CHAPTER 2: THE FORMAL STRUCTURES OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
19. For the most part, relations between the
UK Government and the devolved administrations operate informally
on a bilateral basis; this is healthy and is common across nations
with multi-level political structures.[24]
However, there are formal structures, both bilateral and quadrilateral
(that is, including all four administrations), underpinning and
facilitating those day-to-day informal working relationships.[25]
The existing structures
20. In the UK, the formal structures underpinning
inter-governmental relations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the four administrations. The original MOU was written
in 1999.[26] Since 2009
it has been reviewed and amended regularlythe most recent
edition dating from October 2013.[27]
The MOU also sets out key principles that should underlie inter-governmental
relations: communication, consultation, co-operation and confidentiality.
The document includes some departmental agreements but, on the
whole, relations between individual government departments and
their counterparts in the devolved administrations are governed
by bilateral concordats agreed and published separately by the
departments themselves (see Chapter 4).
THE JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE
21. The MOU establishes a core quadrilateral
forum, the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). The committee has
three levels: plenary, functional and official. Its function is:
· "to consider non-devolved matters
which impinge on devolved responsibilities, and devolved matters
which impinge on non-devolved responsibilities;
· where the UK Government and the devolved
administrations so agree, to consider devolved matters if it is
beneficial to discuss their respective treatment in the different
parts of the United Kingdom;
· to keep the arrangements for liaison between
the UK Government and the devolved administrations under review;
and
· to consider disputes between the administrations."[28]
22. The JMC's plenary meetings are held annually,
attended by the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the
First Ministers of the three devolved administrations, the Deputy
First Minister of Northern Ireland, the territorial secretaries
of state and relevant other ministers from each administration.
Since 2008, they have been hosted by the UK Government in London.
The most recent plenary meeting was held on 15 December 2014.
A communiqué is published on all four administrations'
websites after these meetings, along with an annual report summarising
the content of that meeting and any sub-committee meetings (see
paragraphs 25-6 below) since the last plenary meeting. Neither
document is particularly substantial, a subject we address in
more detail in Chapter 5.
23. During the early years of devolution, ad
hoc sub-committees could beand wereformed on different
subjects on the domestic agenda, while a European sub-committee
met more regularly. In our 2002 report, we recommended that the
criteria for determining when a meeting should take place should
be published and that the sub-committees should meet at least
once a year.[29] The
then Government rejected these proposals, noting that the MOU
set out that the JMC plenary meets once a year.[30]
Shortly thereafter the JMC ceased meeting even on an annual plenary
basisthe European sub-committee alone continued to meet.
24. Following the election of a Scottish National
Party minority government in May 2007, the new First Minister
of Scotland wrote to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State
for Scotland formally requesting the reconvening of the JMC.[31]
A plenary meeting took place on 25 June 2008 and subsequent meetings
have occurred annually since.
25. The revived JMC currently has two formal
sub-committees:
· Domestic (JMC(D))chaired by the
Deputy Prime Minister. It discusses domestic policy issues; these
have included child poverty, welfare reforms, inward investment
co-ordination and electricity market reforms. The sub-committee
met twice in 2009, twice in 2010 and has met annually thereafter.
· European (JMC(E))chaired by the
Foreign Secretary. It meets around five times a year, ahead of
European Council meetings, and continued to meet during the hiatus
in plenary sessions in 2002-08. Its meetings regularly include
'horizon scanning' and preparation for the European Council meetings,
as well as two or three other subjects. For example, in June 2013
it considered broadband infrastructure and small and medium-sizes
enterprises policy, and in October 2013 the balance of competencies
review and youth unemployment.
26. A third committee is reported on in the JMC
annual report but is not technically a JMC sub-committee: the
Finance Ministers' Quadrilateral (FMQ). This committee has met
eight times since January 2010, but its last reported meeting
was in November 2013. Lyndsey White, deputy director at HM Treasury,
told us that it was:
"primarily used as a forum to bring forward
finance issues that are common across the devolved administrations.
That has been a useful forum in developing the Statement of
Funding Policy which
is the document that sets out
the principles that govern the Treasury's relationship on behalf
of the UK Government with the devolved administrations. We have
in the past been able to use the Finance Ministers' quad to reach
agreements on some quite technical issues, but very important
onesfor example, around the nature of budget exchange for
the devolved administrations."[32]
27. There are also officials-level meetings supporting
the JMC; these meetings are not reported in the JMC annual report.
Helen MacNamara, director in the Economic and Domestic Affairs
Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, told us that the officials
meet prior to each plenary JMC meeting to "go through the
agenda and make sure we understand the issues and are able to
brief our Ministers to have productive discussions. However, informally
there is whole range of contact that happens underneath that."[33]
28. The revived post-2008 JMC has a formal mechanism
for dispute resolution between the four administrations. The MOU
sets out a process by which disputes can be raised and either
resolved or escalated; efforts are made to resolve matters at
working level, by officials or ministers, but they can be escalated
to the JMC itself and, if not resolved, to the annual plenary
session.[34] Four disputes
have been raised (all in 2010-11), all of which were resolved
without recourse to the plenary JMC.[35]
29. The disputes dealt with by the JMC structure
to date are political ones, often involving the allocation of
funding. The Supreme Court is the arbiter of legal disputes over
the jurisdiction of the devolved legislatures and administrations.[36]
So far, no cases have been referred to the Supreme Court by the
UK Government relating to the powers of the Scottish Parliament,
but cases have been referred relating to the powers of the National
Assembly for Wales. The two cases referred by the UK Attorney
General confirmed the powers claimed by the Assembly. A third
official referral, by the Counsel General for Wales, related to
a private member's bill introduced in the Welsh Assembly on which
the Court ruled that the Assembly did not have the powers claimed
in the bill.[37]
Lessons from other examples of
inter-governmental relations
DEVOLVED AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS
30. Professor Nicola McEwen provided the Committee
with a summary of the inter-governmental arrangements in four
other countries with multi-level structures.[38]
She concluded that in "most, if not all, countries, these
processes are far more formal and structured than the system which
has emerged in the UK"; the UK's inter-governmental relations
remain "weakly institutionalised and focused more on communication
than coordination". She also drew attention to the varying
levels of devolution in different regions across the UK: "I
cannot think of another system that is as asymmetrical as the
UK. That is always going to be the difficulty. We can take inspiration
from other cases, but we will have to find the solutions internally."[39]
31. Professor Alan Page was similarly "wary
of off-the-shelf solutions adopted or drawn from other systems
I would be entirely confident about our ability to come
up with a bespoke solution that met the needs of the United Kingdom"
building on the UK's ongoing experience of inter-governmental
relations.[40]
32. The lessons that Professor McEwen felt could
be helpfully drawn from overseas examples were that:
· Spill-over in competencies between administrations
cannot be avoided;
· Formal inter-governmental mechanisms are
more likely to generate co-operation than ad hoc ones, and to
allow issues to be dealt with effectively when they arise;
· Formal processes are more effective when
they are not hierarchical and all parties "share an equal
stake in the proceedings";
· "Formal, regular meetings can strengthen
day-to-day informal interaction"; and
· Working groups focused on particular issues
can be effective, as well as set-piece ministerial meetings.[41]
THE BRITISH-IRISH COUNCIL
33. Several witnesses referred to features of
the British-Irish Council as instructive for potential improvements
to the structure of inter-governmental relations in the UK.
34. The Council comprises the governments of
the British Isles: the UK and Irish Governments; the devolved
Scottish and Welsh Governments and Northern Ireland Executive;
and the Governments of the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey. Its
purpose is to "exchange information, discuss, consult and
use best endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters
of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant administrations".[42]
In 2012, a permanent secretariat for the Council was established
in Edinburgh.[43]
35. Professor Derek Birrell, Professor of Social
Administration and Social Policy at the University of Ulster,
told us that there are three levels of engagement within the Council:
a twice yearly summit; 'sectoral' work involving ministers; and
meetings of officials, including visits and seminars.[44]
The 12 'work sectors', each led by ministers from one of the eight
administrations, address different areas of shared interest: creative
industries; collaborative spatial planning; demography; digital
inclusion; early years policy; energy; environment; housing; indigenous,
minority and lesser-used languages; misuse of substances (drugs
and alcohol); social inclusion; and sustainable and accessible
transport.[45] They report
annually on their work.
36. Professor Birrell felt the Council played
a useful role:
"Participants have clearly found some of
the work and activities useful. Benefits have arisen in terms
of the exchange of ideas and policy copying. In terms of practical
co-operation, for example, in the recognition of driving licences,
in preparing UK-wide child poverty legislation, in agreement on
an accord on an all-islands approach to energy resources, and
in examining integrated travel by public transport across two
or more countries."[46]
37. Scottish Government minister Fiona Hyslop
MSP commended the rotation of the chair of the Council among its
member administrations.[47]
The First Minister of Wales told us that the 'work streams' model
used by the Council could be used by the JMC,[48]
while Professor Birrell concluded that a permanent secretariat
might help the JMC function more effectively.[49]
Improving the formal structures
THE IMPORTANCE OF A FORMAL FRAMEWORK
38. Most observers acknowledged the need for
both formal and informal means of inter-governmental communication.
Drawing on examples from overseas, Professor McEwen told us that:
"In all cases, a crucial component of intergovernmental
relations takes place informally, in regular ad hoc communication
between ministers and officials at all levels of responsibility.
This informal interaction is complemented by more formal processes
of intergovernmental relations
Formal, regular meetings
can strengthen day-to-day informal interaction by strengthening
intergovernmental networks and building trust among officials.
Such interaction can often enhance mutual awareness of policy
interdependencies and head off disputes."[50]
39. This Committee warned in 2002 of the risks
of reliance on informal mechanisms. We recommended that inter-governmental
structures be improved during that period of party congruence
in order to ensure that they were working well in advance of a
time when different parties came into power in different administrations
across the UK.[51]
40. The demise of the JMC plenary after 2002
was seen by many as a measure of the success of the devolution
process and of the informal working relations.[52]
The JMC started meeting again in plenary form in 2008, but Professor
McEwen told us that there was still "an overreliance on informalityon
the ad hoc nature of intergovernmental coordination."[53]
The Scottish Government told us similarly that "Good inter-governmental
machinery should be effective whatever the political make up of
the 4 member administrations and should not depend on the goodwill
(or otherwise) of individuals."[54]
41. Witnesses told us that a balance was needed,
with both formal and informal elements playing important roles.
As Ms MacNamara put it, "Too much structure gets in the way,
but so does no structure at all. The best relationships work best
when you are both able to work informally together and then there
is an underpinning structure behind to give that some weight."[55]
We agree with that view.
THE CURRENT JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE
42. Our witnesses were generally critical of
the effectiveness of the Joint Ministerial Committee as it currently
operates. We heard that the plenary and the domestic sub-committee
are venues for "grandstanding"[56]
and the airing of grievances.[57]
43. The First Minister of Wales told us that
the annual plenary committee:
"tends to be a meeting where grievances
are aired rather than constructive proposals taken forward
There tends to be morehow shall I put itfull and
frank discussion in the JMC (Plenary) than constructive discussion.
That is the nature of things: in some ways, of course, there are
four different Administrations with four different parties or
combinations of parties running them."[58]
44. The Rt Hon Peter Robinson MLA, the First
Minister of Northern Ireland told us that the meetings worked
to a strict timetable and that each item was largely a read-out
of the current experience and policy of each administration. This
was useful as it allowed administrations to learn from each other's
experiences and find out what policies they were pursuing, but
it was "very much a tick-box exercise as opposed to really
getting things done."[59]
45. The Scottish Government told us that there
were only limited opportunities to raise issues of concern in
the meetings:
"In theory, the 'current issues' section
which remains a standing item on the agenda of meetings in both
Plenary and Domestic format provides the opportunity for each
administration to raise issues of concern. In practice, lack of
time can make this opportunity less useful, since the UK Government
is generally unwilling or unable to schedule more than 60-90 minutes
for each meeting and there is often no time
left for 'current
issues'. Providing additional time might also provide the opportunity
for proper discussion rather than simply [a] statement of contrary
positions."[60]
46. Ms MacNamara, whose Cabinet Office team provides
the UK's part of the JMC's joint secretariat, firmly rejected
the assertion that the JMC was prone to "grandstanding".[61]
The Secretary of State for Scotland gave us two answers to the
same question: the official answer that "Joint Ministerial
Committees and plenary have been, and are, productive and useful"
and his own observation that he could see why they would be identified
as grandstanding: "They occasionally generate a bit more
heat than light." Like others,[62]
he stressed that this was inevitable: "when you take a room,
fill it with politicians from different parts of the country and
from different parties and leave the press at the door, yes, you're
going to get a bit a bit of politics happening. That's how it
works."[63]
47. The Domestic sub-committee was particularly
criticised. In 2010, the then First Minister of Scotland told
the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee that, as a successful
mechanism for co-operation, the sub-committee had "some distance
to travel."[64]
Five years on, the First Minister of Wales said to us that it
"has no real purpose as far as I can see at the moment".[65]
Ms Hyslop and the Institute for Government both noted the decreasing
frequency of its meetings in recent years. The Institute also
stated that "it seems that there is a lack of agreement about
the purpose of this format" and recommended its replacement.[66]
48. The European sub-committee is significantly
better thought of by politicians, including participants,[67]
and by observers. David Melding AM, Chairman of the National Assembly
for Wales Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee, described
it as "a very effective body", possibly because it was
run by a single departmentthe Foreign and Commonwealth
Officewith a "culture of dealing with different Governments
and people of different views".[68]
Professor Alan Page cited it as an example of how things can work
well in the current inter-governmental structure, which, he explained,
was a result of an "external compulsion, or necessity, by
dint of the European agenda to work out what the United Kingdom's
position is in advance of meetings at the European level that
involve discussion with the devolved Governments."[69]
49. There are still, however, "concerns
about the representation of the devolved territories in European
matters."[70] The
Institute for Government told us that there was a perception in
devolved administrations "that their ministers are often
listened to but then ignored, which can cause frustration, as
can the reluctance of some UK departments to allow devolved ministers
to participate in meetings of the EU Council of Ministers".[71]
The Smith Commission recommended improving the 'Concordat on the
Co-ordination of European Union Policy Issues' (part of the MOU),
around the agreement of UK positions and allowing ministers from
devolved administrations to represent the UK at the Council of
Ministers.[72] The Advocate
General for Scotland, the Rt Hon the Lord Wallace of Tankerness,
acknowledged this concern but highlighted the extent to which
Scottish Ministers did speak at Council meetings; he also noted
that there was only limited space in Council meetings, possibly
restricting the participation of multiple representatives from
the UK as the member state.[73]
50. It is clear that, while some parts of
the JMC structure work better than others, in the eyes of the
devolved administrations at least the way the JMC system works
at present is not satisfactory. The Domestic sub-committee, in
particular, does not appear to serve a useful purpose. Throughout
this report we make recommendations intended to address these
concerns.
51. As more powers are devolved to each region,
inter-governmental structures will need to change to accommodate
the increased number of areas of policy overlap or congruence.
There need to be clear structures within which effective communication
can take place to manage the increasingly complicated and extensive
interface between different administrations.
52. We do not believe that the increasingly complex
devolution settlements can be managed solely in multilateral forums
like the current JMC and its sub-committees. Given the increasingly
asymmetrical nature of devolution in the UK, bilateral relationships
will need to develop to deal with the increasing number of areas
where devolved and non-devolved powers intersect.
BILATERAL FORUMS
53. Bilateral relations between the UK Government
and devolved administrations have tended to be informal at all
levels. However, more formal bilateral forums have been established
during this Parliament to manage the transfer of fiscal powers,
first to Scotland and more recently to Wales.
54. The UK-Scotland Joint Exchequer Committee
(JEC) was established while the Scotland Act 2012 was before Parliament.
Its first meeting was held on 27 September 2011; it met again
in 2012 and 2013, on the latter occasion in Edinburgh. The meetings
were attended by HM Treasury Ministers, the Secretary of State
for Scotland, the Scottish Government Cabinet Secretary for Finance,
Employment and Sustainable Growth and a senior Scottish Cabinet
colleague.[74] This forum
is generally well-regarded, although the Scottish Government noted
difficulties in reaching agreements and recommended the regular
attendance of a more senior UK Minister.[75]
55. A similar UK-Wales JEC was created as the
Wales Act 2014 neared Royal Assent. Like the Scotland Act 2012,
this Act allows for tax-raising powers for the National Assembly
for Wales (in this case, only following a referendum approving
the additional power). The UK-Wales JEC met on 20 October 2014,
attended by HM Treasury Ministers, the Secretary of State for
Wales and the Welsh Government Minister for Finance and Government
Business.[76]
56. Building on the success of the JEC model,
the UK Government recently announced that a "joint Ministerial
Working Group on Welfare has been established to provide a forum
in which UK Ministers and Scottish Ministers can discuss the operation
of the new arrangementsboth in advance of legislation being
delivered, and also to provide a forum for discussion post Royal
Assent."[77] The
Group's first meeting took place on 11 February 2015.[78] Box
2: Complexity and inter-dependency: Welfare powers
The Scottish Parliament is due to receive extensive new powers in relation to welfare, an area where responsibility is presently reserved almost entirely to Westminster. The result will be wide areas of shared competence between the UK and Scottish Governmentsfor example on Universal Credit, where Scottish Ministers will have powers shared with the UK Secretary of State and subject to the latter's agreement, while some devolved benefits such as the Personal Independence Payment and the Attendance Allowance interact with tax credits and income-related benefits that will continue to be controlled by the UK Government. The boundaries between devolved and reserved matters will be less clear-cut than at present, and the two governments will require mechanisms for joint decision-making where their powers interconnect.
The UK Government estimates that responsibility for "one quarter of all welfare spending outside the state pension" will be devolved. One aim of the Universal Credit system is a more integrated welfare system. Inter-governmental relations will be important to ensure that this goal is not undermined by the devolution of welfare benefits and that, on the other hand, the existence of a unified system is flexible enough to allow for policy differences in Scotland.
Examples of overlapping responsibility, and hence of the need for inter-governmental management, include benefits that automatically qualify the recipient for another benefit, or, alternatively, where certain entitlements cause other services to be reduced where they overlap. Careful management will be needed to ensure that differences introduced in Scotland do not lead either to double benefits or unintended losses for individuals. An example of a cross-border issue given in Scotland in the United Kingdom relates to Carer's Allowance, where the carer lives in one jurisdiction whilst caring for someone in the other jurisdiction. Again, joined-up arrangements will be needed to ensure that care for individuals in need does not suffer from gaps in coverage across jurisdictions.
|
Source: Scotland in the
United Kingdom; written evidence from Professor Nicola McEwen
(IGR0010)
57. There are strong arguments for more structured
and ongoing use of formal bilateral arrangements. The Smith Commission
recommended the setting up of "new bilateral governance arrangements
which will be required to oversee the implementation and operation
of the tax and welfare powers to be devolved" following its
other recommendation.[79]
The Scottish Government told us that "Any new structure,
such as JMC sub-committees, should be flexible enough to allow
bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral formats, where appropriate."[80]
58. Professor McEwen told us that:
"It is not clearand seems doubtfulwhether
these forums [the JEC and the Ministerial Working Group on Welfare]
will outlive this transitional and implementation phase, or whether
they will provide opportunities for the Scottish Government to
at least be consulted on those reserved areas of tax policy which
will shape and constrain the new devolved responsibilities."[81]
Professor McEwen noted that "One of the things
that was striking about both the Smith report and the Silk report
was their emphasis on the need for more formal bilateral arrangements",[82]
and called for these bodies to be used "on a more permanent
basis".[83]
59. The Institute for Government also highlighted
the complexity of the tax and welfare proposals for Scotland and
the additional joint working that would be required, and called
for mechanisms to be created to manage the transition and to "ensure
that there is effective administration of the new more complex
fiscal framework and the intersection between devolved and reserved
welfare policy."[84]
60. The Silk Commission recommended the creation
of a broad-ranging Welsh Intergovernmental Committee.[85]
Establishing such bilateral forums risks undermining the role
of the multilateral forums; formal bilateral bodies should be
used for specific areas of shared interest or policy inter-dependency
between administrations.
61. There are areas where formal bilateral
mechanisms are appropriate, particularly in the areas of tax and
welfare where the proposed devolution of powers to the Scottish
Parliament significantly increases the complexity of the devolution
settlement, as would proposed income tax powers for the National
Assembly for Wales.
62. Formal bilateral forums co-ordinating
the operation of the complex fiscal devolution settlements should
continue the work of the Joint Exchequer Committees and the new
UK-Scotland Ministerial Working Group on Welfare. We recommend
that these be brought within the auspices of the JMC structure,
to ensure that their work is co-ordinated as part of a wider inter-governmental
relations strategy.
POLICY CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION
63. Although much of the day-to-day management
of the devolution settlements will need to take place bilaterally,
there is scope for greater multilateral policy co-operation between
the four administrations in the UK.
64. We were told by witnesses that the JMC made
no provision for joint policy-making by participants.[86]
The First Minister of Wales told us that, "It certainly is
not the case that the current machinery has enabled joint working
and joint consideration of policy that affects the whole of the
UK to be taken forward."[87]
65. We heard that joint policy-making does occur
at the level of officials' interaction, but that it is underused.[88]
While the short, high-level JMC plenary or sub-committee JMC meetings
may not be the right venue for the collective development of policy,
the structure of the JMC could be reformed to promote such policy
co-operation, providing high-level ministerial support for inter-governmental
work. Box 3: Policy
and research co-operation: driver behaviour
Driver behaviour is an area in which the UK and Scottish governments have recently co-operated in research on an issue of common interest. Under the Scotland Act 2012, the power to set alcohol limits for drivers on Scottish roads is devolved, as is the power to set speed limits. Transport Scotland and the UK Department for Transport worked together on research on drink-driving, as well as on other illegal driver behaviour such as failure to wear a seatbelt and the use of mobile phones while driving.
As a result of the research, the Scottish Parliament used their new power under the 2012 Act to reduce the alcohol limit for drivers in Scotland, while the limit in the rest of the UK did not change. There is now a policy difference between Scotland and the rest of the UK, but it is the result of a conscious decision based on the same research produced co-operatively between the two administrations; as a DfT official told us, "we will now see how the two systems pan out and which is the better."
|
Source: Q 27 (Dr Philip Rycroft) and Q 69 (Graham
Pendlebury)
66. Witnesses told us that the British-Irish
Council's work sectors (see paragraph 35) could also provide
a model for expansion of the JMC. These sectors largely focus
on cross-cutting issues rather than departmental policy areas,
which suggests a way of developing the JMC and changing the way
that it works. Such a development would mean an increase in the
number of formal bodies in the JMC structure, but could also facilitate
a different way of working: work sectors (led by different members
of the Council) explore their subject areas and report back to
the Council, in contrast to the 'read-out' style that we heard
characterises the plenary JMC.[89]
67. Creating more sub-committees, or something
akin to the British-Irish Council's cross-cutting work sectors,
could be a positive move for the JMC, allowing greater co-operation
on shared concerns at a ministerial level. For example, the JMC(D)
could take on a role of commissioning pieces of work on particular
subjects, each led by different administrations but carried out
jointly by all four administrations, and then act as a forum for
discussion at the conclusion of that work. It would be important,
however, to ensure that the work of UK equivalents did not simply
duplicate the Council's work sectors,[90]
particularly given that the four administrations in the JMC make
up half of the membership of the British-Irish Council.
68. The Smith Commission argued that the increased
devolution of powers to Scotland meant that the JMC had to be
"scaled up significantly", and recommended that there
should be:
"additional sub-committees within the strengthened
JMC structure beyond the current sub-committees. New sub-committees
could include, but need not be limited to, policy areas such as
home affairs; rural policy, agriculture & fisheries; or social
security/welfare."[91]
69. Some witnesses were concerned about a possible
proliferation of the JMC's committee system. Professor Michael
Keating noted that:
"Experience elsewhere suggests that if over-elaborate
systems are constructed and committees proliferate, they will
not be used. The success of a system should not be judged on how
many committees there are or how often they meet. Busy politicians
and officials will use bodies if they are needed and useful; they
will not waste their time on formalities."[92]
70. We recommend that the Cabinet Office,
as part of its current review of inter-governmental structures,
consider and report on how a revised Joint Ministerial Committee
structure might best be used to facilitate joint policy-making
and co-ordination. Provision should be made to ensure that policy
initiatives can come from the devolved administrations, as well
as from the UK Government.
71. The Joint Ministerial Committee should
be given the flexibility to create additional sub-committees on
policy areas where regular four-way discussions are required,
or temporary sub-committees on cross-cutting UK-wide issues that
are beyond the scope of bilateral co-operation between devolved
administrations and individual UK Government departments.
72. The creation of such sub-committees should
not be seen as an end in itself and the continued existence of
each sub-committee should be regularly reviewed by the JMC plenary.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
73. The MOU sets out a formal dispute resolution
mechanism within the JMC structure. There have been criticisms
of its efficacy, although the system has yet to be fully tested
as no disputes have gone all the way to the plenary meeting of
the JMC. The Institute for Government and Ms MacNamara both told
us that the threat of escalation to the JMC's dispute resolution
mechanism was an effective way of forcing a resolution of issues
at official and ministerial level.[93]
Ms MacNamara suggested that the relative lack of formal disputes
was a sign that the informal mechanisms for overcoming disagreements
functioned well.[94]
74. The First Minister of Northern Ireland told
us the JMC was not "a very impartial court to take our case
to" because, in each case "the Cabinet Office will decide
whether the Treasury was right." He confirmed that less formal
means were usually sought for dispute resolution: the JMC "is
not the body that I would take any serious issue to that I wanted
to take up with the Government; I would deal directly with the
Government."[95]
The First Minister of Wales expressed similar views: "The
difficulty is that the dispute resolution process that is in place
leads back inevitably to the Treasury, which will then take the
final decision."[96]
Professor Michael Keating told us that the asymmetrical nature
of devolution, with the UK Government sometimes acting as the
Government of England, made creating a mechanism that did not
favour the UK Government very difficult.[97]
75. There have been suggestions that a formal
dispute resolution process might allow for some form of arbitration
or mediation, but our witnesses were sceptical that this could
work. As Professor McEwen noted, "It is
inevitable
that politics will come into these disputes, which makes it quite
difficult to conceive of a role for an impartial umpire".[98]
Ms MacNamara questioned the constitutional status of a third party
presiding over the decisions of elected representatives.[99]
Professor Alan Page noted that the current mechanism allows for
independent advice to be sought, but in the end decisions must
be resolved politically. He told us that:
"I have some sympathy with that, in the
sense that, if I recall the wording of the protocol properly,
it says effectively, 'There will come a point at which we may
just have to agree to disagree. No solution can be imposed upon
anyone'.
Since the UK Government hold the cards, and are
the most powerful actor in the process, that must inevitably mean
that the devolved Governments are left with a sense of grievance
that they have somehow lost out."[100]
76. The current dispute resolution procedure
under the JMC has yet to be fully tested. We note, however, the
concerns expressed by the devolved administrations that in the
event of a dispute any decision is ultimately made by the UK Government.
We do not believe that any form of external arbitration or mediation
would be feasible, given that many disputes are likely to be essentially
political in nature, but we recommend that the Cabinet Office,
in co-operation with the devolved administrations, consider how
the process of dispute resolution might be made more independent
of the UK Government.
A STATUTORY BASIS FOR INTER-GOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
77. As noted earlier in this chapter, a certain
amount of formal structure is necessary to underpin inter-governmental
relations. The JMC framework provides this structure but it has
no statutory basis: it exists by virtue of an inter-governmental
agreement encapsulated in the MOU. The cessation of meetings of
the JMC from 2002 to 2008, despite a requirement under the MOU
for annual meetings, demonstrates how easily such agreements can
be set aside. Indeed, the MOU states that it "should not
be interpreted as a binding agreement."[101]
Witnesses from all three devolved administrations supported, to
varying degrees, some measure of statutory underpinning.[102]
Other witnesses were divided on the balance of the benefits and
risks of such a move. Legislation setting inter-governmental relations
on a statutory footing would, the First Minister of Wales told
us, give the arrangements added "teeth".[103]
Part of this would be through additional scrutiny; a statutory
underpinning would increase the extent to which the administrations
could be held to account for their interactions.[104]
It could also include specific measures designed to increase transparency;
as Professor Jim Gallagher noted: "there may be benefit in
statutory requirements to produce and present information to Parliament
about how this system is working."[105]
78. The Scottish Government suggested that a
statutory basis could ensure the principles and terms of the MOU
would be adhered to. They said that there was currently "no
mechanism to enforce" these principles. As an example, they
told us of a joint request in December 2011 from the Scottish
and Welsh administrations for a JMC plenary meeting which "did
not happen despite the fact that under the MOU the UK Government
cannot refuse such a request and that the MOU sets out the timescale
in which this should happen."[106]
79. As noted in the Introduction, inter-governmental
structures and relations should serve to strengthen and stabilise
the Union.[107] A statutory
articulation of how those relations functionopenly debated
in Parliament and providing for greater parliamentary accountabilitycould
provide a more solid basis for a stable constitutional settlement
than arrangements agreed behind closed doors between executives
with no parliamentary involvement.
80. Another benefit, albeit not a reason in and
of itself to pass legislation, would be the symbolism of the action.
A statutory requirement for each administration to meet the others
regularly would signal the importance of inter-governmental relations
at the top levels of UK politics.[108]
While it seems unlikely at present that there will be a repeat
of the disappearance between 2002 and 2008 of the JMC's plenary
meetings and its non-EU sub-committees, there may be value in
reaffirming the importance of inter-governmental relations through
giving its structures a statutory basis.
81. Also of symbolicas well as practicalimportance
would be the role of the UK Parliament, and potentially the devolved
legislatures, in passing the legislation required. This could,
Professor Page told us, make the inter-governmental arrangements
something with "popular sanction" rather than "just
something dreamt up between Governments". The legislation
itself would set out "the expectation of the legislatures
of the United Kingdom of the way in which relationships will be
conducted."[109]
82. The main arguments given by witnesses against
providing a statutory basis for inter-governmental relations are
twofold. The first is a potential loss of flexibility. Professor
Gallagher told us he could "see no advantage in making these
arrangements statutory, as there is a risk of introducing inflexibility
into a system subject to change".[110]
Similarly, Ms Hyslop told us that a statutory basisalthough
desirableshould not come at the expense of relations being
"prompt and proactive", while the First Minister of
Northern Ireland warned of creating 'hoops' that participants
had to jump through, slowing down interaction.[111]
Graham Pendlebury, Director of Local Transport in the Department
for Transport, warned that "the more you formalise it, the
more you fossilise the relationship" and that a more formal
structure could lead to ministers simply arriving with "prepared
positions" rather than having a conversation. He argued that
this could actually make for a less open relationship.[112]
83. The second criticism is that it could lead
to inter-governmental relations being subject to judicial review.[113]
Professor Page told us that the current arrangements were designed
to avoid legal commitments and judicial intervention, although
he noted that "it has to be questioned whether the deep seated
fear that executive effectiveness would somehow be compromised
by judicial intervention
is still warranted."[114]
Professor Richard Wyn Jones was also optimistic on this front,
saying that "the judges have a pretty good record on devolution."[115]
84. The effect of any statutory underpinning
of inter-governmental relations depends on the type and extent
of that legislation. The more detailed and complex the legislation,
the greater the risk of inflexibility. Too vague an underpinning
may not have a significant effect and could restrict the capacity
of the legislatures to hold their executives to account.
85. There may be a middle ground, however, whereby
the framework and core principles are set out in statute, but
the detail of the relationships remains flexible to enable administrations
and individual departments to react to new developments without
feeling encumbered by formal statutory requirements. As Mr Melding
put it, the new arrangements should "reduce that element
of random variability" of interactions.[116]
The First Minister of Northern Ireland told us that, although
"it would be difficult to legislate for good relations",
it would be possible to legislate for "minimum requirements
on the number of occasions each of the bodies and sub-bodies met.
You could place a duty on UK departments either to take into account
or to consult the devolved regions when they are dealing with
matters that have an impact there."[117]
86. The Government should consider whether
the framework of inter-governmental relations should be set out
in statute. Such a statute could set out the existence and membership
of the Joint Ministerial Committee and its core sub-committees,
along with the core principles governing relations between administrations.
This legislation could provide a basic framework, within which
the Memorandum of Understanding and departmental concordats would
continue to detail how inter-governmental interactions would function
in practice.
THE FINANCE MINISTERS' QUADRILATERAL
87. Like the JMC(E), which is also led by a single
department, the Finance Ministers' Quadrilateral is relatively
well-regarded. Professor Jim Gallagher told us that the FMQ was
an element of inter-governmental relations that has "real
business to do".[118]
The First Minister of Northern Ireland told us that, as a former
participant, he had always found the FMQ "to be a useful
body. There was much more interaction at those meetings than you
would get at a JMC
You certainly have a much better opportunity
to raise issues and deal with particular problems."[119]
88. It has been suggested that the FMQ should
be included in the JMC structure. Indeed, the annual reports of
the JMC already include a list of the agenda items covered at
each meeting of the FMQ.[120]
The Calman Commission recommended that it be subsumed as a JMC
(Finance) sub-committee,[121]
a change the then Government rejected on the slightly disingenuous
grounds that "there is no compelling case for an additional
forum".[122] The
Institute for Government echoed the Calman Commission's recommendation.[123]
89. As it appears to function well in its current
form, we see no particular reason why the FMQ should not continue
to operate as a separate body. Given its importance, however,
it needs to be more transparent and accountable. Should the JMC
structure be underpinned by a statutory framework, we would expect
the FMQ to follow suit. Whether or not it becomes a sub-committee
of the Joint Ministerial Committee, the FMQ should be included
as a permanent fixture in any statute setting out the framework
of inter-governmental relations, with the added exposure to scrutiny
that this should bring.
INDEPENDENT ADVICE ON FUNDING THE
DEVOLVED ADMINISTRATIONS
90. Professor Keating told us that finance and
welfare were areas where "inter-governmental relations really
are critical,"[124]
and noted that "Federal states with resource-sharing will
usually have some intergovernmental forum for discussing this,
often with an independent body to advise on facts and figures.
In the UK, the Barnett Formula is entirely at the discretion of
the centre."[125]
He felt such a body should be established in the UK given the
increasing devolution of fiscal, tax and welfare policy:
"It would be very important, if we are going
to get into things like detriments and the implications of mansion
taxes or whatever, to have some independent body that does the
homework and produces the statistics, just as the OBR does with
regard to public spending
The Treasury just deciding this
unilaterally is going to get us into political rows and political
arguments that will be settled by political haggling. It is important
that there is some kind of inter-governmental ministerial committee
that can be convened to consider this evidence and then come to
a political decision. Quite rightly, the politicians take the
decision at the end of the day, but they should do it in a way
that is informed by the evidence and that is transparent and accountable."[126]
91. We recommend that the Government consider
tasking an independent body to provide the statistics and evidence
on which to base decisions about the allocation of funding to
the devolved administrations.
An imbalanced relationship?
92. Witnesses told us there was a prevailing
view that the JMC structureand inter-governmental relations
more generallywere dominated by the UK Government to the
detriment of the devolved administrations. Professor Alan Page
told us that:
"At its most general, the complaint, which
long pre-dates devolution, is that the devolved administrations
are forgotten about or ignored. Included within this general complaint
are a number of more specific complaintsabout the unwillingness
of the UK Government to discuss matters the devolved administrations
want to discuss and about its failure to consult the devolved
administrations or to take account of their views."[127]
93. The First Minister of Wales told us bluntly
that:
"The JMC in its present form is basically
a Westminster creation that is designed to allow Westminster to
discuss issues with the devolved administrations. It is not jointly
owned in that sense; the meetings always take place in London
and it is not a proper forum of four Administrations coming together
to discuss issues of mutual interest in that way."[128]
94. Scottish Government minister Fiona Hyslop
MSP highlighted the fact "that the time and the agenda are
quite often controlled by the chair, who is always a UK Government
Minister".[129]
The Scottish Government also told us that while any administration
might remove an item from the agenda, this was mainly done by
the UK Government: "The UK Government in recent years has
sometimes chosen not to expose topics to discussion at JMC until
their policy positionand often draft legislationhas
been finalised. This of course means that the views of the [devolved
administrations] cannot readily be taken into account."[130]
95. The devolved administrations, the First Minister
of Northern Ireland told us, felt that they were "being brought
in as opposed to being a full part of any structure."[131]
96. Ms MacNamara rejected the claim that the
UK Government dominates the JMC agenda. She told us that "In
order to put the agenda together for any JMC meeting, officials
will meet and discuss and come up with ideas and talk about what
might be appropriate
All JMC agendas are agreed by all
Ministers, so we as officials put joint advice to Ministers and
then it is the Ministers together who decide the agenda items."[132]
Whatever the mechanism used to compile the agenda, there is clearly
a perception among academics and the devolved administrations
that JMC meetings are dominated by the UK Government. Professor
Nicola McEwen told us that, with the increasingly complex devolution
settlements, unless "joint working can be conducted on the
basis of equality of status and mutual respect, the complexities
and interdependencies are likely to create new sources of tension
and dissatisfaction, and lead to growing pressure for a further
revision of the devolution settlement".[133]
97. We note the Scottish Government's concern,
previously quoted (see paragraph 45), about the limited time
made available for JMC meetings. The First Minister of Northern
Ireland also told us that meetings were run on a tight timetable:
"You have a starting time and a finishing time and you get
the impression that some people want to get on to the next meeting
and that it is more something that they feel compelled to do."[134]
EQUAL PARTICIPANTS
98. Professor Derek Birrell told us that the
revival of the JMC in 2008 aimed, in part, to "confer parity
of esteem on the devolved governments."[135]
This principle must take account, however, of the difference in
constitutional status between, on the one hand, the three devolved
administrations which have acquired their varied levels of devolved
power from the sovereign UK Parliament and, on the other, the
UK Government which stems from and is responsible to that Parliament.[136]
99. Officials from HM Treasury and the Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) told us that their
colleagues' relationships with devolved administrations depended
to some degree on the extent of devolution in their policy areas.[137]
John Robbs, director of Marine and Fisheries at Defra, said that
department's interaction with the devolved administrations could
be divided into "two broad categories":
· "One is EU and national business,
which of course is reserved in the case of Defra" but with
"a wide-ranging agenda in which the devolved administrations
have a very strong interest. On those dossiers, where we are negotiating,
Defra is the lead UK department but with full and detailed involvement
with the devolved administrations."
· The second "is domestic business,
where responsibilities are devolved. However, that does not mean
to say that we stop talking to each other.
. We ensure that
we take account of knock-on effects on each other, so we do not
cause each other problems."[138]
100. In reserved policy areas, therefore, the
UK Government retains responsibility but consults and discusses
with devolved administrations. In fully devolved policy areas,
the four administrations are all responsible within their jurisdictions
(the UK Government acting for England) and so their interactions
are different,[139]
focussing more on sharing experiences and best practice and taking
account of possible spill-over effects of policies. This means
that in areas with extensive devolution the four administrations
are acting as equal partners, while in others the UK Government
is ultimately responsible for decisions, and other administrations
may be seeking to influence policy decisions that affect the devolved
regions.[140] Inter-governmental
mechanisms need to be flexible enough to cater for both types
of interaction.
101. We recognise, therefore, that the UK Government
plays a dual role in inter-governmental relations, where it is
both the ultimate authority on some issues and more like an equal
participant in others. Given this role, the UK Government should
continue to chair JMC meetings. However, to mitigate the perception
of UK Government dominance the hosting of the JMC plenary and
sub-committee meetings should be shared on a rotating basis,
like the British-Irish Council's plenary meetingsand, indeed,
as was the case for the first three JMC plenary meetings in 2000-02.
MUTUAL RESPECT
102. The Secretary of State for Scotland and
the Advocate General for Scotland argued that equality of status
was less important than mutual respect.[141]
This echoed the view of the Calman Commission which recommended
that "In all circumstances there should be mutual respect
between the Parliaments and the Governments, and this should be
the guiding principle in their relations." The Silk Commission
made a similar recommendation.[142]
We concur: mutual respect is a vital element of good inter-governmental
relations.
103. This mutual respect, of course, applies
to all administrations in their attitudes towards one another.
But if inter-governmental relations are to be a stabilising force
for the Union, there must also be respect for the respective roles
of the different administrations.
104. The First Minister of Northern Ireland told
us that he had witnessed the JMC becoming more adversarial in
recent years with a change in the self-perception of the Scottish
Government: "To some extent, there are two devolved institutions,
which recognise that they are devolved institutions, and one devolved
institution that believes that it is a sovereign state and has
the standing of the Government".[143]
Similarly the Secretary of State for Scotland suggested that a
desire for secession led the current Scottish Government to use
inter-governmental mechanisms to attempt to undermine the Union.[144]
Such behaviour goes against the spirit of mutual respect. The
need for better understanding and co-operation in this strained
relationship was also highlighted for us by Professor Michael
Keating in relation to constitutional debates on Scottish devolution:
"The yes side in the referendum campaign has to accept that
they lost and therefore say, 'Let us join in a realistic settlement
for what Scotland can do within the United Kingdom'. On the no
side there has to be willingness to recognise that there is going
to be a compromise."[145]
105. Although different administrations may
hold different views about the future shape of the UK, all governments
share an interest in ensuring that the current system of inter-governmental
relations operates as effectively and fairly as possible.
24 Constitution Committee, Devolution, para
23; written evidence from Professor Nicola McEwen (IGR0010) Back
25
Written evidence from the Institute for Government (IGR0011) Back
26
Lord Chancellor, Memorandum of understanding and supplementary
agreements between the United Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers
and the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales, Cm 4444,
October 1999; the first MOU to include the Northern Ireland Executive
was the second iteration, dated July 2000,Cm 4806. Back
27
Cabinet Office, Devolution: Memorandum of Understanding and
Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom Government,
the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern
Ireland Executive Committee, October 2013 (hereafter Memorandum
of Understanding): https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_between_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf
[accessed 17 March 2015] Back
28
Memorandum of Understanding, para 24 Back
29
Constitution Committee, Devolution, para 33. Back
30
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Devolution: inter-institutional
relations in the United Kingdom. Government response to the House
of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution second report of
session 2002/03 (HL Paper 28), paras 3-5. Back
31
Justice Committee, Devolution, para 111. Back
32
Q70 Back
33
Q29 Back
34
See Memorandum of Understanding, section A3 Back
35
JMC annual reports 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13, available through
Welsh Government, Joint Ministerial Committee: http://gov.wales/about/organisationexplained/intergovernmental/jmcpubs1/
?lang=en
[accessed 23 March 2015]; Q31 (Helen MacNamara) Back
36
Q10 (Professor Alan Page) Back
37
The decided cases related to the Local Government Byelaws (Wales)
Bill in 2012, the Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill in 2014, and
the Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill
in 2015. Back
38
Written evidence from Professor Nicola McEwen (IGR0010) Back
39
Q14 Back
40
Q14 Back
41
Written evidence from Professor Nicola McEwen (IGR0010) Back
42
British-Irish Council, 'About': http://www.britishirishcouncil.org/about
[accessed 10 February 2015] Back
43
Written evidence from Professor Derek Birrell (IGR0013) Back
44
Written evidence from Professor Derek Birrell (IGR0013) Back
45
British-Irish Council, Annual Report 2013, nd: http://www.britishirishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
attachments/annual%20report%202013.pdf
[5 February 2015] Back
46
Written evidence from Professor Derek Birrell (IGR0013) Back
47
Q66 Back
48
Q49 Back
49
Written evidence from Professor Derek Birrell (IGR0013) Back
50
Written evidence from Professor Nicola McEwen (IGR0010) Back
51
Constitution Committee, Devolution, paras 25 and 29. Back
52
Welsh Affairs Committee, Wales and Whitehall, para 34; written
evidence from Professor Derek Birrell (IGR0013); Q78 (Lord
Wallace of Tankerness) Back
53
Q8 Back
54
Written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015) Back
55
Q21 Back
56
Q37 (David Melding AM) and Q87 (Peter Robinson MLA);
written evidence from the Institute for Government (IGR0011);
see also Alan Trench, Intergovernmental relations and better devolution,
UK's Changing Union project, December 2014, pp. 4, 11: http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/wgc/files/2014/12/
INTERGOVERNMENTAL-RELATIONS-AND-BETTER-DEVOLUTION-FINAL-Dec-2014.pdf
[15 December 2014] Back
57
Q66 (Fiona Hyslop MSP). Back
58
QQ44, 47 Back
59
Q90 Back
60
Written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015); see also
written evidence from the Institute for Government (IGR0011). Back
61
Q28 Back
62
For example, see Q50 (Carwyn Jones AM) Back
63
Q78 Back
64
Scottish Affairs Committee, Scotland and the UK, para 45 Back
65
Q44 Back
66
Q66; written evidence from the Institute for Government
(IGR0011) Back
67
Q78 (Lord Wallace of Tankerness) Back
68
Q34; see also Q44 (Carwyn Jones AM) Back
69
Q8 Back
70
Written evidence from Professor Michael Keating (IGR0003); see
also written evidence from Professor Alan Page (IGR0002). Back
71
Written evidence from the Institute for Government (IGR0011) Back
72
Smith Commission, Report, para 31. Back
73
Q81 (Lord Wallace of Tankerness) Back
74
For example, see Joint Exchequer Committee Communiqué,
18 June 2012: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-exchequer-committee-communique
[accessed 2 March 2015] Back
75
Written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015) Back
76
'Crucial step towards fiscal devolution': https://www.gov.uk/government/news/crucial-step-towards-fiscal-devolution
[accessed 10 February 2015] Back
77
HM Government, Scotland in the United Kingdom, para 4.1.9. Back
78
Joint ministerial working group on welfare: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-ministerial-working-group-on-welfare
[accessed 12 March 2015] Back
79
Smith Commission, Report, para 30(1)(a) Back
80
Written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015) Back
81
Written evidence from Professor Nicola McEwen (IGR0010) Back
82
Q12 Back
83
Q15 Back
84
Written evidence from the Institute for Government (IGR0011) Back
85
Silk Commission, Empowerment and Responsibility, recommendation
R.6 Back
86
Q11 (Professor Nicola McEwen); written evidence from Professor
Alan Page (IGR0002) Back
87
Q47 Back
88
Q27 (Dr Philip Rycroft) and Q2 (Professor Richard
Wyn Jones) Back
89
Q90 (Peter Robinson MLA) Back
90
Q89 (Peter Robinson MLA) Back
91
Smith Commission, Report, para 30(1)(b) Back
92
Written evidence from Professor Michael Keating (IGR0003); see
also written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015) Back
93
Written evidence from the Institute for Government (IGR0011);
Q31 Back
94
Q31 Back
95
Q87 Back
96
Q47; see also Q10 (Professor Alan Page). Back
97
Oral evidence taken on 4 February 2015 (Session 2014-15), Q10 Back
98
Q9 Back
99
Q31 Back
100
Q10 Back
101
Memorandum of Understanding, para 2 Back
102
Q46 (Carwyn Jones AM); Q65 (Fiona Hyslop MSP); Q88
(Peter Robinson MLA) Back
103
QQ46 and 49 Back
104
See Q34 (David Melding AM) Back
105
Written evidence from Professor Jim Gallagher (IGR0007) Back
106
Written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015) Back
107
See paragraph 16 Back
108
Written evidence from Professor Alan Page (IGR0002) Back
109
Q13 (Professor Alan Page) Back
110
Written evidence from Professor Jim Gallagher (IGR0007) Back
111
Q65 and Q88; see also written evidence from the Scottish
Government (IGR0015). Back
112
Q70 Back
113
Written evidence by Professor Derek Birrell (IGR0013) Back
114
Written evidence by Professor Alan Page (IGR0002) Back
115
Q6 Back
116
Q34 Back
117
Q88 Back
118
Written evidence from Professor Jim Gallagher (IGR0007) Back
119
Q91 Back
120
House of Commons Written Answer 216856,
Session 2014-15 Back
121
Calman Commission, Serving Scotland Better, recommendation
4.13 Back
122
Scotland Office, Scotland's Future in the United Kingdom, Cm 7738,
November 2009, p. 22: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228529/7738.pdf
[accessed 12 February 2015] Back
123
Written evidence from the Institute for Government (IGR0011) Back
124
Oral evidence taken on 4 February 2015 (Session 2014-15), Q10 Back
125
Written evidence from Professor Keating (IGR0003) Back
126
Oral evidence taken on 4 February 2015 (Session 2014-15), Q10 Back
127
Written evidence from Professor Alan Page (IGR0002) Back
128
Q46 Back
129
Q66 Back
130
Written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015); see also
written evidence from Professor Alan Page (IGR0002). Back
131
Q87 (Peter Robinson MLA) Back
132
Q28 Back
133
Written evidence from Professor Nicola McEwen (IGR0010) Back
134
Q90 (Peter Robinson MLA) Back
135
Written evidence from Professor Derek Birrell (IGR0013) Back
136
See Q87 (Peter Robinson MLA) Back
137
Q67 (Lindsey Whyte) and Q68 (John Robbs). Back
138
Q68 Back
139
See written evidence from the Scottish Government (IGR0015) Back
140
Q89 (Peter Robinson MLA); written evidence from the Scottish
Government (IGR0015) Back
141
Q77 Back
142
Written evidence from Professor Alan Page (IGR0002); Calman Commission,
Serving Scotland Better, recommendation 4.1; Silk Commission,
Empowerment and Responsibility, para 5.2.6 Back
143
Q87 Back
144
Q77 Back
145
Oral evidence taken on 4 February 2015 (Session 2014-15), Q3 Back
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