Constitutional arrangements for the use
of armed force
CHAPTER 1: THE CONTEXT OF OUR INQUIRY
Introduction
1. The decision to use armed force overseas is
one of the most momentous a Government can make. At present the
role played by Parliament in such decisions varies widely: there
is no standard process by which Parliament becomes involved. In
2006 we conducted an extensive inquiry into Parliament's role
in authorising the use of armed force overseas.[1]
Since 2006 the nature of military interventions overseas has changed:
the majority of recent interventions have concerned either "failed
states" or anti-terrorism operations. In addition, the techniques
of warfare have continued to evolve, particularly in the fields
of intelligence-gathering, surveillance, cyber-warfare and remotely
conducted military operations.
2. There have also been changes in the Government's
institutional arrangements. In 2010 the National Security Council
was established; as a new body its interaction with the other
organs of Government involved in authorising the use of force
overseas, particularly the Cabinet, is still developing. There
is also a lack of clarity about the role in decision-making on
the use of armed force of the Defence Council.
3. In the light of these changes in the military
context and within the Government, we decided to look again at
the constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force overseas.
We have focused in particular on the significance of developments
since 2006 for Parliament's role and on the Government's internal
advisory and decision-making arrangements.
Previous consideration of Parliament's
role
4. The debate about Parliament's role over decisions
on whether to deploy force has centred on whether it should be
formally set out (and if so by what means) or whether it should
be left to convention and practice.
5. The domestic legal position on the deployment
of force is relatively straightforward: Her Majesty's armed forces
are deployed under the royal prerogative, exercised in practice
by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.[2]
The decision to engage in armed conflict is one for the Government;
Parliament has no legal role in authorising or approving the use
of the armed forces overseas.
6. In practice, however, Parliament scrutinises
the use of force closely, through debates and questions. In respect
of the two conflicts with Iraq and the intervention in Libya,
the House of Commons voted on substantive motions to approve the
use of force.
7. The role that Parliament should play has been
subject to significant consideration over the last decade. A 2004
Public Administration Committee report[3]
recommended that the Government legislate to provide for greater
parliamentary control over decisions on the use of armed force.
8. This committee's 2006 report[4]
concluded that the use of the royal prerogative to deploy armed
force overseas was outdated, and recommended that there should
be a parliamentary convention that the Government should seek
parliamentary approval if they propose to deploy British forces
outside the UK into actual or potential armed conflict. Provision
should be made for emergency deployments, in which case Parliament's
approval should be sought within seven days or as soon as is feasible.
The committee envisaged the House of Commons approving the use
of force by way of a substantive motion, discussion of which could
be informed by a debate in the Lords on a neutral motion. Significant
alterations to the nature or objectives of deployments should
require a renewal of the approval.
9. In their response[5]
the then Government quoted Prime Minister Tony Blair saying he
could not "conceive of a situation in which a Government
is going to warexcept in circumstances where militarily
for the security of the country it needs to act immediatelywithout
full parliamentary debate". The Government said they were
"not presently persuaded of the case for going beyond that
to establishing a new convention determining the role of Parliament
in the deployment of armed forces
But the matter needs
to be kept under review."
10. As part of the Governance of Britain programme[6]
in March 2008 the then Government proposed a detailed resolution
which would formalise Parliament's role.[7]
The resolution would be passed by the House of Commons, but would
not have the force of law. It would mean that decisions on deploying
force would still be taken by the Government, but Parliament's
role in scrutinising and approving those decisions would be formally
set out. The draft resolution would not have required retrospective
approval for secret or urgent deployments, nor regular re-approval.
The Prime Minister would have decided at what point it was most
appropriate to seek parliamentary approval. The House of Lords
would have played a consultative role, with the Commons making
the final decision.[8]
No draft resolution was placed before the House of Commons before
the 2010 general election.[9]
The current Government's position
11. British participation in the operation to
enforce the no-fly zone over Libya was announced on Friday 18
March 2011; at the same time the Prime Minister indicated that
a substantive motion seeking retrospective approval for the deployment
of forces would be tabled. Accordingly, on Monday 21 March 2011
the Commons approved a motion which, inter alia, "supports
Her Majesty's Government
in the taking of all necessary
measures
to enforce the No Fly Zone, including the use
of UK armed forces and military assets".[10]
During that debate the Foreign Secretary, the Rt Hon. William
Hague MP, said: "We will
enshrine in law for
the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military
action."[11]
12. In May 2011 the House of Commons Political
and Constitutional Reform Committee welcomed the Foreign Secretary's
commitment. Noting that it was a longer-term project, it recommended
"that the Government should as a first step bring forward
a draft detailed parliamentary resolution, for consultation with
us among others, and for debate and decision by the end of 2011."[12]
13. There were no further public developments
on the matter until November 2012 when the Rt Hon. Lord Wallace
of Saltaire, Government spokesman in the House of Lords for the
Cabinet Office, stated in a written answer:
"Since United Kingdom military intervention
in Iraq in 2003, a convention has developed in the House of Commons
that before troops are committed, the House of Commons should
have an opportunity to debate the matter. The Government propose
to observe that convention except when there is an emergency and
such action would not be appropriate."[13]
14. In a subsequent written answer Lord Wallace
of Saltaire said, "There are a number of important questions
of detail that need to be addressed in the options for the formalisation
of this convention. These are under consideration."[14]
15. In his annual oral evidence to us in January
2013 the Deputy Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Nick Clegg MP,
said there was a debate within Government about how to formalise
and enshrine the convention. He said that he was in favour of
making the convention as strong and fixed as possible, but others
were more cautious. He said the debate had not been resolved.[15]
16. Similarly, in their response to the report
of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, the Government
said the imperative was to consider the issues properly, "rather
than being driven by an artificial deadline. As the Government
has already committed to observing the convention, the case for
urgency has not been established".[16]
17. In oral evidence to our inquiry, Alistair
Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, stated that the Government have taken
no decisions on how to proceed.[17]
He said there was a difference of opinion on how to proceed amongst
members of the Government;[18]
Lord Wallace of Saltaire implied that this difference was not
on party political lines.[19]
Developments over Syria
18. Our inquiry was conducted against the backdrop
of the continuing escalation of the civil war in Syria. As a result
of the public and parliamentary debates on the nature of the UK's
involvement in Syria, there have been a number of statements in
the House of Commons about when parliamentary debates and votes
should take place.
19. The EU has not renewed its arms embargo on
the Syrian opposition (which expired on 1 June 2013), although
at the time of writing there has been no decision to send arms
to Syrian rebels. On 18 June 2013 the Foreign Secretary clarified
the position with regard to a Commons vote on arming the Syrian
National Coalition: "We certainly would not want to pursue
any aspect of our policy on this issue against the will of the
House of Commons. That is neither feasible nor desirable, so of
course we have made clear that there would be a vote. I have also
made it clear that we would expect it to be before any such decision
was put into action."[20]
Later the same day, in responding to a point of order, the Speaker
of the House of Commons indicated that: "an explicit commitment
[has been given] by the Foreign Secretary that there will be no
implementation of such a decision without the prior assent in
the form of a vote on a substantive motion in this House of Commons."[21]
In oral evidence to our inquiry, Alistair Burt MP confirmed
that: "in relation specifically to the Syrian situation,
[the Government] would look for the view of the House of Commons
through a vote."[22]
20. In anticipation of further developments over
Syria, on 11 July 2013 the House of Commons agreed by 114 votes
to 1 a motion put forward by the Backbench Business Committee,
"That this House believes no lethal support should be provided
to anti-government forces in Syria without the explicit prior
consent of Parliament."
21. The Government's intentions as to the
role Parliament should play as the civil war in Syria has escalated
have been unclear. It took some time for the Government to give
a commitment that the House of Commons should vote before any
arms are supplied to the Syrian opposition, and it is unclear
how they intend to involve Parliament should Her Majesty's armed
forces become further engaged in the conflict.
1 Constitution Committee, Waging war: Parliament's
role and responsibility (15th Report Session 2005-06,
HL Paper 236). Back
2
The Governance of Britain-Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative
Powers: Final Report (October 2009) described the position-
"The Royal prerogative is the
legal mechanism which allows the State to appoint people to carry
arms in its service. Thus, the prerogative provides the authority
for the Crown to:
· recruit members of the Armed
Forces;
· appoint commanders and grant
commissions to officers;
· establish the Defence Council;
and
· make agreements with foreign
states about stationing troops on their soil.
Other matters, however-such as the
enforcement of military discipline and the trial of offences under
military law-are regulated by statute." (Para 46.) Back
3
Public Administration Committee, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening
Ministerial Accountability to Parliament (4th Report Session
2003-04, HC 422). Back
4
Op. cit. Back
5
Constitution Committee, Waging war: Parliament's role and responsibility:
Follow-up (3rd Report, Session 2006-07, HL Paper 51). Back
6
The Governance of Britain, Cm 7170, July 2007. Back
7
The Governance of Britain-Constitutional Renewal, Cm 7342-I,
March 2008, Annex A. The Government's proposal followed a green
paper analysing different options, including legislation, (War
powers and treaties: Limiting Executive powers, Cm 7239, October
2007) and a debate on the green paper in the House of Lords (HL
Deb, 31 January 2008, cols 747-96). Back
8
The Government's proposal was scrutinised by two committees: Joint
Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, Draft Constitutional
Renewal Bill (Report, Session 2007-08, HL Paper 166, HC 551);
and Public Administration Committee, Constitutional Renewal:
Draft Bill and White Paper (10th Report, Session 2007-08,
HC 499). Back
9
The Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP, who as Lord Chancellor from 2007 to
2010 had departmental responsibility for the Governance of Britain
programme, told us why no progress was made before the 2010 general
election: Q34. Back
10
The motion was approved by 557 to 13. Back
11
HC Deb, 21 March 2011, col 799. Back
12
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament's
role in conflict decisions (8th Report, Session 2010-12,HC
923), para 6. Back
13
HL Deb, 20 November 2012, col WA333. The answer closely reflects
the wording in the Cabinet Manual (October 2011, para 5.38). Back
14
HL Deb, 13 December 2012, col WA247. Back
15
Transcript of oral evidence on 9 January 2013, QQ34-5. Back
16
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament's
role in conflict decisions-further Government Response (12th
Report Session 2010-12, HC 1673). Back
17
Q44. Back
18
Ibid. Back
19
Q49. Back
20
HC Deb, col 746. Back
21
HC Deb, col 761. Back
22
Q48. Back
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