Chapter 5: The coordination and reinforcement
of the UK's soft power |
288. The previous Chapter of this Report itemised
the immense store of soft power assets and instruments at the
disposal of the UK, ranging from its economic and technical skills
and undoubted diplomatic prowess, to its most revered customs,
characteristics, values, and institutions, including the monarchy
itself. Yet John Micklethwait claimed to be "staggered by
the fact that there was not really any sense of how big were what
might be described as Britain's soft power industries".
Professor Anholt was critical that the UK's soft power 'instruments'
were "just left lying around the place" rather than
being brought together, inspired and informed.
Keith Nichol, Head of Cultural Diplomacy at DCMS told the Committee
that "We have probably about 1,400 arts and cultural organisations
active in all sorts of countries but, until very recently, we
had no coherent sense of where they are going or what they are
doing". Encouragingly, he added "what we are trying
to do now
is to start to map that activity and to see where
it is possible to align it with wider HMG and UK interests".
It is clear that the UK has strong soft power assets: in their
response to this Report, we urge the Government to provide a strong
focus on the specific aspects of the UK's soft and smart power
that they will seek to develop in reaction to the arguments made
in this Report, how they will do so, and to what timetable. The
response should examine the challenges faced by the UK's non-governmental
soft power assets and what the Government can do to assist and
support them. It should also clearly delineate precisely which
of our recommendations they support and will implement, and if
they do not accept any of our recommendations, it should explain
289. We pose below the fundamental question of
whether the Government can themselves do more to upgrade and reinforce
the UK's soft power, both to protect the nation and to further
its central interests and purposes in a world of challenges and
opportunities. We also consider whether Government policies can
be reconfigured more effectively: might they be better articulated
and win greater impact than they do at present? On the basis of
a large volume of written evidence, and of our extensive hearings
with witnesses, we believe that Government policies can answer
these twin challenges. We acknowledge here that much good work
is ongoing, but we argue that much more can be done.
Supporting a strong strategic
290. The Committee heard that "If Britain
is serious about wanting to mobilise its soft power globally"
it needs to have a public debate, combined with rigorous strategic
analysis, over what sort of state the UK wants to be".
Professor Cox asked, "What is the story we want to tell
about our own history? It is an extraordinarily important part
of power. What is our narrative about ourselves?"
According to Indra Adnan, "Every country must find its place
in the world by creating a narrative that binds the past and present
in a way that confidently serves the emerging reality of rapid
Dr James Pamment also saw the need for "a compelling
narrative explaining Britain's place and intentions in the international
Strategic narratives are "a means for political actors to
construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of
politics in order to shape the behavior of other actors",
Professor Roselle explained. She told us that "a compelling
narrative can be a soft power resource, as people may be drawn
to certain actors, events, and explanations that describe the
history of a country, or the specifics of a policy, for example".
291. A national narrative can also play a crucial
part in bringing together and inspiring the contributions made
by a country's soft power actors: Dr Pamment told us that
a narrative was "a form of storytelling that sums up the
overarching national strategy in ways that soft power institutions
can draw upon and rearticulate in their own unique ways".
The "basic values of the UK brand", such as the rule
of law and respect for human rights, constitute a national narrative
and "provide a dynamic framework to loosely (but firmly)
guide all national actors' discourse and behavior", argued
Dr Cristina Archetti, Associate Professor in Politics
and Media, University of Salford, adding that the Government have
"a role in upholding such [a] dynamic framework".
292. Professor Anholt contended that "The
only way that 'soft' power can become an effective force"
is if the UK's soft power assets "are inspired and informed
by a shared, long-term, national strategy". In his view,
"Such a grand strategy is what the United Kingdom lacks.
Its absence is the reason why our instruments of soft power do
so very well on their own account yet achieve only a small part
of what they could achieve for the country and its standing,
if only they were really working together". He considered
that "the most dependably attractive focus for any national
strategy is a moral one: the aim is to prove the utility
of the country to humanity and to the planet, rather than brag
about its assets or achievements (which, in the case of the UK,
are sufficiently appreciated that further bragging is more likely
to annoy than impress). To put it simply, people in other countries
are much more interested in what the UK can do for them
than in what it manages to do for itself". For Professor Anholt,
countries must learn "how to corral their soft and hard powers
around a shared, national, grand strategy, so that their impacts
can be combined and thus multiplied". However, "This
is the task which the UK has failed to seize or even to acknowledge
in living memory, despite the fact that becoming a paragon of
soft power is our country's only remaining strategic option",
293. A 'strategic narrative' projects a past,
present and future that is persuasive and attractive to others
who then 'buy in' to efforts to realise that future. Furthermore,
the story needs to keep up with the times and be re-articulated
in constantly refreshed terms. In a now almost totally transformed
international scene, full of unfamiliar and bewildering new aspects,
it is vital that the UK maintain its sense of purpose and direction:
the British need to feel confident in knowing who we are and what
our role is in a transformed and turbulent world. The Government
must present, and keep updating, a strong narrative about the
UK's changing position; a story about what values the UK stands
for and where it should be heading, because as Professor Nye
put it, "the point is that it is not just whose army wins,
it is also whose story wins in an information age".
We consider that the UK's soft power will only achieve real momentum
if the UK maintains this sense of purpose. Attractiveness will
only convert into positive achievements if the UK and those who
engage with it have a grasp of the contribution that the UK can
makeit will amount to little if the UK is believed merely
to be seeking admiration and economic gain. The Government must
take responsibility for providing a clear vision for the country,
which will help those across Whitehall who influence foreign policy
to understand what is holding the UK back, or could hold it back
in the future.
294. We heard concern from our witnesses that
the strength of a strategic narrative about the UK and what it
stands for would be undermined by the dissolution of the Union.
In giving evidence to the Committee, Sir John Major told
us that from country to country he had seen the issue of Scottish
independence "Increasingly" being raised: "It has
come up in the Far East and it has come up in a number of countries,
simply because they would perceive a country that was damaged
and diminished if a chunk of it voluntarily chose to leave the
Onlookers "would see a country beginning to fracture".
He worried that "we would have had a political fracture of
a most dramatic nature. That makes people wonder about the stability.
If Scotland were to go, what would happen to Wales? What would
happen to Northern Ireland? These are acute worries".
Further, he warned that if Scotland were to secede, "Apart
from an extremely talented chunk of the United Kingdom disappearing,
we would be diminished. That would put at risk our role in many
international bodies. Our voice would be weakened. As to whether
we would retain our seat on the UN Security Council, very possibly
for a while but at some stage that is bound to be reformed.
think were we to lose in Scotland it may be open to doubt when
that change comes whether we would retain our position.
would find ourselves weakened in the IMF. We would find ourselves
weakened in the G8, the G20. In every international gathering
that there is the voice of Britain would not be growing stronger,
as it should as the economy improves. It would be growing weaker".
295. The debate over Scottish independence represents
a vitally important constitutional discussion that goes far wider
than the remit of this inquiry. We note, however, that the
UK's aim and claim to continue to play a major role in world affairs
would be undermined by Scottish separation, because even a debate
about whether the UK should continue to be a member of the UN
Security Council, for example, would do damage to its reputation.
Dismembering the UK is not consistent with promoting the country
abroad as a strong, stable and successful state; nor is it consistent
with promoting the sense of internal social cohesion that is so
important to presenting a positive view of the UK on the international
This damage would be to the disadvantage of the Scottish people,
as much as to the UK as a whole. A number of our witnesses
discussed the importance of the UK projecting "a loose collection
of narratives to reflect the character of its regions".
The Government's internal coordination
296. We feel that promoting the creation of a
unifying strategic narrative about the UK, and enabling the UK's
soft power actors to draw upon it in a coordinated way, is a key
role for the Government. However, we heard evidence that the Government
are not sufficiently coordinated themselves to be able to provide
a strong lead.
297. The Committee has heard contradictory explanations
about who in Government takes charge of protecting and promoting
the UK's soft power. Dr Andrew Murrison MP, Minister
of State for International Security Strategy at the MOD, told
us that it fell within the remit of the FCO;
officials from the FCO informed us that responsibility for soft
power lay ultimately with the National Security Council, chaired
by the Prime Minister.
We could not determine which of these assertions was the more
accurate, as the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were unable
to give evidence to the Committee. The Government's flagship nation
branding programme, the GREAT Campaign, is also influential across
the UK's public diplomacy efforts. And the Ministry of Defence's
key soft power initiative, the 'International Defence Engagement
Strategy', is a joint FCO-MOD initiative, which includes the DFID
as a board member.
We have heard that the Cabinet Office is looking into "the
way all Departments that are relevant to national security at
least bring things together".
The Committee urges the Government to publish, as part of their
response to this Report, an evidence-based explanation that demonstrates
how the sharing of soft power promotion between the NSC, the GREAT
Campaign, the FCO, the MOD, DCMS and DFID has been a success.
298. Because many Departments now play a role
in soft power,
the Committee acknowledges that the GREAT Campaign is best coordinated
from the centrefrom either the Cabinet Office or Number
10. The campaign is led by an official, Conrad Bird, who is based
in Number 10 but is seconded from the Foreign Office, and who
reports to a Cabinet Office official, Alex Aiken.
Yet the Chair of the GREAT Campaign programme board is the Secretary
of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the Rt Hon Maria Miller MP,
meaning that some of the campaign's strategic direction derives
from DCMS. DCMS plays a central role in UK public diplomacy, but
so too do BIS, the FCO, DFID and the MOD, to name just four. Maria
Miller MP reported that members of the programme board include
representatives of "UKTI, BIS and a whole host of organisations,
including our tourism organisation VisitBritain"; we also
heard that the FCO is represented by senior officials, and that
representatives of VisitEngland, the British Council, UK Visas
and Immigration and the Treasury attend, "along with other
representatives such as London & Partners".
While we welcome the role of the GREAT Campaign in bringing
together those involved in the UK's international marketing, we
feel that the Government should do more to build on the campaign's
We have some concern about the lack of clarity about where the
buck stops. We propose that the Government make publicly available
their justification for how the structure of the GREAT Campaign
brings added value.
Poor internal coordination leads
to poor external communication
299. We urge Government decision-makers to
consider adverse consequences for the UK's soft power when devising
policies that might be domestically popular, but could damage
the UK's reputation.
The Committee disagrees with the Minister for Business and Enterprise
that "There is no confusion within government".
John Dickie told us that "there is a fundamental lack of
joined-upness in government" because they "simultaneously
want to tell the world that we are open for business [and] that
we have too many people coming here and we have a net migration
So the mood music is at best confused". He
was concerned by "a lack of co-automated messaging policy
by the Government".
The British Council also saw a lack of coordination on immigration:
"much greater effort should be made to ensure the efforts
of the Foreign Office, BIS and the Prime Minister himself are
not undermined by poor communications".
For the reasons that we outlined in Chapter four, it is important
for the UK's international attractiveness and influence that the
Government avoid expressing confusing views on immigration.
We fully understand the conflicting pressures on Government, and
the need for careful control of immigration to escape the blunders
of the past. But
the Government must ensure greater consistency between the
development and communication of their policies on immigration
and their plans to make the UK attractive to visitors, students,
workers and investors, with all the soft power benefits that openness
brings. The Government have demonstrated a worrying lack of coordination
in the development and communication of certain policies, with
detrimental results for British soft power.
300. Some of our witnesses argued for a soft
power "strategy", department or minister.
Like Professor Cox, we do not believe that the establishment
of a soft power ministry would answer the need for better coordination
of the UK's soft power and external reputation.
A Public Diplomacy Board established by the previous Government
"lapsed" in 2010.
We suggest that bureaucratic coordination through the establishment
of a Government committee on the UK's soft power would lack the
drive and purpose that the issue requires. An understanding of
how soft power is generated, and how the UK should behave if it
is to be attractive and influential should become mainstream in
Whitehall thinking, not hived off to a Cabinet sub-committee.
301. Policy coordination is different from bureaucratic
coordination, however. There needs to be 'joined-up writing' in
terms of the policies exercised by Departments. So while there
should not be a bureaucratic soft power strategyor the
establishment of a soft power ministrythere does need to
be a strategic vision, given vitality by those at the very top
of Government and permeating Whitehall. There needs to be a 'theme'
for Departments to improvise upon: a strategic narrative (see
paragraphs 290 to 293 above).
If, instead of a formal strategy, a central voice set a strong
theme and energised it with a proper vision, he or she could set
the tone, allowing creativity to bloom. This differs from top-down
coordination, which, when excessive, can stifle innovation.
As Emile Simpson put it in his written evidence, "What is
a narrative? The narrative is a story that aspires to communicate
state policy goals in a way that make sensethat is persuasive".
One advantage of such an approach would be that the clarity of
the story should flush out cases where some Departments' policies
countered others' efforts. We feel that there needs to be a
long-term strategic narrative about the international role of
the UK, promulgated from the centre of Government. Innovative
and imaginative Departments would interpret this narrative, with
the freedom to use their initiative but with a clear understanding
of how their responses fitted into the broader theme.
302. The Government view the National Security
Council (NSC) as the body that coordinates soft power.
However, we are not convinced that soft power features on the
NSC's agendathe NSC's three sub-committees consider 'threats,
hazards, resilience and contingencies', 'nuclear deterrence and
security' and 'the UK's relationship with emerging international
powers'. A proposal
for the National Security Council to develop a soft power strategy
appears to have "lapsed", according to Dr Robin
Brown, who told us that "Under the pressure of the Olympics
it appears that any general attempt to coordinate UK public diplomacy
has been abandoned".
If it does not have the capacity regularly to discuss the UK's
broad international standing, the NSC should make this clear,
and the Government should move quickly to put responsibility for
the UK's reputation in different hands. The Committee believes
that while the NSC continues to play this role, soft power should
be a regular item on its agendait needs to have a high
We urge the NSC to devote at least one session every six months
to discussing the exercise of soft power, and to report to Parliament
once a year about the UK's exercise of soft and smart power.
303. Too many Departments and other bodies are
now involved in the UK's international presence for the NSC solely
to be responsible for the UK's soft power vision. The Prime Minister
must give strong and passionate voice to the theme, but he has
too much on his hands to be the conductor.
Professor Anholt outlined a structure that, we consider,
could provide the supportive approach that is required:
"What seems to work is having some sort
of central body that owns the grand strategythe 'everything'
strategythat answers [the following] questions. What is
this country for? What is its purpose in the world? If the hand
of God should accidentally slip on the celestial keyboard tomorrow
and hit delete and Britain went, who would notice and why? These
questions might sound a little airy fairy, but in the age of globalisation
we at least have to try to answer them. That central body owns
that strategy and then it imposes it by providing services to
the other branches of government, rather than acting as a policeman.
In other words, instead of offering to vet people's policies,
it suggests actions that they could take that would be cost-effective
ways of getting across the messages that people want to get across".
304. We therefore propose that there should
be a small unit at the centre of Government specifically to assist
the Prime Minister in reinforcing the consistency of the soft
power story throughout Whitehall, and help him or her to counteract
swiftly any developments that might undermine the UK's broader
message, story and reputational standing across the world.
The unit would set the theme on which Departments and non-state
soft power actors could improvise. It would not impose strategies
on Departments or add a layer of bureaucratic meetings and planning:
by assembling and putting into telling words all aspects of the
UK's strategic story and direction, it would help Departments
to understand the UK's place on the international stage, and how
their actions might affect this.
305. We consider that this strategic narrative
unit could follow the example of the GREAT Campaign's structure,
whose central team invites Departments to 'buy in' to the campaign
and offers them campaign-related marketing materials, but does
not dictate to them.
The unit would work on articulating the UK's strategic narrative,
but would also offer advice, skills, resources, intelligence and
support to the UK's soft power more broadly. The unit could help
to ensure that Departments understand what constitutes the country's
soft power, and which institutions and organisations, inside and
outside Government, contribute to it.
306. Gillespie and Webb told the Committee, in
the context of the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games, that
"Soft power can be used to exert influence and deliver short
term advantages in tactical ways and can exert the right kind
of influence at critical moments".
Many such critical moments, which create opportunities for generating
or exerting influence, might be identified in advance (for example
elections, Royal weddings, sporting contests, and treaty negotiations).
The unit could help Departments plan a range of tactical activities
in response, and ensure that the efforts made were not contradictory
or counterproductive. The unit might conduct research into soft
power measurement and spending, to bring some consistency to Government
oversight of the amount of money invested by the many Departments
that have a role to play.
Departments might also commission the unit to provide quantitative
and qualitative targets to meet over the course of the year,
while the unit's recommendations could feed into terms of reference
for contractors working with Government Departments.
307. The unit might highlight where sections
of Government have undermined the soft power efforts of other
sections, in order to avoid future mistakes like the mixed messaging
over visa policy. It might make policy proposals to mitigate such
confusionto remove students from the immigration cap, for
instance. It might also be equipped to challenge Government decisions
with a potentially detrimental effect on the UK's influence, such
as cuts to the BBC World Service. It could help to ensure that
as the international scene evolves, the balance between hard power
and soft power and the dynamics operating between the FCO, MOD
and DFID are reviewed and adjusted so that these key Departments
work together seamlessly. The unit could also have an outward-facing
communications role, to inform the public about the long-term
benefits of investments that add to the UK's reputation and influence,
and to improve public understanding of the way that international
power is changing.
308. This unit should report directly to the
Prime Minister, in order to support him or her and Ministers in
their efforts to articulate the UK's qualities, outputs and international
contribution, to better coordinate Government policies and to
motivate the UK's soft power actorsinside and outside Governmentto
realise the contribution they can make to the UK's values and
interests. It would also work to support the National Security
Council in focusing on the UK's soft and smart power, assuming
that the NSC retains this remit. Hugo Swire MP told us that
for the Government, "Soft power is like breathing. It is
what we do. It is our natural default position
should get out of bed in the morning thinking soft power".
Given notable failures in Governmental coordination on issues
affecting the UK's reputation, and ambiguities in the presentation
of the nation's position and direction, we are not convinced that
this is yet the reality in Government. But we consider that a
stronger and more articulate lead from the centre, with dedicated
Cabinet Office support, could help to make it soand that
success in doing so is vital for the UK's future.
309. We were heartened to see that our proposal
tallies with the findings of the House of Commons Public Administration
Select Committee inquiry into National Strategy. The Committee
proposed the creation of a "'community of strategists' from
across Whitehalland beyond
to support a National
Security Council (NSC) with a widened remit encompassing National
(or 'Grand') Strategy.
We remain concerned that without
this capacity the NSC can only broker compromises between Departmental
views based on incompatible principles, and that the failure to
establish a common language and idiom of thinking about strategy
is bound to leave different parts of Whitehall at cross purposes".
310. In addition we consider that there ought
to be a Committee in Parliament which annually publishes a review
of the Government's soft power strengths and weaknesses, goals
and priorities, looking particularly closely at the work that
the Government have done to support the UK's international standing
and attractiveness. We note that there are a number of Parliamentary
Committees with international dimensions to their work, such as
the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the Joint Committee
on the National Security Strategy, and we hope that one such Committee
will consider pursuing this. These reports would clarify and
build public understanding of the UK's long-term foreign policy
trajectoryand help to ensure that Departments take this
important issue seriously. We further recommend that, as the
UK's international standing is the ultimate in long-term and non-partisan
concerns, the Government should regularly consult with all the
major parties in the Westminster Parliament and in the devolved
assemblies on the UK's strategic direction and future on the world
stage. The unit tasked with shaping and embellishing the UK's
strategic narrative should also consult widely with non-state
soft power actors, including firms, charities and scientific,
sporting and cultural institutions.
780 Q31. Back
Professor Anholt. Back
The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012
outlined its belief that the National Security Strategy "mentions
many different forms of 'soft power' but could do more to spell
out the different roles of organisations such as the BBC World
Service and British Council. We believe that greater clarity over
exactly what we are seeking, and why, could enable resources to
be better targeted". Joint Committee on the National Security
Strategy, First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010
(1st Report, Session 2010-12, HL Paper 265, HC Paper 1384), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtnatsec/265/265.pdf,
Dr Jamie Gaskarth. Back
Indra Adnan. Back
Dr James Pamment. Back
Professor Roselle. Back
Dr James Pamment. Back
Dr Cristina Archetti. Back
Professor Anholt. Back
Q176; Dr Cristina Archetti. Back
Indra Adnan. Back
See Sir John Major, Q346. Back
See Lord Williams of Baglan, Q38. Back
Professor Cox, Q37; Professor Roselle; Dr Christina Rowley; Commonwealth
Parliamentary Association UK; Welsh Government; Professor Scott-Smith;
Dr Daniel Arthur, International Policy Dynamics; National Museum
Directors' Council. Back
Hugh Elliott, Andrew Mitchell, Q12. See also Andrew Murrison MP,
Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back
MOD and FCO (2013) International Defence Engagement Strategy,
Steve McCarthy, Q61. Back
See Lord Jay of Ewelme, Q292, Q294. Back
See Alex Aiken, Conrad Bird, Q310. Back
Maria Miller MP, Q330. Back
Q330; Conrad Bird, Q314. Back
Alex Aiken, Conrad Bird, Q313, Q314, Q320; Conrad Bird, Q321,
We have received written evidence from the GREAT Campaign stating
that they use methodologies approved by the National Audit Office
and "recognised as standard across the tourism industry"
('Great Britain' Campaign, supplementary written evidence). In
their oral evidence, Conrad Bird and Alex Aiken discussed evaluation
methods that used focus groups and surveys (Q320; Q321; Q324).
However, the Committee did not receive evidence showing how exposure
to the GREAT Campaign directly influenced the attitudes or behaviour
of people from within or outside the UK, or a full explanation
of the methodologies used to measure and evaluate such influence.
See also Professor Rawnsley; Gillespie and Webb; Dr Daniel Arthur,
International Policy Dynamics; Centre for Cultural Relations,
University of Edinburgh; British Academy; Behavioural Dynamics
Institute; Dr Ali Fisher; Research Councils UK. Back
See Professor Cox, Q30; John Micklethwait, Q31. Back
British Council supplementary written evidence. Back
Mark Harper MP, Q260; Government (Home Office) supplementary written
evidence; Hugo Swire MP, Q370. Back
Professor Anholt; Dr Robin Brown; Dr Daniel Arthur, International
Policy Dynamics; Professor Nye, Q182; Dr James Pamment; Professor
Rawnsley; Indra Adnan. Back
Professor Cox told us that "This may make [soft power] very
amorphous, but it is not just a utilitarian concept, whereby you
have a department of soft power and a Minister of Soft Power,
as opposed to a Minister of Defence, for example. It does not
quite work like that
It is rather more amorphous, like
jelly". (Q27) Indra Adnan; Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back
Hugh Elliott, Q11. See also Hugh Elliott, Q10; Professor Anholt,
Q210; Dr Robin Brown. Back
Professor Roselle reminded us that the American diplomat Richard
Holbrooke once commented that "Diplomacy is not like chess.
It's more like jazz-a constant improvisation on a theme".
ProfessorRoselle. See also Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back
Cf. Lord Williams of Baglan, Professor Cox, Q30. Some evidence
highlighted how strategies that aim to promote soft power can
be problematic. Professor Rawnsley wrote that "any programme
that begins with the objective of designing a 'programme to enhance
soft power' will encounter difficulties. Soft power is
a natural by-product of one's values, principles, and behaviour
(at home and abroad). It cannot be strategised". Professor
Rawnsley; cf. Behavioural Dynamics Institute. Back
Emile Simpson. Back
The 2012-15 and 2013-15 FCO Business Plans both contained a commitment
to "develop a long-term programme to enhance UK 'soft power',
co-ordinated by the National Security Council" (FCO (2012)
Business Plan 2012-15, 31 May, http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/282786/business-plan-12-annexes.pdf,
p8; FCO (2013) Business Plan 2013-15, June, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/282912/FCO_departmental_business_plan_-_7_June_2013_formatted__for_Publication.pdf,
p3). The 2011-15 Business Plan listed using soft power "to
promote British values, advance development and prevent conflict"
as one of the five structural reform priorities for the FCO, and
went into detail about actions to be taken (FCO (2013) Business
Plan 2011-15, May, http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32855/FCO-Business-Plan1.pdf,
p2; pp19-20). Back
See also Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, 'Uncorrected
Transcript of Oral Evidence: National Security Strategy' (Rt Hon
David Cameron MP; Sir Kim Darroch, KCMG), HC Paper 1040, 30 January
Q11, Q12, Q13; Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy,
First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010 (1st
Report of Session 2010-12, HL Paper 265, HC Paper 1384), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtnatsec/265/265.pdf,
Dr Robin Brown. Back
See Alex Aiken, Q319. Back
See Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back
See Graham Mather, Q170. Back
Alex Aiken, Conrad Bird, Q313. Back
Gillespie and Webb. Back
See Professor Joseph Nye, Q182. Back
See Professor Anholt, Q211. Back
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Who
does UK National Strategy? Further Report (6th Report of Session
2010-11, HC Paper 713), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubadm/713/713.pdf,
Dr Gaskarth; Jonathan McClory. Back