House of Lords - Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom

Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom - Constitution Committee Contents

CHAPTER 3: MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

106. The UK Government's structures for dealing with the devolved administrations evolved from pre-1998 inter-departmental relations.[146] There have been, and continue to be, calls for a merger of departmental and ministerial responsibilities for devolution.

107. Professor Richard Wyn Jones told us that, while institutions had evolved in the devolved regions, "if you look at the central institutions of the state, almost nothing, frankly, has changed. We still have the territorial offices. We still have … the territorial Select Committees. There has been very little change at the centre, and you have had this fundamental change in the devolved territories."[147]

Territorial Offices and Secretaries of State

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHANGES, 2002-10

108. In our 2002 report, this Committee noted the dispersal of responsibilities across many departments. We recommended that the Government should consider merging the Scotland and Wales Offices and the Devolution and English Regions team into a single department, with a single Cabinet Minister with responsibility for inter-governmental relations overall and with the possibility of appointing Ministers of State to deal with particular policy issues or devolved areas.

109. The Government responded that they felt that the existing machinery worked well, but that it would be kept under review.[148] In 2003 the machinery changed, with the Scotland and Wales Offices being subsumed into the new Department for Constitutional Affairs (and in 2007 its successor, the Ministry of Justice), along with responsibility for devolution strategy. By 2003, devolution to Northern Ireland had been suspended; the Northern Ireland Office kept its position as an independent department, taking over the powers of the Northern Ireland Assembly during the period of suspension, from 2002-07.

110. The new arrangements retained some autonomy for the Scotland and Wales Offices, however, as well as their Cabinet posts, as the Commons Justice Committee found in 2009.[149] That Committee also noted that, even with that set-up, "responsibility for different aspects of what could be considered as devolution issues is currently located in five separate government departments: the Ministry of Justice, the Scotland and Wales Offices, the Cabinet Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government." They concluded that:

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111. In 2003-08, the Secretaries of State for Wales and Scotland also held other positions in Government—the Scotland Secretary also having responsibility for Transport and later Defence, for example. The Justice Committee concluded in 2009 that "the direction of travel" was towards having a single Secretary of State for the constitution.[151]

CURRENT MINISTERIAL AND DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

112. The formation of the current Government in 2010 saw the restoration of stand-alone Scotland and Wales Offices; the Secretaries of State have also been free of other ministerial responsibilities during the current Parliament. Meanwhile, more departments have become more directly involved in dealing with the devolved administrations as a result of the legislated-for and planned devolution of tax and welfare powers.

113. The Deputy Prime Minister is responsible for inter-governmental relations[152] and has "overall policy responsibility for devolution",[153] although this did not appear in a list of his responsibilities that was supplied to this Committee in July 2010 (other than responsibility for "considering the 'West Lothian question.'").[154] The Deputy Prime Minister is supported by the Cabinet Office's Constitution Group; this inherited many of the Ministry of Justice's constitutional responsibilities and includes the Devolution Strategy Team, which "maintains an overview of the position of the devolved administrations within the constitution and works to sustain good relations between the devolved administrations, the Scotland Office, Wales Office and Northern Ireland Office, and Whitehall more widely."[155]

Towards a merged department?

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR

114. As was reflected in the recommendations of this Committee in 2002 and the Justice Committee in 2009, there is a strong case for greater co-ordination of inter-governmental relations and the devolution settlements within Government. Several of our witnesses advocated such a change.[156] Professor Alan Page felt that the case for a single department "would seem overwhelming": it would provide a focus for inter-governmental relations, remove duplication across Whitehall and could monitor compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding across government.[157]

115. The Institute for Government told us they

"favour the creation of a stronger and more joined-up single centre for devolution policy and strategy in Whitehall—perhaps along the lines of past proposals for a single 'Department for Devolution' or 'Department for the Nations and Regions'. This could bring together the different units with responsibility for devolution issues across the Cabinet Office and Treasury along with the three territorial offices."

It could, they said, improve joined-up working across Government and potentially save money.[158]

116. Professor Jim Gallagher argued that the small size of the Scotland and Wales Offices and low status of their Secretaries of State indicated the lack of priority accorded to devolved matters in Whitehall: "Instead of three Secretaries of State, and three tiny departments, the United Kingdom should have one substantial department, and one powerful Secretary of State whose job it is to manage the territorial constitution."[159] He suggested that a Secretary of State for the Union could be supported by Ministers of State for each devolved region, recognising the need for separate voices and departmental expertise relating to each region.[160]

ARGUMENTS AGAINST

117. There was very little support amongst politicians for merging the Territorial Offices.[161] The most common argument was that each devolved region needed its own voice at the Cabinet table.[162] More junior territorial ministers could retain a position attending Cabinet, but Professor Wyn Jones was sceptical that having four ministers responsible for elements of devolution at Cabinet, in place of the present three, was likely to happen.[163]

118. David T.C. Davies MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee, was concerned that there would be challenging conflicts of interests in such a merged role given the different concerns of the devolved regions.[164] This difficulty was also stressed by the First Ministers of Northern Ireland and Wales, the latter of whom cited the differing attitudes towards the Barnett Formula in Wales and Scotland as an example.[165]

119. Carwyn Jones AM was also concerned that Wales would be a low priority for a joint Secretary of State: "My fear would be that if you had a Secretary of State who was responsible for the three devolved administrations, the emphasis would be very strongly on Scotland and issues that arise now and again on Northern Ireland, and Wales would just go off the agenda."[166]

120. The First Minister of Northern Ireland stressed the differences between the administrative case and the political:

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121. Similarly, Bruce Crawford MSP, convenor of the Devolution (Further Powers) Committee of the Scottish Parliament, felt that the creation of a single Territorial Office and Cabinet position might be an impediment to the bilateral relations that predominate in inter-governmental relations in the UK.[168] This was echoed by the Scottish Government, who feared the dilution of knowledge of devolution across Whitehall and the creation of a new "bottleneck" in their relations with UK Government departments.[169]

122. There is also a political and presentational risk in that the removal of their dedicated Secretaries of State could be seen as the Government downgrading or diminishing the importance of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. Mr Davies felt that there would be a "very strong" political reaction; David Melding AM stressed that a consensus would be needed for such a move.[170]

123. The Secretary of State for Scotland felt that any such change to the structure of Whitehall departments would need to follow a thorough look at the constitutional settlement across the UK: "For the moment, talk of a department for the nations and regions is inappropriate until you have a constitutional settlement, when we know that so much other change is coming."[171]

124. Alan Trench, former Professor of Politics at the University of Ulster, in his paper 'Intergovernmental relations and better devolution', wrote that:

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125. We heard arguments from an administrative perspective in favour of creating a single Department and Secretary of State for Devolution, or for the Union. However, there are political reasons for retaining separate Secretaries of State and so long as the devolution settlements in the UK are asymmetrical there will need to be strong bilateral relationships between the UK Government and the devolved administrations, with a Secretary of State as a key conduit and voice for each relationship.

Central co-ordination and responsibility

126. If the separate Territorial Offices are to be retained, there needs to be greater clarity within Government about the central co-ordination of inter-governmental relations and oversight of devolution.

127. As noted above, the minister responsible for both inter-governmental relations and "overall policy responsibility for devolution" is the Deputy Prime Minister. He chairs the JMC Domestic sub-committee; however, he is not on Cabinet's Devolution Committee, the purpose of which is to "consider matters relating to the devolution of powers within the United Kingdom."[173] It is extraordinary that the Cabinet Minister stated to be responsible for devolution is not a member of the Cabinet Committee on that very subject.

128. This chimes with what appears to be a lack of effective co-ordination and oversight of devolution in general. The Secretary of State for Scotland told a committee in the Scottish Parliament that Cabinet had not discussed the wider implications for the rest of the UK of the Smith Commission's recommendations for further devolution to Scotland, other than the West Lothian Question.[174] Mr Carmichael told us that this monitoring of wider constitutional implications was "part of the assessment that we make all the time".[175] He did not, however, seem to recognise a need to have a UK-wide perspective when considering devolution: rather it was up to each part of the UK to call for and receive further devolved powers.[176]

129. This piecemeal approach, with conversations taking place separately about each devolved region, was severely criticised by the First Minister of Wales. He told us that "the view that is taken by some in the UK Government is that [the Smith Commission and Draft Clauses] is a wholly separate process with no effect at all on the other devolved administrations. That is naive. There is inevitably an effect".[177]

130. Similarly, the Institute for Government noted that:

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131. This has continued since the Smith Commission's report was published. In February 2015 the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister announced a "new devolution package" for Wales,[179] outlining further fiscal devolution and funding in Wales and "building on the Wales Act 2014".[180] The Command Paper published by the Secretary of State for Wales setting out this package addresses a range of the proposals made by the Smith Commission and those conclusions of the Silk Commission that are not reflected in the Wales Act 2014 and considers whether there is a political consensus for making those changes in Wales. This appears to have been done without reflection on the wider constitutional settlement.

132. Professor Jim Gallagher told us that "Governments, and Parliaments, have tended to treat the territorial nature of the UK as an afterthought or oddity—not core to its nature, even though it is there in lights in the name."[181]

133. The UK's devolution settlements are of the highest constitutional significance. We are deeply concerned by the lack of central co-ordination and oversight of the devolution settlements and of the minimal consideration given to the effect of devolution in one area of the UK on other areas, and on the Union as a whole.

134. Without a single Devolution or Union department, it is important that ministerial responsibilities for the devolution settlements and inter-governmental relations are clearly set out. This is not the case at present. We noted a similar lack of oversight of the UK's constitution as a whole in our report on the office of Lord Chancellor.[182] We note that the Government insisted that the Deputy Prime Minister plays this role, but were unable to articulate it beyond a list of constitutional reforms.[183] We repeat our recommendation that there should be a clear focus within Government for oversight of the constitution as a whole, beyond individual constitutional reform proposals, with a senior Cabinet minister identified as responsible for that work.

146 Justice Committee, Devolution, para 104; written evidence from Professor Alan Page (IGR0002) and from Professor Jim Gallagher (IGR0007) Back

147 Q1 Back

148 Deputy Prime Minister, Government Response, paras 10-13 Back

149 Justice Committee, Devolution, para 29 Back

150 Justice Committee, Devolution, paras 31 and 63 Back

151 Justice Committee, Devolution, para 66 Back

152 Q22 (Dr Philip Rycroft) Back

153 Cabinet Office, List of Ministerial Responsibilities, (January 2015): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396578/Final_LMR_JAN_2015.pdf [accessed 13 February 2015] Back

154 Memorandum by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform, published in Constitution Committee, The Government's Constitutional Reform Programme (5th Report, Session 2010-12, HL Paper 43) Back

155 National Audit Office, Cabinet Office Constitution Group, April 2012, p. 5: http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/NAO_briefing_Constitution_Group.pdf [8 January 2015] Back

156 See Q5 (Professor Richard Wyn Jones) Back

157 Written evidence from Professor Alan Page (IGR0002) and Q12 (Professor Alan Page) Back