Persuasion and Power in the Modern World - Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK's Influence Contents


Chapter 2: Radical changes to balances of power

5.  Soft power is a concept with huge practical importance at a time when international relations are undergoing radical transformations, with serious implications for the UK's prosperity and security. As the British Council told us, "the tectonics of power are in flux", forcing a reconsideration of how states can exercise influence.[5]

Geopolitical shifts in the distribution of power

6.  What commentators on international affairs call the 'rise of the rest' is resulting in a new international distribution of power, as nation states with distinctly non-Western economic, social and political structures are experiencing rapid economic and demographic growth.[6] As a consequence, power is moving between states, and the global centre of power is drifting from West to East and from North to South.[7] Jonathan Glennie of the Overseas Development Institute told the Committee that it was hard to exaggerate the "mega-shifts" currently underway in what he called "the geography of power". He referred to the rise of fast-developing giant economies such as China, Brazil and India, and of the CIVETS nations (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa); he told us that developing countries and so-called 'emerging' countries are beginning to dominate global economic growth, with their political power increasing as a consequence. These states have also begun to form regional groupings such as the Latin American 'ALBA' alliance (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America—Peoples' Trade Treaty), and the Eurasian Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The countries are also home to rapidly increasing reserves of global savings—almost 50 per cent of world savings, according to the World Bank—and are therefore the source of growing foreign investments, aid and concessional loans.[8]

7.  An "age of choice", in which developing economies have access to many more external financing options and expanded domestic resource revenues, has led to what Jonathan Glennie called a "new assertiveness" among developing countries.[9] Richard Dowden, Director of the Royal African Society, told us that "In recent years African nations have become more self confident and are increasingly pushing back against the former colonial powers".[10] Such assertiveness has seen countries beyond the permanent members of the UN Security Council driving productive initiatives in international relations: for example, Turkey has recently offered its mediation services in some of the world's most intractable conflicts.[11]

8.  A growth in international recognition of the importance of non-Western norms in governance has accompanied the new assertiveness of developing nations.[12] It is now important to understand how the modernisation of other countries differs from classic European models. Rising states in Asia and Africa may hold entirely different understandings of political legitimacy, and of the primacy of national sovereignty over individual human rights, from those in the Western traditions that have dominated international discourse in recent years.[13] Professor Michael Cox described the tensions that will arise as non-Western countries such as China assume stronger roles in the world economic order.[14] As Professor Cox, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, put it, "All those countries are coming at us … with a different set of assumptions about how the world ought to be organised".[15] They may have only local or regional ambitions, not global ones, and thus leave the political and diplomatic order fundamentally untouched.[16] Nevertheless, these countries will have considerable political influence as they come to represent a greater share of the global economy and as developing countries look to them instead of Western nations to provide development models.[17] Jonathan Glennie told the Committee that "poor countries no longer [only] want to be the US or France … They look to Brazil, Vietnam and, of course, China … countries are looking much [more] broadly for examples and help than ever before".[18]

9.  This power shift was illustrated in 2010 by the political confidence on the international stage shown by Brazil and Turkey in trying to bypass the UN Security Council permanent member states (the US, UK, France, Russia and China) plus Germany by offering a solution to the Iran nuclear issue.[19] The British Council told us that there are "multiplying players on the international stage seeking to make their mark and challenge established power structures", and that "International challenges like the Syria crisis and global poverty create new alliances and bring new voices to the fore".[20]

10.  Accordingly, Dr Robin Niblett, the Director of Chatham House, told us that "The UK has enjoyed a privileged position in a Western-led world order that may soon be eclipsed".[21] The UK risks being less influential in the UN Security Council in a world of rising powers; as the Rt Hon Sir John Major KG CH reported, membership of the Security Council is already "grotesquely out of date" having been fixed in 1946 "in a world that bears no relationship to today".[22] The UK's relationship with the US might change as US leaders' focus turns more to the rising nations of Asia.[23] In Dr Niblett's view, the UK could also become "less significant in a leaderless G20 world than [in] one led by the G8".[24] The small group of countries who have in recent decades or centuries enjoyed a position of considerable influence over the world's political and economic structures, including the UK, face increasingly stiff competition.

Hyper-connectivity

11.  Along with the 'rise of the rest' and associated power transition in international terms we could be seeing an equally important change to the Government's role in steering the ship of state—namely the dispersal and "diffusion" of power away from governments, and into the hands of multiple others.[25] As we were told by Jonathan McClory, policy and place branding consultant and author of the IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index, "power is shifting away from states altogether, as non-state actors play more significant roles and wield greater influence in world affairs".[26] This move is closely associated with the new phenomenon of hyper-connectivity[27], which the British Council described as follows:

    "People-to-people contacts are growing in importance at a dramatic pace. 24-hour broadcasting, social media and mobile services mean people are better informed than ever before and can interact directly with each other across national boundaries with limited governmental interference—even in places where government seeks to impose barriers upon the flow of information and opinion. With 6 billion mobile phones around the world, 75 per cent of which are in developing countries, the explosion in people-to-people contacts is far from being a purely Western phenomenon. Shared interests, passions and beliefs bring people together in chat rooms, the blogosphere and other online fora, creating a platform for people to organise themselves—with everything from Pussy Riot supporters to Twilight Fanfic to be found in the undergrowth of this rich, wild new digital jungle".[28]

12.  Research by Demos in 2007 found that the internet had enabled "mass peer-to-peer cultural contact": such contact "had originally been elite-to-elite, then elite-to-many, and was now entering a people-to-people phase, through travel, migration and the internet".[29] New media technologies allow mass self-communication; anyone with internet access and basic media literacy can publish their thoughts on public forums.[30] This sits alongside and competes with mass communication by traditional broadcast and print media.[31] The result is a world politics featuring many-to-many communications, which governments increasingly cannot control.[32]

13.  We explore below why mass people-to-people information sharing and the new, widespread ability to communicate are having a powerful impact on international affairs, but their effects are already visible. The actions of one Tunisian street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, triggered a regional upheaval whose consequences are ongoing and severe. By self-immolating while relatives and bystanders recorded his actions on their mobile phones and uploaded it to YouTube, his actions created awareness that soon translated into collective action.[33] While journalists could not safely reach protest areas, news organisations relied on citizens' mass social media activity that was very difficult for Tunisian authorities to control, and created a sense among protesters that the whole world was watching. As events across the region proved, that sense was justified.[34]

14.  Hyper-connectivity will soon be enhanced by the emergence of digital infrastructures that are international in scope, and which connect not only people but devices, objects, and systems.[35] While the spread of mobile phones in areas of political instability in Africa is strongly correlated with upsurges in violence, crisis mapping programmes process mobile phone communications in these environments to create automated visualisations of conflict outbreaks that military and humanitarian organisations can use to target interventions.[36] International affairs now feature countless feedback loops of humans, devices and systems, meaning the world that international relations operates within has become markedly different.[37]

Hyper-connectivity and the diffusion of power: loss of Governmental control

15.  Hyper-connectivity has made the actions of states such as the UK more visible than ever before, and this involves a loss of control.[38] All organisations now have indelible, and vastly accessible, digital footprints comprising all of their webpages and communications. In the context of Government, this means that all Departments now have an international presence: their actions, statements, and their media coverage are instantly and freely accessible to almost anyone, anywhere. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)—or even the external affairs 'triumvirate' of the FCO, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID)—no longer has the monopoly on the British Government's interface with the rest of the world, let alone that of the country as a whole.

16.  The last decade alone has seen a massive growth in the worldwide transparency of information. Words and images can emerge or re-emerge in uncontrollable, unforeseeable ways. It is increasingly hard for governments to keep secrets, as the mass release of governmental data by Wikileaks in 2010 and by Edward Snowden in 2013 showed. The intrinsic insecurity of communications data is a new, but fundamental, feature of the modern international order: those working in Government and in Embassies must work on the assumption that their communications will not stay private. As private communications are opened to scrutiny, and as political speeches and actions become globally accessible, it has become difficult for governments (and others) to 'segment' their messages on a particular issue for different audiences.[39] Jonathan McClory wrote that "Governments no longer have the luxury of offering domestic audiences one message whilst feeding another to the international community".[40] In the words of Professor Laura Roselle, Professor of Science and Policy Studies at Elon University, "Elites have lost relative power over information, timing, and audience as political actors, including individuals, non-state actors, NGOs, terrorist cells, and international organizations have access to communication technologies that will reach a vast audience".[41] We note that access to the internet is not universal and that there are parts of the world where governments seek to constrain internet usage, but the trend is clearly towards greater openness and a lower degree of state control.

Hyper-connectivity and the diffusion of power: the empowerment of citizens

17.  This new level of exposure has joined a torrent of commentary, critique and citizen journalism made possible by the internet and social media. While politicians in the West have been concerned for some time about falling trust in political leaders[42] (although not in political institutions[43]), the change is now more profound. In a hyper-connected context, the very nature of political trust and confidence are altered due to the number and diversity of information sources on offer, and the greatly extended reach of commentators dissecting and criticising that information. As Professor Marie Gillespie and Dr Alban Webb of the Open University wrote (in evidence hereafter referred to as 'Gillespie and Webb'), "Citizens and publics now expect credible and convincing explanations and appropriate evidence from governments and if they don't get [it] in mainstream media they look to social media".[44] In the hyper-connected age, it is also easier than ever before to find voices closer to one's own; social media users are now more likely to trust and believe their peers than politicians or the media.[45]

18.  As the ability to create content, access information and disseminate opinion is democratised, citizens increasingly expect to be, or at least to feel, empowered.[46] The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at Coventry University wrote that "rapid developments in the global communications infrastructure [are] empowering citizens and enabling them to make their voices heard, pressure their representatives and participate in decision-making". Hyper-connectivity is "redefining the balance of power between the state and citizens in many countries, including in those that may have previously lacked a culture of public consultation and accountability".[47] The rapid movement of information has made individuals more powerful than they have been at any point in history, according to Jonathan McClory: influence is moving away from governments and towards individuals and civil society groupings, even as some governments gather more information about citizens than ever before.[48]

19.  Alongside this empowerment, the real-time monitoring of public opinion facilitated by the internet makes publics appear extremely volatile and disruptive to anxious authorities.[49] There is no evidence that individuals' opinions about political, economic or social issues have become more changeable over time, but politicians, journalists and bloggers can now identify small, rapid surges and dips that give the appearance of substantive opinion swings.[50] There is also evidence that when long-term grievances do reach a tipping point, the process of political mobilisation and protest, once underway, undergoes a "quickening" thanks to use of new media technologies.[51] When these phenomena are allied to powerful iconography and the perceived threat of social media-driven revolutions as in the so-called 'Arab Spring'—or more recently in Kiev, Ukraine—it is little wonder that many political authorities have become super-sensitised to publics and groupings linked in totally digitalised and constant communication and exchange.[52] Every grievance or pressure group becomes empowered, but arguably without producing any prospect for social cohesion: they thus provoke at least the appearance of unending instability.

20.  The digital transformation of communication is affecting virtually all institutions and political processes in the West, including citizen-government relations. International relations will undoubtedly undergo changes of similar nature, scope and scale. Our evidence-taking was concluded before recent events in Ukraine, but the relevance of our key themes to the situation is clear.

Hyper-connectivity and the diffusion of power: the empowerment of international networks

21.  The diffusion of power away from governments is also evident in the growing prevalence and influence of global networks.[53] Social media have enabled the quick creation, with no barriers to entry other than internet access, of ever-expanding virtual networks connecting like-minded people, bypassing borders and geographical distances.[54] This has greatly increased the strength of transnational lateral ties and the ease and speed of communication across those ties, increasing the importance of non-nation communities such as cross-border ideological groups, religious communions and protest movements. Professor Caroline Rooney of the University of Kent told us that "the intensification of cynicism towards mainstream politics leads to loss of trust and competing forms of transnationalism". She described a process akin to a pushing outward, whereby citizens' interests transcended national politics:

    "international power relations are structured through strata that are transnational as opposed to just national" and "the transnational lateral ties are increasingly at least as important as national ones, if not more so", she told us.[55] While the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 and the Occupy network of protests point to the potential for more widespread political participation resulting from this shift, the potential threats of Islamism could be interpreted as part of the same dynamic.[56] Professor Rooney told us that "young rappers in Egypt, the UK and America feel they have much more in common with each other in terms of values and outlooks than with the elite bankers of their own nationalities" and that "Islamism and Zionism are internationally supported movements in ways that can override national interests".[57]

22.  The growing importance of non-state actors, and the increasing influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and their activities, is another dimension of the power shift. NGOs have become important as vehicles for popular political interests and causes. Indra Adnan, Director of the Soft Power Network, noted that "more people sign up to NGOs that fight for pan-global causes such as climate change than sign up for political parties".[58] Phil Vernon, Director of Programmes at International Alert, drew the Committee's attention to NGOs' role in policy, arguing that along with the Government, British NGOs have been at the forefront in shaping the next round of targets which are set to replace the Millennium Development Goals.[59] NGOs such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Rescue Committee and the WWF have a global reach, and, with international organisations such as the World Trade Organization [WTO] and International Monetary Fund, arguably have an international power greater than that of many governments.

23.  Commercial globalisation is a further aspect of the trend towards the expansion of networks and diffusion of power.[60] The dismantling of trade barriers, the building of global supply chains, and the increasing global mobility of goods, services, capital and investment, workers and knowledge all operate to connect people and systems across borders. Multinational corporations such as JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wal-Mart Stores can hold assets worth trillions of dollars and employ millions of people. The growth of the middle classes in rising nations will be crucial in the continued expansion of commercial globalisation. Indra Adnan, wrote that "The rapidly growing ranks of middle-class consumers span a dozen emerging nations, not just the fast-growing BRIC countries [Brazil, Russia, India and China] … and include almost two billion people, spending a total of $6.9 trillion annually. Our research suggests that this figure will rise to $20 trillion during the next decade—about twice the current consumption in the United States".[61] Commercial globalisation is underpinned by the economic importance of intangible assets, intellectual capital and professional services.[62] Trade is no longer dominated by the shipping of tangible goods: some of the world's most valuable industries are based on transnational and completely mobile assets, with search engine providers, social media companies, banks, and accountancy and law firms among the world's richest businesses.

24.  The new cartography of power is also marked by urbanisation and the rise of megalopolises, which act as hubs in global networks. Jonathan McClory told us that "more than half the world's population [is] living in cities, which has big implications for the economy and for how innovation happens, how ideas spread, and how political movements start and manifest".[63] Some cities now rival states in their wealth, population and global clout.

25.  Hyper-connectivity and the expansion of powerful global networks also have a dark side. Just as multinational corporations can move billions of dollars across borders in the blink of an eye, so can international criminal networks, including those trafficking drugs and people.[64] Terrorists can build groups that stretch around the world, while cyber-criminals can steal information or occasion mass denials of service from ten thousand miles away. Other intrinsically transnational threats to security have also emerged in recent years, which—like terrorism and organised crime—cannot be tackled by any one state alone. These include international piracy that can disrupt world-wide shipping networks, global pandemics facilitated by mass air travel, threats to global financial stability, climate change, cross-border air and sea pollution (including radioactive pollution), and environmental damage that degrades the planet and threatens our natural resources.[65]

26.  Professor Nye has written that in today's world, power resources are distributed in a pattern resembling a complex, three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is still largely unipolar and the US is likely to remain the only superpower for some time. On the middle chessboard, economic power has already been multipolar for more than a decade. The bottom chessboard is the realm of cross-border transactions that occur outside of government control, including the exploits of non-state actors such as terrorists, hackers and "bankers electronically transferring sums larger than most national budgets", and the kind of transnational challenges described above. On this board, power is now widely dispersed. In his words, "there are more and more things outside the control of even the most powerful state".[66]

27.  This empowerment of individuals and bodies outside governmental control coincides with an unprecedented degree of synchronicity in international affairs. In the middle of the 19th century, protestors in Paris could not watch and communicate in real time with protestors in Moscow: agitators in the Arab Spring uprisings were able to do exactly that, from Tunisia to Cairo to Syria.

28.  The shifts sweeping the international order over the past 15 years will accelerate and be compounded in the years immediately ahead. Unprecedented international access to state information, the digital empowerment of individuals and groups, the growing role of global protest networks and NGOs, the complexity of modern trade supply chains and multinational corporate operations, accelerated urbanisation and transnational challenges are all operating both to diffuse and fragment traditional state power and to bring many of the world's peoples and countries closer together. At the same time, the rising power, economic and political, of non-Western countries (the so-called 'rise of the rest') is altering the international balance of power and influence. We have heard that these two powerful streams are converging to reshape global politics, and we believe that they require a commensurate response from those who guide the UK's foreign policy, from the Government's leaders downwards. In this hugely changed international context, the UK cannot simply proceed as before. If the UK is still effectively to protect and promote its interests, how it interacts with other nations and communities will need fundamentally to alter. We conclude that this demands a radical change in the mindset of those who direct the UK's foreign policy and shape its international role. We note that the UK is hosting a NATO summit in Newport in September of this year. There will be considerable focus on the UK's foreign policy in the weeks building up to that event: we recommend that the key themes of this Report should be evident in the Government's current and forthcoming preparations for the summit and in their contribution to the public debate surrounding it.


5   British Council supplementary written evidence. Back

6   Lord Williams of Baglan, Q36; John Micklethwait, Q36; Richard Norton-Taylor; Zakaria, F. (2008) 'The rise of the rest', Newsweek, 12 May, pp24-31; Nye J. S. Jr. (2013) 'American power in the 21st century will be defined by the 'rise of the rest', The Washington Post, 29 June, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/american-power-in-the-21st-century-will-be-defined-by-the-rise-of-the-rest/2013/06/28/f5169668-dced-11e2-9218-bc2ac7cd44e2_story.html.
The term 'BRICs' and their rise first appeared in two papers by Jim O'Neill for Goldman Sachs, see: O'Neill, J. (2001) 'Building Better Global Economic BRICs', Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, 66; O'Neill, J. (2005) 'How Solid are the BRICs?', Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, 134. 
Back

7   Jonathan McClory. Back

8   Q127. Back

9   Q127. Back

10   Richard Dowden. See also Professor Michael Cox, Q32; Ian Birrell, Q129; Indra Adnan; British Council supplementary written evidence; Research Councils UK; Royal Society. Back

11   Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University. Back

12   Durham Global Security Institute.  Back

13   See Lord Williams of Baglan, Professor Cox, John Micklethwait, Q36; Professor Nye, Q180; Commonwealth Parliamentary Association UK; Professor Rooney.  Back

14   Q36.  Back

15   Q36. Back

16   John Micklethwait, Q36. See also Patrick, S. (2014) 'The Unruled World: The Case for Good Enough Governance', Foreign Affairs, January/February,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140343/stewart-patrick/the-unruled-world. 
Back

17   Asia House told the Committee that Asian economies constitute 50 per cent of global GDP (Asia House); British Council supplementary written evidence. Back

18   Q127. Since 2002 the EU and the US had taken turns in leading negotiations with Iran to find a deal to manage the development of Iran's nuclear programme, but after years of failure to achieve lasting agreement, in May 2010 Brazil and Turkey announced a new compromise. When the deal was rejected by the US, Iranian state television quoted Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei as saying, "Domineering powers headed by America are unhappy with cooperation between independent countries", and in June 2010 Brazil and Turkey voted against a UN Security Council resolution proposing intensified sanctions on Iran. While Iran and the permanent Security Council states plus Germany finally made progress in 2013, the 2010 Brazil-Turkey approach signalled the growing assertiveness of rising powers, as did India's spearheading of efforts during negotiations for the World Trade Organization's first multilateral trade deal in 2013 to protect emerging markets' agriculture sectors from new 'food security' policies. Back

19   'Doha Delivers', The Economist, 9 December 2013. http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/12/world-trade-organisation.  Back

20   British Council supplementary written evidence. Back

21   Dr Robin Niblett. Back

22   Dr Robin Niblett; Sir John Major, Q347. Back

23   Dr Robin Niblett. Back

24   Dr Robin Niblett. Back

25   Nye J. S. Jr. (2011) The Future of Power, ppxii-xiii. See also HM Government (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, October,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf, p16, p21, p29, p30. 
Back

26   Jonathan McClory. Back

27   British Council; British Council supplementary written evidence. For previous uses of the term 'hyper-connectivity' see Quan-Haase, A. and Wellman, B. (2005) 'Local virtuality in an organization: Implications for community of practice', Communities and Technologies p215; Friedman, T. (2008) 'Why How Counts', New York Times, 14 October, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/opinion/15friedman.html?_r=0. Back

28   British Council supplementary written evidence. Back

29   Demos; Professor Nye, Q181. Back

30   Indra Adnan.  Back

31   Gillespie and Webb. Some experts pointed to the convergence of mainstream and social media as traditional corporate media have adapted to the challenges posed by new patterns of connectivity-for instance see Indra Adnan and Dr Cristina Archetti. Back

32   Professor Nye, Q181. Back

33   Indra Adnan. Back

34   Wilson, C., and Dunn, A. (2011) 'Digital media in the Egyptian revolution: Descriptive analyses from the Tahrir data set', International Journal of Communication, vol. 5, pp1248-1272. Back

35   Taylor, P. (2014) 'CES 2014: Cisco boss hails 'internet of everything'', Financial Times, 7 January, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/576d2f4c-7709-11e3-807e-00144feabdc0.html.  Back

36   Dr Ali Fisher; Pierskalla, J.H. and Hollenbach, F.M. (2013) 'Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa', American Political Science Review, 107. Back

37   Miskimmon. A., O'Loughlin, B., Roselle, L. (2013) Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, New York: Routledge, 22, pp148-175. The Fukushima triple disaster of 2011 exemplified this trend: information systems such as weather sensors, radiation monitors and stock markets became interconnected in ways that outpaced human control, for some days at least. Back

38   Gillespie and Webb; Indra Adnan; British Council; British Council supplementary written evidence; Dr Ali Fisher; Professor Scott-Smith.  Back

39   Universities UK and the UK Higher Education International Unit (UUK and IU).  Back

40   Jonathan McClory. Back

41   ProfessorRoselle. Back

42   'Eurobarometer 76: Public Opinion in the European Union', December 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_first_en.pdf; for explanations see Hay, C. (2007) Why We Hate Politics, Putnam, R. (2001) Bowling Alone.  Back

43   Based on over-time and cross-sectional analysis of public attitudes to political authorities, Harvard/Sydney political scientist Professor Pippa Norris concluded: "no significant erosion of system support was detected from the indices of composite institutional confidence (with the notable exception of declining public confidence in parliaments), attitudes towards democratic governance and rejection of autocracy, or feelings of nationalism. Instead, trendless fluctuations over time (suggesting explanations based on either actual or perceived performance) or a relatively stable pattern can be observed". Professor Norris therefore agreed with Professor Margaret Levi and Professor Laura Stoker who found that: "Finally, despite all the verbiage decrying the decline in trust, there is little actual evidence of a long-term secular decline, either in the United States or in Western Europe across the board. If it is true that political distrust is the norm for Americans, then surveys that date only since World War II may not be of sufficient duration to sustain the claim of a major and unusual decline. And even then, the time-series evidence available suggests that trust levels have been moving both up and down since the mid 1970s. The evidence in other countries is generally of even shorter duration and depends on less comparable questions". See Norris, P. (2011) Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited, p102; Levi, M., and Stoker, L. (2000) 'Political trust and trustworthiness', Annual Review of Political Science, vol.3(1), p483. Back

44   Gillespie and Webb. Back

45   Gillespie and Webb; Professor Rawnsley. See also Weinberger, D. (2014) 'What blogging was', Joho the Blog, 8 January,http://www.hyperorg.com/blogger/2014/01/08/what-blogging-was/.  Back

46   Professor Philip Seib (Professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy and Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California. Back

47   Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University.  Back

48   Jonathan McClory; British Council supplementary written evidence. Back

49   British Council; Ingenious Media. Back

50   The seminal text is Zaller, J. (1992) The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion. McCombs, M. and Zhu, J.H. (1995) 'Capacity, Diversity, and Volatility of the Public Agenda Trends From 1954 to 1994', Public Opinion Quarterly, vol.59(4), pp495-525; for the first studies of the deployment of real-time public opinion monitoring in UK politics see Anstead, N., and O'Loughlin, B. (2011) 'The emerging viewertariat and BBC question time television debate and real-time commenting online', The International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 16(4), pp440-462; and Anstead, N., and O'Loughlin, B. (2012) 'Semantic polling: the ethics of online public opinion',
http://www.lse.ac.uk/[email protected]/documents/MPP/Policy-Brief-5-Semantic-Polling_The-Ethics-of-Online-Public-Opinion.pdf. 
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51   Sloam, J. (2014) 'The outraged young: young Europeans, civic engagement and the new media in a time of crisis', Information, Communication & Society, 10 January, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2013.868019. Back

52   Gowing, N. (2011) 'Time to move on: new media realities-new vulnerabilities of power', Media, War & Conflict, vol. 4(1), pp13-19. Back

53   Jonathan McClory; Professor Rawnsley; Indra Adnan; British Academy; Dr Ali Fisher.  Back

54   Dr Cristina Archetti. Back

55   Professor Rooney. Back

56   Professor Rooney; Richard Norton-Taylor.  Back

57   Professor Rooney.  Back

58   Indra Adnan.  Back

59   Q136. Back

60   Andrew Mitchell, Director of Prosperity Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, told the Committee, "our work is about using political insight and influence to promote British business interests, to work for open economies, to combat protectionism, and to work to remove barriers to business, including weak governance, overregulation and corruption. We use that wide network and strong relationships to sustain an open, transparent, rules-based international economic system, and to advance international trade" (Q2).  Back

61   Indra Adnan.  Back

62   ICAEW; City of London Corporation; Dr Robin Niblett.  Back

63   Q215; Jonathan McClory. Back

64   Nye J. S. Jr.(2011) The Future of Power, pp137, 145. Back

65   Government (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) further supplementary written evidence; John Micklethwait, Q41; Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University; International Alert further supplementary written evidence; Dr Robin Niblett; Richard Norton-Taylor; Welsh Government; Jonathan McClory; Lord Hannay of Chiswick; British Academy; Dr Robin Brown; Professor Nye, Q183; Durham Global Security Institute; see also General Sir Nicholas Houghton (2013) 'Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture 2013', Royal United Services Institute, London, 18 December, http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E5284A3D06EFFD. Back

66   Nye J. S. Jr. (2012) Diversifying American Power, 9 September, http://www.internationalrelations.com/2012/09/09/joseph-s-nye-jr-diversifying-american-power/.  Back


 
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