The UK's opt-in Protocol: implications of the Government's approach - European Union Committee Contents


CHAPTER 7: IS THE CASE LAW OF THE CJEU UNDERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE OPT-IN PROTOCOL?


132.  We summarise below the six recent CJEU judgments on, or relevant to, Title V and the application of the opt-in Protocol, and then consider the inferences the Government and expert witnesses drew from them.

Case C-431/11: UK v Council of the European Union (the EEA case)[134]

FACTS

133.  The UK, supported by Ireland, sought the annulment of a Decision, adopted in the context of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which extended the EU's acquis on access to social security schemes to nationals of the three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states (Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway) lawfully resident in the EU, and to EU citizens lawfully resident in those EFTA states. It was adopted under Article 48 TFEU which provides for the adoption of "social security measures … necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers". The UK argued that in defining the freedom of movement rights of legally resident third-country nationals the Decision related to the EU's common immigration policy and ought to have been adopted under Article 79 TFEU to which the UK's opt-in applies.

134.  The Council argued that the contested Decision sought to extend the EU's acquis on social security systems to EFTA States, which was "indispensable" to the main objective of the EEA Agreement. This was aimed at guaranteeing those nationals effective freedom of movement within the EU. Accordingly, Article 48 TFEU was the appropriate legal basis.

THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING

135.  In line with settled case law, the CJEU held that the choice of a legal basis must rest on "objective factors amenable to judicial review" such as the proposal's aim and content. In this case this included the fact that the EEA Agreement established a "special" and "privileged"[135] relationship between the EFTA States and the EU, which was designed to provide the "fullest possible realisation" of the EU's free movement principles within the EEA, "so that the internal market established within the European Union is extended to the EFTA States".[136] In addition, the CJEU pointed out that the contested Decision not only regulated the social rights of EFTA nationals but also EU citizens in the EFTA States. Without this legislation the free movement of persons could not be exercised within the EEA under the same conditions as those applying within the EU, which would undermine the purpose of the EEA Agreement. In these circumstances, the CJEU agreed with the Council that it was correct to adopt the Decision under Article 48 TFEU.

136.  The CJEU pointed out that legislation on the EU's common immigration policy aimed to ensure "the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals … and the prevention of … illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings".[137] These aims were "irreconcilable" with those of the Decision when viewed in the context of the EU's relationship with the EFTA States.

Case C-137/12: European Commission and the European Parliament v the Council of the European Union (the conditional access services case)[138]

FACTS

137.  The facts of this case turned on the application of the common commercial policy to the Council of Europe Convention on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access (the Convention).[139] A provision in the Convention stipulated that criminal penalties were required to enforce a prohibition in the Convention.

THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING

138.  Of relevance to our inquiry were the CJEU's comments on the applicability of the opt-in Protocol to determining the legal base of the Council Decision allowing the EU to sign the Convention. The CJEU said that, contrary to the arguments of the Council, the opt-in Protocol "was not capable of having any effect whatsoever on the correct legal basis for the adoption of the Decision".[140] It confirmed that the legal basis of the measure, to be assessed according to the established case law of the CJEU, "determines the protocols to be applied, and not vice versa."[141]

Case C-656/11: UK v Council of the European Union (the Swiss case)[142]

FACTS

139.  The UK, supported by Ireland, sought the annulment of a Decision which sought to coordinate the social security schemes of the EU and Switzerland under the EC-Switzerland Free Movement Agreement. The background to the litigation is disputed, and is considered in the previous chapter.

140.  The UK argued that Article 79 TFEU (an immigration legal base under Title V) ought to be the appropriate legal basis for the Decision because it concerned the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in the Member States. It argued that by not choosing this legal base the Council had denied the UK its rights under the opt-in Protocol. The UK also argued that Article 48 TFEU could not be extended to address third-country nationals or economically inactive persons.

141.  The Council said that the aim of the contested Decision was to extend the EU's acquis on the coordination of social security systems both to lawfully resident Swiss nationals in the EU and to EU nationals residing lawfully in the Swiss Confederation. The contested Decision was designed to implement the free movement of persons between the EU and the Swiss Confederation in the same way as it was implemented within the EU. As for the UK's opt-in, the Council argued that the exclusion of the UK (and potentially Ireland) from its scope could jeopardise the agreement's aims and, by introducing a lack of uniformity, undermine the EU's obligations to the Swiss Confederation.

THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING

142.  In line with its established case law, the CJEU said that the choice of legal basis for EU measures must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review including the proposal's aim and content, and restated the significance of the predominant purpose test. The CJEU added that the operation of the UK's opt-in Protocol was not relevant to the question of legal base.

143.  In rejecting the UK's application, the CJEU noted that, according to its preamble, the aim of the EC-Switzerland Free Movement Agreement was to bring about the free movement of persons between them on the basis of relevant EU law. Both the Agreement and the contested Decision were intended to benefit Swiss nationals in the EU, and EU nationals in Switzerland. The contested Decision's aim was to modernise, clarify and simplify the rules on the coordination of social security systems, "in order to preserve a coherent and correct application of the legal acts of the European Union and to avoid administrative and … legal difficulties".[143] In the CJEU's view, it was "properly" adopted under Article 48 TFEU.[144]

Case C-43/12: European Commission v the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (the road traffic offences case)[145]

FACTS

144.  The Commission sought the annulment of a Directive designed to facilitate the cross-border exchange of information on road traffic offences[146] and the cross-border enforcement of sanctions for such conduct, on the grounds that it was adopted under the wrong legal basis. The Directive was proposed by the Commission under the EU's transport competence as a measure to improve transport safety; but it was adopted by the Council in October 2011 as a JHA police cooperation measure under Title V (Article 87(2) TFEU).

145.  The Commission argued that Article 87(2) TFEU applied to police cooperation designed to address the prevention, detection and investigation of "criminal offences". The aim of the contested Directive, however, was to organise the exchange of information between the Member States on traffic offences; it did not oblige the Member States to harmonise their approaches to these matters nor were they obliged to criminalise the conduct. In the Commission's view, the goal and the content of the contested Directive fell within the EU's transport policy.

146.  The Council, supported by a number of Member States including the UK and Ireland, argued that the Directive's aim was to protect legal interests such as life, physical and mental health and property, matters which were usually protected by the criminal law. In addition, given that the aim of the Directive was to promote road safety by deterring behaviour regarded as dangerous, the Directive dealt with criminal matters that could not be classified as road safety norms within the meaning of the EU's transport policy.

THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING

147.  The CJEU repeated that the choice of legal basis must rest on objective factors, such as the proposal's aim and content that are amenable to judicial review, and reiterated the importance of the predominant purpose test.

148.  In upholding the Commission's application the CJEU noted that the Directive's preamble said that its aim was to "ensure a high level of protection for all road users in the Union by facilitating the cross-border exchange of information on road safety related traffic offences".[147] The Directive pursued this by introducing a cross-border system for the exchange of vehicle registration information in order to assist with identifying people who have committed the traffic offences listed in the Directive; this was pursued regardless of whether those offences were criminal or administrative. The Directive's approach was based on the fact that financial sanctions for road traffic offences were often not enforced in the Member States if those offences are committed by a vehicle registered in another Member State. In the CJEU's view, the Directive's aim was clearly to improve road safety which was a "prime objective" of the EU's transport policy. It therefore annulled the Directive. The Commission subsequently proposed a replacement Directive with a transport legal base.

Case C-377/12: European Commission v the Council of the European Union (the Philippines case)[148]

FACTS

149.  The Commission sought the annulment of the Council Decision which provided for the signing of a Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and the Philippines. The Commission proposed the Decision under Article 207 TFEU, relating to the common commercial policy, and Article 209 TFEU, on development cooperation. When the Council unanimously adopted the contested Decision, in September 2010, it added a range of additional legal bases, including Article 79(3) TFEU, a Title V legal base which provides for the conclusion of "agreements with third countries for the readmission to their countries of origin … of third-country nationals who do not … fulfil the conditions for entry … or residence in the territory of one Member State". These are known as "readmission agreements".

150.  The Commission challenged the addition of these legal bases, arguing that they were unnecessary because all the provisions of the Agreement, save for the part on trade and investment, were designed to pursue the development of the Philippines and did not impose extensive obligations distinct from this development goal.

151.  The Council, supported by a number of Member States including the UK and Ireland, argued that partnership and cooperation agreements sought to establish, between the signatories, a "comprehensive relationship covering many different areas of cooperation".[149] As such, no particular area of the Agreement could be established as "predominant", and a "specific or substantial commitment requires the addition of a corresponding legal basis".[150] In relation to the section of the Agreement addressing readmission, the Council argued that this imposed a clear legal commitment that necessitated a specific legal base, namely Article 79(3) TFEU.

THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING

152.  The CJEU repeated the significance of analysing the aim and content of the contested legislation and the predominant purpose test; adding, that where it was established that a measure pursues several objectives the "measure must be founded on the various corresponding" legal bases unless their inclusion led to incompatible legislative procedures.[151] In the CJEU's view, the Commission's application rested on the question whether the sections of the Agreement covering readmission, environmental and transport cooperation fell within development cooperation or went wider, requiring specific legal bases.

153.  In upholding the Commission's application, the CJEU said that the primary objective of the EU's development policy was the long term eradication of poverty by fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development in developing countries. In order to qualify as a development measure, the Agreement must pursue these goals. While development agreements will include clauses covering various different matters this "cannot alter the characterisation of the agreement, which must be determined having regard to its essential object and not in terms of individual clauses".[152]

154.  The preamble of the agreement and its contents illustrated that the intention of the contracting parties was to promote sustainable development and the eradication of poverty. The CJEU examined whether the provisions governing readmission and the environment also contributed to the objective of development cooperation. The CJEU noted that both migration and the environment were among the many development activities envisaged by the Millennium Development Goals and that the contents of the Agreement addressing these issues reflected this. Regarding readmission, the CJEU pointed out that the Agreement linked migration to development, and that it did not "prescribe in concrete terms the manner in which cooperation concerning readmission … is to be implemented". This fact was reinforced by the requirement that the parties conclude a readmission agreement "very soon".[153]

Case C-81/13: UK v The Council of the European Union (the Turkey case)[154]

FACTS

155.   The UK, supported by Ireland, sought the annulment of the Council Decision on the position to be taken on behalf of the EU with regard to the coordination of social security systems between the EU and Turkey. The contested Decision was adopted under Article 48 TFEU governing the adoption of "social security measures … necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers". The contested Decision sought to repeal and replace an existing measure covering the application of Member State social security schemes to Turkish workers and their families (Council Decision No 3/80) which, in turn, gave effect to the aspects of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement, signed in 1963, dealing with the free movement of workers.

156.  The UK Government argued that the proposed legal basis was incorrect because it ought to be applied to situations governing the application of free movement principles to nationals of EU Member States, and not, as in this case to third-country nationals. In the UK's view, the Decision ought to have been adopted under Article 79(2)9(b) of Title V TFEU, the common immigration policy, which empowered the EU to adopt legislation defining the freedom of movement rights of legally resident third-country nationals. The UK distinguished this case from the Swiss case in that the aim of this proposal was not to extend the provisions of the single market to Turkey; rather, it was a measure "limited to updating the limited rights presently enjoyed by Turkish workers" under existing EU laws (Decision No. 3/80).[155]

157.  The Council, supported by the Commission, disagreed, pointing out that the aim of the contested Decision was not the development of a common immigration policy, but securing freedom of movement for workers by providing for the partial coordination of social security systems between the EU and Turkey.

THE CJEU'S DECISION AND REASONING

158.  The CJEU repeated its settled case law that the choice of legal base must rest on objective factors that are amenable to judicial review, including the aim and content of the proposal, and that the application of the UK's opt-in has no bearing on the matter.

159.  In dismissing the UK's application, the CJEU acknowledged that Article 79 TFEU empowered the EU to adopt measures defining the free movement rights of third-country nationals, but its purpose lay in the prevention of illegal immigration and the trafficking in human beings. In contrast, the EU's relationship with Turkey was aimed at securing the progressive free movement of workers between them, and the contested Decision constituted a further step in that relationship. In this context, it was clear to the CJEU that the predominant purpose of the contested Decision was not the pursuit of a common immigration policy designed to ensure effective management of migration flows.

160.  The CJEU did recognise the distinction between the EU-Swiss relationship dealt with in case C-656/11, and accepted that the purpose of the contested Decision was not to extend the principles of the single market to Turkey. It agreed that Article 48 TFEU could not be relied upon as the sole legal basis. Instead, the CJEU concluded that the contested Decision required two legal bases: Article 48 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 217 TFEU, which empowers the Union to conclude agreements with Third-Countries involving reciprocal rights.

161.  To that extent, the CJEU decided that the legal basis for the contested Decision was incorrect, inasmuch as Article 217 TFEU was omitted.

The Government's views on Title V case-law

162.  The Government stated that these judgments did "not have a significant impact" on its opt-in policy,[156] because none of the judgments had addressed the UK's principal argument on the application of the opt-in Protocol to the determination of the legal base of a measure with JHA content. [157]

163.  The Government commented in more detail on four of the cases in its written evidence:[158]

·  The conditional access services case: the UK did not argue in favour of the citation of a JHA legal base, nor did it argue that the existence of the opt-in Protocol meant that CJEU had to approach how it determined legal base differently. This was because the legal challenge related to whether a single market or common commercial policy legal base should have been used; the opt-in was largely irrelevant to this issue. The CJEU's conclusion that Protocol 21 was not relevant did not come as a surprise to the Government. The question of whether JHA content could be incidental to a measure was not a material part of the CJEU's judgment.

·  The EEA and Swiss cases: in both cases, the UK challenged the legal base cited for the Decisions agreeing a Council position on an amendment to social security provisions in the EEA and Swiss Agreements. The CJEU was asked to consider whether the Decisions were rightly adopted under an Article 48 TFEU legal base (free movement of workers) or whether they should have instead been adopted under an Article 79(2)(b) TFEU legal base (immigration policy). The CJEU decided that the Decisions were rightly adopted under Article 48 TFEU as they were aimed at ensuring the free movement of workers between the EU and EFTA states and the EU and Switzerland, based on the close association between the EU and those states. The Government said that both cases related "specifically to whether the measures contained JHA content", and that the CJEU's judgments were "narrowly focused on the specific issues of the cases and did not consider in detail wider issues relating to the application of the UK's JHA opt-in".[159]

·  The road traffic offences case: the Council adopted the Directive on a legal basis under Title V TFEU (Article 87(2) TFEU on police co-operation) rather than the transport policy legal base proposed by the Commission. The UK did not opt into this measure. The Government said the CJEU's reasoning in this case "is again open to differing interpretations. The CJEU's conclusion focused mainly on the ultimate aim of the measure, which was transport policy, and less on the content supporting that aim, "which was clearly JHA". Again, the CJEU did not properly engage with the UK's arguments that the existence of the opt-in Protocol meant that it had to approach how it determined legal base differently. This was because, in the CJEU's view, this was a road transport rather than a JHA measure.

164.  Of the Philippines case the Home Secretary said the Government did not consider that the judgment could be applied more widely to other agreements with third countries where there was no overarching development co-operation aim. So for other types of third-country agreements the Government would continue to assert the opt-in to JHA content. Even where an agreement promotes development co-operation, the Government believed that the opt-in could also apply to agreements that had more extensive JHA content than the Philippines agreement did.[160]

165.  John Ward, of the Legal Adviser's Branch of the Home Office, said of the Turkey case:

    "We do not believe that that judgment takes us any further forward … because the court decided, as it did in the EEA/Swiss agreement … that there is no JHA content … so the court has again definitively decided that it does not want to deal with squarely and head-on the issue of the nature of incidental JHA content. It is avoiding the issue, in our view because it knows that ultimately our interpretation is going to be the right one."[161]

166.  The Justice Secretary seemed less convinced that the CJEU would ultimately uphold the Government's interpretation. When asked whether he thought there were any grounds for thinking the CJEU would change its approach, he replied: "Who knows? The court has not really had to face up to this particular issue."[162]

The views of the expert witnesses on Title V case-law

167.  The views of expert witnesses differed on whether the CJEU could be said to be undermining the opt-in Protocol by restrictively interpreting the scope of Title V.

168.  On one hand Prof Cremona said that the CJEU's approach in these cases was one that had been "adopted consistently by the court over many, many years, both for internal measures and for international agreements." It was "not something especially crafted for the JHA and the protocol."[163]

169.  She said that the CJEU's approach to legal base was also very much dependent on context. For example, its approach to determining the legal base of an internal EU measure, such as the road traffic offences Directive, was different from its approach to determine the legal base of an international agreement:

    "These two contexts operate in different ways. In the second type of context, as in the Philippines, the approach of the court, the predominant purpose test, will have the effect of favouring broad expressed legal bases—trade, development, Common Foreign and Security Policy, et cetera—over secondary legal bases. This means that Title V, the JHA, tends to be used as a legal basis only for those international agreements that are clearly sectoral in nature, such as a private international law agreement or a readmission agreement, and not for agreements that cover a multitude of different clauses and different provisions."[164]

170.  Prof Cremona thought this approach to determining the legal basis of international agreements could be described as "somewhat reductionist", because "it forces the decision-maker to identify a predominant purpose and means that the complexity of an agreement is not reflected in the resulting choice … it renders somewhat invisible the ancillary or secondary objective."[165]

171.  Like Prof Cremona, Prof Barrett did not see reason to criticise the CJEU's approach to determining legal base in these judgments. He agreed that it favoured a single legal base where possible. He thought the CJEU's decision in the road traffic and Philippines cases could have gone either way, but in relation to all of them he did not think "there would be any doubt about the CJEU's sincerity on the conclusions that it reached"[166]

172.  Prof Chalmers, on the other hand, was critical of the CJEU, and sympathised with the Government's concerns:

    "Through a series of judgments that allow the EU to engage in international agreements across almost all areas of migration, asylum and humanitarian policy, you have the possibility that the safeguards for the British Government position that were negotiated under Protocol 21 have been largely eroded. I think that is the political context that worries them. I am sympathetic to that, and I think one can be sympathetic to that on the basis that this was negotiated by both previous Governments and this Government, and it is a long way from what was anticipated."[167]

173.  He found the distinction drawn by the CJEU between immigration and free movement policies in the EEA and Swiss cases "very ambiguous",[168] concluding that the CJEU had restricted Article 79 TFEU, the immigration policy legal base, in an "unsatisfactory"[169] way.

174.  Prof Chalmers agreed with Prof Cremona that "the development competencies and now the association competencies have been developed so widely that they can subsume Title V".[170] On this basis he was critical of the CJEU's reasoning in both the Philippines and Turkey cases, concluding that it had given the Commission "a carte blanche" in its interpretation of the scope of development and association competencies.[171]

175.  Prof Peers' opinion fell somewhere between those of Prof Cremona and Prof Chalmers: he thought four of the cases had been correctly decided; but that two, the road traffic offences and Philippines cases, had not been. On the EEA and Swiss cases he said:

    "I have always thought that if you have an association agreement between the EU and a third country, the whole logic of the association agreement is that you are extending some aspects of the internal law of the European Union to the third country. If you are extending some aspects of the EU's internal law to the third country, the legal bases to do that, if you are taking individual decisions, such as on social security, are those that relate to the internal policy measure. In this case it is social security, what is now Article 48 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. I would say that any association agreement, not just those with the particular features of the European Economic Area or Switzerland, such as the adoption of social security rules, needs the legal base of Article 48. Therefore, no opt-out applies. All member states are covered."[172]

176.  He noted that the concept of an association agreement had existed since the EU's beginning, and that the UK signed up to it when it joined in 1973.

177.  On the conditional access services case he thought the CJEU's judgment of the scope of the common commercial policy power was a reasonable interpretation of the intention of the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon to expand the scope of that policy.[173] He did not think a Title V legal base was required: "The mere fact that there is a brief mention of seizure and confiscation on a purely ancillary basis, backing up the main prohibitions of descrambling devices in the international treaty that was the subject of that case I do not think is enough to make it a criminal law measure as well as a commercial policy measure."[174]

178.  In the road traffic offences case he thought the CJEU was not correct to rule that a measure concerning the exchange of information on road traffic offences should only have a transport policy legal base, because the issue fell within the scope of either criminal law or administrative law depending on Member States' different legal traditions. So there should have been two parallel measures, following the precedent set by the European Protection Order rules. As an alternative, a single measure could have been adopted including JHA and non-JHA legal bases (assuming that this was legally possible; the CJEU had not yet ruled on this issue), indicating clearly in the preamble which Member States were covered by which provisions.[175]

179.  Finally, as regards the Philippines case he thought the CJEU was right to reject the Advocate-General's argument that readmission issues fell within the scope of EU development policy simply because of a political link made between the two issues. The CJEU instead ruled that readmission issues fell within the scope of development policy, even if they contained legally binding obligations, as long as those obligations were not very specific. This ruling was not entirely convincing, because it failed also to consider whether the provisions in question contributed to the development of the country concerned, which was the core of the legal base:

    "I cannot quite see how readmission treaties help the development of the third country concerned. It has to take its own citizens—and, perhaps, citizens of neither the EU nor that country—back on to its territory if they have lived there in transit. I cannot see how that helps their development. The mere fact that there is some EU legislation—EU soft law—that refers to readmission as part of the development process is not convincing. As the Court of Justice says in most of its case law, the mere fact that the EU has taken one approach in the past to the legal scope of its powers does not create a precedent to bind the Court of Justice in future."[176]

180.  Prof Basilien-Gainche agreed with Prof Peers that the CJEU's reasoning in the road traffic offences and Philippines cases was unconvincing. She thought the CJEU's approach to determining legal base was "defective", because it required it to take a "formal and restrictive" approach to sensitive provisions in the EU Treaties, particularly JHA policies under Title V.

181.  Dr Bradshaw stated that: "the distinction between ancillary and principal is very context-specific, and it is quite a difficult question to answer when you ask whether or not the court has reached the right conclusion, necessarily, in each case."[177]

182.  We were grateful for the insights that our experts provided into the CJEU's approach to determining the correct legal base in these six cases. We found Prof Cremona's explanation of the CJEU's reductionist approach to determining the legal base of an international agreement particularly helpful.

183.  We conclude that the CJEU's approach to determining legal base in the six cases relating to Title V does not differ from its established case law.

184.  We agree with witnesses who have suggested that the CJEU's approach to determining the legal base of international agreements means that the complexity of an agreement is not always reflected in the resulting choice: it renders somewhat invisible the ancillary or secondary objective, including ancillary or secondary JHA objectives. We understand why this would cause concern to the Government.

185.  Nevertheless, this does not, in our view, amount to a deliberate undermining of the safeguards in the opt-in Protocol. We note that for internal EU measures on JHA policy, the opt-in Protocol is a very effective safeguard for the UK.

186.  The Government's view that these cases do not have an impact on its opt-in policy lacks credibility. We conclude that they have far-reaching implications for its policy.


134   Judgment delivered on 26 September 2013. Back

135   Para 49 of the judgment Back

136   Para 50 of the judgment Back

137   Para 63 of the judgment Back

138   Judgement delivered on 22 October 2013. Back

139   These are services such as TV or radio broadcasts that require prior individual authorisation such as subscription, pay-per-view and/or signal decoders. Back

140   Para 73 of the judgment Back

141   Para 74 of the judgment Back

142   Judgement delivered on 27 February 2014. Back

143   Para 62 of the judgment Back

144   Para 64 of the judgment Back

145   Judgment delivered on 6 May 2014. Back

146   The offences were: speeding, non-use of a seat belt, failure to stop at a red traffic light, dink driving, driving under the influence of drugs, failure to wear a safety helmet, use of a forbidden lane, and the use of a mobile phone or communication device while driving.  Back

147   Para 32 of the judgment Back

148   Judgment delivered on 11 June 2014 Back

149   Para 24 of the judgment Back

150   Para 25 of the judgment Back

151   Para 34 of the judgment Back

152   Para 39 of the judgment Back

153   Para 58 of the judgment Back

154   Judgment delivered on 18 December 2014. Back

155   Para 24 of the judgment Back

156   Written evidence from the Home Office and Ministry of Justice, para 38 (OIA0009) Back

157   Ibid.; see also  Q49 (Teresa May MP). Back

158   Written evidence from the Home Office and Ministry of Justice, paras 39-55 (OIA0009) Back

159   Written evidence from the Home Office and Ministry of Justice, para 42 (OIA0009) Back

160    Q41 Back

161    Q44 Back

162    Q45 Back

163    Q27 Back

164   Ibid. Back

165   Ibid. Back

166    Q9 Back

167    Q34 Back

168    Q36 Back

169   Ibid. Back

170   Ibid. Back

171    Q38 Back

172    Q9 Back

173   Written evidence from Professor Peers, para 17 (OIA0002) Back

174    Q9 Back

175   Written evidence from Professor Peers, para 15 (OIA0002) Back

176    Q9 Back

177    Q21 Back


 
previous page contents next page


© Parliamentary copyright 2015