Chapter 2: Radical changes to balances
of power |
5. Soft power is a concept with huge practical
importance at a time when international relations are undergoing
radical transformations, with serious implications for the UK's
prosperity and security. As the British Council told us, "the
tectonics of power are in flux", forcing a reconsideration
of how states can exercise influence.
Geopolitical shifts in the distribution
6. What commentators on international affairs
call the 'rise of the rest' is resulting in a new international
distribution of power, as nation states with distinctly non-Western
economic, social and political structures are experiencing rapid
economic and demographic growth.
As a consequence, power is moving between states, and the global
centre of power is drifting from West to East and from North to
South. Jonathan Glennie
of the Overseas Development Institute told the Committee that
it was hard to exaggerate the "mega-shifts" currently
underway in what he called "the geography of power".
He referred to the rise of fast-developing giant economies such
as China, Brazil and India, and of the CIVETS nations (Colombia,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa); he told us
that developing countries and so-called 'emerging' countries are
beginning to dominate global economic growth, with their political
power increasing as a consequence. These states have also begun
to form regional groupings such as the Latin American 'ALBA' alliance
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our AmericaPeoples'
Trade Treaty), and the Eurasian Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
The countries are also home to rapidly increasing reserves of
global savingsalmost 50 per cent of world savings, according
to the World Bankand are therefore the source of growing
foreign investments, aid and concessional loans.
7. An "age of choice", in which developing
economies have access to many more external financing options
and expanded domestic resource revenues, has led to what Jonathan
Glennie called a "new assertiveness" among developing
countries. Richard Dowden,
Director of the Royal African Society, told us that "In recent
years African nations have become more self confident and are
increasingly pushing back against the former colonial powers".
Such assertiveness has seen countries beyond the permanent members
of the UN Security Council driving productive initiatives in international
relations: for example, Turkey has recently offered its mediation
services in some of the world's most intractable conflicts.
8. A growth in international recognition of the
importance of non-Western norms in governance has accompanied
the new assertiveness of developing nations.
It is now important to understand how the modernisation of other
countries differs from classic European models. Rising states
in Asia and Africa may hold entirely different understandings
of political legitimacy, and of the primacy of national sovereignty
over individual human rights, from those in the Western traditions
that have dominated international discourse in recent years.
Professor Michael Cox described the tensions that will arise
as non-Western countries such as China assume stronger roles in
the world economic order.
As Professor Cox, Professor of International Relations
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, put it,
"All those countries are coming at us
with a different
set of assumptions about how the world ought to be organised".
They may have only local or regional ambitions, not global ones,
and thus leave the political and diplomatic order fundamentally
these countries will have considerable political influence as
they come to represent a greater share of the global economy and
as developing countries look to them instead of Western nations
to provide development models.
Jonathan Glennie told the Committee that "poor countries
no longer [only] want to be the US or France
to Brazil, Vietnam and, of course, China
looking much [more] broadly for examples and help than ever before".
9. This power shift was illustrated in 2010 by
the political confidence on the international stage shown by Brazil
and Turkey in trying to bypass the UN Security Council permanent
member states (the US, UK, France, Russia and China) plus Germany
by offering a solution to the Iran nuclear issue.
The British Council told us that there are "multiplying players
on the international stage seeking to make their mark and challenge
established power structures", and that "International
challenges like the Syria crisis and global poverty create new
alliances and bring new voices to the fore".
10. Accordingly, Dr Robin Niblett, the Director
of Chatham House, told us that "The UK has enjoyed a privileged
position in a Western-led world order that may soon be eclipsed".
The UK risks being less influential in the UN Security Council
in a world of rising powers; as the Rt Hon Sir John Major
KG CH reported, membership of the Security Council is already
"grotesquely out of date" having been fixed in 1946
"in a world that bears no relationship to today".
The UK's relationship with the US might change as US leaders'
focus turns more to the rising nations of Asia.
In Dr Niblett's view, the UK could also become "less
significant in a leaderless G20 world than [in] one led by the
G8". The small
group of countries who have in recent decades or centuries enjoyed
a position of considerable influence over the world's political
and economic structures, including the UK, face increasingly stiff
11. Along with the 'rise of the rest' and associated
power transition in international terms we could be seeing an
equally important change to the Government's role in steering
the ship of statenamely the dispersal and "diffusion"
of power away from governments, and into the hands of multiple
others. As we were
told by Jonathan McClory, policy and place branding consultant
and author of the IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index, "power is
shifting away from states altogether, as non-state actors play
more significant roles and wield greater influence in world affairs".
This move is closely associated with the new phenomenon of hyper-connectivity,
which the British Council described as follows:
"People-to-people contacts are growing in
importance at a dramatic pace. 24-hour broadcasting, social media
and mobile services mean people are better informed than ever
before and can interact directly with each other across national
boundaries with limited governmental interferenceeven in
places where government seeks to impose barriers upon the flow
of information and opinion. With 6 billion mobile phones around
the world, 75 per cent of which are in developing countries, the
explosion in people-to-people contacts is far from being a purely
Western phenomenon. Shared interests, passions and beliefs bring
people together in chat rooms, the blogosphere and other online
fora, creating a platform for people to organise themselveswith
everything from Pussy Riot supporters to Twilight Fanfic to be
found in the undergrowth of this rich, wild new digital jungle".
12. Research by Demos in 2007 found that the
internet had enabled "mass peer-to-peer cultural contact":
such contact "had originally been elite-to-elite, then elite-to-many,
and was now entering a people-to-people phase, through travel,
migration and the internet".
New media technologies allow mass self-communication; anyone with
internet access and basic media literacy can publish their thoughts
on public forums.
This sits alongside and competes with mass communication by traditional
broadcast and print media.
The result is a world politics featuring many-to-many communications,
which governments increasingly cannot control.
13. We explore below why mass people-to-people
information sharing and the new, widespread ability to communicate
are having a powerful impact on international affairs, but their
effects are already visible. The actions of one Tunisian street
vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, triggered a regional upheaval whose
consequences are ongoing and severe. By self-immolating while
relatives and bystanders recorded his actions on their mobile
phones and uploaded it to YouTube, his actions created awareness
that soon translated into collective action.
While journalists could not safely reach protest areas, news organisations
relied on citizens' mass social media activity that was very difficult
for Tunisian authorities to control, and created a sense among
protesters that the whole world was watching. As events across
the region proved, that sense was justified.
14. Hyper-connectivity will soon be enhanced
by the emergence of digital infrastructures that are international
in scope, and which connect not only people but devices, objects,
and systems. While
the spread of mobile phones in areas of political instability
in Africa is strongly correlated with upsurges in violence, crisis
mapping programmes process mobile phone communications in these
environments to create automated visualisations of conflict outbreaks
that military and humanitarian organisations can use to target
affairs now feature countless feedback loops of humans, devices
and systems, meaning the world that international relations operates
within has become markedly different.
Hyper-connectivity and the diffusion
of power: loss of Governmental control
15. Hyper-connectivity has made the actions of
states such as the UK more visible than ever before, and this
involves a loss of control.
All organisations now have indelible, and vastly accessible, digital
footprints comprising all of their webpages and communications.
In the context of Government, this means that all Departments
now have an international presence: their actions, statements,
and their media coverage are instantly and freely accessible to
almost anyone, anywhere. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)or
even the external affairs 'triumvirate' of the FCO, the Ministry
of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development
(DFID)no longer has the monopoly on the British Government's
interface with the rest of the world, let alone that of the country
as a whole.
16. The last decade alone has seen a massive
growth in the worldwide transparency of information. Words and
images can emerge or re-emerge in uncontrollable, unforeseeable
ways. It is increasingly hard for governments to keep secrets,
as the mass release of governmental data by Wikileaks in 2010
and by Edward Snowden in 2013 showed. The intrinsic insecurity
of communications data is a new, but fundamental, feature of the
modern international order: those working in Government and in
Embassies must work on the assumption that their communications
will not stay private. As private communications are opened to
scrutiny, and as political speeches and actions become globally
accessible, it has become difficult for governments (and others)
to 'segment' their messages on a particular issue for different
McClory wrote that "Governments no longer have the luxury
of offering domestic audiences one message whilst feeding another
to the international community".
In the words of Professor Laura Roselle, Professor of
Science and Policy Studies at Elon University, "Elites have
lost relative power over information, timing, and audience as
political actors, including individuals, non-state actors, NGOs,
terrorist cells, and international organizations have access to
communication technologies that will reach a vast audience".
We note that access to the internet is not universal and that
there are parts of the world where governments seek to constrain
internet usage, but the trend is clearly towards greater openness
and a lower degree of state control.
Hyper-connectivity and the diffusion
of power: the empowerment of citizens
17. This new level of exposure has joined a torrent
of commentary, critique and citizen journalism made possible by
the internet and social media. While politicians in the West have
been concerned for some time about falling trust in political
not in political institutions),
the change is now more profound. In a hyper-connected context,
the very nature of political trust and confidence are altered
due to the number and diversity of information sources on offer,
and the greatly extended reach of commentators dissecting and
criticising that information. As Professor Marie Gillespie
and Dr Alban Webb of the Open University wrote (in evidence
hereafter referred to as 'Gillespie and Webb'), "Citizens
and publics now expect credible and convincing explanations and
appropriate evidence from governments and if they don't get [it]
in mainstream media they look to social media".
In the hyper-connected age, it is also easier than ever before
to find voices closer to one's own; social media users are now
more likely to trust and believe their peers than politicians
or the media.
18. As the ability to create content, access
information and disseminate opinion is democratised, citizens
increasingly expect to be, or at least to feel, empowered.
The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University
wrote that "rapid developments in the global communications
infrastructure [are] empowering citizens and enabling them to
make their voices heard, pressure their representatives and participate
in decision-making". Hyper-connectivity is "redefining
the balance of power between the state and citizens in many countries,
including in those that may have previously lacked a culture of
public consultation and accountability".
The rapid movement of information has made individuals more powerful
than they have been at any point in history, according to Jonathan
McClory: influence is moving away from governments and towards
individuals and civil society groupings, even as some governments
gather more information about citizens than ever before.
19. Alongside this empowerment, the real-time
monitoring of public opinion facilitated by the internet makes
publics appear extremely volatile and disruptive to anxious authorities.
There is no evidence that individuals' opinions about political,
economic or social issues have become more changeable over time,
but politicians, journalists and bloggers can now identify small,
rapid surges and dips that give the appearance of substantive
opinion swings. There
is also evidence that when long-term grievances do reach a tipping
point, the process of political mobilisation and protest, once
underway, undergoes a "quickening" thanks to use of
new media technologies.
When these phenomena are allied to powerful iconography and the
perceived threat of social media-driven revolutions as in the
so-called 'Arab Spring'or more recently in Kiev, Ukraineit
is little wonder that many political authorities have become super-sensitised
to publics and groupings linked in totally digitalised and constant
communication and exchange.
Every grievance or pressure group becomes empowered, but arguably
without producing any prospect for social cohesion: they thus
provoke at least the appearance of unending instability.
20. The digital transformation of communication
is affecting virtually all institutions and political processes
in the West, including citizen-government relations. International
relations will undoubtedly undergo changes of similar nature,
scope and scale. Our evidence-taking was concluded before recent
events in Ukraine, but the relevance of our key themes to the
situation is clear.
Hyper-connectivity and the diffusion
of power: the empowerment of international networks
21. The diffusion of power away from governments
is also evident in the growing prevalence and influence of global
media have enabled the quick creation, with no barriers to entry
other than internet access, of ever-expanding virtual networks
connecting like-minded people, bypassing borders and geographical
distances. This has
greatly increased the strength of transnational lateral ties and
the ease and speed of communication across those ties, increasing
the importance of non-nation communities such as cross-border
ideological groups, religious communions and protest movements.
Professor Caroline Rooney of the University of Kent told
us that "the intensification of cynicism towards mainstream
politics leads to loss of trust and competing forms of transnationalism".
She described a process akin to a pushing outward, whereby citizens'
interests transcended national politics:
"international power relations are structured
through strata that are transnational as opposed to just national"
and "the transnational lateral ties are increasingly at least
as important as national ones, if not more so", she told
us. While the uprisings
in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 and the Occupy network
of protests point to the potential for more widespread political
participation resulting from this shift, the potential threats
of Islamism could be interpreted as part of the same dynamic.
Professor Rooney told us that "young rappers in Egypt,
the UK and America feel they have much more in common with each
other in terms of values and outlooks than with the elite bankers
of their own nationalities" and that "Islamism and Zionism
are internationally supported movements in ways that can override
22. The growing importance of non-state actors,
and the increasing influence of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and their activities, is another dimension of the power
shift. NGOs have become important as vehicles for popular political
interests and causes. Indra Adnan, Director of the Soft Power
Network, noted that "more people sign up to NGOs that fight
for pan-global causes such as climate change than sign up for
Phil Vernon, Director of Programmes at International Alert, drew
the Committee's attention to NGOs' role in policy, arguing that
along with the Government, British NGOs have been at the forefront
in shaping the next round of targets which are set to replace
the Millennium Development Goals.
NGOs such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
the International Rescue Committee and the WWF have a global reach,
and, with international organisations such as the World Trade
Organization [WTO] and International Monetary Fund, arguably have
an international power greater than that of many governments.
23. Commercial globalisation is a further aspect
of the trend towards the expansion of networks and diffusion of
power. The dismantling
of trade barriers, the building of global supply chains, and the
increasing global mobility of goods, services, capital and investment,
workers and knowledge all operate to connect people and systems
across borders. Multinational corporations such as JPMorgan Chase
& Co. and Wal-Mart Stores can hold assets worth trillions
of dollars and employ millions of people. The growth of the middle
classes in rising nations will be crucial in the continued expansion
of commercial globalisation. Indra Adnan, wrote that "The
rapidly growing ranks of middle-class consumers span a dozen emerging
nations, not just the fast-growing BRIC countries [Brazil, Russia,
India and China]
and include almost two billion people,
spending a total of $6.9 trillion annually. Our research suggests
that this figure will rise to $20 trillion during the next decadeabout
twice the current consumption in the United States".
Commercial globalisation is underpinned by the economic importance
of intangible assets, intellectual capital and professional services.
Trade is no longer dominated by the shipping of tangible goods:
some of the world's most valuable industries are based on transnational
and completely mobile assets, with search engine providers, social
media companies, banks, and accountancy and law firms among the
world's richest businesses.
24. The new cartography of power is also marked
by urbanisation and the rise of megalopolises, which act as hubs
in global networks. Jonathan McClory told us that "more than
half the world's population [is] living in cities, which has big
implications for the economy and for how innovation happens, how
ideas spread, and how political movements start and manifest".
Some cities now rival states in their wealth, population and global
25. Hyper-connectivity and the expansion of powerful
global networks also have a dark side. Just as multinational corporations
can move billions of dollars across borders in the blink of an
eye, so can international criminal networks, including those trafficking
drugs and people.
Terrorists can build groups that stretch around the world, while
cyber-criminals can steal information or occasion mass denials
of service from ten thousand miles away. Other intrinsically transnational
threats to security have also emerged in recent years, whichlike
terrorism and organised crimecannot be tackled by any one
state alone. These include international piracy that can disrupt
world-wide shipping networks, global pandemics facilitated by
mass air travel, threats to global financial stability, climate
change, cross-border air and sea pollution (including radioactive
pollution), and environmental damage that degrades the planet
and threatens our natural resources.
26. Professor Nye has written that in today's
world, power resources are distributed in a pattern resembling
a complex, three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard,
military power is still largely unipolar and the US is likely
to remain the only superpower for some time. On the middle chessboard,
economic power has already been multipolar for more than a decade.
The bottom chessboard is the realm of cross-border transactions
that occur outside of government control, including the exploits
of non-state actors such as terrorists, hackers and "bankers
electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets",
and the kind of transnational challenges described above. On this
board, power is now widely dispersed. In his words, "there
are more and more things outside the control of even the most
27. This empowerment of individuals and bodies
outside governmental control coincides with an unprecedented degree
of synchronicity in international affairs. In the middle of the
19th century, protestors in Paris could not watch and communicate
in real time with protestors in Moscow: agitators in the Arab
Spring uprisings were able to do exactly that, from Tunisia to
Cairo to Syria.
28. The shifts sweeping the international
order over the past 15 years will accelerate and be compounded
in the years immediately ahead. Unprecedented international access
to state information, the digital empowerment of individuals and
groups, the growing role of global protest networks and NGOs,
the complexity of modern trade supply chains and multinational
corporate operations, accelerated urbanisation and transnational
challenges are all operating both to diffuse and fragment traditional
state power and to bring many of the world's peoples and countries
closer together. At the same time, the rising power, economic
and political, of non-Western countries (the so-called 'rise of
the rest') is altering the international balance of power and
influence. We have heard that these two powerful streams are converging
to reshape global politics, and we believe that they require a
commensurate response from those who guide the UK's foreign policy,
from the Government's leaders downwards. In this hugely changed
international context, the UK cannot simply proceed as before.
If the UK is still effectively to protect and promote its interests,
how it interacts with other nations and communities will need
fundamentally to alter. We conclude that this demands a radical
change in the mindset of those who direct the UK's foreign policy
and shape its international role. We note that the UK is hosting
a NATO summit in Newport in September of this year. There will
be considerable focus on the UK's foreign policy in the weeks
building up to that event: we recommend that the key themes of
this Report should be evident in the Government's current and
forthcoming preparations for the summit and in their contribution
to the public debate surrounding it.
5 British Council supplementary written evidence. Back
Lord Williams of Baglan, Q36; John Micklethwait, Q36; Richard
Norton-Taylor; Zakaria, F. (2008) 'The rise of the rest', Newsweek,
12 May, pp24-31; Nye J. S. Jr. (2013) 'American power in the
21st century will be defined by the 'rise of the rest', The
Washington Post, 29 June, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/american-power-in-the-21st-century-will-be-defined-by-the-rise-of-the-rest/2013/06/28/f5169668-dced-11e2-9218-bc2ac7cd44e2_story.html.
The term 'BRICs' and their rise first appeared in two papers by
Jim O'Neill for Goldman Sachs, see: O'Neill, J. (2001) 'Building
Better Global Economic BRICs', Goldman Sachs Global Economics
Paper, 66; O'Neill, J. (2005) 'How Solid are the BRICs?',
Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, 134. Back
Jonathan McClory. Back
Richard Dowden. See also Professor Michael Cox, Q32; Ian Birrell,
Q129; Indra Adnan; British Council supplementary written evidence;
Research Councils UK; Royal Society. Back
Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University. Back
Durham Global Security Institute. Back
See Lord Williams of Baglan, Professor Cox, John Micklethwait,
Q36; Professor Nye, Q180; Commonwealth Parliamentary Association
UK; Professor Rooney. Back
John Micklethwait, Q36. See also Patrick, S. (2014) 'The Unruled
World: The Case for Good Enough Governance', Foreign Affairs,
Asia House told the Committee that Asian economies constitute
50 per cent of global GDP (Asia House); British Council supplementary
written evidence. Back
Q127. Since 2002 the EU and the US had taken turns in leading
negotiations with Iran to find a deal to manage the development
of Iran's nuclear programme, but after years of failure to achieve
lasting agreement, in May 2010 Brazil and Turkey announced a new
compromise. When the deal was rejected by the US, Iranian state
television quoted Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei as saying,
"Domineering powers headed by America are unhappy with cooperation
between independent countries", and in June 2010 Brazil and
Turkey voted against a UN Security Council resolution proposing
intensified sanctions on Iran. While Iran and the permanent
Security Council states plus Germany finally made progress in
2013, the 2010 Brazil-Turkey approach signalled the growing assertiveness
of rising powers, as did India's spearheading of efforts during
negotiations for the World Trade Organization's first multilateral
trade deal in 2013 to protect emerging markets' agriculture sectors
from new 'food security' policies. Back
'Doha Delivers', The Economist, 9 December 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/12/world-trade-organisation.
British Council supplementary written evidence. Back
Dr Robin Niblett. Back
Dr Robin Niblett; Sir John Major, Q347. Back
Dr Robin Niblett. Back
Dr Robin Niblett. Back
Nye J. S. Jr. (2011) The Future of Power, ppxii-xiii. See
also HM Government (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty:
The National Security Strategy, October,
p16, p21, p29, p30. Back
Jonathan McClory. Back
British Council; British Council supplementary written evidence.
For previous uses of the term 'hyper-connectivity' see Quan-Haase,
A. and Wellman, B. (2005) 'Local virtuality in an organization:
Implications for community of practice', Communities and Technologies
p215; Friedman, T. (2008) 'Why How Counts', New York Times,
14 October, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/opinion/15friedman.html?_r=0. Back
British Council supplementary written evidence. Back
Demos; Professor Nye, Q181. Back
Indra Adnan. Back
Gillespie and Webb. Some experts pointed to the convergence of
mainstream and social media as traditional corporate media have
adapted to the challenges posed by new patterns of connectivity-for
instance see Indra Adnan and Dr Cristina Archetti. Back
Professor Nye, Q181. Back
Indra Adnan. Back
Wilson, C., and Dunn, A. (2011) 'Digital media in the Egyptian
revolution: Descriptive analyses from the Tahrir data set', International
Journal of Communication, vol. 5, pp1248-1272. Back
Taylor, P. (2014) 'CES 2014: Cisco boss hails 'internet of everything'',
Financial Times, 7 January, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/576d2f4c-7709-11e3-807e-00144feabdc0.html.
Dr Ali Fisher; Pierskalla, J.H. and Hollenbach, F.M. (2013) 'Technology
and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political
Violence in Africa', American Political Science Review,
Miskimmon. A., O'Loughlin, B., Roselle, L. (2013) Strategic
Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, New
York: Routledge, 22, pp148-175. The Fukushima triple disaster
of 2011 exemplified this trend: information systems such as weather
sensors, radiation monitors and stock markets became interconnected
in ways that outpaced human control, for some days at least. Back
Gillespie and Webb; Indra Adnan; British Council; British Council
supplementary written evidence; Dr Ali Fisher; Professor Scott-Smith.
Universities UK and the UK Higher Education International Unit
(UUK and IU). Back
Jonathan McClory. Back
'Eurobarometer 76: Public Opinion in the European Union', December
for explanations see Hay, C. (2007) Why We Hate Politics,
Putnam, R. (2001) Bowling Alone. Back
Based on over-time and cross-sectional analysis of public attitudes
to political authorities, Harvard/Sydney political scientist Professor
Pippa Norris concluded: "no significant erosion of system
support was detected from the indices of composite institutional
confidence (with the notable exception of declining public confidence
in parliaments), attitudes towards democratic governance and rejection
of autocracy, or feelings of nationalism. Instead, trendless fluctuations
over time (suggesting explanations based on either actual or perceived
performance) or a relatively stable pattern can be observed".
Professor Norris therefore agreed with Professor Margaret Levi
and Professor Laura Stoker who found that: "Finally, despite
all the verbiage decrying the decline in trust, there is little
actual evidence of a long-term secular decline, either in the
United States or in Western Europe across the board. If it is
true that political distrust is the norm for Americans, then surveys
that date only since World War II may not be of sufficient duration
to sustain the claim of a major and unusual decline. And even
then, the time-series evidence available suggests that trust levels
have been moving both up and down since the mid 1970s. The evidence
in other countries is generally of even shorter duration and depends
on less comparable questions". See Norris, P. (2011) Democratic
Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, p102; Levi, M., and
Stoker, L. (2000) 'Political trust and trustworthiness', Annual
Review of Political Science, vol.3(1), p483. Back
Gillespie and Webb. Back
Gillespie and Webb; Professor Rawnsley. See also Weinberger, D.
(2014) 'What blogging was', Joho the Blog, 8 January,http://www.hyperorg.com/blogger/2014/01/08/what-blogging-was/.
Professor Philip Seib (Professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy
and Professor of International Relations at the University of
Southern California. Back
Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University.
Jonathan McClory; British Council supplementary written evidence. Back
British Council; Ingenious Media. Back
The seminal text is Zaller, J. (1992) The Nature and Origin
of Mass Opinion. McCombs, M. and Zhu, J.H. (1995) 'Capacity,
Diversity, and Volatility of the Public Agenda Trends From 1954
to 1994', Public Opinion Quarterly, vol.59(4), pp495-525;
for the first studies of the deployment of real-time public opinion
monitoring in UK politics see Anstead, N., and O'Loughlin, B.
(2011) 'The emerging viewertariat and BBC question time television
debate and real-time commenting online', The International
Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 16(4), pp440-462; and Anstead,
N., and O'Loughlin, B. (2012) 'Semantic polling: the ethics of
online public opinion',
Sloam, J. (2014) 'The outraged young: young Europeans, civic engagement
and the new media in a time of crisis', Information, Communication
& Society, 10 January, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2013.868019. Back
Gowing, N. (2011) 'Time to move on: new media realities-new vulnerabilities
of power', Media, War & Conflict, vol. 4(1), pp13-19. Back
Jonathan McClory; Professor Rawnsley; Indra Adnan; British Academy;
Dr Ali Fisher. Back
Dr Cristina Archetti. Back
Professor Rooney. Back
Professor Rooney; Richard Norton-Taylor. Back
Professor Rooney. Back
Indra Adnan. Back
Andrew Mitchell, Director of Prosperity Directorate, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, told the Committee, "our work is about
using political insight and influence to promote British business
interests, to work for open economies, to combat protectionism,
and to work to remove barriers to business, including weak governance,
overregulation and corruption. We use that wide network and strong
relationships to sustain an open, transparent, rules-based international
economic system, and to advance international trade" (Q2).
Indra Adnan. Back
ICAEW; City of London Corporation; Dr Robin Niblett. Back
Q215; Jonathan McClory. Back
Nye J. S. Jr.(2011) The Future of Power, pp137, 145. Back
Government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) further supplementary
written evidence; John Micklethwait, Q41; Centre for Peace and
Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University; International Alert
further supplementary written evidence; Dr Robin Niblett; Richard
Norton-Taylor; Welsh Government; Jonathan McClory; Lord Hannay
of Chiswick; British Academy; Dr Robin Brown; Professor Nye, Q183;
Durham Global Security Institute; see also General Sir Nicholas
Houghton (2013) 'Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture 2013',
Royal United Services Institute, London, 18 December, http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E5284A3D06EFFD. Back
Nye J. S. Jr. (2012) Diversifying American Power, 9 September,