scotland".
They would leave when Scotland became independent, but not before.
61. The presence of MPs representing constituencies
that would soon no longer be part of the Union may be controversial.
It could become "the West Lothian question on steroids",
especially if Scottish MPs continued to debate and vote on issues
relating solely to the rest of the United Kingdom or on issues
affecting the United Kingdom after Scotland seceded from it.
62. It may be that Parliament simply lived with
"this greater anomalythough for a much shorter period
of time." Alternatively,
the House of Commons could make internal arrangements to address
the situation. Professor Tierney told us that "constitutional
principles might lead to a suggestion of recusal, or a convention
emerging where those [Scottish] MPs would recuse themselves from
decision-making on those [non-Scottish] issues."
The English Lobby called for Scottish MPs to be "debarred
by a resolution of the Commons, from speaking and voting on English
and Welsh matters and confined to matters affecting Scotland."
Any such "recusal" may affect the majority of the government
on these issues.
63. In the event of a "yes" vote,
the status of MPs for Scottish constituencies in the period between
the referendum and independence day should be resolved quickly,
and certainly before the 2015 general election.
64. In the event of Scotland becoming independent,
once the UK Parliament ceased to have jurisdiction over Scotland
there would be no grounds for retaining MPs representing Scottish
constituencies. The only question would be when Scottish MPs should
leave the House of Commons.
65. Removing the 59 Scottish MPs may affect the
balance of power in the House of Commons, potentially forcing
a change of government. Since 1945, there have been two elections
in which the largest party in the Commons would have been different
were Scottish MPs excluded: 1964 and February 1974.
There were two more elections in which Scottish MPs made the difference
between a minority and a majority administration: October 1974
and 2010. A majority administration elected in May 2015 could
lose their majority upon the departure of Scottish MPs. Alternatively,
the largest party in May 2015 may have a minority of seats, but
stand to gain a majority through the departure of Scottish MPs.
Both situations would be foreseeable after the election in 2015.
66. Lord Hope of Craighead observed that, under
current legislation, all MPs would be elected in 2015 to serve
a full term. Therefore
legislation would be needed to remove the right of Scottish MPs
to sit mid-Parliament. Previous changes to representation, the
franchise or the distribution of seats have come into force at
the subsequent general election.
67. The consensus in our evidence was that MPs
should leave on independence day.
Professor McLean suggested that Scottish MPs might want to remain
beyond the Scottish Government's proposed independence day of
24 March 2016, if it was possible that the Scottish Government
elected in May 2016 would want to reverse the move to independence.
We do not see that this should be kept as an option: the Edinburgh
agreement was for a "decisive" referendum whose outcome
will be respected on both sides.
68. The Law Society of Scotland recommended that
the end of a parliamentary session would be a convenient point
at which to make such a change.
Prorogation of Parliament could be timed so that independence
day for Scotland would fall between two sessions. This would mean
that parliamentary business would need to be arranged around the
agreed date for Scottish independence. Given the impact of the
loss of 59 MPs on the House of Commons, it is likely that the
date would be of great significance in Parliament anyway, in which
case starting a new session without Scottish MPs may be sensible.
69. It has been suggested that an early general
election could be held when Scottish MPs depart. This would remove
the problem of changing the composition of the House of Commons
mid-Parliament, but it would mean that the Parliament elected
in 2015 would be liable to be dominated by negotiations over Scotland.
It would also risk alienating the electorate in the remaining
UK: "Voters in the [rest of the UK] may well resent being
forced to have a second election so soon for no other reasonone
foreseeable before the 2015 electionthan Scottish independence".
The decision over whether an early election should be held would
be for Parliament to take: the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
allows for an early election if the Government lose a vote of
confidence in the House of Commons (and no new government is formed
within a fortnight) or if two-thirds of MPs vote to hold an election.
70. An alternative suggestion has been mooted
by a Scottish National Party MP: that the UK general election
could be postponed to 2016 and not return MPs for Scottish constituencies.
The extension of a Parliament beyond five years would be an extraordinary
step constitutionally; it may risk being seen by voters as self-serving,
extending the time in power of the current Government. Professor
Tierney told us that he "cannot imagine that there is any
appetite to postpone a general election."
The suspension of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act to delay the
first election scheduled under it risks undermining the very certainty
over election dates that the Act was supposed to deliver.
71. Given that the impact of the loss of 59 MPs
on the balance of power would be known immediately after the 2015
general election, there may be a risk that the government then
in power would seek to delay the departure of these members to
retain their majority. This should be avoided. The clearest way
to avoid a delay would be to set out before the 2015 general election
Parliament's intention to remove Scottish MPs at the point that
Scotland became an independent country.
72. The UK Government should make it clear
as soon as possible after a "yes" vote when they propose
that Scottish MPs would be removed from the House of Commons.
MPs for Scottish constituencies should cease to sit in the
House of Commons from the date on which Scotland secedes from
the United Kingdom. Legislation to this effect would be necessary.
The Government should provide sufficient parliamentary time to
enable the matter to be clearly resolved.
Effect on the House of Lords
73. The impact of Scottish independence on the
House of Lords is less immediately obvious than on the House of
Commons. Members of the House of Lords sit by virtue of their
peerage and do not represent a particular territorial part of
the UK. Unlike MPs representing Scottish constituencies, it is
not obvious what constitutes a Scottish peer. Since devolution
the House of Lords has not been concerned with legislation that
is before the Scottish Parliament, and peers have not held UK
ministers to account for matters which are devolved to the Scottish
74. The vast majority of members hold life peerages
of the United Kingdom. If Scotland were to secede, these peers
of the United Kingdom would continue to have a right to sit in
the United Kingdom Parliament. The fact that a peer was, for example,
born in Scotland would not be sufficient to exclude them from
the House, any more than it should an MP born in Scotland who
represents a constituency in the rest of the UK. Neither should
peers' territorial designations be taken as a statement of their
affiliation to Scotland rather than the rest of the United Kingdom.
75. All members of the House of Lords are deemed
to be resident, ordinarily resident and domiciled in the United
Kingdom for the purposes of certain taxes,
under section 41 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act
2010. A three-month transitional period was provided after this
provision came into force, during which members could decide to
leave the House and so not be subject to those tax requirements.
At present, at least 62 members are resident in Scotland.
As the Advocate General for Scotland told us, these peers would
need to decide whether they were willing to pay tax in two countries
in order to remain members of the House.
In the event of a "yes" vote in September 2014, the
period before independence could serve as transitional period,
during which peers wishing to pay tax in Scotland and not the
rest of the UK could retire from membership of the House under
the House of Lords Reform Act 2014.
76. As the law now stands, if Scotland were
to leave the United Kingdom, members of the House of Lords who
live in Scotland would have to be resident, ordinarily resident
and domiciled in the rest of the UK for the purposes of certain
taxes. If they did not want to pay tax in the rest
of the UK, they would have to retire from the House.
77. Among the 92 hereditary members of the House,
there are six who sit solely as peers of Scotland, their titles
pre-dating the formation of Great Britain in 1707.
Other peers of Scotland also hold peerages of Great Britain (peerages
created in 1707-1801) or of the United Kingdom, so would be unaffected.
Under the Peerage Act 1963, peers of Scotland sit as though they
were peers of the United Kingdom.
78. In the event of independence it would
need to be decided whether peers of Scotland should be entitled
to continue to be members of the House of Lords on the basis of
a Scottish peerage alone.
Effect on the UK Supreme Court
79. The United Kingdom's Supreme Court hears
cases from the three jurisdictions in the UK: the English and
Welsh, Northern Irish and Scottish systems.
All Supreme Court justices are eligible to hear cases from any
of those jurisdictions, but to ensure that expertise in all three
systems is represented in the court, appointments must be made
so that between them the justices "have knowledge of, and
experience of practice in, the law of each part of the United
no numbers are set in statute, by convention the court has contained
two judges with experience of Scots law and one with experience
of Northern Irish law.
80. The Scottish Government's white paper sets
out a plan for a supreme court in an independent Scotland: "The
Inner House of the Court of Session and the High Court of Judiciary
sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal will collectively be Scotland's
Lord Hope of Craighead told us that he could see advantages to
the remaining UK and an independent Scotland sharing a supreme
court: "a great deal of the legislation that affects commercial
matters applies throughout the United Kingdom, and much of that
would continue after independence." He and Lord Mackay of
Clashfern agreed, however, that it was unlikely that an independent
Scotland would share a supreme court with the rest of the UK.
81. If an independent Scotland had its own supreme
court, there would no longer be a need for justices to be appointed
to the UK Supreme Court with experience of Scots law, as Scottish
appeal cases would no longer be heard there.
82. In a debate on Scottish independence, Lord
Hope commented on the effect on the UK Supreme Court of losing
justices from the Scots legal system:
"The process of cross-fertilisation of ideas
across the border will cease. The tendency to prefer principle
to precedent, which is one of the characteristics of the Scottish
approach, is also at risk of being lost. So, too, will be the
breadth of experience which has always marked Scots judges out
in comparison with the specialists from England. Of course, the
loss of the two Scots justices, if and when this has to happen,
can be made good, but the breadth of vision which comes from having
what is at present a court for the entire United Kingdom and draws
its ideas from a broad canvas, cannot."
83. Whatever their background, justices are appointed
to hear cases from across the UK. Therefore, it would not be appropriate
to remove the serving justices with experience of Scots law; indeed
it would be advantageous, as Lord Hope explained, for them to
continue. The retention
of serving Scottish justices would also be helpful in retaining
their experience of devolution matters that would still arise
from Welsh cases.
- If an independent Scotland were to have its
own supreme court, justices with experience of Scots law would
no longer be appointed to the UK Supreme Court. However, given
their UK-wide remit, serving justices with this experience should
continue to sit on the Supreme Court until their scheduled date
33 Paragraph 1(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act
Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013. Back
So called because they are made under section 30 of the Scotland
Act 1998. Back
Written evidence from Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Back
Q 5. Back
Written evidence from Prof Stephen Tierney. Back
Written evidence from Prof Alan Boyle. Back
Q 32. Back
Q 32. Back
Written evidence from Prof Stephen Tierney. Back
Q 41. Back
QQ 16 and 41. Back
Section 1(1) and (2) of the Trinidad and Tobago Independence Act
1962. Section 2 of the Canada Act 1982 is similar. Back
Q 25. Back
Written evidence from Prof Alan Boyle. Back
Written evidence from the Scottish Government. Back
Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,
p 558; Q 5; written evidence from Prof Alan Boyle. Back
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. Back
Q 27. Back
Q 27. Back
'Foreign Office hints it would cease to represent Scots' interests
the minute they vote Yes', Sunday Herald, 9 March 2014. Back
Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,
pp 338-40. Back
Q 53. Back
Q 53. Back
The convention is set out in: Cabinet Manual: A guide to laws,
conventions and rules on the operation of government, Cabinet
Office, October 2011, paras 2.27-2.28. Back
In this report we use the phrase "Scottish MPs" as shorthand
for MPs representing Scottish constituencies. Back
For example, see written evidence from Lord Mackay of Clashfern,
Ian Campbell, Donald Shell, the Scottish Government and the Law
Society of Scotland; QQ 22 and 36. Back
Q 22. Back
Q 36; written evidence from the Law Society of Scotland. Back
Q 62 (Alex Massie). Back
Written evidence from Shell. Back
Q 23. Back
Written evidence from the English Lobby. Back
Written evidence from the Scottish Government; written evidence
from David Torrance. Back
Q 7. Back
For example, provision was made for the removal of constituencies
in what became the Irish Free State in the Irish Free State (Agreement)
Act 1922; at the following general election (in October 1922)
no MPs were returned for those seats. The abolition of university
seats, under the Representation of the People Act 1948, took effect
when a new Parliament was elected in 1950. Back
For example, written evidence from Ian Campbell; written evidence
from the Campaign for an English Parliament; Q 22. Back
Q 8. Back
Written evidence from the Law Society of Scotland. Back
Written evidence from Barry Winetrobe. Back
Unless the Act is amended, the requirement for two-thirds of all
MPs to vote for dissolution would include the 59 Scottish MPs. Back
'Call to delay UK election for a year after Yes vote', The
Scotsman, 30 November 2013. Back
Q 23. Back
Income tax, capital gains tax and inheritance tax. Back
See section 42 of that Act. Back
62 of the 601 members whose residence was reported in August 2013
had their main residence in Scotland: see Regional Representation
in the House of Lords, Lords Library Note LLN 2014/005. Back
Q 39. The situation may change were there to be a double-taxation
agreement between an independent Scottish Government and the government
of the rest of the UK. Back
The six peers of Scotland are the Countess of Mar, the Earl of
Caithness, the Earl of Erroll, the Earl of Lindsay, Viscount Falkland
and Lady Saltoun of Abernethy. They are excepted peers under the
House of Lords Act 1999. Back
Section 4. Back
The court hears only civil appeals from Scotland. Back
Section 27 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which established
the Supreme Court. Back
Q 11. This convention was developed with the Law Lords, and
carried over to the Supreme Court when it was created. Back
Scotland's Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland,
p 46. Back
Q 13; written evidence from Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Back
HL Deb, 30 January 2014, cols 1379-80. Back
Q 12. Back
Q 11. Back