154.In Chapter 2 we set out our understanding of the key elements that comprise and underpin the Union. In this chapter we consider what principles should guide consideration of the Union and devolution.
155.As we have previously noted, the process of devolution to date has proceeded on an ad hoc, piecemeal basis. There has been no overt effort to devolve power on the basis of an agreed set of principles. Akash Paun of the Institute for Government told us: “it is hard to identify clear and consistent principles that have guided the development of the territorial constitution.” He argued that: “it has meant that there was no clear guiding set of principles to ensure coherence of the constitution as a whole. We have now reached a point where there needs to be much more serious thought about what those principles should be.”
156.In general, our witnesses felt that establishing a clear set of principles would be helpful. Professor Charlie Jeffery, Professor of Politics, University of Edinburgh, told us that recent changes to the devolution settlements had been “entirely contingent on the persuasiveness or other means of the negotiating parties. This has not been a process driven by principle.” He argued that if the UK was to achieve an “enduring settlement … we need to start thinking about principle rather than the contingencies of negotiation processes.” Former Head of the Civil Service Lord Kerslake agreed: “A set of guiding principles about devolution, both UK and within England, is worth exploring.” He noted, however, that “It is easy to say it and harder to write it”.
157.Professor Adam Tomkins, John Millar Professor of Public Law, University of Glasgow, argued that:
“We really cannot carry on, in the United Kingdom, developing devolution or developing Britain’s territorial governance in silos. … Really for me the value of thinking about principles of union constitutionalism is that it gets us, or might help to get us, out of those silos and into the space where we can start thinking about the things that we have in common.”
158.Some of our witnesses felt that agreeing a set of principles could be unhelpful. Scottish Government Minister Fiona Hyslop MSP said that it risked ending up reflecting only the lowest-common denominator. She advocated instead a focus on “the exercise of power, behaviour and practice” and on positive examples of the administrations working well together. Lord Empey, Chair of the Ulster Unionist Party, warned of the dangers of over-prescription or inflexibility.
159.The UK Government Minister responsible for the constitution, Oliver Letwin MP, was similarly disinclined to formulate a set of guiding principles:
“I quite understand why it is that people … seek this theoretical underpinning. But … I do not share that yearning. The genius of the British constitution is that it has worked in practice, not in theory. In general, trying to theorise about these things and to lay down a set of general principles that is meant to be absolute, and at the same time are meant to apply in the same way to each of the different component parts, is an exercise which sounds like some sort of Cartesian cleaning of the Augean stables … it precipitates a whole series of further debates and discussions which are probably unproductive, and maybe even counterproductive.”
160.We disagree with the view that setting out general principles to underpin consideration of the Union and devolution would be unproductive. There is a strong case for creating a flexible framework, based on appropriate principles, as a guide to future action within which any further demands for devolution can be considered in a coherent manner. This would help to ensure that such considerations take into account the interests of the Union and of all four constituent nations of the United Kingdom, rather than proceeding in the reactive, ad hoc manner in which devolution has been managed to date. A guiding set of principles, while not prescriptive and still less absolute, would provide a yardstick against which the current devolution settlements, and any proposals for further devolution, could be measured and appraised.
161.The Silk Commission on Devolution in Wales put forward a list of principles with the intention of creating “a framework that could be applied to the consideration of any proposed future adjustments in the [devolution] settlement. This would be in contrast to the reactive and piecemeal nature of the development of devolution in the past.” It concluded that these principles should include “accountability, clarity, coherence, collaboration, efficiency, equity, stability and subsidiarity”. The Bingham Centre, in their draft Charter of the Union (see Annex B), put forward a similar list. We discuss the draft Charter in more detail in Chapter 6.
162.We do not intend to set out a comprehensive list of the principles that should govern the relationship between the Union and the devolved nations, and underpin any further discussions about devolution. Instead we consider some of the core principles that might be included on any list. The principles that we elaborate on below must not be treated by Government as a box-ticking exercise—they should guide the way in which the Government considers any future proposals for devolution, and inform any assessment they make of the impact of the current devolution settlements.
163.We identify six principles that could assist the assessment process: solidarity and diversity, which reflect the ongoing combination of unity and the accommodation of national differences in the Union; consent and responsiveness, which acknowledge the importance of taking account of the public’s wishes; and subsidiarity and clarity, which aim to ensure that power is allocated in a manner that leads to effective outcomes and that is coherent and comprehensible to the public.
164.A number of our witnesses referred to the principle of solidarity, which Professor Ailsa Henderson, Professor of Political Science, University of Edinburgh, described as “the common purpose of all within the state” or the “glue that binds citizens together”. The Silk Commission’s principle of ‘collaboration’ covers the same ground to some extent, but the principle of solidarity carries a deeper meaning: it is related to the unity of the state and to common identity. Witnesses saw solidarity in two principal ways. First, the redistribution of resources through the social union. Second, in social cohesion and the comity of relationships within the UK.
165.Professor Robert Hazell, Director of the Constitution Unit, University College London, described the first: “The social union provides the social solidarity that binds the Union together, by redistributing revenue and pooling and sharing risk through welfare benefits and through the pension system.” Professor Michael Keating, Professor of Scottish Politics, University of Aberdeen, referred to “territorial solidarity”, which he described as “the appropriate relationship of sharing among the various component parts of our political system”. He noted that “I do not think you need to go into deep-seated senses of identity or whether you feel British or not. It is a more practical question: how are we going to get a proper system for redistributing resources?”
166.Professor Jeffery was concerned that in this regard the concept of solidarity, of considering the good of the whole UK rather than simply the good of a specific nation, was breaking down:
“I think that there has been a loss of belief in the UK as a framework for solidarity and redistribution in Scotland, and quite likely in parts of England as well. More generally, it has been lost in England as an understanding of how to share this space with Scotland. Lots of the grievances that we reveal in public attitudes in England are about the sense that ‘our’ money is going to fund ‘them’. That is not a very promising way to invoke that kind of solidarity across a state.”
167.The second manifestation of solidarity goes beyond the simple redistribution of resources. Professor Keating argued that in a world where citizens are subject to multiple layers of government, from the European Union to the local level, it was important to build social cohesion “at all levels”. The Bingham Centre’s draft Charter states that governments within the UK should “cooperate with each other in a spirit of trust, fair dealing and good faith.”
168.Professor Henderson noted that the concept of solidarity is often linked with unity in the constitutions of federal states, but expressed scepticism that it was enforceable as a principle. Professor Nicola McEwen, Professor of Territorial Politics, University of Edinburgh, agreed: “In any set of relationships that kind of mutual trust has to be earned, learned and acquired through experience rather than something that can be a top-down measure.” Professor Henderson suggested one concrete expression of solidarity was “a harm principle—you can have difference but you will not do undue harm to either another constituent unit or residents in those units.”
169.This would seem similar to the proposal by the Smith Commission that there should be “no detriment as a result of UK Government or Scottish Government policy decisions post-devolution”. The Lords Economic Affairs Committee concluded that this principle was “unworkable … a recipe for future disagreement”. Many of their witnesses felt that “it could only work as a high-level principle” rather than being applied literally. We recognise that the no detriment principle cannot be used as a tool by which public finances can be adjusted to reflect the impact of differing policy choices. It may have use, however, as a way to help decision-makers apply the principle of solidarity to the everyday choices they face.
170.The solidarity that binds together the citizens of the UK as one people is essential to the Union. This is most clearly evident in the social union that provides for a pooling and sharing of resources across the UK. It should, however, guide the activities of decision-makers throughout the UK in a broader fashion: through comity and fair dealing. There is no way to legislate for, or enforce, solidarity but it is nonetheless vital to ensuring that the Union does not fall prey to division and an “us vs them” mentality. All those working in public service, at whatever level, must bear this principle in mind. This is particularly true in dealings over shared or concurrent powers, or in policy areas where decisions taken by one administration will have an impact on others. In these situations, solidarity means that the policies of one administration should not inflict avoidable harm on another nation or region.
171.While solidarity reflects the unity that is integral to the Union, this has always been accompanied by bespoke arrangements for governing each nation, long pre-dating the formal devolution of legislative powers (see Chapter 2). Bespoke arrangements continue to this day, and there are substantial differences between the powers granted to each of the devolved legislatures, and notably between the governance of those nations and that of England and its regions. This asymmetry of powers is one of the territorial constitution’s notable features.
172.Professor Jim Gallagher, Nuffield College, Oxford, told us that this was the result of the diversity of the nations of the UK: “different parts of the UK have demographic, economic and social differences. Things that matter in Wales might not matter in Scotland; things that matter in Northern Ireland certainly quite often do not matter in Wales and Scotland.”
173.Accommodating the diverse nature of the Union’s constituent nations can be seen as one of the guiding principles of the way the UK’s devolution settlements have developed over the last 20 years. Our witnesses generally felt that having a degree of diversity was justified because it allowed devolution settlements to be tailored to the needs of individual nations. Professor Tomkins told us that: “It would be counter-productive to seek to iron out the differences and to impose a single, uniform model on all parts of the UK. … What is good for Scotland may well not be good policy for Wales.”
174.Several witnesses argued that the asymmetrical settlements helped stabilise the Union by tailoring constitutional arrangements to each nation. Mr Colin Murray, Senior Lecturer in Law at Newcastle University, told us that: “it is entirely possible that persisting with the pre-1998 system of governance would have further destabilised the Union”. Professor Neil Walker, Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations, University of Edinburgh, felt that “asymmetry is both stabilising and inevitable in the UK context”, although he added that asymmetry had inevitable consequences for central government that had to be addressed.
175.Other witnesses saw the degree to which the devolution settlements had diverged as a source of concern. The Constitution Society told us that: “Asymmetry is not necessarily wrong in itself. But the particular form it has now taken has created uncertainty and is connected to various forms of political dissent, some of which are in tension with each other.”
176.Professor Hazell also expressed concerns:
“Asymmetry is a problem. It is a problem for two reasons. One is it is more difficult for citizens in different parts of the UK to understand their rights as citizens and their responsibilities if there is a different set of powers in different parts of the UK. Secondly, in an asymmetrical system, there is the risk of a game of leapfrog between the devolved countries, so that, if Scotland is offered something more, then Wales puts its hand up and says, ‘We want that too’, and Northern Ireland, and perhaps in time English cities or regions. Asymmetry possibly creates a dynamic that makes it harder to reach a stable and enduring settlement.”
177.Similarly, Professor Jeffery felt that asymmetry contained “at least the seeds of instability, because you tend to get spillovers from one part of the UK to the next, or senses of fairness or unfairness deriving from particular powers that one place has in comparison to another”, which made it “vulnerable, to put it crudely, to the next opinion poll.”
178.Other witnesses echoed Professor Hazell’s concern about one particular outcome of asymmetry: the level of complexity now evident in the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Sir Kenneth Calman, who chaired the Commission on Scottish Devolution, told us that the difference between settlements was confusing. He suggested that he “could not answer questions on Wales easily, for example” and that the “average person in the street will have difficulty with it”. This confusion has affected the workings of government: we heard during our 2015 inquiry into inter-governmental relations that there was a lack of understanding in the UK Civil Service about the differences between the devolution settlements in the different nations.
179.Public opinion on asymmetry is divided, but generally in favour of greater symmetry. Dr Jan Eichhorn, Chancellor’s Fellow in Social Policy, University of Edinburgh, told us that:
“If you ask people whether the arrangements for devolved powers should be the same everywhere across all of the parts that make up the UK, about 60% in Wales, Northern Ireland and England agree. Even in Scotland 50% say everyone should have the same, probably like the Scottish model. But it could be read the other way: even in England 40% say it is fine to have this disparity.”
180.The benefits of recognising the diversity of the UK’s different nations outweigh the potential confusion and public perceptions of unfairness that may result. However, the wider impact of asymmetry on the Union and on other nations in the UK must be properly considered as part of any assessment of devolution proposals.
181.The differences in the devolution settlements reflect the perceived needs and circumstances of each nation. They also reflect governmental decisions taken about devolution to Scotland and Wales in 1997. Any future proposal to devolve power should be assessed in light of the merits of devolving a particular power to a particular nation, as well as against its impact on the Union as a whole.
182.One clear principle that can be drawn from the development of devolution since 1997 is that devolution is delivered with the consent of the relevant nation. Professor Tomkins told us that “One of the absolute principles of devolution” is that “[it] is not imposed on parts of the United Kingdom that do not want it.” The conditions in which the consent of the people should be sought directly via a referendum, as opposed to the consent of their elected representatives, are not, however, clear.
183.While the creation of the devolved institutions was ratified by referendum in each of the devolved nations, there have been significant changes made to the devolution settlements since then for which referendums were not thought necessary (although in each case the devolved legislature has given its consent).
184.There have been no referendums on devolution in Scotland since 1997, although the substance of the debate leading up to the independence referendum in 2014 meant that it was widely regarded as being a choice between independence and the devolution of further powers.
185.There was a referendum in Wales in 2011 on whether the National Assembly for Wales should have the power to make primary legislation, and the Wales Act 2014 provides for a referendum on the Assembly gaining powers over income tax (consciously echoing the 1997 vote on tax powers in Scotland). In 2015, however, the UK Government announced that it would legislate to remove the requirement for a referendum to implement powers over income in Wales—raising the question of in what circumstances it is appropriate to require public consent by means of a referendum rather than agreement by a devolved legislature.
186.The principle of consent has become fundamental to the development of devolution in the UK, and should continue to be a guiding principle in the future. The circumstances in which changes to the devolution settlements require the consent of the people via a referendum are unclear. They should be clearly set out in any statement of these principles.
187.We consider issues relating to public engagement in more detail in Chapter 5.
188.In addition to this principle of consent, many witnesses agreed that devolution had been ‘demand led’—i.e. that the impetus for the devolution of powers had come from the nations themselves, rather than from the centre. Successive Governments have been responsive to national demands for devolution and this has been a driving force in defining how devolution has developed.
189.Some saw this responsiveness as a purely reactive response by the UK Government to a perceived threat from nationalism. Dr Ben Wellings, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Monash University in Australia, told us that: “If any underlying principle is discernible it is devolution as a response to nationalist pressure.” Professor Gallagher also described successive UK Governments’ approach as “if not tactical, then certainly reactive: that is, change happens—let us be blunt—when something happens in Scotland, and Northern Ireland marches to its own tune somewhere else. Typically, Wales is dragged along in the Scottish slipstream to the extent that it wants to be.”
190.If devolution was, at least initially, the result of a desire to assuage nationalist feeling, there are those who now argue that responsiveness to demand should be a guiding principle. Mr Letwin, in evidence to this Committee in July 2015, stated that not only should devolution settlements not be imposed without consent, but that the UK Government should, where possible, seek to meet all requests for further devolution:
“to the greatest possible extent, where people in any constituent part of the Union, or indeed in part of a constituent part of the Union—as in the case of Greater Manchester, for example—express the desire and clearly have the capacity to take a greater share of power over their own affairs, we should seek means of answering that positively and give them that power.”
191.We cannot accept that as a sensible way forward, particularly in relation to local and regional government in England. In any event, the First Minister of Wales felt there was little sign of this principle emerging from the UK Government’s dealings with the devolved nations: “there is a feeling in Scotland and Wales that powers have to be wrestled out of Westminster rather than there being a rational discussion as to what the future of the UK as a whole should be.”
192.The principles of demand and consent rarely extend to direct engagement with the electorate. As we note above, with the exception of the devolution of primary legislative powers to the National Assembly for Wales, the extension of devolution has—while being prompted by demand—not required any form of direct public consent from those affected.
193.While successive UK Governments have been responsive in general terms to national demands for greater devolution, they have proceeded in a fragmented way, rather than developing an overarching strategy within which devolution and the territorial constitution could be considered in the round. Peter Riddell, Director of the Institute for Government, stated that ‘demand led’ devolution “has undoubtedly been damaging, mainly because there has been an absence of thinking at the central UK level about these issues.” Other witnesses echoed this sentiment, criticising the ‘siloed’ approach to devolution that this engendered.
194.Devolution settlements have been ‘demand led’, with successive UK Governments responding to demands for greater powers and responsibility. While it is right that the UK Government listens and responds to the desires of the constituent nations of the UK, successive Governments have neglected their duty to do so in a manner that takes into account the wider needs and wishes of the Union and of all its constituent nations.
195.Subsidiarity is the principle that power should be exercised at the lowest level possible consistent with good government. The Silk Commission defined it as follows: “decisions should be made as close as possible to the people they affect, consistent with addressing the relevant matter effectively”. The Bingham Centre’s draft Charter of the Union includes a similar principle: that the different governments in the UK “should have powers that reflect the principles of autonomy and subsidiarity to the extent that they are best suited to providing for the particular needs of its people.” Several of our witnesses stressed that the exercise of power closer to the level of those whose lives it affects was a desirable result of devolution in its own right. We heard concerns about the centralisation of power within England and within Wales and Scotland since the creation of the devolved institutions, which suggests that this principle has scope to be applied more effectively within the constituent nations of the UK as well as at the level of the Union.
196.Many witnesses pointed to the principle of subsidiarity as the cornerstone of a principles-based approach. Dame Rosemary Butler AM, Presiding Officer of the National Assembly for Wales told us that: “the fundamental organising principle for the devolved settlements should be subsidiarity: the centre should reserve to itself only what cannot be effectively done at a devolved level.” This sentiment was echoed by other witnesses who called for powers to be devolved unless there was a strong argument against it.
197.Martin McTague, National Policy Vice-Chairman, Federation of Small Businesses, noted that from a business point of view subsidiarity was also desirable: “You are trying to get decision-making to the lowest reasonable level, where businesses can understand who is making the decision and they feel that they are in tune with conditions in their local market and local community”.
198.Subsidiarity is a principle that provides a useful benchmark against which to test any proposals for devolution. Where powers can be exercised more effectively at a lower level of government, then it should be open for those powers to be devolved. That is contingent upon the needs of the Union and the ability of the devolved body to exercise those powers effectively. Powers should not, however, be devolved solely because they can be—power should be devolved to a particular nation only when doing so would benefit the people of that nation or region and without detriment to the Union as whole.
199.The Silk Commission described the principle of clarity thus: “voters should understand where decisions are made and the settlement should be straightforward to operate”. The evidence we received made it clear that the devolution settlements are not well understood by the public. There are different factors that contribute to this general lack of public understanding. Two of these relate to the structure of the devolution settlements. First, the asymmetry of the devolution settlements obscures public understanding of where powers lie across the UK. Second, the complexity of the devolution settlements themselves means that the division of powers between central, devolved and local government in each devolved nation is hard to disentangle.
200.There is a lack of public understanding across all four nations. Amongst the devolved nations, it seems particularly acute in Wales with its complex conferred-powers model of devolution (albeit a model which is less complex than that used in 2006–11). The First Minister of Wales told us that, even though public understanding had improved, “it can be difficult for people to understand who does what. … People tend to assume now that the Welsh Government are responsible, even in areas where we are not”. By contrast, Sir Kenneth Calman felt that a lack of understanding led citizens in devolved nations to blame the UK Parliament and Government for everything. Kirsty Williams AM, leader of the Welsh Liberal Democrats, stated bluntly: “the devolution settlement at the moment is … about as clear as mud to the people.” It is not surprising, then, that the Silk Commission made clarity a core principle for future Welsh devolution.
201.Witnesses from Wales told us that the problem was exacerbated in that nation by the lack of Welsh sources of news, a situation which has existed since the end of the First World War. Jessica Blair of the Institute of Welsh Affairs noted that as Welsh newspapers had declined, people were increasingly accessing news from UK-wide sources, often based in England. Dr David S Moon, Lecturer in Politics, University of Bath, emphasised the problem:
“we have independent media—a Welsh media, with the Western Mail, BBC programmes, the Daily Post up north, but the readership and the people watching the programmes is small. The majority of the newspapers read are English … the coverage of Welsh politics is very poor. That is going to be an issue not because the media drive opinion but simply to explain how the system works.”
202.There is also a lack of clarity in Scotland. Lord Smith of Kelvin, in the foreword to the Smith Commission’s report, wrote that: “A challenge facing both [UK and Scottish] Parliaments is the relatively weak understanding of the current devolution settlement. This is not surprising given what is a complex balance of powers. With the enhancement of these powers, improved understanding is all the more critical to sustaining the trust and engagement of the public.”
203.Professor Colin Harvey, Professor of Human Rights Law, Queen’s University Belfast, noted that there was “scope for profound confusion” for the public in Northern Ireland due to the lack of clarity. He was echoed by Mark Durkan MP, former leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party: “it is very hard for citizens to understand where power lies and where the buck stops. That is very bad for democracy. We are giving people all sorts of layers of democracy and they cannot understand who is responsible for what. We all appear to point the finger at each other.” He noted that the confusion also extends to the role of European Union institutions.
204.A relative lack of public understanding of constitutional structures is not unusual; Professor Charles Lees, Professor of Politics, University of Bath, and Professor Henderson told us that levels of public understanding were low in many countries with multi-level governance structures.
205.A certain amount of complexity in the devolution settlements is inevitable, given the combination of devolved, reserved and shared powers in each nation. Yet it is important that the public understand where power lies if the democratic process is to work effectively. While voters can assess the outcome of public policies, they cannot accurately express a judgement on their elected representatives at the ballot box if they are ill-informed about the division of responsibilities between different levels of government. All those involved in developing devolution settlements should ensure that the division of powers is made as clear as possible, to aid public understanding of what responsibilities lie at each level of government.
202 ; see also written evidence from Paul Scott ()
204 ; see also written evidence from Professor Derek Birrell ()
211 Commission on Devolution in Wales (the Silk Commission), Empowerment and Responsibility: Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales (March 2014) p 26: [accessed 9 May 2016]
212 Silk Commission, Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales, p 28
213 Written evidence from Professor Ailsa Henderson ()
214 Silk Commission, Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales, p 28
217 ; see also (Ed Cox).
219 See Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, Draft Charter of the Union with Explanatory Notes, 2016 (included at Annex B of this report)
224 Smith Commission, Report, p 26
225 Economic Affairs Committee, paras 56-57
226 see also written evidence from Lord Morrow () and Dr Carlotta Redi ()
227 Written evidence from Professor Adam Tomkins (); see also (Sir Paul Silk)
228 (Professor Michael Keating) and (Alun Evans)
229 Written evidence from Mr Colin Murray ()
230 ; see also (Professor James Mitchell)
231 Written evidence from the Constitution Society ()
232 ; see also (Dr David S Moon)
233 ; see also written evidence from Justice for Wales () and Mr Paul Scott ()
235 Constitution Committee, ,Chapter 4; see also (Sir John Elvidge)
237 ; see also written evidence from Professor Arthur Aughey () and John Hartigan ()
238 In our report on referendums, we noted the inconsistency in the requirement for a referendum on the powers of the National Assembly for Wales in 2011 but not on the new powers for the Scottish parliament recommended by the Calman Commission. Constitution Committee, (12th Report, Session 2009–10, HL Paper 99) para 83
239 For example, see ‘Scottish independence: Cameron says No vote “not for status quo”’, BBC News, (15 May 2014): [accessed 14 April 2016], and ‘Scotland Votes to Stay the Same, and for Change’ Time (19 September 2014): [accessed 14 April 2016]
240 See comments by the then Secretary of State for Wales, David Jones MP, HC Deb, 31 Mar 2014,
241 HM Treasury, Spending review and autumn statement 2015 (27 November 2015): [accessed 7 April 2016]
242 (Professor Richard Rawlings), written evidence from Professor Robert Hazell () and Mr Paul Scott ()
243 Written evidence from Dr Ben Wellings ()
245 Oliver Letwin MP, Evidence to the Constitution Committee on 8 July 2015,
248 (Akah Paun) and written evidence from Professor Adam Tomkins ()
249 Silk Commission, Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales, p 28
250 Bingham Centre, Draft Charter of the Union, article 2.1 (see Annex B)
251 On England, see Chapter 8; regarding Scotland and Wales: (Brendan Donnelly), (Fiona Hyslop MSP), (Martin McTague), (Willie Sullivan), (Professor Philip Booth)
252 (Alexandra Runswick), (Sir Richard Leese), (Maggie Chapman), (Martin Sime), (Steve Thomas); written evidence from Scotland in Union ()
253 See, for example, ResPublica (), Professor Hazell (), Ed Cox (), Mr Martlew (), Scotland in Union (), Sir Jeffrey Jowell ()
254 Written evidence from Dame Rosemary Butler AM ()
255 (Willie Sullivan), (Martin McTague), (Paul Nowak), (Lord Porter of Spalding), (Sir Richard Leese)
257 Silk Commission, Legislative Powers to Strengthen Wales, p 28; see also written evidence from the Society of Conservative Lawyers () and Dame Rosemary Butler AM ()
258 See House of Commons Library, The UK devolved legislatures: some comparisons between their powers and work, Standard Note , November 2007, pp 15-17
259 ; see also (Sir Paul Silk) and (Dr Victoria Winckler)
262 See, for example, Carwyn Jones () and Andrew Davies ()
265 Smith Commission, Report, p 6; see also (Baroness Goldie MSP and Maggie Chapman)
267 ; see also (Sir Richard Leese and Lord Porter of Spalding)
268 Written evidence from Professor Charles Lees () and Professor Ailsa Henderson ()