Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
1. In a practical sense, inter-governmental relations
should enable administrations to work together in areas of mutual
concern and interest, both where there are overlapping or inter-dependent
competencies and on cross-border issues. (Paragraph 13)
2. Good inter-governmental relations are vital
to the effective governance of the United Kingdom. The structures
and practices of inter-governmental relations should serve to
strengthen, and provide constitutional stability to, the Union.
(Paragraph 16)
The formal structures of inter-governmental relations
3. We agree that the best relationships strike
a balance between formal and informal elements. (Paragraph 41)
4. It is clear that, while some parts of the
JMC structure work better than others, in the eyes of the devolved
administrations at least the way the JMC system works at present
is not satisfactory. The Domestic sub-committee, in particular,
does not appear to serve a useful purpose. (Paragraph 50)
5. There are areas where formal bilateral mechanisms
are appropriate, particularly in the areas of tax and welfare
where the proposed devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament
significantly increases the complexity of the devolution settlement,
as would proposed income tax powers for the National Assembly
for Wales. (Paragraph 61)
6. Formal bilateral forums co-ordinating the
operation of the complex fiscal devolution settlements should
continue the work of the Joint Exchequer Committees and the new
UK-Scotland Ministerial Working Group on Welfare. We recommend
that these be brought within the auspices of the JMC structure,
to ensure that their work is co-ordinated as part of a wider inter-governmental
relations strategy. (Paragraph 62)
7. We recommend that the Cabinet Office, as part
of its current review of inter-governmental structures, consider
and report on how a revised Joint Ministerial Committee structure
might best be used to facilitate joint policy-making and co-ordination.
Provision should be made to ensure that policy initiatives can
come from the devolved administrations, as well as from the UK
Government. (Paragraph 70)
8. The Joint Ministerial Committee should be
given the flexibility to create additional sub-committees on policy
areas where regular four-way discussions are required, or temporary
sub-committees on cross-cutting UK-wide issues that are beyond
the scope of bilateral co-operation between devolved administrations
and individual UK Government departments. (Paragraph 71)
9. The creation of such sub-committees should
not be seen as an end in itself and the continued existence of
each sub-committee should be regularly reviewed by the JMC plenary.
(Paragraph 72)
10. The current dispute resolution procedure
under the JMC has yet to be fully tested. We note, however, the
concerns expressed by the devolved administrations that in the
event of a dispute any decision is ultimately made by the UK Government.
We do not believe that any form of external arbitration or mediation
would be feasible, given that many disputes are likely to be essentially
political in nature, but we recommend that the Cabinet Office,
in co-operation with the devolved administrations, consider how
the process of dispute resolution might be made more independent
of the UK Government. (Paragraph 76)
11. The Government should consider whether the
framework of inter-governmental relations should be set out in
statute. Such a statute could set out the existence and membership
of the Joint Ministerial Committee and its core sub-committees,
along with the core principles governing relations between administrations.
This legislation could provide a basic framework, within which
the Memorandum of Understanding and departmental concordats would
continue to detail how inter-governmental interactions would function
in practice. (Paragraph 86)
12. Whether or not it becomes a sub-committee
of the Joint Ministerial Committee, the Finance Minsters' Quadrilateral
should be included as a permanent fixture in any statute setting
out the framework of inter-governmental relations, with the added
exposure to scrutiny that this should bring. (Paragraph 89)
13. We recommend that the Government consider
tasking an independent body to provide the statistics and evidence
on which to base decisions about the allocation of funding to
the devolved administrations. (Paragraph 91)
14. The UK Government should continue to chair
JMC meetings. However, to mitigate the perception of UK Government
dominance the hosting of the JMC plenary and sub-committee meetings
should be shared on a rotating basis. (Paragraph 101)
15. Although different administrations may hold
different views about the future shape of the UK, all governments
share an interest in ensuring that the current system of inter-governmental
relations operates as effectively and fairly as possible. (Paragraph 105)
Ministerial responsibilities
16. We heard arguments from an administrative
perspective in favour of creating a single Department and Secretary
of State for Devolution, or for the Union. However, there are
political reasons for retaining separate Secretaries of State
and so long as the devolution settlements in the UK are asymmetrical
there will need to be strong bilateral relationships between the
UK Government and the devolved administrations with a Secretary
of State as a key conduit and voice for each relationship. (Paragraph 125)
17. It is extraordinary that the Cabinet Minister
stated to be responsible for devolution is not a member of the
Cabinet Committee on that very subject. (Paragraph 127)
18. The UK's devolution settlements are of the
highest constitutional significance. We are deeply concerned by
the lack of central co-ordination and oversight of the devolution
settlements and of the minimal consideration given to the effect
of devolution in one area of the UK on other areas, and on the
Union as a whole. (Paragraph 133)
19. We repeat our recommendation that there should
be a clear focus within Government for oversight of the constitution
as a whole, beyond individual constitutional reform proposals,
with a senior Cabinet minister identified as responsible for that
work. (Paragraph 134)
The Civil Service and departmental interactions
20. We welcome examples of formal structures
which lead to regular and defined engagement between UK government
departments and the devolved administrations. These are useful
means by which to build relationships between departments which
are not dependent on individuals who may move jobs or retire.
(Paragraph 146)
21. As we have previously noted, the changing
devolution settlements will result in a more complex arrangement
of devolved and reserved policy areas, particularly in areas such
as welfare and tax policy. In the light of these changes, we recommend
that the Government consider whether more formal structures are
needed at a civil service level to manage these increasingly complex
inter-governmental relations—particularly in the context
of those departments which are most affected by the changes. (Paragraph 147)
22. We recommend that the concordats setting
out relations between UK government departments and the devolved
administrations be reviewed at least once during each Parliament
and, in particular, each time there is a change in the devolution
settlements. Devolution guidance notes should also be reviewed
and updated regularly. (Paragraph 162)
23. Departmental concordats should set out clearly
how the devolved administrations should be consulted on, and alerted
to, forthcoming changes to UK Government policy that might have
an effect on the devolved administrations. (Paragraph 163)
24. We recommend that the Government sets out
a strategy for ensuring that senior civil servants have either
experience of, or training in, working with devolved administrations.
(Paragraph 170)
25. We would welcome clarification from the Government
as to how training on dealing with devolved administrations is
now provided, following the closure of the National School of
Government in 2012. (Paragraph 171)
Transparency and parliamentary scrutiny
26. Greater transparency around the Joint Ministerial
Committee is vital. A balance needs to be maintained between confidentiality
and openness, but the current lack of information is not acceptable.
We recommend that the dates, venues and headline agenda items
of Joint Ministerial Committee meetings be announced further in
advance. (Paragraph 184)
27. We recommend that the Government consider
what additional information could be published following Joint
Ministerial Committee meetings and meetings of bilateral forums
such as the Joint Exchequer Committee, and in the Joint Ministerial
Committee annual report. This information should, at the very
least, be published promptly and laid in the libraries of both
Houses of Parliament. (Paragraph 185)
28. Were the Joint Ministerial Committee framework
to be placed on a statutory footing, Parliament should ensure
that the legislation requires adequate information to be published
to enable effective parliamentary scrutiny of inter-governmental
relations. (Paragraph 186)
29. In addition to ensuring that formal guidance
notes are regularly updated, we recommend that UK Government departments
detail in their annual reports which areas of their work are devolved
and which are reserved. They should also set out the forums and
bodies through which they engage with the devolved administrations,
reporting at a high level on their activity over the past year.
This would provide a solid base on which parliamentary scrutiny
of bilateral relations between government departments and the
devolved administrations might take place. (Paragraph 188)
30. We hope that common ground can be found on
which to base some form of cross-parliamentary scrutiny of inter-governmental
relations, although we make no specific recommendations as to
how this might best be achieved. That is a matter for each parliament
or assembly and its relevant committees. (Paragraph 198)
31. We repeat the recommendation we made in 2002:
the Prime Minister should make an annual statement to the House
of Commons after the plenary meeting of the Joint Ministerial
Committee regarding that meeting and the conduct of inter-governmental
relations in the United Kingdom generally over the previous 12
months. (Paragraph 202)
32. We support proposals for an independent annual
audit of inter-governmental relations. (Paragraph 203)
33. We recognise these administrative difficulties,
but in view of the increasing range of policy areas currently
devolved and due to be devolved and given the likely expansion
of shared or concurrent powers, the prohibition on Parliament
debating matters for which responsibility has been devolved may
no longer be appropriate. (Paragraph 208)
Inter-governmental relations, devolution and the
future of the United Kingdom
34. As we note in our recent report Proposals
for the devolution of further powers to Scotland, we consider
that the Government, and the major UK-wide parties, need to devise
and articulate a vision for the future of the state and its devolution
settlements. An overarching vision for the future shape of the
United Kingdom should be a stabilising force in its own right
and would also allow for inter-governmental arrangements to be
organised on a more stable basis. (Paragraph 211)
35. In September 2014 the people of Scotland
voted for the continuation of a devolved Scotland within the UK;
the people of the UK as a whole need now to establish how the
Union will work in future. An overarching strategy should reinforce
the central position of the Union in our country's constitutional
architecture, while recognising the benefits that devolution can
bring. A comprehensive, pan-UK strategy is needed to provide a
coherent basis for any discussions of further devolution and afford
greater constitutional stability to the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 212)
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