Chapter 2: The Government's internal
decision-making process
Introduction
22. We have investigated aspects of the Government's
internal process for making decisions on the use of force. In
particular, we have considered the roles of the Cabinet, the National
Security Council ("NSC"), the Defence Council and senior
forces personnel. In this chapter we describe what we understand
to be the Government's current arrangements, with the aim of shedding
light on the processes which are followed and the relationships
between various actors.
The Cabinet
23. On these issues, as on all other matters
of Government business, the Cabinet is the ultimate decision-making
body within Government. Alistair Burt MP stressed that, though
much of the detailed policy formulation and day-to-day discussions
about military interventions take place in cabinet committees
(including the NSC and, where appropriate, war cabinets), these
discussions are advisory in nature, and "in line with the
Ministerial Code, formal decisions relating to the commitment
to military intervention are taken by the Cabinet."[23]
Similarly, though the exigencies of a conflict situation may require
the creation of a dedicated war cabinet (or the use of an equivalent
cabinet committee) to receive information and make decisions day-to-day,
the authority for such a body should be derived from the full
Cabinet.[24]
24. The formal role of the Cabinet may also be
significant in strengthening the actual and perceived legitimacy
of deployment decisions. Though smaller (and potentially less
formal) discussions will always occur around the Cabinet process,
these ought not to be at the expense of formal Cabinet procedures
for the taking of final decisions. In the context of the decision
in 2003 to participate in the invasion of Iraq, for example, the
Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006,
said:
"I was uncomfortable … about the informality
of decision-making that took place when Tony Blair was Prime Minister
… I absolutely stand by the decisions we made on Iraq but,
on this issue of legitimacy, they would have been regarded—then
and today—as far more legitimate if there had been a much
more formal process within the Government over making them".[25]
25. The Cabinet's role in decision-making in
this area is clearly of continuing importance. The need for decisions
to be taken at Cabinet level is significant in ensuring both that
the principle of collective ministerial responsibility is engaged
(thus allowing the Government to be held properly to account for
the decision by Parliament and the public) and, as far as possible,
that the decision will be recognised as having been arrived at
following a proper and robust process within the Government. Though
other Government bodies have important roles in advising the Cabinet,
preparing discussion there and implementing its decisions, we
consider that it continues to be constitutionally important that
the full Cabinet is the ultimate decision-maker on whether to
use armed force overseas.
The National Security Council
26. The NSC was created by the current Government
in 2010. It is a cabinet committee with terms of reference covering
national security, foreign policy, defence, international relations
and development, resilience, and energy and resource security.[26]
It meets weekly under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and
is attended by senior Cabinet ministers, senior armed forces personnel
(including the Chief of the Defence Staff) and the heads of the
intelligence services, and is supported by a dedicated secretariat
led by the National Security Adviser.
27. There was consensus amongst our witnesses
that the NSC has brought a number of benefits to Government decision-making.
Several witnesses emphasised that the NSC allows a cross-departmental
approach in a manner which reflects the close connection between
foreign policy, security and defence.[27]
Nigel Inkster, Director of Transnational Threats and Political
Risk at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, thought
that the NSC "adds a significant element of process and clarity
to debates which, in the past, often lacked both these attributes."[28]
Alistair Burt MP suggested that the regular, formal and well-informed
discussions of the NSC have helped to elicit confidence in the
Government's decisions in the areas of security and defence.[29]
Jack Straw MP told us that "all the reports I receive
are that [the NSC] represents a significant advance in our constitutional
arrangements."[30]
However, the parliamentary body which scrutinises the NSC has
expressed concerns about how it has operated and how influential
it has been in practice.[31]
28. The NSC provides a regular and formal line
of communication between senior ministers, senior military figures
and the heads of the intelligence services. It allows an "institutional
memory" to develop, both through the regular attendance of
ministers and through the National Security Adviser and the NSC
secretariat. This in turn ought to allow the Cabinet to be provided
with high-quality advice to inform its decision making on matters
of national security and defence. Further, the NSC's wide terms
of reference take account of the increasingly blurred lines between
defence, security and diplomacy.
The Defence Council and senior
armed forces officers
29. The Defence Council is the body which provides
the formal legal basis for the conduct of defence in the UK through
a range of powers vested in it by statute and Letters Patent.[32]
It is chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence and comprises
other ministers, senior military officers and senior civil servants
in the Ministry of Defence.[33]
30. We heard evidence that, though the Defence
Council possesses considerable legal authority, its practical
role in the UK's defence arrangements is very limited. Air Chief
Marshal Lord Stirrup, Chief of the Defence Staff 2006-10, told
us, "[the Defence Council] is a legal entity but it does
not meet regularly as a grand body, as it were."[34]
General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff 2003-06,
clarified that the Defence Council is not involved in executive
decision-making.[35]
The practical significance of the Defence Council was summarised
by the Rt Hon. Andrew Robathan MP, Minister for the Armed
Forces: "put it this way: I do not have an appointment for
the Defence Council in my diary."[36]
31. Our witnesses were clear that the practical
role of advising the Prime Minister on the armed forces falls
to the Chief of the Defence Staff, in consultation with his senior
colleagues. Field Marshal Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank, Chief of
the Defence Staff 1997-2001, explained the process which was followed
during his time in office:
"Before I saw [the Prime Minister] I held
a meeting with the other chiefs of staff so that we could get
what we thought our line was. Obviously the Chief of Intelligence
was there, as were various other people, including the Permanent
Under-Secretary [of the Ministry of Defence]. I would chair the
meeting, hear what had to be said and then tell the Prime Minister
and the Secretary of State [for Defence]".[37]
32. Lord Stirrup added: "clearly the Secretary
of State [for Defence], the ministers and the Chief of the Defence
Staff are all involved very closely in formulating advice for
the Prime Minister. The decision … is essentially taken by
the Prime Minister in Cabinet."[38]
33. The provision of military expertise and advice
to the Prime Minister is delivered by the Chief of the Defence
Staff, in consultation with other senior military officers, ministers
and officials—many of whom are members of the Defence Council.
Although the Defence Council possesses potentially significant
legal powers, it is not in practice a meaningful part of the decision-making
apparatus of the Government as regards the use of armed force
overseas. In terms used by Bagehot, it could be seen as a dignified,
rather than efficient, part of the constitution.
The Cabinet Manual
34. Taken as a whole, the Government's formal
internal arrangements for deciding on whether to use armed force
overseas seem to us to be appropriate. The arrangements allow
for the provision of detailed advice on the security, defence
and political considerations involved in authorising the use of
force, through expert individuals such as the Chief of the Defence
Staff and specialist bodies such as the NSC, whilst preserving
the Cabinet as the forum for taking the final decision within
government.
35. We are concerned, however, that the Government's
internal mechanisms in this area are not well understood. In particular,
we note that the Cabinet Manual does not contain a detailed description
of the processes we have set out. Lord Wallace of Saltaire told
us that, when the Cabinet Manual next undergoes a revision, the
Government will consider including a fuller description of the
NSC.[39] We welcome this;
however, it would be clearer and more transparent if the Cabinet
Manual covered the whole advisory and decision-making apparatus
described in this chapter. The Government should amend the
Cabinet Manual so that it includes a detailed description of their
internal arrangements for advising and deciding on the use of
armed force.
23 Q57. Back
24
Q10. Back
25
Q41. Back
26
Q55. Back
27
See, for example, Q26 (Field Marshal Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank,
Chief of the Defence Staff 1997-2001). Back
28
Q8. Back
29
Q56. Back
30
Q41. Back
31
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, The work
of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012
(2nd Report, Session 2012-13, HL Paper 115, HC 984). Back
32
The Defence Council was established by Order in Council in 1964
under the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Act 1964 and replaced
the Defence Board. The Admiralty Board, the Army Board and the
Air Force Board sit under the Defence Council and are charged
with the administration of matters relating to the naval, military
and air forces respectively. Back
33
Its full membership is: all ministers at the Ministry of Defence;
the permanent secretary, chief scientific adviser and director
general for finance of the Ministry of Defence; the Chief of the
Defence Staff and his deputy; the First Sea Lord, the Chief of
the General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff; and the Chief
of Defence Materiel. Back
34
Q29. Back
35
Ibid. Nigel Inkster shared that view (Q8). Back
36
Q55. Back
37
Q27. Back
38
Ibid. Back
39
Q57. Back
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