Conclusions and recommendations
This Committee was an 'ad hoc' appointment by the
House and therefore ceased to exist on the production of this
Report. The Liaison Committee, which is responsible for reviewing
the work of the House's select committees, has decided to follow
up the recommendations of former ad hoc committees a year after
their reports are published. Some of our recommendations (those
marked with an asterisk below) are therefore identified as issues
on which we hope progress can be made within a year, and which
should be subject to this process.
1. The shifts sweeping the international order
over the past 15 years will accelerate and be compounded in the
years immediately ahead. Unprecedented international access to
state information, the digital empowerment of individuals and
groups, the growing role of global protest networks and non-governmental
organisations, the complexity of modern trade supply chains and
multinational corporate operations, accelerated urbanisation and
transnational challenges are all operating both to diffuse and
fragment traditional state power and to bring many of the world's
peoples and countries closer together. At the same time, the rising
power, economic and political, of non-Western countries (the so-called
'rise of the rest') is altering the international balance of power
and influence. (see paragraph 28 of the main body of the
Report)
2. We have heard that these two powerful streams
are converging to reshape global politics, and we believe that
they require a commensurate response from those who guide the
UK's foreign policy, from the Government's leaders downwards.
In this hugely changed international context, the UK cannot simply
proceed as before. If the UK is still effectively to protect and
promote its interests, how it interacts with other nations and
communities will need fundamentally to alter. We conclude that
this demands a radical change in the mindset of those who direct
the UK's foreign policy and shape its international role. We note
that the UK is hosting a NATO summit in Newport in September of
this year. There will be considerable focus on the UK's foreign
policy in the weeks building up to that event: we recommend that
the key themes of this Report should be evident in the Government's
current and forthcoming preparations for the summit and in their
contribution to the public debate surrounding it.* (paragraph 28)
3. While the balances of power are shifting away
from the West and away from governments, military force—though
undoubtedly vital—is proving insufficient for defending
the international interests of modern states. However, international
relations are becoming ever more important as many nations become
increasingly interconnected and interdependent, with a broadening
interface between official, non-state and private interests and
organisations. In this context, we consider that a country wishing
to maintain or improve its place on the international stage must
find new, complementary ways of establishing and exerting power
and maintaining influence to reinforce and build on the crucial
contribution made by the Armed Forces. (paragraph 39)
4. In the context of shared global threats and
high economic and political interdependence between states, and
because military coercion alone is proving insufficient for defending
nations' interests, being able to build positive international
relationships and coalitions—as well as being able to export
goods and services—is vital for modern nations' security
and prosperity. The degree to which populations now form networks
across borders gives this soft power a newly increased impact
because it relies to a significant degree on popular perceptions.
(paragraph 41)
5. The evidence that we have received about the
role of soft power in modern international relations has convinced
us that because the methods that countries use to sustain or gain
international power are changing, successfully communicating the
attributes, values and outputs that gain for the UK both attractiveness
and respect in the eyes of people abroad will be vital in maintaining
the UK in positions of influence. Soft power may be difficult
to measure and control, but it is nonetheless essential for protecting
the UK's interests. The mindset of those who shape the UK's foreign
policy must reflect this. (paragraph 60)
6. To maximise their overall power, governments
must strike an intelligent balance between supporting and benefiting
from softer methods of power and persuasion now available and
resorting to the use of force (hard power). Governments must also
understand how hard and soft power are mutually reinforcing. Using
the analogy of Professor Nye's three-dimensional chess game
(with military power still unipolar on the top board, economic
power now multipolar on the middle board, and the realm of cross-border
transactions outside governmental control on the bottom board
where power is now widely dispersed), governments need to be able
to negotiate their positions in all three dimensions. In the hyper-connected
world, we consider that the game will be played more often on
the third board, where transnational attractions and connections
produce soft power. While it will be rarer for states to call
on military force or economic sanctions, failure to consider the
whole playing board could lead to the UK being outmanoeuvered.
(paragraph 70)
7. For the UK to thrive in the new global milieu—as
it should be well equipped to do—Government, Parliament,
leading voices and shapers of opinion, non-governmental actors
and the public will all need a better understanding of the importance
of soft power alongside traditional hard power, and of how they
interact. It is vital that the Government should have confidence
in communicating with the British public about how some of their
actions and spending in support of soft power can only deliver
tangible and measurable results over time, and with patience and
dedication. (paragraph 78)
8. A greater public appreciation for how the
UK's soft power assets (such as its cultural strengths) and most
attractive characteristics (such as its diversity) contribute
to the UK's international standing, its security, and its prosperity,
could improve both domestic and international understanding of
the UK's strategic narrative. It could also support internal community
cohesion, and help voters recognise the benefits of the international
networks of which the UK is a member, and the assets and policies
that taxpayers fund. We urge strongly-led public debate about
the Government's approach to smart power. Particularly within
Government and Parliament, there is a need for urgent reflection
on the mechanisms through which the Government seek to exercise
power to achieve the UK's goals. (paragraph 79)
9. We also urge on all concerned a much deeper
understanding of how others see the UK, and how the very most
can be made of our undoubtedly unique assets. Thus, while the
US is the UK's close ally, and while the UK is a European power
by history, geography and interests, we feel that there can be
real soft power gains for the UK if it is seen to have a role
and direction which is distinct—at least in some respects—from
the broad American-led sphere of influence, and distinct from
collective European Union endeavours. (paragraph 80)
10. As our witnesses have made very clear, the
days are long gone when this nation's, or any nation's, power
could be measured in the size of its military forces, or in traditional
patterns of enforcement. (paragraph 81)
11. If the UK is to benefit from its significant
soft power potential, the Government need to recognise that some
of the bigger gains will only emerge over time and as conditions
evolve. An overemphasis on immediate returns on investment will
dilute the urgent attention that the pursuit and exercise of soft
power require. (paragraph 84)
12. The task for the Government will be to build
on the UK's strengths, support the already evident success of
soft power projection in many fields, and avoid the false economies
of short-termism in areas where results take time to mature. Some
of our proposals below involve relatively small levels of additional
expenditure. We emphasise that investment now will realise significant
future returns, not least because it is cheaper to support established
and successful soft power assets now than it would be to attempt
to regenerate neglected assets later, when the benefits of soft
power become even clearer. In addition, the Government need to
express honestly to the public that successes in the generation
of soft power may come only from long-term commitments. (paragraph 85)
13. As the Government examine the UK's geopolitical
situation, they need to refine the country's role to ensure that
they and other UK actors are able to maximise both the UK's attractiveness
and the benefit gained from the country's soft power. (paragraph 94)
14. We consider that the UK has much to offer
the world, particularly because its history has bequeathed it
both a global perspective and a deep understanding of most of
the world's regions. It also enjoys alliances with many of the
world's nations, both great and rising. The UK must therefore
not accept any putative foreign policy choice between acting as
a poodle of Washington or a lapdog of Brussels. The UK must chart
its own course at the centre of a networked and transformed world
in which it has significant comparative advantages. (paragraph 96)
15. We urge those shaping the UK's foreign policy
to act with greater confidence on the international stage, particularly
in the Commonwealth, and not be reluctant to play a global role
because of the complexity of the UK's colonial history. (paragraph 97)
16. We consider that better coordination of the
UK's overseas activities will require the Government to commit
more resources to the Embassy network.* (paragraph 99)
17. Embassies are now 'super-facilitators', facilitating
contacts abroad for British businesses and other organisations
and then standing aside while new relationships develop. The global
redistribution of power away from governments means that the Embassy
network needs to be supported more than ever, and Embassy resourcing
strengthened. We welcome the Government's ambition to reopen diplomatic
posts across the world, particularly in the BRIC countries and
Latin America. But we are concerned that at a time when such posts
have become vital to British soft power, the Government might
have spread the UK's diplomatic representation too thinly.* (paragraph 101)
18. Ambassadors are now required to be polymaths,
and need training in a wide range of skills. The Committee recognises
that spending constraints currently prevent the Government from
providing much in the way of extra compensation to acknowledge
this increased level of responsibility, but we urge the Government
to ensure that remuneration and career structures allow the FCO
to retain the most able. (paragraph 102)
19. The era-shifting rise of social media will
require the UK's official representatives to keep abreast of the
skills that public diplomacy now demands. We therefore recommend
that all UK diplomats receive professional training in public
diplomacy. Government representatives should make use of all the
methods and technologies that they have at their disposal to communicate
effectively. In the hyper-connected world, UK diplomats will need
always to be aware of the power of social media, and competent
in their use of it.* (paragraph 104)
20. We urge the Government to keep under review
their decision to decentralise public diplomacy funding. When
making funding commitments, the FCO should consider how best to
spend public money to achieve the widest possible soft power impact.
(paragraph 105)
21. The Committee welcomes the re-opening of
the FCO's Language Centre. The Government should conduct an audit
of the language skills of civil servants across all Departments.
The Government would not need to spend a great deal on such an
exercise, but being able to draw upon all of the Government's
language skills would bring sizeable advantages for officials
working overseas or with foreign counterparts.* (paragraph 106)
22. There will be significant crossover between
the roles that the Armed Forces, DFID and the FCO assume in unstable
and post-conflict contexts worldwide. We therefore recommend that
the Government should review how well DFID, the MOD and the FCO
cooperated in Afghanistan, with a view to providing lessons for
any future post-conflict reconstruction efforts. They should publish
the results of their review as a Command Paper within a year of
the withdrawal from Afghanistan.* (paragraph 113)
23. We acknowledge the concerns raised by some
witnesses that the perceived blurring of boundaries between humanitarian
organisations and armed forces can create political and security
difficulties for aid workers. But the level of separation involved
in 'humanitarian space' runs counter both to the idea that the
Armed Forces involve themselves more closely in post-conflict
and peacetime activities, and to the new imperative for the UK
to use all the assets at its disposal in a joined-up way to gain
influence in a changing world. Generally, such barriers should
not be allowed to halt cooperation between military and civilian
actors where cooperation is necessary. At the same time, servicemen
and servicewomen deserve greater recognition for the important
work that they do in post-conflict reconstruction.* (paragraph 115)
24. We recommend that the Government undertake
a thorough analysis of the contribution that soft and smart power
might make to the UK's security as part of the 2015 Strategic
Defence and Security Review. They should look in particular at
the role that the military plays in projecting soft power and
at its humanitarian work.* (paragraph 116)
25. Because their work is now so dependent on
understanding the cultural and political contexts of countries
in which they operate, and because the work of the military is
linked inextricably to broader efforts to improve the UK's reputation
overseas, military attachés should be fully integrated
into mainstream Embassy work under the purview of Ambassadors.*
(paragraph 117)
26. The importance of hard power (military force)
in knitting together with soft power as part of a smart power
strategy should be more fully grasped. The Armed Forces, as they
face the demands of a still faster-changing role in the new context,
should be properly resourced to meet these challenges. (paragraph 119)
27. The promotion of British values through the
funding of international development projects can yield significant
soft power gains. The Government should improve their communications
around the UK's involvement in Africa and other developing regions
and countries, for example by promoting the UK as a partner (including
a commercial partner), not simply as an aid-giver. (paragraph 124)
28. The Government should attempt better coordination
of the activities that UK agencies undertake 'on the ground' in
each post and market. The Committee feels that DFID is too divorced
from other arms of Government and UK Embassies. (paragraph 127)
29. DFID could, for example, make an explicit
commitment in its annual business plan outlining how it might
better promote itself as an enabler of soft power and as a promoter
of British industry and commerce. The Government should also consider
soft power gains when reviewing DFID's activities. Humanitarian
assistance and post-conflict reconstruction, for instance, might
yield greater soft power gains than other forms of support, and
this should be part of the picture when DFID's work is evaluated.
(paragraph 128)
30. We consider that as well as its focus on
when UK development assistance can achieve the most for the people
it is intended to support, DFID should give consideration to the
degree to which its work can support the promotion of British
values. It should do so both because such a focus would support
the UK's soft power, and because British values such as democracy
and the rule of law promote the stability of the countries involved
and the wellbeing of their people. (paragraph 131)
31. The Government should ensure that Departments
are sufficiently resourced to deliver British aid in a way that
supports the UK's soft power, because false economies here will
result in aid spending that fails to deliver benefits for the
UK in the long run. The Government should also ensure that DFID
does more to improve the transparency and accountability of the
overseas projects that it supports, of consultants whom DFID employs
directly, and of consultants employed by the NGOs that DFID funds.
In addition, DFID should be more open about the projects that
it has paid for whose objectives have not been achieved. (paragraph 132)
32. Building on the UK's networked position will
mean that the Government can work to shape the milieu of the international
networks and global 'system' in which it plays a part, and not
just relations within that system. (paragraph 144)
33. The underrepresentation of British officials
in international institutions such as the EU and UN could well
prove detrimental to the UK's long-term influence. (paragraph 145)
34. The UK must engage more actively and flexibly
with the networks of the future that represent key emerging powers,
such as ASEAN, the African Union, the Arab League, the Pacific
Alliance and the new Latin American groupings now taking shape.
We consider that the UK is in a uniquely strong position to seize
the opportunities that its global history offers and present itself
as able and keen to forge bonds with countries and communities
across the globe. (paragraph 146)
35. The strategic imperatives of a transformed
global order demand that the UK aim to be the best-networked state
in the world. To answer one-time US Secretary of State Dean Acheson's
challenge—that the UK had "lost an Empire and not yet
found a role"—we submit that the country's history,
experience and global reach now present it with an enviable opportunity
to work with others in shaping the world. This role will require
sometimes difficult engagement with partners old and new, but
it is a role that the Government should embrace unequivocally
and enthusiastically. (paragraph 147)
36. Since it is a clear source of advantage to
UK interests, the Government could investigate how to give more
support to intra-Commonwealth trade. (paragraph 154)
37. The Government need to put greater focus
on the important potential in the Commonwealth. The Minister of
State charged with responsibility for Commonwealth matters should
have that task as his or her main role, and should be seen to
do so, rather than just having care for Commonwealth relationships
included amongst a list of numerous duties. (paragraph 156)
38. The UK must not be too timid about engaging
energetically with the Commonwealth. Hyper-connectivity and the
'rise of the rest' are conspiring to give the Commonwealth every
opportunity to become a vital network of the 21st century. The
UK would be foolish not to recognise this development. (paragraph 157)
39. Our evidence suggested that the new significance
for the UK of the modern Commonwealth, offering high-growth and
high-savings markets, as well as a gateway to many of the great
emerging powers of Asia, Africa and Latin America, is not quite
understood in Whitehall. We note that the education, business,
training and cultural sectors have taken the lead in Commonwealth
networking. In particular, the UK's increasingly successful exporters
of all kinds of services have forged ahead with this engagement—a
highly promising trend in a world of fast-expanding knowledge-based
exchanges. (paragraph 159) We recommend that the Government
should follow this lead both in inspirational word and in deed:
not just inside the FCO, but in all the lead Departments with
a substantial international interface (including DFID, MOD, DCMS,
DfE, DEFRA and others). The Government should foster and encourage
Commonwealth linkages with much more vigour than before, while
recognising the challenges which currently confront Commonwealth
bodies. (paragraph 160)
40. Given the importance of the wide-ranging
debate regarding the UK's membership of the EU, we feel that all
political parties should ensure that their policy choices take
heed of the UK's long-term global influence. While recognising
that the balance of evidence we received argued that membership
of the EU offers the UK a useful and important arrow in the quiver
to employ in international relations, we consider that the Government
should enhance the UK's input to the reform and modernisation
of the EU. We see major opportunities for the UK to work with
many allies, at both the governmental and popular levels, throughout
the European Union to strengthen and adapt the Union's 21st-century
role. Such an approach would support British interests and help
adapt the European Union's own position to new global challenges.
However, the gains all round will also depend on the success of
the EU in addressing present challenges, such as divisions within
the Euro zone and unacceptably high youth unemployment. (paragraph 169)
41. UKTI, and other Government bodies charged
with promoting UK companies abroad, should emphasise the reliability
and trustworthiness of British businesspeople as one of the significant
advantages of trading with the UK. (paragraph 182)
42. It is the Committee's opinion that the Government
must take positive steps to link soft power deployment and support
for the country's exports, its enterprise, and its innovation.
(paragraph 186)
43. We welcome the Government's recognition of
the importance of supporting exporting small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). A House of Lords Select Committee recently
conducted an inquiry into this subject and we urge the Government
to continue working on implementing its recommendations. (paragraph 191)
44. We agree with the evidence that we heard
from a number of witnesses that UKTI should encourage more follow-up
work in the aftermath of trade missions. Helping British businesses
to export their goods and services to other countries and form
supply chains and consortia is crucial for building up the UK's
soft power, as these international connections strengthen trust
in the UK and its reputation for providing valuable outputs. It
is also vital that the UK's trade promotion bodies pull out all
the stops to capitalise on the UK's soft power and translate it
into trade deals. We urge the Government to put every energy into
this effort. (paragraph 192)
45. Embassy staff should undergo training in
seeking out opportunities for British SMEs as well as large businesses.
The Government should also encourage the FCO actively to recruit
more advisory staff from the private sector. What used to be purely
commercial work should now be reinforced by linkages to new audiences
in cultural, educational and broader spheres, to propel forward
the whole UK 'package'.* (paragraph 193)
46. The Committee suggests that wherever feasible,
UK Government bodies working to promote British commercial interests
in a particular country should be brought under one roof, and
under the direct purview of the Ambassador to ensure effective
coordination of all the UK's efforts 'on the ground'.* (paragraph 194)
47. Constructive engagement with economies of
a range of sizes is good for trade, not least because global supply
chains are now so complex, and involve so many partners. (paragraph 195)
48. There should be reinforced private and public
investment and supportive policy-making to protect the UK education
sector's global position. (paragraph 206)
49. The FCO could sustain the important connections
formed through education by working with universities and schools
to scope out opportunities for the establishment of overseas campuses,
and by funding new and targeted scholarships in key growth areas
such as Africa. The Government should ensure that the Chevening,
Commonwealth and Marshall awards offer a coherent package of engagement
with the UK and its Embassies during the period of the scholarship
and afterwards.* (paragraph 209)
50. While we are pleased to hear that "the
Chevening cuts are in the process of being reversed", this
is the minimum that the Government should do. Greater investment
in scholarships by other countries is threatening the UK's competitive
position. The Committee feels that a relatively small amount of
extra funding would bring the country into line to ensure that
the brightest and best of the world's future leaders feel an affinity
with the UK.* (paragraph 210)
51. We agree that study abroad provides soft
power benefits to the UK, and that the Government should work
with universities to increase the number of students who are studying
in other countries. (paragraph 211)
52. The Government should consider greater integration
of science within their foreign policy strategy, objectives and
formulation. For example, they should identify the ways in which
science can inform diplomacy. The Government should also put considerable
effort into assuming leadership roles in multilateral efforts
to address science-related policy problems. To strengthen links
between British scientists and their counterparts overseas, the
Government should provide particular diplomatic assistance to
scientists working in regions with weak governance. They should
work to ensure that security concerns around nuclear physics and
microbiology, for example, do not entirely limit progress or international
cooperation in these areas. British Embassies should also more
actively communicate scientific initiatives, and the FCO should
give training in science policy to diplomatic staff. (paragraph 217)
53. The Committee is concerned that the Government
are not supporting the teaching of British English as well as
they might. The Government must ensure that the British Council
is properly resourced. In order to ensure that its position does
not disadvantage private-sector education providers, the Government
should require the British Council to provide in its annual report
a much more detailed appraisal of the work that it has done to
support private sector British English education across the world.*
(paragraph 223)
54. The UK's capacity to build connections is
constrained by the small number of its citizens who are able to
speak foreign languages. Given the transition towards a more people-to-people,
reciprocal form of international relations, remaining mono-lingual
goes against the grain of how influence and engagement, and therefore
power, now operate. (paragraph 225)
55. We therefore urge the Government to make
every effort to redress the decline in language learning in UK
schools and universities. The Government could also provide increased
support for study-abroad programmes. (paragraph 226)
56. In almost every one of our evidence sessions,
witnesses told us that the Government's new visa policies were
harming the assets that build the UK's soft power. (paragraph 227)
57. We call on the Government to present and
communicate their visa and immigration policies with a level of
balance and in a tone that do not discourage those who would add
to the UK's prosperity from coming to the UK and supporting its
businesses and trade. We do not believe that this is always the
case at present. (paragraph 228)
58. We welcome the Government's announcement
that they intend to make UK visas more attractive to Chinese visitors.
We now urge the Government to improve visa application processes—including
access to visa processing facilities—for other key growth
areas such as India and other Commonwealth nations, and to keep
a close eye on competitors' visa policies. The Government must
make every effort to ensure that legitimate tourists can access
UK visas quickly, easily and cheaply, as they contribute so much
to both the UK's economy and the UK's international standing.*
(paragraph 229)
59. We believe that the Government should remove
students from net migration targets, and publish data on how previous
progress on migration targets would have looked had the Government
not counted students in previous years. The Government must work
harder to ensure that their efforts to cut migration by those
who would not add to the UK's wellbeing do not prevent those whose
presence would further the UK's domestic and international interests
from seeing the UK as welcoming. We note that we are the sixth
Select Committee to recommend in this Parliament that the Government
remove international students from the net migration target, and
that the Chairs of the other five Commons and Lords Committees
to do so wrote to the Prime Minister in January 2013 to stress
their belief that this degree of consensus between committees
of both Houses was unprecedented.* (paragraph 235)
60. We urge the Government to consider the effects
that their visa and immigration policies might have on the UK's
well-established reputation for academic and cultural cooperation.
The Government should acknowledge the effects that tighter visa
regulations might have on UK scientists' ability to undertake
international research collaboration. (paragraph 236)
61. A focus on strengthening diversity in positions
of influence is an important way to enhance the UK's reputation
for being meritocratic and open. Any lack of diversity risks squandering
any soft power benefits that might accrue if representatives of
communities that are in the minority in the UK, but which link
to huge and powerful communities beyond the UK's shores, were
more visible in British institutions and media. We also believe
that improving the UK's record on gender equality in the boardrooms
and corridors of power is of utmost importance, and could add
to the UK's reputation in regions where the role of women is expanding.
(paragraph 243)
62. We feel that there is a real risk that anti-immigration
rhetoric will lead immigrant communities in the UK to feel less
welcome and less a part of the UK, with injurious consequences
for the unity of the nation. This can only undermine the message
of friendliness and diversity that the UK hopes to project. (paragraph 244)
63. The Committee acknowledges that in straitened
economic times, the Government will have spending priorities other
than the funding of the UK's cultural institutions. Yet now that
the economy is returning to growth, we urge the Government to
reconsider funding cuts to publicly subsidised collections. We
suggest that the Government focus in particular on funding cultural
exchanges with a demonstrable soft power value, along the lines
of the Cyrus Cylinder tour to Iran. We further propose that the
Government use GREAT Campaign funding and advertising resources
to promote specific cultural activities that are likely to increase
inbound tourism.* (paragraph 255)
64. We recommend that the Government should consider
analysing tax incentives so that support for British creative
industries is in line with the UK's competitors.* (paragraph 257)
65. We welcome the British Council's efforts
to nurture creative industries. Because of their role in developing
the innovators of the future, we would also underline the importance
of teaching design and technology in British schools. In order
to promote a business environment in which the creative industries
might thrive, we further recommend that the Government ensure
a regulatory environment that encourages creative industries to
headquarter in the UK.* (paragraph 259)
66. Given the diversity of the BBC's international
services, there is scope for a coordinated and cohesive approach.
(paragraph 260)
67. While we understand that the BBC World Service's
budget has been protected in the move to licence-fee funding,
we are concerned that this protection might be more difficult
to maintain in the face of future budget pressures and challenges
to the principle of the licence fee. We are concerned that the
Government are not currently doing enough to support the BBC World
Service, and we urge the BBC and the Government to ensure between
them that the BBC World Service's budget is not reduced any further
in real terms, and the opportunities for coordination across multiple
platforms to deliver content are taken.* (paragraph 268)
68. The Committee feels that the Government should
consider a range of funding options for the BBC World Service—including
drawing on commercial sources for income—to ensure that
its reach and influence do not diminish in a newly competitive
global media market. (paragraph 270)
69. We stress that any reorganisation of the
BBC World Service should be commercially self-sustaining, but
that the suitability of any proposals must be judged against their
potential to help or harm the global influence of the BBC World
Service and the UK as a whole. Should the BBC Trust or the Government
deem any commercialisation to be detrimental to the UK's influence,
we urge the Government to seek other means of providing increased
support to the World Service, perhaps from central taxation. However,
we should never forget that the BBC's independence from Government
is an essential part of its credibility, so that the case for
more direct funding from Government is not always valid. The Government
must avoid at all costs following the example of other states
where nationally funded radio and TV stations (often resourced
on a lavish scale) are seen as mere instruments of propaganda.
(paragraph 271)
70. The Committee supports the use of DFID funding
to assist the BBC's development work, and we urge further consideration
of how this type of support can be expanded. (paragraph 272)
71. The soft power benefits originating from
sport convince us that now the London Olympic and Paralympic Games
have concluded, the UK should work to find a way to retain the
"glow" attached to British sport institutions. We suggest
that the Government continue to publicise the success of the 2012
Olympic and Paralympic Games wherever possible—particularly
through UKTI and the GREAT Campaign—while promoting the
upcoming Glasgow Commonwealth Games. In addition, UKTI should
strongly promote the UK as a reserve of expertise in the design
and delivery of megaprojects like the London 2012 Games and the
2014 Commonwealth Games. (paragraph 283)
72. It is clear that the UK has strong soft power
assets: in their response to this Report, we urge the Government
to provide a strong focus on the specific aspects of the UK's
soft and smart power that they will seek to develop in reaction
to the arguments made in this Report, how they will do so, and
to what timetable. The response should examine the challenges
faced by the UK's non-governmental soft power assets and what
the Government can do to assist and support them. It should also
clearly delineate precisely which of our recommendations they
support and will implement, and if they do not accept any of our
recommendations, it should explain why not.* (paragraph 288)
73. The Government must present, and keep updating,
a strong narrative about the UK's changing position; a story about
what values the UK stands for and where it should be heading.
We consider that the UK's soft power will only achieve real momentum
if the UK maintains this sense of purpose. Attractiveness will
only convert into positive achievements if the UK and those who
engage with it have a grasp of the contribution that the UK can
make—it will amount to little if the UK is believed merely
to be seeking admiration and economic gain. The Government must
take responsibility for providing a clear vision for the country,
which will help those across Whitehall who influence foreign policy
to understand what is holding the UK back, or could hold it back
in the future. (paragraph 293)
74. The UK's aim and claim to continue to play
a major role in world affairs would be undermined by Scottish
separation, because even a debate about whether the UK should
continue to be a member of the UN Security Council, for example,
would do damage to its reputation. Dismembering the UK is not
consistent with promoting the country abroad as a strong, stable
and successful state; nor is it consistent with promoting the
sense of internal social cohesion that is so important to presenting
a positive view of the UK on the international stage. This damage
would be to the disadvantage of the Scottish people, as much as
to the UK as a whole. (paragraph 295)
75. The Committee urges the Government to publish,
as part of their response to this Report, an evidence-based explanation
that demonstrates how the sharing of soft power promotion between
the National Security Council, the GREAT Campaign, the FCO, the
MOD, DCMS and DFID has been a success.* (paragraph 297)
76. While we welcome the role of the GREAT Campaign
in bringing together those involved in the UK's international
marketing, we feel that the Government should do more to build
on the campaign's successes. We have some concern about the lack
of clarity about where the buck stops. We propose that the Government
make publicly available their justification for how the structure
of the GREAT Campaign brings added value.* (paragraph 298)
77. We urge Government decision-makers to consider
adverse consequences for the UK's soft power when devising policies
that might be domestically popular, but could damage the UK's
reputation. It is important for the UK's international attractiveness
and influence that the Government avoid expressing confusing views
on immigration. The Government must ensure greater consistency
between the development and communication of their policies on
immigration and their plans to make the UK attractive to visitors,
students, workers and investors, with all the soft power benefits
that openness brings. The Government have demonstrated a worrying
lack of coordination in the development and communication of certain
policies, with detrimental results for British soft power. (paragraph 299)
78. We suggest that bureaucratic coordination
through the establishment of a Government committee on the UK's
soft power would lack the drive and purpose that the issue requires.
An understanding of how soft power is generated, and how the UK
should behave if it is to be attractive and influential should
become mainstream in Whitehall thinking, not hived off to a Cabinet
sub-committee. (paragraph 300)
79. We feel that there needs to be a long-term
strategic narrative about the international role of the UK, promulgated
from the centre of Government. Innovative and imaginative Departments
would interpret this narrative, with the freedom to use their
initiative but with a clear understanding of how their responses
fitted into the broader theme. (paragraph 301)
80. If it does not have the capacity regularly
to discuss the UK's broad international standing, the National
Security Council (NSC) should make this clear, and the Government
should move quickly to put responsibility for the UK's reputation
in different hands. The Committee believes that while the NSC
continues to play this role, soft power should be a regular item
on its agenda—it needs to have a high priority. We urge
the NSC to devote at least one session every six months to discussing
the exercise of soft power, and to report to Parliament once a
year about the UK's exercise of soft and smart power.* (paragraph 302)
81. We propose that there should be a small unit
at the centre of Government specifically to assist the Prime Minister
in reinforcing the consistency of the soft power story throughout
Whitehall, and help him or her to counteract swiftly any developments
that might undermine the UK's broader message, story and reputational
standing across the world. The unit would set the theme on which
Departments and non-state soft power actors could improvise. It
would not impose strategies on Departments or add a layer of bureaucratic
meetings and planning: by assembling and putting into telling
words all aspects of the UK's strategic story and direction, it
would help Departments to understand the UK's place on the international
stage, and how their actions might affect this.* (paragraph 304)
82. We consider that there ought to be a Committee
in Parliament which annually publishes a review of the Government's
soft power strengths and weaknesses, goals and priorities, looking
particularly closely at the work that the Government have done
to support the UK's international standing and attractiveness.
We note that there are a number of Parliamentary Committees with
international dimensions to their work, such as the House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Joint Committee on the National
Security Strategy, and we hope that one such Committee will consider
pursuing this. We further recommend that, as the UK's international
standing is the ultimate in long-term and non-partisan concerns,
the Government should regularly consult with all the major parties
in the Westminster Parliament and in the devolved assemblies on
the UK's strategic direction and future on the world stage. The
unit tasked with shaping and embellishing the UK's strategic narrative
should also consult widely with non-state soft power actors, including
firms, charities and scientific, sporting and cultural institutions.
(paragraph 310)
83. In an era in which the distribution and very
nature of power, influence and engagement are undergoing radical
change, the UK finds itself with a tremendous range of institutions
and relationships in politics, economics, science and culture,
often amassed over generations, which give it a great deal of
internationally recognised soft power. To parody the old saw about
how it came to rule an empire, the UK could be said to have acquired
a great many of these soft power assets 'in a fit of absence of
mind'. We feel that the Government have moved from absent-mindedness
to neglect of certain aspects of British soft power potential,
particularly the UK's relations with the Commonwealth. The Government's
imperative now must be to defend and preserve the UK's accumulated
estate of soft power—and capitalise on the gains which soft
power generates in order to fulfil the UK's aims and purposes.
(paragraph 311)
84. To make sure that the UK's attractiveness
and influence can be used by the Government and other British
bodies to promote the country's interests, the Government and
foreign policy community must develop new approaches to international
relations. These approaches involve communicating openly and actively
both with old allies and new partners; offering the UK's soft
and hard power to the pursuit of solutions to common concerns;
and avoiding false choices between international institutions
and working to nudge these institutions towards global arrangements
from which the UK stands to gain. It means allowing British Embassies
to flourish as dynamic centres of commercial, diplomatic, and
cultural activities, and ensuring that all of these activities
are underpinned by a positive vision or narrative about the UK
and about its role in shaping how the world will look in the future.
(paragraph 312)
85. The Government should employ the UK's soft
power advantages to ensure and protect national security by employing
a judicious and 'smart' mixture of hard and soft power, and through
opening and safeguarding the access routes that its various industries
need to ensure the UK's continuing prosperity. To play a responsible
and progressive role in building global peace and stability, the
UK needs to widen its diplomacy, understand that it is dealing
with empowered and e-enabled publics everywhere and in every country,
and accept through its tone and policies that power has in some
degree shifted East, South and into the world's networks. The
Committee submits that such an approach would enhance the UK's
soft power, work with the grain of the changing nature of international
relations, and further the country's security and prosperity.
(paragraph 313)
86. A huge change of mindset is required among
those who shape the UK's international role and placing in the
world. This mindset should not only recognise the fundamental
ways in which international power balances are changing and the
crucial role played by soft power in adapting to those shifts,
but come to see the UK in the 21st century no longer solely as
a 'Western' power—tied to Western models of modernisation
and political development—but as a nation uniquely equipped
to understand, respect and work with the new mélange of
Eastern, Western and Southern powers, cultures and values now
rapidly taking shape. The UK must appreciate that nations such
as China are following other paths, and working together outside
traditional multilateral structures such as the UN Security Council.
(paragraph 314)
87. The UK has to slip its twentieth-century
moorings and look to Asia, Africa and other regions, countries
and communities. This does not necessarily mean striking out alone:
all nations are now intensely interdependent. But the UK can exploit
its singular position and its uniquely strong networks to put
it in a very influential position in the changing international
scene. The Government should be clear about what the UK wishes
to achieve as an interdependent, networked power. This will include
fulfilling its international roles and responsibilities and encouraging
others to do the same in a way that spreads the load of international
policing, and building the UK's prosperity, not least to enable
it to perform those roles and meet those responsibilities effectively.
The Government must work to restore the UK's reputation, and show
up outdated perceptions of the UK as an outdated power. The UK
can, and should, act as a serious force for good as the world
continues to change. (paragraph 315)
88. This new approach becomes more urgent by
the day. The UK must remain a top-rank performer in the global
network and it finds itself in the fortuitous position of having
every opportunity to do so. However, while celebrating the UK's
fortune, we also warn that if the Government do not face the facts
of the transformed international order, the UK will risk finding
itself outwitted, out-competed, and increasingly insecure. (paragraph 316)
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