Under those principles, costs awards are not prescriptive, nor is it our intention that they should be. We are simply allowing the court to make decisions with the appropriate information available to it. For example, the court will not have to make an award against a parent in a school challenge case and would not be expected to do so. We do not agree with Amendment 162 that prospective funding or the ability of company members to provide financial support can be excluded from this consideration, nor do we agree that the court should consider only those who have promised to provide funding. In our view, that creates an easily avoidable threshold.
We also do not agree that this information should be provided only on the making of an order by the court, as stated in Amendment 159B. There is no reason why the court should not be informed of the parties driving litigation early on in proceedings, as this would enable the judge to make decisions on costs without having to order the parties to provide information. Essentially this amendment seeks to favour the opaque, rather than the transparent. What information an applicant should provide will be set out in court rules. The rules will not require invasive financial information but will require the claimant to be clear about the sources of their funding. It will be perfectly acceptable to update the court if funding does not materialise; that was a point made in Committee and I would like to make that clear. The requirements will not be burdensome for claimants. The Government have on many occasions stated that they wish to see a light-touch approach, and I am sure that any rules will be fair and proportionate to the court’s need for transparency.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made reference to the judiciary’s response. I am sure he has read carefully what it is and I am in no position to contradict it. My understanding was that the judiciary had welcomed transparency, although, having revisited what I said in Committee, I did not seek to rely specifically on that as the only basis for this argument. He may well be right that the comments were directed more at non-parties than in the situation of an applicant. If I inadvertently misled Parliament, I make it absolutely clear that that was not my intention.
The requirement for transparency is wholly understandable and wholly consistent with judges making decisions on the best possible information. The question is: is this going to be chilling? I suggest that it will not be chilling to those who have good reasons for bringing claims and who are, as one would expect, open and frank about what, in financial terms, is driving the challenge.
This has been a useful debate and I hope it has enabled me to be clear about what lies behind Clauses 71 and 72 and to allay any remaining concerns. The Government take the view that these clauses do not take away the judge’s discretion. As is always the case, he or she will make the decision on the basis of the facts of each case. These clauses enable the judge to have better information before exercising the discretion. No judge wants to exercise a discretion in the absence of all the information that could reasonably be made available to them. It is not obvious to me why this is as objectionable as it is said. With that reassurance, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Pannick: My Lords, the purpose of Amendments 157, 158, 160 and 161, which are all of a piece, is simply to ensure that the court has a discretion rather than a duty in relation to information about the funding of judicial review. It is very important to be clear in the Bill that the court retains a discretion in relation to these matters. That is what these amendments seek to do in relation to funding issues. I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 157.
5.55 pm
Contents 228; Not-Contents 195.
CONTENTS
Adams of Craigielea, B.
Ahmed, L.
Alli, L.
Anderson of Swansea, L.
Andrews, B.
Armstrong of Hill Top, B.
Bach, L.
Bassam of Brighton, L.
Beecham, L.
Berkeley, L.
Best, L.
Bhatia, L.
Bichard, L.
Blackstone, B.
Blair of Boughton, L.
Blood, B.
Boateng, L.
Borrie, L.
Bradshaw, L.
Bragg, L.
Brennan, L.
Brooke of Alverthorpe, L.
Brookman, L.
Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, L. [Teller]
Butler-Sloss, B.
Campbell of Surbiton, B.
Campbell-Savours, L.
Carlile of Berriew, L.
Carter of Coles, L.
Chandos, V.
Christopher, L.
Clancarty, E.
Clark of Windermere, L.
Clarke of Hampstead, L.
Clinton-Davis, L.
Collins of Highbury, L.
Condon, L.
Corston, B.
Craigavon, V.
Cunningham of Felling, L.
Davidson of Glen Clova, L.
Davies of Oldham, L.
Davies of Stamford, L.
Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, B.
Derby, Bp.
Desai, L.
Donaghy, B.
Doocey, B.
Drake, B.
Drayson, L.
Dubs, L.
Eatwell, L.
Elder, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L.
Erroll, E.
Evans of Temple Guiting, L.
Falconer of Thoroton, L.
Falkland, V.
Farrington of Ribbleton, B.
Fellowes, L.
Filkin, L.
Foster of Bishop Auckland, L.
Foulkes of Cumnock, L.
Gale, B.
Gavron, L.
Gibson of Market Rasen, B.
Giddens, L.
Glasman, L.
Golding, B.
Goodhart, L.
Gordon of Strathblane, L.
Goudie, B.
Gould of Potternewton, B.
Grantchester, L.
Greenway, L.
Griffiths of Burry Port, L.
Grocott, L.
Hannay of Chiswick, L.
Hanworth, V.
Harris of Haringey, L.
Harris of Richmond, B.
Harrison, L.
Haskel, L.
Haskins, L.
Haworth, L.
Hayman, B.
Hayter of Kentish Town, B.
Healy of Primrose Hill, B.
Henig, B.
Hennessy of Nympsfield, L.
Hollis of Heigham, B.
Hope of Craighead, L.
Howarth of Breckland, B.
Howarth of Newport, L.
Howe of Idlicote, B.
Howells of St Davids, B.
Howie of Troon, L.
Hoyle, L.
Hughes of Stretford, B.
Hughes of Woodside, L.
Hunt of Chesterton, L.
Hunt of Kings Heath, L.
Hylton, L.
Irvine of Lairg, L.
Jay of Ewelme, L.
Jones, L.
Jones of Moulsecoomb, B.
Jones of Whitchurch, B.
Jordan, L.
Judd, L.
Judge, L.
Kennedy of Cradley, B.
Kennedy of Southwark, L.
Kennedy of The Shaws, B.
Kerr of Kinlochard, L.
King of Bow, B.
Kinnock, L.
Kinnock of Holyhead, B.
Kirkhill, L.
Kirkwood of Kirkhope, L.
Knight of Weymouth, L.
Lawrence of Clarendon, B.
Layard, L.
Lea of Crondall, L.
Lennie, L.
Lester of Herne Hill, L.
Levy, L.
Liddell of Coatdyke, B.
Liddle, L.
Lipsey, L.
Lister of Burtersett, B.
Lloyd of Berwick, L.
Low of Dalston, L.
Luce, L.
Lytton, E.
McAvoy, L.
McDonagh, B.
Macdonald of Tradeston, L.
McFall of Alcluith, L.
McIntosh of Hudnall, B.
Mackay of Drumadoon, L.
MacKenzie of Culkein, L.
McKenzie of Luton, L.
Mallalieu, B.
Mandelson, L.
Mar, C.
Marks of Henley-on-Thames, L.
Masham of Ilton, B.
Maxton, L.
Meacher, B.
Mendelsohn, L.
Mitchell, L.
Monks, L.
Moonie, L.
Morgan of Drefelin, B.
Morgan of Ely, B.
Morgan of Huyton, B.
Morris of Aberavon, L.
Morris of Handsworth, L.
Morris of Yardley, B.
Murphy, B.
Nye, B.
O'Loan, B.
Pannick, L.
Patel, L. [Teller]
Patel of Blackburn, L.
Patel of Bradford, L.
Pendry, L.
Phillips of Worth Matravers, L.
Pitkeathley, B.
Plant of Highfield, L.
Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Prescott, L.
Prosser, B.
Quin, B.
Radice, L.
Ramsay of Cartvale, B.
Redesdale, L.
Rees of Ludlow, L.
Reid of Cardowan, L.
Rendell of Babergh, B.
Rogan, L.
Rooker, L.
Rosser, L.
Rowe-Beddoe, L.
Rowlands, L.
Royall of Blaisdon, B.
St Albans, Bp.
St John of Bletso, L.
Sawyer, L.
Scotland of Asthal, B.
Sherlock, B.
Simon, V.
Smith of Basildon, B.
Smith of Finsbury, L.
Snape, L.
Soley, L.
Stern, B.
Stevenson of Balmacara, L.
Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Taylor of Bolton, B.
Temple-Morris, L.
Thomas of Gresford, L.
Thomas of Winchester, B.
Thornton, B.
Tomlinson, L.
Tonge, B.
Tunnicliffe, L.
Turnberg, L.
Uddin, B.
Wall of New Barnet, B.
Walpole, L.
Warner, L.
Warnock, B.
Watson of Invergowrie, L.
West of Spithead, L.
Wheeler, B.
Whitaker, B.
Whitty, L.
Williams of Elvel, L.
Wilson of Tillyorn, L.
Wood of Anfield, L.
Woolf, L.
Woolmer of Leeds, L.
Worthington, B.
Young of Hornsey, B.
Young of Norwood Green, L.
NOT CONTENTS
Addington, L.
Ahmad of Wimbledon, L.
Anelay of St Johns, B.
Arran, E.
Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, L.
Ashton of Hyde, L.
Astor of Hever, L.
Attlee, E.
Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, B.
Balfe, L.
Barker, B.
Bates, L.
Benjamin, B.
Black of Brentwood, L.
Blencathra, L.
Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury, B.
Borwick, L.
Bourne of Aberystwyth, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.
Bridgeman, V.
Brinton, B.
Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.
Browne of Belmont, L.
Butler of Brockwell, L.
Byford, B.
Caithness, E.
Carrington of Fulham, L.
Cathcart, E.
Cavendish of Furness, L.
Chidgey, L.
Chisholm of Owlpen, B.
Colville of Culross, V.
Colwyn, L.
Cooper of Windrush, L.
Cope of Berkeley, L.
Cotter, L.
Courtown, E.
Cox, B.
Crickhowell, L.
Cumberlege, B.
De Mauley, L.
Deighton, L.
Dholakia, L.
Dixon-Smith, L.
Dobbs, L.
Dykes, L.
Eaton, B.
Eccles, V.
Eccles of Moulton, B.
Eden of Winton, L.
Empey, L.
Falkner of Margravine, B.
Farmer, L.
Faulks, L.
Fearn, L.
Feldman of Elstree, L.
Fink, L.
Flight, L.
Fookes, B.
Forsyth of Drumlean, L.
Fowler, L.
Framlingham, L.
Freeman, L.
Freud, L.
Garden of Frognal, B.
Gardiner of Kimble, L.
Gardner of Parkes, B.
Geddes, L.
German, L.
Glasgow, E.
Glenarthur, L.
Glendonbrook, L.
Goodlad, L.
Grade of Yarmouth, L.
Grender, B.
Hamilton of Epsom, L.
Hanham, B.
Harding of Winscombe, B.
Harris of Peckham, L.
Henley, L.
Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, L.
Holmes of Richmond, L.
Hooper, B.
Horam, L.
Howard of Lympne, L.
Howard of Rising, L.
Howe, E.
Howe of Aberavon, L.
Howell of Guildford, L.
Humphreys, B.
Hunt of Wirral, L.
Hussain, L.
Hussein-Ece, B.
Inglewood, L.
James of Blackheath, L.
Janvrin, L.
Jenkin of Kennington, B.
Jenkin of Roding, L.
Jolly, B.
Jones of Cheltenham, L.
Kilclooney, L.
Kirkham, L.
Knight of Collingtree, B.
Kramer, B.
Laming, L.
Lawson of Blaby, L.
Leach of Fairford, L.
Lee of Trafford, L.
Leigh of Hurley, L.
Lexden, L.
Lindsay, E.
Lingfield, L.
Listowel, E.
Loomba, L.
Lothian, M.
Luke, L.
Lyell, L.
McColl of Dulwich, L.
MacGregor of Pulham Market, L.
Mackay of Clashfern, L.
McNally, L.
Maddock, B.
Mancroft, L.
Marland, L.
Marlesford, L.
Mawson, L.
Mobarik, B.
Moore of Lower Marsh, L.
Morris of Bolton, B.
Moynihan, L.
Naseby, L.
Nash, L.
Neville-Rolfe, B.
Newby, L. [Teller]
Newlove, B.
Northover, B.
O'Cathain, B.
Oppenheim-Barnes, B.
Paddick, L.
Palmer of Childs Hill, L.
Parminter, B.
Perry of Southwark, B.
Popat, L.
Purvis of Tweed, L.
Randerson, B.
Rawlings, B.
Razzall, L.
Rennard, L.
Ridley, V.
Risby, L.
Roberts of Llandudno, L.
Roper, L.
Seccombe, B.
Selborne, E.
Selkirk of Douglas, L.
Selsdon, L.
Shackleton of Belgravia, B.
Sharples, B.
Shephard of Northwold, B.
Sherbourne of Didsbury, L.
Shipley, L.
Shrewsbury, E.
Shutt of Greetland, L.
Skelmersdale, L.
Smith of Clifton, L.
Smith of Newnham, B.
Spicer, L.
Stedman-Scott, B.
Steel of Aikwood, L.
Stephen, L.
Stewartby, L.
Stoneham of Droxford, L.
Stowell of Beeston, B.
Suri, L.
Suttie, B.
Taverne, L.
Taylor of Holbeach, L. [Teller]
Tebbit, L.
Teverson, L.
Thomas of Swynnerton, L.
Tope, L.
Trefgarne, L.
Trenchard, V.
True, L.
Ullswater, V.
Verma, B.
Wakeham, L.
Wallace of Saltaire, L.
Wallace of Tankerness, L.
Walmsley, B.
Wheatcroft, B.
Wilcox, B.
Williams of Trafford, B.
Younger of Leckie, V.
6.08 pm
158: Clause 71, page 69, line 28, after “paragraph” insert “, or, notwithstanding a failure to do so, the tribunal in its discretion considers that it is nevertheless appropriate to grant the applicant permission or leave to apply for relief”
Clause 72: Use of information about financial resources
Amendments 159A and 159B not moved.
Amendments 161A to 163 not moved.
Clause 73: Interveners and costs
164: Clause 73, page 70, line 21, leave out subsections (2) to (6) and insert—
“( ) The High Court and the Court of Appeal shall have a discretion whether to order an intervener to pay the costs of a relevant party to the proceedings, and shall have a discretion whether to order a relevant party to the proceedings to pay the intervener’s costs.”
Lord Pannick: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 165. Your Lordships now turn to Clause 73, which concerns the costs of interveners in judicial review proceedings. Your Lordships will know that often in judicial review cases the court allows a person or body to intervene because they have knowledge or experience which may assist it in resolving the legal issues. Clause 73 states that interveners may not receive their costs other than in “exceptional circumstances”, and it adds—this is my concern—that, unless there are exceptional circumstances, an intervener must pay any costs that have been incurred by a party as a result of that intervention.
I cannot understand why such a provision is necessary or appropriate. The current legal position is clear and fair: the court has discretion over whether to order a party to the judicial review to pay the intervener’s costs or whether to order the intervener to pay costs to a party. Clause 73 is manifestly unfair. It will create a strong presumption that the intervener must pay costs, even if the intervention is helpful to the court in raising points that assist it in arriving at its substantive judgment. The Minister may say that the intervener can resist paying costs on the basis that there are “exceptional circumstances”, but there is nothing exceptional about the intervener assisting the court: it happens every week in judicial review cases. In any event, if there is a statutory presumption, rebuttable only by showing exceptional circumstances, that the intervener must pay the costs, public interest bodies will be far less likely to intervene. The courts will be denied assistance from those public interest bodies, which will be greatly to the public detriment and greatly to the detriment of the legal system, whether the intervention is from Liberty, the GMC, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or, indeed, the Home Secretary—because a number of interventions in judicial review cases are made by government departments. None of this makes any sense whatever.
Amendment 164 would provide that it is a matter for the discretion of the court whether to order costs to be paid by or to an intervener. I commend that amendment to the House. I beg to move.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB): I support the amendment. It is a feature of Clause 73, as I am sure the Minister will have noticed, that it does not mention the Supreme Court—one should be thankful for small mercies—but it creates a very unbalanced situation. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has explained, interventions are extremely helpful. Nobody has a right to intervene—courts at every level give permission if they are persuaded that the intervention would be of
use to them—so that I cannot see that there is any compelling reason for turning interveners away. The court values them, and certainly, from the point of view of the Supreme Court, in my experience where we allow an intervention we derive benefit from it.
The regime that the clause seeks to create seems rather unbalanced. From the Supreme Court’s point of view, as we are a court of appeal, it would much rather, I am sure, that those who had a point to make were able to make it at the Court of Appeal level if not at the level of the High Court. While I welcome the absence of the Supreme Court from this clause, it adds to my feeling that there is something wrong about it. Given that the intervener has no right to intervene and that the courts are perfectly capable of controlling the volume of intervention and the time taken by interveners, which the Supreme Court does regularly, I cannot see any value in the reform, if one can call it that, that the clause seeks to bring about.
6.15 pm
Lord Low of Dalston (CB): My Lords, it is a pleasure to find myself speaking after the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—not for the first time. I am very worried about a particular aspect of the provisions we are considering today; namely, their impact on children. That is thrown into sharp relief by Clause 73, which requires that interveners pay the costs of their intervention in the circumstances outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, save for those which are “exceptional”.
We had a briefing here, which a number of noble Lords may have attended, from a number of children’s organisations representing children and manifesting their concern for the rights of children. The points that they made were extremely powerful, and I am glad to have the opportunity of raising them in this debate.
Following cuts to legal aid, children are increasingly forced to face court proceedings without a lawyer. In these circumstances, litigation brought by charities, NGOs and children’s rights organisations in the public interest is ever more important. Equally, in the new environment where they are increasingly faced by litigants in person, the courts increasingly value the contribution of third-party interveners providing expert advice to assist them on specific points of law and fact, including points on what is in the children’s best interests.
As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, said in a speech that she gave to the Public Law Project conference in October 2013:
“Once a matter is in court, the more important the subject, the more difficult the issues, the more help we need to try and get the right answer … interventions are enormously helpful”.
That is the testimony of a justice of the Supreme Court. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out, the noble and learned Baroness will not necessarily be deprived of such interventions in the Supreme Court, but I am sure that she was referring also to the value of interventions in lower courts.
Children and young people are disproportionately affected by the legal aid changes. They are often powerless to prevent the circumstances that give rise to the legal problems for which they seek resolution, such as homelessness, and they certainly cannot assert their rights without the help of a lawyer. They are either forced to fend for themselves as litigants in person without
the skills to do so, have their problems inappropriately channelled to overstretched and inadequate complaints procedures, or have them go unresolved altogether.
The effect of the proposals about which we are talking today will be to inhibit legitimate challenge, limit judicial discretion to act in the public interest and shield public agencies from effective scrutiny. Despite what the Minister said earlier, it is difficult to escape the feeling that these provisions curtailing the scope of judicial review are animated by a belief that applications for judicial review are somehow vexatious. However, consider the sort of cases that we are talking about—cases where highly vulnerable children and young people seek protection from abuse and exploitation. Those affected include homeless children and young people; children who have been sexually exploited or abused—how salient is that today?—trafficked children; those with mental health problems and learning difficulties; children in care, care leavers and children affected by care proceedings; and young refugees and asylum seekers. The changes we are considering will inevitably have a chilling effect on charities and other organisations that seek to protect children’s rights through court action in the sort of cases I have mentioned. I urge noble Lords to support the amendments, which would negate these provisions, Clause 73 specifically.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill: My Lords, I wish to make a couple of points in addition in support of the amendment. My personal experience in cases has been that third-party interveners in judicial review proceedings perform a vital task in enabling the judicial review court, if it so wishes, to open its windows on to a wider range of considerations. We are not dealing with a dispute between two civil parties. We are dealing, as has been said, with judicial review designed in the public interest to resolve questions of public law. One such case has been implicitly referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—the case in which the High Commissioner for Refugees intervened in a difficult point about the proper construction of the refugee convention read with our other provisions. The court found it extremely valuable and it enabled the court, led by Lord Bingham, to give an authoritative ruling on what were novel issues about the refugee convention.
Another case was from Northern Ireland. One of the strange things about the Bill, which I hope the Minister will deal with in his reply, is that this provision does not apply to Northern Ireland or Scotland. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission had to struggle for some years to have a right of audience at all and to be able to make third-party interventions. Members of the House will remember that a couple of years ago, the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland wanted to commit Peter Hain for scandalising the judiciary by daring in his memoirs to criticise the Northern Ireland High Court judge. The Attorney-General applied to commit for contempt. I was instructed by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to make a third-party intervention. I like to think that the result of that written submission is what caused the Attorney-General to drop the whole idea, as he did.
Unless I am completely wrong, we are now in the curious position that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission will be able, with its very limited
budget, to be a third-party intervener without this costs effect, whereas the Equality and Human Rights Commission, for example, with its limited budget, will not be in the same position. That seems arbitrary and it will make it harder for our senior judiciary to be helped by third parties, which is the whole object of the third-party intervention.
Another example from the distant past concerned privacy in relation to the disclosure of patients’ medical information in the Court of Appeal. I seem to remember that a third-party intervention in that case was absolutely crucial. It is vital that small NGOs and ordinary citizens who have something to contribute, if the court decides that it wants to hear from them or read their written submissions, should be able to do so without the threat of costs orders being made against them.
Baroness Campbell of Surbiton (CB): My Lords, I wish to add my support for the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lord Pannick. This provision will, indeed, deter interventions from organisations with limited resources—organisations, as my noble friend Lord Low suggested, that are likely to have the best and most pertinent expertise about the more vulnerable sectors of our society: children, disabled people, elderly people. Judges have publicly recognised the value of specialist knowledge in helping them to make informed decisions, as demonstrated by my examples in Committee. I had the privilege to be involved in interventions in two landmark cases where my organisation and individual knowledge could contribute to the outcome, which everybody heralded as a great success. I know that the Government’s reforms would have deterred me and my organisation from intervening. I believe that cases will be very poor for that.
It is critical that intervention remains readily available and that we do not deter weak charities and individuals who are quite sceptical about getting involved at all. Let us face it, intervening in a High Court case is a scary prospect. I know because I remember I was terrified. Therefore, I believe that these provisions will have a devastating effect, particularly on the community that I know best, disabled people—the very people who need the most support, protection and expert advice, coming from maybe some of the people who know them best and who have themselves experienced what they might have been going through or might go through. Clause 73 cannot be allowed to stand because there will be no interventions of such knowledge and value—interventions that have literally changed the lives of some disabled individuals and interventions that will change the lives of those who come before the courts in the future.
Lord Faulks: My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on interveners. The position is that any person may apply to the court to give evidence or make representations in judicial review proceedings. However, we think it is right that people who intervene in judicial reviews should have a fairer financial stake in the case and do so in a way that does not cause the true parties to the judicial review additional costs.
Clause 73 aims to strengthen the costs rules in relation to third parties who voluntarily apply to join
in judicial review cases as interveners. It does this by establishing two presumptions: first, that the court will order an intervener to pay their own costs—that is normally the position now; secondly, that it will order an intervener to pay the reasonable costs that they cause a party to the judicial review to incur by their intervention. However, neither would apply where, in the view of the court, there are exceptional circumstances making it appropriate for that presumption to be rebutted. Neither presumption will apply when the court invites an intervention—and courts do quite often invite interventions. The clause will not affect the judge’s ability to invite whichever interventions, from whichever interveners, he or she sees fit.
The clause has been subject to significant debate and, as I said at Second Reading and in Committee in this place, and as my honourable friend Shailesh Vara said in the other place, the Government wanted to look again at how best to ensure that interveners consider carefully the costs implications of intervening, while not deterring appropriate interventions in appropriate cases, and, as a result, whether any changes to the clause were required. We have taken into account the views expressed in this House and the other place. The Government have listened to the concerns raised in Parliament and by stakeholders but consider that the current clause is right and are not persuaded that amendment is needed. The Government have considered and discussed the clause in some detail. I know that my ministerial colleagues have also discussed it with fellow Peers. I regret to say that we have been unable to agree an alternative formulation. The Government recognise that interveners can add value to a case and we do not want to stop that. However, interventions should be made in the right cases after careful consideration beforehand. That means that interveners should have a fair financial stake in the case.
6.30 pm
Let me answer two of the questions that emerged from our debate. Do the courts get help from interveners? Indeed, can they not provide valuable assistance in some cases? The answer to both questions is emphatically yes. I should declare an interest as having appeared as counsel in a number of cases in which there have been interveners; on one occasion, I have acted for an intervener. I do not think there is any doubt that the number of interventions has increased. Sir Henry Brooke, a former Court of Appeal judge with particular knowledge of the civil procedure rules, said in 2005:
which was, incidentally, the date of the creation of the Administrative Court—
“there has been a noticeable increase in the number of interventions in judicial review and other proceedings in the Administrative Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords”.
The main criterion for an intervention ought to be whether would-be interveners through their expertise are likely to be able to assist the court in understanding either the legal issues in question or the factual basis of the claim. Interventions should not be the routine response of a body generally interested in the area of law concerned or to use up an annual budget. Nor should interveners duplicate the arguments of a true party to a judicial review or simply act as a cheerleader for one party or another.
One problem that an intervention may cause is its scale. Permission may be granted on the basis of what the then judge thinks would be a modest intervention. What can follow is often a very lengthy skeleton argument and lever-arch files full of authorities. Both true parties to a judicial review are then put to the time and expense of trying to prepare a response. They cannot simply assume that the judge at the hearing—rarely the same judge who gave the permission—will simply cut off or limit the intervention; although many do their very best to do so.
Lord Hoffmann in E (A Child) v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 2009, AC 536, said:
“An intervention is however of no assistance if it merely repeats points which the appellant or respondent has already made. An intervener will have had sight of their printed cases and, if it has nothing to add, should not add anything. It is not the role of an intervener to be an additional counsel for one of the parties”.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, correctly pointed out, we do not by the provisions purport to tell the Supreme Court how to organise its affairs, but I suggest that the point that Lord Hoffmann makes can find resonance across both the Court of Appeal and first-instance cases. Why should there be any difference between the Supreme Court and judges of the lower tier? Perhaps there is this distinction—apart, of course, from the great respect that the Government have for the Supreme Court and its ability to organise its hearings and what it decides to rely on. By definition, a case that has reached the Supreme Court has been acknowledged as one of great public importance. The same is not always the case in cases of first instance or at the Court of Appeal.
We need to control the costs of judicial review, which are sometimes caused by interventions. We make no apology for trying to encourage potential interveners to think carefully about whether they can truly add anything new. The Government have listened to concerns, including that the clause is too broad or means that an intervener could be asked to pay the costs of the losing side. However, we consider that the scope of the clause and the safeguards built into it present a sensible approach. The court will be asked to consider making a costs order against an intervener only on application by a party, not in each and every case where an intervener is involved. It may be that in suitable cases, the parties agree with the potential intervener that they will not apply for costs against it. Even if the parties make an application, the court will retain discretion not to order costs where it considers that there are exceptional circumstances that make it inappropriate to do so.
It is important also to emphasise that the judge will have discretion over both aspects: causation and quantum. That will ensure that the parties will continue to carry a costs risk, helping to ensure that they do not engage the most costly legal advice available to deal with points that do not truly merit that level of expertise.
Lord Deben: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I am listening very carefully. The tiny bit that I do not understand is why the judge should not have discretion to decide whether the case merits payment of costs or not. The discretion is very bound, because he has to maintain that these are exceptional circumstances. I find that difficult. Why cannot he be
given the right to say, “In this case, they ought to pay because they have been in one way or another negligent”, or have overcharged, and in another case that they should not? Why cannot we leave it to the judge? It is his court and he should make the decision.
Lord Faulks: My Lords, of course that is the burden of the argument in favour of the amendment, and that is the current situation. The clause is intended to place a higher burden—we accept that it is a higher burden—on interveners to think carefully about the intervention that they intend to make as to whether it is truly worth while.
Before my noble friend’s intervention, I was stressing that the judge has discretion over both aspects: causation and quantum. The intervention may have caused only a degree of additional costs, rather than the entire costs of the action, which will modify the intervener’s exposure to costs. That will be a matter for the discretion of the judge. Of course, it is ultimately up to the judge to decide what are exceptional cases. Judges have different views as to what constitutes an exceptional case, but ultimately it is for the judge. It is very rare, if at all, that one sees appeals on questions of costs having any success. Amendment 164 would remove both presumptions that the clause creates, replacing it with a general discretion, which my noble friend would like, for the court to award costs either for the intervener against a party or to require the intervener to pay the parties’ costs. That is the status quo.
Clause 73 has been criticised for being too broad and meaning that interveners could be expected to pay costs in any circumstances. Critics have said that that means that an intervener would not be able to intervene in important cases and provide assistance to the court, as the risk of adverse costs is too unclear and potentially too great. Under Clause 73, what amounts to exceptional circumstances will ultimately be set out in court rules. That will provide clarity for an intervener at the point where they are considering whether to intervene on the manner in which they should carry out their intervention or risk costs.
Clause 73 does not mean that in every case where an intervener is involved they will be forced to pay all the costs of all of the parties, but it is right that they have a fairer financial stake. All those with experience will confirm that, just as interveners can add value, they can delay and hinder and make arguments that simply amplify or repeat—
Lord Lester of Herne Hill: I am grateful to the Minister, and I apologise for intervening at this late stage, but I do not understand from his reply how he can cite cost saving as a justification for giving detailed instructions to the courts about matters that are well within their discretion. Nor do I understand why a different rule should apply to the Supreme Court from that applied in others or in Northern Ireland from that applied in England and Wales.
Lord Faulks: I think that I have answered my noble friend’s point on the difference between the Supreme Court and the courts at a lower level. On costs, as I said, with this clause we hope to deter inappropriate interventions and also to make interveners think about
the scale of their intervention so as to reduce the costs for all parties, whether applicants or respondents, and to ensure that those interventions are relevant and genuinely assist the court.
These clauses apply to judicial review in England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate legal jurisdiction on this question because it is devolved, but of course if they intervene in a court in England and Wales that would be a different matter.
Interveners can also, as I think is accepted, make arguments that go beyond what is necessary. The changes that Clause 73 introduces reflect the Government’s intention of ensuring that they do so in an appropriate manner. We submit that the overall effect of the clause, while not drastic, will reduce the number of cases—and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says that there are very many cases where interventions take place—in which the taxpayer is expected to shoulder the burden.
That is what Clause 73 does and why the Government, having considered the issues, are of the view that the provision represents a sensible, workable and balanced position that takes proper account of the role of the judiciary, which will remain at the centre of this issue. Therefore, having provided an explanation of the Government’s thinking, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment, and I commend Clause 73 to the House.
Lord Pannick: I am grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have spoken. This short debate has, I think, illuminated and emphasised just how bizarre Clause 73 is, because there is no dispute that interventions by third parties at all levels of judicial review assist the court by the provision of information. That is simply not in dispute.
There is also no dispute that interventions by third parties are already under the control of the court. They are under the control of the court as to whether they are allowed, on what grounds, and with what consequences on costs, having regard to the issues in the case. It is true, as the Minister says, that there have been more interventions in recent years, but that is only because courts find them helpful and have allowed third parties to intervene. If interveners act inappropriately —and I am not aware of any cases where this has occurred, with the exception of one possible case in the Appellate Committee, which, as it is now the Supreme Court, would not be covered by this provision in any event—the judge has ample power, at present, to order the payment of costs. That point was correctly made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who also rightly referred to the limited scope of the exceptional circumstances provision. The problem is that there is nothing exceptional about interveners assisting the court. That is what they normally do.
When an expert body is deciding whether to intervene and assist the court, it will know, if Clause 73 is enacted in its present form, that there is a strong presumption that it must pay the costs. The inevitable consequence is that it is unlikely to intervene. This will not achieve the Minister’s policy aim of, as he said, deterring inappropriate interventions; it will deter interventions, however helpful they may be to the court.
Clause 73 makes no sense whatever. It makes no sense, with great respect, to speak of a need to make interveners have a financial stake in the proceedings. The court has ample power to penalise them in costs. Amendment 164 will maintain judicial discretion in Clause 73, just as your Lordships have decided that judicial discretion should remain in Clauses 70, 71 and 72. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
6.45 pm
Contents 219; Not-Contents 186.
CONTENTS
Adams of Craigielea, B.
Ahmed, L.
Alli, L.
Anderson of Swansea, L.
Andrews, B.
Armstrong of Hill Top, B.
Bach, L.
Bassam of Brighton, L.
Beecham, L.
Berkeley, L.
Best, L.
Bichard, L.
Birt, L.
Blackstone, B.
Blair of Boughton, L.
Blood, B.
Boateng, L.
Borrie, L.
Brennan, L.
Brooke of Alverthorpe, L.
Brookman, L.
Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, L.
Butler-Sloss, B.
Cameron of Dillington, L.
Campbell of Surbiton, B.
Campbell-Savours, L.
Carlile of Berriew, L.
Carter of Coles, L.
Christopher, L.
Clancarty, E.
Clark of Windermere, L.
Clarke of Hampstead, L.
Clinton-Davis, L.
Collins of Highbury, L.
Colville of Culross, V.
Corston, B.
Craig of Radley, L.
Cunningham of Felling, L.
Davidson of Glen Clova, L.
Davies of Oldham, L.
Davies of Stamford, L.
Dean of Thornton-le-Fylde, B.
Derby, Bp.
Desai, L.
Donaghy, B.
Donoughue, L.
Doocey, B.
Drake, B.
Drayson, L.
Dubs, L.
Elder, L.
Elis-Thomas, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L.
Erroll, E.
Evans of Temple Guiting, L.
Falconer of Thoroton, L.
Farrington of Ribbleton, B.
Fellowes, L.
Filkin, L.
Foster of Bishop Auckland, L.
Foulkes of Cumnock, L.
Gale, B.
Gibson of Market Rasen, B.
Giddens, L.
Glasman, L.
Golding, B.
Goodhart, L.
Gordon of Strathblane, L.
Goudie, B.
Gould of Potternewton, B.
Grantchester, L.
Griffiths of Burry Port, L.
Grocott, L.
Hannay of Chiswick, L.
Hanworth, V.
Harris of Haringey, L.
Harris of Richmond, B.
Harrison, L.
Haskel, L.
Haworth, L.
Hayter of Kentish Town, B.
Healy of Primrose Hill, B.
Henig, B.
Hennessy of Nympsfield, L.
Hollis of Heigham, B.
Hope of Craighead, L. [Teller]
Howarth of Breckland, B.
Howarth of Newport, L.
Howe of Idlicote, B.
Howells of St Davids, B.
Howie of Troon, L.
Hoyle, L.
Hughes of Stretford, B.
Hughes of Woodside, L.
Hunt of Chesterton, L.
Hunt of Kings Heath, L.
Irvine of Lairg, L.
Jones, L.
Jones of Moulsecoomb, B.
Jones of Whitchurch, B.
Jordan, L.
Judd, L.
Judge, L.
Kennedy of Cradley, B.
Kennedy of Southwark, L.
Kennedy of The Shaws, B.
Kerr of Kinlochard, L.
King of Bow, B.
Kinnock of Holyhead, B.
Kirkhill, L.
Kirkwood of Kirkhope, L.
Knight of Weymouth, L.
Lawrence of Clarendon, B.
Layard, L.
Lea of Crondall, L.
Lennie, L.
Lester of Herne Hill, L.
Levy, L.
Liddell of Coatdyke, B.
Liddle, L.
Lipsey, L.
Lister of Burtersett, B.
Listowel, E.
Loomba, L.
Low of Dalston, L.
Lucas, L.
Lytton, E.
McAvoy, L.
McDonagh, B.
Macdonald of River Glaven, L.
Macdonald of Tradeston, L.
McFall of Alcluith, L.
McIntosh of Hudnall, B.
Mackay of Drumadoon, L.
MacKenzie of Culkein, L.
McKenzie of Luton, L.
Maginnis of Drumglass, L.
Mallalieu, B.
Mandelson, L.
Mar, C.
Marks of Henley-on-Thames, L.
Masham of Ilton, B.
Maxton, L.
Mendelsohn, L.
Mitchell, L.
Monks, L.
Moonie, L.
Morgan of Drefelin, B.
Morgan of Ely, B.
Morgan of Huyton, B.
Morris of Handsworth, L.
Morris of Yardley, B.
Murphy, B.
Nye, B.
O'Loan, B.
Pannick, L.
Patel, L. [Teller]
Patel of Blackburn, L.
Patel of Bradford, L.
Phillips of Worth Matravers, L.
Pitkeathley, B.
Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Prescott, L.
Prosser, B.
Quin, B.
Radice, L.
Ramsay of Cartvale, B.
Rea, L.
Redesdale, L.
Reid of Cardowan, L.
Rendell of Babergh, B.
Roberts of Llandudno, L.
Rogan, L.
Rosser, L.
Rowlands, L.
Royall of Blaisdon, B.
St John of Bletso, L.
Sawyer, L.
Scotland of Asthal, B.
Scott of Foscote, L.
Sharkey, L.
Sherlock, B.
Simon, V.
Smith of Basildon, B.
Smith of Finsbury, L.
Snape, L.
Soley, L.
Steel of Aikwood, L.
Stern, B.
Stevenson of Balmacara, L.
Stoddart of Swindon, L.
Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Taylor of Bolton, B.
Temple-Morris, L.
Thomas of Gresford, L.
Thomas of Winchester, B.
Thornton, B.
Tomlinson, L.
Tonge, B.
Tunnicliffe, L.
Turnberg, L.
Tyler, L.
Uddin, B.
Wall of New Barnet, B.
Walpole, L.
Warner, L.
Warnock, B.
Watson of Invergowrie, L.
Wheeler, B.
Whitaker, B.
Whitty, L.
Wigley, L.
Wilson of Tillyorn, L.
Wood of Anfield, L.
Woolf, L.
Woolmer of Leeds, L.
Worthington, B.
Young of Norwood Green, L.
Young of Old Scone, B.
NOT CONTENTS
Addington, L.
Ahmad of Wimbledon, L.
Anelay of St Johns, B.
Arran, E.
Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon, L.
Ashton of Hyde, L.
Astor of Hever, L.
Attlee, E.
Baker of Dorking, L.
Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, B.
Balfe, L.
Bates, L.
Benjamin, B.
Black of Brentwood, L.
Blencathra, L.
Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury, B.
Borwick, L.
Bourne of Aberystwyth, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.
Bridgeman, V.
Brinton, B.
Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.
Browne of Belmont, L.
Byford, B.
Caithness, E.
Carrington of Fulham, L.
Cathcart, E.
Cavendish of Furness, L.
Chidgey, L.
Chisholm of Owlpen, B.
Colwyn, L.
Cooper of Windrush, L.
Cope of Berkeley, L.
Cotter, L.
Courtown, E.
Craigavon, V.
Crickhowell, L.
Cumberlege, B.
De Mauley, L.
Deighton, L.
Dholakia, L.
Dixon-Smith, L.
Dobbs, L.
Dykes, L.
Eaton, B.
Eccles, V.
Eccles of Moulton, B.
Eden of Winton, L.
Empey, L.
Falkner of Margravine, B.
Farmer, L.
Faulks, L.
Fearn, L.
Fink, L.
Flight, L.
Fookes, B.
Forsyth of Drumlean, L.
Fowler, L.
Framlingham, L.
Freeman, L.
Freud, L.
Garden of Frognal, B.
Gardiner of Kimble, L.
Gardner of Parkes, B.
Geddes, L.
German, L.
Glasgow, E.
Glenarthur, L.
Glendonbrook, L.
Goodlad, L.
Greenway, L.
Grender, B.
Hamilton of Epsom, L.
Hanham, B.
Harding of Winscombe, B.
Harris of Peckham, L.
Henley, L.
Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, L.
Holmes of Richmond, L.
Hooper, B.
Horam, L.
Howard of Lympne, L.
Howard of Rising, L.
Howe, E.
Howe of Aberavon, L.
Howell of Guildford, L.
Humphreys, B.
Hunt of Wirral, L.
Hussain, L.
Inglewood, L.
James of Blackheath, L.
Jenkin of Kennington, B.
Jenkin of Roding, L.
Jolly, B.
Jones of Cheltenham, L.
Jopling, L.
Kirkham, L.
Knight of Collingtree, B.
Kramer, B.
Lang of Monkton, L.
Lawson of Blaby, L.
Leach of Fairford, L.
Lee of Trafford, L.
Leigh of Hurley, L.
Lexden, L.
Lindsay, E.
Lingfield, L.
Lothian, M.
Luke, L.
Lyell, L.
MacGregor of Pulham Market, L.
Mackay of Clashfern, L.
McNally, L.
Maddock, B.
Mancroft, L.
Marland, L.
Marlesford, L.
Mawson, L.
Mobarik, B.
Moore of Lower Marsh, L.
Morris of Bolton, B.
Moynihan, L.
Naseby, L.
Nash, L.
Neville-Rolfe, B.
Newby, L. [Teller]
Newlove, B.
Northover, B.
O'Cathain, B.
Oppenheim-Barnes, B.
Paddick, L.
Palmer of Childs Hill, L.
Parminter, B.
Perry of Southwark, B.
Phillips of Sudbury, L.
Popat, L.
Purvis of Tweed, L.
Randerson, B.
Rawlings, B.
Razzall, L.
Rennard, L.
Ridley, V.
Risby, L.
Roper, L.
Seccombe, B.
Selborne, E.
Selkirk of Douglas, L.
Shackleton of Belgravia, B.
Sharples, B.
Sheikh, L.
Shephard of Northwold, B.
Sherbourne of Didsbury, L.
Shipley, L.
Shrewsbury, E.
Shutt of Greetland, L.
Skelmersdale, L.
Smith of Clifton, L.
Smith of Newnham, B.
Spicer, L.
Stedman-Scott, B.
Stephen, L.
Stewartby, L.
Stoneham of Droxford, L.
Stowell of Beeston, B.
Suri, L.
Suttie, B.
Taverne, L.
Taylor of Holbeach, L. [Teller]
Tebbit, L.
Teverson, L.
Thomas of Swynnerton, L.
Tope, L.
Trefgarne, L.
True, L.
Ullswater, V.
Verma, B.
Wakeham, L.
Wallace of Saltaire, L.
Wallace of Tankerness, L.
Walmsley, B.
Wheatcroft, B.
Wilcox, B.
Williams of Trafford, B.
Wrigglesworth, L.
Younger of Leckie, V.
6.56 pm
Lord Ashton of Hyde (Con): My Lords, in moving that further consideration on Report be now adjourned, and before those who are participating in the Bill depart from the Chamber, it may be helpful to confirm expectations of timings for the next items of business. The Leader of the House will shortly repeat a Statement on the EU Council. The dinner break business, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, will follow immediately after. I would urge noble Lords to monitor the business, as that for the dinner break is not time-limited. The Report stage of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill will therefore start immediately after the conclusion of the dinner break business at, very approximately, 8 pm.
Consideration on Report adjourned.
EU Council
Statement
6.58 pm
The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Stowell of Beeston) (Con): My Lords, with the leave of the House I will now repeat a Statement made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place. The Statement is as follows:
“Mr Speaker, yesterday British forces concluded their combat mission in Afghanistan. I know that the thoughts of the whole House will be with the friends and families of every one of the 453 British soldiers who lost their lives in this long campaign. We will never forget their sacrifice for us. When al-Qaeda attacked the twin towers in 2001 it planned that attack from Afghanistan, operating freely under the Taliban regime. Our incredible service men and women have driven al-Qaeda out and they have built up and trained the Afghan forces, none of which even existed in 2001, so that the Afghans can take control of their own security. I said when I became Prime Minister that I would bring our combat troops home. Today, they are coming home and we should be incredibly proud of all that they have done to keep our country safe.
With permission, I would like to make a Statement on last week’s European Council. Before turning to the issue of our contributions to the EU, let me first update the House on three significant agreements where the UK played an important role: on Ebola, on climate change and on the situation in Ukraine.
First, on Ebola, the world is facing one of the worst public health emergencies in a generation. Playing our part in halting the rise of this terrible disease is not just about meeting our moral obligations; it is also the single most effective way of preventing Ebola infecting people here in the United Kingdom. That is why Britain has been making such a major contribution to the international response, pledging more than £205 million, and sending troops and health workers to West Africa. However, it also means that Britain must use its influence to get other countries to step up their contributions, too.
Before the Council I wrote to all my fellow leaders, urging that we significantly step up our collective response. At the meeting, member states agreed to my proposal to more than double the EU effort by pledging more than €1 billion in assistance. The Council also agreed to increase the deployment of medical and support staff in the region and for member states to guarantee proper care for our courageous health workers.
Secondly, it is vital that Europe plays its part if we are to secure a global deal on climate change in Paris next year. One of the problems we have faced in the past is that instead of just setting a binding target on carbon emissions, the EU has set binding national targets on things such as renewables and energy efficiency. These diktats over how each country should reach its commitments can pile up costs on our industries, consumers and families who do not want to pay any more on their energy bills than they have to. They also create an unnecessary trade-off between cutting carbon emissions and promoting economic growth. At this Council, we have chosen a different path. We have reached a landmark commitment to deliver at least 40% reductions in greenhouse gases by 2030. We rejected any new binding national targets for renewables or energy efficiency, giving us full flexibility over how we reduce our carbon, allowing us to do so at the lowest possible costs for consumers and businesses. This is another example of where British leadership has helped the EU to step up and meet its international obligations, while at the same time protecting our national interest by keeping energy bills down for businesses and Britain’s hard-working families.
The Council also discussed the situation in Ukraine and relations with Russia. We welcomed the Minsk agreement between Kiev, Moscow and the separatists. However, the Council was also clear that much more must be done to implement that agreement before the EU should consider lifting any of the sanctions put in place in response to the conflict and in response to Russia’s actions. The Council welcomed the parliamentary elections that took place in Ukraine yesterday. It made clear that it would not recognise the outcome of any elections organised by the separatists outside the framework of Ukrainian law.
Let me turn to the issue over the UK’s contributions to the EU. I want to be clear with the House how the demand for the UK to repay money has come about and why the scale and timing of this demand is unacceptable. In an organisation like the EU, if your economy grows a little faster or a little slower, then there can be adjustments every year to the amount you pay. In some years the UK adjustment has been negative, as it was in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012. In some years we contribute a little bit more. This happens every year. When the UK is growing at 3% a year, and many European economies are growing much more slowly, it would not be surprising to find Britain being asked to pay a little bit more this year. What has never happened is for €2 billion to be demanded. This represents around 20% of our net contribution to the EU last year. Member states collectively are being asked to pay almost four times the highest gross figure requested in recent years.
It is simply not acceptable for the EU to make these kinds of demands, and to do so through a fast-tracked process lasting barely a month. Two billion euros is bigger than many countries’ entire gross contributions. It cannot just be nodded through by the EU bureaucracy as some kind of technical adjustment. It is British taxpayers’ money and it is not small change—it is a vast sum. So this has to be examined in detail and discussed properly. That is why I interrupted the Council meeting on Friday to seek an urgent resolution to this issue. I was supported by the Prime Ministers of Italy, Holland, Malta, Greece, and others. The Council agreed that there would be an urgent discussion with Finance Ministers to resolve this issue going forwards.
It is not just about the scale of the money being demanded; it is also the timetable. The Commission admits that it does not actually need this—indeed, the President of the Commission was not even aware of it on Thursday evening. So there is no pressing need for the money to be paid. There are fundamental questions over the fairness of these payments. For example, the proposal is for funds to be taken from the UK to correct historic contributions to the EU budget dating back to 2002 and to be redistributed based on the current share of gross national income to countries which only joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. It is not just Britain that would lose out. It is perverse that a country such as Greece, at the heart of the crisis in the eurozone, is being asked to find money to pay back to countries like Germany. The revised gross national income statistics on which these adjustments are based are also not yet finalised. The numbers are a ‘provisional estimate’ and the EU-wide process to quality-assure the figures will not conclude until well into 2015. So Britain will not be paying €2 billion to anyone on 1 December, and we reject this scale of payment. We will be challenging this in every way possible. We want to check on the way that the statistics were arrived at and the methodology that was used. We will crawl through this in exhaustive detail.
The events at last week’s Council will not—to use some British understatement—have enhanced the reputation of the European Union in the United Kingdom. As the Italian Prime Minister put it, ‘Even the EU’s founding fathers would turn to Euroscepticism when faced with some of the things that you’ve seen see here’. The European Union has to change. It has to regain trust. That starts by understanding and respecting the fact that these payments and adjustments are about the hard-earned taxes of its citizens. This is just one of the many challenges in our long campaign to reform the European Union. It is vital that we stick to the task. We have already cut the EU budget, got Britain out of the bail-out schemes, vetoed a treaty that was not in our national interest, made vital progress on cutting red tape and completing the single market, and we are leading the push for what will be the biggest bilateral trade deal in history, between the EU and the US.
None of this is easy. Progress is hard-won. It requires perseverance and hard work. We will carry on defending our national interest and fighting with all we have to reform the EU over the coming years. At the end of 2017, it will not be the Brussels bureaucracy or the politicians of any party who will decide whether we
remain in the European Union or not. If I am Prime Minister, it will be the British people who make that decision through an in/out referendum. Others who aspire to this office and who refuse to give the British people their say should explain themselves to this House and the country. I commend this Statement to the House”.
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
7.08 pm
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab): My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, the Leader of the House, for repeating the Statement given by the Prime Minister in the other place.
Let me begin by echoing the words of the Prime Minister about the contribution of our Armed Forces in Afghanistan. On these Benches, as in the rest of the House, our thoughts are with those who have served our country and the families of those who have lost their lives. Britain’s commitment to Afghanistan will continue beyond the handover of Camp Bastion. We must continue to support the Afghan Government through both political and humanitarian aid as well as in our training mission. Every one of our troops who served in Afghanistan can take pride in both their mission and in what they achieved, and our whole country is proud of them. I also echo the Prime Minister’s words about Ukraine and support for its Government.
On climate change, we welcome the climate and energy package, paving the way for the global UN summit in Paris next year. What action will the Government be taking in the coming months to encourage other countries, particularly China and the US, to agree a more ambitious target, sending a clear leadership signal to all countries in advance of the summit next year? Specifically, why was the energy-saving goal watered down from the Commission’s recommendation of 30%? All opportunities must now be taken to strengthen these elements of the package over the coming months.
I turn briefly to the Ebola crisis in west Africa. The whole world has been horrified by the devastating scenes in West Africa, and our hearts go out to the communities that are confronting this threat on a daily basis. We welcome the UK’s efforts to help affected countries. We are proud of the work of our Armed Forces, our health professionals and our aid community. I welcome the fact that the Statement said that member states agreed to increase the deployment of medical and support staff in the region.
I turn to the EU budget change. The Commission’s handling of this matter has been cack-handed and unacceptable and, as the noble Baroness said, has caused consternation in a number of other member states. The urgent priority now is for the Government to pursue all diplomatic means to get the best deal for Britain. We are bound to wonder if they have done due diligence in their handling of what one might term a fiasco. The Prime Minister says that he was made aware of this matter only on 23 October, and the Chancellor said that he had no warning. However, that is simply not the case. These changes to the budget arise from changes to estimates of gross national income, or GNI. Can the noble Baroness confirm that the Office for National Statistics agreed to, and has been part of,
the substantial and planned changes to GNI across Europe for the past two years, since 2012? Can she further confirm that the ONS stated publicly in May 2014 that these changes would impact on our budget contribution? It said in its press release:
“GNI … is used in the calculation of a Member State’s contribution to the EU budget”.
Clearly, the Treasury was aware of this. My right honourable friend the leader of the Opposition quoted in another place from a letter from the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, the right honourable Member for Loughborough, who wrote to the parliamentary committee on Europe a full seven months ago on 11 March. In her letter she said that changes to GNI were going to take place in time for 2014, and wrote about the high priority that the Government were giving to addressing them.
So these changes were planned for a number of years, the ONS publicly declared that they would impact on our budget contribution, and Ministers knew about them and claimed that they were a high priority. Are there any further budgetary adjustments coming down the line that will affect any amounts due or owing—adjustments that are currently not in the public domain? I think that we deserve to know.
It is hard to see how the Prime Minister can maintain his assertion that there was no warning and that Treasury Ministers knew nothing about these changes. Surely the Treasury must have made its own estimates of the impact on the EU budget that would follow. The reason why this matters is that in our view the Prime Minister could have done much earlier what he did at the last minute on Friday when he called for a meeting of Finance Ministers and entered negotiations about this demand. I think we would all be interested to know how he plans to go ahead and sort out this fine mess.
It is clear that the Prime Minister spends all his time negotiating with his party about Europe, when what he should be doing is negotiating with our partners in the rest of Europe about a reformed Europe and getting a better deal for the British people in the European Union. It is the British people who are paying the cost for the Prime Minister’s focus on his party rather than working in the best interests of the country.
7.13 pm
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, for her comments in response to mine on Afghanistan and Ukraine.
In starting my response to the points that she has made, it is important for me to make it clear that the Prime Minister played a leading role in Brussels last week on climate change and Ebola, two very important matters on the agenda at the Council meeting. He achieved very good results that were good for Europe and for the United Kingdom; they felt right and they felt fair. This is in stark contrast to the way in which the previous Government approached some of the negotiations on matters such as climate change in the past. The same cannot be said, though, in terms of it being right or fair, when we consider what happened on the EU budget surcharge.
Taking the questions that the noble Baroness put to me, and starting with climate change, the target of at least a 40% reduction in carbon emissions has been described as ambitious, but it is a very sensible one. The way that we are approaching this, in not having the subtargets as binding agreements on member states, is very important. However, we are now in the best possible position to push our international partners, such as America and China, to bring forward ambitious climate pledges to reach a global deal next year.
On Ebola, the noble Baroness was right to say that the Prime Minister succeeded in ensuring that we attracted a financial commitment from member states, so Europe as a whole now will be contributing €1 billion to fighting Ebola. However, it is not just about the money; we also got a commitment that other European member states will help with their healthcare workers and ensure that they travel to affected countries. This is something that we need to continue to apply pressure on and ensure that we all do our fair share in ensuring that Ebola is properly tackled out there in west Africa.
As far as the budget is concerned and the points that she made about the surcharge, I do not think that it is right to focus on who knew what and when. What people really care about is how much is being demanded and the fact that this amount is unprecedented in the level that is being sought by the EU. It is true to say that there is a process every year that is standard in calculating these contributions, but it has never led to the kind of demand that we have seen on this occasion. Importantly, with regard to the level that the UK is being asked to contribute, no member state will know what amount it is being required to contribute in terms of its net contribution until it is clear what amount the EU is going to return, having identified what the countries’ gross contributions are. It is the net contribution that is key in this context, and it is that net contribution that the Prime Minister has made clear is absolutely unacceptable. He has made it clear that the way in which the European Commission has behaved in going about this process is not right, and that is something that we will ensure is properly addressed in the way in which the Prime Minister has described today.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD): My Lords, we now have 20 minutes for questions on the Statement. I remind noble Lords that it is not a short debate. Noble Lords are asked to keep their questions short so as to enable others to follow.
7.18 pm
Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con): My Lords, does my noble friend accept that it is quite acceptable for the EU to want to recalculate the basis for calculating gross national income? However, why does this tax have to become retrospective? Can she explain to us why this has to be a retrospective exercise? Why is it not just being taken forward from here, if we get the agreement of Ministers, with the tax applying in the future, not the past?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: My noble friend has highlighted one of the issues that we have to explore in greater detail in the process of talks that will start in the emergency discussions between Finance Ministers later next week.
Lord Tomlinson (Lab): My Lords, I think we can all agree that the figures that have been produced need to be pored over in the greatest detail and justified, if they are justifiable. However, we have all read in recent days and weeks about the domestic changes that we have made to the calculation of GNI. I ask the Minister —as the Government seem to have been quite coy about this—whether, in the recalculation of GNI, we have included two service industries that have not been included previously, one of which is the illegal drugs trade and the other prostitution. If that is the case, what was their contribution to the increase in GNI and are we in fact the victims of our own success in boasting about the growth of GNI?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: There is a lot of talk going on at the moment and many suggestions are being made. People are trying to complicate yet further something that is already incredibly complex. As the Prime Minister has been emphatic in saying, this is a standard process that happens on an annual basis. The UK expects to play its part in this process in the way it has done in the past. What has not happened before, but has happened this time, is this kind of demand being made at this sort of level. We need to understand the detail before we can go any further forward on this matter.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (LD): My Lords, I associate myself with the Prime Minister’s remarks on the drawdown from Afghanistan in offering our deepest support for the 453 men and women who gave their lives in that cause. I also say to the Minister that we must not forget the many thousands who have been injured and maimed and who continue to live. We must remember our obligation to them as well.
On the EU budget contribution, does the Minister agree that since these reservations, voiced by Eurostat, go back to 2002—indeed, I understand that there were six reservations—they would have been known about by the Labour Government in all the years since 2002, and that the statistics that needed to be looked at have not come out of the blue for either side? Will she tell the House whether the emergency Finance Ministers’ meeting on 7 November will hold bilateral discussions with the other eight states that are similarly affected in order to build a consensus that this cannot go down the route which the Prime Minister is resisting and which they are trying to make him take? Will she also tell the House whether I am right to say that the amount sought is 0.01% of GNI?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: My noble friend is right to remind the House that in the context of Afghanistan we must also remember those Armed Forces personnel who were very badly injured through their service on our behalf in that country. I am grateful to her for reminding us of that.
On her point about bilateral conversations on 7 November, I do not have the detail about the way in which the meeting and the conversations are going to be constructed that day. However, it is important for us to be clear that other member states are affected by this and that they feel as strongly as we do. The Italian Prime Minister has it made clear, as he said when he was talking about the demands put on some member
states by the surcharge, that this is not a figure but a lethal weapon. On my noble friend’s specific point, I may have to write to her if I am not able to give her an answer during the course of answering the Statement.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB): Will the Minister confirm that the GNP funding stream was invented here in London, was introduced 20 years ago and has worked extraordinarily well for this country in comparison to the old VAT-based stream? Will she also confirm that the reason the sums are large is that the refund to those who have overpaid is a multi-year refund, covering up to 20 years? Furthermore, will she confirm that for the United Kingdom to refuse to contribute to those who have overpaid would be illegal, unreasonable, unwise and unjust?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: As I said in an earlier response, the Prime Minister is clear that this demand, and the scale of it, have come out of the blue without any proper preliminary discussions. We now have to consider it very carefully and in great detail, and that is what we are going to do.
Lord Pearson of Rannoch (UKIP): My Lords, in all the hullabaloo about yet another £1.7 billion of our taxpayers’ money going down the drain in Brussels, I notice that the Statement fails to mention a brilliant new spending spree to which the Council agreed—a mere €300 billion over 2015 to 2017. However, the Council conclusions mention it on page 10, where it is referred to as the,
“Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change”.
Can the Minister tell us what the UK’s share will be of this new €300 billion and when we will pay it? Presumably we are looking at about another €30 billion or so over the next two years. Can she also tell us whether the Prime Minister was a party to this further lunacy or whether he was outvoted?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: The package to which the noble Lord refers is the new investment package that the new Commission is proposing for the eurozone. Clearly, if it is the eurozone, that does not include the United Kingdom.
Lord Howell of Guildford (Con): My Lords, is not the real and deeper lesson of this whole budgetary saga that the European Union administration is struggling to cope with a 20th century, highly centralised EU model in 21st century conditions that are completely different and in which these heavily centralised provisions no longer operate or are even necessary? Are the Minister and the Prime Minister not right to focus on the need for fundamental reform, such as many people throughout Europe, as well as many Governments, are calling for, and on winning the allies to build up a course for a better European Union that will fit 21st century conditions?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: My noble friend is absolutely right. That is what the Prime Minister is seeking to do and he is attracting a great deal of support from other member states in reforming the European Union, because it is clear that that is what needs to happen.
Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab): My Lords, the Prime Minister is putting it about that there is nothing he could have said or done about this until he knew the full details, which happened only on Thursday, and the Minister has been trying to defend him on that basis. However, is that not complete and obvious nonsense? It has been known for many months that these negotiations were continuing between Eurostat and the ONS. Anybody half awake would have known that, even if the recorded growth discrepancies in any one year were fairly small, resolving the whole matter by a single payment could amount to paying a very considerable cash sum. All that the Chancellor and the Prime Minister had to do was simply to follow carefully, via the ONS, how the discussions were proceeding to see whether that danger was materialising. They monumentally failed to do that: they took their eyes completely off the ball and have no one but themselves to blame for the surprise that they found on Thursday and Friday.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: I know that the noble Lord follows European matters quite closely but, from what he has just said, he is clearly not familiar with this process, which happens every year. Each country puts forward the calculations of its own measures and then the Commission has to look at each country’s submissions alongside one another. It then proposes what will be refunded in the light of that. No nation state will know the net payment until the last minute. That is why all of the nation states that were affected by this dramatic increase were as surprised as Mr Cameron.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB): Will the Minister not agree that it is sad that we should be welcoming, as I welcome, the three points on which the Council made great progress with British leadership—climate change, Ukraine and Ebola—but yet again we are caught up in one of these kerfuffles? Would the noble Baroness not accept that, frankly, to suggest that the Prime Minister only heard about this from the British Permanent Representative in the car on the morning of the meeting, when the matter had been notified by the Commission about 11 months ago and had been agreed with various emanations of the British Government in the summer, is not credible? There was a slip-up somewhere and the Prime Minister was not properly briefed; that is surely the truth of the matter.
Given the point of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, about the great benefit to this country of the switch from TVA to gross national income calculations from the time of the Edinburgh European Council in the 1990s onwards, would it not be helpful to the House if the noble Baroness were to let us have the Treasury calculation of just how much Britain has benefited over the years from having a GNI calculation? It is surely also important to recognise that the EU is not the only organisation that works in this way. The United Nations assessed contributions are based on GNI calculations; no doubt our GNI contribution will go up a bit as a result of the success of the Government’s policies. This is the normal way in which these organisations work. Should we not be a bit calmer about it?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: I have tried to make it clear, both in the Prime Minister’s Statement that I have repeated and in the responses I have given to
points made today, that the Prime Minister has been very active in taking a leading role in Europe, both on the specific agenda items that I have talked about and in saying that we believe, as do others, that the European Union needs to reform. The Prime Minister is absolutely clear that there are real benefits to this country from being in Europe and he has spoken loudly about those benefits.
However, the situation in which we find ourselves with the budget on this occasion cannot be as the noble Lord describes. Why are other European leaders also surprised to find themselves in receipt of a big bill, as the UK was last week? I will see whether there are any specific further data that I can share in response to the noble Lord’s point, but I say to him that people in this country see the benefit of Britain’s place in Europe. They see that it has an important place in achieving some important international objectives, whether about Ebola or climate change. However, those successes and important advances do not come at any price. The way in which the European Union sometimes behaves and operates means that it lets itself down in the eyes of the people who have to fund its membership.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con): My Lords, does my noble friend not agree that what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, describes as a “kerfuffle” is about £1.7 billion? We have not got any money. We are borrowing money in order to pay our bills. Surely the point is that the European Union is spending too much. It simply cannot issue continuing demands as it has and argue that that fits some formula or other. Will my noble friend note that the Opposition have singularly failed to indicate whether they would pay this money or not? The truth is that they are a pushover as far as this is concerned. Is my right honourable friend the Prime Minister not right to try to get the European Union to put its house in order and live within its means, as everyone else has to do?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: My noble friend is absolutely right on every point. I would add that we should remember that it is not clear for what purpose the European Union needs this extra money, and that this is an organisation whose accounts have been qualified for many years.
Lord Lea of Crondall (Lab): My Lords, the big peanuts in this—
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con): The noble Lord was not here for the beginning of the Statement.
Lord Tomlinson: He came in during the Statement.
Lord Lea of Crondall: I got the thing from the office.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: My noble friend was not in the Chamber. It is not appropriate for him to speak.
Lord Lea of Crondall: It is a bit ratty to say that—goodness gracious.
A noble Lord: It is not ratty to say it. It is the truth.
Lord Dubs (Lab): My Lords, I pursue the point of my noble friend Lord Tomlinson because I was a bit puzzled by the answer. To what extent has the increase in GNI been caused by estimates for drugs and prostitution? Is this the first time that we have done that, and how large were those figures? Above all, were they accurate? Are we not, in fact, making it difficult for ourselves by adding in such figures in such a way that we are then being hit on the head by Brussels?
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: The noble Lord is focusing on the wrong thing. What is vital is that we have been presented with a massive bill which is wholly unacceptable and have been given a wholly unacceptable timeframe in which to pay it.
Lord Pearson of Rannoch: My Lords—
Lord Lawson of Blaby (Con): I think that the noble Lord has already had a go. Is it not the case that the agreement on climate change, happily, does not amount to a row of beans? The official conclusions say that,
“all Member States will participate in this effort, balancing considerations of fairness and solidarity”.
In other words, there is no target for any individual member state, and I commend the Government for having made it clear that energy policy is the responsibility of member states, not of the European Union as a whole, so it does not mean anything.
Is not the fundamental question of the contributions a problem? While the late Lady Thatcher succeeded in securing a substantial improvement in the net contribution which we paid, not only was that net improvement insufficient to do us justice but the previous Labour Government also gave a large part of it away in exchange for a promise of reform of the common agricultural policy, which has not happened. This is why the issue is so sensitive. We already pay more than our fair share into the European Union budget.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: My noble friend is absolutely right to point out that the previous Government gave away our rebate, to the tune of £2 billion. That has really affected the demands that Europe makes on our budget.
On my noble friend’s point about climate change, I certainly disagree with his description of what has been agreed in Europe on emissions reduction targets of 40%, but I say to him and the House that the way in which we have reached that agreement is different from the way in which previous Governments did so. We have made sure that we are able to retain flexibility in this country and are able to deliver on these targets in a very cost-effective way.
Lord Soley (Lab): Will the Minister accept that there are a number of people besides myself in this House who would like a clearer answer to the questions
asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who has great experience and knowledge of these matters? I would be grateful if she could look at them in
Hansard
tomorrow and put answers of some type in the Library. They are important. I know that they are complex, and I am not necessarily saying that she ought to have the answers at her fingertips, but I would like to hear them.
Finally, as long as the Prime Minister keeps giving into and appeasing those in his party who want to take us out of Europe, sooner or later they will push him into a corner, where he will have to abandon that appeasement. Frankly, he needs to stand up and fight for whatever it is that he believes in.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston: On the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and reinforced by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, as I have already said, I will see what it is possible for me to provide by way of a written answer. As to the noble Lord’s broader point, I restate that the Prime Minister is absolutely committed to securing good reforms in Europe. He is approaching this in a very constructive way because he wants to see a Europe that works properly for the people of Europe. That is what he will succeed in achieving. When he has done that he will hold a referendum in 2017 in which people will have the final say.
Care Quality Commission (Reviews and Performance Assessments) Regulations 2014
Motion to Regret
7.40 pm
Moved by Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
That this House regrets that the Care Quality Commission (Reviews and Performance Assessments) Regulations 2014 include no provision for the regular assessment of performance by clinical commissioning groups and local authorities in the commissioning of health and social care and of the NHS Commissioning Board in relation to specialty commissioning (SI 2014/1788).
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab): My Lords, the statutory instrument that we are debating tonight arises from an amendment that the Government sought parliamentary approval for during the passage of the Care Bill in 2013 and 2014. That amendment related to the scope of periodic performance assessments to be undertaken by the CQC and the method by which such reviews are to be devised and will allow an aggregate performance rating to summarise and compare the performance of organisations or the services provided. It is for the CQC to devise such quality standards and methodology in consultation with the Secretary of State and those key stakeholders that the CQC considers appropriate. The scope of those performance assessments is set out in these regulations, which by virtue of Regulation 1 will come into force on 1 October this year. That means that the CQC will be under a duty to undertake performance ratings of those registered service
providers and regulated activities that such providers carry out, as prescribed by Regulation 2 and the schedule to these regulations.
I remain somewhat sceptical of the ability of the CQC to place such huge organisations as hospitals in one of only four categories. The Explanatory Note to the SI refers to work commissioned by the Secretary of State on the use of aggregate ratings of providers. This is not the first attempt at performance ratings, but the fascinating piece of work produced by the Nuffield Trust and commissioned by the department has a number of warnings on this. The trust says in its report:
“A rating by itself is unlikely to be useful in spotting lapses in the quality of care”,
particularly for services which “complex providers like hospitals” give.
“It is here that the analogy with Ofsted’s ratings of schools breaks down. Hospitals are large, with many departments and different activities, seeing large numbers of different people every day, carrying out complex activities, many 24/7, and in which people are sick and can die. Put another way, the risks managed by hospitals vastly outweigh those managed in schools. For social care providers the risks may be lower, but many are still dealing with frail, ill and otherwise vulnerable individuals”.
“unless there is a ‘health warning’ on a rating to clarify to the public what it can and cannot say about the quality of care, there is an inevitable risk that the rating (and the rating organisation) will be discredited, as lapses occur in providers scored as ‘good’ or ‘excellent’”.
It says that it will be just a matter of time. In summary the Nuffield Trust concluded that,
“the overall approach to ratings should allow complex organisations to be assessed at different levels and to promote service-specific ratings where possible, particularly in the case of hospitals”.
I would be grateful if the noble Earl could comment on this, particularly on how he considers the rating outcomes of individual providers are to be communicated to the public in an understandable way that none the less pays due regard to the complexity of the ratings so well described by the Nuffield Trust.
My real objective in bringing these regulations before your Lordships’ House is not so much what is in the statutory instrument as what is not. I go back to our debates during the passages of both the Care Bill and the Health and Social Care Bill in 2012. The noble Earl will know that I have expressed considerable concerns about the fact that the way in which clinical commissioning groups and local authorities commission services is no longer to be subject to regular review, audit and, indeed, rating by the CQC. During the passage of the Care Bill only a few months ago we discussed concerns about the quality of local authority commissioning of care services in the context of the scandal of 15-minute visits and zero-hours contracts. We argued then that the CQC should undertake regular inspections of local authority commissioning performance.
I suggest that the same goes for clinical commissioning groups in the National Health Service. When we debate NHS issues the noble Earl frequently—indeed, consistently —refers to the importance of commissioning. Whenever he is pressed on problems or gaps in services he has put his trust in more effective commissioning. However,
it is very difficult to see how the performance of commissioners is properly assessed and held to account in the current structure. The noble Earl has previously argued that we should rely on such things as CCG outcome indicators, backed up by scrutiny from local Healthwatch. I think that that is a pretty weak response. So far there is scant evidence to show that this is effective. I am sure we would acknowledge that often when things go wrong in a health system it is a failure of the system—of course of the providers giving the services, but also of commissioners and, indeed, local authorities. Let us take the four-hour A&E target, which is proving to be a major challenge up and down the country. There will of course be issues in the organisation of the hospital itself, but there will also be issues around the organisation of primary care, the way in which services are commissioned and the ability of local authorities to ensure that there are specific and sufficient facilities in the community for when patients are discharged from hospital.
It is a matter of regret that the CQC, as the primary regulator on quality and standards, is no longer concerned on a regular basis with the performance of local authorities as commissioners, and with clinical commissioning groups. It is true that the CQC has the power to conduct special reviews where concerns have been raised about a particular commissioner. I do not know whether that has happened yet—maybe the noble Earl will be able to tell me—but it seems to me that that is not anywhere near sufficient.
I also want to discuss the position of NHS England. The noble Earl will know that, although the original changes brought about by Mr Lansley were designed to hand over nearly all the commissioning budget to clinical commissioning groups, a rather substantial amount of money was ultimately retained by NHS England for commissioning of specialist services. It would be fair to say that NHS England’s performance on that has given cause for concern. The noble Earl will be aware that the budget for specialist commissioning is hundreds of millions of pounds overspent. In essence, we had an out-of-control budget and the board of NHS England seemingly unaware of what was going on. If an NHS provider had performed so lamentably its board would have been sacked, and rightfully so. I ask the noble Earl how the board of NHS England has been held to account for its lamentable performance relating to specialist commissioning. Have sanctions been applied? At the very least, should the CQC not assess NHS England’s commissioning performance?
In our previous debate on NHS England, the noble Earl informed us:
“NHS England has its own governance processes in place, including the development of the direct commissioning assurance framework to demonstrate that it meets the standards required. As this is developed further, elements will be introduced to bring external scrutiny to its board and function”.
“Ultimately, NHS England is held to account by the Department of Health for its commissioning activity against its delivery of the priorities set in the mandate”.—[Official Report, 21/10/13; col. 813.]
I am sure the noble Earl thought that they were comforting words, but how on earth does this apply to the debacle over specialised commissioning? To my knowledge, that has still not been properly resolved.
I am not convinced that the Government have the right approach to commissioning. If commissioning in the health service and in local government is as important as the Government say it is, surely it is in the public interest that the CQC should take a much stronger role in checking and rating the performance of commissioners, and indeed of health and care system performance generally. I hope that this leads to a good debate. I beg to move.
Baroness Wall of New Barnet (Lab): My Lords, I support in principle the wording of the business that we are dealing with, particularly the emphasis on regular assessment of other than the provider trusts. I share with the House and the Minister why I now feel that that is even more important. I declare an interest as chairman of Milton Keynes Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. Just last week, we were inspected by the CQC. Obviously, we do not yet know the outcome of that. The CQC was with us for four days and there were 40-odd people there.
As the noble Earl is aware, I have been very supportive of the CQC and share his aspirations for it. To be honest, our inspection was extremely thorough. We have to wait with bated breath for the outcome, but the enthusiasm, what was described as the buzz around the hospital and the way that people felt strongly about the services that they were giving made a huge difference to the whole thing. I am only three months into that trust, but this was not about preparing for the CQC; it was about the culture of the organisation and wanting to improve. I hope that the CQC comes back with recognition of that, whatever the outcome might be.
The inspection was carried out under the new way of doing things, which I think is great. There were many more people across all the spectrums of our services, at a professional and clinical level. That was superb. The reporting back every night was very good and helpful to the chairman and chief executive. All that felt good and thorough, which is what it is all about. I agree with my noble friend’s view about extending that for the very reason that he just gave. The importance of that inspection to the outcome for our patients was absolutely paramount, regardless of what the outcome might be in terms of the grading or level of assessment we might be given. But without that thoroughness and rigour, particularly with the CCGs, who are the ones making decisions about our services, with the GPs who run them—unless there is a deep dive, as we would call it, into any other part of the health service—the gaps that are still a worry for us may remain.
In particular, my noble friend Lord Hunt said that there was an issue around local authorities. All trusts are struggling terribly with A&E. There are many reasons for that, as my noble friend has said. But one of the big reasons is the lack of rigour in social care and local authorities’ commitment to or understanding of the role that they play. From the experience that we have had over the past week, I believe that this is not a threat to people: it is empowering for them to have the CQC in there, ensuring that the rigour that they are supposed to apply to their work is there and that the role they play in patients’ experience really makes a difference. I urge the noble Earl to consider this opportunity yet again. We made a decision in the Care
Act, which I think even more now is really a mistake from which we need to move on. I do not share the cynicism of my noble friend, but I share the concern about whether the CQC can embrace all that.
The investigation into my trust was supported, as I understand it, by far more clinicians than ever before and far more people had a much greater knowledge of the health service. If the CQC can continue to develop in that way, I believe it is in its interest—and, more importantly, in our patients’ interests—that those commissioning groups go wider and deeper into other than the provider trusts.
Baroness Barker (LD): My Lords, I spent a happy weekend making a start on the 500 pages of regulations that have been issued under the Care Act. What can I tell noble Lords? I am living for pleasure alone. I regard this Motion as the first of many to come our way.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for the opportunity to go back to some of the discussions that we had during the passage of the Bill, particularly on commissioning. We had long debates about commissioning and the extent to which it did or did not impact on services. We also talked at considerable length about the differences between the commissioning of healthcare in the NHS and commissioning in social care. In these regulations, we are beginning to see some attempt to have proportionate and slightly different attitudes towards commissioning in both those settings. I would like to see us taking a more proportionate look at commissioning across the board. To a certain extent, these are the first of the regulations that begin to do that.
We also had extensive discussion about whether performance ratings should be specific to particular services within hospitals or whether they should go across the piece. My recollection, informed quite often by people with valuable experience such as the noble Baroness, Lady Wall, was that there would be a lot of data generated in hospitals, particularly clinical governance data, which would be there to inform one’s opinion about a particular service in a hospital. However, what would have been missed, and what was missed so spectacularly in Mid-Staffordshire, was the across-the-board bad management practices throughout a hospital that undermined patient care. That was why we ultimately took the decisions that we did about the nature of performance review.
I want to pick up two particular issues that are brought to the fore by these regulations. I notice that prison healthcare has been exempted. I understand that there is a sense in which the NHS or the CQC would be able to look at the performance of only a part of prison healthcare. But prison healthcare is, in terms of mental health, addiction services and so forth, becoming much more important. There is a much clearer focus on the amount of ill health that people have within the criminal justice system. I want to be sure that we are not enabling those prison health services to escape proper scrutiny.
My final question to the noble Earl is more fundamental. We had extensive debates during the passage of the Care Bill about the right of entry for those people who are involved in carrying out performance reviews and the extent to which the people responsible
for them should be able to go into any service to assure themselves that those services are safe and the people within them are not being abused. I do not see anything in these regulations that gives comfort to those of us who believe we took the wrong decision during the passage of the Bill and that, as a consequence of our failure, there may well be people in health and social care settings who are being abused at worst or ill treated at best.
8 pm
Baroness Wall of New Barnet: I thank the noble Baroness for giving way. In response to her comments on nurses and hospitals, she is absolutely right. I emphasised the clinical stuff. However, the CQC interviewed everyone on our board: the non-executive directors, me—as chairman—for an hour and a half, and all our executive directors. It interviewed not just the clinical staff but the whole of the trust to make sure that we all understood what we were doing in the job we are employed to do.
Baroness Barker: I thank the noble Baroness for that. I trust that if the CQC was doing its job, it would really go to the seat of power in a hospital and interview the porters.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe) (Con): My Lords, this has been a useful debate. Although the Motion to Regret moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, relates to regulations which, as he said, cover a certain area of the CQC’s activities, I note his broader questions and will come to those.
These regulations set out which health and adult social care providers will be rated following inspection by the Care Quality Commission. They came into force at the beginning of this month. However, it is clear that the noble Lord’s main concern is not so much about the regulations, although he did query aspects of them and I will address those in a second. I think—or, at least, I hope—that there is a good deal of agreement between us about the way in which the CQC now approaches its task of assessing service providers. The noble Lord’s concern lies largely around the accountability arrangements for commissioning. I will begin by setting out the purpose of the regulations and summarise the considerable progress that the CQC has made in inspecting and rating service providers.
Noble Lords will recall that the Care Act put in place a new system of reviews and performance assessments of providers to be developed by the CQC. The regulations referred to in the Motion specify which providers will be rated by it. They cover NHS hospital trusts and foundation trusts, general practices, independent hospitals and providers of adult social care. The CQC has set out its approach to inspection and ratings in a series of handbooks for each regulated sector. Each service is judged against a number of key questions: is it safe; is it caring; is it effective; is it responsive; and is it well-led? The CQC produces a rating against each of these areas at both location and provider level.
This new system is providing information about the quality of care that goes beyond mere compliance with minimum standards. This information is of value to patients and service users, to commissioners and, of course, to the providers themselves. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, referred to the comments of the Nuffield Trust around hospital ratings and questioned how such ratings could be communicated to the public in an understandable way. We have committed the CQC to publishing clear, authoritative ratings of providers. Not only are these ratings broken down into the five key questions about services that I have just referred to, but the CQC has also published, where it has been possible, ratings of specific hospital services. The CQC is under an obligation to consult on the development of its ratings methodology. It has done so, and will continue to do so as its methodology grows more sophisticated over time. I completely take the point that ratings must be robust and stand up to scrutiny, but the CQC’s view is that it is more than possible to construct indicators that are genuinely representative of an organisation’s performance.
The CQC has made rapid progress on developing and implementing the ratings system. It has already published more than 130 ratings of NHS providers, and has recently published the first ratings of adult social care providers. Over the next few years, it will inspect and rate every provider that is covered by the regulations. Noble Lords will recall the debate we had last year on whether the CQC should also carry out routine inspections of commissioners. The CQC’s primary purpose is to regulate service providers and the Care Act clarified this by removing its power to carry out periodic reviews of commissioners of both health and adult social care.
Some providers argued that the system we were putting in place left them solely accountable for failings in care that could have some of their roots in commissioning decisions. I listened carefully to the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Wall, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I accept that there is a link between commissioning and quality of care and that, in some instances, it would be appropriate for the CQC to review commissioners. We have therefore maintained a power for the CQC to carry out special reviews of commissioners under Section 48 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. However, this will be used only where there is clear evidence that failings in commissioning are leading to poor care for patients and service users and it is subject to the approval of the relevant Secretary of State. Let me be clear: where it is justified by the circumstances, the CQC will be able to inspect commissioning.
Although the CQC is not routinely reviewing commissioning, there are other arrangements for the oversight of commissioners. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked me whether any special inspections of commissioners had happened yet. The answer to that is no in relation to local authorities’ commissioning of adult social care, but the CQC is undertaking a special review of children’s safeguarding in Doncaster. I understand that this review will look at both the provision of services and their commissioning by the local NHS. The review is due to be published in the coming months.
For adult social care, the Care Act puts in place clear duties on local authorities to have regard to the importance of ensuring the sustainability of the market as a whole in order to meet the care needs of local people. Last week, my department published statutory guidance for local authorities as part of a package of secondary legislation which implements the Care Act. This includes a chapter on commissioning and market shaping. Furthermore, the Local Government Association and the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services will shortly publish a set of new standards for commissioning services that has been produced with stakeholders. These standards will provide clarity on what good quality commissioning looks like. They will build on best practice and encourage councils to conduct more thorough self-audit and peer review in order to move towards excellence, covering, for example, commissioning for outcomes, integrated commissioning and workforce issues.
Where local authorities struggle to meet these commissioning standards, they are able to seek support through a system of sector-led improvement. Where a need has been identified, a variety of improvement support can be offered. This may include advice and visits from peers in high performing local authorities; mentoring and leadership training for councillors and officers; and bespoke support from national experts. This approach has been developed in partnership with local government partners in order to improve local authorities’ performance and capabilities. It supports local authorities to take responsibility for their own performance and drive improvement, developing a system of performance management by councils for councils. Sector-led improvement is based on the principles that councils are primarily accountable to their local communities; they are responsible for their own performance and improvement; and they have a collective responsibility for the performance of the sector as a whole.
Turning to commissioning of NHS services, NHS England is responsible for the performance management of clinical commissioning groups and has a statutory duty to carry out an annual performance assessment of each CCG. NHS England must be assured that commissioners are acting efficiently and effectively on behalf of local patients. Using the principles set out in the CCG assurance framework, NHS England supports and challenges CCGs to meet the needs of their local population. The assurance process is informed by robust and diverse sources of evidence, including the CCG outcomes indicator set and a detailed delivery dashboard.
Where concerns are identified, improvement actions are agreed. NHS England has broad powers to ensure that these improvements are made, whether this is through the provision of support and advice or by taking action when a CCG is at significant risk of failure. Examples of the support that can be made available are advice and expertise, facilitating peer review and partnership with other CCGs, or the brokering of conversations between CCG and providers by the area team.
The CCG assurance process has so far worked well. NHS England’s year-end CCG assurance assessment for the year 2013-14 showed that 210 out of 211 CCGs
were assured, with 132 receiving some support to improve in particular domains of the assurance framework. An NHS England-commissioned survey of stakeholders, including local health and well-being boards, Healthwatch and patient groups, found that 68% had confidence in CCGs to commission high quality services.
The approach taken in this first year rightly focused on developing the capacity and capability of CCGs, as relatively young organisations, building on the domains which were the foundation of CCG authorisation. This focus on developing the organisational health of CCGs has meant that, as of July 2014, only 13 CCGs still have conditions or directions remaining in relation to their authorisation, compared with 153 CCGs initially authorised with conditions. In one case, a CCG was not assured and NHS England has put legal directions in place to improve its performance. As intervention is the element of the assurance framework which most affects CCG autonomy, careful consideration is, of course, required before NHS England will take this course of action.
Assurance ratings are based on the area team’s assessment of the level of the CCG’s insight of the identified issues and its willingness to take the necessary steps to improve. In cases where serious concerns arise, NHS England has shown that it will take necessary and appropriate intervention action. These legal interventions can take many forms, such as directing the CCG how to perform a certain function or asking another CCG to perform that function. They may even require the removal or replacement of the accountable officer or dissolution of a group.
Noble Lords may have seen recent reports of how NHS England is considering developing the CCG assurance framework to emphasise CCG achievement as well as capability. The detail of the assurance framework is, of course, a matter for NHS England but I am sure that noble Lords will be encouraged that NHS England is reflecting on how the assurance system can be improved. Ultimately, the Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament for the performance of the health system and will hold NHS England to account for how it has fulfilled its responsibilities, including how it has ensured that the health services which both it and CCGs commission are high quality and deliver value for money.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about how NHS England is held to account by the department. The Secretary of State has formal accountability meetings with the chair and chief executive of NHS England every two months, which are structured around the mandate objectives and NHS England statutory duties. These are also attended by other NHS England board members, Ministers, the senior departmental sponsor and the Permanent Secretary. These meetings focus on strategic issues and any issues of delivery. Actions for NHS England are agreed in the meetings, recorded in the minutes and followed up in subsequent Secretary of State meetings. This process feeds into an annual assessment of NHS England by the Secretary of State. It is a legal requirement that this is laid before Parliament in response to NHS England’s annual report and covers NHS England’s performance in respect of mandate objectives and fulfilment of its statutory duties.
Meanwhile, NHS England is holding itself to account internally for its commissioning responsibilities. Just as there is a CCG assurance framework, a reciprocal direct commissioning assurance framework has been produced to demonstrate that NHS England is also exposing itself to similar scrutiny of its own commissioning responsibilities. NHS England has made a commitment to CCGs and wider stakeholders that it will apply the same level of scrutiny to its own direct commissioning responsibilities as it does to CCG commissioning. The assurance framework is used to identify concerns where the direct commissioning functions of area teams are particularly challenged. In these circumstances, the issues will be escalated through the line management arrangements in order to ensure that extra scrutiny or support is given as required. Ultimately, NHS England’s board will assure direct commissioning processes.
The noble Lord’s particular concern was around specialised commissioning and the overspend that we saw last year. In quarter 4 last year, NHS England forecast an overspend in specialised services of £172 million, an adverse variation to plan which was in excess of £291 million. Departmental analysis found that last year’s overspend in specialised services was due to a combination of factors, some historical and intrinsic, others unique to 2013-14. In April this year NHS England established a specialised commissioning task force in order to make some immediate improvements to the way in which it commissions specialised services and to put commissioning arrangements on a stronger footing for the longer term. The task force is led by Richard Jeavons, Director of Specialised Commissioning, NHS England. Additional resource from within NHS England has been diverted to the task force to ensure that it has the right mix of skills and expertise to enable it to meet its objectives. The task force comprises seven distinct work streams, which are focusing on financial control during the current year and planning for the 2015-16 commissioning round.
NHS England provides updates on the work of the task force to external and internal stakeholders every three to four weeks. There are also briefings given at key meetings and to key groups—for example, the Patient and Public Voice Assurance Group. Updates can be found on the NHS England website. NHS England describes its specialised commissioning task force work as a way to secure financial control in 2014-15 and to plan for 2015-16; it is not a wholesale review of specialised commissioning. The aim is to improve ways of working and to ensure that specialised commissioning is undertaken in the most efficient and effective way possible. The department is working closely with NHS England as it develops proposals for change. NHS England will continue to be held to account through the regular accountability meetings and the annual assessment that I have referred to.
Although these arrangements for the oversight of commissioning are new, I am confident that they are robust. The CQC’s new approach to inspection and the information that it provides about the quality of care through ratings is itself of use in commissioning, and where there is evidence that commissioning decisions are leading to poor care, it will, as I have said, be possible to escalate this to the CQC. I believe that
these arrangements strike the right balance, allowing the CQC’s focus to remain on its core task of inspecting and regulating health and adult social care, but retaining an ability to look at commissioning issues when necessary.
8.15 pm
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath: My Lords, I am sure that the House is most grateful to the noble Earl for such a comprehensive description of the relationship between the department, NHS England and commissioners for health and social care. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Wall on her appointment to the chairmanship of the Milton Keynes Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. I echo her thoughts about the new inspection regime, which is a vast improvement on the old regime. I also acknowledge that the CQC has made some excellent appointments at senior level to help the inspection process.
That is a very good start, but there are gaps in relation to the commissioning of services. I would like to follow up the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker about prison health services. The Explanatory Memorandum states that regulated activities provided by prescribed service providers in prisons are excluded because:
“A performance rating might be helpful to the commissioners of these services, but only if it can be uniformly awarded to all providers in the sector and at present, not all prison healthcare is regulated by CQC”.
This is not the time to go into that in more detail, but I should be grateful if the noble Earl would be prepared to write to us about it—unless he wishes to intervene now. I am grateful that he indicates that he would be prepared to write to us, because it is an important point. There have been vast improvements in the health service within prisons in recent years and I would have thought that they would welcome some ratings from the CQC. I hope that the Government will look into that.
On the substantive point, I simply want to say to the noble Earl that many of the issues that the health service and care services face are very pressing and very challenging. Those services depend on all the people within a system—both commissioners and providers —working together. I still believe that there is a strong case for there to be assessment by the CQC to help systems generally to learn from others, to see where weaknesses are and to improve the whole system approach—something that is missing from the current regime. This has been a good debate. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Criminal Justice and Courts Bill
Report (3rd Day) (Continued)
8.22 pm
Lord Pannick (CB): My Lords, this group of amendments is concerned with Clauses 74 and 75, and it relates to costs capping orders, or protective costs orders, as they were previously called. In a case that
raises issues of public importance, the court has a power, before the case is heard, to set the maximum figure for the costs that a claimant will be required to pay should the claim not succeed. The object of such an order is to ensure that a claimant who raises an issue of public importance is not deterred from bringing the claim because of the risk of having to pay unquantified costs should the claim fail.
At the moment costs capping orders are a matter for the discretion of the court. They are rarely made, particularly in contexts other than environmental claims, which Clause 76 rightly recognises to raise special considerations because of an international convention, the Aarhus convention. The Minister, in correspondence, has helpfully referred to three or four cases a year of protective costs orders being made outside the environmental field. It is not a major problem. I have seen no evidence to suggest that the current exercise of the costs capping order power by the courts has caused any problems at all, other than the general problem that government departments would much prefer not to be the subject of judicial review applications at all.
Amendment 166 addresses a particular vice of Clause 74. Clause 74(3) provides that a costs capping order may be made,
“only if leave to apply for judicial review has been granted”,
but such a provision would defeat the very object of a costs capping order. If an applicant cannot seek and obtain a costs capping order in an appropriate case until leave to move for judicial review is granted, applicants will inevitably be deterred from bringing those judicial review proceedings in the public interest in the first place. They will be deterred because of the risk of having to pay an unquantified amount of costs at the permission hearing. I suggest to your Lordships that protective costs orders should remain available, if and only if the judge considers it appropriate in the circumstances of the individual case, prior to the grant of permission to move for judicial review. I beg to move.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab): My Lords, I am sorry I missed the beginning of the noble Lord’s introduction of this amendment but I got called out. I simply want to speak on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Our latest report says:
“We remain of the view expressed in our Report on judicial review that restricting the availability of costs-capping orders to cases in which permission has been granted would be a disincentive to meritorious public interest challenges being brought”—
“and we maintain our recommendation that the Bill be amended to remove this restriction”,
and that we explicitly support,
“Lord Pannick’s amendment … which would preserve the court’s current power to make a costs-capping order at any stage of judicial review proceedings, including before permission is granted”.
I hope that your Lordships’ House will feel able to support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB): My Lords, I, too, support this amendment. By the same token that the House approved the earlier amendments, logically this amendment must be allowed as well. The vice of the proposed legislation is once again the
narrowing of the courts’ discretion and the chilling of the judicial review. In this case, in the most important area of public interest litigation, it is really imperative that this amendment succeeds.
8.30 pm
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con): My Lords, I am grateful once again to noble Lords for their contributions—brief but helpful. Your Lordships will understand that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, seek significantly to undermine Clauses 74 and 75. I will begin by reminding the House what the clauses do. They build on case law, in particular the Corner House case, to establish a codified costs capping regime for judicial review proceedings with the aim of governing what we ordinarily refer to as protective costs orders.
The Government’s position, which I made clear throughout Committee, remains clear. We believe that costs protection should be available in appropriate cases but costs capping orders should not be made widely or, indeed, routinely. Alongside Clause 76, to which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred, which excludes certain environmental cases from the new regime, these clauses ensure that costs protection is granted only in cases where there are serious issues of the highest public interest that would not be taken forward without an order. It is only in these cases that a public body defendant should have to pay its own costs regardless of whether it wins or loses.
As noble Lords have explained already, part of Amendment 166 would remove the effect of Clause 74(3), which provides that costs capping orders should be made only where permission to proceed to judicial review has been granted. I do not believe this is correct. It would mean that claimants with weak cases would benefit from costs protection even if the court subsequently decides that their case has no merit and that it should not be given permission for judicial review. This would leave the public body paying the costs of dealing with an ex hypothesi unmeritorious case.
As it stands, the clause does not mean that the costs of applying for permission will not be covered by the order. As is the situation now, if made, an order will be able to cover costs incurred prior to the grant of permission. This, I think, is the answer to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described as a particular vice of these provisions. The claimant can, as now, ask the court to make the order as part as the permission application. But we feel that it is right that a claimant should bear the financial risk of bringing a weak claim.
Amendment 166 once again seeks to remove the requirement for the court to be provided with information on funding available, as well as what is likely to be available to a claimant, for use by the court when deciding whether to make a costs capping order, and for court rules to set out what that information should include.
As I have said, it is the Government’s position that a claimant should be required to provide information on how their case will be funded. Under the current regime, and as set out in the Corner House case, courts
are required to consider the financial resources of those who request costs capping orders. This is the very essence of why we have costs capping orders, something that we should, of course, replicate in this new regime.
Furthermore, setting out what information is required in court rules will give clarity to applicants about exactly what they need to provide. We cannot prejudge what the rules will say; I am sure noble Lords will be aware that this is a matter for the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. During the course of debates, some doubt seemed to be cast on the independence of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. With respect, I think that doubt was misplaced. It is a committee chaired by the Master of the Rolls and contains, among others, Lord Justice Richards, all of whom, I am sure, with their experience and independence, will provide rules entirely independent of what the Secretary of State might or might not want. Of course, we expect that the information requested will be proportionate.
I turn to Amendment 167, which seeks to remove the third requirement in subsection (6), which is that an order can be made only if, without an order, it would be reasonable for the claimant to discontinue the judicial review. Again, this was a requirement of the Corner House case, and it is right that this remains. Doing anything other than this would make no sense. It would mean that well resourced claimants, including large companies, would be eligible for a costs capping order provided they could show that, without one, they would discontinue the claim, even though it would be entirely unreasonable for them to do so. This simply cannot be right. Indeed, it would mean they could be granted a costs capping order despite not being eligible under Corner House and the current regime.
Amendments 168 and 173 of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, seek to remove entirely from Clauses 74 and 75 powers afforded to the Lord Chancellor to amend lists of matters within these clauses through statutory instrument. It is the priority of the Government to respond at pace to any future developments. These amendments would simply prevent our doing just that. It may well be that, in future, developments mean that it is considered necessary to make changes to the matters set out in these lists. Of course, as I have said, Parliament will still be able to scrutinise any changes as both powers are subject, not to the negative, but to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Turning now to Clause 75, which sets out in subsection (1) five non-exhaustive factors that the court must consider when deciding whether to make a costs capping order and its terms, Amendment 170 seeks to make it optional for the court to have regard to these factors. With the exception of paragraph (e), these factors are based on the principles taken from the Corner House case, and all five factors are important in ensuring that a costs capping order is not awarded where it is unnecessary, as is the Government’s case.
The courts retain significant discretion, as the clause does not dictate how much weight, if any, should be given to each factor. Furthermore, the list is not exhaustive, so the court may consider any other factors that it considers relevant.
The other amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would amend that list, first, so that the courts would not be required to have regard to whether the applicant might receive funding in the future and, secondly, so that the courts would not have to consider whether someone who might provide future funding would benefit from the judicial review. They would be told to ignore factors which, I respectfully suggest, are relevant. This would mean that the court would not have available to it a full picture of the claimant’s financial position when deciding whether it was appropriate to grant costs protection and, if so, at what level that protection should be set.
It is vital that the courts are made aware of the full financial underpinnings of a claim. This allows the court to assess whether a claim, although notionally brought by a claimant of limited means, is sufficiently well resourced not to require taxpayers’ subsidy by way of costs protection. It also allows the courts to ensure that, if they do make a capping order, the cap is made at the right level. Otherwise, it could result in the taxpayer being asked to pick up the bill for the defendant’s costs when the claimant would in fact have been in a position to pay.
If—and this is an important point—future financial support is not forthcoming, the claimant will be able to inform the court so that it can take the change of circumstances into consideration. We will invite the Civil Procedure Rule Committee to include this safeguard, which may be necessary, in court rules.
On removing the requirement that the court consider the benefit to a potential third-party funder, the Corner House case recognised that a claimant’s private interest in a case is a relevant factor when considering whether to grant a costs capping order. This requirement reflects that principle and the court should consider it as part of the full picture.
The clauses retain the principle that costs are a matter for the judiciary, a theme which has run through our debates today. When considering an application for a costs capping order in an individual case, it will be for the judge to decide whether the particular proceedings are in the public interest, whether an order should be made and, if so, what the terms of that order should be. That represents no change to the current position.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, effectively posed the question, “What’s wrong with the current position?”, and he did not understand there to be many cases concerned. I have asked for further data on this. I have to confess to the House that the Government’s data on costs capping orders are limited, but we have indicative figures from the Treasury Solicitor’s Department which estimate that, between September 2010 and August 2014, it was involved in at least 38 cases where protective costs orders were awarded, of which 14 related to non-environmental cases. However, these figures will not represent all judicial reviews, as the Treasury Solicitor’s Department does not represent all government departments, nor will the figures cover non-governmental defendants such as local authorities, so that the actual number of such orders may be that much higher. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, may be fed up with references to the Richard III case, but a protective costs order
was made there and, as he will well know, the Government were unable to recover any money from the claimants because it was a shell company. It was created entirely to pursue the litigation, which turned out to be entirely baseless.
These are unusual orders. They should be made where the judge has as much information as he or she should have in order to be able to make them. Any other provision is simply saying, “The judge shouldn’t take into account matters which most people would think were relevant”. These clauses are to ensure that costs capping orders are made only in cases that genuinely need them—we are talking about public money here—and are set at a level that properly reflects the financial position of the claimant. With that perhaps rather overlong explanation, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments and to agree to Clauses 74 and 75 standing part of the Bill.
Lord Pannick: I am grateful to the Minister for his detailed explanation, which, far from being overlong, was very helpful, because I see the force of what he says—except in relation to Amendment 166, which addresses the removal of a power in the courts to make a costs capping order at the outset of the proceedings. There is no question of a costs capping order being made routinely, which was the Minister’s concern. These orders are in the discretion of the court. The court will not make such an order unless it is satisfied that the claim is sufficiently well founded to justify such an order.
I do not think it is any answer for the Minister to say that if leave is granted, a costs capping order can then be made. The problem, as the Minister knows, is that if a costs capping order cannot be made at the outset then these public interest claims will be deterred. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, pointed out, Amendment 166 has precisely the same purpose and effect as the three amendments already debated and voted on in your Lordships’ House this afternoon—that is, to retain judicial discretion, in this case as to when it is appropriate to make a costs capping order. In relation to Amendment 166, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
8.40 pm
Contents 58; Not-Contents 149.
CONTENTS
Adams of Craigielea, B.
Armstrong of Ilminster, L.
Bach, L.
Bassam of Brighton, L.
Beecham, L.
Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, L. [Teller]
Campbell of Surbiton, B.
Clancarty, E.
Clark of Windermere, L.
Davies of Oldham, L.
Davies of Stamford, L.
Desai, L.
Donoughue, L.
Elder, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L.
Erroll, E.
Farrington of Ribbleton, B.
Foulkes of Cumnock, L.
Gordon of Strathblane, L.
Gould of Potternewton, B.
Grantchester, L.
Henig, B.
Hollis of Heigham, B.
Hope of Craighead, L.
Howarth of Newport, L.
Irvine of Lairg, L.
Judd, L.
Kennedy of Cradley, B.
Kennedy of Southwark, L.
Layard, L.
Lea of Crondall, L.
Lister of Burtersett, B.
Lytton, E.
McAvoy, L.
McConnell of Glenscorrodale, L.
McFall of Alcluith, L.
McIntosh of Hudnall, B.
Mar, C.
Marks of Henley-on-Thames, L.
Masham of Ilton, B.
Maxton, L.
Monks, L.
Morgan of Ely, B.
Morris of Handsworth, L.
Morris of Yardley, B.
O'Neill of Clackmannan, L.
Pannick, L.
Patel, L. [Teller]
Patel of Bradford, L.
Rosser, L.
Royall of Blaisdon, B.
Smith of Basildon, B.
Soley, L.
Thornton, B.
Triesman, L.
Tunnicliffe, L.
Woolf, L.
Young of Norwood Green, L.
NOT CONTENTS
Ahmad of Wimbledon, L.
Anelay of St Johns, B.
Ashton of Hyde, L.
Astor of Hever, L.
Baker of Dorking, L.
Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, B.
Bates, L.
Blencathra, L.
Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury, B.
Borwick, L.
Bourne of Aberystwyth, L.
Brabazon of Tara, L.
Bridgeman, V.
Brinton, B.
Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.
Burnett, L.
Byford, B.
Caithness, E.
Carrington of Fulham, L.
Cavendish of Furness, L.
Chisholm of Owlpen, B.
Colwyn, L.
Cooper of Windrush, L.
Cope of Berkeley, L.
Cotter, L.
Courtown, E.
Craigavon, V.
Crickhowell, L.
Cumberlege, B.
De Mauley, L.
Deighton, L.
Dholakia, L.
Dobbs, L.
Eaton, B.
Eccles, V.
Eccles of Moulton, B.
Empey, L.
Farmer, L.
Faulks, L.
Fearn, L.
Fink, L.
Flight, L.
Fookes, B.
Forsyth of Drumlean, L.
Fowler, L.
Framlingham, L.
Freeman, L.
Freud, L.
Garden of Frognal, B.
Gardiner of Kimble, L.
Gardner of Parkes, B.
Geddes, L.
German, L.
Glasgow, E.
Glendonbrook, L.
Goodlad, L.
Grender, B.
Hanham, B.
Harris of Peckham, L.
Henley, L.
Holmes of Richmond, L.
Hooper, B.
Horam, L.
Howard of Lympne, L.
Howe, E.
Humphreys, B.
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Hussain, L.
Inglewood, L.
James of Blackheath, L.
Jenkin of Kennington, B.
Jolly, B.
Kirkham, L.
Kramer, B.
Lang of Monkton, L.
Lawson of Blaby, L.
Lee of Trafford, L.
Leigh of Hurley, L.
Lexden, L.
Lindsay, E.
Lingfield, L.
Loomba, L.
Luke, L.
Lyell, L.
MacGregor of Pulham Market, L.
Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Maddock, B.
Marlesford, L.
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Morris of Bolton, B.
Moynihan, L.
Naseby, L.
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Newby, L. [Teller]
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Oppenheim-Barnes, B.
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8.52 pm
Amendments 167 to 169 not moved.
Clause 75: Capping of costs: orders and their terms
Amendments 170 to 174 not moved.
Clause 76: Capping of costs: environmental cases
174A: Clause 76, leave out Clause 76 and insert the following new Clause—
“Capping of costs: environmental cases
(1) This section applies to judicial review proceedings which constitute or concern an Aarhus Convention claim.
(2) Sections 71, 72 and 73 shall not apply to proceedings to which this section applies.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in sections 74 and 75, in proceedings to which this section applies the court shall make a costs capping order in favour of an applicant for judicial review of its own motion or upon the application of any party in any case where the court considers that if a costs capping order is not made the proceedings are unlikely to be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive as required by the Aarhus Convention.
(4) Rules of court may prescribe the terms upon which a costs capping order may be made in accordance with subsection (3) provided that such terms are calculated to ensure that the proceedings will be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.
(5) In determining whether proceedings are likely to be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive, the court shall have regard to any relevant reports of the Compliance Committee established pursuant to the Aarhus Convention.”
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD): My Lords, I moved amendments in these terms in Committee and so I will try to be brief, although the area they cover is quite complicated. Clause 76 is in the Bill because the Aarhus convention of 1998, which was ratified by this country in 2005, committed the United Kingdom to ensuring that environmental litigation will be,
“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”.
My amendments are founded on the principle that Parliament has a duty to ensure that this country acts in a way that is compliant with its international obligations.
Clause 76 recognises that the restrictions on costs capping orders as proposed in the Bill have the effect of making environmental litigation prohibitively expensive in any case. That is true ex hypothesi, because in a case where a judge would decide that a costs capping order is needed in order to enable an applicant to pursue the application, it follows that the application, if pursued without such an order, would be prohibitively expensive. It is for that reason that rules of court have already introduced rules limiting costs awards in Aarhus convention judicial review claims to relatively low fixed sums. Those sums are £5,000 against an individual applicant, £10,000 against a corporate applicant and £35,000 against a defendant.
However, the costs capping provisions are not the only provisions of the Bill that would put us in breach of the Aarhus convention: so would the provisions on disclosure of actual and likely financial resources and on the consequential orders for costs based on that information, as disclosed. Those provisions would have the effect that sources of support for judicial review applications would be choked off, making them prohibitively expensive for applicants without means, who would be left without the support of those people deterred from giving such support. The provisions on interveners and on costs capping would also have the effect of making environmental cases prohibitively expensive. Our amendments are therefore directed at broadening Clause 76 to exclude Clauses 71 and 72 on information about resources, and Clause 73 on interveners, for environmental cases as well as the costs capping provisions.
A further difficulty with Clause 76 is that it is permissive only and not mandatory, so that the Lord Chancellor is not required to make any regulations excluding the operation of the restrictions on costs capping. The provision is limited to ensuring that he is entitled to do so, if he chooses. Any such regulations that he chooses to make may also, under Clause 76(2), be as wide or as narrow as he chooses. Regrettably, this Lord Chancellor has given us little confidence that he is concerned to make challenges on judicial review less expensive.
Our amendments would also allow for costs capping orders in any case where the court considers that without such an order, the proceedings are unlikely to be,
“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”,
so as to bring the provisions squarely in line with our obligations under the convention. In our Amendment 174A, subsection (4) of the proposed new clause would introduce an objective test which would,
“prescribe … terms upon which a costs capping order may be made”,
to ensure compliance, once again by using the words of the convention. This is particularly important because the compliance committee established under the Aarhus convention has already found the United Kingdom to be non-compliant in a number of respects. The safe course is to ensure that the statute complies with the convention specifically and that there is a requirement that the regulations and rules of court do the same.
A further problem arises regarding definition. Clause 76(1) says that the definition of environmental cases is those cases which are environmental,
“in the Lord Chancellor’s opinion”.
Amendment 174B, which introduces a definition squarely based on the convention, is intended to address that difficulty and introduce an objective test. I beg to move.
Lord Faulks: My Lords, Clause 76 allows for judicial review claims on issues which relate entirely or partly to the environment to be excluded from the revised costs capping regime established by Clauses 74 and 75. This is to ensure continuing compliance with our obligations under the Aarhus convention and the various European directives which implement it. The requirements include that relevant procedures must not be prohibitively expensive. This is relevant to judicial reviews in certain environmental cases. Consequently, Clause 76 allows for environmental judicial reviews to be excluded from the approach in Clauses 74 and 75.
9 pm
I set out the Government’s arguments at some length in Committee, so I hope that the House will forgive me if I am brief. We say that the approach taken under Clause 76 provides sufficient flexibility to meet relevant future changes in the international legal landscape. Under the present law, costs capping orders in these types of cases in England and Wales are governed by a separate regime, set out in the Civil Procedure Rules. It applies a fixed costs framework where, if a judicial review falls within the scope of the convention, the liability of the claimant to pay the defendant’s costs is automatically capped at particular levels.
Amendment 174A would seek to exclude convention claims from the provisions in Clauses 71 to 73 and introduce a new requirement for making costs capping orders in these types of cases separate from the existing regime in the Civil Procedure Rules. The Government are not persuaded that as a matter of law there is a requirement to exclude environmental cases from Clauses 71 to 73 of the Bill, nor that there would be merit in allowing for the potential abuse they seek to rectify to continue in environmental cases. The Government continue to consider it unnecessary to introduce a new requirement for making costs capping orders in these types of cases and are satisfied that it is appropriate for the procedures governing costs capping in convention claims to be set out in the Civil Procedure Rules.
Amendment 174B would seek to define what would fall within the definition of an Aarhus convention claim. In the Government’s view, which I also set out in Committee, the definition in Amendment 174B goes well beyond the current approach and the requirements which that approach is intended to satisfy. In particular, we would still not accept that all private law claims falling within the new clause should come under the term “Aarhus convention claim”. The Government see no reason for including additional cases within this definition. If the definition is too broad, we risk gold-plating our requirements. This would also risk encouraging claimants to characterise their claims as being “environmental”, generating satellite litigation and assisting, for example, those bringing weak claims to shelter from their proper costs liability.
The intention behind Clause 76 and the regulations that will be made under it is to exclude relevant environmental cases from the codified regime created by Clauses 74 and 75 and to allow these cases to continue to be dealt with under the separate regime in the Civil Procedure Rules, ensuring compliance with the relevant international obligations. The new clauses would upset the careful balance between ensuring the proper measure of access to justice in environmental cases and ensuring that judicial review is not misused. On that basis, having listened carefully to the arguments advanced by the noble and learned Lord—I am sorry, my noble friend Lord Marks—I ask him to withdraw the amendment and agree to Clause 76 standing part of the Bill.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames: My Lords, I am rather surprised that my noble friend regards my performance on this Bill as meriting promotion to “noble and learned Lord”.
We have both been brief. I rehearsed the arguments for the amendments in Committee and my noble friend rehearsed the arguments against. I will seek leave to withdraw the amendment but I say only this: I have a prediction that if these provisions are enacted in their present form, it will not be very long before the Compliance Committee established under the Aarhus convention draws attention to non-compliance by this country with its international obligations under Aarhus, not only in respect of Clauses 74 and 75 but in respect of Clauses 71 to 73 as well. I would regard that as a great pity because international obligations are a matter of great importance. With that observation, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.