CHAPTER 7: IS THE CASE LAW OF THE CJEU
UNDERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE OPT-IN PROTOCOL?|
132. We summarise below the six recent CJEU judgments
on, or relevant to, Title V and the application of the opt-in
Protocol, and then consider the inferences the Government and
expert witnesses drew from them.
Case C-431/11: UK v Council of
the European Union (the EEA case)
133. The UK, supported by Ireland, sought the
annulment of a Decision, adopted in the context of the European
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which extended the EU's acquis
on access to social security schemes to nationals of the three
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states (Iceland, Lichtenstein
and Norway) lawfully resident in the EU, and to EU citizens lawfully
resident in those EFTA states. It was adopted under Article 48
TFEU which provides for the adoption of "social security
necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers".
The UK argued that in defining the freedom of movement rights
of legally resident third-country nationals the Decision related
to the EU's common immigration policy and ought to have been adopted
under Article 79 TFEU to which the UK's opt-in applies.
134. The Council argued that the contested Decision
sought to extend the EU's acquis on social security systems
to EFTA States, which was "indispensable" to the main
objective of the EEA Agreement. This was aimed at guaranteeing
those nationals effective freedom of movement within the EU. Accordingly,
Article 48 TFEU was the appropriate legal basis.
THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING
135. In line with settled case law, the CJEU
held that the choice of a legal basis must rest on "objective
factors amenable to judicial review" such as the proposal's
aim and content. In this case this included the fact that the
EEA Agreement established a "special" and "privileged"
relationship between the EFTA States and the EU, which was designed
to provide the "fullest possible realisation" of the
EU's free movement principles within the EEA, "so that the
internal market established within the European Union is extended
to the EFTA States".
In addition, the CJEU pointed out that the contested Decision
not only regulated the social rights of EFTA nationals but also
EU citizens in the EFTA States. Without this legislation the free
movement of persons could not be exercised within the EEA under
the same conditions as those applying within the EU, which would
undermine the purpose of the EEA Agreement. In these circumstances,
the CJEU agreed with the Council that it was correct to adopt
the Decision under Article 48 TFEU.
136. The CJEU pointed out that legislation on
the EU's common immigration policy aimed to ensure "the efficient
management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country
and the prevention of
and trafficking in human beings".
These aims were "irreconcilable" with those of the Decision
when viewed in the context of the EU's relationship with the EFTA
Case C-137/12: European Commission
and the European Parliament v the Council of the European Union
(the conditional access services case)
137. The facts of this case turned on the application
of the common commercial policy to the Council of Europe Convention
on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of,
conditional access (the Convention).
A provision in the Convention stipulated that criminal penalties
were required to enforce a prohibition in the Convention.
THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING
138. Of relevance to our inquiry were the CJEU's
comments on the applicability of the opt-in Protocol to determining
the legal base of the Council Decision allowing the EU to sign
the Convention. The CJEU said that, contrary to the arguments
of the Council, the opt-in Protocol "was not capable of having
any effect whatsoever on the correct legal basis for the adoption
of the Decision".
It confirmed that the legal basis of the measure, to be assessed
according to the established case law of the CJEU, "determines
the protocols to be applied, and not vice versa."
Case C-656/11: UK v Council of
the European Union (the Swiss case)
139. The UK, supported by Ireland, sought the
annulment of a Decision which sought to coordinate the social
security schemes of the EU and Switzerland under the EC-Switzerland
Free Movement Agreement. The background to the litigation is disputed,
and is considered in the previous chapter.
140. The UK argued that Article 79 TFEU (an immigration
legal base under Title V) ought to be the appropriate legal basis
for the Decision because it concerned the rights of third-country
nationals residing legally in the Member States. It argued that
by not choosing this legal base the Council had denied the UK
its rights under the opt-in Protocol. The UK also argued that
Article 48 TFEU could not be extended to address third-country
nationals or economically inactive persons.
141. The Council said that the aim of the contested
Decision was to extend the EU's acquis on the coordination
of social security systems both to lawfully resident Swiss nationals
in the EU and to EU nationals residing lawfully in the Swiss Confederation.
The contested Decision was designed to implement the free movement
of persons between the EU and the Swiss Confederation in the same
way as it was implemented within the EU. As for the UK's opt-in,
the Council argued that the exclusion of the UK (and potentially
Ireland) from its scope could jeopardise the agreement's aims
and, by introducing a lack of uniformity, undermine the EU's obligations
to the Swiss Confederation.
THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING
142. In line with its established case law, the
CJEU said that the choice of legal basis for EU measures must
rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review including
the proposal's aim and content, and restated the significance
of the predominant purpose test. The CJEU added that the operation
of the UK's opt-in Protocol was not relevant to the question of
143. In rejecting the UK's application, the CJEU
noted that, according to its preamble, the aim of the EC-Switzerland
Free Movement Agreement was to bring about the free movement of
persons between them on the basis of relevant EU law. Both the
Agreement and the contested Decision were intended to benefit
Swiss nationals in the EU, and EU nationals in Switzerland. The
contested Decision's aim was to modernise, clarify and simplify
the rules on the coordination of social security systems, "in
order to preserve a coherent and correct application of the legal
acts of the European Union and to avoid administrative and
In the CJEU's view, it was "properly" adopted under
Article 48 TFEU.
Case C-43/12: European Commission
v the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
(the road traffic offences case)
144. The Commission sought the annulment of a
Directive designed to facilitate the cross-border exchange
of information on road traffic offences
and the cross-border enforcement of sanctions for such conduct,
on the grounds that it was adopted under the wrong legal basis.
The Directive was proposed by the Commission under the EU's transport
competence as a measure to improve transport safety; but it was
adopted by the Council in October 2011 as a JHA police cooperation
measure under Title V (Article 87(2) TFEU).
145. The Commission argued that Article 87(2)
TFEU applied to police cooperation designed to address the prevention,
detection and investigation of "criminal offences".
The aim of the contested Directive, however, was to organise the
exchange of information between the Member States on traffic offences;
it did not oblige the Member States to harmonise their approaches
to these matters nor were they obliged to criminalise the conduct.
In the Commission's view, the goal and the content of the contested
Directive fell within the EU's transport policy.
146. The Council, supported by a number of Member
States including the UK and Ireland, argued that the Directive's
aim was to protect legal interests such as life, physical and
mental health and property, matters which were usually protected
by the criminal law. In addition, given that the aim of the Directive
was to promote road safety by deterring behaviour regarded as
dangerous, the Directive dealt with criminal matters that could
not be classified as road safety norms within the meaning of the
EU's transport policy.
THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING
147. The CJEU repeated that the choice of legal
basis must rest on objective factors, such as the proposal's aim
and content that are amenable to judicial review, and reiterated
the importance of the predominant purpose test.
148. In upholding the Commission's application
the CJEU noted that the Directive's preamble said that its aim
was to "ensure a high level of protection for all road users
in the Union by facilitating the cross-border exchange of information
on road safety related traffic offences".
The Directive pursued this by introducing a cross-border system
for the exchange of vehicle registration information in order
to assist with identifying people who have committed the traffic
offences listed in the Directive; this was pursued regardless
of whether those offences were criminal or administrative. The
Directive's approach was based on the fact that financial sanctions
for road traffic offences were often not enforced in the Member
States if those offences are committed by a vehicle registered
in another Member State. In the CJEU's view, the Directive's aim
was clearly to improve road safety which was a "prime objective"
of the EU's transport policy. It therefore annulled the Directive.
The Commission subsequently proposed a replacement Directive with
a transport legal base.
Case C-377/12: European Commission
v the Council of the European Union (the Philippines case)
149. The Commission sought the annulment of the
Council Decision which provided for the signing of a Framework
Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and the
Philippines. The Commission proposed the Decision under Article
207 TFEU, relating to the common commercial policy, and Article
209 TFEU, on development cooperation. When the Council unanimously
adopted the contested Decision, in September 2010, it added a
range of additional legal bases, including Article 79(3) TFEU,
a Title V legal base which provides for the conclusion of "agreements
with third countries for the readmission to their countries of
of third-country nationals who do not
the conditions for entry
or residence in the territory
of one Member State". These are known as "readmission
150. The Commission challenged the addition of
these legal bases, arguing that they were unnecessary because
all the provisions of the Agreement, save for the part on trade
and investment, were designed to pursue the development of the
Philippines and did not impose extensive obligations distinct
from this development goal.
151. The Council, supported by a number of Member
States including the UK and Ireland, argued that partnership and
cooperation agreements sought to establish, between the signatories,
a "comprehensive relationship covering many different areas
As such, no particular area of the Agreement could be established
as "predominant", and a "specific or substantial
commitment requires the addition of a corresponding legal basis".
In relation to the section of the Agreement addressing readmission,
the Council argued that this imposed a clear legal commitment
that necessitated a specific legal base, namely Article 79(3)
THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING
152. The CJEU repeated the significance of analysing
the aim and content of the contested legislation and the predominant
purpose test; adding, that where it was established that a measure
pursues several objectives the "measure must be founded on
the various corresponding" legal bases unless their inclusion
led to incompatible legislative procedures.
In the CJEU's view, the Commission's application rested on the
question whether the sections of the Agreement covering readmission,
environmental and transport cooperation fell within development
cooperation or went wider, requiring specific legal bases.
153. In upholding the Commission's application,
the CJEU said that the primary objective of the EU's development
policy was the long term eradication of poverty by fostering sustainable
economic, social and environmental development in developing countries.
In order to qualify as a development measure, the Agreement must
pursue these goals. While development agreements will include
clauses covering various different matters this "cannot alter
the characterisation of the agreement, which must be determined
having regard to its essential object and not in terms of individual
154. The preamble of the agreement and its contents
illustrated that the intention of the contracting parties was
to promote sustainable development and the eradication of poverty.
The CJEU examined whether the provisions governing readmission
and the environment also contributed to the objective of development
cooperation. The CJEU noted that both migration and the environment
were among the many development activities envisaged by the Millennium
Development Goals and that the contents of the Agreement addressing
these issues reflected this. Regarding readmission, the CJEU pointed
out that the Agreement linked migration to development, and that
it did not "prescribe in concrete terms the manner in which
cooperation concerning readmission
is to be implemented".
This fact was reinforced by the requirement that the parties conclude
a readmission agreement "very soon".
Case C-81/13: UK v The Council
of the European Union (the Turkey case)
155. The UK, supported by Ireland, sought the
annulment of the Council Decision on the position to be taken
on behalf of the EU with regard to the coordination of social
security systems between the EU and Turkey. The contested Decision
was adopted under Article 48 TFEU governing the adoption of "social
necessary to provide freedom of movement
for workers". The contested Decision sought to repeal and
replace an existing measure covering the application of Member
State social security schemes to Turkish workers and their families
(Council Decision No 3/80) which, in turn, gave effect to the
aspects of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement, signed in 1963,
dealing with the free movement of workers.
156. The UK Government argued that the proposed
legal basis was incorrect because it ought to be applied to situations
governing the application of free movement principles to nationals
of EU Member States, and not, as in this case to third-country
nationals. In the UK's view, the Decision ought to have been adopted
under Article 79(2)9(b) of Title V TFEU, the common immigration
policy, which empowered the EU to adopt legislation defining the
freedom of movement rights of legally resident third-country nationals.
The UK distinguished this case from the Swiss case in that the
aim of this proposal was not to extend the provisions of the single
market to Turkey; rather, it was a measure "limited to updating
the limited rights presently enjoyed by Turkish workers"
under existing EU laws (Decision No. 3/80).
157. The Council, supported by the Commission,
disagreed, pointing out that the aim of the contested Decision
was not the development of a common immigration policy, but securing
freedom of movement for workers by providing for the partial coordination
of social security systems between the EU and Turkey.
THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING
158. The CJEU repeated its settled case law that
the choice of legal base must rest on objective factors that are
amenable to judicial review, including the aim and content of
the proposal, and that the application of the UK's opt-in has
no bearing on the matter.
159. In dismissing the UK's application, the
CJEU acknowledged that Article 79 TFEU empowered the EU to adopt
measures defining the free movement rights of third-country nationals,
but its purpose lay in the prevention of illegal immigration and
the trafficking in human beings. In contrast, the EU's relationship
with Turkey was aimed at securing the progressive free movement
of workers between them, and the contested Decision constituted
a further step in that relationship. In this context, it was clear
to the CJEU that the predominant purpose of the contested Decision
was not the pursuit of a common immigration policy designed to
ensure effective management of migration flows.
160. The CJEU did recognise the distinction between
the EU-Swiss relationship dealt with in case C-656/11, and accepted
that the purpose of the contested Decision was not to extend the
principles of the single market to Turkey. It agreed that Article
48 TFEU could not be relied upon as the sole legal basis. Instead,
the CJEU concluded that the contested Decision required two legal
bases: Article 48 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 217 TFEU,
which empowers the Union to conclude agreements with Third-Countries
involving reciprocal rights.
161. To that extent, the CJEU decided that the
legal basis for the contested Decision was incorrect, inasmuch
as Article 217 TFEU was omitted.
The Government's views on Title
162. The Government stated that these judgments
did "not have a significant impact" on its opt-in policy,
because none of the judgments had addressed the UK's principal
argument on the application of the opt-in Protocol to the determination
of the legal base of a measure with JHA content. 
163. The Government commented in more detail
on four of the cases in its written evidence:
conditional access services case: the UK did not argue
in favour of the citation of a JHA legal base, nor did it argue
that the existence of the opt-in Protocol meant that CJEU had
to approach how it determined legal base differently. This was
because the legal challenge related to whether a single market
or common commercial policy legal base should have been used;
the opt-in was largely irrelevant to this issue. The CJEU's conclusion
that Protocol 21 was not relevant did not come as a surprise to
the Government. The question of whether JHA content could be incidental
to a measure was not a material part of the CJEU's judgment.
EEA and Swiss cases: in both cases, the
UK challenged the legal base cited for the Decisions agreeing
a Council position on an amendment to social security provisions
in the EEA and Swiss Agreements. The CJEU was asked to consider
whether the Decisions were rightly adopted under an Article 48
TFEU legal base (free movement of workers) or whether they should
have instead been adopted under an Article 79(2)(b) TFEU legal
base (immigration policy). The CJEU decided that the Decisions
were rightly adopted under Article 48 TFEU as they were aimed
at ensuring the free movement of workers between the EU and EFTA
states and the EU and Switzerland, based on the close association
between the EU and those states. The Government said that both
cases related "specifically to whether the measures contained
JHA content", and that the CJEU's judgments were "narrowly
focused on the specific issues of the cases and did not consider
in detail wider issues relating to the application of the UK's
road traffic offences case: the Council
adopted the Directive on a legal basis under Title V TFEU (Article
87(2) TFEU on police co-operation) rather than the transport policy
legal base proposed by the Commission. The UK did not opt into
this measure. The Government said the CJEU's reasoning in this
case "is again open to differing interpretations. The CJEU's
conclusion focused mainly on the ultimate aim of the measure,
which was transport policy, and less on the content supporting
that aim, "which was clearly JHA". Again, the CJEU did
not properly engage with the UK's arguments that the existence
of the opt-in Protocol meant that it had to approach how it determined
legal base differently. This was because, in the CJEU's view,
this was a road transport rather than a JHA measure.
164. Of the Philippines case the
Home Secretary said the Government did not consider that the judgment
could be applied more widely to other agreements with third countries
where there was no overarching development co-operation aim. So
for other types of third-country agreements the Government would
continue to assert the opt-in to JHA content. Even where an agreement
promotes development co-operation, the Government believed that
the opt-in could also apply to agreements that had more extensive
JHA content than the Philippines agreement did.
165. John Ward, of the Legal Adviser's Branch
of the Home Office, said of the Turkey case:
"We do not believe that that judgment takes
us any further forward
because the court decided, as it
did in the EEA/Swiss agreement
that there is no JHA content
so the court has again definitively decided that it does
not want to deal with squarely and head-on the issue of the nature
of incidental JHA content. It is avoiding the issue, in our view
because it knows that ultimately our interpretation is going to
be the right one."
166. The Justice Secretary seemed less convinced
that the CJEU would ultimately uphold the Government's interpretation.
When asked whether he thought there were any grounds for thinking
the CJEU would change its approach, he replied: "Who knows?
The court has not really had to face up to this particular issue."
The views of the expert witnesses
on Title V case-law
167. The views of expert witnesses differed on
whether the CJEU could be said to be undermining the opt-in Protocol
by restrictively interpreting the scope of Title V.
168. On one hand Prof Cremona said that the CJEU's
approach in these cases was one that had been "adopted consistently
by the court over many, many years, both for internal measures
and for international agreements." It was "not something
especially crafted for the JHA and the protocol."
169. She said that the CJEU's approach to legal
base was also very much dependent on context. For example, its
approach to determining the legal base of an internal EU measure,
such as the road traffic offences Directive, was different from
its approach to determine the legal base of an international agreement:
"These two contexts operate in different
ways. In the second type of context, as in the Philippines,
the approach of the court, the predominant purpose test, will
have the effect of favouring broad expressed legal basestrade,
development, Common Foreign and Security Policy, et ceteraover
secondary legal bases. This means that Title V, the JHA, tends
to be used as a legal basis only for those international agreements
that are clearly sectoral in nature, such as a private international
law agreement or a readmission agreement, and not for agreements
that cover a multitude of different clauses and different provisions."
170. Prof Cremona thought this approach to determining
the legal basis of international agreements could be described
as "somewhat reductionist", because "it forces
the decision-maker to identify a predominant purpose and means
that the complexity of an agreement is not reflected in the resulting
it renders somewhat invisible the ancillary or secondary
171. Like Prof Cremona, Prof Barrett did not
see reason to criticise the CJEU's approach to determining legal
base in these judgments. He agreed that it favoured a single legal
base where possible. He thought the CJEU's decision in the road
traffic and Philippines cases could have gone either way,
but in relation to all of them he did not think "there would
be any doubt about the CJEU's sincerity on the conclusions that
172. Prof Chalmers, on the other hand, was critical
of the CJEU, and sympathised with the Government's concerns:
"Through a series of judgments that allow
the EU to engage in international agreements across almost all
areas of migration, asylum and humanitarian policy, you have the
possibility that the safeguards for the British Government position
that were negotiated under Protocol 21 have been largely eroded.
I think that is the political context that worries them. I am
sympathetic to that, and I think one can be sympathetic to that
on the basis that this was negotiated by both previous Governments
and this Government, and it is a long way from what was anticipated."
173. He found the distinction drawn by the CJEU
between immigration and free movement policies in the EEA and
Swiss cases "very ambiguous",
concluding that the CJEU had restricted Article 79 TFEU, the immigration
policy legal base, in an "unsatisfactory"
174. Prof Chalmers agreed with Prof Cremona that
"the development competencies and now the association competencies
have been developed so widely that they can subsume Title V".
On this basis he was critical of the CJEU's reasoning in both
the Philippines and Turkey cases, concluding that
it had given the Commission "a carte blanche"
in its interpretation of the scope of development and association
175. Prof Peers' opinion fell somewhere between
those of Prof Cremona and Prof Chalmers: he thought four of the
cases had been correctly decided; but that two, the road traffic
offences and Philippines cases, had not been. On the EEA
and Swiss cases he said:
"I have always thought that if you have
an association agreement between the EU and a third country, the
whole logic of the association agreement is that you are extending
some aspects of the internal law of the European Union to the
third country. If you are extending some aspects of the EU's internal
law to the third country, the legal bases to do that, if you are
taking individual decisions, such as on social security, are those
that relate to the internal policy measure. In this case it is
social security, what is now Article 48 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union. I would say that any association agreement,
not just those with the particular features of the European Economic
Area or Switzerland, such as the adoption of social security rules,
needs the legal base of Article 48. Therefore, no opt-out applies.
All member states are covered."
176. He noted that the concept of an association
agreement had existed since the EU's beginning, and that the UK
signed up to it when it joined in 1973.
177. On the conditional access services case
he thought the CJEU's judgment of the scope of the common commercial
policy power was a reasonable interpretation of the intention
of the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon to expand the scope of
that policy. He
did not think a Title V legal base was required: "The mere
fact that there is a brief mention of seizure and confiscation
on a purely ancillary basis, backing up the main prohibitions
of descrambling devices in the international treaty that was the
subject of that case I do not think is enough to make it a criminal
law measure as well as a commercial policy measure."
178. In the road traffic offences case he thought
the CJEU was not correct to rule that a measure concerning the
exchange of information on road traffic offences should only have
a transport policy legal base, because the issue fell within the
scope of either criminal law or administrative law depending on
Member States' different legal traditions. So there should have
been two parallel measures, following the precedent set by the
European Protection Order rules. As an alternative, a single measure
could have been adopted including JHA and non-JHA legal bases
(assuming that this was legally possible; the CJEU had not yet
ruled on this issue), indicating clearly in the preamble which
Member States were covered by which provisions.
179. Finally, as regards the Philippines
case he thought the CJEU was right to reject the Advocate-General's
argument that readmission issues fell within the scope of EU development
policy simply because of a political link made between the two
issues. The CJEU instead ruled that readmission issues fell within
the scope of development policy, even if they contained legally
binding obligations, as long as those obligations were not very
specific. This ruling was not entirely convincing, because it
failed also to consider whether the provisions in question contributed
to the development of the country concerned, which was the core
of the legal base:
"I cannot quite see how readmission treaties
help the development of the third country concerned. It has to
take its own citizensand, perhaps, citizens of neither
the EU nor that countryback on to its territory if they
have lived there in transit. I cannot see how that helps their
development. The mere fact that there is some EU legislationEU
soft lawthat refers to readmission as part of the development
process is not convincing. As the Court of Justice says in most
of its case law, the mere fact that the EU has taken one approach
in the past to the legal scope of its powers does not create a
precedent to bind the Court of Justice in future."
180. Prof Basilien-Gainche agreed with Prof Peers
that the CJEU's reasoning in the road traffic offences and Philippines
cases was unconvincing. She thought the CJEU's approach to determining
legal base was "defective", because it required it to
take a "formal and restrictive" approach to sensitive
provisions in the EU Treaties, particularly JHA policies under
181. Dr Bradshaw stated that: "the distinction
between ancillary and principal is very context-specific, and
it is quite a difficult question to answer when you ask whether
or not the court has reached the right conclusion, necessarily,
in each case."
182. We were grateful for the insights that our
experts provided into the CJEU's approach to determining the correct
legal base in these six cases. We found Prof Cremona's explanation
of the CJEU's reductionist approach to determining the legal base
of an international agreement particularly helpful.
183. We conclude that the CJEU's approach
to determining legal base in the six cases relating to Title V
does not differ from its established case law.
184. We agree with witnesses who have suggested
that the CJEU's approach to determining the legal base of international
agreements means that the complexity of an agreement is not always
reflected in the resulting choice: it renders somewhat invisible
the ancillary or secondary objective, including ancillary or secondary
JHA objectives. We understand why this would cause concern to
185. Nevertheless, this does not, in our view,
amount to a deliberate undermining of the safeguards in the opt-in
Protocol. We note that for internal EU measures on JHA policy,
the opt-in Protocol is a very effective safeguard for the UK.
186. The Government's view that these cases
do not have an impact on its opt-in policy lacks credibility.
We conclude that they have far-reaching implications for its policy.
134 Judgment delivered on 26 September 2013. Back
Para 49 of the judgment Back
Para 50 of the judgment Back
Para 63 of the judgment Back
Judgement delivered on 22 October 2013. Back
These are services such as TV or radio broadcasts that require
prior individual authorisation such as subscription, pay-per-view
and/or signal decoders. Back
Para 73 of the judgment Back
Para 74 of the judgment Back
Judgement delivered on 27 February 2014. Back
Para 62 of the judgment Back
Para 64 of the judgment Back
Judgment delivered on 6 May 2014. Back
The offences were: speeding, non-use of a seat belt, failure to
stop at a red traffic light, dink driving, driving under the influence
of drugs, failure to wear a safety helmet, use of a forbidden
lane, and the use of a mobile phone or communication device while
Para 32 of the judgment Back
Judgment delivered on 11 June 2014 Back
Para 24 of the judgment Back
Para 25 of the judgment Back
Para 34 of the judgment Back
Para 39 of the judgment Back
Para 58 of the judgment Back
Judgment delivered on 18 December 2014. Back
Para 24 of the judgment Back
Written evidence from the Home Office and Ministry of Justice,
para 38 (OIA0009) Back
Ibid.; see also Q49 (Teresa May MP). Back
Written evidence from the Home Office and Ministry of Justice,
paras 39-55 (OIA0009) Back
Written evidence from the Home Office and Ministry of Justice,
para 42 (OIA0009) Back
Written evidence from Professor Peers, para 17 (OIA0002) Back
Written evidence from Professor Peers, para 15 (OIA0002) Back