Chapter 7: Summary of conclusions and
recommendations
CHAPTER
1: INTRODUCTION
168. This report is intended as a contribution
to an important and ongoing debate. Because of this, in several
places we put forward a range of practical options which could
improve the involvement of national parliaments in the scrutiny,
formulation and implementation of EU policies, for further consideration
by national parliaments and others, rather than presenting a definitive
blueprint for change. We look forward to continuing this debate
with Members of other parliaments, representatives of the EU institutions,
and others. (Paragraph 15)
169. In the context of our own chamber we consider
that this report raises important questions about the effective
scrutiny of EU matters, and so we make this report to the House
for debate. (Paragraph 16)
170. Treaty change is not necessary to enhance
the role of national parliaments in the EU: substantial improvements
can, and should, be achieved without treaty change. To a significant
degree it is a matter for the will of parliamentarians to insist
on securing substantial and lasting changes, and of their governments
to give effect to that will. Important improvements could be achieved
through the autonomous action of national parliaments, and through
actions collectively agreed between the national parliaments,
the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament where
relevant. This report sets out options for reforms which could
be pursued in such agreements. (Paragraph 19)
171. Even in these difficult economic circumstances
it is important that national parliaments, including that of the
UK, ensure that sufficient resources are devoted not only to effective
scrutiny but also to other aspects of their involvement with the
European institutions and each other. Expenditure on improving
EU legislation through scrutiny is seldom wasted. (Paragraph 20)
CHAPTER
2: NATIONAL SCRUTINY
EFFECTIVE NATIONAL SCRUTINY
172. Effective scrutiny by national parliaments
of the activities of their own governments in the European Union
is essential. It is fundamental to ensuring that there is accountability,
and legitimacy, for the actions of the Union. It should be recognised
as core business for every parliament. (Paragraph 21)
173. National scrutiny systems will inevitably
vary according to the national context. Whatever system suits
the national context, it is vital that national parliaments carefully
scrutinise the EU activities of their national governments, in
order to ensure that the positions of national Ministers are effectively
examined, and that the Ministers who constitute the Council are
held to account for their decisions. (Paragraph 23)
174. While each national parliamentary chamber
is unique, we can nonetheless learn from each other. COSAC can
be a very good forum for this learning. We cite two examples relating
to our work in the House of Lords. First, we have taken a cue
from the Dutch Tweede Kamer, amongst others, and begun to use
the Commission's annual work programmes more explicitly in examining
the year ahead and publicly highlighting areas of particular interest.
Second, this Committee also intends to follow practice in other
parliaments and experiment with holding sessions with the UK Minister
for Europe before European Councils, to feed into Government preparations,
rather than holding them afterwards to discuss the conclusions
reached. (Paragraph 24)
175. In addition, we continue to seek to improve
our engagement with the Members of the House of Lords who are
not currently serving on the EU committees. In this context, we
observe that it is important that the whole House continues to
scrutinise the EU activities of the UK Government, through debate,
questioning and the scrutiny of legislation. As we have said,
this is core business, not the preserve of a group of specialists.
(Paragraph 25)
176. We are always willing to consider, with
the Government and our colleagues in the Commons, improvements
to the scrutiny process. In our day-to-day work scrutinising EU
policies and the EU activities of the UK Government, it is essential
that the Government consistently provide high quality and timely
written information, in the form of explanatory memorandums on
EU documents and correspondence, and that Ministers meet committees
regularly. A good flow of information by government officials,
including the UK Representation in Brussels (UKRep), is also crucial.
The UK Government usually does this well and the current Minister
for Europe, the Rt. Hon. David Lidington MP, has been an effective
advocate for national parliamentary scrutiny. However, there are
unacceptable variations in performance including in the quality
of explanatory memorandums, particularly between departments,
and we urge the Government to continue to focus on consistently
supporting and engaging effectively with national parliamentary
scrutiny of EU matters. (Paragraph 27)
DIFFERENT SYSTEMS
177. In our view, effective EU scrutiny systems
are most likely to include elements of both examination of documents
and direct discussions with Ministers (and other interested parties).
Scrutiny of documents enables parliaments to engage early on with
Commission consultations, and to propose precise changes to legislative
proposals. Contact with Ministers allows direct exchanges of views,
and allows Members to influence or control the government's position,
or to challenge the government to explain and defend their view.
(Paragraph 28)
178. It is important to involve a wide range
of Members, and committees where possible, in the examination
of European policies. Such policy expertise needs to be combined
effectively with knowledge and understanding of EU policymaking
processes and EU institutions. (Paragraph 30)
PRACTICALITIES OF SCRUTINY WORK
179. It is often helpful if there is effective
prioritisation, so that each national chamber and its committees
concentrate on the policies which matter the most to it. (Paragraph 33)
180. Even when parliaments do prioritise consideration
of the most important policies, it must be recognised that effective
scrutiny is resource-intensive, in terms of Member time and staff
time. (Paragraph 34)
181. Contributions by national parliaments must
have, and must be seen to have, an influence on EU policy development
and formulation. It is important that the Commission, Council
and European Parliament make effective use of dialogue with national
parliaments, and make clear where national parliaments have had
an effect on the policymaking process. (Paragraph 35)
CHAPTER
3: DIALOGUE WITH
THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE COMMISSION
182. In this chapter we make suggestions for
possible improvements, which national parliaments may wish to
take up in discussion with national governments and with the Commission.
In summary these possible improvements, which are considered in
greater detail below, are:
· the
increased early involvement of national parliaments in the development
of EU legislative proposals and other policies in advance of the
Commission making formal communications and proposals for legislation;
· that
the Commission should make clear when and how national parliaments
have influenced the development of policies, by:
o identifying
national parliament contributions in summary reports on consultation
exercises and in subsequent communications on the policy, including
how the policy has been shaped or modified in response,
o responding
promptly to national parliament contributions under the general
political dialogue, usually within three months,
o using
its annual report on relations with national parliaments to identify
the impacts of national parliament engagement;
· that
the new Commission should make a commitment that Commissioners
and senior officials will meet committees of national parliaments
as a core part of their duties;
· that
a procedure should be developed to allow a group of national parliaments
to make constructive policy or legislative suggestions (a 'Green
Card'). (Paragraph 40)
EARLY ENGAGEMENT WITH POLICY PROPOSALS
183. The Committee supports effective early engagement
by national parliaments in the development of EU legislative proposals
and other policies. In this way, drawing on their diverse experience
and expertise, national parliaments can make a distinctive contribution
to the development of policy at an early stage, before considerable
time and political capital has been invested in a particular idea,
and before firm proposals have been drawn up which the Commission
may then feel obliged to defend. (Paragraph 43)
184. The Commission must engage fully with the
views put forward by national parliaments early on in the policymaking
process, and must be seen to engage fully with them by making
clear when and how national parliaments have had a significant
influence on the early development of policies. We note that if
the Commission does not engage constructively and deal with concerns
raised by national parliaments under the informal political dialogue,
it becomes more likely that national parliaments will be forced
to use the reasoned opinion procedure to ensure that their views
are addressed in a more formal way. Put another way, the more
that the Commission engages positively with the concerns of national
parliaments as expressed in the political dialogue, the less likely
it is that parliaments will feel compelled to issue reasoned opinions.
(Paragraph 48)
185. When national parliaments engage upstream,
and make contributions to consultations, their views should be
identified and specifically addressed in a discrete section of
the Commission's summary report on the consultation, including
where appropriate how the proposal has been modified in response.
National parliament contributions and the responses to them should
also be identified in subsequent documentation relating to the
proposal including impact assessments and communications accompanying
legislative proposals. This will show that the views of national
parliaments have been given appropriate consideration; and help
national parliaments to continue to pursue key points. (Paragraph 49)
186. When national parliaments make contributions
to the general political dialogue (not in response to specific
consultation exercises), these contributions should receive a
response within three months, clearly addressing the points made
and, where appropriate, explaining how their views have been taken
into account. (Paragraph 50)
187. The Commission should use its annual reports
on relations with national parliaments to identify policy impacts
of engagement by national parliaments, as well as simply outlining
the number of interactions with the Commission. (Paragraph 51)
DIRECT CONTACT WITH COMMISSIONERS AND OFFICIALS
188. The Commission which will be appointed in
2014 should make a commitment that its Commissioners and senior
officials will be willing to meet committees of national parliaments
as a core part of their duties, subject of course to practical
limitations and without imposing an impossible burden. This must
be a clear and firm commitment which binds the whole College:
it is too important to be left to the whim of individual Commissioners.
(Paragraph 54)
MAKING PROPOSALS: A GREEN CARD?
189. In principle, we agree that there should
be a way for a group of like-minded national parliaments to make
constructive suggestions for EU policy initiatives, which may
include reviewing existing legislation, complementing the existing
'Yellow Card' with a 'Green Card'. We note the concerns raised
about intruding on the Commission's formal right of initiative,
and we would envisage a 'Green Card' as recognising a right for
a number of national parliaments working together to make constructive
policy or legislative suggestions, including for the review or
repeal of existing legislation, not creating a (legally more problematic)
formal right for national parliaments to initiate legislation.
(Paragraph 58)
190. A 'Green Card' agreement would need to include
an undertaking by the Commission that it would consider such suggestions
carefully, and either bring forward appropriate legislative or
other proposals (or consult on them), or explain why it had decided
not to take the requested action. (Paragraph 59)
CHAPTER
4: THE REASONED
OPINION PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
191. The reasoned opinion procedure can, and
must, be made more effective. It is an important way in which
national parliaments can contribute to the making of EU legislation;
and can thereby enhance the quality and legitimacy of that legislation.
(Paragraph 67)
192. National parliaments working together may
wish to consider which particular changes they would like to see
made to the operation of the reasoned opinion procedure. (Paragraph 69)
193. The key elements of the procedure, including
its scope, the deadlines, and the effect of a Yellow Card being
issued, are set out in the EU Treaties and could only formally
be changed through a revision to the Treaties. However, it would
be possible for the Member States acting together in the Council,
in co-operation with the European Commission, to agree a package
of improvements. The parliaments, Council and Commission could
undertake to operate the reasoned opinion procedure consistently
with the agreed changes. (Paragraph 70)
194. These are some of the options for inclusion
in an inter-institutional agreement to improve the operation of
the reasoned opinion procedure:
· scope:
including the proportionality principle within the procedure,
and a check that an appropriate legal base is being used;
· deadline:
extending the time period for reasoned opinions to be submitted,
from 8 weeks, to 12 or 16 weeks;
· Commission
engagement: improving the quality of the
Commission's explanatory memorandums on subsidiarity and its engagement
with reasoned opinions;
· effect:
establishing that if a Yellow Card is triggered the Commission
will either withdraw or substantially amend the proposal;
· threshold:
considering whether the threshold for triggering a Yellow Card
should be lowered;
· timing:
considering whether the reasoned opinion procedure might somehow
remain open, or be re-engaged, later in the legislative procedure.
(Paragraph 71)
SCOPE
195. While there may be a useful role for COSAC
in sharing practical experience in how to conduct subsidiarity
assessments and how to prepare an effective reasoned opinion,
we do not think that it would be sensible to attempt a more precise
definition of the subsidiarity principle than the definition that
is already set out in the EU Treaties. (Paragraph 74)
196. Witnesses have made a strong case that the
reasoned opinion procedure should be extended to include the principle
of proportionality. There is also a strong case that the procedure
should encompass whether the proposal is brought forward under
an appropriate legal base. We support both of these suggestions.
(Paragraph 79)
DEADLINE
197. We consider that the time limit within which
national parliaments can issue a reasoned opinion should be extended,
to 12 or 16 weeks. (Paragraph 84)
COMMISSION ENGAGEMENT
198. It is the responsibility of the Commission
to provide a clear explanation of why it considers that a proposal
complies with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
In the absence of a comprehensive and convincing assessment by
the Commission, it is appropriate for a national parliament to
come to the conclusion that it has not been proven that a proposal
complies with the subsidiarity principle. (Paragraph 86)
199. Every reasoned opinion merits a reasoned
response. When a reasoned opinion is issued by a national parliament,
whether or not a Yellow Card is triggered, that opinion should
be seriously considered by the Commission, and a response should
be prepared which addresses the concerns raised in that reasoned
opinion, in a timely manner. (Paragraph 88)
200. The Committee does not consider it appropriate
for the Commission to assume the sole responsibility for deciding
what arguments do, or do not, come within the ambit of the subsidiarity
principle. There should be dialogue between national parliaments
and the Commission, to determine appropriate guidelines for the
Commission to respond to reasoned opinions, whether or not a Yellow
Card has been issued. (Paragraph 90)
EFFECT
201. The Committee considers that the Commission
should make an undertaking that, when a Yellow Card is issued,
it will either drop the proposal in question, or substantially
amend it in order to meet the concerns expressed. (Paragraph 95)
THRESHOLD
202. The suggestion that the threshold for triggering
a Yellow Card should be reviewed deserves further consideration.
(Paragraph 96)
TIMING
203. The suggestion that the reasoned opinion
procedure might remain open, or be re-engaged at some later point,
deserves further consideration. (Paragraph 98)
ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: FIRST
READING DEALS
204. It is vital that national parliaments should
have a recognised opportunity for their voices to be heard during
the later stages of legislative negotiations, particularly when
those negotiations result in major changes to draft legislation.
We suggest that the Council consider making a commitment that,
if a legislative proposal is significantly altered during its
consideration by the co-legislators, the Council will allow sufficient
time, and no less than 12 weeks, for each national parliament
to scrutinise the new or significantly altered elements of the
proposal. This would be a logical development of the role of national
parliaments in EU policymaking and without such a commitment there
will remain a fundamental gap in the legislative process. (Paragraph 101)
CHAPTER
5: INTER-PARLIAMENTARY
CO-OPERATION
CO-OPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
205. National parliaments and the European Parliament
have a vital, and complementary, role to play in the European
Union. It is not a 'zero sum' game: greater involvement for one
should not be at the expense of the other. (Paragraph 108)
206. There is scope for national parliaments
and the European Parliament to engage more effectively with each
other, sharing information and debating key policies. Several
witnesses to our inquiry made useful suggestions as to how this
might be done:
· there
could be more direct contact between committees of national parliaments
and committees of the European Parliament;
· when
national parliaments or their committees have a close interest
in a particular legislative proposal, they should be encouraged
to contact the relevant rapporteur and shadow rapporteur on the
responsible committee of the European Parliament;
· national
parliaments and the European Parliament could reach agreement
that EP rapporteurs could provide informal briefings to Members
of national parliaments on the progress of trilogue negotiations;
· videoconferencing
could be used to facilitate discussions between committees;
· a brief
overview of comments by national parliaments might be included
in reports prepared by European Parliament Committees. (Paragraph 109)
207. Where it is practical and mutually useful,
national parliaments and the European Parliament should enhance
their co-operation and sharing of information, perhaps on the
basis of discussions on these ideas and others at the Conference
of Parliamentary Committees for EU Affairs (COSAC). (Paragraph 110)
FORMS OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CO-OPERATION
208. It is vital that Members of the parliaments
of the European Union establish the habit of co-operation on European
matters. Communication between Members of national parliaments,
and between Members of national parliaments and the European Parliament,
is essential, to share information, to debate policies, and to
reach common understandings. However, it must be recognised that
parliamentarians have a limited amount of time, and conferences
must offer clear 'added value' in order for Members to be able
to prioritise participation at them. In the view of this Committee,
the number of inter-parliamentary conferences must be kept within
reasonable limits and where it is appropriate we should be willing
to rationalise the conference framework. We must ensure that conferences
have clear and well managed agendas; that they have clear intended
outcomes; and above all that they encourage wide participation
and lively debate as opposed to long set-piece speeches. (Paragraph 114)
COSAC
209. Ideas which might be considered for changes
to COSAC's procedures include:
· a
reduction in the number and length of general reports from the
Presidency and the Commission, allowing plenty of scope for contributions
from delegates;
· agendas
which feature well focused and specific topics for debate, perhaps
including a topical debate;
· appointing
a longer-term chair of COSAC (following the example of the European
Council);
· ad hoc
working groups (working remotely) to prepare discussion papers,
or to take forward agreed conclusions;
· a standing
group of representatives of EU affairs committees;
· the
President of the European Council attending COSAC once per year.
(Paragraph 119)
210. The issue of resources for COSAC may also
need to be considered and the small COSAC secretariat increased,
particularly if its procedures are to be changed in some way,
as suggested in the previous paragraph. (Paragraph 120)
211. COSAC can disseminate good practices and
procedures that might be useful for other parliaments. COSAC's
biannual reports and informal presentations by Members of national
parliaments are two existing ways in which this dissemination
of good practice can be achieved. COSAC might wish to consider
whether an informal panel of experienced Members of COSAC from
a range of different Member States and scrutiny systems might
be willing to offer advice to national parliaments on their scrutiny
of EU matters. The staff of European affairs committees of national
parliaments can also share practical experience and information
about their procedures, to help them support effective European
scrutiny work by their committees. (Paragraph 121)
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
GOVERNANCE
212. Inter-parliamentary co-operation on all
matters, including on economic and financial matters, must continue
to involve all 28 Member States. (Paragraph 125)
DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARIANS
213. It is important that Members of national
parliaments forge their own contacts with Members of other parliaments,
including of course the European Parliament. Particularly once
good working relationships have been established, teleconferencing,
videoconferencing and electronic communications should be used
to full advantage, for quick exchanges of information and opinion.
(Paragraph 135)
IPEX (INTER-PARLIAMENTARY EU INFORMATION EXCHANGE
WEBSITE)
214. It is important that the IPEX platform is
easy to use, and that national parliaments upload information
consistently and promptly. We note the potential burden that translating
all parliamentary documents uploaded onto IPEX might place on
national parliaments, and we suggest that the IPEX Board consider
whether a technological solution, such as automated translations,
might be implemented in the future. (Paragraph 141)
CHAPTER
6: ECONOMIC AND
FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
215. The political and economic reforms required
in the wake of the eurozone crisis have challenged the EU's democratic
framework. The Commission asserts that "accountability should
be ensured at that level where the respective executive decision
is taken, whilst taking due account of the level where the decision
has an impact". Given the dramatic consequences of the crisis
on the lives of ordinary citizens across the EU, this is over-simplistic
and unrealistic. (Paragraph 163)
216. An asymmetry has developed between the growing
powers of key institutions such as the Commission, the ECB, the
Eurogroup and the 'Troika', and the ability of citizens to hold
them to account for their actions. As political tensions across
the EU testify, a serious democratic deficit now exists. The European
Parliament has a vital role to play in holding EU institutions
to account. (Paragraph 164)
217. The proposal for a euro area Sub-Committee
of the European Parliament would have significant negative consequences.
First, it could undermine the unified structure of the European
Parliament. Second, it risks losing the perspective and expertise
of parliamentarians from outside the eurozone. Third, it risks
exacerbating divisions between eurozone and non-eurozone Member
States, with the concomitant danger that those in one group propose
policies that are not in the interests of those in the other.
This is of particular concern for the UK. (Paragraph 165)
218. While the European Parliament does have
a key role to play, the principle of democratic accountability
can only be upheld if national parliaments also have an enhanced
role. We are therefore extremely concerned at how little emphasis
is placed on the role of national parliaments in the EU institutions'
proposals for 'Genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. (Paragraph 166)
219. While we welcome moves towards greater inter-parliamentary
co-operation between the European Parliament and national parliaments,
they are not enough. National parliaments must have more effective
purchase on the steps towards enhanced economic surveillance,
as encapsulated in the European Semester. This is an essential
element of the key role of national parliaments in scrutinising
the economic and financial policies of their national governments.
Means must be found to ensure that EU institutions are accountable
not only to the European Parliament but also to national parliaments,
in particular when such significant decisions about their future
are being taken. Further steps towards greater eurozone integration
are likely to follow in the years to come. Unless steps are taken
to strengthen national parliaments' role in oversight of such
developments, the democratic foundations of the EU could be undermined.
(Paragraph 167)
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