CHAPTER 2: THE RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
15. As we stated in our 2007 report, "the
role of Lord Chancellor is of central importance to the maintenance
of judicial independence and the rule of law".[17]
The Lord Chancellor's duties and responsibilities with respect
to the rule of law and judicial independence are set out in sections
1 and 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and combined in
the oath of office, in section 17 (see Box 1). The oath is unique
to the Lord Chancellor and is made in addition to the privy
councillor's oath of allegiance taken by other Cabinet Ministers.
What is the rule of law?
16. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 does not
define the "existing constitutional principle of the rule
of law", nor "the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional
role in relation to that principle". If the officeholder
is to carry out that role, he or she must have a sense of what
both the principle and the role mean in practice.
17. Yet the rule of law "is not readily
defined or readily understood."[18]
Not all lawyers will agree on what the rule of law entails; differences
of opinion will undoubtedly also occur between different Lord Chancellors.
As this Committee has previously stated, "the rule of law
remains a complex and in some respects uncertain concept".[19]
18. Mr Grayling told us that the rule of
law meant "an independent justice system, free from interference
from outside, free from corruption, free from influence, that
is respected and treated as independent by those in Government
and those in Parliament, and that ultimately … we respect
the ability of the courts and the responsibility of the courts
to take decisions according to their best judgment about what
the law of the land requires".[20]
19. That judicial independence is a core feature
of the rule of law is not contested. Likewise, compliance with
the law as it stands is a key element, ensuring a stable and predictable,
rather than arbitrary, exercise of powers. These two elements
alone, however, comprise too narrow a definition. The rule of
law goes beyond judicial independence and compliance with extant
law, particularly as regards the Government which can, through
Parliament, change the law. Box
1: Key provisions of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005
| Section 1, 'The rule of law', states:
"This Act does not adversely affect—
(a) the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, or
(b) the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional role in relation to that principle."
Section 3, 'Guarantee of continued judicial independence', includes the following provisions:
(1) "The Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the Crown and all with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary …
(4) The following particular duties are imposed for the purpose of upholding that independence.
(5) The Lord Chancellor and other Ministers of the Crown must not seek to influence particular judicial decisions through any special access to the judiciary.
(6) The Lord Chancellor must have regard to—
(a) the need to defend that independence;
(b) the need for the judiciary to have the support necessary to enable them to exercise their functions;
(c) the need for the public interest in regard to matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice to be properly represented in decisions affecting those matters."
The Lord Chancellor's oath, inserted into the Promissory Oaths Act 1868 by section 17(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act, is:
"I, , do swear that in the office of Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain I will respect the rule of law, defend the independence of the judiciary and discharge my duty to ensure the provision of resources for the efficient and effective support of the courts for which I am responsible. So help me God."
|
20. During our 2007 inquiry into relations between
the executive, the judiciary and Parliament, Professor Paul
Craig, Professor of English Law at the University of Oxford,
set out the complexity of the principle of the rule of law. In
our report we summarised and quoted from his submission as follows:
"First, 'a core idea of the rule of law
… is that the government must be able to point to some basis
for its actions that is regarded as valid by the relevant legal
system'. This is, however, too limited so, secondly, the rule
of law requires that legal rules 'should be capable of guiding
one's conduct in order that one can plan one's life'. In other
words, legal rules should meet a variety of criteria, including
that they should be prospective, not retrospective; that they
should be relatively stable; and that there should be an independent
judiciary. … some commentators regard these 'formal' attributes
of law to be necessary but not sufficient. So a third meaning
of the rule of law held by some is that it encompasses substantive
rights, thought to be fundamental, which can be 'used to evaluate
the quality of the laws produced by the legislature and the courts'."[21]
21. The late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Chief
Justice from 1996-2000 and senior Law Lord from 2000-08,
set out eight principles of the rule of law in his book on the
subject; these are the most recent widely accepted articulation
of it (see Box 2). When we asked Former Attorneys General the
Rt Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP and the Rt Hon. the Baroness Scotland
of Asthal QC for their view, they endorsed the Bingham principles,
as did former Lord Chancellor Mr Straw.[22] Box
2: Lord Bingham of Cornhill's eight principles of the rule
of law
| 1. The Accessibility of the Law: The law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.
2. Law not Discretion: Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion.
3. Equality before the Law: The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation.
4. The Exercise of Power: Ministers and public officers at all levels must exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers and not unreasonably.
5. Human Rights: The law must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights.
6. Dispute Resolution: Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to resolve.
7. A Fair Trial: Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair.
8. The Rule of Law in the International Legal Order: The rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law as in national law.
|
Source: Tom Bingham, The
Rule of Law (Allen Lane, London, 2010)
22. Lord Bingham of Cornhill argued in his
book that observance of current statute law was not necessarily
the same as governing in accordance with the rule of law. He stated
that "a state which savagely represses or persecutes sections
of its people cannot in my view be regarded as observing the rule
of law" even if these transgressions were "the subject
of detailed laws duly enacted and scrupulously observed."[23]
23. In many countries, the principles underlying
the rule of law are provided by a written constitution. In the
UK, domestic statutes such as the English Bill of Rights and Scottish
Claim of Right of 1689 and international obligations such as the
European Convention on Human Rights[24]
play a part, but the roots of the rule of law lie in common law
principles.[25] Lord Falconer
told this Committee during an earlier inquiry that "there
are certain constitutional principles which if Parliament sought
to offend would be contrary to the rule of law as well. To take
an extreme example simply to demonstrate the point, if Parliament
sought to abolish all elections that would be so contrary to our
constitutional principles that that would seem to me to be contrary
to the rule of law."[26]
This has now been recognised in case law at the highest level.
In AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate in 2011,
the Rt Hon. the Lord Hope of Craighead, then Deputy President
of the Supreme Court, said in a powerful statement that "the
rule of law requires that judges must retain the power to insist
that legislation of that extreme kind is not law which the courts
will recognise".[27]
24. It is particularly important that there is
an understanding in Government of this wider conception of the
rule of law, including common law. This provides a constitutional
constraint on their power, through Parliament, to change laws
in any ways they see fit. This is an important balance in a country
where the Government usually has a majority in the House of Commons
and can, through the use of the Parliament Acts, legislate without
the consent of Parliament as a whole.[28]
As Lord Bingham of Cornhill noted: "it is on the observance
of the rule of law that the quality of government depends."[29]
25. It is clear to us that the rule of law goes
beyond "simply … complying with the law"[30]
as set out in statute. We are reluctant to attempt to define the
rule of law, although we note that Lord Bingham of Cornhill's
principles are a useful articulation of core constitutional principles.
We invite the Government to agree that the rule of law extends
beyond judicial independence and compliance with domestic and
international law. It includes the tenet that the Government should
seek to govern in accordance with constitutional principles, as
well as the letter of the law.
The Lord Chancellor's responsibilities
in relation to the rule of law
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
26. The independence of the judiciary is a core
element of the rule of law and of the United Kingdom constitution
more broadly. All ministers are required, under section 3(1) of
the Constitutional Reform Act to "uphold the continued independence
of the judiciary." The Lord Chancellor has an additional
duty, expressed in the oath of office, to "defend" that
independence. As the rest of section 3 sets out (see Box 1), this
defence includes preventing undue Government influence on judicial
decisions (including undue ministerial criticism of judicial decisions),
ensuring adequate resources for the judiciary to exercise their
functions and having regard to the public interest.
27. Former Lord Chief Justice and President
of the Supreme Court the Rt Hon. the Lord Phillips of Worth
Matravers told us that "judicial independence describes the
position of a judge upon whom no outside influences are brought
to bear, direct or indirect, in relation to the performance of
his judicial duties". Former Lord Chancellor the Rt
Hon. the Lord Mackay of Clashfern added that it "also
implies respect for the authority of the judge exercising his
responsibility as a judge in court. That respect has to be both
in word and in action … the idea of respecting independence
also carries with it the responsibility of carrying out the judgment
[of both domestic and international courts], subject to appeal."[31]
28. The requirement for the Lord Chancellor
to have regard to the public interest reflects a tension between
judicial independence and the need for proper scrutiny. It also
requires efficient use of public funds in supporting the justice
system, which highlights the need for judicial independence to
be balanced with accountability. As Professor Andrew Le Sueur,
Professor of Constitutional Justice at the University of
Essex, told us, "On the one hand you want public accountability
for the expenditure of public money and public interest in the
administration of justice, while on the other hand you want a
system that acknowledges the importance of judicial independence
and the autonomy of the judiciary."[32]
The public interest provision, Graham Gee, Senior Lecturer in
Law at the University of Birmingham, told us, allows the Lord Chancellor
"to challenge the senior judiciary on the robustness of the
arguments that may be made with regard to judicial independence",
for example on grounds of value for money and efficiency, or "to
disentangle legitimate concerns about judicial independence from
more spurious claims driven by judicial self-interest".[33]
29. The result is a Lord Chancellor as the
minister responsible for the judiciary, with an "intricate
network of institutions" designed to maintain the balance
of these competing demands.[34]
This role entails a number of duties, powers and responsibilities
as set out in Chapter 1, many of them performed in conjunction
with the Lord Chief Justice as the head of the judiciary.
30. The Lord Chancellor's position is often
described as that of a 'link' or 'buffer' between the judiciary
and the executive.[35]
While the pre-reform Lord Chancellor, as a judge and a member
of the Cabinet, had a foot in each camp, the post-reform officeholder
is likely to maintain less close but still frequent contact with
the judiciary. However, the Lord Chancellor remains a "conduit"
for the concerns of the judiciary and has regular meetings with
the senior judiciary.[36]
31. It is clear from the evidence of the current
Lord Chancellor and of the Ministry of Justice, as well as
of former Lord Chancellors, that the importance of judicial
independence and the Lord Chancellor's central role in upholding
it are well understood in Government.[37]
32. Judicial independence is a vital element
of the United Kingdom's uncodified constitution. That its defence
is a core part of the Lord Chancellor's role is uncontested.
The Lord Chancellor must ensure that the judiciary are free
to act without undue pressure from the executive, that the executive
respects the outcome of court judgments, and that the legal system
is adequately resourced.
BEYOND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
33. Like the precise meaning of the rule of law,
the Lord Chancellor's statutory duty in respect of it is
contested and ill-defined. Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform
Act simply states that the "existing constitutional principle"
of the rule of law and the Lord Chancellor's "existing
constitutional role" are not "adversely affected"
by the Act.[38] A key
element of this role is defending the independence of the judiciary
and in this respect the Lord Chancellor's duties are clear;
they are articulated in Section 3 of the Act. Beyond a defence
of judicial independence, however, it is unclear what is covered
by the Lord Chancellor's duty regarding the rule of law.
34. Mr Grayling told us that he had "a
stewardship role over the judiciary and over the justice system."
Beyond that, he regarded the "task of upholding the rule
of law as not being something that simply resides with the Lord Chancellor,"
but with every minister and parliamentarian.[39]
He argued that under the Ministerial Code "it is absolutely
fundamental on any one of Her Majesty's Ministers to uphold the
rule of law".[40]
The Code states "the overarching duty on [all] Ministers
to comply with the law including international law and treaty
obligations".[41]
35. Mr Grayling's description of his role
differs from that of pre-reform Lord Chancellors, who acted
as what Dr Patrick O'Brien, Research Associate at University
College London, called a "special constitutional guardian
of the principles of judicial independence and the rule of law
within cabinet."[42]
Sir Hayden Phillips stated that debates in Parliament during
the passage of the Constitutional Reform Act reflected "a
view that the Lord Chancellor had a special responsibility
in Government to encourage and underpin the rule of law, to uphold
the independence of the judiciary and to be a focus for the resolution
of constitutional issues more broadly."[43]
It was this role that the Constitutional Reform Act sought to
maintain in section 1.
36. Yet some witnesses felt that the post has
already evolved to the point where the Lord Chancellor could
no longer claim any such role. Dr O'Brien told us that "it
seems clear that post-2003 Lord Chancellors are not 'special'
guardians in this sense. Since 2003 the office has gradually come
to mean little more than the name that is given to the Secretary
of State for Justice when he exercises his functions in relation
to courts and the judiciary".[44]
As a result, he argued that the Lord Chancellor's role in
relation to the rule of law was not, nor should be, unique:
"It is … possible that the continuing
existence of the Lord Chancellor distracts ministers from
their own responsibility to respect judicial independence and
the rule of law … Making the duty to defend judicial independence
and the rule of law common to all ministers, through amendments
to the ministerial code or to section 3 of the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005, would enhance general awareness amongst ministers
of the importance of these principles."[45]
37. Similarly, Colin Murray, Senior Lecturer
in Law at Newcastle University, told us that placing a specific
duty on the Lord Chancellor was not effective. He suggested
that the rule of law would be better served by placing increased
emphasis on the existing ministerial duty to comply with the law
and uphold judicial independence, to inculcate a wider appreciation
of the rule of law.[46]
Mr Grayling's predecessor as Lord Chancellor, Mr Clarke,
stated that while he hoped he had upheld the rule of law while
in office, he had never felt that a "statutory duty was compelling
me to do this".[47]
38. The majority of our witnesses, however, felt
that notwithstanding the changes to the role, the Lord Chancellor
still had a particular duty to the rule of law which went beyond
an obligation under the Ministerial Code to "comply with
the law". Former Attorney General Mr Grieve stated that
"if any Lord Chancellor were to ask me whether his oath
of office is merely compliance with the ministerial code, I would
tell him that I think it goes beyond that".[48]
Lord Falconer firmly disagreed with Mr Grayling's assertion
that the Lord Chancellor did not have a wider rule of law
guardianship role beyond that of other ministers. He argued that
the Lord Chancellor had a "special role" to protect
the rule of law, and that to think otherwise was "to undermine
what the Constitutional Reform Act had sought to do."[49]
39. Sir Thomas Legg QC, former Permanent Secretary
of the Lord Chancellor's Department, told us that "of
course, every person holding public office in our democracy has
a responsibility to uphold the rule of law. Of course that must
be right. But … some Ministers and officials perhaps have
a greater responsibility, because that is an inevitable result
of the distribution of functions."[50]
40. The Law Officers are clearly among those
who have a greater responsibility to uphold the rule of law. We
discuss their role in more detail later in this chapter (paragraphs 69-77).
While it is clear that they have a role supporting the Lord Chancellor
in his duty, they do not duplicate or supplant it.
41. The Constitutional Reform Act explicitly
refers to the Lord Chancellor's "existing constitutional
role" regarding the rule of law. It does not clarify what
this duty is, but in the oath of office the Lord Chancellor
promises specifically to "respect the rule of law".
42. All ministers have a duty, reflected in
the Ministerial Code, to comply with the law. The Lord Chancellor
continues to have an additional responsibility in this regard.
THE SCOPE OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S
DUTY TO THE RULE OF LAW
43. Our witnesses were divided as to whether
the Lord Chancellor's oath applied simply to his dealings
with the justice system in the discharge of his departmental duties,
or whether it required him to play a wider role, as a guardian
of the rule of law across Government.
44. As we have noted, the current Lord Chancellor
does not believe that he has a wider guardianship role in Government
beyond upholding the independence of the judiciary and the integrity
of the justice system.[51]
Mr Grieve said that the Lord Chancellor's duty was currently
considered to relate to his or her department, rather than an
overarching guardianship role. Whereas the pre-reform Lord Chancellors
"might have been a second focus within Cabinet for general
guidance [on the rule of law], now it is much more specific to
his own departmental responsibilities but it is going to vary
from one Lord Chancellor to another according to their interests
and according, probably, to their legal qualifications."[52]
The implication is that it is up to individual Lord Chancellors,
depending on their interests and expertise, to decide the extent
to which they pursue their duty in relation to the rule of law
beyond their department.
45. There are certainly aspects of the rule of
law that are centred upon the Ministry of Justice. The public
interest in the administration of justice, set out in section
3(6)(c) of the Constitutional Reform Act, includes adequate resourcing
of the justice system, having regard both to the use of public
funds and to access to justice. This is an important part of the
rule of law: as Lord Bingham's principle puts it (see Box
2), dispute resolution through the courts should be available
"without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay", where
such resolution is necessary. The Lord Chancellor's responsibility
for legal aid means that he or she will have to take significant
decisions about the funding of the justice system that could affect
access to justice.[53]
46. Other witnesses were clear that the Lord Chancellor's
duty should not be restricted to the work or interests of his
or her department. Sir Hayden Phillips said that the office
of Lord Chancellor was retained "to provide singular
leadership in relation to the rule of law, the protection of judicial
independence, and in taking responsibility for constitutional
issues in the broadest sense".[54]
Although the wording of the Constitutional Reform Act is not clear
in this respect, Lord Falconer's assertion "there was
absolutely no doubt"[55]
that this wider function was intended by Parliament is borne out
by the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee's assessment
that the Lord Chancellor was marked out as distinct from
other ministers and "will continue to be the 'constitutional
conscience' of Government", in respect of both judicial independence
and the rule of law.[56]
47. Dr Gabrielle Appleby, Deputy Director
of the Public Law and Policy Research Unit at the University of
Adelaide, described the Lord Chancellor's obligations to
the rule of law "as 'responsibilities' to warn and advise
on how proposed policies and actions may impact on the different
aspects of the rule of law."[57]
Sir Alex Allan, former Permanent Secretary of the Department
for Constitutional Affairs, while recognising that it was "the
responsibility of all Ministers to uphold the law and not to do
things that are illegal," noted, that beyond that general
duty, the Lord Chancellor has "a general fallback, oversight
role."[58]
48. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, giving
evidence to this Committee as Lord Chief Justice in 2006,
thought "there must be occasions in government where a question
may arise as to whether the conduct that the Government is contemplating
is or is not in accordance with the rule of law, and there, I
would imagine, the Lord Chancellor would have a role to play
in his capacity as a minister."[59]
49. It is regrettable that the Ministerial Code
and the Cabinet Manual do not address the Lord Chancellor's
role in respect of the rule of law, beyond judicial independence.
The Cabinet Manual refers to the Law Officers' role in
"helping ministers to act lawfully and in accordance with
the rule of law",[60]
which we explore further in paragraphs 69-77, but makes no
mention of the Lord Chancellor's duty in this respect.[61]
The only mention of the Lord Chancellor in the Ministerial
Code relates to the appointment of judges and legal officers to
Royal Commissions and inquiries.[62]
Mr Straw told us that the two documents "have not caught
up with" the changed role of the Lord Chancellor.[63]
50. The Lord Chancellor's duty to respect
of the rule of law extends beyond the policy remit of his or her
department; it requires him or her to seek to ensure that the
rule of law is upheld within Cabinet and across Government. We
recommend that the Ministerial Code and the Cabinet Manual
be revised accordingly.
51. The Lord Chancellor therefore has an
oversight role with respect to the rule of law that is not adequately
reflected in the current oath which requires him or her simply
to "respect the rule of law". To clarify the scope
of the Lord Chancellor's duty in relation to the rule of
law, we recommend that the oath to "respect the rule of law"
be amended to a promise to "respect and uphold the rule of
law".
Upholding the rule of law and
judicial independence in practice
52. The Lord Chancellor's duty to the rule
of law predates the Constitutional Reform Act, which states that
that duty is not "adversely affected" by the changes
to the role. The changed nature of the role has inevitably, however,
affected how Lord Chancellors since 2005 have performed this
duty compared with their predecessors.
53. There have always been limitations on the
capacity of a Lord Chancellor to be a guardian of the rule
of law across Government.[64]
In large part the Lord Chancellor's ability to uphold the
rule of law across Government has depended on his or her membership
of the Cabinet, of which the Lord Chancellor is a permanent
member,[65] and its committees.[66]
These provide a Lord Chancellor with the opportunity to monitor
policy developments and proposals across Government for potential
rule of law issues. Through Cabinet meetings and committee membership
the Lord Chancellor (like other ministers) is able to monitor
colleagues' policy proposals.
54. Yet Professor Le Sueur told us that
fulfilment of the duty is "premised on the idea that matters
are discussed fully at Cabinet meetings or in Cabinet committees
where the Lord Chancellor is present. If the Lord Chancellor
does not know about issues because he is not at the relevant meetings
or if key issues are not put on to the relevant agendas, that
constitutional conscience role cannot operate effectively."[67]
The Lord Chancellor cannot sit on all Cabinet committees,
although he or she will be aided by the Law Officers who sit on
many of the relevant committees (see paragraph 73). Even
if the Lord Chancellor received all committee papers, this
does not cover all the activities of Government. Cabinet committee
clearance is not required for "Matters wholly within the
responsibility of a single Minister and which do not significantly
engage collective responsibility".[68]
55. This limitation is even more acute for Lord Chancellors
since 2010 because, unlike their predecessors, they have not been
members of the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee.[69]
All legislation must be cleared by this committee, and it represented
an important route through which Lord Chancellors were kept
informed about the Government's legislative and policy agenda.
56. Different Lord Chancellors may also
take different views on what constitutes a rule of law issue.
Lord Falconer disagreed with many commentators who felt that
the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Bill
was "constitutionally problematic".[70]
Mr Murray told us that, "differences in interpretation
of the concept of the rule of law have seen opponents of various
policies advanced by Chris Grayling level the charge against him
that he is in breach of his duty regarding the rule of law."[71]
Given the ill-defined nature of the rule of law, discussed above,
it should not be surprising that different Lord Chancellors,
and their critics, have differing views of what constitutes a
threat.
57. As a result, Professor Le Sueur told
us that Lord Chancellors probably provided only, "at
very best … sporadic and peripheral direction to the government's
agenda" on constitutional propriety.[72]
Dr O'Brien and Mr Murray both noted inconsistency in
pre-reform Lord Chancellors' understanding and performance
of this role.[73] Lord Phillips
of Worth Matravers acknowledged that this may indeed be the reality
of the situation, but argued that ideally "it should be a
fundamental part of a minister's duty to look out for constitutional
impropriety and draw attention to it."[74]
58. Although pre-reform Lord Chancellors
may have performed this duty in a variety of ways,[75]
their actions were still valued. Lord Falconer stated that
the Lord Chancellor's role did not "require him proactively
to police every act of government".[76]
'Sporadic' intervention could still be effective: the Chartered
Institute of Legal Executives told us "the evidence suggests
that Lord Mackay [of Clashfern] spoke little but when he
did speak, the Cabinet listened".[77]
Yet many witnesses felt that post-reform Lord Chancellors
were even more limited in their ability to play a cross-government
guardianship role than their predecessors. In part, this was because
the holder of the post no longer wields the authority that the
Lord Chancellor once enjoyed as a senior lawyer and head
of the judiciary.
59. The pre-reform Lord Chancellors were,
Lord Mackay of Clashfern told us, "quite high in the
Cabinet hierarchy right back as far as I can remember just by
virtue of being the Lord Chancellor and because of the importance
then attached to the responsibilities that he carried."[78]
Without the inherent status that the pre-reform post carried,
it is vital that the modern post is filled by someone with the
personal authority to defend the rule of law in Government. We
address this issue in more detail in Chapter 4.
60. The combination of the post with that of
Secretary of State for Justice in 2007 has resulted in the office
becoming more political in nature. While a pre-reform Lord Chancellor,
such as Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Lord Chancellor from
1988-1997), could stay out of "the nitty-gritty of party
politics",[79] a
modern Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State cannot stay
outside the political fray, particularly when holding responsibility
for a contentious area of public policy such as the prison system.
Whether the Lord Chancellor should also be a Secretary of
State is something we address in Chapter 4, but it is undeniably
the case that while holding such offices, the Lord Chancellor
will be a more political figure.[80]
It is true that a more political figure may be privy to policy
ideas earlier in their formulation and so be able to monitor threats
to the rule of law during policy development. However, he or she
may also be more likely to prioritise the political objectives
of their party over any rule of law issues that arise (and equally,
not consider the latter to be serious issues if they conflict
with political objectives).[81]
As former Lord Chief Justice the Rt Hon. the Lord Woolf
told us, "whereas a [pre-reform] Lord Chancellor could
position himself outside the normal ministerial role in relation
to political issues that are deeply contested, it is much more
difficult for someone who is both Lord Chancellor and Minister
of Justice."[82]
61. In addition, although pre-reform Lord Chancellors
could be (and were on occasion) dismissed from office,[83]
it is felt to be a significantly greater risk for holders of the
modern office with their more political position as Secretaries
of State,[84] and who
will, it seems likely, continue to be drawn from the House of
Commons.[85] This may
affect their ability or willingness to act independently and to
stand up to Cabinet colleagues or the Prime Minister when necessary.[86]
62. As a result of these changes, Mr Gee
argued that post-reform Lord Chancellors were likely to be
more 'reactive' guardians than their predecessors: "proactive
guardianship is less likely to occur with Lord Chancellors
today, but they can be effective reactive guardians." Pre-reform
Lord Chancellors were senior lawyers or judges, closely attuned
to issues of concern to the senior judiciary. The post-reform
officeholder is the head of a substantial spending department,
and less closely attuned to the judiciary's concerns. Mr Gee
argued that a modern Lord Chancellor may spend "much
less of his or her time on judiciary-related issues, which presumably
makes it much more difficult to grasp the full weight of and respond
proactively to judicial concerns. To exaggerate the point somewhat:
the post-2003 [Lord Chancellor] might do 'the right thing'
only after exhausting all other possibilities. Though messy and
unedifying, this can still be effective."[87]
63. In an ideal world, Lord Chancellors
would pursue their duty to uphold the rule of law proactively
across Government, scrutinising policy proposals for threats to
the rule of law. That has never been the reality. Pre-reform Lord Chancellors
faced many of the same practical and political limitations their
successors face today. Yet current Lord Chancellors, with
their wider policy responsibilities, their political position
as Secretaries of State, and their reduced role in relation to
the judiciary, have to contend with restrictions and obstacles
that their predecessors did not. Whilst still central to the maintenance
of the rule of law, they have become more reactive guardians.
As a result, the roles of other individuals and institutions have
taken on a greater importance in this respect.
Other guardians
64. As the Lord Chancellor's ability to
act as a guardian of the rule of law has diminished, the role
of other guardians has increased in importance. Professor Robert
Hazell, Professor of British Politics and Government at University
College London, noted that the Lord Chancellor "is not
the only guardian of judicial independence and the rule of law,"
and "should not be viewed in isolation".[88]
WITHIN GOVERNMENT
65. All ministers are required to uphold judicial
independence and consult the Law Officers on legal issues. Alongside
the Lord Chancellor, the Law Officers thus have a key role
in upholding the rule of law. We consider their role in more detail
below.
66. Civil servants also play an important role
in upholding the rule of law.[89]
We were told the civil service code includes a duty to "comply
with the law and uphold the administration of justice".[90]
Rosemary Davies, Legal Director at the Ministry of Justice, told
us that in the department "there is a presumption always
that the law must be complied with and in that sense the rule
of law is central."[91]
Mr Grayling added that this was true of all government departments.[92]
Sir Alex Allen told us that issues of the rule of law were
discussed at a permanent secretary level when appropriate, and
that it was the role of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry
of Justice, as well as the Treasury Solicitor or First Parliamentary
Counsel, to speak up on those issues.[93]
67. Government lawyers have a particular role
to play.[94] The Government
Legal Service employs 2,000 lawyers,[95]
including the Treasury Solicitor's Department and departmental
lawyers. Along with the Attorney General, Parliamentary Counsel
(Government lawyers specialising in drafting legislation) scrutinise
draft Government bills to ensure that they comply with the Human
Rights Act 1998 and "look at issues of propriety, [such as]
unusual use of powers".[96]
Government lawyers have a duty not only to their department but
to the Law Officers,[97]
to whom concerns over the rule of law can be referred (see paragraph 72).
68. Former Lord Chief Justices the Rt Hon.
the Lord Judge and Lord Woolf raised concerns about
the level and expertise of legal support for the Lord Chancellor
inside the Ministry of Justice.[98]
Mr Gee and Sir Hayden Phillips referred to a loss of
expertise as staff were transferred to organisations in the justice
system outside the department.[99]
Ms Davies assured the Committee that there was substantial
and experienced legal support for the Lord Chancellor; Mr Grayling
agreed with this, as did his predecessor Lord Falconer.[100]
Some of the arm's-length bodies to which legal expertise from
the Department might have gone (such as HM Courts and Tribunals
Service, the Judicial Appointments Commission or the Judicial
Office) are also organisations that can highlight rule of law
concerns to the Lord Chancellor.[101]
THE LAW OFFICERS' ROLE
69. The Law Officers have always played a key
role upholding the rule of law within Government. Mr Grieve
stated that "the law officers are there to make sure that
the ministerial code is observed … [that] the United Kingdom,
its Ministers, its civil servants, … obey the law, the rule
of law and act in accordance with our international legal obligations."[102]
As we stated in our 2008 report on the office of Attorney General,
"the provision of legal advice to the Government is important
in giving practical effect to the constitutional principle of
the rule of law."[103]
70. The Attorney General is the Government's
principal adviser on legal matters, and the Solicitor General
is his or her deputy. The Advocate General advises the UK Government
on Scots law.[104]
The Law Officers act as legal advisers to ministerial colleagues
when potential rule of law issues arise. Lord Mackay of Clashfern
referred to the Lord Chancellor's role in this respect which
"is to ensure that, if there is a legal and constitutional
issue on which it is necessary to take the Attorney General's
advice, that is done."[105]
71. While the Constitutional Reform Act 2005
dealt with the Lord Chancellor's ongoing, if undefined, role
in relation to the rule of law, it did not address the position
of others with a significant role, particularly the Law Officers.[106]
Instead it is left to non-legislative documents to set out the
position. The Ministerial Code requires all ministers to consult
the Law Officers "in good time … [on] critical decisions
involving legal considerations."[107]
The Cabinet Manual, which does not mention the rule of
law in relation to the Lord Chancellor, describes the Law
Officers' role more explicitly as "helping ministers to act
lawfully and in accordance with the rule of law."[108]
72. The Attorney General is also the head of
the Government Legal Service. Mr Grieve said that when issues
arise that need the Law Officers' attention, he was confident
that they were brought to his attention appropriately. Lady Scotland
described Government lawyers as having a duty both to their own
department and to the Attorney General, to whom they can and do
refer issues of particular importance or complexity.[109]
73. The Attorney General is a member of key Cabinet
Committees at which rule of law issues may arise (and on which
the Lord Chancellor does not sit).[110]
These include the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee
and the National Security Council.[111]
These are important avenues through which potential rule of law
issues can be noted and raised at an early stage. In addition,
the Attorney General scrutinises all Government bills for their
compliance with human rights law and legal propriety.[112]
74. Sir Thomas Legg told us that the Law
Officers have "an obligation to draw the attention of their
fellow Ministers to substantial issues of legal values, as well
as the precise law".[113]
Mr Grieve stressed that Government lawyers were not, however,
"spies in government departments telling me when ministerial
colleagues might be on the point of going off the rails".
With only a small number of staff in the Attorney General's Office,
the Law Officers are "certainly not in a position to be overseers
of the rule of law".[114]
75. Another limit on the Attorney General's capacity
to be a guardian of the rule of law is that he or she, although
of cabinet rank, is not a full member of the Cabinet.[115]
In recent years it has become standard practice for the Attorney
General to attend all Cabinet meetings,[116]
but unlike the Lord Chancellor they do so at the invitation
of the Prime Minister, not as of right. Moreover, as the Government's
legal adviser rather than a minister (as Lady Scotland described
it "in government but not of government"),[117]
the Attorney General may be privy to less of the policy discussions
in which rule of law issues could arise.
76. It is clear that the Law Officers have an
important role as guardians of the rule of law, alongside the
Lord Chancellor. To some extent they are complementary, upholding
the rule of law in different ways. While the more political post-reform
Lord Chancellor is in a better position to observe and intervene
in the development of wider policy decisions that could affect
the rule of law, the Law Officers scrutinise legislation for rule
of law issues and can act when potential infringements arise—for
example inappropriate Henry VIII clauses or retrospective legislation.
77. With the post-reform Lord Chancellors
playing a more limited and reactive guardianship role, the Law
Officers have become ever more important in this respect. Although
the Law Officers are not, as Mr Grieve told us, in a position
to oversee the rule of law more generally across government, they
do have a significant role supporting the Lord Chancellor
in his duty to do so. This includes alerting the Lord Chancellor
to potential rule of law issues, and working with him or her in
Cabinet in uphold the rule of law, including defending judicial
independence. As Lord Falconer told us: "the Attorney
and the Lord Chancellor acting together are quite a powerful
force in government."[118]
78. The duty of Lord Chancellors to ensure
that the rule of law is respected across Government has not changed
as a result of the Constitutional Reform Act. Carrying out this
duty has, however, become more difficult for post-reform Lord Chancellors
and more directly dependent on the personal authority and attitude
of the individual holding the office.
79. The Law Officers' role in upholding the
rule of law has always been important. The changes to the office
of Lord Chancellor over the last decade have made it even
more so. As a result, we consider that it is imperative the Attorney
General continues to attend all Cabinet meetings, and that they
are adequately resourced not only in their role as legal advisers
to the Government, but in their capacity as guardians of the rule
of law.
80. We recommend that the Law Officers give
due consideration to the more reactive role of modern Lord Chancellors
and ensure that the holder of that office is kept informed of
potential issues within Government relating to the rule of law.
81. A commitment to the rule of law is an
essential component of good government. The Government should
ensure that the responsibilities of those charged with upholding
the rule of law are clear and widely understood, and that they
receive the support necessary to fulfil those duties.
OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT
82. Outside Government, the judiciary play a
pivotal role in upholding the rule of law. As Lord Phillips
of Worth Matravers told us in 2006, "It is the role of the
judiciary, in practice, to uphold the rule of law".[119]
Judicial review provides an avenue through which the actions of
the executive can be directly challenged and assessed in the light
of the rule of law. In addition, the senior judiciary have a more
direct role in ensuring that the Government is aware of concerns
about the rule of law through discussions with the Lord Chancellor.
The Lord Chancellor has monthly meetings with the Lord Chief
Justice,[120] as well
as less frequent but regular meetings with the President of the
Supreme Court.[121]
The Lord Chief Justice also has biannual meetings with the
Prime Minister.[122]
Judges are able to express their views publicly in extra-judicial
speeches, although discretion is of course important in making
speeches on controversial subjects.[123]
83. Parliament's role in upholding the rule of
law and judicial independence was stressed by witnesses.[124]
Threats to the rule of law can be identified through legislative
scrutiny and holding the Government to account for their actions.
The work of parliamentary select committees was particularly noted,
both in their scrutiny of policy and legislation and as a forum
in which members of the senior judiciary might express any concerns
they had.[125]
84. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 removed
one channel of communication between the judiciary and Parliament
by disqualifying holders of senior judicial office from membership
of the House of Lords.[126]
Former judges still take part in debates, but new Justices of
the Supreme Court no longer automatically receive life peerages.
Lord Woolf told us that as a result the need for judicial
representation in Parliament would increase with time.[127]
85. Without the right to take part in debates
in the House of Lords, the Lord Chief Justice is restricted
to making written representations to Parliament and speaking to
select committees.[128]
Lord Judge referred to making a written representation as
a "nuclear option," but even so felt that it did not
give the Lord Chief Justice "sufficient authority, in
an age when the Lord Chancellor is no longer the head of
the judiciary, to convey the views of the judiciary".[129]
Other former judges were more relaxed about the use of written
representations,[130]
although Lord Hope of Craighead agreed that "one should
exercise restraint in exercising the right."[131]
86. While witnesses did not feel that serving
judges should be able to speak in the House of Lords Chamber,[132]
there was general agreement that addressing select committees
was useful. There are several committees to which senior judges
can and do give evidence, including this Committee and the House
of Commons Justice Committee.[133]
Lord Judge suggested that, as well as the regular evidence
sessions already undertaken with senior judges, the Lord Chief
Justice "should be able to say to [the Constitution Committee]
or another committee, 'I would like to come and address you on
these issues, which have been raised about pending legislation
and whether the judges would be upset.'"[134]
The current Lord Chancellor, Mr Grayling, told us that
"I would not be hostile to a route of last resort …
[for senior judges] if something is going badly wrong—the
Government of the day are misbehaving, the Lord Chancellor
is paying no attention—to have the ability to say to Parliament,
'Help'."[135]
Both Lord Judge and Mr Grayling stressed that such action
should be taken sparingly so as to avoid the judiciary being seen
to take sides in political debates;[136]
similarly, former Lord Chancellors Lord Falconer and
Mr Clarke felt that it would be appropriate if used sparingly.[137]
87. While the Lord Chancellor may "no
longer [be] the pre-eminent guardian of constitutional values
that pre-2003 Lord Chancellors might have been",[138]
they still play a central role in this wider group of guardians
of the rule of law. Professor Hazell told us that
"The Lord Chancellor is no longer the
sole defender of the rule of law. He is buttressed by all these
other bodies, who can provide advice and support, and scrutiny.
The institutional landscape may seem more complex and more fragmented;
but reliance on multiple guardians rather than a single guardian
is also more robust."[139]
88. The Lord Chancellor has never been
the sole guardian of the rule of law, either within Government
or more broadly. The importance of other guardians has, however,
increased in the light of the changes to the role since 2003.
Parliament in particular should be aware of its crucial role as
a body that can hold the Government to account to ensure that
it governs in accordance with the rule of law.
17 Constitution Committee, Relations between the
executive, the judiciary and Parliament, para 71 Back
18
Q 19 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers) Back
19
Constitution Committee, Relations between the executive, the
judiciary and Parliament, para 24 Back
20
Q 49 Back
21
Constitution Committee, Relations between the executive, the
judiciary and Parliament, para 24 Back
22
Q 91 (Dominic Grieve MP and Baroness Scotland of
Asthal) and Q 96 (Jack Straw MP) Back
23
Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, London, 2010),
p 67 Back
24
The Convention was ratified by the United Kingdom in 1951. Back
25
Written evidence from the Charter Institute of Legal Executives
(OLC0017) Back
26
Constitution Committee, Relations between the executive, the
judiciary and Parliament, para 25 Back
27
AXA General Insurance v Lord Advocate (2011) UKSC
46, para 51. The case concerned an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
not an Act of the UK Parliament, but Lord Hope expressed
his remarks about the rule of law as though they may apply to
all legislation. Back
28
Thus by-passing the House of Lords which some witnesses referred
to as one of the key guardians of the United Kingdom's constitution.
See, for example, written evidence from Lord Woolf (OLC0009). Back
29
Bingham, The Rule of Law, p 173 Back
30
Q 78 (Lord Falconer of Thoroton,) Back
31
Q 16 Back
32
Q 4 Back
33
Q 5 and written evidence from Graham Gee (OLC0006) Back
34
Written evidence from Professor Andrew Le Sueur (OLC0005) Back
35
See Q 94 (Dominic Grieve MP) and written evidence from
Prof Dawn Oliver (OLC0001) and the Bar Council (OLC0026). Back
36
Q 61 (Chris Grayling MP), written evidence from the
Ministry of Justice (OLC0028) Back
37
Written evidence from the Ministry of Justice (OLC0028), Q 43
(Chris Grayling MP), Q 77 (Lord Falconer and Ken
Clarke MP). Back
38
Similarly, the Explanatory Notes do not expand on either the principle
or the role (Explanatory Memorandum, Constitutional Reform Act
2005: Overview) Back
39
Q 43 Back
40
QQ 47-48 Back
41
Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code, (2010), para 1.2 Back
42
Written evidence from Dr Patrick O'Brien (OLC0012) Back
43
Written evidence from Sir Hayden Phillips (OLC0029) Back
44
Written evidence from Dr Patrick O'Brien (OLC0012) Back
45
Written evidence from Dr Patrick O'Brien (OLC0012) Back
46
Written evidence from Colin Murray (OLC0021) Back
47
Q 77 Back
48
Q 92 Back
49
Q 77 Back
50
Q 67 Back
51
QQ 47-48 Back
52
Q 89 Back
53
See Q 47 (Rosemary Davies), Q 56 (Chris Grayling MP)
and Q 103 (Jack Straw MP) Back
54
Written evidence from Sir Hayden Phillips (OLC0029), see
also written evidence from Dr Gabrielle Appleby (OLC0018) Back
55
Q 76 Back
56
Q 76 and House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee,
Constitutional Reform Bill [Lords]: the Government's proposals
(3rd Report, Session 2004-05, HC 275-I), paras 24 and 28 Back
57
Written evidence from Dr Gabrielle Appleby (OLC0018) Back
58
Q63 Back
59
Constitution Committee, Relations between the executive, the
judiciary and Parliament, Appendix 8: Evidence by the Lord Chief
Justice, 3 May 2006, Q7 Back
60
The Cabinet Manual: A guide to laws, conventions and rules
on the operation of government (October 2011), para 6.4 Back
61
Q 10 (Andrew Le Sueur) Back
62
Ministerial Code, para 4.10 Back
63
Q 96 Back
64
Written evidence from Professor Andrew Le Sueur (OLC0005) Back
65
The Lord Chancellor's salary is specifically listed in Section
1 of the Ministerial and other Salaries Act 1975, whereas other
ministers are dealt with in Schedule 1. Back
66
Written evidence from the Bar Council (OLC0026) Back
67
Q 14 Back
68
Cabinet Office, Guide to Cabinet and Cabinet Committees
(nd, [2010]), p 6 Back
69
Cabinet Committee Membership List (February 2014): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279220/Cabinet_Committee_Membership_Lists_12_Feb_2014.pdf
Back
70
Written evidence from Professor Andrew Le Sueur (OLC0005);
the Bill became the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants,
etc) Act 2004. Back
71
Written evidence from Colin Murray (OLC0021) Back
72
Written evidence from Professor Andrew Le Sueur (OLC0005) Back
73
Written evidence from Dr Patrick O'Brien (OLC0012) and Colin
Murray (OLC0021) Back
74
Q 21 Back
75
Written evidence from Colin Murray (OLC0021) Back
76
HL Deb, 20 Dec 2004, Column 1538 Back
77
Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives
(OLC0017) Back
78
Q 22, see also Q 76 (Ken Clarke MP) Back
79
Q 23 and Q 76 (Ken Clarke MP), see also Q 35
(Lord Woolf) Back
80
Q 1 (Graham Gee) and Q 9 (Dr Patrick O'Brien) Back
81
Written evidence from Dr Gabrielle Appleby (OLC0018) Back
82
Q 39 Back
83
Q 9 (Andrew Le Sueur) Back
84
Q 8 (Graham Gee) and written evidence from the Bar Council
(OLC0026) Back
85
Q 82 (Ken Clarke MP) and Q 7 (Professor Andrew
Le Sueur), and written evidence from Graham Gee (OLC0006), Lord Woolf
(OLC0009), the Bar Council (OLC0026) and the Law Society of England
and Wales (OLC0025) Back
86
Q 9 (Graham Gee) and written evidence from the Bar Council
(OLC0026) Back
87
Q 1 and written evidence from Graham Gee (OLC0006) Back
88
Written evidence from Professor Robert Hazell (OLC0014),
see also written evidence from the Bingham Centre for the Rule
of Law (OLC0022) Back
89
Written evidence from Professor Andrew Le Sueur (OLC0005)
and the Bar Council (OLC0026) Back
90
The Civil Service Code, published 30 November 2010 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-code/the-civil-service-code
[accessed 20 November 2014] Back
91
Q 47 Back
92
Q 47 Back
93
Q 69 Back
94
Q 9 (Graham Gee) Back
95
Q 86 Back
96
QQ 86 and 89 Back
97
Q 86 (Baroness Scotland) Back
98
Q 35 and written evidence from Lord Woolf (OLC0009) Back
99
Q 5 and written evidence from Sir Hayden Phillips (OLC00029) Back
100
Q 53 (Chris Grayling MP and Rosemary Davies) and Q 84
(Lord Falconer). Former permanent secretary Sir Alex
Allan also said that he was content with the legal support during
his time working for the Lord Chancellor (Q 68). Back
101
Q 9 (Graham Gee) and written evidence from Professor Andrew
Le Sueur (OLC0005), Graham Gee (OLC0006), Dr Gabrielle Appleby
(OLC0018) and Professor Robert Hazell (OLC0014) Back
102
Q 86 Back
103
Constitution Committee, Reform of the Office of Attorney General
(7th Report, Session 2007-08, HL Paper 93), para 4 Back
104
Under the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, section 27, the
Attorney-General of England and Wales also holds the office of
Advocate General for Northern Ireland. Back
105
Q 86 (Dominic Grieve MP) and Q 28 (Lord Mackay
of Clashfern) Back
106
Written evidence from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives
(OLC0017) Back
107
Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (May 2010), para 2.10 Back
108
Cabinet Manual, para 6.4 Back
109
Q 86 Back
110
Q 54 (Chris Grayling MP) Back
111
Q 54 (Chris Grayling MP) and Q 93 (Dominic Grieve MP).
The Attorney's attendance at National Security Council meetings
is not acknowledged in the most recent (February 2014) list of
Cabinet Committees and their membership. Back
112
For the Attorney General's wider role, see Constitution Committee,
Reform of the Office of Attorney General (7th Report, Session
2007-08, HL Paper 93). Back
113
Q 72 Back
114
Q 86, see also written evidence from the Bar Council (OLC0026) Back
115
Written evidence from Dr Gabrielle Appleby (OLC0018) Back
116
See Q 54 (Chris Grayling MP) Back
117
Q 87 (Baroness Scotland of Asthal) Back
118
Q 80 Back
119
Constitution Committee, Relations between the executive, the
judiciary and Parliament, Appendix 8: Evidence by the Lord Chief
Justice, 3 May 2006, Q 7. This is echoed in Dr O'Brien's
evidence for this inquiry (Q 8). Back
120
The regularity appears to vary: Lord Judge told us that he
had monthly meetings with the Lord Chancellor, but Lord Woolf
said that he did not have such regular meetings (Q 33) Back
121
Constitution Committee annual oral evidence from the President
and Deputy President of the Supreme Court, 25 June 2014, Q 2
(Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury) Back
122
Graham Gee, 'The Lord Chief Justice and Section 5 of the
Constitutional Reform Act', U.K. Constitutional Law Blog, 14th
April 2014: http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/04/14/graham-gee-the-lord-chief-justice-and-section-5-of-the-constitutional-reform-act/
[accessed 9 July 2014] Back
123
Lord Neuberger Of Abbotsbury, 'Where Angels Fear To Tread'
Holdsworth Club 2012 Presidential Address, 2 March 2012: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-holdsworth-lecture-2012.pdf
[accessed 7 November 2014] paras 53-54 Back
124
Q 1 (Graham Gee) and Q 14 (Patrick O'Brien) Back
125
For example, written evidence from Professor Andrew Le Sueur
(OLC0005), the Bar Council (OLC0026) and Colin Murray (OLC0021) Back
126
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, section 137. The Lord Chief
Justice is still made a life peer, but is disqualified from membership
while in office. Back
127
Q 37. To date, all Justices who have left the court (other
than to other disqualifying judicial offices) have been former
Law Lords and been able to return to the House of Lords. Back
128
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, section 5, permits the Lord Chief
Justices of England and Wales, or Northern Ireland, and the Lord President
of the Court of Session in Scotland to make written representations
to Parliament. This is due to be extended to the President of
the Supreme Court under the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill. Back
129
Q 37 Back
130
For example written evidence from Lord Hamilton (OLC0016) Back
131
Q 37 Back
132
Written evidence from Professor Robert Hazell (OLC0014) Back
133
QQ 24, 36 and 85, see also written evidence from Professor Robert
Hazell (OLC0014) Back
134
Q 36 Back
135
Q 62 Back
136
Q 36 (Lord Judge) Back
137
Q 85 Back
138
Q 1 (Graham Gee) Back
139
Written evidence from Professor Robert Hazell (OLC0014) Back
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