CHAPTER 8: BODIES TO SUPPORT ACTION AT
EU LEVEL
196. Witnesses across all sectors were positive
about the exchange of expertise and best practice in reducing
alcohol-related harm across EU borders, which was regarded as
one of the main benefits of the Strategy. Two bodies set up under
the Strategy, the Committee on National Alcohol Policy and Action
(CNAPA) and the European Alcohol and Health Forum (EAHF), were
repeatedly cited as having contributed to this achievement. At
the same time, public health interest groups and government representatives
were particularly vocal about the shortcomings of these bodies.
197. Alongside some specific issues, there are
two overarching problems which affect all bodies set up under
the Strategy to some degree: unclear and informal mandates and
remits; and unclear and informal relationships between them.
The Committee on National Alcohol
Policy and Action (CNAPA)
198. The 2012 review of the Strategy used six
evaluation questions to assess CNAPA as an instrument for coordinating
national alcohol policies. It found that CNAPA had "supported
information exchange and convergence of Member State policies,
including through cross-policy discussions", and made two
main suggestions for the improvement of CNAPA's work: greater
political visibility and strengthened consistency and continuity.[190]
199. CNAPA was not mentioned in the text of the
Strategy, which was silent on its role or objectives. Instead,
some information on CNAPA's mandate can be found in the Annex
to the 2007 Charter establishing the EAHF, which states that "The
main objective of this group will be to further coordinate government-driven
policies aimed at reducing alcohol-related harm at national and
local level, building upon the examples of good practice identified
in the Commission's Strategy." The Charter also describes
CNAPA's tasks as reviewing national and regional alcohol policy
development, "with a view to disseminating best practice
across the EU".[191]
200. CNAPA can make an important contribution
to EU action on alcohol-related harm by enabling Member State
representatives to exchange best practice and coordinate national
policies. Examples of CNAPA's work include RARHA and the Joint
Action on Youth and Heavy Episodic Drinking, as well as its role
in carrying out a scoping exercise following the expiry of the
Strategy. However, our evidence has also shown some limitations
to its practical value.
201. The Advertising Association felt that "the
role of CNAPA as speaking for all Member States is unclear. We
understand that some Member States send representatives to CNAPA
who do not speak for government departments."[192]
Mr Carlin agreed, adding: "I think Member States need
to prioritise and nominate officials to CNAPA who are equipped
to speak on behalf of their governments and to act to ensure that
they gain cross-government support for the policy positions that
they take."[193]
202. Some witnesses agreed with the findings
of the 2012 evaluation. Lundbeck Ltd suggested that "CNAPA
would benefit from more political visibility. For example, beyond
the exchange of best practices, CNAPA could open a structured
dialogue with the forthcoming EU Trio Presidencies and with the
[European Parliament] Health Coordinators to present CNAPA's recommendations
on how to take EU policy action on alcohol to the next level."[194]
Ms Willmott suggested that CNAPA's role could also be strengthened
by establishing it as a full working party under the Council structures.[195]
203. A number of public health NGOs felt that
CNAPA's role should also be enhanced in practice.[196]
The Alcohol Health Alliance UK wrote: "As CNAPA is the body
representing Member States, it is essential that its role be strengthened
to reflect its position as the driving force for the design and
implementation of a new EU Alcohol Strategy."[197]
204. The current confusion over CNAPA's exact
powers, as well as its relationship to the EAHF, Member States
and the Commission, may hamper its effectiveness. While this confusion
may in part be due to its lack of formal status, it is likely
to have been compounded by the Commission's attitude towards its
role within the Strategy, which we discuss below.
205. We recommend that the Commission review
the structure and functioning of CNAPA in order to ensure that
it is fully capable of carrying out its coordination function.
In particular, it should encourage Member States to nominate officials
who are in a position to represent their governments' views.
The European Alcohol and Health
Forum (EAHF)
206. The EAHF was established in 2007, following
its inclusion in the Strategy under the heading 'coordination
of actions at EU level'. The text of the Strategy stated that
"The overall objective of this Forum will be to support,
provide input for and monitor the implementation of the Strategy".
In practice it has mainly done so by enabling industry and NGO
partners to enter into voluntary commitments intended to reduce
alcohol-related harm.
207. The 2012 evaluation of the Strategy noted
that several sectors and Member States are under-represented in
the EAHF. This was supported by a 2013 report on commitments made
by members of the EAHF, which found that all but one of the member
organisations at the time were from the EU15 countries,[198]
with 10 out of 34 Member-State level members being based in the
United Kingdom.[199]
208. The evaluation also recommended that the
Forum should re-focus its work on fewer well-defined action areas
and implement outcome and impact indicators, as well as strengthening
its relationship with CNAPA, which we discuss below. Again, our
witnessesmany of whom are themselves members of the EAHFbroadly
agreed with these findings and felt that, in general, the Forum
was a valuable body worth keeping. However, when we began taking
oral evidence, it quickly became apparent how greatly the opinions
of the industry on the one hand, and the public health lobby on
the other hand, differed as to the value of the key feature of
the EAHF: the involvement of the alcohol industry.
INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
209. Unsurprisingly, representatives of the alcohol
industry were positive about the structure of the EAHF, which
exemplified the "inclusive multi-stakeholder approach"[200]
taken by the Strategy. Mr Beale even considered the Forum
to be the Strategy's "key advantage and benefit".[201]
The Advertising Association was also particularly enthusiastic,
describing the EAHF as "an extremely important mechanism
for dialogue between industry, the NGO community and the European
Commission
It, or an equivalent channel for this dialogue,
must be retained in any future Strategy."[202]
210. Notwithstanding the importance of such a
dialogue, spiritsEUROPE was disappointed that the policy debate
on alcohol at EU level had become "too polarised and inefficient".[203]
The background to this statement is what the Advertising Association
described as "repeated complaints from the NGO community
about the extent of industry's representation in the EAHF",
which were "consistent with public health lobbyists' general
suspicion of co- and self-regulation."[204]
211. Witnesses from the public health sector
were indeed a great deal less positive about the manner in which
the EAHF had been conducting its work and the value of its output.
It is also true that many of their concerns related to the extent
of industry representation in the EAHF, although it seemed to
us that in most cases these were grounded in their first-hand
experience as EAHF members.
212. In fact, many public health witnesses appreciated
that there was some benefit to involving the alcohol industry
at some stage of the EU policy cycle. Eurocare, a member of the
EAHF, saw "value in maintaining a mechanism whereby NGOs
and public health bodies can discuss with the European Commission
how economic operators can contribute to actions that will reduce
alcohol harm."[205]
Towards the end of an oral evidence session in which all three
public health witnesses had been particularly critical of the
alcohol industry, Dr Gillan conceded that "of course
you have to talk to the industryof course they are a stakeholder.
No one is suggesting that we ignore them completely. However,
we have to be clear about where the industry's expertise lies
For example, the industry has a clear role in server training,
labellingthere are a number of things that are to do with
its role as producers, marketers and sellers of alcohol, and that
is what the role should be confined to."[206]
213. Similarly, Prof Sheron confirmed that
he was in fact in favour of speaking to representatives of the
industry, although he continued: "I have met many members
of the drinks industry who were quite committed to doing the best
they can to reduce alcohol-related harm, but I have not met a
single one who would put the health of the population above the
health of their company."[207]
214. The concerns of the public health witnesses
related not so much to the fact of industry involvement in the
EAHF as to its extent, and the effects which this had on the Forum's
priorities. ScHARR told us:
"Action following the EU Alcohol Strategy
has largely been translated as industry action, with alcohol producers
and retailers strongly represented on EAHF. Whilst economic actors
have a role to play in tackling alcohol-related harm, they also
have major conflicts of interest
Permitting the alcohol
industry to have such a dominant voice in implementing the EU
Alcohol Strategy and influencing future policy development is
not an effective way to safeguard public health."[208]
215. Public health NGOs, including Eurocare and
SHAAP, also had some specific concerns about industry involvement
with regard to the interpretation of the Forum's mandate: "Despite
the EAHF having no official role in policy development, views
of Forum members were sought throughout the development of the
EU Alcohol Action Plan, and objections from economic operators
to scientific reports produced on behalf of the Forum have been
upheld." Eurocare therefore wished to emphasise that, despite
their seeing value in the EAHF, "alcohol industry activities
should be restricted to their core roles as developers, producers,
distributors, marketers and sellers of alcoholic beverages and
that they should have no role in the formulation of alcohol policies,
which must be protected from distortion by commercial or vested
interests."[209]
216. Of all our witnesses, Government representatives
seemed to present the most balanced and realistic picture of industry
involvement in alcohol policy. In reference to the UK Responsibility
Deal, which we discussed in Chapter 7, Lindsay Wilkinson, Deputy
Director of Drug and Alcohol Policy at the Department of Health,
said: "Alcohol manufactures and retailers can reach their
customers in a way that other people cannot
We have a long
history of working with the alcohol industry, and we find that
it does some things that we are not able to do through any other
means."[210] She
was, though, also careful to point out that "Ultimately policy
formulation is a matter for Member States and governments. There
is no reason why the industry cannot say what it believes we should
do, but that does not mean that it is part of the decision-making
about what happens."[211]
217. It seems that this crucial distinction has
been lost in the workings of the EAHF, thanks in particular to
its unclear mandate and its involvement in policy setting. This
has blurred the line between policy debate and policy formulation,
which we regard as unacceptable in the light of the significant
industry presence in the Forum.
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
218. In recognition of the Forum's general usefulness,
and in order to improve its functioning, several witnesses felt
that the Forum should become a more focused body, with fewer priorities
and clearer indicators to measure the success of commitments.
Eurocare and SHAAP suggested the implementation of a work plan
by the Commission, aligned to a set of core objectives agreed
by CNAPA and drawn up in consultation with Forum members.[212]
This would provide a practical framework within which commitments
could be made in the EAHF.
219. ScHARR suggested an alternative structure
for the EAHF which would separate discussions on alcohol health
policy from discussions on policy areas touching upon alcohol-related
harm more widely:
"One committee would focus on trade and,
where appropriate, implementation (e.g. for interventions impacting
directly on retail or production). Alcohol industry membership
would be confined to this committee where their expertise would
be utilised and legitimate interests addressed. A second committee
would focus on impacts on health and well-being, with membership
predominantly drawn from the public health and scientific communities."[213]
220. In the light of the evidence described above,
we question whether the Strategy's "multi-stakeholder approach",
so lauded by the alcohol industry, has actually been a success.
It seems that the enthusiasm about its functioning is rather one-sided,
while a successful model for cooperation, and in particular dialogue,
would require satisfaction by all partners. We believe that there
is merit in involving the industry at some stage of the policy
cycle. But steps must be taken to address the shortcomings we
have identified, in order to make the most of that involvement
and foster true cooperation, in place of the "polarised and
inefficient" debate that has arisen from the current arrangements.
221. Most witnesses were willing to accept industry
involvement at some stage and in some way. It therefore seems
to us that it is not the involvement of the alcohol industry per
se, but rather the nature of that involvement, combined with
the unclear mandate of the Forum itself, which is undermining
the EAHF. The EAHF is a valuable policy tool and should be retained,
but it should be made clear that it is a tool for the formulation
of voluntary commitments to support European alcohol policies,
not for setting policy objectives, which should be the role of
the Commission and Member States.
222. We recommend that the Commission restate
the remit of the EAHF and review its structure and functioning.
The terms of reference of the Forum should clearly state the roles
and responsibilities of all participating stakeholders, including
the alcohol industry.
The Science Group
223. The mandate of the Science Group is found
in Annex 3 of the Charter establishing the EAHF: "The main
tasks of the Group are to stimulate cross-EU networking of scientific
activities around the issues before the Forum and, on request,
to: provide scientific guidance
offer guidance on monitoring/
evaluation
provide in-depth analyses of key issues."[214]These
tasks include issuing Scientific Opinions when requested by the
EAHF. In the six years of the 2006-12 Strategy, only two such
Opinions were produced.
224. Prof Andersonhimself an expert
member of the Science Groupattributed this low output to
uncertainty about the responsibility and funding of the Group:
"The problem with the Science Group as it was formulated
was that it was never given a very clear mandate and it was not
sure what it was supposed to be doing. There was no money whatever
to support its work, so the two reports that it did were done
completely voluntarily."[215]
As a result, the Group's meetings became irregular and rare, with
attendance gradually decreasing until the Group became practically
defunct.
225. Prof Anderson also had concerns about
the selection of the Group's members, stating that they "were
not necessarily the ones you might want to discuss policy issues:
there were a mixture of people, who were chosen more to represent
different interest groups and to get people there."[216]
Mr Spillane noted that "After four years of the Science
Group, every meeting struggled to have a quorum and, in the end,
it was driven largely by scientists linked to organisations that
were able to fund their science. Consequently, you ended up with
probably the most polarised people sitting in these groups."[217]
226. In March 2014, a group of NGOs called for
the Science Group to be strengthened through, among other measures,
a new call for experts, additional financial means and improved
interaction with the EAHF and CNAPA. The NGOs emphasised the Science
Group's key tasks in "moving discussions forward that are
blocked due to a lack of conclusive scientific evidence"
within the EAHF and CNAPA, as well as "bringing together
top scientists in alcohol research".[218]
227. Some witnesses also suggested tasks which
a strengthened and well-resourced Science Group could carry out
in order to contribute more fully to the Strategy. These included:
"setting the scene in each EAHF session on the health consequences
of harmful use of alcohol and on new evidence published of interest
to the EAHF; identifying research gaps and priorities for EU funding
based on discussions with the healthcare members of the EAHF."[219]
Written evidence from public health NGOs added that the Group
could "ensure that EU alcohol policies are underpinned by
an up to date evidence base of effectiveness moving forward, and
that the evidence advising such policies is independently verified
and free from commercial vested interests."[220]
We welcome these constructive suggestions.
228. We agree that an independent Science Group
could make a significant contribution to EU action on alcohol-related
harm. It would address several of the concerns identified in this
report, including the tension between public health and industry
representatives in the EAHF, agenda-setting for EU-funded research,
and the development of a common evidence base through standardised
data collection. If it is to satisfactorily fulfil all these tasks
however, it will need to be re-established as an independent body
with adequate resources.
229. We recommend the re-establishment of
the Science Group, which should be independent from the EAHF and
include experts from all Member States. The Science Group should
receive adequate support as well as sufficient financial resources
from the Commission.
The relationship between supporting
bodies
230. The 2012 evaluation of the Strategy explicitly
pointed out deficits in the interaction between the bodies intended
to assist in its implementation. These findings were endorsed
and confirmed by several of our witnesses.[221]
When we asked them for their opinions on the structures in place
more generally, the unclear and at times troubled relationships
amongst the bodies, as well as between them and the Commission,
emerged as a concern shared by all sectors.
THE EAHF AND THE SCIENCE GROUP
231. The creation of the Science Group from within
the EAHF caused some concern among witnesses from the public health
sector. Most of these concerns related to the level of industry
influence in the Forum, which we have already described. Prof Meier
stated that "there is a very substantial industry representation,
so any reports that the Science Group sends to the Forum get filtered
through an industry interpretation process."[222]
232. We also received written evidence from several
public health NGOs saying that "the Science Group
would be better placed if it reported directly to CNAPA. This
would enable policy discussions on the evidence to support interventions
to reduce alcohol harm to be free from commercial conflicts of
interest
The Science Group of the EAHF should therefore
be re-established as an independent expert group, free from membership
from economic operators."[223]
We agree that, if the Science Group is to act as a broker for
discussions on scientific evidence, including within CNAPA, it
should have a status separate from the EAHF.
233. Ms Skar and Prof Anderson both
emphasised the need for a body similar to the Science Group, regardless
of the form it would finally take. Prof Anderson said: "What
the Commission needs is a scientific expert body on which it can
call and get scientific advice. Looking to the future, I would
find a way of reformulating the work of the science group; rather
than being the science group for the forum, it should be like
an expert or an evidence-based group for the Commission itself."[224]
Ms Skar added that "we do believe it is good to have
a Science Group, whether it is EMCDDA or the Joint Research Centre
or whether we let the Commission use their own. It is not so important
how it is organised, but we should have some body that is relatively
independent."[225]
CNAPA AND THE EAHF
234. There was feeling among industry EAHF members
that "it would be good to see the CNAPA and the European
Alcohol and Health Forum working more closely together."[226]
The WSTA and SWA were particularly concerned about the lack of
coordination between the two bodies, highlighting that there "is
currently little or no interaction between the Forum and CNAPA;
some Member States do attend the Forum meeting but attendance
is low and variable."[227]
SpiritsEUROPE added: "More information, communication, and
interaction between the Forum members and CNAPA would be welcomed:
there is no indication as to the level of awareness of CNAPA members
about the discussions, conclusions and, even more broadly, the
commitments made in the EAHF over the past seven years."[228]
235. Mr Acton confirmed this, albeit from
CNAPA's perspective: "For most of [the EAHF's] existence,
there has been almost semi-exclusion of the Member State role.
Although we have been notified of Forum meetings, sometimes we
do not get the papers, so we cannot decide how important it is
to attend. There is no formal process for seeking Member States'
opinions on Forum commitments."[229]
236. At the moment, the only document setting
out how CNAPA and the EAHF are to interact is the 2007 Charter
establishing the EAHF, which states, in a rather scant section
entitled 'relations with other structures': "The plenary
meetings of the Forum are open to members of [CNAPA and the Committee
on data collection and indicators]. Where the work of the Forum
is relevant to their agenda, the Committees may invite members
of the Forum to contribute to their discussion, alongside other
sources of input."
237. Based on the experience of our witnesses
from both the EAHF and CNAPA, it seems that the level of interaction
between the two bodies is insufficient and should be reviewed.
The WSTA and SWA commented: "It would be useful to have formal
exchanges between the two bodies. Forum commitments should be
on the agenda of each CNAPA meeting, and reciprocally, CNAPA members
should present Member States' national developments at Forum meetings."
Lundbeck Ltd suggested that the interaction between CNAPA and
the EAHF could be improved by "the presence of representatives
from the EU Trio Presidencies and CNAPA members at the EAHF meetingswho
could report back to CNAPA members on points of relevance".[230]
CNAPA AND THE COMMISSION
238. Mr Carlin argued that CNAPA would benefit
from a clear delineation of its responsibilities, as opposed to
those of the Commission. Specifically, he suggested that:
"a new energised and empowered CNAPA needs
to make clear to Commission officials that the Commission's role
is to support CNAPA's policy decisions, not to block, undermine
or even partially disown them as sometimes happensfor example
with the new Action Plan, where a bit of a battle went on behind
the scenes to get the Commission to include mention of CNAPA within
the action plan."[231]
239. Eurocare argued that "to date CNAPA's
view has not been awarded sufficient attention, with several calls
for a renewed EU Strategy since 2010 failing to result in action
from the European Commission
It is essential that the views
and priorities of CNAPA are given active consideration in developing
and implementing European alcohol policy."[232]
We agree, and believe the Commission should be more supportive
of CNAPA's role.
Conclusions
240. The bodies created under the EU Alcohol
Strategy 2006-12 have the potential to facilitate the exchange
of expertise and best practices across the EU, and therefore to
make an important contribution to EU alcohol policy. None of our
witnesses, many of whom had first-hand experience and were critical
of their functioning, suggested that any of the bodies should
be abolished.
241. Despite the contributions made by these
bodies, our evidence revealed significant problems with how they
operate in practice. Problems common to all bodies are a lack
of clear mandates and unclear relationships between them. Putting
the existing structures on a more formal footing may go some way
to addressing these concerns, including those surrounding the
relationships between bodies. In particular, a clear remit for
each body, including more limited priorities, could avoid the
duplication of tasks and thus waste of resources.
242. In the light of the evident tensions between
bodies, as well as between CNAPA and the Commission, further steps
are needed to encourage more active cooperation. We consider that
the nature and extent of relationships between the bodies should
be included in any document formalising the status of CNAPA and
an independent Science Group. Links between CNAPA and the EAHF
should be strengthened through regular exchanges and mutual representation
at meetings, while the administrative links between the EAHF and
the Science Group should be severed to ensure the latter's independence.
243. EU action on alcohol should continue
to be supported by bodies facilitating the exchange of expertise
and best practices, which is seen by many as the key benefit of
the EU Alcohol Strategy 2006-12.
244. We recommend that the roles and mandates
of CNAPA, the EAHF and the Science Group should be formalised
and reviewed periodically. In each case the role should include
a clear work plan in line with the stated objective of any future
EU action on alcohol abuse, as well as an explanation of the relationships
between bodies and the Commission, which should be agreed by the
Council.
190 COWI-Milieu, Assessment of the added value of
the EU strategy to support Member States in reducing alcohol-related
harm (December 2012): http://ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/docs/
report_assessment_eu_alcohol_strategy_2012_en.pdf
[accessed 24 February 2015] Back
191
EAHF, Charter establishing the European Alcohol and Health
Forum (June 2014): http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/alcohol/documents/Alcohol_charter2007.pdf
[accessed 24 February 2015] Back
192
Written evidence from the Advertising Association (EAS0015) Back
193
Q116 Back
194
Written evidence from Lundbeck Ltd (EAS0011) Back
195
Q158 Back
196
Written evidence from Alcohol Health Alliance UK (EAS0012), Balance
(EAS0017), Eurocare (EAS0006) and the Institute for Alcohol Studies
(EAS0002) Back
197
Written evidence from Alcohol Health Alliance UK (EAS0012) Back
198
The 15 Member States of the European Union prior to the 2004 enlargement. Back
199
COWI-Milieu, Summary report on commitments made by members
of the European Alcohol and Health Forum (October 2013): http://ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/docs/eahf_commitments_2013_en.pdf
[accessed 24 February 2015] Back
200
For example written evidence from SABMiller (EAS0009)and the Advertising
Association (EAS0015) Back
201
Q142 Back
202
Written evidence from the Advertising Association (EAS0015) Back
203
Written evidence from spiritsEUROPE (EAS0025) Back
204
Written evidence from the Advertising Association (EAS0015) Back
205
Written evidence from Eurocare (EAS0006) Back
206
Q47 Back
207
Q49 Back
208
Written evidence from the University of Sheffield Alcohol Research
Group (ScHARR) (EAS0014) Back
209
Written evidence from Eurocare (EAS0006) Back
210
Q30 Back
211
Q31 Back
212
Written evidence from Eurocare (EAS0006) and SHAAP (EAS0001) Back
213
Written evidence from the University of Sheffield Alcohol Research
Group (ScHARR) (EAS0014) Back
214
EAHF, Charter Establishing the European Alcohol and Health
Forum (June 2007), Annex 3, page 12: http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/alcohol/documents/Alcohol_charter2007.pdf
[accessed 24 February 2015] Back
215
Q9 Back
216
Q9 Back
217
Q136 Back
218
Eurocare, 'Call for the Science Group of the European Alcohol
and Health Forum to be strengthened': http://www.eurocare.org/library/updates/call_for_the_science_group_of_the_european_alcohol_and_health_forum_to_be_strengthened
[accessed 10 February 2015] Back
219
Written evidence from Lundbeck Ltd (EAS0011) Back
220
Written evidence from Alcohol Health Alliance UK (EAS0012), Balance
(EAS0017), Eurocare (EAS0006), Institute for Alcohol Studies (EAS0002) Back
221
For example written evidence from the Advertising Association
(EAS0015)and the Department of Health (EAS0019) Back
222
Q9 (Professor Meier) Back
223
Written evidence from Alcohol Health Alliance UK (EAS0012),
Balance (EAS0017), Eurocare (EAS0006), Institute for Alcohol Studies
(EAS0002) Back
224
Q9 (Professor Anderson) Back
225
Q165 Back
226
Q186 (Brigid Simmonds) Back
227
Written evidence from the Wine and Spirits Trade Association (EAS0016)
and the Scotch Whisky Association (EAS0020) Back
228
Written evidence from spiritsEUROPE (EAS0025) Back
229 Q240
(Crispin Acton) Back
230
Written evidence from Lundbeck Ltd (EAS0011) Back
231 Q116 Back
232
Written evidence from Eurocare (EAS0006) Back
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