The EU and Russia: before and beyond the
crisis in Ukraine
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Purpose and scope of this inquiry
1. Since late 2013, the EU's relationship with
Russia has reached a critical juncture. The EU-Russia relationship
is of vital economic, energy and cultural importance for Member
States, and the security of Europe as a whole depends upon harmonious
relations. Yet the relationship is now more fractious than at
any time since the end of the Cold War. The Committee's previous
report on the EU and Russia, published in 2008, noted that relations
had been going through a difficult phase. At the time, we concluded
that the change of presidency in Russia would provide an opportunity
to take stock and to consider whether the deterioration could
and should be reversed.[1]
Unfortunately the deterioration has continued, while the crisis
in Ukraine—and the accompanying disruption of economic,
political and security relations between Russia and the EU—means
that an urgent reassessment is now needed.
2. Russian actions in Ukraine need to be understood
within both the particular historical context of Ukraine and a
broader Russian pattern of behaviour in the neighbourhood. The
situation now is very different from 1991, when the Soviet Union
peacefully disintegrated into 15 countries. It was apparent even
then that Ukraine, in particular, and the Baltic states to some
extent, held a special place in the hearts and minds of the Russian
people. The Russian democrats that emerged made great efforts
to keep Ukraine as close as possible.[2]
Russian actions in Ukraine today occur in the context of its continued
involvement in a number of territorial and ethnic disputes throughout
the post-Soviet space which threaten the sovereignty of these
states. While the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia),
Transnistria (Moldova) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan and Armenia)
are still unresolved—and with Crimea and Donbas now added
to the list—the potential for further conflict remains high.
3. While the current Russian government has adopted
a more adversarial policy, it is too easy to assume that recent
events have solely been due to one government's approach, or that
the current impasse in relations is a short-term problem. Multiple
witnesses have pointed out to us that Russia's policies are based
on long-standing threat perceptions, historical grievances and
issues surrounding Russia's identity. Such perceptions are shared
by many of the Russian people and parts of the Russian elite as
well. It is important that these perceptions should be better
understood in the West, although that does not mean accepting
the premises on which they are based.
4. The EU, especially those Member States who
play a pivotal role in relations with Russia, need to find a way
either to build co-operative security, with Russian support, or
else to secure themselves and the region in the context of a more
adversarial relationship. The consequences of a further deterioration
of relations could include the spread of instability in the neighbourhood,
greater disruption of trade and a weakening of economic ties,
and a breakdown in co-ordination over other global and regional
issues, including Syria, Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan.
5. It was not possible for us to consider, let
alone do full justice to, the full range of issues affecting EU-Russia
relations. We have therefore addressed only those issues which
have arisen as a result of the current crisis. We have noted the
energy and economic interdependencies but have not focused on
them in detail.[3] It is
self-evident that the EU can only act where it has the competence
to do so. While the EU does have a Common Foreign and Security
Policy, which includes the framing of a common defence policy,
the responsibility for national security and territorial defence
remains with the Member States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the cornerstone of defence for its EU Members, is outside
the scope of this report.
6. However, there are steps that the EU can take
to strengthen its internal resilience and make its strategic intent
more acutely felt in Russia. We have focused on the crisis in
Ukraine but also looked well beyond it, seeking to address the
question of how the EU should shape its policies with regard to
Russia in order to break what appears to be a recurring cycle
of conflict and growing frustration, and to set relations on a
mutually beneficial and stable footing. Our purpose has not been
to analyse events in Ukraine as they unfold but rather to consider
the causes of the conflict and to learn lessons, even as events
are still ongoing.
7. At the outset the Chairman of the Sub-Committee
on External Affairs, which conducted the inquiry, informally met
the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the UK, His Excellency
Dr Alexander Yakovenko, in order to explain its scope and purpose.
We are grateful to the Ambassador for subsequently providing written
evidence to the Committee. In June 2014, the Sub-Committee held
two scoping seminars with Sir Rodric Braithwaite GCMG, former
British Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Russia, Sir Andrew
Wood GCMG, former British Ambassador to Russia and Associate Fellow
of the Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, Professor
Roy Allison, Professor of Russian and Eurasian International Relations,
School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies, University of Oxford,
Dr Simon Pirani, Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, University of Oxford, Mr John Lough, Associate
Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House, and Mr Peter
Tabak, Senior Economist, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). In July 2014, the Sub-Committee also received
an informal briefing from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
officials. We would like to thank all those who provided their
guidance and thoughts at these informal meetings.
8. In inviting witnesses to give oral evidence,
we have tried to ensure that we heard from a number of Russians,
with a wide range of views, as well as from other nationalities.
We note that the remit of our Committee is to scrutinise the work
of the EU and its institutions, and to hold the UK Government
to account for its role in developing EU policy. Therefore, while
we have commented on the actions of the Russian government, our
primary role has been to scrutinise the effectiveness of the EU's
policies towards Russia and to make recommendations to the UK
Government and EU institutions.
9. In this report, we use the shorthand "Russia",
"Moscow", and on occasion "Kremlin", to denote
the official policy of the Russian state, though we recognise
that there is a plurality of views even among the Russian elites.
We have retained the distinction between the Russian state and
the Russian people whose views and interests do not necessarily
coincide.
10. A full list of witnesses who provided evidence,
including their affiliations, is printed in Appendix 2.
Structure of the report
11. In Chapter 2 we outline the main interdependencies
between the EU and Russia and briefly examine the institutional
agreements which form the basis of the EU's relationship with
Russia. In Chapter 3, we then summarise relations between the
EU and Russia over the last 20 years, the evolution of the relationship,
and the role of the Member States today.
12. In Chapter 4 we consider the shared neighbourhood,
the geopolitical and economic competition between the EU and Russia
in the neighbourhood, and the implications of the formation of
the Eurasian Economic Union. We then, in Chapter 5, turn to Ukraine,
and consider witnesses' views on how the vulnerabilities and fragility
of the EU-Russia partnership have been exposed during the crisis
there. Finally, in Chapter 6, we consider how the relationship
with Russia should be constructed, setting out the steps that
could be taken in the short term, and the factors that could form
the basis of a mutually beneficial long-term relationship.
13. The inquiry that led to this report was carried
out by the Sub-Committee on External Affairs, whose Members are
listed in Appendix 1. We received written evidence and heard oral
evidence from a wide range of witnesses, whose names are listed
in Appendix 2. The Sub-Committee's Call for Evidence, which was
launched at the beginning of the inquiry, is reprinted in Appendix
3. We would like to thank all our witnesses, along with those
who facilitated our visits to Brussels and Berlin. Notes of these
visits are printed in Appendices 4 and 5. Finally, we express
our gratitude to Dr Samuel Greene, our Specialist Adviser for
the inquiry.
14. We make this report to the House for debate.
1 European Union Committee, The European Union and Russia
(14th Report, Session 2007-08, HL Paper 98) Back
2
Serghii Plokhy, The Last Empire (Oneworld Publications,
2014), Chapter 9 Back
3
We have previously reported on steps that the EU could take to
meet its carbon reduction targets while maintaining security of
energy supply and affordability to domestic and industrial consumers.
European Union Committee, No Country is an Energy Island: Securing Investment for the EU's Future
(14th Report, Session 2012-13, HL Paper 161). Back
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