On TPIMs, I have always resisted the idea of relocation, because I have seen it up close and seen the effect on families. I saw a young mother giving birth to her second baby while her first child was still unable to walk; they were being moved out of London to Leicester, to live on the 18th floor of a multi-storey block, where they had no family and where she had no support systems at all, with none of her sisters living there, or her mother. We have to have real consideration for what this does to families, and we have to remember the impact on what is described as the folklore of oppression as it is seen by the Muslim communities. This is not a sensible route to go down. I know that the independent reviewer said that he had a heavy heart in thinking that it was necessary sometimes. I hope that it is used with great limitations, if it is used at all. I always thought that it was one of those things only ever used by totalitarian regimes—sending people to Siberia or Pinochet sending people to the remoter parts of Chile. I really regret that we are even thinking about doing it here.

Finally, I want to talk about universities. I am the head of an Oxford college and I know that, across Oxford, there is real concern about the introduction of this power. Others have spoken to it, so I am not going to repeat what they have said, but academic freedom is

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very important. The idea that an academic will feel in some way obliged to report on a student whom she feels is asking questions or expressing views that seem inflammatory is a really worrying thing for academic freedom. It would destroy the trust that is so important between the student and the academic, which is where learning is at its best—the point where people are experimenting and thinking the unthinkable. That is where you beat it down with good argument. The idea that we should not have freedom of expression in our universities and that we will have people reporting each other, or that when we go to speak at a university we will have to declare and send ahead the notes of our speeches, is really not workable. I ask the Government to think again and at least to remove universities from the list. I actually think that the whole Prevent project should be looked at again.

A real issue is undoubtedly presenting itself to us as a society, but I say to all of us, “Beware”, because we can give away the most important things if we are not careful—the things that we are most proud of.

9.25 pm

Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD): My Lords, the night is wearing on. It is nearly half-past nine and there are another seven speakers to come. I have chucked away my speech: I am going to make a few rather jagged points and sit down. I commend, as other noble Lords have done, our two maiden speakers who, as I am sure we all agree, did extraordinarily well. Their presence here will be of great value to us over the years to come.

I want to tell my noble friend the Minister that I understand what an intensely difficult task it has been to put the ideas behind this Bill into print. It is almost impossible to arrive at precisely the right conclusion. However, the House of Commons did move in the right direction and it is clear from the speeches tonight that the bulk of opinion in this House is that we have some way to go, that we can go there and we can do it without undermining the essential protection for which the measure is needed. We are considering this in the aftermath of the dramatic events in Paris at the weekend. It is impressive that nobody has been carried away by that, but we have paid due deference to it. This has been the House of Lords at its best: measured, completely lacking in partisanship and extremely thoughtful.

The difficult balance between public safety and human rights needs the most careful and prolonged contemplation. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, I regret the time we have been given for this measure and I do not think it is necessary to push it through before the election. I feel very strongly that, if we insist on legislating before the election, the consultation and report which the independent reviewer, David Anderson, is in the process of undertaking should mean that Part 5 is left out of the Bill. I will come back to that in a minute.

The danger is that the intangible values are given less credence and force in our deliberations than the tangible effects of terrorism, which are only too obvious and dramatic. A corpse will always carry more conviction than philosophy, but here at least we realise that that is

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a short and dangerous road to take. The background to all this is that we must get the culture as beneficent as it can be vis-à-vis our minorities—our Muslim minorities in particular—and create what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham called a culture of fraternity and my noble friend Lord Paddick spoke of at some length using different language. We have to help sustain a culture of inclusion, of mutual value and co-operation and of tolerance. A number of speakers have remarked on some of the interesting work being done by the churches. In my own small town of Sudbury in Suffolk we have an amalgamation called Churches Together, which includes non-Christian as well as Christian faiths. That is far more important than this Bill. The fruits of the work that we do at grass-roots level, through communities, will determine, far more than legislation, whether this country lives in peace or in fear.

I agree with the majority of speakers on the legal aspects of the Bill. Particularly, I could not disagree with a word said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford. We absolutely have to have judicial oversight. If we cannot have it because there is a genuinely instant and plangent emergency, then we must have it as soon as possible after the emergency. We must have reference to this House when regulations are issued and we must have affirmative resolutions in matters as important as these. In Part 5, guidance is issued by the Secretary of State that does not come through Parliament at all. That is not right.

We have had some distinguished contributions on Part 5 from the noble Lords, Lord Hannay of Chiswick and Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett. I want to put their comments in a fuller context because I think it makes what they said even more compelling. Part 5, which runs to some 12 pages of small print and has two chapters, applies to not just universities but also to “specified authorities”, which, in Schedule 1, are a whole range of bodies, including health authorities, police authorities, probation authorities—you name it—and, of course, education authorities. But the thing to remember is not just that the authorities covered by Part 5 must have,

“regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”,

as stated in Clause 21(1), but that guidance will come in on the back of that which they have a duty to follow. The Secretary of State can issue directions if he considers that any of these specified authorities is not doing exactly what it should do vis-à-vis the guidance. Ultimately, enforceable mandatory orders can be issued under Clause 25(2). That is heavy-duty regulation and it is all in pursuit of a statutory demand—namely, to have,

“regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”.

That is so vague that I suggest it will give a thousand lawyers a thousand years’ work to define. My noble friend the Minister smiles at me as he knows that I am a lawyer, but there are limits, and I think that this part of Chapter 1 of Part 5 goes too far.

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Nobody has referred to Chapter 2 of Part 5, which covers local authority support panels. Local authorities include all district and county councils. Their function is somewhat the same—that is, to assess,

“the extent to which identified individuals are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism”.

That statutory obligation is placed on every single district and county council. They have to have a support plan for each individual, which they have to review, revise and assess, and they are governed by guidance. Even worse, they have to have partners—although I should not say that because that prejudges the utility of the measure—which are as voluminous as are the specified authorities in Chapter 1 of Part 5. Indeed, they are the same sort of bodies. The partners are under a statutory obligation, set out in Schedule 4, to co-operate with these local authority panels. If they do not do so, there is potentially a punitive regime for such a failure. The bureaucracy attendant on Part 5 is massive, whether you are dealing with Chapter 1 and the duty to prevent people entering terrorism, or Chapter 2, which deals with identifying individuals who are vulnerable to terrorism and then supporting them with plans and so on. That is a massive creation of bureaucracy, both locally and centrally.

I would not mind if I felt that it would work but I have a terrible feeling that, quite apart from the in-principle issues raised by Peers vis-à-vis the freedom and culture of universities, I concur with every word that they said about the complete inappropriateness of lumbering universities most of all, but schools and probation services too. I speak as someone who was chancellor of the University of Essex for 10 years. This part of the Bill is severely misconceived. I deeply hope that it will be excluded for the time being. If on further reflection and after David Anderson’s report it appears necessary to do something along these lines, so be it. We will do it. However, the voluntary aspect of the status quo is essential to its effect. I am sure that we can build on the status quo. The Government could fund support for what is being done, and no doubt provide inspectors who could go round the country and see what is being done, but we do not need a statutory framework.

I could say so much more, but 10 minutes have gone and the night is old. I will end merely by saying, “Je suis Charlie”. Perhaps I will not; your Lordships will think that I am a Charlie.

9.36 pm

Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB): My Lords, speaking so late in the debate has its advantages. You will be reassured to hear that I have been able to do some rigorous editing of my speech, partly because many other noble Lords have made the points that I wish to make. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Evans of Weardale on his excellent maiden speech, but of course I would say that, wouldn’t I? He is also a friend. I also congratulate my noble friend Lord Green of Deddington, with whom I worked when he was in the Foreign Office.

My noble friend Lord Evans says that he followed in my footsteps. Certainly, this evening I follow in his: to my surprise, I agree with everything that he said. I

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wish to avoid the thought that MI5 all thinks the same. In the time that we worked closely together we had many disagreements and arguments.

In particular, I agree this evening with the point that was picked up by the noble Lord, Lord Judd. Whatever the outside world may think, those in the Security Service, including my noble friend Lord Evans and I, believed that we were trying to protect civil liberties through security. There is no liberty without security. That is very important. I am extremely glad that my noble friend’s maiden speech was not on vintage cars, because I would have gone to sleep.

In starting scrutiny of the latest counterterrorist legislation, we do so, as Members of the House have noted, against the sober backdrop of events in Paris, although drafting this legislation predated that. The calm and resolute way in which Parisians have responded reminds me of how London responded in the days after the attacks in July 2005, which I remember very well, as we all can.

In some observations before I get down to the legislation, I note that, as in July 2005, some people—not in this House—have rushed to blame not the terrorists but the French authorities for the crimes of the terrorists. They assume that the crimes could have been prevented because those responsible were known. My noble friend and I will not always agree but, as he has said in the past, you can know of people without knowing what they can do. Although people are known, there may still be inadequate intelligence to identify what they are going to do and, mercifully, we do not intern people on suspicion, although we have in the past.

As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the numbers involved are simply too big to prevent everybody of concern being monitored constantly, be that here, in France or anywhere in the world, even in a totalitarian regime, which we are not. The French security service is an excellent organisation. Its leaders are well known to us and it is a very good friend of the United Kingdom.

As Andrew Parker, who is following in the footsteps of my noble friend Lord Evans, said last week, it is not possible to prevent all attacks. We must remember that. Post hoc analysis of events, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, referred to regarding the awful murder of Lee Rigby, gives us lessons. We learn from what happened in those events. However, it is not the case that we can ever expect to prevent everything. Incidentally, I strongly support the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, on the need to revisit the issue of communications data.

This legislation is taking a number of steps—some of them contentious, some of which will probably be improved in Committee—to do a number of smallish things. However, the loss of capability following the revelations of Snowden is extremely damaging. For the record, this House should not assume that counterterrorism legislation is, as it were, dictated to government and the Home Office by the security and intelligence organisations and the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, mentioned, that is simply not true. Governments have their own ideas on counterterrorism legislation. I remember, in the wake of the Brighton bomb, trying to persuade Mrs Thatcher against the

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powers that she was thinking of. Many people and different departments contribute to legislation, and it is not the script of the Security Service.

I will keep my main comments on the legislation for Committee, but like others I am concerned about Part 5 of the Bill concerning Prevent. Prevent is the key part of the Government’s counterterrorism strategy. That strategy has existed for a decade; it was drafted in 2005 and became part of the previous Government’s strategy in 2006. Of the various strands—Pursue, Prepare, Protect and so on—Prevent is the most difficult and the most important. I cannot agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, that we need to do less of Pursue. The identification, tracking, arresting and prosecution of terrorists needs to go on unabated. However, it seems to me that Prevent is clearly not working.

This is not altogether surprising because it is difficult. We do not really know what works. I retired nearly eight years ago. I know that a great deal of effort has gone into thinking about how to counter this toxic and murderous ideology. I believe that we must have a better understanding of the roots of terrorism than we used to, and a better understanding of how to divert people—particularly vulnerable young people who have, in some cases, been groomed and exploited—from their path.

Some of those who come back from Syria will not be terrorists; some need to be reintegrated. The Channel programme is obviously to be applauded, but I am still concerned that it is bound to be slow, even over the long term. It is understandable that it will be slow, but we do not seem—I beg to be corrected by others who are more up to date than me—to be having much effect. We are told that 600 dangerous extremists who are British citizens have fought in Syria. That is a large number. If Prevent had been working for the past 10 years, we might not have seen so many going.

It follows that I rather doubt that the Government, however laudable their efforts, are well placed to counter this ideology. A lead on that has and is beginning to come from moderate, mainstream Islam, which has itself suffered so much from the distorted version of its faith propounded by terrorists. One of the most appalling scenes from Paris was that of the Muslim policeman on the pavement being executed brutally by one of the terrorists.

It also follows, therefore, that I am not convinced of the value of putting Prevent on a statutory footing. I am out of date. The Government may be able to convince me but I cannot see how legislation can really govern hearts, minds and free speech. We can legislate against activity—the actions that people take can be detected, prosecuted and brought to court—but this I find much more difficult. We already have legislation on incitement to violence, which it is difficult enough to get evidence of, as the police know and have tried.

Finally, I must declare an interest. This is not as a pensioner of MI5, although I am that, but as the chair of the council of Imperial College London. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, expressed strong feelings about the difficulties for universities of what is proposed. Again, I will listen carefully in Committee but I prefer to believe that a voluntary, optional regime of securing co-operation is preferable to what is proposed in Part 5.

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I have real difficulty in understanding the practicality of requiring an enormous range of authorities to respond to what is described as the “local threat”, which may after all be covert. How will they judge who is vulnerable? How will they judge who is a non-violent extremist? I wait to hear. I look forward to listening to the Government’s arguments in Committee on these and other issues.

9.46 pm

Lord Marlesford (Con): My Lords, I suppose it is axiomatic that defence of the realm is the first priority for any British Government, but what is it defence against? Today in the UK we face the gravest threat to our safety, freedom and way of life since the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. We are not alone. It is a threat faced by much of the developed world and often more immediately by developing countries in every continent. The threat is that from political Islam. I first heard this phrase through President Sisi of Egypt, himself a devout Muslim, who is one of the doughtiest opponents of political Islam. It is, he said recently, “antagonising the entire world”. Some Muslim clerics have bravely denounced political Islam as a distortion of the religion of Islam, although many have remained silent. Let us hope that some of them now speak out.

I believe that political Islam ticks all the boxes to be identified as an international fascist movement. It is conceptually undemocratic. It is wholly intolerant. It is racist. It is in fact secular, with its leaders being drawn, and many of its supporters attracted, from among the fanatical, alienated, criminal and psychopathic elements that lurk at the bottom of every society. It inflicts on men, women and children unbridled brutality and cruelty that is truly psychotic. By combining modern management methods with the latest cyber and communications technologies, as well as the lesson of history on the effectiveness of terror as a weapon, which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to, it has been horrifyingly successful so far. Its stated aim is to establish a worldwide caliphate apparently recalling the days of the Ottoman Empire, which in 1923 Ataturk replaced with a secular republic in Turkey.

We are told that political Islam has succeeded in recruiting some 15,000 foreign fighters from 80 countries, the majority of them to ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The seduction of many of these appears to involve offering sexual delights. I have myself seen a film on ISIS in which one of its leaders promises recruits, “The virgins are waiting for you”. In north-east Nigeria, where Boko Haram continues to wreak havoc, killing more than 4,000 people last year, schoolgirls are being kidnapped to become sex slaves of the fighters of that terror group.

In the longer term, the destruction of political Islam must come through the collective rejection of it by the Governments and religious leaders of the Muslim world. Meanwhile, we have to defend ourselves from it, and this Bill is concerned with that defence. Its aim, therefore, must have our support. However, the methods that it proposes manage, in some areas, to be both inadequate and sometimes injudicious. I shall focus on some of the inadequacies.

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First, in Part 1, with its powers to disrupt the travel of people suspected of involvement in terrorism, I suggest that one of the most urgent and easiest measures—not in the Bill—would be to require all British passport holders to notify Her Majesty’s Passport Office of any other passport they hold. I have, over several years, repeatedly sought to introduce this requirement. I have never sought any limit on other passports of British passport holders. All I ask is that details of them are available in the records of the Passport Office and that they are revealed to immigration staff when scanning British passports. The Home Office has always opposed my proposal. Now surely its time has come.

Other, very simple but necessary, changes to passport administration should include the automatic electronic cancelling of passports—I think that the idea of physically seizing passports is rather old hat—particularly, for example, those of all deceased persons. There is currently a silly little gap in this regard. Quite often, these passports are flogged off on the black market. I think that the General Register Office should be made responsible for the immediate notification of deaths to the Passport Office. The cancellation of passports of all persons while in custody or serving custodial sentences is also appropriate. We have heard of people suspected of terrorism, even on bail, getting out with their passports intact. The courts can already require the surrender of passports but I think that electronic cancellation would be simpler.

Secondly, there needs to be much more rigorous vetting and control of the integrity of Border Force staff and all those concerned with the processing and issuing of visas. In January 2012, my noble friend Lord Henley, in a Written Answer, gave me details of 29 convictions of Home Office staff for misconduct in public office in the previous five years—that is, one every two months. The seriousness of the offences is indicated by the sentences passed: 18 were sent to prison for two years or more, and in one case nine years. Twenty-one of the 29 were employed in what was then the UK Border Agency. Considering the improbability of detection, the scale of what in many cases was abuse of the administration of the immigration system for private profit suggests that this behaviour may be responsible for a significant failure to secure our borders.

The Answer to the Written Question gave an indication of the sort of profiling needed in the recruitment procedures. Interestingly, my noble friend Lord Bates, updating the list in an Answer on 6 January, omitted to give the names of those convicted. When I inquired about the reason for this omission, I was told that the Home Office,

“do not consider it appropriate to include sensitive personal data in our response, ie the names of individual offenders”.

Convictions and sentencing in this country are done in public. What is this Home Office playing at, trying to conceal from Parliament names of its employees who have been sent to prison for misconduct in public office? Given the ease with which people could get jobs in the border agency in order to make money from such practices, is not the possibility of terrorists infiltrating the Home Office to threaten our country a much more serious risk? For example, given what the

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Government said yesterday about Boko Haram, would it be wise to employ people who might have such sympathies or indeed connections? During the Cold War there was an elaborate system of positive vetting to prevent those with communist sympathies being employed in sensitive areas. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure us that all government departments and agencies are now equally vigilant on the threat from political Islam.

Finally, I draw attention to the extremely unsatisfactory situation regarding the electronic monitoring of our national borders. I refer of course to the e-Borders system, which is one of the biggest failures of government computer procurement. The main contract with the American-based company Raytheon, signed in 2007 and worth around £750 million, was terminated by the present Government in July 2010. After binding arbitration, the Home Office has been left to pay Raytheon £224 million. Now we are talking about the need for more resources for the police and security services. That, by any standards, is big money.

What we should have is electronic scanning and recording of the passports of every person arriving at and leaving our borders, by land, sea or air. This information should be stored, probably for at least five years. That is simply not happening. Although there is now fairly extensive scanning of arrivals, even that is not complete, nor is it recorded. However, scanning and recording on departure is every bit as important. That is virtually non-existent. How do we know that those who have been admitted for a limited period have departed? How do we know that those who should not have been allowed to depart have not got out of the country?

A full e-Borders system is of the highest priority in protecting us from terrorism. When I have raised this question I have been fobbed off with the suggestion that the monitoring of exits is “intelligence-led”. That is simply not good enough.

I hope very much that the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee will urgently consider the consequences of Raytheon and the action that is now needed. I hope that the report of the National Audit Office, which is reviewing this fiasco, will be published soon and reported on by the Public Accounts Committee.

There are three problems in making this legislation fit for purpose. First, the Home Office is traditionally extremely resistant to any suggestions as to how it could better perform its duties. The “not invented here” factor meant that it took me 10 years from the time the legislation requiring it was passed to get the invaluable electronic firearms register established—10 years. Secondly, the Home Office is not taking the measures it could do under existing legislation. There is a lot of new legislation but it is a matter of doing what could already be done. This is largely because—as demonstrated by Raytheon—it is lacking in the computer skills and capabilities to defend our borders. Thirdly, I am afraid that the performance of the Home Office certainly does not indicate that—in this area at least—the “gentleman in Whitehall always knows best”, as has been demonstrated by a number of contributions this evening. This House must scrutinise and, where necessary, amend this legislation fully and fearlessly.

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9.59 pm

Viscount Hanworth (Lab): My Lords, the Bill is a mixture of new initiatives and refinements of existing legislation. It is being fast-tracked through Parliament in a way that makes it very difficult to subject it to adequate scrutiny. The complicating factor is that much of the information that might enable parliamentarians to judge the likely effects of the powers to counter terrorism or the terrorist threat is unavailable to them. To reveal more might prejudice the security of operations, so parliamentarians have to work in the dark.

Apart from the questionable urgency that Governments typically associate with such legislation, there is a new factor that might affect our critical judgments. We witnessed appalling terrorist atrocities in France last week. These are bound to increase anxieties about the possibility of a similar event occurring in the UK. This, I am sure, will predispose many of us to look favourably on the Bill’s provisions. Nevertheless, the Bill deserves detailed and critical scrutiny. It requires far more scrutiny than the time that has been allocated to it will allow.

In the absence of such careful oversight, it may be appropriate to offer some words of warning. This is an enabling Bill that grants powers without either mandating their use or posing limitations on the extent to which they might be used. They are powers that in the main should be used very sparingly. There is a danger that some of the powers will be used to the extent that they will become counterproductive. In addition to refining the existing powers, the Bill adds a whole new dimension to the counterterrorist legislation. This is contained in Part 1.

Chapter 2 concerns a new power to enable the Home Secretary to issue a temporary exclusion order that would control the return to the UK of a British citizen who is reasonably suspected of involvement in terrorist activities abroad. An exclusion order can last for up to two years, after which it will be renewable. Very little has been said to justify these orders. They seem to have originated in an extemporary pronouncement of the Prime Minister when the atrocities of ISIL were prominently exposed for the first time in our media. It was in August that David Cameron first raised the prospect of barring a British jihadist from returning to the UK. At the time Dominic Grieve, the former Attorney-General, said that the proposal was likely to be a non-starter. He pointed out that withdrawing an individual’s passport would effectively make them stateless, which would contravene international laws.

In an address to the Australian Parliament in November, David Cameron said that British fighters in Syria and Iran would be barred from returning to this country for two years unless they submitted to strict conditions. He also indicated that they would be granted a right of appeal. That represented a refinement of the original proposal which has been described by some as an attempt to dump the UK’s toxic waste in distant places. The suspicion remains that the Bill’s proposals represent an attempt at saving face by turning a hasty and ill considered reaction into practical legislation. However, few of the practicalities have yet been considered.

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An appropriate policy for confronting British nationals who wish to return to the UK after visiting the areas of conflict in the Middle East would make some clear distinctions regarding their motives for going there and their reasons for wishing to return. There should be no automatic presumption of guilt in advance of proof of innocence. We must distinguish among the various categories of Muslim Britons who have travelled, or are thinking of travelling, to the areas of conflict.

In the first category, which might be the predominant category, are young and naively impressionable individuals who have been influenced by others to espouse the cause of the jihadists. When confronted with the realities of the conflict they might seek to return home. They should be assisted to do so in every possible way, and they should not be made fearful of punishment or reprisals. There will be others who have inevitably been involved in brutal acts of war. In those cases, it will be difficult to judge how a balance should be struck between any punishments and programmes of rehabilitation to which individuals should be subjected. Those involved in barbaric acts that can be classified as war crimes ought not to go unpunished, and in the light of the likelihood of such punishment it will be less likely that they should seek to return. There will be some who would seek to return for the purpose of wreaking havoc in the UK. They will be very few in number but they will pose a disproportionate threat to our security. These dangers need to be averted by enhanced levels of surveillance and intelligence.

Our Islamic community will be one of the most important factors in overcoming the threat of Islamist terrorism in this country. The opinions of parents, siblings, friends and elders will eventually discourage young people from espousing the ideology of jihad. Every effort must be made to make sure that such people are not alienated by the rough handling of their errant relatives. Senior police officers who have been involved in these matters understand this. Helen Ball, of the Metropolitan Police, who is the senior national co-ordinator for counterterrorism and terrorist investigations, has stated this clearly in outstanding testimony to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee. She confirmed that the police clearly see the need to build trust and confidence which will enable families, schools and institutions to be forthcoming with intelligence about people who are in danger of being radicalised.

Another testimony from the police is that their ability to handle the cyberintelligence that should enable them to avert acts of terrorism is constantly being degraded by the advent of new means of electronic communication. It is to matters of cyberintelligence that Part 3 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill is devoted. There are various provisions that will enable the Home Office to require communication service providers to retain the data that would facilitate the identification of individuals who might be planning acts of terrorism in association with others. It is by no means certain that these provisions will enable the investigators to redress the balance in their favour. This is where part of the danger to which I have alluded resides.

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What might happen in the event of a failure of this intelligence? A likely outcome could be increasing harassment of young individuals of the Islamic community whose profiles might resemble those of the terrorist suspects. This would serve only to generate the alienation and resentment that sustain the cause of the terrorists. In the opinion of many who are concerned with civil liberties, a further expansion of the powers to retain electronic data is inconsistent with our rights to privacy. However, we all demand a degree of security against the threat of terrorism. We cannot expect to have the best on both accounts. We must tolerate a degree of intrusion into our private affairs as the cost of this security but we must be vigilant in guarding our rights.

10.07 pm

Baroness Brinton (LD): My Lords, it is inevitable in a debate that has taken more than seven hours already, and will continue for some time to come, that the focus of much of what we have said has been on the current Islamicist terrorists. However, one of the most important tests for this Bill is ensuring that it covers other terrorists as well; we should not forget those. Noble Lords have mentioned the IRA in the past but 10 years ago there were terrorists in the animal rights movement who were leaving pipe bombs—certainly in Hertfordshire, where I lived. In Europe there is a threat from far-right racists who, as we know, can also perpetrate acts of terrorism.

The 2.5 million Muslims who live in this country are currently finding it very difficult to be heard, so I want to start by giving one example from my home town of Watford. On Sunday, Watford’s Muslim community came together to turn their procession—which should have been in honour of the Prophet’s birth—into a solidarity march for the people of Paris. They were joined by ordinary people in Watford who would not normally have done that. It was recorded and commented on much in the local media. Sadly, there has not been much comment in the press, but that sort of activity shows that Prevent is working in this country. The attitude of many in our community, particularly those who were criticised in the Muslim community 10 years ago for not having the dialogue about extremism, is at last beginning to change. Of course, there is much more to do.

Much of the Bill is important and it will be vital if we are to follow through on everything that the independent reviewer, David Anderson QC, has set out as being necessary. Liberal Democrats are very supportive of those measures which will combat terrorists and help the police and the security services in all they need to do to monitor people, arrest them and deal with them in a judicious way. As other noble Lords have mentioned, there is a difficult balance between human rights and having the tools to catch those committing the most heinous of crimes. Even moving towards that has to be balanced, and that is what this legislation is about. Many noble Lords have spoken about that today and I will not add much more, except to say that there is a key role for Parliament and the judiciary to have oversight. We must ensure that it is not left to the Home Secretary or the department to

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make judgments. We must always check to make sure that the balance between human rights and security is there.

What will otherwise happen is that all those we seek to catch will move to the dark web. There was discussion earlier about IP addresses. I have been in this Chamber when we discussed the young and how they work their way around pornographic filters far too easily. They are way ahead of us, their parental generation. The same is true, I am afraid, of those who will subvert any route we set up. If we think that we have resolved the issue by being able to identify IP addresses, they will immediately find another way around it. In fact in Russia, I understand, Putin is talking about moving back to typewriters to avoid anything being written in a form that can be traced via the internet.

I worked in the university sector for over 20 years, not as an academic but as an administrator. I was the bursar of a Cambridge college for 10 years and then ran a unit that looked at universities working together with communities and employer engagement. I have read the Bill with an eye to how practical the implementation of the duty will be. I am concerned that those in the Home Office who have drawn it up do not understand the way in which our universities are structured. The duty on curbing free speech that is being asked for to protect us from terror will require primary legislation to change universities’ current duty to ensure that there is free speech. That debate will take some time because, fundamentally, it lies at the heart of what we believe our universities are there for. It is not an add-on to be sorted out in regulations, as has been suggested by the briefing notes for the Bill.

As a bursar, I would be horrified to have to sit and debate whether a student society—over which my college and the university would have no control because it was an autonomous body—was making the right decision to allow somebody there, let alone to demand in my role to see the presentation of a speaker and try to understand whether it just went over the boundaries of extremism. How do individuals in institutions decide what is or is not extremism? This is madness. It is the sort of thing that is done in haste. I notice that this part was not debated when the Bill went through the Commons but has been introduced only recently. It is utterly impractical and I hope that before we move to Committee next week, serious consideration will be given to whether this duty will work for universities. Certainly, there is no time to look at changing the primary legislation required for universities to make this possible. I liked my noble friend Lord Phillips’s phrase about “a lumbering part of the Bill”, but it is more than lumbering. It will kill this part of the Bill if it goes through.

I support my noble friend Lady Berridge, who referred to the funding of terrorism at the moment through looted works of art and religious icons. The Walk of Truth charity that she spoke of is a 21st-century equivalent of “The Monuments Men”, a splendid film which recognised the work done by service men and women at the end of the Second World War to restore looted arts. There is nothing to restore in the current system because works of art are being sold through traders, some of it coming to this country. I hope that,

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in Committee, it will be possible to at least put down a probing amendment and perhaps to have reassurance from the Minister that we are making sure that works of art coming into this country have effective provenance, to show that they are not being looted from the Middle East.

The Guardian reported on 15 June that a series of flash sticks was discovered after a courier was killed in battle. These flash sticks revealed that ISIS had taken $36 million-worth of goods from al-Nabuk alone, including a large number of antiquities up to 8,000 years old. Each item could be sold for between $20,000 and $50,000. That is the scope of how ISIS is funding its activities. We have a duty to ensure that religious art, icons and murals are not coming into this country and being sold on; and that that flow of money for terrorism stops. At the moment, the Bill is very light on the funding of terrorism: it is rightly saying that other things should be stopped. This may be small, but it is important that we dry up that flow of money for terrorism, whether it is in this country or in the Middle East.

10.16 pm

Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB): My Lords, we have had a long debate with very many thoughtful contributions. I certainly do not propose to try to sum them all up. I would like particularly to thank the two noble Lords who made their maiden speeches; theirs were notable contributions to the debate and we look forward to hearing from them both. If I pick particularly on the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, it is because I come from a generation of public servants for whom the Security Service was not allowed to exist. It was like the girl in the song:

“Oh! no! we never mention her,

Her name is never heard”.

The director-general’s identity and name were the most profound state secrets, and the director-general’s voice was never heard in public. Things have changed, and they have changed to our advantage: we had the present director-general making a speech that we read last Thursday and we had two noble Lords who are former directors-general of the Security Service contributing to our debate this evening with all the authority of their experience.

The people of this country have a right to be able to go about their lawful business freely and in freedom, and in private if they so wish. They also have a right to be able to go about their business in safety and without fear. Parliament and the Government have to try to resolve the conflict between these duties, since measures to provide safety and security almost invariably and inevitably limit freedom and erode privacy. How the balance should be struck at any given time has to be decided by Parliament, and should be decided by Parliament. The Government can and must propose, but people will expect Parliament to decide. It is a serious and heavy responsibility.

The rights to freedom and privacy, although they might have to be qualified, are none the less absolute. They should be qualified or limited only to the extent necessary for the purpose of maintaining or improving safety and security. We must therefore be ready to

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accept limitations on freedom and privacy where they can be shown to be essential for maintaining—or preventing a deterioration in—safety and security. If and when we are satisfied that the nature of the threat has changed, so as to make it unnecessary to retain measures that were hitherto regarded as indispensible, we need to be ready to dispense with those measures.

We have once again reached a stage when the balance needs to be reconsidered and restruck in the light of new threats to safety and security. I believe that the Government had established a case for the new measures proposed in this Bill before the shocking events in Paris last week. Those events have served to strengthen that case.

No doubt we shall go through the Bill in detail and consider the relevance and effectiveness of each of the measures but, subject to that examination, I hope that the House will give the Bill a Second Reading today and eventually pass it. We owe it to the law enforcement and intelligence and security agencies on whose vigilance and effectiveness we depend to provide them with the powers, authorities and resources that they need for the purpose of providing us with the best possible protection from threats to safety and security, as we now perceive them.

As for the detail of the Bill, I shall only briefly mention that I await to see what is said about the temporary exclusion orders and the role of judicial review. I also await to hear what is said about the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board. On that matter, my respect and admiration for the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Mr David Anderson, is possibly slightly less—but hardly less—than that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. It is very great. We shall need to ensure that nothing in the Bill dilutes or diminishes his responsibilities. We shall need to ensure that he has the range of duties that he thinks he needs and the resources to fulfil them. We shall need to watch that very carefully as the Bill proceeds.

I comment briefly on Part 3. It will allow the Government to require communication service providers to retain data that will allow the authorities to link the unique attributes of a public internet protected address to the person or device using it at any given time. It will not enable the authorities to obtain access to the content of such communications; that will continue to require the authority of the Secretary of State.

The power to be able to access such data and, often, to be able to do so as a matter of urgency, is, as we have heard this evening, an indispensable and vital tool in the investigation and detection of terrorist threats and crimes—and of other serious crime. It was one of the provisions contained in the Government’s draft Communications Data Bill, which was given pre-legislative scrutiny two or three years ago by a Joint Committee of both Houses under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, of which I was a member. The Joint Committee recommended a number of changes to the draft Bill, but accepted this provision.

For my part, I regret that the current Government were unable to reintroduce a communications data Bill that incorporated the Joint Committee’s recommendations.

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Such a Bill is needed to reflect fast-moving changes in communications—particularly internet—technology since the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 15 years ago. Parliament should be asked to return to the subject very early in the new Parliament. I am glad to learn that the Prime Minister has said that if he is still Prime Minister after the election, he intends to introduce such a measure. A similar commitment from the leader of the Opposition and other party leaders would no doubt be welcome.

Indeed, I believe that the new Parliament will have to give early consideration to these issues, as Part 3 includes a sunset clause which provides for its repeal at the end of 2016, at the same time as the repeal of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. In the mean time, thankful for small mercies, I welcome and commend Part 3 to the House.

10.24 pm

Lord King of Bridgwater (Con): My Lords, may I fill in the gap and follow the magisterial address from the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, on the considerable number of issues with which he dealt in his previous incarnations for a considerable length of time? In general, I will simply say that I support the Bill but I also welcome the way in which the House has addressed the issues contained within it. I recognise and applaud the way in which the Minister introduced it, and I am sure he will enjoy my applause after his wind-up as well. He has been willing to listen and that is very much appreciated in this House.

On Clause 5, the Minister will have undoubtedly have some interesting discussions on exclusion orders and relocation with many Members in Committee. I pick up the rod of the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller: there is no civil liberty without security. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, who I am delighted to see here—I have had the pleasure of meeting him on other occasions in different venues—made a chilling remark in an excellent maiden speech. He said that the threat is greater but the capability to meet it is less. You listen to that statement and think, given the troubled nature of this world, about what it means—the threat and the worry that it represents for our country. It is our duty as a House and as a Parliament—the Government have their duty as well—to take every reasonable step that we can to try to ensure that that capability is as little reduced as possible, even after Mr Snowden and other activities which have arisen.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Jones, with her considerable experience in this field, said that this is not a short-term problem. We look at the state of the world, the places from which our problems are coming and the conditions of those places at present, and see the virtual impossibility of envisaging any real significant improvement in those areas. We are moving, I believe, into an extraordinarily difficult and different time. Having had my own experiences in trying to counter terrorism and in other situations, I recognise the exceptionally difficult nature of the problems we now face. We never faced suicide bombs in Northern Ireland; other noble Lords have made that comment. We did not have 10 year-old girls coming as suicide bombers, which has only recently occurred.

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I disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who referred to a finite number. I think he said there were 250, or maybe 500, who have to be dealt with and accommodated. I do not think that this is a static figure. The risk is that it is a continuing movement. There is the growth of social media; the extraordinary capabilities in organising and mobilising shown by ISIS at present; and the fact that Mademoiselle Boumeddiene could, while French police were still worried about whether they were going to arrest her, go from Paris to Madrid to Istanbul to Syria. The mobility of some of these people, and the fact that others can make the reverse journey, means that the threat to us is very great.

My own knowledge is that in these situations you can have all the boots on the ground that you like, but unless you have good intelligence you do not have a chance of meeting the threats that you face. It is to be hoped that, once the Bill has had its Second Reading, it will get serious and responsible consideration in Committee in the interests of improving the security of all the people in our country, which is our great responsibility at this time.

10.28 pm

Lord Rosser (Lab): My Lords, I do not wish to detain the House for too long, frankly because of the hour. Secondly, I am not sure for how long my voice will hold up. This has been a calm and measured debate on an issue that can and does arouse diverse and very different reactions. We have heard from nearly 40 Members of your Lordships’ House with considerable knowledge of the issues addressed in the Bill, including two thought-provoking maiden speeches approaching the subject of counterterrorism and security from different standpoints and experiences. I hope it will not be too long before we are able to hear again from the noble Lords, Lord Evans of Weardale and Lord Green of Deddington, when they will no longer be constrained by the accepted conventions applicable to maiden speeches.

Inevitably, the recent atrocities in France have played a part in this debate. However, the Bill is not of course a response to what happened in Paris, although no doubt many feel that what happened there has underlined the case for it. The Bill relates to counterterrorism and security issues in this country, and sets out the measures and changes that the Government are asking this House to agree to in addition to existing statutory revisions. However, we are not alone in having faced and continuing to face the reality and prospect of terrorist acts. Pakistan, Australia, India, Canada, Belgium, America, and of course France, to name just some countries, have been and potentially still are in a similar situation to us. Home Office Ministers have previously referred to the 40 or so terrorist plots that have been disrupted since the attacks in London in July 2005, and 2013 saw the first terrorist-related deaths in this country since 2005. We know that there is a very real prospect that British nationals, following involvement with terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, will seek to persuade others to go down the same route or will carry out attacks here, or both.

The Government have said that they believe that about 600 people of interest to the security services

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have travelled to Syria, with about half having already returned to the United Kingdom, some of whom pose a significant threat. The problem is not unique to the United Kingdom: the United Nations estimates that foreign fighters from 80 countries may be in the region, mainly fighting for ISIL. Over the past five years or so, more than 800 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences, more than 200 have been charged, and nearly 150 have been successfully prosecuted. Last year alone, the Metropolitan Police made some 270 arrests following counterterrorism investigations, and with other agencies it has disrupted several attack plots.

The recent Intelligence and Security Committee report set out the serious challenges our security services and police face in keeping us safe, and they deserve our gratitude and thanks. As my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon said at the beginning of this debate in setting out our position on the Bill, we agree that the terror threat has grown, and we will support the Bill because it responds to new and changing threats and addresses some past mistakes, not least on terrorism prevention investigation measures. The Government have at last recognised the need to restore relocation powers, the abolition of which led to the effective demise of TPIMs for those extreme cases where prosecution cannot be successfully pursued but the threat continues.

However, there is a need to examine closely the detail of the provisions in the Bill and to ask: whether what is proposed will in each case achieve the stated objective; whether the stated objective is clear, unambiguous and proportionate in the light of the situation we now face; and whether there are sufficient checks and balances in place to prevent powers which should be proportionate from being abused and discredited, thus undermining the fight against extremism. A number of the contributions today have homed in on one or more of those considerations, and a number of concerns have been expressed. It is for the Government to seek to allay those concerns, either in their response to this debate today or, probably more realistically, during the further stages of the Bill’s consideration.

One such concern which has already been raised is in connection with the provision in Part 5 for a new statutory duty on certain bodies, including local authorities, schools, colleges and universities, to have due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism. I doubt that too many people would disagree with that as an objective, but there is a need for the Government to be clear about exactly what powers the Bill gives to the Secretary of State, who will be able to make a direction to one of the bodies covered by that power, such as a university, if it is deemed to be failing to exercise its statutory duty. The Government also need to state clearly what a body would have to do to show that it had met a duty to have regard to the need to prevent people being driven into terrorism. When asked in the other place if she envisaged the Home Secretary making a direction in order to tell a university or institution not to allow somebody to speak, the Home Secretary replied that that was not the intention of that power of direction. The question that does need to be answered, though, is whether the Government consider that a Home Secretary could make such a direction, under the powers in Part 5.

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There will also be a need for the Government to provide more detail on exactly how the proposed temporary exclusion orders will work in practice, bearing in mind that they will be dependent on the co-operation of other countries, which will presumably also have to be acting within the provisions of their own laws, and international law. It is not clear at the moment just how practical or otherwise, or how bureaucratic or otherwise, the proposed arrangements for what the Government describe as a “managed return” will be, how long it is envisaged that those covered by the proposed arrangements could be detained, or even if they will be detained on foreign soil, pending their being allowed to travel back to this country.

The Government appear to have changed tack on the issue of judicial oversight of the temporary exclusion order power, following pressure on this point in the other place, although the Home Secretary may have left the door ajar to not doing anything, since she said in the other place last week that,

“the Government have committed to look very carefully at judicial oversight of the temporary exclusion order power”,

and that the Government,

“will return to this issue in the House of Lords”.—[

Official Report

, Commons, 7/1/15; col. 340.]

Perhaps the Minister in his reply could give a specific commitment that the Government will bring forward amendments to provide for judicial oversight of the temporary exclusion order power.

We will want to discuss further the role of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, since the Bill itself reveals very little on this point. It contains more on the make-up and composition of the board than it does on its purpose and powers. Like the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, had to say, because I thought he was indicating something about the intentions of the Government in respect of the board which I do not think I have heard from either the lips of the Minister or in writing from his pen. No doubt the Minister will want to clarify the intentions of the Government. The Bill says that the board will advise and assist the independent reviewer. Will the board be able to overrule or outvote the independent reviewer on any issues related to the carrying out of his role and responsibilities? Will the existence of the board create a bureaucracy which will divert the time and attention of the independent reviewer away from his existing crucial role, and will the board have its own separate support staff, and if so what will their role be? Will the independent reviewer still be able to seek advice—if he so wishes—from outside the board, and will he be required to seek the advice of the board on any specific issues, or will it be a matter for him to decide whether he wants their advice or not?

I appreciate that the Government have published a consultation paper, but presumably they did not provide for the setting up of the board in the Bill without having come to the conclusion that it was needed, and what its working relationship and role would be in respect of the independent reviewer. As my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon said, our response to the threats we face can never just be a legislative one.

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Community action, pressure, and involvement is needed; and understanding and tackling the reasons why people—mainly young people—become radicalised and go down the road of violence and extremism is crucial. We hope that putting Prevent on a statutory footing will assist the situation in this regard, but we need to examine how the arrangements will work in practice, including, in the light of the resources previously cut, what will be made available. While we share the view that there is a need to take quick action to stop someone who it is believed is about to leave the country to become involved in terrorism-related activity, we believe that checks and balances are needed to minimise the possibility that the power to seize travel documents will be misused, or otherwise result in an injustice, a view that the government parties do not apparently share.

We very recently had the benefit of the views on the Bill of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, as well as those of the Constitution Committee. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has raised a number of points of concern, no doubt all of which will be considered and debated at Committee stage. Bearing in mind that there appears to be pretty widespread support in your Lordships’ House for the overall objectives and intentions of the Bill, the Committee and Report stages are likely to be the crucial ones. It is at those stages that the detail of how it is intended that the proposals will actually be implemented should be provided by the Government so that a considered view can be reached on the practicality and feasibility of what is being proposed, as well as on the adequacy or need for checks and balances to ensure that powers cannot be abused and that the possibility of injustice occurring can be minimised.

We have already indicated our support for the objectives and intentions of the Bill. It is the detail that needs careful and considered debate, but with a recognition that we need both liberty and security in a democracy if the goal of safety for our citizens is to continue to be delivered and sustained.

10.40 pm

Lord Bates: My Lords, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in viewing this debate as calm and measured. In the words of my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury, it has been the House at its best, as it is on many occasions of this nature. A lot of issues have been raised and I shall do my very best to get through them. Essentially, they have grouped around nine main thematic areas: the nature of the threat; the procedure and legislative process; passports, and their seizure; temporary exclusion orders; funding and resources; international co-operation; IT and data retention; Prevent powers, particularly in relation to universities; and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board.

I turn to the first of those—the nature of the threat. I thought that the debate was aided immensely by the contributions in our two new maiden speeches, which were both focused on the particular expertise that the noble Lords, Lord Evans and Lord Green, have in their respective roles. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, referred to a jolt of energy that has gone through the terrorist networks; they are enlivened, bold and audacious in how they undertake their attacks. The noble Lord, Lord Green, from his immense experience in the Middle

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East, spoke of what he regarded as that region descending into a chaotic situation. He chillingly viewed the situation as being the worst that he could recall in 50 years. That is of course because of what is happening through ISIL in Iraq and Syria. I pay tribute to the work of my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones, who pointed out that it is not a static threat but an expanding one, and that ISIL is now very much on the borders of NATO in Turkey. It is growing and dynamic.

The noble Lord, Lord King, has immense expertise, which I was grateful that he could draw on while speaking in the gap. He reminded us that ISIL is different and distinctive from anything that we have seen before. The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, talked about its international nature in referring to Boko Haram and attacks elsewhere, including Pakistan. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to the horrific attack on the school in Peshawar, which led to the death of 132 schoolchildren. It is of course not just happening far away; it is happening with the active and determined support of British citizens—a small and determined band. That is what makes it different.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Jones and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, referred to the fact that in the case of the horrific attacks in Paris, the attackers were using skills and training that they had experienced in training camps and active service elsewhere. The noble Baroness referred to Yemen, where they had learnt those deadly skills that we need to counter. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked from his immense experience about the actions of a determined minority that were jeopardising free speech. When we have a debate about the Prevent duties for universities—which I will come to in a minute—it is important that we also remember this enemy’s absolutely determined war on free speech.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, offered me some professional sympathy, having been a distinguished predecessor in this role, and talked about a group of people who were intent on destroying our very way of life. For these reasons, and others, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, adjudged fairly that the Government had entirely and convincingly made the case for the necessity of legislation. On the nature of the legislation and its process, a couple of noble Lords, to whom I will not refer directly, questioned whether it was a knee-jerk reaction. They used terms such as “window-dressing” and questioned whether it was meaningful and would have a real effect in tackling a real problem. At my very junior level in the Government, I have an overwhelming sense of the need to consider such matters as: are you overlooking something; are you upholding safety; are you correctly balancing security, civil rights and freedom; are you doing all that you can? I can only imagine what the weight and pressure must have been for the Prime Minister when he was informed, on 29 August, of the view of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre—not of his committee, not in his judgment—that the threat level should be raised from substantial to severe. It therefore determined that an attack was highly likely. I guess he responded as most of us would do on 1 September, when he said that he wanted to be absolutely sure he had done everything in his power to try to keep our citizens safe. That is the genesis of the legislation.

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As to the legislative process before us, the Government are committed to ensuring the effective parliamentary scrutiny of the legislation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, talked about the use of fast-track in a very thoughtful speech, which showed an incredible understanding of the wrestling and agonising which is going on across government about how to strike the balance and frame the legislative approach. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said that he did not feel that the term “fast-track” was appropriate. In some senses it is not, because we are talking here about a limitation of the intervals, not limitation of the debate. The signal of intent came at the beginning of September; the Bill was introduced at the end of November; we have had hearings by the Joint Committee on Human Rights; it has been scrutinised in another place; it will have three days in Committee, then go on to Report and Third Reading. There are also five or six parallel consultations on different aspects of the Bill. We can make the case. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, brings immense expertise to this area. He made a very thoughtful speech in which he raised concerns on this point and I listened carefully to them. However, I feel that in this case of necessity we have got the balance about right in terms of the legislative process.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, to whom I express my gratitude for her support as we work through the Bill, asked about the sunset clause. There are certain provisions within TPIMs and the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act which are subject to sunset clauses. However, the view is that it would be inappropriate to add a sunset clause for some of the other provisions—for instance, where they simply clarify existing legislation or where an industry, such as the aviation sector, needs certainty if it is to implement new technical systems. Noble Lords will wish to note that the Constitution Committee, which took a great interest in such issues, did not recommend a sunset provision in this regard.

My noble friend Lord Jopling and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, talked about preparedness. My noble friend Lord Jopling also spoke about the chemical, biological and nuclear attacks which could arise—and about the chilling side-effects of Botox, which, if they were made known in the market, would lead to a dramatic fall in sales. However, it is right that preparedness is a key part of what the Government are seeking to do here. In 2014, more than 120 people were arrested for alleged offences relating to Syria while seven individuals were convicted for Syria-related terrorist activities, which shows that the Government are prepared in this regard.

Many literary allusions were made in the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, referred to Karl Popper, and I was grateful that he struggled with the relevant text as that made me feel less guilty. We have also had references to Joseph Conrad, Voltaire, Henry James and others. Noble Lords have struggled with the texts of philosophers in trying to get the right balance between privacy and security. That issue was helpfully touched on by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who said that it is not how we live but how we live together that matters, and that we need to be careful about taking away security and civil liberties. The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, talked about the need to restrike the balance between

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the two concepts in the face of the new threat. That balance is constantly under review. My noble friend Lord Carlile, in a very powerful and eloquent speech, which was full of insight, said that the Home Office was far from caricatures portraying a cadre of people seeking every opportunity to restrict the freedoms of others. In his experience and in mine, the Home Office is full of incredibly professional people who agonise, along with everybody else, about whether they have struck that balance correctly.

My noble friend Lady Shields and a number of others spoke about the international discussions that are going on. I can inform the House that active discussions are taking place bilaterally with Turkey and France, as one would expect, but also with EU partners. This underscores the fact that we are facing these threats having taken the decision at the end of November to opt into certain justice and home affairs issues. One can only imagine what people might be thinking, and how insecure they might feel if, in the face of the terrorist attacks in Paris, we did not have any legislation currently in train. We are debating it and that is part of our preparedness.

The noble Lord, Lord Condon, referred to lessons from Denmark. My noble friend Lord Carlile painted a picture of a phalanx of international leaders arm in arm on the march on Sunday. The international community needs to move forward and to ensure that we send a collective message, but we also need to work with each other to counter this very serious threat. My noble friend Lord Roberts and I are attracted to the suggestion of my noble friend Lord Carlile that religious communities can be part of the solution, not part of the problem. My noble friend Lord Marlesford talked about political Islam but religions are very much part of the solution. The picture of the Albanian Christians and Muslims marching together in Paris certainly showed that the terrorists have not won.

Several noble Lords, including my noble friends Lady Berridge and Lady Buscombe, referred to passport seizure for longer than 14 days. They talked about the Joint Committee on Human Rights report. There is an important point here. My noble friend Lady Buscombe said that to characterise this as a universally critical statement on the Bill, as perhaps some of the press releases that have surrounded this debate did, was absolutely wrong. The report took a fair and balanced approach. Again, it reflected the fact that everybody is wrestling with this. The difference in views between the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and my noble friend Lady Buscombe reflects the scale of debate that is happening not just in the Joint Committee on Human Rights but across the Floor of the House. In fact, it is happening across the country.

At 14 days, the police’s investigation should have progressed to the extent that a court can meaningfully consider whether the investigation has been conducted diligently and expeditiously. Any evidence provided at a court hearing should not differ too greatly from that which caused the decision to seize a passport in the first place. This is done on a case-by-case basis. The noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, reminded us that

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each individual has a different route to ISIL or wherever they are going. We need to treat them as individuals, case by case.

In terms of reasonable suspicion, I am sure that my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford did not mean that officials would seize a passport on a hunch. We are in consultation over a substantial document—a code of practice. It goes into exhaustive detail about the circumstances, assurances and processes that must be gone through before such a serious step as temporarily taking away someone’s travel documents is taken. I can assure the House that that power would be used only on a case-by-case basis, where the police reasonably suspect that a person is travelling overseas for terrorist purposes. It would probably be circumscribed by a number of stringent safeguards, with a check by a senior officer above superintendent level and an additional check by a more senior officer independent of the investigation for up to 72 hours; an initial retention period of only 14 days; and a court review of the ongoing need to retain a passport, allowing a judge to extend that period up to a maximum of 30 days if the police needed more time for their investigation.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked whether we could seize foreign as well as UK passports. The answer is yes and it feeds into the point that my noble friend Lord Marlesford raised about notifying people when they have more than one nationality. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked about the JCHR’s proposal for notification of the turnovers, and I feel that my noble friend Lady Buscombe dealt with that effectively. We are all searching for the right approach.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, asked whether the temporary exclusion orders will be retained indefinitely. The clause makes it clear that there is a duty for the Secretary of State to issue to the subject of a temporary exclusion a permit to travel within a reasonable period if the subject applies for one. This is a key provision for a temporary exclusion power. It is about managing the return, to which a number of noble Lords have referred.

I was asked specifically about what is meant by “considering further action” and the judicial oversight of that process. The only language that I am able to use at present, which may not be satisfactory—noble Lords will have to read between the lines—is that we will visit this in Committee. Noble Lords understand how legislation works. I hope they will understand that that is more than a general statement; it is something of a statement of intent.

On temporary exclusion orders, if people want to return we will decide whether to impose a temporary exclusion order on a case-by-case basis. A temporary exclusion order does not prevent individuals from returning to the UK. It ensures that they return in a controlled manner and subjects them to additional measures on their return. It can be in operation for up to two years because of those additional measures; it is not that the process of their return will take two years.

I now move on to funding. I hope the House will bear with me just a little bit longer, given that I was chastised by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for

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being a little bit brief at the beginning. She is perhaps beginning to regret that statement now, as I am sure the House is. I will try to get through this, but I will certainly finish within the next few minutes. I give that undertaking. Not a great many questions were raised on finance, but the noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked me about it. I have that finance available. I am happy to write to the noble Lord about that. I absolutely underscore the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend Lady Berridge that finance is critical to the way that this terrorist organisation is growing. It is a rich organisation, as the noble Lord said. We need to attack its finances as well as its ideology and its human resources.

I think the point on control orders is now accepted. We have seen the remarks of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson. He has made his position very clear on this and we are listening very carefully to him.

I was asked by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Butler, about the oversight board and whether it was the case that we had somehow changed our position. I think that was the suggestion. We are currently consulting on the powers. The document is out there and that consultation is live until 30 January for people to offer their views on the shape of the board. We do not want to pre-empt the end of that process at this stage. We are determined to go forward in the light of the consultation. If it goes forward, the establishment of the board will be by means of the affirmative procedure, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, asked. The timing of this will be subject to the availability of parliamentary time. I cannot say a great deal more on that, but I assure noble Lords that we will have more to say on that in Committee.

A number of points were made on Prevent. I will use this as an opportunity to plug the fact that we have a meeting at 2.30 pm on Thursday 15 January to deal with this matter, particularly relating to universities, in Committee Room 4A. Most noble Lords have been written to about this. The only point I would make on universities is that a copy of the Official Report of this debate should be required reading in all universities. That is not a regulation; it is just a suggestion. I do not want to stir things up too much further.

On the Data Retention Act, I want to thank my noble friend Lady Shields in particular for her work and for her helpful comments. During the scrutiny of the draft Communications Data Bill, both the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and the Joint

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Committee on the Bill concluded that legislation is required to address the ongoing capability gaps that this narrow provision will not fill. We talked about the gaps in current capability. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, referred to that as well.

I have covered as many points as I can. The first duty of any Government is to ensure that their citizens are safe. That means not only the wider elements of how we talk about and tackle the culture that is giving rise to this problem but also effective policing, as my noble friend Lord Wasserman pointed out. I agree with noble Lords that we must protect our civil liberties alongside our rights to safety and security. The range of safeguards in this Bill and those we propose to add in Committee will do that, ensuring that these new powers are used in a necessary and proportionate way. The varied and detailed contributions from noble Lords have enabled us to cover a full range of issues during the course of today’s debate and I and my noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde look forward to returning to these issues in detail in Committee. I commend the Bill to the House.

Bill read a second time.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Order of Consideration Motion

11.05 pm

Moved by Lord Bates

That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House, and that it be an instruction to the Committee that they consider the Bill in the following order:

Clause 1, Schedule 1, Clauses 2 to 20, Schedule 2, Clause 21, Schedule 3, Clauses 22 to 30, Schedule 4, Clauses 31 to 35, Schedule 5, Clauses 36 to 43.

Motion agreed.

Consumer Rights Bill

Returned from the Commons

The Bill was returned from the Commons with certain of the Lords amendments agreed to and with a reason for disagreeing to the remaining amendment.

House adjourned at 11.06 pm.