Persuasion and Power in the Modern World - Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK's Influence Contents

Chapter 5: The coordination and reinforcement of the UK's soft power

288.  The previous Chapter of this Report itemised the immense store of soft power assets and instruments at the disposal of the UK, ranging from its economic and technical skills and undoubted diplomatic prowess, to its most revered customs, characteristics, values, and institutions, including the monarchy itself. Yet John Micklethwait claimed to be "staggered by the fact that there was not really any sense of how big were what might be described as Britain's soft power industries".[780] Professor Anholt was critical that the UK's soft power 'instruments' were "just left lying around the place" rather than being brought together, inspired and informed.[781] Keith Nichol, Head of Cultural Diplomacy at DCMS told the Committee that "We have probably about 1,400 arts and cultural organisations active in all sorts of countries but, until very recently, we had no coherent sense of where they are going or what they are doing". Encouragingly, he added "what we are trying to do now … is to start to map that activity and to see where it is possible to align it with wider HMG and UK interests".[782] It is clear that the UK has strong soft power assets: in their response to this Report, we urge the Government to provide a strong focus on the specific aspects of the UK's soft and smart power that they will seek to develop in reaction to the arguments made in this Report, how they will do so, and to what timetable. The response should examine the challenges faced by the UK's non-governmental soft power assets and what the Government can do to assist and support them. It should also clearly delineate precisely which of our recommendations they support and will implement, and if they do not accept any of our recommendations, it should explain why not.[783]

289.  We pose below the fundamental question of whether the Government can themselves do more to upgrade and reinforce the UK's soft power, both to protect the nation and to further its central interests and purposes in a world of challenges and opportunities. We also consider whether Government policies can be reconfigured more effectively: might they be better articulated and win greater impact than they do at present? On the basis of a large volume of written evidence, and of our extensive hearings with witnesses, we believe that Government policies can answer these twin challenges. We acknowledge here that much good work is ongoing, but we argue that much more can be done.

Supporting a strong strategic narrative

290.  The Committee heard that "If Britain is serious about wanting to mobilise its soft power globally" it needs to have a public debate, combined with rigorous strategic analysis, over what sort of state the UK wants to be".[784] Professor Cox asked, "What is the story we want to tell about our own history? It is an extraordinarily important part of power. What is our narrative about ourselves?"[785] According to Indra Adnan, "Every country must find its place in the world by creating a narrative that binds the past and present in a way that confidently serves the emerging reality of rapid globalisation".[786] Dr James Pamment also saw the need for "a compelling narrative explaining Britain's place and intentions in the international system".[787] Strategic narratives are "a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of politics in order to shape the behavior of other actors", Professor Roselle explained. She told us that "a compelling narrative can be a soft power resource, as people may be drawn to certain actors, events, and explanations that describe the history of a country, or the specifics of a policy, for example".[788]

291.  A national narrative can also play a crucial part in bringing together and inspiring the contributions made by a country's soft power actors: Dr Pamment told us that a narrative was "a form of storytelling that sums up the overarching national strategy in ways that soft power institutions can draw upon and rearticulate in their own unique ways".[789] The "basic values of the UK brand", such as the rule of law and respect for human rights, constitute a national narrative and "provide a dynamic framework to loosely (but firmly) guide all national actors' discourse and behavior", argued Dr Cristina Archetti, Associate Professor in Politics and Media, University of Salford, adding that the Government have "a role in upholding such [a] dynamic framework".[790]

292.  Professor Anholt contended that "The only way that 'soft' power can become an effective force" is if the UK's soft power assets "are inspired and informed by a shared, long-term, national strategy". In his view, "Such a grand strategy is what the United Kingdom lacks. Its absence is the reason why our instruments of soft power do so very well on their own account yet achieve only a small part of what they could achieve for the country and its standing, if only they were really working together". He considered that "the most dependably attractive focus for any national strategy is a moral one: the aim is to prove the utility of the country to humanity and to the planet, rather than brag about its assets or achievements (which, in the case of the UK, are sufficiently appreciated that further bragging is more likely to annoy than impress). To put it simply, people in other countries are much more interested in what the UK can do for them than in what it manages to do for itself". For Professor Anholt, countries must learn "how to corral their soft and hard powers around a shared, national, grand strategy, so that their impacts can be combined and thus multiplied". However, "This is the task which the UK has failed to seize or even to acknowledge in living memory, despite the fact that becoming a paragon of soft power is our country's only remaining strategic option", he warned.[791]

293.  A 'strategic narrative' projects a past, present and future that is persuasive and attractive to others who then 'buy in' to efforts to realise that future. Furthermore, the story needs to keep up with the times and be re-articulated in constantly refreshed terms. In a now almost totally transformed international scene, full of unfamiliar and bewildering new aspects, it is vital that the UK maintain its sense of purpose and direction: the British need to feel confident in knowing who we are and what our role is in a transformed and turbulent world. The Government must present, and keep updating, a strong narrative about the UK's changing position; a story about what values the UK stands for and where it should be heading, because as Professor Nye put it, "the point is that it is not just whose army wins, it is also whose story wins in an information age".[792] We consider that the UK's soft power will only achieve real momentum if the UK maintains this sense of purpose. Attractiveness will only convert into positive achievements if the UK and those who engage with it have a grasp of the contribution that the UK can make—it will amount to little if the UK is believed merely to be seeking admiration and economic gain. The Government must take responsibility for providing a clear vision for the country, which will help those across Whitehall who influence foreign policy to understand what is holding the UK back, or could hold it back in the future.

294.  We heard concern from our witnesses that the strength of a strategic narrative about the UK and what it stands for would be undermined by the dissolution of the Union.[793] In giving evidence to the Committee, Sir John Major told us that from country to country he had seen the issue of Scottish independence "Increasingly" being raised: "It has come up in the Far East and it has come up in a number of countries, simply because they would perceive a country that was damaged and diminished if a chunk of it voluntarily chose to leave the United Kingdom".[794] Onlookers "would see a country beginning to fracture".[795] He worried that "we would have had a political fracture of a most dramatic nature. That makes people wonder about the stability. If Scotland were to go, what would happen to Wales? What would happen to Northern Ireland? These are acute worries".[796] Further, he warned that if Scotland were to secede, "Apart from an extremely talented chunk of the United Kingdom disappearing, we would be diminished. That would put at risk our role in many international bodies. Our voice would be weakened. As to whether we would retain our seat on the UN Security Council, very possibly for a while but at some stage that is bound to be reformed. …I think were we to lose in Scotland it may be open to doubt when that change comes whether we would retain our position. …We would find ourselves weakened in the IMF. We would find ourselves weakened in the G8, the G20. In every international gathering that there is the voice of Britain would not be growing stronger, as it should as the economy improves. It would be growing weaker".[797]

295.  The debate over Scottish independence represents a vitally important constitutional discussion that goes far wider than the remit of this inquiry. We note, however, that the UK's aim and claim to continue to play a major role in world affairs would be undermined by Scottish separation, because even a debate about whether the UK should continue to be a member of the UN Security Council, for example, would do damage to its reputation.[798] Dismembering the UK is not consistent with promoting the country abroad as a strong, stable and successful state; nor is it consistent with promoting the sense of internal social cohesion that is so important to presenting a positive view of the UK on the international stage.[799] This damage would be to the disadvantage of the Scottish people, as much as to the UK as a whole. A number of our witnesses discussed the importance of the UK projecting "a loose collection of narratives to reflect the character of its regions".[800]

The Government's internal coordination

296.  We feel that promoting the creation of a unifying strategic narrative about the UK, and enabling the UK's soft power actors to draw upon it in a coordinated way, is a key role for the Government. However, we heard evidence that the Government are not sufficiently coordinated themselves to be able to provide a strong lead.

297.  The Committee has heard contradictory explanations about who in Government takes charge of protecting and promoting the UK's soft power. Dr Andrew Murrison MP, Minister of State for International Security Strategy at the MOD, told us that it fell within the remit of the FCO[801]; officials from the FCO informed us that responsibility for soft power lay ultimately with the National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister.[802] We could not determine which of these assertions was the more accurate, as the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were unable to give evidence to the Committee. The Government's flagship nation branding programme, the GREAT Campaign, is also influential across the UK's public diplomacy efforts. And the Ministry of Defence's key soft power initiative, the 'International Defence Engagement Strategy', is a joint FCO-MOD initiative, which includes the DFID as a board member.[803] We have heard that the Cabinet Office is looking into "the way all Departments that are relevant to national security at least bring things together".[804] The Committee urges the Government to publish, as part of their response to this Report, an evidence-based explanation that demonstrates how the sharing of soft power promotion between the NSC, the GREAT Campaign, the FCO, the MOD, DCMS and DFID has been a success.

298.  Because many Departments now play a role in soft power[805], the Committee acknowledges that the GREAT Campaign is best coordinated from the centre—from either the Cabinet Office or Number 10. The campaign is led by an official, Conrad Bird, who is based in Number 10 but is seconded from the Foreign Office, and who reports to a Cabinet Office official, Alex Aiken.[806] Yet the Chair of the GREAT Campaign programme board is the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the Rt Hon Maria Miller MP[807], meaning that some of the campaign's strategic direction derives from DCMS. DCMS plays a central role in UK public diplomacy, but so too do BIS, the FCO, DFID and the MOD, to name just four. Maria Miller MP reported that members of the programme board include representatives of "UKTI, BIS and a whole host of organisations, including our tourism organisation VisitBritain"; we also heard that the FCO is represented by senior officials, and that representatives of VisitEngland, the British Council, UK Visas and Immigration and the Treasury attend, "along with other representatives such as London & Partners".[808] While we welcome the role of the GREAT Campaign in bringing together those involved in the UK's international marketing, we feel that the Government should do more to build on the campaign's successes.[809] We have some concern about the lack of clarity about where the buck stops. We propose that the Government make publicly available their justification for how the structure of the GREAT Campaign brings added value.[810]

Poor internal coordination leads to poor external communication

299.  We urge Government decision-makers to consider adverse consequences for the UK's soft power when devising policies that might be domestically popular, but could damage the UK's reputation.[811] The Committee disagrees with the Minister for Business and Enterprise that "There is no confusion within government".[812] John Dickie told us that "there is a fundamental lack of joined-upness in government" because they "simultaneously want to tell the world that we are open for business [and] that we have too many people coming here and we have a net migration target. …So the mood music is at best confused". He was concerned by "a lack of co-automated messaging policy by the Government".[813] The British Council also saw a lack of coordination on immigration: "much greater effort should be made to ensure the efforts of the Foreign Office, BIS and the Prime Minister himself are not undermined by poor communications".[814] For the reasons that we outlined in Chapter four, it is important for the UK's international attractiveness and influence that the Government avoid expressing confusing views on immigration. We fully understand the conflicting pressures on Government, and the need for careful control of immigration to escape the blunders of the past.[815] But the Government must ensure greater consistency between the development and communication of their policies on immigration and their plans to make the UK attractive to visitors, students, workers and investors, with all the soft power benefits that openness brings. The Government have demonstrated a worrying lack of coordination in the development and communication of certain policies, with detrimental results for British soft power.

300.  Some of our witnesses argued for a soft power "strategy", department or minister.[816] Like Professor Cox, we do not believe that the establishment of a soft power ministry would answer the need for better coordination of the UK's soft power and external reputation.[817] A Public Diplomacy Board established by the previous Government "lapsed" in 2010.[818] We suggest that bureaucratic coordination through the establishment of a Government committee on the UK's soft power would lack the drive and purpose that the issue requires. An understanding of how soft power is generated, and how the UK should behave if it is to be attractive and influential should become mainstream in Whitehall thinking, not hived off to a Cabinet sub-committee.

301.  Policy coordination is different from bureaucratic coordination, however. There needs to be 'joined-up writing' in terms of the policies exercised by Departments. So while there should not be a bureaucratic soft power strategy—or the establishment of a soft power ministry—there does need to be a strategic vision, given vitality by those at the very top of Government and permeating Whitehall. There needs to be a 'theme' for Departments to improvise upon: a strategic narrative (see paragraphs 290 to 293 above).[819] If, instead of a formal strategy, a central voice set a strong theme and energised it with a proper vision, he or she could set the tone, allowing creativity to bloom. This differs from top-down coordination, which, when excessive, can stifle innovation.[820] As Emile Simpson put it in his written evidence, "What is a narrative? The narrative is a story that aspires to communicate state policy goals in a way that make sense—that is persuasive".[821] One advantage of such an approach would be that the clarity of the story should flush out cases where some Departments' policies countered others' efforts. We feel that there needs to be a long-term strategic narrative about the international role of the UK, promulgated from the centre of Government. Innovative and imaginative Departments would interpret this narrative, with the freedom to use their initiative but with a clear understanding of how their responses fitted into the broader theme.

302.  The Government view the National Security Council (NSC) as the body that coordinates soft power.[822] However, we are not convinced that soft power features on the NSC's agenda—the NSC's three sub-committees consider 'threats, hazards, resilience and contingencies', 'nuclear deterrence and security' and 'the UK's relationship with emerging international powers'.[823] A proposal for the National Security Council to develop a soft power strategy appears to have "lapsed", according to Dr Robin Brown, who told us that "Under the pressure of the Olympics it appears that any general attempt to coordinate UK public diplomacy has been abandoned".[824] If it does not have the capacity regularly to discuss the UK's broad international standing, the NSC should make this clear, and the Government should move quickly to put responsibility for the UK's reputation in different hands. The Committee believes that while the NSC continues to play this role, soft power should be a regular item on its agenda—it needs to have a high priority.[825] We urge the NSC to devote at least one session every six months to discussing the exercise of soft power, and to report to Parliament once a year about the UK's exercise of soft and smart power.

303.  Too many Departments and other bodies are now involved in the UK's international presence for the NSC solely to be responsible for the UK's soft power vision. The Prime Minister must give strong and passionate voice to the theme, but he has too much on his hands to be the conductor.[826] Professor Anholt outlined a structure that, we consider, could provide the supportive approach that is required:

    "What seems to work is having some sort of central body that owns the grand strategy—the 'everything' strategy—that answers [the following] questions. What is this country for? What is its purpose in the world? If the hand of God should accidentally slip on the celestial keyboard tomorrow and hit delete and Britain went, who would notice and why? These questions might sound a little airy fairy, but in the age of globalisation we at least have to try to answer them. That central body owns that strategy and then it imposes it by providing services to the other branches of government, rather than acting as a policeman. In other words, instead of offering to vet people's policies, it suggests actions that they could take that would be cost-effective ways of getting across the messages that people want to get across".[827]

304.  We therefore propose that there should be a small unit at the centre of Government specifically to assist the Prime Minister in reinforcing the consistency of the soft power story throughout Whitehall, and help him or her to counteract swiftly any developments that might undermine the UK's broader message, story and reputational standing across the world.[828] The unit would set the theme on which Departments and non-state soft power actors could improvise. It would not impose strategies on Departments or add a layer of bureaucratic meetings and planning: by assembling and putting into telling words all aspects of the UK's strategic story and direction, it would help Departments to understand the UK's place on the international stage, and how their actions might affect this.

305.  We consider that this strategic narrative unit could follow the example of the GREAT Campaign's structure, whose central team invites Departments to 'buy in' to the campaign and offers them campaign-related marketing materials, but does not dictate to them.[829] The unit would work on articulating the UK's strategic narrative, but would also offer advice, skills, resources, intelligence and support to the UK's soft power more broadly. The unit could help to ensure that Departments understand what constitutes the country's soft power, and which institutions and organisations, inside and outside Government, contribute to it.

306.  Gillespie and Webb told the Committee, in the context of the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games, that "Soft power can be used to exert influence and deliver short term advantages in tactical ways and can exert the right kind of influence at critical moments".[830] Many such critical moments, which create opportunities for generating or exerting influence, might be identified in advance (for example elections, Royal weddings, sporting contests, and treaty negotiations). The unit could help Departments plan a range of tactical activities in response, and ensure that the efforts made were not contradictory or counterproductive. The unit might conduct research into soft power measurement and spending, to bring some consistency to Government oversight of the amount of money invested by the many Departments that have a role to play.[831] Departments might also commission the unit to provide quantitative and qualitative targets to meet over the course of the year[832], while the unit's recommendations could feed into terms of reference for contractors working with Government Departments.

307.  The unit might highlight where sections of Government have undermined the soft power efforts of other sections, in order to avoid future mistakes like the mixed messaging over visa policy. It might make policy proposals to mitigate such confusion—to remove students from the immigration cap, for instance. It might also be equipped to challenge Government decisions with a potentially detrimental effect on the UK's influence, such as cuts to the BBC World Service. It could help to ensure that as the international scene evolves, the balance between hard power and soft power and the dynamics operating between the FCO, MOD and DFID are reviewed and adjusted so that these key Departments work together seamlessly. The unit could also have an outward-facing communications role, to inform the public about the long-term benefits of investments that add to the UK's reputation and influence, and to improve public understanding of the way that international power is changing.

308.  This unit should report directly to the Prime Minister, in order to support him or her and Ministers in their efforts to articulate the UK's qualities, outputs and international contribution, to better coordinate Government policies and to motivate the UK's soft power actors—inside and outside Government—to realise the contribution they can make to the UK's values and interests. It would also work to support the National Security Council in focusing on the UK's soft and smart power, assuming that the NSC retains this remit. Hugo Swire MP told us that for the Government, "Soft power is like breathing. It is what we do. It is our natural default position … all Ministers should get out of bed in the morning thinking soft power".[833] Given notable failures in Governmental coordination on issues affecting the UK's reputation, and ambiguities in the presentation of the nation's position and direction, we are not convinced that this is yet the reality in Government. But we consider that a stronger and more articulate lead from the centre, with dedicated Cabinet Office support, could help to make it so—and that success in doing so is vital for the UK's future.

309.  We were heartened to see that our proposal tallies with the findings of the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee inquiry into National Strategy. The Committee proposed the creation of a "'community of strategists' from across Whitehall—and beyond— …to support a National Security Council (NSC) with a widened remit encompassing National (or 'Grand') Strategy. … We remain concerned that without this capacity the NSC can only broker compromises between Departmental views based on incompatible principles, and that the failure to establish a common language and idiom of thinking about strategy is bound to leave different parts of Whitehall at cross purposes".[834]

310.  In addition we consider that there ought to be a Committee in Parliament which annually publishes a review of the Government's soft power strengths and weaknesses, goals and priorities, looking particularly closely at the work that the Government have done to support the UK's international standing and attractiveness. We note that there are a number of Parliamentary Committees with international dimensions to their work, such as the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, and we hope that one such Committee will consider pursuing this. These reports would clarify and build public understanding of the UK's long-term foreign policy trajectory—and help to ensure that Departments take this important issue seriously. We further recommend that, as the UK's international standing is the ultimate in long-term and non-partisan concerns, the Government should regularly consult with all the major parties in the Westminster Parliament and in the devolved assemblies on the UK's strategic direction and future on the world stage. The unit tasked with shaping and embellishing the UK's strategic narrative should also consult widely with non-state soft power actors, including firms, charities and scientific, sporting and cultural institutions.[835]

780   Q31. Back

781   Professor Anholt. Back

782   Q21. Back

783   The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy in 2012 outlined its belief that the National Security Strategy "mentions many different forms of 'soft power' but could do more to spell out the different roles of organisations such as the BBC World Service and British Council. We believe that greater clarity over exactly what we are seeking, and why, could enable resources to be better targeted". Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010 (1st Report, Session 2010-12, HL Paper 265, HC Paper 1384),, p14. Back

784   Dr Jamie Gaskarth. Back

785   Q37. Back

786   Indra Adnan. Back

787   Dr James Pamment. Back

788   Professor Roselle. Back

789   Dr James Pamment. Back

790   Dr Cristina Archetti. Back

791   Professor Anholt. Back

792   Q176; Dr Cristina Archetti. Back

793   Indra Adnan. Back

794   Q346. Back

795   Q345. Back

796   Q347. Back

797   Q347. Back

798   See Sir John Major, Q346. Back

799   See Lord Williams of Baglan, Q38. Back

800   Professor Cox, Q37; Professor Roselle; Dr Christina Rowley; Commonwealth Parliamentary Association UK; Welsh Government; Professor Scott-Smith; Dr Daniel Arthur, International Policy Dynamics; National Museum Directors' Council. Back

801   Q382. Back

802   Hugh Elliott, Andrew Mitchell, Q12. See also Andrew Murrison MP, Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back

803   MOD and FCO (2013) International Defence Engagement Strategy,, p5. Back

804   Steve McCarthy, Q61. Back

805   See Lord Jay of Ewelme, Q292, Q294. Back

806   See Alex Aiken, Conrad Bird, Q310. Back

807   Maria Miller MP, Q330. Back

808   Q330; Conrad Bird, Q314. Back

809   Alex Aiken, Conrad Bird, Q313, Q314, Q320; Conrad Bird, Q321, Q324. Back

810   We have received written evidence from the GREAT Campaign stating that they use methodologies approved by the National Audit Office and "recognised as standard across the tourism industry" ('Great Britain' Campaign, supplementary written evidence). In their oral evidence, Conrad Bird and Alex Aiken discussed evaluation methods that used focus groups and surveys (Q320; Q321; Q324). However, the Committee did not receive evidence showing how exposure to the GREAT Campaign directly influenced the attitudes or behaviour of people from within or outside the UK, or a full explanation of the methodologies used to measure and evaluate such influence. See also Professor Rawnsley; Gillespie and Webb; Dr Daniel Arthur, International Policy Dynamics; Centre for Cultural Relations, University of Edinburgh; British Academy; Behavioural Dynamics Institute; Dr Ali Fisher; Research Councils UK. Back

811   See Professor Cox, Q30; John Micklethwait, Q31. Back

812   Q341. Back

813   Q253. Back

814   British Council supplementary written evidence. Back

815   Mark Harper MP, Q260; Government (Home Office) supplementary written evidence; Hugo Swire MP, Q370. Back

816   Professor Anholt; Dr Robin Brown; Dr Daniel Arthur, International Policy Dynamics; Professor Nye, Q182; Dr James Pamment; Professor Rawnsley; Indra Adnan. Back

817   Professor Cox told us that "This may make [soft power] very amorphous, but it is not just a utilitarian concept, whereby you have a department of soft power and a Minister of Soft Power, as opposed to a Minister of Defence, for example. It does not quite work like that … It is rather more amorphous, like jelly". (Q27) Indra Adnan; Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back

818   Hugh Elliott, Q11. See also Hugh Elliott, Q10; Professor Anholt, Q210; Dr Robin Brown. Back

819   Professor Roselle reminded us that the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke once commented that "Diplomacy is not like chess. … It's more like jazz-a constant improvisation on a theme". ProfessorRoselle. See also Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back

820   Cf. Lord Williams of Baglan, Professor Cox, Q30. Some evidence highlighted how strategies that aim to promote soft power can be problematic. Professor Rawnsley wrote that "any programme that begins with the objective of designing a 'programme to enhance … soft power' will encounter difficulties. Soft power is a natural by-product of one's values, principles, and behaviour (at home and abroad). It cannot be strategised". Professor Rawnsley; cf. Behavioural Dynamics Institute.  Back

821   Emile Simpson. Back

822   The 2012-15 and 2013-15 FCO Business Plans both contained a commitment to "develop a long-term programme to enhance UK 'soft power', co-ordinated by the National Security Council" (FCO (2012) Business Plan 2012-15, 31 May,, p8; FCO (2013) Business Plan 2013-15, June,, p3). The 2011-15 Business Plan listed using soft power "to promote British values, advance development and prevent conflict" as one of the five structural reform priorities for the FCO, and went into detail about actions to be taken (FCO (2013) Business Plan 2011-15, May,, p2; pp19-20). Back

823 See also Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, 'Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence: National Security Strategy' (Rt Hon David Cameron MP; Sir Kim Darroch, KCMG), HC Paper 1040, 30 January 2014,, Q11, Q12, Q13; Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First Review of the National Security Strategy 2010 (1st Report of Session 2010-12, HL Paper 265, HC Paper 1384),, p14. 

824   Dr Robin Brown. Back

825   See Alex Aiken, Q319.  Back

826   See Hugo Swire MP, Q383. Back

827   Q210. Back

828   See Graham Mather, Q170. Back

829   Alex Aiken, Conrad Bird, Q313. Back

830   Gillespie and Webb. Back

831   See Professor Joseph Nye, Q182. Back

832   See Professor Anholt, Q211. Back

833   Q383. Back

834   House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Who does UK National Strategy? Further Report (6th Report of Session 2010-11, HC Paper 713),, p4. Back

835   Dr Gaskarth; Jonathan McClory. Back

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