CHAPTER 3: when should there be a public
inquiry?
44. As set out in chapter 1, our investigation
has been concerned only with the category of inquiries into matters
of public concern. This category includes a spectrum of inquiries
which range from those concerned with a particular event or chain
of events to those involving policy.
45. The question whether and when to hold an
inquiry is always problematic. Calls for inquiries are frequent;
our own researches have shown that during the few months of our
investigation, there have been in excess of 30 calls for ''public''
inquiries, into matters such as domestic violence, the Supa-Puma
helicopter crashes and the baby ashes scandal.[58]
Calls for an inquiry can be made by a single person or group,
often victims or victims' families. Even the support of an interested
celebrity or Member of Parliament does not necessarily demonstrate
sufficient wider public concern.
46. For an inquiry under the Act, and no doubt
also for one not under the Act, "public concern" that
events may have occurred, or "public concern" caused
by events that have occurred, is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition. Ashley Underwood QC explained: "Generally speaking,
by the time there is a head of steam for any sort of inquiry there
will be a victim support group, there may be NGO support, there
may well have been a lot of publicity, lobbying of parliamentarians
and so on."[59]
Without these, it is unlikely that the necessary public concern
condition will be satisfied. Even if all these are present, it
does not follow that the concern justifies an inquiry.
47. The most important question seems to us to
be, as Professor Sir Ian Kennedy put it, "are there
circumstances where a public inquiry is an appropriate response
and where it is not?"[60]
There are many events which can be said to have caused public
concern, but have not been investigated by an inquiry. Examples
include the deaths of four young soldiers at Deepcut barracks,[61]
the murder of Pat Finucane,[62]
the death of Alexander Litvinenko,[63]
and the Omagh bombing.[64]
The solicitor for 60 of Jimmy Savile's victims has requested an
inquiry chaired by a High Court judge.[65]
The NHS is currently conducting 33 separate investigations into
individual NHS institutions in relation to Savile.
48. In order to consider when an inquiry is an
appropriate response to a matter of public concern the Cabinet
Secretary in 2010 issued an Advice Note on the establishment of
a judicial inquiry,[66]
which identified certain common characteristics present in previous
inquiries. They are:
· Large scale loss of life
· Serious health and safety issues
· Failure in regulation
· Other events of serious concern.[67]
Again, even if these conditions are present, they
may not be sufficient to justify an inquiry.
49. Several of our witnesses[68]
told us that there should be set criteria against which to decide
on the establishment of a public inquiry. Julie Bailey CBE,[69]
founder of Cure the NHS[70]
and a core participant[71]
in the Leveson Inquiry, was clear on the need for certainty for
victims and victims' families,[72]
while Eversheds[73] linked
the need for criteria to the need for transparency in decision
making.[74]
50. The Government echoed the draft Cabinet Office
Inquiries Guidance,[75]
telling us that in fact "Ministers take a number of factors
into account when deciding whether to establish an inquiry, including
whether the public interest will be served by an inquiry rather
than another form of investigation and whether that public interest
will outweigh the costs."[76]
But again these factors may not be sufficient to justify an inquiry.
51. None of our witnesses was able to suggest
useful criteria.[77]
Indeed, as suggested by Robert Francis QC,[78]
there is a danger that fixed criteria may in fact fetter discretion,
and so limit the circumstances when an inquiry may be set up.
After some consideration of possible formulae and witnesses' suggestions,
we have concluded that there neither can nor should be fixed
criteria regulating the setting up of inquiries.
52. One thing is clear to us. Establishing an
inquiry should not be a matter of politics. But Professor Kennedy
told us that an inquiry is usually set up in the context of political
controversy[79] and Dr Karl
Mackie, the Chief Executive of the Centre for Effective Dispute
Resolution (CEDR), thought that "the major political decision
very often is the on/off switch,"[80]
and gave an example of when political considerations had influenced
the decision whether to have an inquiry.[81]
53. Conversely there are examples of opposition
parties promising inquiries into particular matters once they
come into power. An inquiry into the Marchioness disaster
was promised by John Prescott MP,[82]
then Shadow Secretary of State for Transport, in 1991, after the
Conservative Government of the time had declined to order an inquiry.
When the Labour Party came to power Mr Prescott, then Secretary
of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions, set up the
first inquiry by Lord Justice Clarke in 1999, and the second in
2000.
54. The then Labour Government refused requests
by members of the local community for a statutory inquiry into
the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust in 2009 "given the thoroughness
of the reports already produced";[83]
instead setting up the non-statutory inquiry. Andrew Lansley MP
said that the Conservative Party would order a statutory inquiry
if they came to power, and he did so as Secretary of State for
Health in 2010.
55. An approach which may help to limit the political
nature of the decision making process was suggested by Robert
Francis QC: "it might be thought that a better course would
be to list factors it is considered Ministers should take into
account".[84] We
have considered the 14 inquiries held under the Act to ascertain
whether the characteristics identified by the Cabinet Secretary
were present:
· Five inquiries[85]
involved multiple deaths (five or more people);
· One inquiry (ICL: 2008) was set up in
relation to health and safety concerns;
· Ten inquiries[86]
involved a previous investigation report and/or regulatory or
investigatory body involvement;
· Two inquiries (Baha Mousa in 2008 and
Al Sweady in 2009) were established in the context of international
law or relations. One inquiry (Azelle Rodney, 2010) was established
because it was not possible for the death to be adequately investigated
by an inquest because there was certain intelligence material
which the coroner was not permitted to be privy to;[87]
and one (E. coli, 2006) was set up due to the
scale of the event.
56. "Failure in regulation", one of
the Cabinet Secretary's inquiry characteristics, seems to us to
be particularly significant.[88]
We agree with Michael Collins, Judi Kemish and Ashley Underwood
QC, the secretary, solicitor and counsel of the Rodney Inquiry,[89]
that "The first principle we believe should underlie the
use of public inquiries is that a matter of public concern has
been identified which cannot be allayed by lesser means such as
investigation by an established regulatory body."[90]
It is generally when concern has arisen about a "lesser investigation"
that previous inquiries have been initiated. Where it is the established
regulatory or investigatory body which itself is seen to have
failed, there is really no way that public concern can be allayed
short of an inquiry.
BOX 3
Examples of inquiries which investigated
failure by a regulatory or
investigatory body
· The Mid Staffordshire Inquiry investigated the failure by the Healthcare Commission, Care Quality Commission (CQC) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to monitor the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust.
· Inquiries into the deaths of Victoria Climbié and Baby P examined the combined failure of the multi-agency child protection system by the care services, NHS and the police.
· The Bichard Inquiry into the Soham murders examined the failure of police child protection systems.
· The Shipman Inquiry investigated failure by police, the coronial system, the system of death certification, the General Medical Council (GMC) and others.
· The Equitable Life Inquiry examined the failure of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the Government Actuary's Department (GAD) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
· The Azelle Rodney Inquiry, set up because there was certain intelligence material which the coroner was not permitted to be privy to, examined the failure by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) to identify any significant fault on behalf of the police.
|
57. Where deaths, injuries or other incidents
have occurred which seemingly need not and would not have occurred
if regulatory or investigatory bodies had properly been carrying
out their duties, there will be public concern not just at what
has happened but at the failure to prevent it happening. In such
cases a public inquiry may well be the best and only way of alleviating
public concern.
58. A number of existing statutory bodies have
the power to investigate complaints or specific incidents referred
to them, for instance the IPCC, Ofsted, the Information Commissioner,
the Parliamentary Commissioners for Administration and Health,
the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People,
and the Commission for Local Administration. Some
of these bodies already influence national policy and practice.[91]
The Children's Commissioner for England's powers go one step further.
Under the Children Act 2004 the Commissioner is required to draw
national policymakers' and agencies' attention to the particular
circumstances of a child or small group of children which should
inform both policy and practice.[92]
59. We believe that statutory bodies such
as the IPCC, Ofsted, the Information Commissioner, the Parliamentary
Commissioners for Administration and Health, the Commission for
Local Administration, and the Children's Commissioner, can be
in a position to recommend full public inquiries when they identify
wider areas of concern.
What type of inquiry? Statutory
or non-statutory?
60. The majority of our witnesses found the Act
to be a useful framework for conducting inquiries, particularly
those witnesses who had chaired or acted as counsel to an inquiry.[93]
Lord Gill explained in the ICL Inquiry Report in July 2009: "The
2005 Act has introduced a new framework for public inquiries that
will greatly increase the efficiency with which they are conducted
without compromising the thoroughness of the process."[94]
Human Rights organisations have been generally supportive of the
Act overall: "Liberty firmly believes that an inquiry into
allegations of human rights violations should be conducted under
the Inquiries Act. We believe it provides protection. We do not
believe that it goes far enough to guarantee the key features
of an inquirythe publicness and effective independence
from the Executivebut we think that it provides useful
protections and creates a better situation than the sort of ad
hoc situation that existed before."[95]
Rights Watch UK told us: "Our experience is that inquiries
under the Act have been efficient and cost effective."[96]
We conclude that the Act is a useful tool in the administration
of effective inquiries.
61. We can see no good reason why the Act should
not be used as a matter of course when establishing an inquiry,
as suggested by Professor Tomkins, who told us: "The
presumption should be that if an inquiry is to be established,
it should be established under the legislation
because
otherwise there is a question as to why we have the statute at
all".[97] Lord Justice
Beatson gave concurring evidence, and thought it was "important
for there to be careful consideration of the justification for
not using the procedure so recently established by Parliament
as the appropriate one for inquiries."[98]
62. The Cabinet Office Guidance, which we consider
more fully in chapter 5,[99]
merely states: "Departments should seek advice from
the Cabinet Office Propriety and Ethics Team on the different
forms of inquiry and the merits of the different options. Possible
forms of inquiry include inquiries conducted under the Inquiries
Act 2005, statutory public inquiries under other legislation,[100]
non-statutory ad hoc inquiries (public or private), Committee
of Privy Counsellors or Royal Commissions." No preference
is expressed for inquiries to be set up under the Act.
63. We asked Shailesh Vara MP, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Justice, whether there should not
at least be a presumption that if an inquiry was being set up,
it should be under the Act. Mr Vara replied: "I see
no reason for not having that presumption
certainly the
Act is there and it is there to be used
it is a first port
of call". But he subsequently corrected himself: "To
the extent that I may have led the Committee to believe that there
is a presumption, I am saying that I do not know the answer. I
am not aware of the word "presumption" being used in
the Guidance
I do not know whether there is a natural presumption
or whether the decision that needs to be taken is something for
future guidance."[101]
This hardly amounts to a ringing endorsement of the Act as the
preferred vehicle for conducting inquiries; or even to a coherent
policy on the use of the Act.
64. We note moreover that the Act has not been
used since the establishment of the Leveson Inquiry in 2011. In
that time two non-statutory inquiries have been announced. The
first, which began in September 2013, is the Morecambe Bay inquiry
into a high number of serious untoward incidents in the maternity
and neonatal services provided by the University Hospitals of
Morecambe Bay Trust. The Ministry of Justice tell us that this
is not an inquiry because the Secretary of State for Health, in
his written statement,[102]
described it as an investigation and said that evidence sessions
would be open to family members but not to the public. We regard
this as a distinction without a difference. This inquiry has all
the characteristics of the first, non-statutory, inquiry by Robert
Francis QC into the NHS Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust, except
that the chairman, Dr Bill Kirkup, intends to exercise his
power to exclude the public from evidence sessions.
65. The second non-statutory inquiry is even
more recent. On 6 February 2014 Lord Faulks QC, the Minister of
State at the Ministry of Justice, announced that the Government
had decided to hold "an independent review to learn lessons
from self-inflicted deaths of young adults in custody aged between
18 and 24". In reply to a question whether this was to be
an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 he said that he was unable
to give a precise answer.[103]
Lord Faulks subsequently wrote to the chairman to say that the
review had not been established under the 2005 Act, but gave no
reason for this.
COMPELLABILITY OF WITNESSES AND
EVIDENCE ON OATH
66. The only significant differences between
a statutory and a non-statutory inquiry are, first, that a non-statutory
inquiry has to rely on the voluntary compliance of witnesses,
or on the coercive power of the press and public opinion; secondly
that it cannot take evidence on oath;[104]
and thirdly, that a statutory inquiry under the Act contains a
presumption that hearings will be held in public.[105]
67. Many of our witnesses, including Sir Brian
Leveson and Professor Kennedy, have been in favour of the
power given by the Act to compel witnesses, at least as a power
of last resort. In his report on Bristol Royal Infirmary, Professor Kennedy
wrote:
"In conducting our Inquiry we were aided
by the fact that we were appointed under a statute and, as a consequence,
had powers which that statute conferred on us. In particular,
we had the power, if necessary, to compel witnesses to attend
hearings and require that documents be produced
Secondly,
we had the power to take evidence on oath or affirmation. We found
these powers, particularly the former, essential (if only to be
held in reserve). Their existence assured us of compliance, without
our having to use them."[106]
68. On the other hand Sir John Chilcot,
the chairman of the Iraq inquiry,[107]
felt that the power of compulsion contributed to an overly formal
or court-like adversarial process, commenting on his own non-statutory
inquiry: "The absence of legal powers to subpoena witnesses
and to take evidence on oath was also the subject of debate when
the Inquiry launched
In my statement on 30 July [2009]
I said that the Inquiry is not a court of law and nobody is on
trial, and that remains the case."[108]
69. The European Court of Human Rights has determined
that Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) give rise to a duty to investigate certain deaths and ill
treatment.[109] Lord
Bingham summarised the Article 2 requirements as being:
· The investigation must be independent.
· The investigation must be effective.
· The investigation must be reasonably prompt.
· There must be a "sufficient element
of public scrutiny".
· The next of kin must be involved to an
appropriate extent.[110]
70. In relation to compellability, the judgment
of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Edwards
v United Kingdom[111]
is particularly significant. The applicants were the parents of
a prisoner killed in his cell by another prisoner who was dangerous
and mentally ill. Two prison officers, one of whom had walked
past the cell shortly before the death was discovered, had submitted
statements to an inquiry but declined to attend it. Their absence
prevented the provision of further detail and clarification. The
court held that the inquiry had failed to be effective and so
was not compliant with Article 2: "The Court finds that the
lack of compulsion of witnesses who are either eyewitnesses or
have material evidence related to the circumstances of a death
must be regarded as diminishing the effectiveness of the inquiry
as an investigative mechanism. In this case
it detracted
from its capacity to establish the facts relevant to the death,
and thereby to achieve one of the purposes required by Article
2 of the Convention."[112]
71. It is only if an inquiry is set up under
the Inquiries Act, or another Act giving the inquiry similar powers,[113]
that the inquiry will have the power to compel the production
of documents and the attendance of witnesses, and to require witnesses
to give evidence on oath. We are aware of three instances where
those involved in the setting up of inquiries seem either not
to be aware of this simple fact, or to be prepared to attempt
to devise a way to circumvent it.
72. In the first case, in his letter of 17 June
2009 setting up the inquiry the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown MP,
wrote to Sir John Chilcot on the powers of compulsion: "I
hope
that you will consider whether it is possible for
there to be a process whereby they give their contributions on
oath."[114] It
seems to us extraordinary that the Prime Minister should have
been advised to set up a non-statutory inquiry and at the same
time to ask the chairman to devise a means for evidence to be
given on oath. This was presumably an attempt to ensure that the
non-statutory investigation complied with ECHR Article 2.
73. The second example is that of Dr Bill
Kirkup CBE, chairman of the current Morecambe Bay Investigation,
which is non-statutory, who said in his opening statement: "With
the panel and the secretariat, I am determining what evidence
I will require them [certain organisations] to supply and the
practical arrangements for the safe transfer of that material
to the investigation."[115]
It is not open to this inquiry to "require" information.
74. Lastly, in 2013 a judgment of the Divisional
Court[116] required
the Ministry of Defence to set up non-statutory inquiries into
recent cases involving claims by Iraqi citizens of ill-treatment
and unlawful killing by British armed forces in Iraq. It was held
that an investigation established by the Secretary of State for
Defence was neither independent nor adequately compliant with
the investigative duties under ECHR Articles 2 and 3. Further
inquiries were deemed necessary, and the Court went on to give
detailed directions as to what form these should take. The Court
agreed with the decision of the Secretary of State not to order
an overarching public inquiry, on grounds including length, cost,
the difficulty of finding a judge or retired judge for the necessary
length of time, and the different margins of appreciation in different
cases.[117] Instead,
the Court asked for a large number of inquest-like investigations
to be conducted by "a suitable person such as a retired judge
or possibly a very experienced practitioner" who would need,
despite the fact that the inquiry was not to be set up under the
2005 Act, powers to require witnesses to attend to give evidence
and to produce a statement, together with appropriate sanctions
for non-compliance.[118]
The judgment added:
"If the inquiry is not to be set up under
the 2005 Act, a way must be found of providing the Inspector with
similar powers [powers of compulsion set out in section 21] and
appropriate sanction
Under the Act, a chairman can also
compel the production of documents; we would anticipate that the
undertaking to which we have referred
should obviate the
need for similar powers, but it would be prudent to make express
provision for such powers with appropriate sanctions."[119]
The Court's formal order provides: The Inspector
must have a power to compel witness [sic] to attend and to compel
the production of documents (with appropriate sanction for failures
to comply)."[120]
There is no indication as to how this might be achieved. The intention
is presumably to secure compliance with ECHR Article 2, following
the judgment in Edwards v United Kingdom.[121]
There is however no suggestion as to how the inspector might
acquire such powers of compulsion.
75. Our witness from the Ministry of Defence,
Jonathan Duke-Evans, Head of Claims, Judicial Reviews and Public
Inquiries, told us how the department was intending to implement
the judgment in practice. He thought it might be possible to use
the powers under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) to summon witnesses
or require the production of documents if requested by a tribunal,
and added: "We think that may be the answer unless anyone
can come up with a reason that says a new creature of this kind
cannot be regarded as a tribunal".[122]
We ourselves doubt whether the CPR were intended to assist a new
kind of non-statutory tribunal to compel documents to be produced
or witnesses to attend.
HEARINGS IN PUBLIC
76. We received criticism of non-statutory inquiries
from human rights organisations such as Liberty[123]
and Rights Watch UK[124],
and from Julie Bailey,[125]
because of the lack of rules governing private and public hearings.
Rights Watch UK told us: "non-statutory inquiries
can be the result of political agendas which undermine their credibility,
for example
The Detainee Inquiry (Gibson). When a human
rights violation is engaged, either individual or systemic, then
a statutory inquiry is required".[126]
Eversheds reasoned that "The legislative framework under
which a public [2005 Act] inquiry operates also makes the inquiry
accountable to the public in a way that a non-statutory inquiry
cannot."[127]
Other witnesses were also concerned that the practice of holding
all or part of an inquiry in private might not satisfy the Article
2 obligations.[128]
Non-statutory inquiries are therefore more likely to be non-compliant
with Article 2 than inquiries held under the Act. As the cases
of Edwards and Ali Zaki Mousa demonstrate, non-statutory
inquiries are particularly likely to be non-compliant if witnesses
fail or refuse to attend.
77. The reasons given to hold non-statutory inquiries
often include that they are cheaper and quicker.[129]
We explain later in our report why we do not agree that this is
necessarily so.[130]
78. Another reason given is that matters of intelligence
may make it impossible to hold an inquiry under the Act for reasons
of national security. Professor Tomkins cautioned there "would
never have been an Iraq inquiry and there would never have been
a Detainee inquiry at all"[131]
if the non-statutory route had not been available, or that in
such cases important evidence might have had to be heard in closed
session. Peter Riddell told us that had the non-statutory Detainee
Inquiry commenced hearing evidence, evidence from security agencies
on operational issues would have had to be heard in secret.[132]
79. We note that security issues can sometimes
be managed under the Act, as demonstrated by the pragmatic solution
in the Azelle Rodney Inquiry. The inquiry team told us: "the
majority of Metropolitan Police Officer statements [were] re-drafted
to reveal the intelligence gathered as part of covert operations
without revealing the source of that information. This meant that
statements contained minor redactions and did not compromise existing
legislation."[133]
This approach fits with the Act's intent. During the Second Reading
of the Inquiries Bill in the Commons, Christopher Leslie MP,
then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs, said: "The Bill would [put] on a proper, more comprehensive
footing our ability to conduct an effective public inquiry in
circumstances where national security issues may well arise."[134]
THE COMMITTEE'S VIEW
80. Nevertheless even those of our witnesses
who had chaired statutory inquiriesLord Cullen of Whitekirk,[135]
Lord Gill,[136] and
Robert Francis QC[137]supported
retention of the non-statutory route as a means of conducting
a less formal investigation. Lord Bichard felt that the non-statutory
nature of his inquiry helped to keep proceedings as informal as
possible for the victims' families.[138]
81. We recommend that inquiries into issues
of public concern should normally be held under the Act. This
is essential where Article 2 of the ECHR is engaged. No inquiry
should be set up without the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses unless ministers are confident that all potential witnesses
will attend.
82. We would not however remove the possibility
of an inquiry being held otherwise than under the Act, for example
where security issues are involved, or other sensitive issues
which require evidence to be heard in secret. Ministers should
give reasons for any decision to hold an inquiry otherwise than
under the Act.
Inquests as an alternative
83. As a matter of course certain deaths[139]
in the United Kingdom are investigated by means of an inquest.
Where it appears that agents of the State may be implicated in
some way in the circumstances of the death, the subsequent investigation,
whether that be by inquest or not, must satisfy the minimum requirements
imposed by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[140]
An inquest is limited to examining who the deceased was; and how,
when and where the deceased came by his or her death.[141]
An inquiry's scope is determined by its terms of reference and
so can be much wider. We say more about this in chapter 4. The
other chief distinctions are that inquests cannot hear evidence
in private, cannot make recommendations, and may in certain circumstances
have a jury. Juries do not give reasons for their decisions.
84. Witnesses gave different views about the
usefulness and independence of inquests and inquiries. Some witnesses
told us that in some instances the coronial system had not worked.
Eversheds thought that "On occasion, Article 2 inquests have
been established where the public interest in our view might have
been better served by public inquiries."[142]
For Collins, Kemish and Underwood the recent investigations and
inquests into the Hillsborough football disaster could be said
to be "an example of a lengthy investigation which led to
a further investigation (in this instance new inquests) when it
would have been swifter and more economical to move straight to
a public inquiry."[143]
Disaster Action believed "Failures in the inquest process
have been important in other disasters, including the Marchioness
disaster".[144]
85. Other witnesses favoured inquests as the
preferred Article 2 compliant investigation to establish the truth
of a death. Helen Shaw of INQUEST told us: "I think everybody
who represents people at inquests is very keen that we continue
to have inquests as the primary method of investigating any kind
of contentious death".[145]
Liberty were concerned that "there are problems with the
ability of an inquiry to get to the truth in the same way as an
inquest can,"[146]
and that "The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 radically changed
the role played by inquiries under the 2005 Act, as it allowed
them to be used as a substitute for an inquest."[147]
The 2009 Act was in fact only re-enacting a provision already
on the statute book[148]
which was used by the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer of Thoroton,
to suspend the inquest into the death of Dr David Kelly when
the Hutton Inquiry was set up.
86. Those working with family groups seemed to
favour an inquest over an inquiry because of a preference for
a jury-led decision. Ashley Underwood QC explained: "Ministers
think there is a great driver to having a jury, if they can possibly
have one, to investigate a death, because the popular perception
is that unless you have a jury, somehow it is being swept under
the carpet
I think there was a great deal of pushing for
[the Mark Duggan inquest] to remain a jury matter and the Ministers
took that on."[149]
Helen Shaw of INQUEST agreed: "We lost the jury in the [Azelle
Rodney] inquiry, and that is very important in these kinds of
deaths."[150]
87. The circumstances surrounding the deaths
of Mark Duggan and Azelle Rodney contained many similarities,[151]
but were investigated by different means. The Azelle Rodney Inquiry
replaced the earlier inquest which could not proceed because there
was certain intelligence material which the coroner was not permitted
to be privy to. The death of Mark Duggan in 2011, which led to
serious riots in London and beyond, was investigated by way of
an inquest. This unquestionably was a matter of public concern
which could have justified an inquiry; the inquest could look
only at the circumstances of the death. A jury verdict cannot
provide any reasons for the conclusions.
88. In fact the Mark Duggan inquest "was
the subject of considerable debate about whether it should have
been an inquiry under the 2005 Act."[152]
Ashley Underwood QC explained: "the question is whether there
is something more than just the death. For example, let us look
at allaying the public concern. In the inquest we have into Mark
Duggan
we are only exercised by the death, but it is idle
to forget that the riots took place as a result of that death.
Now, the public concern that surrounds the death does not just
deal with how it is that Mark Duggan came to die. There is an
argument for the allaying of public concern to deal with it rather
wider than the inquest would ordinarily do."[153]
89. The investigation of a death by an inquest
can also be compromised by the presence of intelligence issues
which the inquest cannot investigate, but which could be considered
by an inquiry, using if necessary its power to restrict disclosure
of evidence. Sir Robert Owen, the Assistant Deputy Coroner
of the inquest into the death of Alexander Litvinenko, wrote to
ministers asking for the inquest to be converted into an inquiry
under the Act. The letter said: "if I were to remove certain
[intelligence] issues from scope, that would be likely to lead
to the inquest failing to discharge its duty to undertake a full,
fair and fearless investigation."[154]
His request was refused by the Home Secretary, but following an
application for judicial review[155]
a three-judge court decided on 11 February 2014 that her decision
could not stand and must be re-considered,[156]
albeit stressing that the judgment did not of itself mandate any
particular outcome. The Home Secretary did not appeal the Court's
decision.
90. The Government's 2011 Justice and Security
Green Paper[157] put
forward a proposal to amend the Coroners Rules to allow for a
closed material procedure where sensitive material is required
for consideration. The Green Paper detailed inquiries as an alternative
to the coronial system. It is relevant to our investigation that
the Government define inquiries as "an exceptional means
of last resort to investigate deaths of significant public interest",[158]
citing complexity and cost as justification for this view.
We do not agree with this definition, nor is it in line with the
circumstances when an inquiry into public concern may be suitable
as specified in section 1 of the Act.
91. We received evidence from Liberty supporting
the need for a statutory inquiry in instances where the coronial
system is not engaged: "wherever there are human rights allegations
involved there should always be a statutory inquiry if there is
not an inquest."[159]
The most important contributory factor when deciding whether to
hold an inquest or an inquiry into the circumstances of a particular
death seems to us to be whether wider areas of public concern
are present, or policy issues which require examination.
92. Where public concern extends significantly
beyond a death itself to wider related issues, an inquiry may
be preferable to an inquest. If such issues emerge in the course
of an inquest, consideration should be given to suspending the
inquest and appointing a senior judge as chairman of an inquiry
under the Inquiries Act 2005.
Who should decide?
93. The question who should decide whether to
hold or not to hold an inquiry, and what type of inquiry to hold,
is a delicate one on which we heard differing views.
94. Section 1 of the Act provides that the minister
"may cause an inquiry to be held" where "it appears
to him" that public concern about particular events
is present. There is no legal duty to establish an inquiry under
the Actit is a matter of discretion for the minister. Inquiries
may also be established otherwise than under the Act, as discussed
earlier in this chapter.
95. The proposed ministerial powers in the draft
Inquiries Bill were subject to much criticism at the time about
the perceived effect the powers would have on the independence
of inquiries. Specifically, there was criticism of a "shift
in emphasis towards inquiries established and largely controlled
by government Ministers."[160]
Many of our witnesses thought one of the most significant changes
made by the Act was to set out in statute that the power to establish
an inquiry into matters of public concern rested with a minister.
96. Criticism varied from that of Disaster Action,
who felt the discretionary nature of the power "is vague
and, in our view, leaves too wide a discretion to the minister
concerned"[161]
and claimed there was an "arbitrary and inconsistent approach
to decision making",[162]
to that of Dr Mackie, who thought it possible for unnecessary
inquiries to be set up "as a way of kicking issues into the
long grass".[163]
97. Many of our witnesses, including Eversheds,
Disaster Action, Liberty, the (Northern Ireland) Committee on
the Administration of Justice (CAJ), and Collins, Kemish and Underwood
gave examples of matters which they believed should have been
investigated under the Act but which were not.[164]
Some witnesses, for instance CAJ[165]
and Liberty,[166] told
us that this called into question the independence of ministerial
decision making. We do not agree. An analysis of ministerial decisions
shows that while it is true that the case for holding a statutory
inquiry has often been argued by family members and interest groups
to no avail, in many cases, ministers have given comprehensive
reasons for the decision not to hold an inquiry. In the recent
case of Litvinenko, the Home Secretary's reasons, while comprehensive,
were found by the High Court "not [to] provide a rational
basis for the decision not to set up a statutory inquiry".[167]
BOX 4
Examples of ministerial reasons not to
hold an inquiry
· The then Secretary of State for Defence (Geoffrey Hoon MP) opposed an inquiry into the deaths of four young soldiers at Deepcut Barracks in a debate in the House of Commons on 27 April 2004,[168] arguing that the matter been "subject to thorough and detailed examination" by Surrey Police.
· The then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Caroline Flint) set out three reasons for not holding an inquiry into the murder of Daniel Morgan. They were, in summary, that there was insufficient public concern; Government did not consider there be a realistic prospect of uncovering new evidence following previous investigations; and previous investigations found no police involvement in the murder.[169]
· The then Secretary of State for Health, Andy Burnham MP, opposed a "full public inquiry" into the failings at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust "given the thoroughness of the reports already produced."[170]
· The Prime Minister (David Cameron MP) set out reasons for not holding an inquiry into the death of Pat Finucane on 12 December 2012: "if we look at the other inquiries
we see that some of them took five or six years or longer and cost tens of millions of pounds, and I do not believe that they got closer to the truth than de Silva[171] has in his excellent and full report."[172]
· In the case of the inquest into the death of Alexander Litvinenko, in a letter to the Coroner of 17 July 2013 the Home Secretary (Theresa May MP) set out her detailed reasons for her decision not to convert the inquest into an inquiry. The six reasons included, in summary, that an inquiry was likely to be more costly of time, money and resources, and that international relations would be better served by an inquest.[173] This decision was later overturned by the High Court, which expressed concern about each of the reasons.
· In September 2013 the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Theresa Villiers MP) decided not to initiate a public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the bombing in Omagh on 15 August 1998, as: "I do not believe there are sufficient grounds to justify a further review or inquiry above and beyond those that have already taken place or are ongoing. The current investigation by the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland is the best way to address any outstanding issues relating to the police investigation of the Omagh attack."[174]
|
98. Where the Act has not been used, it seems
that this has been primarily due to cost and logistical concerns,
particularly in relation to security and intelligence issues.
We received no evidence of a minister failing to establish an
inquiry under the Act into his or her department in order to avoid
criticism; or of a minister establishing a statutory inquiry to
''kick an issue into the long grass''[175].
99. Sir Stephen Sedley however felt the
scarcity of inquiries under the Act might be because of reluctance
by the Government to establish an inquiry due to the perceived
lack of independence from the executive: "It does not look
good if you set up an independent inquiry and retain the power
to interfere with its proceedings."[176]
This was the reason given by the Home Secretary in her letter
of July 2013, refusing a public inquiry into the death of Alexander
Litvinenko. She wrote: "An inquest managed and run by an
independent coroner is more readily explainable to some of our
foreign partners, and the integrity of the process more readily
grasped, than an inquiry, established by the Government, under
a Chairman appointed by the Government which has the power to
see Government material, potentially relevant to their interests,
in secret."[177]
But this reason was not accepted by the High Court, which overturned
the decision.
100. Conversely, there has been one instance
where the Government tried unsuccessfully to set up an inquiry
under the Act: the family of Pat Finucane refused to take part
in an inquiry under the Act due to their concerns about its independence.[178]
101. Witnesses who remained unconvinced about
the impartiality of ministerial decision-making suggested alternatives.
Rights Watch UK suggested that a new independent body be established
to take the decision: "A statutory authority such as a Permanent
Commission of Inquiry
A quasi statutory authority such
[as] a Public Truth Commission",[179]
amongst others. This is not a new proposalthe families
of the Lockerbie victims suggested: "the creation of an independent
''disasters ombudsman''."[180]
While we do not view this as necessary, for reasons explained
above, there is nothing within the Act which prohibits the minister
from establishing a committee to consider whether an inquiry should
be heldthe National Assembly for Wales set up a cross-party
committee to consider the need for an inquiry into the E. coli
outbreak. The Committee recommended an inquiry under the Inquiries
Act which was duly held.
102. Some of our witnesses, including Rights
Watch UK, Eversheds, and Peter Riddell, favoured transfering the
power to set up an inquiry to Parliament, for instance via a motion
in either House.[181]
103. Many of our witnesses felt that the power
to establish inquiries was best left with a minister, who is accountable
to Parliament. In written evidence Collins, Kemish and Underwood
told us: "In the final analysis, the recognition, and response
to, public concern, is a matter for the executive, subject as
it is to oversight by the legislature and by the courts."[182]
Peter Riddell,[183]
Professor Tomkins[184]
and Dr Mackie[185]
all described the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight, for
instance parliamentary questions. On the other hand Robert Francis
QC cautioned: "While Parliament can hold ministers to account
for not holding an inquiry it cannot force them to do so."[186]
This is true as a matter of law, but in practice a minister would
be unlikely to decline to comply with a motion carried by either
House calling for an inquiry to be set up.
104. Eversheds told us that concerns about independence
could be addressed by the way the inquiry is established, in ensuring
openness, transparency and fairness: "we believe the issue
is not about whether or not Ministers should have the power or
discretion to set up, or not set up, an inquiry, but rather ensuring
that there is transparency in the way that an inquiry is created
and conducted."[187]
That view is borne out by the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in the Edwards case.[188]
In that case the authorities who had statutory responsibility
towards the deceased set up the inquiry into the circumstances
of his death, determined its terms of reference, and appointed
its members as well as the solicitors who assisted the inquiry.
Nevertheless the court was satisfied that the inquiry was independent,
because the inquiry chairman was a member of the Bar with judicial
experience and the other members were eminent or experienced in
the relevant fields. None had any hierarchical link to the authorities
in question and, in the court's view, all acted in an independent
capacity. The report was described as meticulous and the Court
declared that it had no hesitation in relying on its assessment
of the facts and issues.[189]
105. We have considered whether the power to
set up an inquiry should reside with the minister of the department
responsible for the matter under investigation, or with a minister
of an ''overseeing'' department, which would have responsibility
for all inquiries. Prior to the passage of the Act departments
had been responsible for specific legislation, now repealed, under
which inquiries could be set up; they still retain expertise on
the subject of particular inquiries. One example is the Ministry
of DefenceJonathan Duke-Evans told us of his position:
"it was thought that there needed to be a quasi-permanent
post dealing with public inquiries".[190]
In chapter 5 we recommend the establishment of a central inquiries
unit with responsibility for maintaining good practice. Before
an inquiry is established the minister could seek advice from
this unit.
106. We believe it is right that the power
to establish a public inquiry should be held by a minister of
the relevant department. The fact that ministers are accountable
to Parliament, and that Parliament can always call for an inquiry
to be set up, allows sufficient Parliamentary involvement in the
process.
Giving reasons for not ordering
inquiries
107. In Effective inquiries: response to consultation,[191]
it was stated that: "The Government believes that it is right
that Ministers should explain publicly any decision to establish,
or not to establish, an inquiry." Normally a minister who
decides not to order an inquiry does not have to give reasonsindeed,
does not have to do anything at all. In practice, in significant
matters of public concern, there has often been a ministerial
statement to Parliament; we have given examples of these above.
In this section we consider whether it is possible to set out
stricter criteria governing the cases where ministers should be
obliged to give their reasons.
108. As judicial review is the only means by
which to challenge a ministerial decision, it is important whether
or not reasons are given. Christopher Jefferies told us: "it
is absolutely essential that cogent reasons are given"[192]
for the refusal to hold an inquiry. Robert Francis QC went further
and suggested a procedure which could "allow for these reasons
to be offered to Parliament for scrutiny",[193]
a suggestion also made by Professor Tomkins[194].
109. We see no reason why a practice of giving
reasons for not holding an inquiry should lead to an escalation
in applications for judicial review. The decision to hold or not
to hold an inquiry can be judicially reviewed whether or not reasons
are given[195] and
the position is similar in respect of coroners' inquests. Several
aspects of inquiry procedure have been the subject of judicial
review, notably challenges concerning the anonymity of witnesses
before the Saville Inquiry.[196]
Robert Francis QC told us: "Judicial review should offer
a sufficient opportunity to challenge perverse or unlawful refusals."[197]
A number of witnesses, on the other hand, including Sir Stephen
Sedley,[198] Julie
Bailey,[199] Disaster
Action,[200] Herbert
Smith Freehills,[201]
Stephen Jones[202]
and Liberty,[203] stressed
that judicial review was cumbersome and expensive and hence not
necessarily easily available to persons hoping that an inquiry
will be set up or seeking to challenge procedure. Robert Francis
QC also noted that "there remains a judicial reluctance to
order inquiries".[204]
For instance, we referred earlier[205]
to recent cases where it was held that an investigation established
by the Secretary of State for Defence was neither independent
nor adequately compliant with the investigative duties under Articles
2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
110. It would be impractical for ministers to
give reasons every time there is a call for an inquiry which they
do not believe to be justified, and none of our witnesses were
able to suggest firm criteria for when reasons should, or should
not, be given. We believe ministers must retain a general discretion
as to when to give reasons for their decisions; at the same time,
events involving what the Cabinet Secretary called "failure
in regulation" are uniquely important and reasons should
always be given for a decision not to initiate an inquiry.
111. We recommend that ministers should give
reasons to Parliament for a decision not to hold an inquiry particularly
in the following circumstances: when invited to hold an inquiry
by IPCC, Ofsted, the Information Commissioner, Parliamentary Commissioners
for Administration and Health, the Commission for Local Administration,
or a body of similar standing; and when an investigation by a
regulatory body has been widely criticised.
112. A decision on a request by a coroner
for an inquest to be converted into an inquiry should always be
the subject of reasons.
58 It emerged recently that the ashes of
dead babies had been being buried or disposed off without the
knowledge of families. Back
59
Q 249. Back
60
Q 205. Back
61
See the review by Nicholas Blake QC into the Circumstances
Surrounding the Deaths of Four Soldiers at Princess Royal Barracks,
Deepcut between 1995 and 2002, available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228930/0795.pdf. Back
62
In fact, the then Northern Ireland Secretary Paul Murphy
MP had announced on 23 September 2004 an inquiry to investigate
the death of Pat Finucane under "new legislation which will
be introduced shortly" (the then Inquiries Bill). But the
Finucane family opposed an investigation under the Act, due to
concerns about whether information would be released. See Northern
Ireland Office, Statement by Secretary of State Paul Murphy
MP on Finucane Inquiry, News release, 23 September 2004; and
UK: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International,
June 2008. Back
63
Litvinenko died in London in November 2006 of radiation
poisoning. Back
64
A car bomb attack carried out in Omagh by the Real Irish
Republican Army on Saturday 15 August 1998. Back
65
Dame Janet Smith is currently conducting an investigation
into Savile on behalf of the BBC. Back
66
The Advice Note explored findings of the Culture, Media
and Sport Select Committee into Press Standards. The Committee's
subsequent inquiry led to the establishment of the Leveson Inquiry. Back
67
Cabinet Secretary Advice Note, Public Inquiries,
19 March 2010, available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60808/cabinet-secretary-advice-judicial.pdf. Back
68
Julie Bailey, Q 162; Eversheds, written evidence, paragraph
13; Susan Bryant, Q 236-237. Back
69
An honour Ms Bailey was awarded in the New Year Honours
2014 for her work in the setting up of the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry. Back
70
A campaign group established in 2007 following the death
of Julie Bailey's mother while in the care of Mid Staffordshire
NHS Foundation Trust. Back
71
Under rule 5 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 the chairman of an
inquiry may designate a person as a core participant. In his book
Public Inquiries (OUP, 2011) Jason Beer QC defines core
participant as a term "to denote a person
who has
a particularly close connection to the inquiry's work-known in
a non-2005 Act inquiry as an 'interested party' or 'full participant'."
(Page 156, paragraph 4.61) Back
72
Julie Bailey, Q 162. Back
73
London solicitors who acted as solicitors to the Bloody
Sunday, Shipman, Rosemary Nelson and Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust
inquiries, and acted for the metropolitan Police in the Leveson
inquiry. Back
74
Eversheds, written evidence, paragraph 13. Back
75
We have included details of the guidance at paragraphs 157
et seq. Back
76
Government written response, part 2, paragraph 18. Back
77
Rights Watch UK suggested criteria based on the need for
compellability; public confidence and "lesser" alternatives.
All of these are either provisions under the Act, or in the existing
Cabinet Office guidance. Supplementary written evidence, paragraph
1. Back
78
Robert Francis QC, written evidence, paragraph 14. Back
79
Q 203 and Q 218. Back
80
Q 51. Back
81
Into the death of Alexander Litvinenko. Back
82
Now Lord Prescott. Back
83
HC Deb, 21 July 2009, col 124WS. Back
84
Robert Francis QC, written evidence, paragraph 11. Back
85
Mid Staffordshire, 2010; Vale of Leven Hospital, 2009;
C. difficile, 2008, Penrose, 2008; ICL, 2008. Back
86
Leveson, 2011 (previous police inquiry); Mid Staffordshire,
2010 (involvement of Healthcare Commission, CQC and the HSE);
Azelle Rodney, 2010 (previous IPCC report); Bernard (Sonny) Lodge,
2009 (previous investigation by a prison governor); C. difficile,
2008 (involvement of RQIA); Penrose, 2008 (NHS boards); Fingerprint
(previous inquiries), E. coli, 2006 (food regulatory bodies);
Robert Hamill, 2004 (previous investigation/collusion of state
agencies); Billy Wright, 2004 (previous investigation/collusion
of state agencies). Back
87
Coroners are not able to consider intelligence material
gathered under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Back
88
Even where the principal event involves a private person
(such as Dr Harold Shipman) or a private organisation (such as
the BCCI), there will often be allegations of regulatory or other
failures by organs of the State (eg the Department of Health and
the Bank of England). (As explained by Jason Beer, Public Inquiries
(OUP, 2011), page 269, footnote 8). Back
89
We quote many times from this valuable evidence, referring
to it subsequently as Collins, Kemish and Underwood. Ashley Underwood
QC was Leading Counsel to the Robert Hamill Inquiry, and to the
Azelle Rodney Inquiry, and was subsequently Counsel to the Mark
Duggan inquest. Judi Kemish is a solicitor employed by the Government
Legal Service who was seconded as the solicitor and secretary
to the Robert Hamill Inquiry, then as the solicitor and also junior
Counsel to the Azelle Rodney Inquiry, and subsequently as the
solicitor to the Mark Duggan inquest. Michael Collins is a civil
servant with the Ministry of Justice who was seconded as secretary
to the Azelle Rodney Inquiry and subsequently seconded as secretary
to the Mark Duggan Inquest. Back
90
Written evidence, paragraph 8. Back
91
For instance Ofsted conducts in depth surveys and good practice
studies to provide unique evidence to national policymakers. Back
92
The Children's Commissioner also has the power to conduct
an inquiry, under section 3 of the Children Act 2004, which states
"Where the Children's Commissioner considers that the case
of an individual child in England raises issues of public policy
of relevance to other children, he may hold an inquiry into that
case for the purpose of investigating and making recommendations
about those issues". See chapter 'About the Office of the
Children's Commissioner' in the report of an inquiry of the Office
of the Children's Commissioner, Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation
in Gangs and Groups, available at: http://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/content/publications/content_636. Back
93
Professor Sir Ian Kennedy, Sir Brian Leveson, Mr Justice
Jay, Jason Beer QC, and Lord Gill. See paragraph 214. Back
94
The ICL Inquiry Report, p.iii, available at:
http://www.theiclinquiry.org/documents/documents/HC838ICL_Inquiry_Report.pdf. Back
95
Q 230. Back
96
Rights Watch UK, written evidence, paragraph 10. Back
97
Q 38. Back
98
Written evidence, paragraph 23. Back
99
Paragraphs 157 et seq. Back
100
What that "other legislation" might be is something
we have considered in paragraphs 38 et seq. Back
101
QQ 321, 323. Back
102
HC Deb, 12 Sep 2013, col 57WS. Back
103
HL Deb, 6 February 2014, cols 260-264. Back
104
Under the Statutory Declarations Act 1835, section 13. Back
105
Section 18 of the Inquiries Act 2005 provides that, subject
to restrictions, the chairman must reasonably ensure that members
of the public are able to attend the hearing; and obtain or view
a record of evidence and documents. Back
106
Professor Kennedy, The Report of the Public Inquiry into
children's heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995,
Chapter 2, available at:
http://www.specialisedservices.nhs.uk/library/30/Learning_from_Bristol_The_Report_of_the_Public_Inquiry_into_childrens_heart_surgery_at_the_Bristol_Royal_Infirmary_1984_1995_The_Kennedy_Report_1.pdf Back
107
The Iraq Inquiry investigated the period from the summer
of 2001 to the end of July 2009, embracing the run-up to the conflict
in Iraq, the military action and its aftermath, the UK's involvement
in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken. Back
108
Sir John Chilcot, written evidence. Back
109
For instance: Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR
245; McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97. Back
110
R (Amin) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2003] UKHL 51. Back
111
Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19. Back
112
Ibid., paragraph 78. Back
113
For instance the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974; Financial
Services Act 2012; or the Inquiry into Historical Institutional
Abuse Act (Northern Ireland) Act 2013. See paragraphs 39-43. Back
114
HC Deb, 13 July 2009, col 106W. Back
115
Chairman's statement on the Morecambe Bay investigation,
1 November 2013, available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254621/morecambe_bay_method_statement.pdf. Back
116
The President of the Queen's Bench Division and Mr Justice
Silber. The President at that time was Sir John Thomas P, now
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the Lord Chief Justice. Back
117
R (Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence and another
[2010] EWHC 3304 (Admin); [2011] EWCA Civ 1334; R(Ali Zaki
Mousa and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2013]
EWHC 1412 (Admin). And see Al Skeini and others v United Kingdom
(2012) 53 EHRR 18. Back
118
R(Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence (No 2),
24 May 2013, [2013]EWHC 2941 (Admin). Back
119
R (Ali Zaki Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence
[2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin), paragraphs 16 and 17. Back
120
Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2): Order paragraph (vii). Back
121
Edwards v United Kingdom
(2002) 35 EHRR 19, paragraph 70. Back
122
Q 278. Back
123
Liberty, written evidence, paragraphs 16-21. Back
124
Rights Watch UK, written evidence, paragraph 12. Back
125
Q 173, Q 178. Back
126
Rights Watch UK, written evidence, paragraph 12. Back
127
Eversheds, written evidence, paragraph 35. Back
128
Robert Francis QC, first written evidence, paragraphs 8-9;
Liberty, written evidence, paragraph 24; Rights Watch UK, written
evidence, paragraph 12; Ashley Underwood QC, Q 252. Back
129
Robert Francis Q 211 and Q 217, Jonathan Duke-Evans
Q 279, Robert Francis QC Q 211, Lord Bichard Q 211,
Alun Evans Q 132. Back
130
Paragraphs 191 et seq. Back
131
Q 91. Back
132
Q 57. Back
133
Collins, Kemish and Underwood, written evidence, footnote
20. Back
134
HC Deb, 15 March 2005, col 150. Back
135
Q 193. Back
136
Q 193. Back
137
Q 217. Back
138
Q 211. Back
139
If the coroner has reason to suspect that the deceased died
a violent or unnatural death; the cause of death is unknown; the
deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention.
Section 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Back
140
See paragraph 69. Back
141
Section 5(1) Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Back
142
Eversheds, written evidence, paragraph 14. Back
143
Collins, Kemish and Underwood, written evidence, paragraph
27. Back
144
Disaster Action, written evidence, paragraph 13.1. Back
145
Q 233. Back
146
Rachel Robinson, Q 233. Back
147
Liberty, written evidence, paragraph 22. Back
148
The Coroners Act 1988 had a section inserted, section 17A,
allowing the Lord Chancellor to order the suspension of an inquest
if an inquiry was opened which was likely to look at the cause
of death. That section was repealed when Part 1 of the Coroners
and Justice Act 2009 came into force in 2013, and was replaced
by Schedule 1 to the Act, which requires a senior coroner to suspend
an investigation (which includes an inquest) "if (a) the
Lord Chancellor requests the coroner to do so on the ground that
the cause of death is likely to be adequately investigated by
an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 that is being or is to
be held, (b) a senior judge has been appointed under that Act
as chairman of the inquiry, and (c) the Lord Chief Justice has
indicated approval to the Lord Chancellor, for the purposes of
this paragraph, of the appointment of that judge." "Senior
judge" does not include a retired judge. Back
149
Q 258. Back
150
Q 233. Back
151
Azelle Rodney was shot and killed by a police firearms officer
after the car he was travelling in was forced to a stop by the
police, in April 2005, in Mill Hill, North West London. Guns were
found in the car and there was credible intelligence to the effect
that Rodney and his companions were on their way to commit an
armed robbery at the time. The IPCC investigation into the death
did not make any findings of significant fault on the part of
the Metropolitan Police Service and its officers. Sir Christopher
Holland's inquiry report found that none of the shooting by the
police was necessary.
Mark Duggan was shot and killed by
a police firearms officer after the taxi he was travelling in
was forced to a stop by the police, in August 2011, in Tottenham,
North London. A gun was found near the car. The IPCC investigation
into the death has not, to date, published its report, although
the Guardian reported in August 2013 that the IPCC had found no
evidence of criminality at that stage. The inquest verdict in
January 2014 was that the shooting was lawful. Back
152
Collins, Kemish and Underwood, written evidence, paragraph
5. Back
153
Q 258. Back
154
Letter 4 June 2013. Back
155
Litvinenko's widow judicially reviewed the refusal by the
Secretary of State for the Home Department to order the setting
up of a statutory inquiry under section 1(1) of the Inquiries
Act 2005 ("the 2005 Act") into the circumstances of
the death. Back
156
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014]
EWHC 194 (Admin). Back
157
Justice and Security Green Paper, Cm 8194, October 2011,
available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228860/8194.pdf. Back
158
Ibid. paragraph 1.49. Back
159
Q 244. Back
160
The Inquiries Bill-the Wrong Answer, A Joint Statement
by Amnesty International; British Irish Rights Watch (now Rights
Watch UK); The Committee on the Administration of Justice; Human
Rights First; The Human Rights Institute of the International
Bar Association; INQUEST; JUSTICE; Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada;
The Law Society of England and Wales; Pat Finucane Centre; and
Scottish Human Rights Centre, available at:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/008/2005/en/54771d67-d508-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/eur450082005en.html. Back
161
Disaster Action, written evidence, paragraph 2.1. Back
162
Ibid. Back
163
Q 58. Back
164
Examples detailed earlier in the chapter are the initial
Mid Staffordshire Inquiry, Deepcut, the murder of Pat Finucane,
the death of Alexander Litvinenko, Hillsborough, the recent banking
crisis and the Omagh bombing. Back
165
Written evidence, paragraph 5. Back
166
Written evidence, paragraph 16. Back
167
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014]
EWHC 194 (Admin). Back
168
HC Deb, 27 April 2004, col 204 WH. Back
169
HC Deb 6 July 2004, cols 234-236. Back
170
HC Deb, 21 July 2009, col 124WS. Back
171
The Rt Hon Sir Desmond de Silva QC conducted a non-statutory
review into the death. Back
172
HC Deb, 12 December 2012, col 300. Back
173
See paragraph 99. Back
174
Written Ministerial Statement by the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland on the Call for an inquiry into the Omagh
Bomb, 12 September 2013, available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/September_2013/12-9-13/14-NIO-OmaghBomb.PDF. Back
175
We received evidence from Liberty that the purpose of the
non-statutory Detainee Inquiry was "a cynical public relations
exercise, to diffuse political criticism, and ensure that potentially
embarrassing events or issues are kicked into the long grass until
an anodyne or inconclusive report is produced." (written
evidence, paragraph 21). Back
176
Q 41. Back
177
Letter of 17 July 2013 from the Home Secretary to Sir Robert
Owen, Assistant Coroner of the Litvinenko Inquest. Back
178
Amnesty International urges judiciary not to partake
in inquiry sham, Pat Finucane Centre, available at:
http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/pf/inqubill/ai050420.html.
And Investigatory Inquiries and Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence)
Act 1921, Commons Library Standard Note, 3 September 2012,
available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN02599/investigatory-inquiries-and-the-tribunals-of-inquiry-evidence-act-1921.
In the event, subsequent to their refusal of an inquiry under
the Act, Finucane's family stated that they would accept such
an inquiry, but with the stipulation that the ministerial powers
under section 19 would not be used, as had been arranged in the
Baha Mousa Inquiry, Submissions on behalf of the family of
Pat Finucane, contained in Note for Madden and Finucane
Meeting, Pat Finucane Centre, available at:
http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/pf/111014docs.pdf. Back
179
Rights Watch UK, written evidence. Back
180
Extract from UK Families Flight 103 19 July 2002 Letter
to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. Back
181
Peter Riddell, Q 63. Back
182
Collins, Kemish, Underwood, written evidence, paragraph
11. Back
183
Q 62. Back
184
Q 24. Back
185
Q 62. Back
186
Robert Francis QC, written evidence, paragraph 11. Back
187
Eversheds, written evidence, paragraph 12. Back
188
Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 19. Back
189
Ibid. paragraphs 25, 28,
76 and 80-81. Back
190
Q 275. Back
191
CP (R) 12/04, ODPM, 28 September 2004. Back
192
Christopher Jefferies, Q 163. Back
193
Robert Francis QC, written evidence, paragraph 14. Back
194
Q 39. Back
195
In R v Home Secretary ex p Amin [2003] UKHL 51, the
appellant successfully challenged the decision of the Home Secretary
not to hold an inquiry in public. The case established the obligation
to hold a sufficient inquiry in cases covered by Article 2 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. And in R v Secretary
of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 194 (Admin) the
appellant successfully challenged the reasons given by the Home
Secretary not to hold an inquiry under the Act. Back
196
R v Lord Saville of Newdigate, ex p. A [2000] 1 WLR
1855; R v Lord Saville of Newdigate ex p. B (No 2) [2000]
1 WLR 1855; Lord Saville of Newdigate and others v Widgery
Soldiers and others [2002] 1 WLR 1249. Back
197
Written evidence, paragraph 11. Back
198
Q 46. Back
199
Q 182. Back
200
Written evidence, paragraph 4.4. Back
201
Written evidence, paragraph 14. Herbert Smith Freehills
are London solicitors who have represented a number of core participants
in inquiries, including Trinity Mirror plc in the Leveson inquiry. Back
202
Written evidence, paragraph 4. Back
203
Q 243. Back
204
Written evidence, paragraph 9. This is also true of the
judgment in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2014] EWHC 194 (Admin) where the Court stopped short of ordering
an inquiry. Back
205
Paragraphs 74-75. Back
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