Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy
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SUMMARY

Europe faces an increasingly unstable and dangerous neighbourhood. The continuing war in Syria, a humanitarian crisis in the region and the weakening of state structures have created a combustible environment, which has contributed to the refugee and migration crisis and the rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Meanwhile, the conflict in eastern Ukraine appears to have become frozen, and relations with Russia are dominated by sanctions. In such a moment of uncertainty and upheaval, the discipline of developing a new strategy is welcome.

First and foremost, a new EU foreign and security strategy must be underpinned by the recognition that the driving force in foreign policy is the Member States: it must provide the overarching framework for how Member States can act more collectively, and offer them the political framework to act within and through the EU.

A new strategy for the EU must undertake a forthright process of prioritisation, agreed by the Member States. It should set out where the EU should act, and take into account what means it has at its disposal. It must be driven by a sober assessment of the risks facing the Union, its security interests therein and a clear-sighted analysis of the resources the Union can bring to bear.

Such prioritisation must encompass a frank reappraisal of the EU’s international role. The EU has global interests—economic, climate change, the multilateral order—and must therefore have a global vision, and policy to support that vision. On the other hand, the EU is not a global security provider. In the foreseeable future, the most direct threats to the Union will stem from the instability and insecurity in the European neighbourhood and its periphery. We recommend strongly that a new strategy should focus on formulating a foreign and security policy for the wider neighbourhood.

To that end, the Union needs urgently to reassess its policies towards key countries in the neighbourhood, notably Russia and Turkey. We recommend that the EU and Member States should pursue a dual-track policy to Russia: this should encompass a coherent and credible response to Russian breaches of international law, while keeping open the potential for co-operation and dialogue on areas of shared interest. We find that the EU has not demonstrated a credible commitment to Turkey’s accession, but nor has it defined an alternative relationship. We recommend that the EU should review the relationship on the basis of first principles, and set the relationship on a strategic footing.

The strategy must also rebalance towards a more pragmatic promotion of values outside the Union. We do not recommend that the EU should pursue a purely transactional policy—such an approach would be unpalatable to many European citizens. We recommend that a reform agenda that promotes good governance, economic reform and judicial reform within partner countries is one that would support the Union’s security, and could assist the citizens of those countries to secure their political rights and improve their material conditions. The EU’s values are a component of its power, and underpin the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Member States should, therefore, endeavour to exemplify the EU’s values.
The EU must also improve the execution of its foreign policy. We find the option of _ad hoc_ groups very promising. They offer Member States a flexible format which could allow for ambitious and agile action. The new strategy should consider what logistical support such groups might require, and the mechanisms to ensure that _ad hoc_ groups can remain integrated with the EU.

Member States should use the instruments of the Commission more effectively. They are a comparative advantage in international affairs. The strategy should align the political priorities agreed by the Member States with the instruments of the Commission. It should also ensure that Commission instruments are deployed strategically, in areas of proven need and impact.

In a more threatening geopolitical context, the wariness of Member States to underpin their foreign policy with legitimate and proportionate military means has undermined the Union as a foreign policy actor. The Union has a challenge here: the demilitarisation of some Member States, due to declining defence spending and the lack of effective co-operation mechanisms between the EU and NATO, has reduced the chances of the Union developing an effective military deterrent capability. Addressing the strategic culture of the EU is beyond the scope of the strategy, but small steps to foster closer working relations and promote cultural convergence between the EU and NATO would be helpful.

We are convinced that, while Union faces daunting challenges, it also possesses formidable strengths. There have been two recent notable successes: economic sanctions on Moscow convincingly deterred further Russian aggression in the eastern neighbourhood, and the actions of the EU and its Member States were critical in securing a nuclear deal with Iran. When the Union speaks with one voice and wields its entire arsenal of foreign policy instruments, it can be an uncommon and exceptional actor.
Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. The European Union (EU) is undertaking a strategic reflection on its foreign and security policy. In June 2015, the European Council mandated the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (hereafter the High Representative) to:

   “continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016”.1

2. The basis of a new EU strategy on foreign and security policy will be the High Representative’s June 2015 report, *The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world* (hereafter the background report). The background report described a changed global environment. It listed five broad sets of “challenges and opportunities”: European Neighbours; North Africa and the Middle East; Africa; Atlantic Partnerships; and Asia. The background report suggested five key issues that the EU must address in order to improve the functioning of its external instruments: direction; flexibility; leverage; co-ordination; and capabilities.2

3. Such a process of strategic reflection was last undertaken in 2003 and resulted in the European Security Strategy (ESS).3 Since then, the external security environment facing the EU has deteriorated significantly and the context, as the High Representative asserted, has become more “contested and complex.”4 Mr Chris Sainty, Head of EU External Department, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), pointed out that the ESS had begun:

   “with the now slightly infamous words, ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.’”5

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5 Q 21
That language had not been “outrageously complacent” at the time, but the context had “changed a very great deal in the intervening period.”

4. We agree that a strategic review is timely and necessary. In order to pursue its interests and protect its citizens in the context of the return of geopolitics, instability in the neighbourhood, the diffusion of international power and persistent economic challenges, the EU will need to improve its capacity for strategic thinking and its execution of foreign and security policy. The strategic review provides the opportunity.

Structure of the report

5. Our report first considers the strategic review process and the critical components of a strategy for foreign and security policy (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3, we set out the background—a considerably altered internal and external context—to the drafting of a new foreign and security policy. Here we consider the major security threats facing the Union. We then turn to our witnesses’ views on the objectives of a new strategy and which factors should guide a process of prioritisation (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, we consider how the EU can effectively use its instruments to deliver its political objectives. We illustrate our evidence with case studies from the European neighbourhood.

6. We hope that our report will make a contribution to the process of strategic reflection, and thereby to the preparation of a new strategy on foreign and security policy.

7. The inquiry that led to this report was carried out by the External Affairs Sub-Committee, whose members are listed in Appendix 1. The Sub-Committee’s Call for Evidence, which was launched on 23 July 2015, is reprinted in Appendix 3. A full list of witnesses, including their affiliations, is printed in Appendix 2. We would like to thank all our witnesses, along with those who facilitated our visit to Brussels. A note of this visit is provided in Appendix 4.

8. Before the inquiry was launched, the Sub-Committee held a scoping seminar in July 2015, with Mr Nick Witney, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, Dr Spyros Economides, Associate Professor of International Relations and Deputy Director of the Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics and Political Science, Dr Joost Hiltermann, Program Director, Middle East and North Africa, International Crisis Group, and James de Waal, Senior Fellow, International Security, Chatham House. We would like to thank the participants at the seminar for their guidance and expertise. Finally, we are particularly indebted to Dr Kai Oppermann, our Specialist Adviser for the inquiry.

9. We make this report to the House for debate.
CHAPTER 2: STRATEGY MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Drafting a new strategy

10. The High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have been at pains to ensure that consultation on the development of the new strategy has been open and inclusive. Mr Pierre Vimont, Senior Associate, Carnegie Europe, and former Executive Secretary-General, EEAS, described “a very open consultation”, which included the “Member States, the think-tank community and civil society organisations.”7

11. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassadors of Germany, France, Poland and Italy and the FCO confirmed that they had been consulted by the High Representative’s team, and had provided significant input.8 Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO, former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, saw value in developing a consensus among Member States.9

12. Mr Henry Wilkinson, Head of Intelligence and Analysis, The Risk Advisory Group, pointed to the importance of public consensus and support for EU foreign policy. European countries had to “explain to people how the policy will work, that it will deliver results, and that … crises can be dealt with better or even pre-empted.” That, he said, should “be an integral part of the plan”.10 Mr Sainty agreed that a “credible strategy needs to be underpinned by a strong degree of public support”; the UK would look to “ensure that a range of British views and opinions are heard”.11 To achieve this, we believe that the engagement of national legislatures and the European Parliament will be critical. The European Parliament will feed into the new EU foreign and security strategy in the form of an own-initiative report. Its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) will adopt its draft on priorities for the new strategy in March, which will then be voted in the European Parliament plenary in April.12

Parallel processes

13. Several witnesses raised concerns about the simultaneous preparation of the strategy, reviews of other areas of external affairs policy, and about the unaligned timetables for the allocation of financial resources. Mr Vimont noted that reviews of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of states and development assistance were also underway. The result was that the EU lacked a “coherent, comprehensive geopolitical vision”.13 Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Professor Karen Smith, London School of Economics and Political Science, emphasised that there was a “mismatch between the setting of foreign policy priorities and the debates on the EU budget”, which was “unsatisfactory”.14

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7 Q 69
8 Q 22 (Chris Sainty) and Appendix 4: Evidence taken during visit to Brussels
9 Q 14
10 Q 9
11 Q 26
12 AFET held a hearing on 14 January 2016 with a number of experts from think tanks and academia. Details of the AFET hearing are at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet/events.html?id=20160108CHE00011 [accessed 8 February 2016]
13 Q 73
14 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi, Dr Nicola Chelotti, Dr Spyros Economides and Prof Karen Smith (FSP0006)
14. Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, expressed particular concern that the Commission’s publication of a new ENP was “uncoordinated” with the foreign and security strategy. Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG, Managing Director, Middle East and North Africa, EEAS, acknowledged that it was “slightly bizarre” that the EU was “producing a neighbourhood policy before we have produced our grand strategy.” The EEAS was trying to make sure the two strategies were “coherent”, but the separate timetables were “not ideal.”

Conclusions and recommendations

15. The consultation phase of the new strategy has been open and transparent, with a high degree of participation by academics and think-tanks.

16. Once the new strategy has been agreed at the European Council, the High Representative and the EEAS should reach out to the European Parliament and national parliaments to ensure they are informed and engaged. European legislatures could play an important role in reviewing the new strategy and ensuring coherence across EU external policy.

17. It is regrettable that the review of the ENP was out of step with the strategic review process. In her dual role as Vice-President of the Commission, the High Representative should ensure that a foreign and security policy strategy acts as a political framework to guide the policy and implementation of the ENP.

What type of strategy?

18. We heard wide-ranging views on what should constitute a strategy and what type of strategy would be useful for the Union. Dr Duke said the review should establish a “meta strategy”, by “outlining clear priorities” and make “the necessary linkages with existing sub-strategies.” Dr Westcott said the strategy should identify the “interests, values and priorities in terms of overall policy approach”, which would then govern “decisions on individual situations.” A “set of objectives and a list of things to do” was not his idea of a useful strategy.

19. Mr Wilkinson advocated that the EU should prioritise “specifically what needs to be done to realise the outcomes that it wants, such as what to do about Russian foreign policy and the situation in Syria”. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. also suggested a detailed approach: a new strategy should assess the “instruments and resources that are necessary” to achieve its agreed objectives “within a specified time frame”, decide on “directing the necessary resources” and set out which “specific instruments and institutional actors” should be devoted to implement the decisions. The PSC Ambassadors of Germany, France, Poland and Italy believed the strategy should be a political framework that could be used as an operational document.

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15 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
16 Q 103
17 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
18 Q 100
19 Q 1
20 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)
21 Appendix 4: Evidence taken during visit to Brussels
Objectives, ways and means

20. According to General Maxwell D Taylor, writing in 1981, a strategy consists of objectives (towards which one strives); ways (courses of action, concepts); and means (instruments) that can be used towards delivering the strategic goals.\(^2^2\)

21. Building on this definition, a new EU foreign and security policy strategy needs to achieve three things:

- First, the strategy has to spell out clear political objectives and priorities;
- Second, it must identify the ways and means. The ways are the formats and political processes through which the EU can act. The means are the resources and significant foreign policy tools the Union can employ. These include technical instruments of the Commission, access to the single market, and the diplomatic weight and military power of Member States; and
- Third, it must marry the ways and means to its political objectives.

Working to a clear framework, such as the one set out above, would set a benchmark for the strategy. The Union must be clear on what it wishes to achieve with the strategic process—it must define what success would look like. In our view, the strategy will be a success if it informs future decision-making by Member States, and improves the coherence of EU foreign policy and the functioning of EU instruments.

22. As a next step, the EU should use the strategy to align its policies, discipline its actions and prioritise its use of resources. It should therefore influence the planning and drafting of all relevant sub-strategies at the EU level. In our report, we offer evidence on a ‘grand’ strategy, and also provide some suggestions on practical implications for policy.

23. Finally, witnesses suggested that the implementation of the strategy should be kept under review. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. said that the new strategy must include a “feedback loop, with regular monitoring and assessment of progress made in implementation and achieving objectives, and adjustment of priorities and resources”.\(^2^3\)

Conclusions and recommendations

24. A new EU foreign and security strategy should introduce the overall strategic rationale for EU and Member State action. It should help the EU prioritise, and not seek to offer prescriptive policy suggestions on every issue. The goal should be to guide policy-makers to make better decisions on specific issues.

25. The strategy must also take a comprehensive view of EU foreign policy instruments, in particular of how the resources and instruments of the Commission can support the foreign policy objectives of the Union. Military capabilities should not be ignored. We hope that the


\(^2^3\) Written evidence from Federica Bicchi et al (FSP0006)
strategic review will also stimulate a discussion on how the EU and NATO can work together more effectively.

26. We recognise that Member States will continue to undertake their own sovereign foreign policies, but where appropriate they should use the new strategy as a framework to influence their policies.

27. We hope that the current level of engagement of Member States with this review means that national and EU foreign policy priorities should align more closely.

28. We suggest that a review should be undertaken every five years, in line with the term of the High Representative, in order to keep the strategy current and relevant to fluctuations in the EU’s strategic environment.

29. Clear goals and a more focused framework for action should build a more resilient EU. However, we acknowledge that crises intrude, events happen and plans fail. Member States will continue to face unexpected events, and their actions will have unpredictable consequences. The Union will not be able to predict the future, but the strategy should enable it to be flexible, agile and adaptable.

A focus on the neighbourhood

30. We believe that a key judgement that the new strategy must make is how the EU balances its global interests with the pressing insecurity in its neighbourhood, bearing in mind the practical considerations of the available resources and the political will of Member States.

31. Some witnesses argued that it was important for the Union to have a global foreign policy. Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham, told us that “Africa, together with the Middle East, should be the two main priorities.” In “2050 there will be two billion Africans, and if poverty and lack of security are still rife in some African states, they will migrate to other regions in the world, including Europe.”

32. Dr Anna Katharina Stahl, Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe, urged the EU to “formulate a regional foreign policy towards Asia”, as well as to consider the implications for the EU of China’s One Belt One Road initiative. Dr Thomas Henökl, Senior Researcher, German Development Institute, viewed the maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas as tests of the “EU’s credibility to mediate and its capacities [to police] respect of the rule of international law.” He proposed an ambitious role for the EU to “invest in orchestrating its partners worldwide” and promote regional multilateralism in the Asian-Pacific theatre.

33. Mr Sainty said the EU’s global interests demanded a global vision. The EU had, for example, very significant economic interests in China and the US. Furthermore, on “some cross cutting global issues such as climate change”

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24 Written evidence from Dr Catherine Gegout (FSP0008)
25 Written evidence from Dr Anna Katharina Stahl (FSP0016). The ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative is a development strategy to build co-operation and connectivity between China and countries on the traditional overland Silk Road (principally Eurasia) and the maritime Silk Road (countries on the sea routes linking China’s coastal cities to Africa and the Mediterranean and key ports in Southeast Asia and the Suez Canal). It was announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013.
26 Written evidence from Dr Thomas Henökl (FSP0014)
the EU was “unquestionably a global player” and had to be part of the “global dialogue and negotiation.” In many cases, that engagement might “be led more by the Commission than the External Action Service.” However, the “overwhelming foreign policy priorities of the EU” were the “problems and challenges” emanating from the eastern and southern neighbourhood.27

34. Other witnesses made the case for a more limited and regionally-focused strategy. Professor Karen Smith, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, drew a distinction between being a global actor and having a global foreign and security policy. The EU had a global role in areas such as “trade policy or even to a certain extent environmental policy”. In that sense, the EU was a global actor—but that did not mean, “particularly given the challenges around [the EU], that it should have a global foreign policy.”28 Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer in European Security, Aberystwyth University agreed that the EU was “a global power” but “not a global security actor”; in the security realm it was “more regionally focused”.29

35. The ‘wider neighbourhood’ was suggested as the region of importance for the EU’s new strategy on foreign and security policy.30 Professor Smith defined the wider neighbourhood to include the 16 countries of the ENP, the accession countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia), Russia and, turning to the south, the “neighbours of the neighbours”—the Sahel region, Iran and Iraq.31 We would add Turkey to the list. We use this definition henceforth.

36. Witnesses emphasised the security rationale for focusing on the wider neighbourhood. Mr Vimont advised us that the EU should focus on Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and the Sahel, because this was “where the threats [were] at the moment with regard to our own security and stability”.32 The refugee crisis had underlined for Dr Duke that the focus on the neighbouring regions was “not entirely a matter of choice.”33 Dr Federica Bicchi et al. agreed that the security threats of the region were now of such a magnitude that it was “imperative that the EU re-focus resources” into this region. The “conflicts in the region have created serious security threats (terrorist groups in particular) and the current refugee crisis, one of the largest in post-war history.”34

Conclusions and recommendations

37. The strategy is an opportunity to reflect on the EU’s international role and set its level of ambition. The Union has global interests and, therefore, a global foreign policy, but a realistic assessment must recognise that the Union is not a global security provider. A new strategy should draw that distinction.

27 Q 23
28 Q 5
29 Written evidence from Dr Alistair Shepherd (FSP0007)
30 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006), Dr Amelia Hadfield (FSP0013) and Dr Alistair Shepherd (FSP0007)
31 Q 5 The sixteen countries of the ENP are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine, Belarus, Libya and Syria.
32 Q 67
33 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
34 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)
38. The current security imperative is the pursuit of stability, security and prosperity in the wider neighbourhood. We recommend that a new strategy—formulating the objectives for the Union in the medium-term—should focus on the neighbourhood.

39. A foreign and security policy in the wider neighbourhood must be supported by clear political will and exercise of action by Member States. Moreover, the execution of policy will require significant resources and more command power, including the civilian and military tools of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
CHAPTER 3: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CONTEXT

40. We do not seek to offer a comprehensive vision of the external and internal context facing the Union, but to rank key external priorities and to pinpoint internal dynamics that a new strategy must take account of. The current challenges facing the Union—in particular terrorism and the refugee crisis—have been unexpected, and have caught the Union unprepared.

External security context

41. Witnesses painted a bleak picture of security in the neighbourhood and the direct impact on the EU. For Mr Wilkinson, the world was not getting more dangerous per se, but the countries in the “worst shape” were in the European neighbourhood or periphery. Foreign policy challenges in the neighbourhood were “of a very different nature and magnitude” from those of a decade ago. Professor Smith concurred that the neighbourhood was an “arc of crisis” surrounding the EU.

42. We consider below Russia and the rise of geopolitics, the fragile states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and terrorism. We then consider the handling of the migration and refugee crisis in 2015, and the role of the US in EU security.

Russia and the return of geopolitics

43. In its eastern neighbourhood, the Union faces a more aggressive and nationalist Russia, which increasingly views itself as antagonistic to Europe and the West. The illegal annexation of Crimea and the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty have redrawn the European map and led to the resurgence of power politics on the European continent. This Committee considered these issues in depth, in our report The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (February 2015).

44. Russia’s actions have dramatically changed the strategic landscape in the shared neighbourhood. Sir Robert Cooper found Russia’s breach of the “fundamental rule” that political international stability was based on territorial sovereignty “frightening.” For the Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, the Russian intervention in Ukraine, particularly the annexation of Crimea, was “not a precedent that we can simply sit back and pretend has not been set.” The Minister for Europe and Mr Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute, Wilson Centre, agreed that it was not clear that Russia genuinely recognised the right of sovereign countries that were once part of the Soviet Union to decide their own futures.

45. Russia has been disengaging from the West. Mr Lidington stated that “the Government of Russia have chosen to treat Europe more as a strategic adversary than as a strategic partner”, and suggested that the gradual integration of Russia into a rules based order could not be taken “for granted.

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35 Q 5
36 Q 21 (Chris Sainty)
37 Q 4
39 Q 18
40 Q 186
41 Q 186 (David Lidington MP) and Q 152 (Matthew Rojansky)
TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY STRATEGY

at all”. Mr Rojansky also noted that Russia had been actively reducing its economic interdependence with Europe and EU sanctions had reinforced that process. Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp, President of the Federal Academy of Security Policy, Berlin, agreed that the Russian attack on Ukraine “ended, once and for all, the partnership with the West”. In his view this was not a “bad-weather period but a fundamental climate change.”

46. It became clear in the course of our inquiry into EU-Russia relations that the current confrontation is driven both by Russian domestic and political considerations and the geopolitical ambitions of the current Russian administration. Even a settlement in Ukraine will not guarantee that the Union will be able return to harmonious relations with Russia. Therefore, the future of EU-Russia relations, the security of neighbours such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as well as the long-term alignment of countries such as Azerbaijan and Armenia—neither of which, in the words of Professor Elena Korosteleva, Mr Igor Merheim-Eyre, Ms Eske Van Gils and Ms Irena Mnatsakanyan, Global Europe Centre, University of Kent, “enjoys very close relations with the EU”—remain in the balance.

Fragile states in the Middle East and North Africa

47. Two trends have led to a combustible MENA region, with direct security consequences for the Union: the weakening of state structures and the rise of non-state actors. Dr Henökl characterised the MENA region as containing “ungoverned spaces”—areas where the state lacks administrative capacity to exercise effective control within its own borders. Dr Shepherd noted that such “ungoverned spaces” were “conflict prone.” He concluded that it was a key strategic interest of the EU to prevent, manage and resolve these conflicts.

48. It is widely accepted that weak governance and widespread economic and political grievances in the region provide the conditions in which extremism and violent non-state actors can flourish. Mr Lidington reinforced this point: a “well governed and prosperous” country would “find it easier to prevent and defeat terrorism and extremism” and would be “much less likely than a failing state to find that many of its citizens want to get out at almost any cost.”

Terrorism

49. A major security threat facing the EU today, and for the foreseeable future, comes from decentralised jihadist and extremist affiliates, most notably the so-called ISIL, also known as Daesh. Witnesses reminded us that the jihadist threat was not confined to Syria and Iraq. Mr Vimont said that ISIL was acting in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and was “slowly moving into other parts of the Sahel or the Horn, and probably Yemen.” He warned that “very close to our own territory, we have a major security threat”—a danger also highlighted by Mr Wilkinson.

42 Q 186
43 Q 154
44 Q 164
45 Written evidence from Global Europe Centre (FSP0019)
46 Written evidence from Dr Thomas Henökl (FSP0009)
47 Written evidence from Dr Alistair Shepherd (FSP0007)
49 Q 181
50 Q 68 (Pierre Vimont) and Q 6 (Henry Wilkinson)
50. Terrorism affects both the internal and the external security of the Union. Dr Henökl explained that Syria had become “a pole of attraction for radicalized youth from Europe to join the jihad under the banner of Daesh, the Islamic State, as foreign fighters”.51 The internal threat was underlined during our inquiry: on 13 November 2015, Paris suffered a significant terrorist attack with 130 fatalities.52 The perpetrators are alleged to have been citizens of the EU, and some individuals may have served with ISIL in Syria and returned to Europe.53

51. Support for security and stability in the MENA will be fundamental to both combating terrorism and delivering a sustainable response to refugee and migration flows. We turn to the EU’s role in building better governance in Chapter 5.

The refugee and migration crisis: an inadequate response

52. The unprecedented refugee and migration crisis that developed in 2015 has become one of the most pressing challenges for the EU.54 This crisis illustrates the capacity of external insecurity and conflict in the MENA region to degrade the internal security of Europe. The EU response, in turn, has demonstrated polarisation among Member States and the inadequacy of the Union’s crisis management capacities.

53. Dr Rosa Balfour, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, said that divisions between Member States had undermined the ability of the EU to address the challenge of refugees and migrant inflows.55 Mr Marc Pierini, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe, and former EU Ambassador to Turkey, Tunisia and Libya, Syria and Morocco, described a “flurry of uncontrolled events in the east and in the south”, to which the EU had “tended to be reactive more than organised.”56 Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Professor of Politics with reference to the Middle East, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, said that Member States had been “scrabbling around both individually and in concert”.57 Mr Rojansky reflected that the EU had “been caught, relatively speaking, unprepared”; the EU should ask itself what capacities it needed to deal with a “real security and humanitarian crisis” on its doorstep.58

54. Dr Balfour summarised the lesson of the refugee crisis:

“Perhaps never before has the evidence for the need for a stronger EU in the international arena been so compelling. Similarly, the domestic consequences of insufficient collective European capacity to respond to international crises have rarely been so evident.”59

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51 Written evidence from Dr Thomas Henökl (FSP0009)
53 ‘Paris attack: The latest on what we know about the suspects’, Financial Times (18 November 2015): http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/22a0f686-8c74-11e5-a549-b89a1dfddde9b.html#axzz3wBOWcGhu [accessed 1 February 2016]
55 Written evidence from Dr Rosa Balfour (FSP0021)
56 Q 46
57 Q 35
58 Q 151
59 Written evidence from Dr Rosa Balfour (FSP0021)
*The United States*

55. The posture of the US has shifted. Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Witney wrote that a “combination of fatigue, of increasingly insular public opinion, and of diminishing resources [had] undermined US willingness to act as a global policeman.”60 Professor Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics, Tufts University, agreed that the US was no longer hegemonically powerful and needed the EU “more than it did perhaps 15 or 20 years ago.”61 The US’s strategic priorities had also shifted toward Asia.62

56. Professor Menon and Mr Witney, as well as Professor Drezner, agreed that the US wanted and needed Europe to take on a greater role as an international and regional security provider.63 According to Professor Menon and Mr Witney, the US was “anxious that its allies take over more of the burden of maintaining security in their own backyards.” Washington had come to believe increasingly that Europeans would “need to work together more effectively within the EU.”64 Mr Lidington too noted a shift: on Libya and Mali, the US had been ready to say: “this is not going to be an issue where we are the first ones to step forward.” He also described a “growing sense of resentment in the United States” at the perception of “Europe consuming security … paid for by United States taxpayers.”65

57. Dr Kamp agreed with this assessment: there had been a “fundamental change on the other side of the Atlantic”, from suspicion of the EU developing its own military capacity to the current position, whereby the US was now unconcerned if the Europeans strengthened their defence capacities at the EU or NATO level—what mattered was that it happened at all.66

*Conclusions and recommendations*

58. The strategic review must recognise that the external security context surrounding the Union has deteriorated significantly. The US has long urged Europe to take more responsibility for its own security. The US has now become more open to the EU as a security actor distinct from NATO.

59. Migrant and refugee inflows are likely to remain a long-term challenge for the Union. So far, Member States have not agreed a collective response to this issue at the EU level. The fractious and polarised debates have battered the reputation of the EU and resulted in a muted response to a pressing security and humanitarian crisis. These internal divisions are likely to undermine Member States’ ability to achieve unity on foreign policy issues.

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60 Written evidence from Prof Anand Menon and Nick Witney (FSP0010)
61 Q 130
63 Q 130 (Prof Daniel Drezner) and written evidence from Prof Anand Menon and Nick Witney (FSP0010)
64 Written evidence from Prof Anand Menon and Nick Witney (FSP0010)
65 Q 179
66 Q 165
Internal context: economic weakness and internal tensions

60. The current internal context of the Union also has implications for the drafting of the new strategy on foreign and security policy and the capacity of the Union as a foreign policy actor.

Eurozone crisis and economic power

61. Power rests on economic success. Ernest Bevin is said, apocryphally, to have given a very practical example: “Our fighting men will not be able to achieve their purpose unless we get an adequate supply of coal.” President Obama has also emphasised the dependence of power on economics: “Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy.”\(^{67}\) This is particularly the case for the EU, which has relied on access to the single market as a source of its power.

62. A notable difference between the EU and the US is that the EU has never converted its considerable economic weight into effective hard power, in particular because many Member States have been opposed to that step. In contrast, the EU’s use of its economic strength in pursuit of foreign and security policy goals, and the demonstrable effect this can have on other countries, has been evident in its use of sanctions against Iran and Russia.

63. The travails of the Eurozone crisis have been well documented. As this Committee noted in its report, Euro area crisis: an update (April 2014), although the crisis has stabilised, significant economic weaknesses remain in the Eurozone countries, with consequences for all Member States. We explained that the crisis laid bare numerous divisions between Member States and provoked significant internal political conflict.\(^{68}\)

64. There have also been consequences for EU foreign policy. Professor Smith said that the Eurozone crisis had “been incredibly diverting of the attention of key players”; there appeared to have “been a lack of appetite for engaging in hard discussions about foreign policy.”\(^{69}\) While Mr Sainty saw no “obvious direct link” between the Eurozone crisis and the strategic review itself, he acknowledged that when EU leaders were “preoccupied by a difficult internal debate” there was “much less time and inclination to focus on foreign and security policy questions.” Throughout this period, however, the EU had “forged and maintained unity on sanctions against Russia”, and “contributed to successful outcomes in Iran”.\(^{70}\)

65. Several witnesses argued that the EU’s economic difficulties have had a negative impact on the perception of the EU by third countries. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. wrote that the Eurozone crisis had “damaged the EU’s standing and credibility in the eyes of many observers around the world”, although the Union still benefited from considerable soft power.\(^{71}\) Professor Drezner added that the continued debility of the Eurozone and the European economy had been a “turn-off” for countries considering joining the Union, and that this represented “a blow—an erosion of the EU’s normative power.”\(^{72}\) In

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\(^{67}\) Quoted in Prof Daniel Drezner, ‘Does Obama have a grand strategy? Why we need doctrines in uncertain times’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2011): [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011–06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy][1] [accessed 1 February 2016]

\(^{68}\) European Union Committee, Euro area crisis an update (11th Report, Session 2013–14, HL Paper 163) Q 8

\(^{69}\) Q 21

\(^{70}\) Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)

\(^{71}\) Q 133
contrast, Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham, did not believe that the Eurozone crisis had weakened the appeal of the EU as an important international actor.\footnote{Written evidence from Dr George Kyris (FSP0003)}

**Internal tensions**

66. The Eurozone crisis has been accompanied by a rise of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties across the EU, giving rise to damaging internal challenges to the Union. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. wrote that that this “current internal contestation of the EU (in many EU Member States) is damaging to its influence abroad”.\footnote{Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)} Professor Drezner said that the “greatest existential threat to the European Union” was “the Hungarian Prime Minister's articulation of the notion that liberal democracy as we know it is a failed model.”\footnote{Q 134 We note that the election victory of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland in October 2015 is another recent example for the rise of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties. Witold Waszczykowski, the foreign minister of Poland, has spoken of “curing” the country of “diseases” after “25 years of liberal indoctrination” ‘Haben die Polen einen Vogel?’, Bild (3 January 2016): \url{http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/ausland/polen/hat-die-regierung-einen-vogel-44003034,var=a,view=conversionToLogin.bild.html} [accessed 1 February 2016]} For Dr Kyris, these trends “might pose obstacles to common foreign policy objectives”.\footnote{Q 4} Professor Smith agreed that the “increase in contestation of the European Union from within” made it more difficult for Member States “to achieve unity to deal with the diffusion of international power.” She said that the decrease in internal support for the EU—both public and governmental—”also deprives it of legitimacy and ultimately decreases its soft power”.\footnote{Q 4}

**Conclusion**

68. The EU’s foreign policy has been built on its economic strength. The Union’s credibility and capacity as a foreign policy actor have been weakened and tarnished by the Eurozone crisis, persistent low levels of economic growth and the internal tensions of the European project. This will be an ongoing constraint on the EU as a foreign policy actor.

**Primacy of Member States**

69. Witnesses were clear that European diplomacy remained primarily a national affair.\footnote{Q 130 Prof Daniel Drezner related the memoirs of Richard Holbrooke. When he was negotiating the Dayton Accords, Member States urged him not to talk to the EU. Things have “changed somewhat but not that much”, he judged.} Member States have retained most of their sovereign rights in foreign policy: votes on foreign and security policy are mainly by unanimity, Member States have retained their national representations, and they have not transferred their military capabilities to the European level.

70. Despite decades of working together, Member States remain far apart in their threat perceptions, priorities and proficiencies. Our witnesses highlighted three critical divergences.
First, divisions over whether the EU should be a geopolitical actor at all. Dr Duke sensed “profound ambiguity” on this from the UK and France, which retained “pretensions towards a global foreign and security policy.” In contrast, Professor Smith explained that small Member States “have traditionally seen the EU as a good power multiplier. It is extremely useful to them.”

A second division was the geographical outlook of Member States. Mr Lidington said that some Member States had a narrow focus—for example, central European countries saw Russia and the eastern neighbourhood as the priority, while the Mediterranean countries looked south to Africa and the Near East, and others, such as France, the UK and Germany, had a more global outlook.

A third difference—not necessarily determined by the size of the state—was the capacities that Member States brought to the table and their appetite for foreign policy. This, for Mr Vimont, was the key distinction between Member States: those “with diplomatic capacity and resources and whether they have [an] active diplomacy”. In this context, he included, alongside France, the UK and Germany, countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Denmark, which undertook an “active diplomacy” and wanted “a very active European Union in the field of foreign policy.”

Divisions and disagreements among Member States have not receded. From the PSC Ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy and Poland, we heard that an enlarged European Council allowed for greater debate, but challenges and divisions remained unchanged—for example on controversial dossiers such as Russia and the Middle East Peace Process. Indeed, while Member States had always had different security interests, the crisis in Ukraine had shown that these might be more significant strategic differences.

We note that it also remains the case that some Member States, often those with a more global outlook and capable foreign policy instruments, are sceptical about the desirability of an EU global foreign policy.

Conclusions and recommendations

The starting point for a new strategy must be to recognise the ultimate authority that Member States retain over EU foreign and security policy, and to acknowledge their priorities.

Member States have not always formulated the necessary collective positions on key foreign policy dossiers, provided the necessary strategic direction or awarded the requisite resources to the EU.

The strategy should provide the overarching framework for where Member States could act more collectively at the EU level, and where the EU could support closer alignment between the foreign policies of Member States.

71. Divisions and disagreements among Member States have not receded. From the PSC Ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy and Poland, we heard that an enlarged European Council allowed for greater debate, but challenges and divisions remained unchanged—for example on controversial dossiers such as Russia and the Middle East Peace Process. Indeed, while Member States had always had different security interests, the crisis in Ukraine had shown that these might be more significant strategic differences.

72. We note that it also remains the case that some Member States, often those with a more global outlook and capable foreign policy instruments, are sceptical about the desirability of an EU global foreign policy.

Q 72 (Pierre Vimont) and written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
Q 4
Q 177 (David Lidington MP)
Q 74
Appendix 4: Evidence taken during visit to Brussels
76. **Member States and the High Representative must not allow the current crises and internal fissures to dilute the strategic review into a ritual exercise.** Our impression is that the necessary rigour and political will are not yet in evidence, either at the Member State or at the EU level.

**The ‘herbivorous’ power: political reluctance and reduced capability**

77. The EU is a weak military actor. National security and military and defence capacity are the responsibility of Member States, while the NATO alliance remains the cornerstone of European defence. Professor Drezner noted that on the military side, the EU “punches far below its weight.” Dr Duke agreed that one of the “main credibility challenges for the EU lies in its reluctance to embrace its hard security elements”.86

78. Witnesses also expressed concern about Member States’ investment in their military capabilities. Mr Rojansky described military capacity and planning as largely absent from European countries’ security and defence strategies: “step two in the plan right now is ‘call Washington’”.87 Member States have not been investing in their military capacity and as a result have not been meeting their commitments to NATO. Mr Lidington confirmed that roughly 70% of the NATO budget was funded by the US.88

79. In September 2015, after decades of decline in military spending, many European states pledged to increase defence spending towards 2% of GDP over the next 10 years. The UK confirmed this pledge in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in November 2015, and also committed to spend £178 billion over the next decade equipping and improving the armed forces.90

80. Witnesses doubted that the 2% pledges would have a meaningful effect. General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO, pointed out that many Member States had already been weakened by long-term under-investment in defence capacity; if the “European nations really want to deliver an effective deterrent capability, there is a very strong case that they need to increase defence spending [to] quite a lot more than 2% of GDP.”91

81. Dr Kamp pointed out that while “six European countries have increased their defence spending … six have cut it further”—including eastern European and Baltic states. General Sir Richard Shirreff agreed that many Member States “are still way below the 2% limit.”93

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85 Q 126
86 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
87 Q 158
88 Q 179
91 Q 110
92 Q 171
93 Q 110
82. The data are revealing. Among the Baltic states, Estonia alone already meets the 2% target. In 2015 Latvia pledged to reach the 2% target by 2020, up from the current defence budget of approximately 1% of GDP. Lithuania has pledged to meet the NATO target by 2020, whereas it currently only spends 0.8% of GDP on its military. It should be noted that both Latvia and Lithuania cut their defence budgets dramatically in the period of austerity following the financial crisis. Latvia cut its defence budget by 38% in 2009 and 16% in 2010, while Lithuania cut its military spending by 17% in both 2009 and 2010. In 2015, of the EU Member States which are also NATO members, only Estonia, Greece, Poland and the UK met the NATO commitment to spend 2% of their GDP on defence. Russia spends consistently between 3 to 4% of its GDP on the military.

83. We consider the possibilities for leveraging military capabilities—both EU and NATO—in Chapter 5.

Conclusion

84. In the new geopolitical context, reduced military capacity and the unwillingness of Member States to underpin foreign policy with the legitimate use of force undermine the Union as a foreign policy actor. This climate hollows out both the collective military capacity of the EU and that of Member States, endangering the security of EU citizens.

Germany: a reluctant leader

85. Leadership on the Eurozone crisis, the response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and the refugee crisis have propelled Germany into a leadership role—a role not sought, but one reluctantly accepted by Chancellor Angela Merkel. Professor William Paterson ascribed Germany’s increased role to the “declining capacity and will of France and the UK to play an active foreign policy role which potentially puts Germany in ‘the last man standing role’.”

Mr Rojansky suggested two reasons why, on Ukraine, the Germans had been “extremely reluctant, and in almost all respects [were] still reluctant, to respond in a decisive fashion”. The calculated reason was that Ukraine was “a mess” and, therefore, a considerable responsibility. The moral consideration was: “how can Germany, politically, morally and in every other way, choose to fight against Russia given its history?”

References

98 Q 174 (Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp) and Q 124 (Prof Daniel Drezner)
100 Q 157
86. Germany assumed a leadership role on Ukraine and in response to the refugee and migrant inflows, two crises which had a clear domestic impact. Germany has also been proactive on enlargement to the Western Balkans—another issue with domestic ramifications. Dr James Ker-Lindsay, Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science, and Research Associate, Centre of International Studies, University of Oxford, told us that Germany was the “key actor in the European Union” on enlargement—a role which would have been played by Britain five or 10 years ago. British and French absence in the Balkans had “created a vacuum which Germany has moved into, very effectively”.101 Mr Vimont saw “much more active German diplomacy”, prepared to act alone or with one or two other Member States.102

87. There has been an expectation from the US that Germany would assume a leadership role, and in particular the role of the German Chancellor in foreign affairs has come to the fore. Professor Drezner and Mr Rojansky agreed that the answer to Henry Kissinger’s question—‘who do I call if I want to call Europe?’—was now clear:103 the “answer is now Angela Merkel”.104 In the Ukraine crisis, “President Obama made it clear that he expected Germany to do the heavy lifting.”105

88. Dr Kamp sensed a slight shift in the German political and public mood to one more accepting of a German role in military conflict.106 In 2014 Germany—breaking with a 70-year-old tradition—sent arms to a live conflict in support of the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters opposing ISIL. In November 2015 the German parliament voted to support the military campaign against ISIL by deploying Tornado reconnaissance jets, refuelling aircraft and a frigate to the region.107 The German government will commit further resources to defence: in March 2015, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyden announced plans for a 6.2% defence spending increase over the period 2016–19.108

89. However, the overriding and habitual instinct among German leaders has been to resist the use of force even under multilateral auspices.109 The constraint on the use of military force is embodied constitutionally. It is also driven by a great reluctance amongst the German public to exercise military power.110 Therefore, while “Germany has been more assertive, it also has a clear set of policy preferences that are probably distinct from those of Great Britain and France, particularly with respect to the use of military force.”111

101 Q 139
102 Q 74
103 Q 136 (Prof Daniel Drezner) and Q 157 (Matthew Rojansky)
104 Q 130 (Prof Daniel Drezner)
106 Q 172 and Q 173
107 Reuters, Germany to support military campaign against IS after French appeal (26 November 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-germany-france-idUKKBN0TF0ZU20151126 [accessed 1 February 2016]
109 Q 124 (Prof Daniel Drezner)
111 Q 124 (Prof Daniel Drezner)
90. This posture restricts the fuller exercise of German foreign policy leadership. The reaction of some Member States to the German assumption of leadership on the refugee crisis—by offering asylum in Germany to refugees and leading a policy at the EU level for mandatory quotas for refugees and shared funding—could also deter further proactive steps: “Most of Europe seems to resent Germany’s decision.” Any future German leadership could be more contested both within Germany and among other Member States “precisely because of the degree of political blowback both within Germany and among other EU Member States”.

91. Mr Vimont also made the point that the UK and France were likely to remain important players in foreign and security policy, as permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and countries with significant military capabilities and wide-ranging diplomatic networks.

92. The importance of leadership and engagement from large Member States on foreign policy dossiers is discussed in Chapter 5.

The United Kingdom

93. The strategic review is taking place concurrently with the likely timetable for a referendum on the UK’s membership of the Union. The Prime Minister has stated his intention to negotiate reformed terms of membership for the UK and then to recommend these to the British people as a basis for remaining in the Union.

94. This report does not take a position on the forthcoming referendum. The Select Committee will produce a report in due course scrutinising the Government’s vision for Europe. In this report we have sought only to assess UK engagement on EU foreign policy dossiers and the consequences for both the EU and UK of a UK exit from the EU.

95. Witnesses indicated to us that the UK was engaged with the strategic review process. Mr Sainty said the FCO would “continue to engage fully and positively, including with this review”. Dr Westcott agreed that the “prospect of a renegotiation has not had any significant impact on the UK’s ability to input substantively to the strategy.” Witnesses in Brussels also assured us that British diplomats were robust in their defence of British interests and continued to contribute on foreign and security policy issues. The issue of the referendum had been separated from discussions on the strategic review.

96. On the other hand, evidence on the UK’s engagement on major EU foreign policy dossiers was varied. Mr Rojansky and General Sir Richard Shirreff described the UK as almost absent from the discussions with Russia on Ukraine. General Sir Richard Shirreff had picked up a “sense of surprise, disappointment almost, that Britain appears to be taking a back seat and not stepping up to the mark as a leader”. Looking more broadly, Mr Rojansky...
said the UK had “largely muddled around as part of a European consensus, occasionally as a critical voice in it, but mostly sowing confusion rather than increasing clarity.”

97. Mr Pierini noted that a “lot less” had been heard from the UK “in the foreign policy area in the EU since the debate on the referendum started”, but cautioned: “Who am I to establish a link there?”

98. On the other hand, we heard that the UK had played a significant role on the negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme in the format of the so-called E3+3.

99. For Professor Drezner, if the UK were to leave the EU, the “weight that … Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] would carry would be considerably less.” Dr Lars-Erik Lundin, Distinguished Associate Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and former EU Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna, had understood that Germany would “see the EU as much, much weaker after a UK exit.” For Dr Kamp, the implications of a British exit would be “severe”, not only for EU-NATO co-operation—it could lead to an “overall weakening of Western … security and defence”.

100. We also heard that a UK exit would have an impact on the UK’s own foreign policy: the UK and EU’s strategic interests are closely aligned and the EU is an important forum for protecting the UK’s strategic interests. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. argued that “outside of the EU, the UK would find it extremely challenging to protect its interests in a world that is increasingly multipolar.”

Conclusion

101. The UK is an important player in international affairs, and the EU has the potential to enhance UK influence. A UK exit would significantly limit the UK’s international reach, not least by removing the UK’s influence over, and access to, the Commission’s instruments of foreign policy. It would also diminish the foreign policy of the EU.

120 Q 160
121 Q 55
122 Q 55 (Marc Pierini) and Q 160 (Matthew Rojansky)
123 Q 125
124 Q 125
125 Q 162
126 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (ESP0006) and Dr Alistair Shepherd (ESP0007)
127 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (ESP0006)
CHAPTER 4: THE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

OBJECTIVES OF THE UNION

Clarity of purpose

102. A new EU strategy on foreign and security policy must establish priorities from a long list of potential objectives. Such prioritisation has not, in the past, been a strength of the Union. Professor Smith noted that previous strategies had tended to be “motherhood and apple pie-type things”, which “everybody could agree with”, and indeed “everybody has agreed with them, but no hard choices have been made.” Such strategies become “relatively unimportant” in policy-making.\(^{128}\) The Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister of Europe said the EU must avoid the “temptation to have a shopping list that grows ever longer”.\(^{129}\)

103. There are two significant obstacles to achieving such clarity of purpose. First, Member States remain divided and averse to making difficult decisions about shared EU priorities. Mr Vimont said setting priorities “was one of the most difficult challenges for Europeans. Every Member State has its own priorities”.\(^{130}\) Professor Smith pointed out that hard choices had to be made, but whether “28 Member States [were] capable of doing that [was] another matter”.\(^{131}\)

104. Second, and fundamentally, Member States have not articulated a coherent foreign policy vision for the EU. Mr Jan Techau, Director, Carnegie Europe, noted in a recent article that effective foreign policy was “not just about economic vibrancy, functioning institutions and military capabilities.” It was “also about conceptual firepower.”\(^{132}\) Mr Vimont has written that Member States have “never genuinely elaborated on the concept of the Union’s added value in foreign policy.”\(^{133}\)

Case study: EU policy on Turkey—strategic disarray

105. Turkey is particularly important to the security of the Union and is a potentially valuable regional partner. Mr Lidington noted Turkey has been “a member of NATO for decades” and is a “significant player in the politics of the Near East but also a country with significant reach into Africa”.\(^{134}\)

106. The offer to Turkey of membership of the Union has been undermined. In September 1963, the then six Members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement.\(^{135}\) It aimed, in part, to facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EEC at a later date. The 1999 Helsinki Council Conclusions noted that Turkey was a “candidate state destined to join the Union.”\(^{136}\) Accession negotiations started in 2005, but as

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\(^{128}\) Q 1

\(^{129}\) Q 180

\(^{130}\) Q 67

\(^{131}\) See also written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002) and Dr Alistair Shepherd (FSP0007)


\(^{134}\) Q 183


Mr Pierini pointed out, certain key Member States, including France, were “harshly against Turkey’s accession”, for “domestic political reasons.” On 15 October 2015 German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated: “I have always been against EU membership, President (Tayyip) Erdoğan knows this, and I still am.”

107. Member States have failed to articulate what alternatives to full membership could look like. Mr Pierini told us that “for years, if not decades, we [EU and Member States] have been trapped into accession … and the Turks themselves were trapped.” This has been “detrimental to a strategic approach” and to EU leverage on Turkey: if the EU had conducted the negotiations on membership “in fairness, [the EU] would have had an influence on the shape of Turkish reforms, both economic and political.”

108. Mr Lidington and Mr Meredith, Head of Strategy and Policy, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, disagreed. Mr Lidington characterised Turkey as both a “candidate for EU accession and a strategic partner”, and described the two roles as “complementary.” Mr Meredith said that accession was “the best available path for the future of EU-Turkey relations”, though there were also “other avenues to support the broader political relationship.”

109. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) regained a parliamentary majority on 1 November 2015, presenting the EU with a more acute dilemma. The “liberal reform agenda” had “almost disappeared” said Professor Adam Fagan, Professor of European Politics, Queen Mary, University of London.

110. Against this backdrop, witnesses questioned the efficacy of accession negotiations. Dr Ker-Lindsay judged that President Erdoğan had “taken Turkey in a completely different direction”, and by “any reasonable measure, [the EU] should not be talking about Turkish membership of the European Union. It should be off the table.” He could not see how EU accession was “now going to bring about any fundamental reforms.” Mr Pierini agreed that accession negotiations were having little impact in securing compliance with European standards of governance. He surveyed the freedom of the press, rule of law, independence of the judiciary and the role of the President in Turkey, and concluded that “none of it is what we believe in.” The “tactical game” within accession negotiations was not working, and the EU had “to find another way to approach Turkey.”

111. By contrast, Professor Fagan said there had “never been a more compelling time to keep EU membership for Turkey on the table”: the “gauntlet must be thrown down.” He saw the accession process as an effective tool to promote reform, provided that the EU was clear in its demands and chose the chapters to be opened “very carefully, in consultation with Ankara”.

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137 Q 50
139 Q 50
140 Q 183
141 Q 84
142 Q 148
143 Q 146
144 Q 52
145 Q 147
By doing so, the EU “could make a huge difference to instigating a liberal reform agenda”.  

112. Mr Lidington acknowledged the challenges within Turkey, but also believed that “the best way to address the issues of the rule of law and human rights” was through the EU accession process. While the EU “should not ignore the challenges or pretend that they do not exist”, accession was “the way forward.”

113. The 2015 refugee and migration crisis and the rise of ISIL have brought the role of Turkey as a critical ‘buffer state’ to the forefront. In response, EU policy-makers have beaten a path to Ankara and undertaken their own individual diplomacy. Mr Pierini made a list: on 12 September Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, went to Ankara (without taking the External Action Service with him); on 18 September the German Foreign Minister, the Austrian Foreign Minister and the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg were trampling on each other in Ankara on virtually the same day.” Next, a “high level … official mission went, last week Mr Timmermans went, together with two other Commissioners, and this afternoon [20 October] another high official mission is going. Everybody is running around.” That afternoon (20 October), Mr Meredith explained, his director was on a plane to Turkey.

114. Meanwhile, on 19 October, Angela Merkel said she had reconsidered her opposition to Turkish membership and supported the acceleration of talks on accession and visa liberalisation. The Turks, Mr Pierini told us, were “rejoicing at this complete mess … Everybody has gone there begging.”

115. The result of all this diplomacy was the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, agreed by the European Council on 15 October 2015. The Action Plan proposed a series of short and medium term measures to be implemented by the EU and Turkey to support refugees and their host communities in Turkey, prevent further irregular migration flows, and improve EU-Turkey co-operation in the field of migration and refugee management. Member States met some of Turkey’s long-standing demands: the accession process would be “re-energized” and Member States committed to “accelerating the fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap.” A €3 billion Refugee Facility was also promised to help Turkey to manage the presence of Syrians in Turkey.

116. This sequence of events, in our opinion, exemplifies reactive and uncoordinated policy-making, raising expectations on membership without...
unity among Member States, while possibly committing more than can be delivered—in particular visa-liberalisation and considerable financial support.\textsuperscript{156} It is also transactional: the Joint Action Plan makes no mention of the Copenhagen criteria—the accession criteria which require a state to guarantee inter alia “democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”\textsuperscript{157}

Conclusions and recommendations

117. The EU’s adoption of the EU-Turkey Action Plan, in response to the refugee and Syria crises, fails to disguise the lack of consensus among Member States on their objectives and tactics on Turkey.

118. Member States have long been divided in their vision for Turkey, have not articulated the end goal of the EU-Turkey relationship, and have not assessed the threats inherent in their current policy. The EU has not demonstrated a credible commitment to Turkey’s accession, nor has it defined an alternative relationship.

119. We consider that the EU should revisit the whole EU-Turkey relationship, on the basis of first principles. This should be a priority for the new strategy on foreign and security policy.

120. We urge the UK, as a supporter of Turkish accession to the EU, to initiate a review process at the EU level—perhaps led by the High Representative—with a view to reinvigorating relations with Turkey and setting the partnership on a more strategic footing.

The balance between a transformational or transactional foreign policy

121. The tension between values and interests in foreign policy is a challenge for the Union, as for Member States and other democracies. The Union purports to have a foreign policy that actively pursues its values. Article 3(5), Treaty on European Union (TEU) states:

“\textit{In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights.”}\textsuperscript{158}

122. We first consider a region where the EU’s promotion of its values has not been a success—the MENA—before considering the balance between interests and values in the EU’s foreign and security policy more generally.

Case study: values in the Middle East and North Africa

123. In the Middle East, Dr Westcott argued, values and interests could “pull in slightly different directions”.\textsuperscript{159} While the EU’s interests were “very closely linked” with its values, there were differences between Member States, for example on “how you deal with President Assad”. On such dossiers, Member

\textsuperscript{156} Letter from Lord Boswell of Aynho to David Lidington MP, (29 October 2015)
\textsuperscript{158} Article 3(5), The Treaty on European Union
\textsuperscript{159} Q 107
States had to agree collectively where “the right balance” lay. Dr Henökl criticised the EU values agenda as only “superficially conceived, disguising … underlying interests”, including stability, security, containing illegal migration, trade and the flow of natural resources such as oil and gas.

124. The current refugee crisis and the threat from terrorism have exacerbated the tendency of many Member States to view the MENA region through the prism of security and stability. Before the Arab Spring, Professor Smith explained, the calculation had been to “attribute stability to the lack of democracy, and therefore to support authoritarian regimes.” That was the “key weakness”, and she feared that the EU was “going back to that”. Mr Pierini traced the emphasis on stability and security to the aftermath of 11 September 2001: values had taken a back seat to “cooperat[on] with the Mubaraks, the Ben Alis, the Gaddafis and the Assads on anti-terrorism.”

125. Professor Tripp noted that Member States had also been “complicit” in the economic conditions that had sustained the political structures which the Arab Spring had sought to overturn. Mr James Watt CVO, former British Ambassador to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, on the other hand, said that Western interventions to support liberal democracy were believed to be “positively dangerous” in some countries of the Arab Spring. For example, in Egypt in 2011, the “western liberal agenda was seen as supporting and empowering … [the] Islamic takeover.”

126. Member States face a “major credibility challenge” in the region. Mr Pierini noted that the EU’s reputation as a values-driven actor in the Middle East had been undermined: civil society organisations in Syria, Egypt or Tunisia “will tell you, ‘Yes, EU values are all fine. That is what we want, but where were you when we were tortured?’”

127. Mr Wilkinson stressed the importance of timing: he was cautious about the capacity of the EU to promote its values in conflict zones, because “without security nothing else really functions.” Mr Watt was also hesitant: while principles such as human rights and equality before law were “absolutely correct”, whether it was possible to “get there by taking a step now to majority parliamentary rule [was] another question.”

Redrawing the balance between values and interests

128. We heard and read a range of views on how the EU should balance values and interests in its foreign policy. No witness suggested that the EU should ignore its values entirely and pursue a purely transactional foreign policy. Many argued for a more finely-tuned balance based on a sober analysis of the challenges, restricted resources and the EU’s limited ability to shape outcomes.

160 Q 106
161 Written evidence from Dr Thomas Henökl (FSP0009)
162 Q 7 (Prof Karen Smith) and see also Q 42 (Imad Mesdoua)
163 Q 7
164 Q 57
165 Q 35
166 Q 36
167 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
168 Q 57
169 Q 7
170 Q 36
129. Some witnesses urged the EU to put its values at the heart of its foreign and security policy. Dr Gegout wrote that European values “stand for the respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights”, which should be “protected for both Europeans and non-Europeans.” Dr Gegout suggested that development should be central to the new strategy and, in particular, the EU should play an active role in mediating conflicts in Africa and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{171} The Quaker Council for European Affairs urged us to “consider how a safer world can be achieved with the contribution of an EU that rejects violence in favour of evidence-based peacebuilding approaches.”\textsuperscript{172}

130. The EU’s values are a component of its power. Dr Lundin said that if the EU was “not seen as compassionate to normal people in other parts of the world”, its effectiveness would be “drastically reduced.”\textsuperscript{173} Dr Federica Bicchi et al. added that the EU’s foreign policies in “support of international law and multilateralism generate good will.”\textsuperscript{174}

131. It was also suggested that the EU should try to deliver the values agenda more strategically. Mr Meredith said that the values agenda remained “extremely important” and one of the EU’s “key interests.” It was “not so much a question about that as an objective”, but “about how to achieve it.” The Commission was “looking at what has been best practice, where we have achieved leverage and what we can build on what we have learnt over the past 10 years.”\textsuperscript{175} Dr Duke suggested that the EU should “identify and engage its ‘strategic partners’ in those areas that are consonant with these underpinning values.” In its engagement with China, for example, the EU could cooperate on areas of shared interest such as anti-piracy operations, while areas that “[were] contrary to the EU’s core values should be de-emphasized.”\textsuperscript{176} Professor Drezner argued that “transformational diplomacy” should continue to be part of the EU’s strategy, but a “different component … a much longer-term, softer power project.”\textsuperscript{177}

132. Mr Lidington suggested that it would be possible to marry the EU’s strategic interests with a reform agenda in the wider neighbourhood—focused on “securing greater prosperity and better-quality governance”—which was in the EU’s “very direct, practical self-interest.” Desirable “economic and political reform” could include the independence of the judiciary, transparency and free markets:

“One must not abandon one’s values, but actually our values can help those countries to make a transformation that will be to our mutual benefit.”\textsuperscript{178}

133. No approach is entirely unproblematic: well-meaning interventions—consonant with the EU’s values—can strengthen authoritarian power structures. Professor Tripp warned of the danger that technical support “may also be the thing that reinforces pre-existing forms of power and

\textsuperscript{171} Written evidence from Dr Catherine Gegout (FSP0008)
\textsuperscript{172} Written evidence from Quaker Council for European Affairs (FSP0017)
\textsuperscript{173} Q 134
\textsuperscript{174} Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)
\textsuperscript{175} Q 80
\textsuperscript{176} Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
\textsuperscript{177} Q 132
\textsuperscript{178} Q 181
inequality.” In order to achieve institutional and structural reforms, the EU would need to work with existing political structures. For example, there was an “obvious logic” to security sector reform in Tunisia, but it could also contribute to the “militarisation of security”. Often the focus of assistance was on border security, and less on ensuring that the security organs were trusted by the Tunisian people. This echoes Professor Smith’s point that the key weakness of EU action had been to attribute “stability to the lack of democracy and therefore to support authoritarian regimes.”

134. Finally, Professor Tripp drew our attention to the fact that economic reforms promoted by the EU in Tunisia and Egypt “completely ignored the huge inequalities within those countries which had been the drivers of revolt.”

135. Given the internal and external context, set out in Chapter 3, it could also be argued that Europe has been too weak—politically, economically and militarily—to promote EU values. Mr Techau argued that these weaknesses drive leaders “into policies and alliances that are morally questionable”, and make values “dispensable.”

Conclusions and recommendations

136. We recognise that there is no easy and entirely happy balance to be struck in promoting values in foreign policy. Even well-meaning intentions and actions can have adverse consequences. Moreover, in order to defend its interests, the EU will have to continue to engage with the political structures that are in place.

137. A more pragmatic approach could focus on supporting good governance in the political, economic and judicial sectors in the wider neighbourhood. This would go some way to marry the EU’s strategic interests with a reform agenda that benefits the citizens of those countries.

138. The values of the Union are also an important dimension of the Union’s power to persuade and dissuade, and of its authority as a trusted and reliable international actor. We recognise that some decisions are a function of strategic necessity, and that the promotion of values outside the EU is likely to be selective, but as far as possible the Union, in particular Member States, should seek to exemplify its values.

A foreign and security policy in the wider neighbourhood

139. We now consider the contours of an EU foreign and security policy focused on the wider neighbourhood, including Russia, the eastern neighbourhood and the southern neighbourhood.

179 Q 38
180 Q 38
181 Q 7
182 Q 35
**EU policy on Russia: in need of a strategy**

140. Member States face a unique challenge with regard to Russia. This is an area where leadership must come from the EU Member States—and is also a role that the US wishes the Union to shoulder.

141. In our previous report, we argued that the EU had made a convincing use of economic sanctions in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The EU imposed economic sanctions including a ban on financial instruments, an embargo on dual-use goods and technology for military use, and a prohibition on export of equipment and technology related to oil exploration and production. The consistency and durability of EU and US sanctions on Russia have been a considerable achievement.

142. However, sanctions are an instrument of policy, not a strategy. Mr Rojansky explained that the “Russian economy has not collapsed; it is hurting … but right now this political experiment may be very much in Vladimir Putin’s interest.” Sanctions have allowed Russia to shift its economy to become “less dependent” on Europe for “trade, financing, technology and everything else in their economy”. Furthermore, sanctions have not altered President Putin’s strategic calculation in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. Dr Balfour wrote that the EU understood success through the prism of reaching unity, rather than in terms of the impact or consequence of EU action.

143. Europe, Mr Rojansky counselled, needed to build a policy beyond “economic sanctions and isolation and wishful thinking that the Putin regime will simply disappear or transform.” He pointed to a window of opportunity for Europe to lead on this issue: the US was in the process of electing a new president, which gave the Union about “18 months to develop some strong European capabilities and something resembling a European strategy for the long haul with Russia.” For the EU, this was “a fantastic opportunity to engage with a new American president.” Whether that led “to something like a new Helsinki order or is more confrontational” remained a matter for Member States to decide.

**A new Helsinki dialogue**

144. In our inquiry into EU-Russia relations, we heard evidence that Member States should consider renewing discussions with Russia on the European security architecture. His Excellency Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EU, believed that discussions on a new European security architecture could be a path to developing a more positive relationship between the EU and Russia.

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185 European Commission, *EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis*: [http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm#1](http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm#1) [accessed 1 February 2016]
186 As we noted in our report, there have also been consequences for Member States, not only as a result of EU sanctions but also from retaliatory Russian sanctions. European Union Committee, *The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine* (6th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 115)
187 Q 154
189 Q 160
190 Q 160
145. Mr Rojansky also suggested a renewed dialogue on the Helsinki Accords. He has written that the “best hope” of repairing the damage to European security would be “likely a return to the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and through a similarly inclusive region-wide dialogue.”\textsuperscript{192} The 1972–1975 Helsinki Process was “birthed in a period of intense rivalry between the US and Soviet-led blocs”.\textsuperscript{193} In evidence, he told us that the US, Russia and Europe all had a shared interest in the renewal of such a dialogue. The role of Europe would be to “supply that motivation”, which was lacking in the US.\textsuperscript{194}

146. The UK Government, in contrast, had grave concerns. Russia had been “willing to discard” agreements on which European collective security has been based, including the Helsinki Accords:

> “New structures or treaties will not address this problem, so our primary concern is to uphold the principles and values of existing mechanisms.”\textsuperscript{195}

\textit{Preparing for confrontation}

147. Mr Lidington told us the EU was facing a multi-dimensional threat from Russia: hybrid conflicts in Ukraine, “energy and strategic communications used as powerful political weapons”, and in the Baltics “cyberattacks and cyberthreats”.\textsuperscript{196} Mr Rojansky noted the “kinetic military actions” being taken by NATO, which included the deployment of heavy NATO equipment in countries close to the Russian border and the repositioning of US units from Germany to Hungary.\textsuperscript{197} Mr Rojansky did not perceive Western actions as “dramatically different from the use of hard power.”\textsuperscript{198} Actions—such as “levying very significant sanctions against the Russian economy” and “some of the power politics … being deployed on the Western side”—were viewed by the Russians as “acts of war”.\textsuperscript{199}

148. In the case of outright military confrontation, Russia retained certain advantages, including “preparedness; of being genuinely ready as a matter of doctrine, investment and infrastructure, and with the political psychology of the people, who have been prepared for conflict”.\textsuperscript{200} In order to deter Russian action in the Baltic States, NATO would need some “form of permanently stationed forces there”.\textsuperscript{201}

149. General Sir Richard Shirreff judged that even if the Baltic States were threatened, other NATO/EU members—including the UK and Germany—would be inhibited about engaging in a military conflict: “the notion of actually having to step up and fight for our freedoms is seen almost as...”\textsuperscript{202}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{193} \textit{Ibid.}, p 171
\item \textsuperscript{194} \textit{Q 156}
\item \textsuperscript{195} \textit{Government response} to House of Lords EU Committee Report: The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (6th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 115):
\item \textsuperscript{196} \textit{Q 178}
\item \textsuperscript{197} \textit{Q 153}
\item \textsuperscript{198} \textit{Q 153}
\item \textsuperscript{199} \textit{Q 153} (Matthew Rojansky)
\item \textsuperscript{200} \textit{Q 153} (Matthew Rojansky)
\item \textsuperscript{201} \textit{Q 109} (General Sir Richard Shirreff) Matthew Rojansky also told us that Russia has “the enhanced capability of making the Black Sea into what we call an area denial zone.” He said Member States, the US and NATO needed to demonstrate to Russia that it “will not be able to deny free navigation of the Black Sea”. \textit{Q 158}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
something from another era.”202 He believed that “difficult questions would be asked about the notion of British soldiers fighting, and if necessary dying, for Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian freedom.”203 Dr Kamp pointed to another challenge—outdated equipment and operational inefficiencies. A NATO exercise to bring one brigade from Portugal to the Baltics took 21 days in order to facilitate all the customs and regulations and a further 10 days to find the trains to transport the tanks.204

Conclusions and recommendations

150. **The West’s relations with Russia are currently led by the US, but the EU must be more engaged. The High Representative should devote particular attention to the issue of EU policy on Russia in the new strategy.**

151. **The EU and Member States should pursue a dual-track policy to Russia. Sanctions must be embedded into an overall strategic approach. In the short-term, the EU and Member States must be coherent and credible in their response to Russian breaches of international law, and reflect on what sanctions are achieving. The Union must also be open to co-operation and dialogue with Russia on areas of shared interest, for example, Russian influence on the Syrian regime and broader Middle East issues.**

152. **Member States must endeavour to put forward a positive agenda with Russia where it is possible to do so. A renewed discussion on European security, in the format of the Helsinki Accords could be a useful starting point.**

153. **On the other hand, should Russian actions or the action of Member States, whether that is by inertia or active decision, lead towards confrontation, then the Union must also be prepared for that scenario.**

154. **EU and NATO deterrence in the Baltic States and the Black Sea should be strengthened. Credibility is central to deterrence: Member States must be willing, and convincing in their willingness, to act in defence of the Union. While it is likely that sanctions have deterred Russian action beyond Ukraine, it is not clear that Russian military action in the Baltic states would be met with a forceful response by European states.**

Eastern neighbourhood: clarify the policy on enlargement

155. Witnesses were divided on the value of enlargement as a tool of foreign policy. Professor Fagan and Dr Ker-Lindsay supported using enlargement as a tool to engage more fully with the Western Balkans, and to deal with the declining support for EU integration. Dr Ker-Lindsay regarded the accession of the Western Balkans as the “completion of the European Union rather than enlargement … the European map is not complete without bringing in the Western Balkans.”205
156. Dr Ker-Lindsay set out the security imperative of building functioning countries in the region: the migration crisis was a very clear example of where the EU needed the “co-operation of Western Balkans countries … in order to manage these flows.” 206 A “clear policy perspective for the Western Balkans” would ensure effective co-operation between the two sides. 207

157. Dr Kyris agreed that conditionality remained “the EU’s most powerful tool in promoting security in its neighbourhood.” The “power of EU accession conditionality” was evident in the resolution of the Slovenia-Croatia border disputes, and in “the breakthrough 2013 agreement between Kosovo and Serbia”. 208

158. On the other hand, Professor Smith warned that enlargement was not a “magic wand that you wave and suddenly everybody steps into line.” 209 It had been “a bit of a diversion of diplomatic attention and perhaps public debate”, to such an extent that she advised taking the issue off the table entirely. 210 Mr Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, wrote that accession was “not a panacea and premature promises lead to disappointment.” 211

159. Looking further afield, to countries such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, Professor Fagan told us that the “golden carrot of membership” drove change. 212 Therefore, the EU should put the question of membership for countries such as Georgia, where there was a high level of support for EU membership and the potential to make further progress, firmly on the table. 213 The EU had “tried and tested tools of carrots and sticks” to bring about reform in these countries. 214 Meanwhile, Dr Duke noted frustration among countries such countries that the development of deep and comprehensive free trade areas involved “many of the sacrifices and strictures involved in membership preparation, without the ultimate carrot.” 215

160. Policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) remains couched in diplomatic, coded and vague terms. At the Eastern Partnership Summit, in Riga in May 2015, the “much-debated and carefully worded language” of the agreement recognised the “European aspirations and choices” of the partner countries. 216 Mr Meredith explained that this meant that the Commission had heard those countries “signalling a clear desire to be closer and, in some cases, an expression of interest in membership” of the EU. He described the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit as “the outcome we have been able to reach at 28.” 217

206 Q 138
207 Q 138
208 Written evidence from Dr George Kyris (FSP0003)
209 Q 7
210 Q 7
211 Written evidence from Johannes Hahn (FSP0024)
212 Q 140
213 Q 142 (Prof Adam Fagan)
214 Q 142 (Prof Adam Fagan)
215 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)
216 Q 83 (Lawrence Meredith)
Conclusions and recommendations

161. The prospect of EU membership for the countries of the Eastern Partnership is ambiguous. Enlargement cannot be an effective tool if the final objective is not clarified.

162. EU policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries is couched in vague and diplomatic terms. In the absence of a viable and realistic timetable for these countries to accede to the Union, Member States should define their interests and objectives in the region and communicate these clearly to partner countries.

Southern neighbourhood: the golden thread of good governance

163. The realities of the southern neighbourhood—authoritarian regimes, economic inequalities, fragile or failing states, terrorism and ungoverned spaces—present dilemmas that cannot be solved by the EU (with the available resources and political will). Mr Sainty said the challenges were “really immense in this region and no single actor, including the EU, can do all that.” There may therefore be an element of wishful thinking in the suggestion that the EU can, in the words of the High Representative’s background report:

“devise policies that, without preaching, support human dignity, social inclusiveness, political responsiveness, educational modernisation and the rule of law across the region … encourage inclusive and rules-bound reconciliation in old and new conflicts embedded within a new regional security architecture in the wider Middle Eastern space.”

164. The EU’s interests in the southern neighbourhood would be best served by efforts to improve governance in the political, economic and security sector. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in 2014: “Missiles may kill terrorists. But good governance kills terrorism.” Similarly, General Sir Richard Shirreff’s advice was that it was “much better and cost-effective to build stability through capacity-building”, rather than responding to crises and state failure. The remit of action could include building professional armed forces, “law and order, governance, education, health, tackling corruption, and having effective administrators in civil ministries.”

165. In 2009, David Cameron, then Leader of the Opposition, referred to countries being pulled out of poverty by a:

“golden thread that starts with the absence of war and the presence of good governance, property rights and the rule of law, effective public services and strong civil institutions, free and fair trade, and open markets”.

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218 Q 30
221 Q 115
In a similar vein, Mr Lidington advocated both “classic diplomatic activity”—such as efforts to bring about a Government of National Accord in Libya—and “efforts to improve the quality of governance” in the southern neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{223}

166. We discuss the ways and means by which the EU could improve governance in this region in Chapter 5.

\textit{Conclusions and recommendations}

167. \textbf{The key external security risk in the southern neighbourhood is the existence of fragile states, leading to challenges such as terrorism and refugee flows. This must be addressed as a priority in the new strategy.}

168. \textbf{The EU needs to move away from trying to fix as many problems as it can in as many countries as it can, and instead determine which risks are vital security threats, and where the EU can make a meaningful difference.}

169. \textbf{The agenda in the southern neighbourhood should focus on the ‘golden thread’ of economic reform and good governance in the political, judicial and security sectors, which could contribute to the stability of the region.}
CHAPTER 5: THE WAYS AND MEANS OF A STRATEGY

170. A new EU foreign and security policy will only be meaningful if it also identifies the tools and resources necessary to deliver the objectives. The EU will need ways (courses of action) and means (instruments) to deliver its foreign policy objectives. The ways and means fall both to the Commission (partnership agreements, trade and development) and to the Member States (hard power, diplomatic resources, international standing and political guidance.)

171. Three assumptions have guided us:

- First, the strategy should work with the Union that exists. We are convinced by Mr Vimont’s exhortation that the “task the EU faces today is not to deny the reality of the Union’s divided foreign policy or to pretend this division will go away easily.” Instead, the EU should “focus on creating the conditions that can allow the current system to run more smoothly.”

- Second, there are more than marginal improvements to be made by recalibrating the institutions for EU foreign and security policy. Too often, the Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe said, the “comfort zone” of the EU was to “do something institutionally”, when in fact what was need was “focus and the political will to bear to make those structures effective.”

- Third, the instruments of the Commission should be used more strategically to deliver political goals. Mr Vimont diagnosed the EU as possessing a “Commission with very good and strong expertise but which sometimes lacks the geopolitical vision, whereas Member States ... quite often have that vision but lack the political will to make something of it”. The challenge would be to bring these two sides together: a “coherent geopolitical vision, plus the instruments to implement it.”

172. We believe the effort would be worthwhile. No other international actor possesses such a range of tools: if used effectively they “would make the European Union a formidable actor in the international community”.

Flexible, decisive and timely action: ad hoc groups of Member States

173. The Prime Minister has said that the:

“EU must be able to act with the speed and flexibility of a network, not the cumbersome rigidity of a bloc .... Let’s welcome that diversity, instead of trying to snuff it out.”

174. Mr Vimont agreed that the EU needed to “be flexible” and “capable of moving quickly” in the event of a crisis, and recommended ad hoc groups

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225 Q 176
226 Q 73
227 Q 73 (Pierre Vimont)
as a way to achieve this. According to Mr Lidington, for the EU to work effectively on foreign policy, it would often “need initiatives to be developed by a smaller group of countries that are prepared to do the work and then present it to their colleagues as a way forward.”

175. Three successful examples of such groupings were described to us, which share a key characteristic: Commission means used effectively in the service of political objectives.

**E3+3 Iran negotiations**

176. The negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Programme (14 July 2015) were cited as a good example of an *ad hoc* grouping. Mr Sainty set out the process: political engagement and negotiations had taken place at the Member State level through the E3+3 format—the UK, France and Germany with US, Russia and China. Meanwhile, EU instruments such as “restrictive measures” had “maintained pressure on the Iranians and kept them at the table negotiating in a serious way.”

177. The High Representative was engaged in the Iran negotiations. It was “interesting and quite striking” that the three Member States of the E3+3 (in 2003) “immediately came to the conclusion that [the then High Representative, Javier Solana] … should be the chair of the small group, in order for the other Member States … to feel a sense of ownership.” Mr Sainty explained that both the current High Representative, Mrs Federica Mogherini, and her predecessor, Baroness Ashton of Upholland, “supported by a team of External Action Service diplomats, played an instrumental co-ordination and facilitation role” in the negotiations. Furthermore, the “High Representative acted as the E3+3’s informal spokesperson.”

178. Mr Sainty suggested that the Union’s “perceived political neutrality” was an asset in this context: it allowed the EU to “play the part of a neutral broker between the E3+3 and the Iranian Government.” This gave the EU “an edge” over what an individual Member State, such as the UK, might be able to achieve.

**Normandy Format**

179. The Normandy Format (Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia), which had delivered the Minsk Agreement, was highlighted as another effective *ad hoc* grouping. The Minsk Agreement in February 2015 was brokered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, negotiating with the Ukrainian and Russian presidents. Mr Richard Lindsay, Head of Security Policy Department, Defence and International Security Directorate, FCO, explained that as part of the origin of the Russian approach...
to Ukraine had been its relationship with the EU, the EU “was less likely to be the most effective actor in solving a conflict in that region. The EU was “not delivering the Normandy format”, rather it was “delivered by different members, as [was] appropriate in the circumstances.”237

180. The second step, as with the Iran deal, was for Member States to use wider EU instruments to support their political goals. Mr Lindsay informed us that the “EU very quickly established the EU mission to assist with security sector reform within Ukraine”, he added that the mission was “starting to deliver effect.”238 Significant economic sanctions were also imposed on Russia and favourable trade preferences offered to Ukraine.

181. The Normandy Format had been weakened, according to Mr Vimont, by the fact that it did not “have that European chair or presence on board.” He understood that the Russians were opposed to the involvement of an EU representative and acknowledged the regular information and updates offered by the French and Germans. However, it was “not exactly the same”, and some Member States were “not entirely satisfied with this way of doing things.”239

Anglo-German Initiative in Bosnia-Herzegovina

182. A final example of an ad hoc grouping, cited by Mr Lidington and Professor Fagan, was the Anglo-German initiative to catalyse reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 2014.240 Mr Lidington explained the genesis: both London and Berlin had been deeply concerned that the Commission-led reform process was “at risk of slipping backwards”.241

183. The two countries took the initiative. The first discussions took place at a bilateral level: UK and German “officials, and ultimately our two Foreign Ministers, got together and agreed on a plan.” The UK and Germany “talked to the High Representative and other Governments about it, and it was eventually, after discussion, accepted as the position of the EU as a whole.” That, Mr Lidington concluded, “was a good illustration of how this can work to everybody’s benefit.”242

184. Professor Fagan was positive about the results: it was “one of the most successful initiatives in recent years.” The new focus on the economy and growth, led by Germany and the UK, had “unlocked the stalemate on Bosnia’s progress in moving forward with the enlargement process.” Now, “Bosnia looks as though it is ready to apply for membership.” The initiative “was also warmly welcomed by the Bosnians, who felt that it broke through the blandness of an EU strategy”.243

185. Professor Fagan noted that other candidate countries would also value such an approach:

“following year after year of progress reports and bureaucratic engagement with the Commission, the injection of realpolitik to deal with the Government of a powerful state is often very welcome.”244
Methodology for ad hoc groupings

186. Mr Vimont suggested a methodology for how ad hoc groupings could work most effectively:

- The first step would be for Member States with interest and expertise to come together. It was likely that at least one large Member State would be part of the grouping. Large Member States could “live with” such contact groups as long as they were part of them.

- The second challenge was to ensure that other Member States were engaged and involved—to that end, the role of the High Representative was critical. Many Member States would be happy to let countries with particular expertise manage a foreign policy dossier, but would want “regular information” and to “have their representative, namely the High Representative and the EEAS as part of that team”.

- The composition of the groups should be flexible and varied. The countries likely to have concerns about these flexible groups were medium-sized countries, which might resent the influence of the large Member States. The format should be open for such countries to engage or perhaps lead a group.

187. We also heard how not to do it. In 2012 and 2013, the French had twice acted alone, and then requested a financial contribution from other Member States. In Mali, the French had to respond urgently to a possible coup, but “to do the same afterwards” in the Central African Republic had caused consternation. Other Member States “were all taken by surprise and had the impression that the French were just asking for money without further information, consultation or co-operation”.

Conclusions and recommendations

188. Ad hoc groups are the most useful available format for rapid, decisive and ambitious action by Member States, which can then become the wider EU position. We recommend that, in order to gain the widest possible support among Member States, ad hoc groups should include the High Representative.

189. The new strategy should explore how the instruments of the EU—the Commission and EEAS—can be mobilised to support such groups, for instance by supplying them with the logistical support that is required for these groups to function.

Case study: Syria—an ad hoc group?

190. We asked our witnesses for their assessment of the role that Member States could play in the Vienna peace process. In particular, we asked if an ad hoc group of Member States could lead EU diplomacy.
The Vienna Process is a new diplomatic initiative, launched under US and Russian leadership, which aims to chart a political process to end the Syrian conflict. The process started in a quartet format, involving the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The quartet was subsequently enlarged into the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), which includes the Arab League, China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the UK, the UN and the US.

The ISSG has met on three occasions. After the second meeting on 14 November 2015, the outlines of a roadmap and timetable towards a ceasefire and political process were set out. The ISSG agreed:

- To implement a ceasefire as soon as the Syrian government and opposition have begun talks towards transition. The ceasefire would not apply to offensive or defence actions against ISIL, Al-Nusra or any other terrorist groups;
- To support “credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance” within a period of six months and set up a schedule for drafting a new constitution;
- That free and fair elections, administered by the UN, would be held within 18 months;
- That Jordan would help develop a common understanding of terrorist individuals and groups;
- That the five Permanent Members of the UNSC would support a UNSC resolution to institute a new UN monitoring mission;
- Expedited humanitarian access; and
- On the need to convene Syrian government and opposition representatives under UN auspices, as soon as possible.

On 18 December the UNSC endorsed the roadmap and set the timetable for talks. In January 2016 the UN Secretary General convened the representatives of the Syrian government and main opposition groups to engage in formal negotiations.

191. Our witnesses were clear that the political process was led by the Quartet. Mr Pierini said that there was no EU “role today, quite obviously”, but in the future “there has to be a role because [the EU] cannot leave the US and the Russians to handle it on their own.” Syria was “the kind of problem where collectively Member States do not have strong military means, so they are complementary to the US”, whereas “on the diplomatic side they have more means”, which could be useful. For Professor Drezner, the timing was not propitious: a role could be more likely once the Russians realised they could not change the facts on ground. When parties to the conflict were “looking for an alternative solution”, then the EU “could potentially play a role”.

251 Q 53
252 Q 49
253 Q 131
192. Mr Vimont believed that the EU had “many cards in its hand that it could play to act as an honest broker between the different partners”. The main challenge was that Member States were not agreed and united on an EU position. If all Member States were on-board, it would be an “extraordinary opportunity” for Europe to offer an objective view and to bring all the different parties to the table.²⁵⁴

Conclusions and recommendations

193. The EU’s limited role in the Vienna political process is a function of the divisions between Member States and of the fact that the EU is not a security provider in the region.

194. The EU has a direct interest in the resolution of the conflict in Syria, not least because of the flow of refugees from Syria to the EU. Member States must seek to define a coherent position internally, and seek a more central role. The EU will be essential in order to deliver a credible sanctions package, should that prove necessary, and could offer important international support to a political solution.

195. There is also a potential role for EU on the ‘day after’, which must be grasped. Member States should mandate the High Representative and the EEAS to explore measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, manage regional and local ceasefires, strengthen local authorities and establish forums for dialogue. The aftermath of the war will be a critical time for Syria, and the EU has the tools to play an important and constructive role.

Improved decision-making: recalibration of the EU institutions

196. Decision making by unanimity protects Member States. As Mr Lidington said, unanimity in foreign policy was “the ultimate safeguard written into the treaties. Not even the smallest EU member can be overridden by a majority vote.”²⁵⁵ On the other hand, we judge, there is a risk that decision making by unanimity can also act as a strait jacket, hindering ambition and decisiveness in EU foreign policy.

197. Unused provisions of the TEU could improve the agility of decision-making. Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam, said serious thought should be given to opportunities “to render the intergovernmental method of CFSP decision-making more efficient and effective.”²⁵⁶ He pointed to the four exceptions to unanimity in decision making listed in TEU Article 31(2), whereby the Council can decide by Qualified Majority Voting in the following circumstances:

(a) When adopting a decision relating to the EU’s strategic interests and objectives;

(b) On a proposal from High Representative following a specific request from the European Council;

²⁵⁴ Q 72
²⁵⁵ Q 177
²⁵⁶ Written evidence from Prof Steven Blockmans (FSP0023)
(c) When implementing a decision defining a Union action or position;
and
(d) When appointing a special representative.

198. The second of these exceptions “would leave the High Representative plenty of room for initiative to operationalise” the new strategy on foreign and security policy.257

199. Professor Blockmans also suggested that the “constructive abstention” mechanism could be useful. Article 31(1) TEU allows any Member of the Council to abstain in a vote, and in doing so that Member State “shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union.” The TEU had “widened the legal space to accommodate Member States’ interests in abstaining from CFSP decision-making by unanimity.” So far the mechanism has only been used once—Cyprus abstained when the Council adopted the Decision establishing the EULEX Kosovo mission (a civilian CSDP rule of law mission) in February 2008.258

200. Such use of the constructive abstention mechanism would be consistent with the view of Professor Stefanie Hofmann and Mr Ueli Staeger, Centre on Conflict, Peacebuilding and Development, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, who wrote that while the EU encouraged “a discourse that suggests that a powerful EU needs to be a united EU”, in fact diversity was a “strength and not a weakness of the EU.” It should be acceptable to “agree to disagree”.259

Conclusions and recommendations

201. Unanimity among Member States is often too high a bar for EU foreign and security policy: it acts as a strait jacket on the ambition and agility of EU foreign policy. The provisions of the TEU offer Member States opportunities to act within the EU but without consensus. Member States should take advantage of these opportunities.

202. We recommend that the foreign and security policy should give high-level political guidance on when these more flexible mechanisms might be used, and—in order to reassure Member States—when they would not be acceptable.

Co-ordinating the Commission instruments: the role of the European External Action Service

203. The instruments of the Commission are wide-ranging: Mr Sainty highlighted that, in addition to conventional diplomatic and security activity, the EU had “all these other levers, such as energy, trade, migration, development and so on, to help deliver its priorities.”260 In 2015 the budget for the EU’s external policy—Global Europe heading IV—dwarfed the funding for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at €8.7 billion and €321 million respectively.261

257 Written evidence from Prof Steven Blockmans (FSP0023)
258 Written evidence from Prof Steven Blockmans (FSP0023). This would have undertaken through the Pre-Treaty of Lisbon, Article 23(1) TEU.
259 Written evidence from Prof Stephanie Hofmann and Mr Ueli Staeger (FSP0020)
260 Q 27
204. Dr Westcott said that the ‘comprehensive approach’ was underpinned by the fact that all the EU’s “instruments and different bits of the institutions need to pull in the same direction.” \(^{262}\) Dr Henökl, though, said that the ‘comprehensive approach’ had only been delivered partially. \(^{263}\) The new strategy, Mr Lidington suggested, was an opportunity to “set the diplomatic work alongside the work led by the Commission on energy, humanitarian aid, development, trade and so on, within the broad context of Europe’s strategic foreign policy priorities.” \(^{264}\)

205. Witnesses noted that the EEAS had an important role to play in adding the geopolitical element to Commission policy. \(^{265}\) We heard different views on how well the EEAS and Commission worked together. Mr Lidington said there had been recent examples where the relationship had not “worked as effectively as it ought to have done. That is a pity and it needs to be addressed”. \(^{266}\) Dr Neil Winn, Senior Lecturer in European Studies, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, noted the “intense competition between the two institutions across all areas of EU external action.” \(^{267}\) This could lead to a “poorly co-ordinated and sometimes ineffectual response.” \(^{268}\)

206. In contrast, both the Commission and the EEAS told us they enjoyed regular, constructive and close working relations. \(^{269}\) Mr Hahn said that working relations between the EEAS and Commission were good. \(^{270}\)

207. Dr Balfour highlighted the effective co-ordination role that had been played by the EEAS in facilitating the high-level dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo in 2012–2014. The EEAS had played a critical role: its negotiating team “worked with the Commission staff in charge of enlargement”, and the High Representative “consulted with Member States on agreeing to provide incentives to the two countries to help the implementation of the agreements.” Finally, “EU Delegations supported the parties in implementing the agreements on the ground”, and “the international community backed the entire process.” \(^{271}\)

208. Witnesses welcomed one recent improvement, namely that the High Representative has co-ordinated a Commissioners’ Group on External Action, bringing together all the Commissioners with external policy portfolios. This group meets at least once a month. Mr Hahn explained that so far the system was “working well”, with co-ordination at all levels between the relevant Commission Directorates General and the EEAS. Staff from both institutions collaborate to prepare the agendas and meetings. \(^{272}\)

209. Mr Vimont suggested some institutional recalibrations that would help the EEAS operate more efficiently:

- Streamlining ‘inter-service consultation’. Briefings prepared by the EEAS have to reach the Council via the “green light of the

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\(^{262}\) Q 101 (Dr Nicholas Westcott)
\(^{263}\) Written evidence from Dr Thomas Henökl (FSP0009)
\(^{264}\) Q 181
\(^{265}\) Q 104 (Dr Nicholas Westcott)
\(^{266}\) Q 178
\(^{267}\) Written evidence from Dr Neil Winn (FSP0001)
\(^{268}\) Q 27 (Chris Sainty)
\(^{269}\) Q 87 (Lawrence Meredith)
\(^{270}\) Written evidence from Johannes Hahn (FSP0024)
\(^{271}\) Written evidence from Dr Rosa Balfour (FSP0021)
\(^{272}\) Written evidence from Johannes Hahn (FSP0024)
Commission”, because the EEAS is “seen and perceived as—from an institutional point of view—part of the Commission”. By the time this time-consuming ‘inter-service consultation’ has been undertaken, the crisis can be “over or it has become worse”.

- Simplifying the renewal of the mandate for Heads of Delegations. The four year terms of Heads of Delegations are rigidly set and cannot be renewed without a “cumbersome” procedure of consultation.

210. Mr Vimont also advocated giving the EEAS the “resources it needs … the creation of a diplomatic administration with adequate resources should be one of the EU’s main goals.” However, this position was not shared by the UK Government, which would not propose any “large increases” in the budget of the EEAS.

Conclusions and recommendations

211. European Commission instruments need to be co-ordinated and aligned with the priorities of Member States—the means better aligned with the objectives. The EEAS has a critical role to play here.

212. The EEAS should not be constrained by rigid working practices. The High Representative, in her dual role, should streamline and simplify its working practices to allow briefings to be produced in a timely manner.

Using the Commission instruments strategically

213. We considered how the Commission’s instruments should be applied to make a meaningful impact.

Functional and differentiated approach

214. Taking the MENA as a case study, Professor Tripp advised the EU to approach the region “country by country”. A “functional” approach should consider what resources the EU had at its disposal and what means it had to effect change. The support of Member States would be necessary. Mr Sainty suggested that the MENA region could be divided into:

- Countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and perhaps Jordan, which were making “progress with reforms and may well be interested in a closer partnership.” Here the EU should aim to “provide deeper, closer support across a very wide range of issues, and can do so relatively easily.”

- Countries which might be less interested in a close partnership with the EU and less willing to make the long-term reforms that the EU would encourage. Co-operation might “still add up to a pretty substantial relationship” but had to “focused on those encouraging elements in that country that respond to the European agenda—things such as
economic stability, job creation and the rule of law.”

Arguably, Egypt could fall into this category.

- Conflict-ridden countries. Here the priority would be to resolve the conflict. This, of course, would be a role for the Member States and the wider international community. The role for the Commission would be to focus on humanitarian assistance. This category could include countries such as Syria and Iraq.

**Sensitivity to local conditions**

215. Commission instruments can only function when the local conditions are propitious. Our witnesses identified two factors which should be taken into account.

216. First, the EU could only act with the support of local partners. Mr Meredith said that within the ENP there should be “stronger ownership by the partners.” Mr Imad Mesdoua, Political Analyst, Africa Matters Limited, stressed that ownership was critical for the success of the programmes; without it, the EU was likely to face “rejection or ineffective policies and no follow-through from local authorities.”

217. Second, assistance programmes should consider the capacity of a country to absorb such assistance. Professor Fagan offered the example of Georgia, where EU aid “cannot be absorbed.” There was “an enormous time lag” and Georgia was “still trying to implement projects that were awarded four, five or six years ago.”

218. More generally, we were told that the ENP—the Commission policy that governs relations with neighbouring countries—is not effective in dealing with countries in conflict. Mr Watt said that countries “very preoccupied with their internal struggles” did not have much of “an attention span” for “regional co-operation and, indeed, for soft power generally.” It was not, he added, that the EU was not “trying hard”; it was just that it was “not sufficient”, and “doing more of it [was] not the answer.”

219. Finally, witnesses told us that the Member States could bring deep local knowledge and networks in the region and the EU should leverage “individual Member States’ strengths.” Mr Mesdoua explained that a country like France would have “obvious advantages, connections, links and know-how in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia”, and the “same with the UK in Egypt and Italy in Libya.”

**Trade agreements and economic partnerships**

220. Mr Sainty said that the size and wealth of the EU gave it “the power to deliver commercially beneficial trade agreements”, which could be translated into a “lever to promote values such as human rights, democracy and political
reconciliation.” The “size and reach of the EU’s financial instruments, particularly development budgets and economic partnerships”, was also an external policy asset. Professor Smith agreed that the “EU’s greatest strength and comparative advantage is its longer-term policy.” The EU’s “trade, aid and structured relationships with third countries could allow it to have more impact on preventing conflicts, atrocities and gross human rights violations.” Professor Fagan told us that when Bosnians sought membership of the Union, what they valued was “potential access to the single market and the ability … to study, travel and work in the rest of Europe.”

221. The Commission has recognised the value of trade in promoting the EU’s agenda. The Joint Communication on the Review of the ENP, published on 18 November 2015, noted that a “key instrument in promoting prosperity in the ENP so far has been granting access to the EU market.”

222. Access to the single market is a geopolitical tool that has been used to deliver the Union’s security objectives. For instance, the Commission is currently negotiating a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Tunisia. This will be a wide-ranging agreement, including chapters on services, investment, competition, customs and trade facilitation, alleviating regulatory barriers to trade, public procurement, sustainable development and sanitary and phytosanitary measures. Professor Tripp informed us that trade between the EU and Tunisia constituted around 60% of Tunisia’s foreign trade. He noted a trade imbalance and an outflow of capital which had weakened the Tunisian economy and contributed to unemployment. The EU was “extraordinarily well-equipped” to deal with these challenges: it had the instruments and the political will to do so. This was a “huge priority”—at the heart of the challenges in Tunisia was an “economic crisis.” Mr Mesdoua agreed that the “security challenge” in Tunisia was linked in “many ways to the economic and political challenge the country [was] facing”, including “structural inequalities between the north and south” and “young people who are marginalised and without jobs”.

223. The EU has also signed a DCFTA with Ukraine, which came into effect on 1 January 2016. Overall, the EU and Ukraine will eliminate over 90% of trade duties between the two sides. Ukrainian exporters are expected to save €487m annually due to reduced EU import duties. In return, Ukraine will remove around €391m in duties on imports from the EU. Ukrainian agriculture is expected to benefit most from cuts in duties: €300m for agricultural products, and €53m for processed agricultural products.

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287 Q 27 (Chris Sainty)
288 Q 27
289 Q 6
290 Q 140
291 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, SWD(2015) 500 final [accessed 1 February 2016]
294 Q 41
295 Q 41
note that Russian opposition to the DCFTA with Ukraine was a salutary lesson on the need for caution in the use of these tools.

Conclusions and recommendations

224. Commission instruments have been used in too diluted and disparate a manner. The Commission must do less, and do it better. Member States must provide the necessary guidance.

225. Commission instruments have a potentially valuable role to play in securing the conditions that underpin the long-term security, prosperity and stability of the Union and third countries. However, at the moment, Commission instruments are too isolated from the EU’s foreign and security policy objectives.

226. We recommend that the new strategy should review how Commission instruments can more effectively support the foreign and security policy objectives of the Union. Trade agreements and technical agreements should be pursued when it is clear that they will deliver leverage in third countries and promote security, stability and prosperity in both the partner country and the EU.

227. Steps should be taken to align the priorities and strengths of Member States and the Commission. The strategic review should consider how Member States and the Commission can work together more coherently both at the level of programming and implementation on the ground.

228. Commission instruments should only be used in countries where there is local support and political acceptance for the EU’s approach. Tunisia meets these criteria. Libya, under a new Government of National Accord, may also do so.

Case study: Tunisia and Libya—security sector reform

229. The evidence suggests the EU could also make a valuable contribution in security sector reform. In our view, consideration should be given to how the Commission’s means could better support the political goals and actions of Member States in security sector reform.

230. For instance, Mr Mesdoua explained that Tunisia faced a security challenge, with domestic radicalisation and the insecurity in neighbouring Libya. Security sector reform was therefore “an important area” in which the EU could assist. Mr Pierini agreed.

231. On Libya, Professor Tripp said that once a political agreement was in place “the capacity for assisting just on the technical level and in a non-lethal way” would be “enormous.” In the course of a one-off hearing on Libya in July 2015, Sir Dominic Asquith KCMG, former British Ambassador to Libya, agreed that EU security assistance—which “could run the gamut from a

297 Q 38
298 Q 51
299 Q 43. Libya has been divided between two rival governments—in the east and west—each backed by a separate coalition of militias and former rebels. The government in Tobruk has been internationally recognised, while the Tripoli government, which is led by Islamists, has not. On 17 December, the two rival factions signed an UN-mediated agreement to form a Government of National Accord. On 19 January, the members of the new Government of National Accord was named.
physical presence on the ground … through to logistic, intelligence and some specialised niche support along with advice, training and equipping”—would be required.300

232. Mr Lindsay agreed that the EU was “very well-placed …. to provide both financial and practical support” for a Government of National Accord.301 Mr Mesdoua believed that a new Government would need “time to cement its authority, to grow”, and to “rebuild the foundations of the Libyan state.” The EU could contribute “both directly and indirectly to that.” EU assistance to build institutional capacity would be necessary to combat security issues such as terrorism and migration.302

233. There was, however, a risk that Member States would neglect these countries. Mr Pierini said that the EU appeared to have calculated that Tunisia was small, peaceful and could be left “for tomorrow, except that it [was] not, potentially, going to resolve itself by a miracle.”303 Looking at Libya, Sir Dominic Asquith emphasised the need for urgent action: “planning is being conducted … but it needs to be grasped quickly.”304

Conclusions and recommendations

234. The EU can play a valuable role in security sector reform, but actions to support a country’s security capabilities must be undertaken with care. There is a risk of militarising security and reinforcing authoritarian power structures. The role and capability of the Commission to support security sector reform should be bolstered.

235. The danger is that Member States neglect countries where they can make a long-term impact, focusing instead on solving short-term crises, to the detriment of strategic planning. We are concerned that this could be the case for Tunisia and Libya.

Leveraging military capabilities

EU-NATO co-operation

236. Our witnesses told us that EU-NATO co-operation was not functioning. According to General Sir Richard Shirreff, the Berlin Plus agreements—which allow Member States access to NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations—were “dead in the water”.305

237. General Sir Richard Shirreff said that the EU and NATO needed to build better linkages to deliver “more effective civil-military co-operation.”306 One solution might be a “reverse Berlin Plus”, whereby “NATO can call upon the EU for some of the soft power capabilities the EU can bring to the party, as well as finance and funding.”307 Dr Kamp, on the other hand, questioned what assets the EU could bring to the table. If financial resources

300 Oral evidence taken on 9 July 2015 (Session 2015–16), Q 4 (Sir Dominic Asquith)
301 Q 29 (Richard Lindsay)
302 Q 43
303 Q 51
304 Oral evidence taken on 9 July 2015 (Session 2015–16), Q 4 (Sir Dominic Asquith)
305 Q 113, The 1996 Berlin Arrangements set out that the EU should be able to act military on its own absent the US. To that the “Berlin Agreement” permitted Western European Union (WEU) members to use NATO structures for that purpose. The Berlin Agreement was upgraded to the Berlin Plus which permitted the entire EU to use NATO structures for military crisis management operations.
306 Q 116
307 Q 113 (General Sir Richard Shirreff)
were required by the US, these would be negotiated at the heads of state level rather than through a formal agreement.\textsuperscript{308} Mr Rojansky suggested that the focus should be on practical areas of co-operation between the EU and NATO: “what are the specific capabilities that we need to respond on a precise, measured and controlled level to the kinds of provocations that we are likely to see?”\textsuperscript{309}

238. Dr Kamp said it would be more useful to bring the two sides together—"the beauty contest is over and the EU and NATO can act together." In particular, there was potential to take advantage of the two institutions’ common membership: it made “sense to understand the European NATO members, or the EU members, as the caucus in NATO.”\textsuperscript{310} He noted that the barrier to this was political—the ‘participation problem’—but if that issue was “tackled at the top level it would not be impossible to solve.”\textsuperscript{311} Deeper co-operation between the EU and NATO would “certainly depend on the contingency and on the political will of the nations involved.”\textsuperscript{312}

239. Dr Kamp’s reference to political will highlights a further challenge. General Sir Richard Shirreff pointed to a “progressive demilitarisation in Europe” over the last two decades.\textsuperscript{313} Mr Rojansky said that the post-Cold War domestic perception that Europe did not face a conventional security threat meant that it would be not be possible to “artificially conjure up political will for defence spending and military interventions or deployments without there being a real, clear and present danger.” His assessment was that the “mood will trail the real world events—the threat—probably by several months or several years.”\textsuperscript{314}

240. Even if defence budgets do not increase, or increase only slightly, the EU could look at how its defence budgets and spending are structured in order to deliver more efficiencies through joint capabilities. Sir Robert Cooper said that while he was not in favour of a European army, he was in “favour of a European rifle” and the EU ought to do more “joint military procurement.”\textsuperscript{315} Savings made from integrating European defence could also be significant. A research paper by the European Parliament estimated that €600 million could be saved from the sharing of infantry vehicles and €500 million from having a collective system of certification of ammunition.\textsuperscript{316}

241. There are challenges. As many witnesses pointed out to us, Member States diverge in their foreign policy and defence postures. The unevenness of spending and capabilities could create a burden-sharing problem inside the Union. As a result, Member States remain reluctant to rely on each other in the matter of defence.

\textsuperscript{308} Q 166
\textsuperscript{309} Q 158
\textsuperscript{310} Q 164
\textsuperscript{311} The ‘participation problem’ refers to the dispute between Turkey (a member of NATO but not the EU) and Cyprus (a member of the EU but not NATO) which has prevented the organisations working together.
\textsuperscript{312} Q 168
\textsuperscript{313} Q 165 (Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp)
\textsuperscript{314} Q 110
\textsuperscript{315} Q 156 (Matthew Rojansky)
\textsuperscript{316} Q 16
Conclusions and recommendations

242. A key challenge in building better EU-NATO co-operation is the fundamental nature of the two organisations: NATO is a military alliance, with defence as its core business, which for the EU is a peripheral activity. This leads to a fundamental difference in culture and attitude between the two institutions. While steps such as joint programming and institutional and operational reform are useful, what is required is a change in the political and strategic culture of the organisations.

243. Such a cultural transformation and reorientation is enormously difficult to effect. Mechanisms such as joint scenario planning and shared exercises could help foster a closer cultural convergence and more formal and regular meetings of defence ministers would also be useful. Without such a convergence, the EU’s ability to exercise hard power will remain inchoate.

The Common Security and Defence Policy

244. Most of our witnesses found the CSDP wanting. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. said that the CSDP “produced relatively low-key and small civilian missions, mainly in its neighbourhood and in Africa.” The EU had not matched “the UN’s capacity to maintain international peace and security, and could not remotely match NATO’s capabilities to defend Europe”\(^\text{318}\). Professor Menon and Mr Witney concluded that ongoing CSDP missions on Europe’s periphery were not much more than “tokenism.”\(^\text{319}\) Furthermore, Mr Hans Wessberg, Member, European Court of Auditors (ECA) and former State Secretary, Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, said the EU’s Battlegroups\(^\text{320}\) had failed as a “rapid deployment force”: they were “definitely not rapid”, had “never been deployed” and it remained unclear whether or not they were a force.\(^\text{321}\)

245. By contrast, Mr Lindsay saw the added value of CSDP. It could deliver “hard-edged security” for conflict affected states.\(^\text{322}\) He offered the example of EU actions in Somalia, where the anti-piracy mission, Operation Atalanta, was launched in 2008. Since 2012, there have been no successful pirate attacks.\(^\text{323}\) Operation Atalanta had been complemented by EUCAP Nestor (a CSDP mission mandated to enhance the maritime capacities of Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania) and the EU training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia), which had contributed to training 3,600 Somali soldiers. This, Mr Lindsay explained, was the comprehensive approach in action: capacity building of naval forces, interdiction, judicial processes and the onshore security forces: “That is an example of the EU bringing together its different elements within the toolbox, and the outcome is quite startling”.\(^\text{324}\)

\(^{318}\) Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)
\(^{319}\) Written evidence from Prof Anand Menon and Nick Witney (FSP0010)
\(^{320}\) The 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal created the Battlegroups—a standing force of 50,000–60,000 persons, deployed by Member States on a rotational basis, self-sustained, with the necessary command and control capabilities able to be deployed within 60 days. Battlegroups have been available since January 2007 and have never been deployed. European Council Conclusions, Helsinki 10–11 December 1999 available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions/pdf/1993–2003/helsinki-european-council–presidency-conclusions-10-11-december-1999/ [accessed 1 February 2016]
\(^{321}\) Q 61
\(^{322}\) Q 33
\(^{323}\) Q 27
\(^{324}\) Q 29
Mr Lindsay added that CSDP missions could also complement NATO action. In Operation Atalanta, the EU was able to associate with Korean, Japanese and other naval forces that might “not necessarily have joined in with a NATO operation”. In Bosnia in 2004, on the other hand, the EU was able to deliver a transition mission (Operation Althea) from a NATO operation.

We also heard of the added value of civilian CSDP missions. The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) was launched in 2007 to contribute to the establishment of a sustainable and effective police force. Mr Wessberg, who audited the mission for the ECA in 2014, had found a “rather professional police organisation with equipment that worked, with communications that worked, with policemen who could read and write—not all of them, but most of them—concerning themselves not only with fighting the Taliban but with the rule of law.” In 2014 the Afghan police “had organised and protected the freest and most secure election ever in Afghanistan”; EUPOL had “played a very big role”.

Conclusions and recommendations

The CSDP adds value to the efforts of Member States and complements the role played by Member States on an independent basis or within NATO.

The CSDP should be directed towards managing crises in the wider neighbourhood: the capacity to restore security, support our regional partners and secure the EU border is a clear priority.

The new strategy—in its reflection on EU capabilities—should review the CSDP as a tool of crisis management in the wider neighbourhood. We urge the High Representative to initiate a debate on the overall purpose of the CSDP as a tool of crisis management, the balance of capabilities and resources required, the necessary institutional resources within the EEAS and Commission, and the cost implications.

Case study: UK contribution to CSDP

In order for the CSDP to function effectively, it needs the support of key military powers such as the UK. We asked the FCO to provide us with figures for the UK contribution—personnel and financial—to EU civilian and military CSDP operations (see Appendix 5).

We observe that the UK does not supply personnel to the missions in proportion to its population size in the EU (14.8%). On the other hand, Mr Lindsay highlighted the quality of UK engagement and leadership. He pointed to UK leadership in Operation Sophia, the EU Naval Mission in the Southern Central Mediterranean. In this case, the UK had been “quite instrumental in getting the EU to implement a CSDP operation very quickly in response to need”. Mr Lindsay reminded us that the operational headquarters of Operation Atalanta were in Northwood, Middlesex. Mr Wessberg agreed that UK commitment to the CSDP was “quite high.”
253. The UK also acts outside the formal CSDP framework. The UK was part of the NATO coalition that acted in Libya in 2011 (Operation Odyssey Dawn) and is intervening militarily against ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Mr Lindsay explained that the UK valued the “flexibility” offered by membership of the EU, which allowed the UK to “use those tools in pursuit of [UK] foreign policy priorities where they are most appropriate and to pursue other routes where they are not.”

Analytical and assessment capabilities

254. Analytical capability is essential if the EU is to decide on and deliver its foreign and security policy objectives. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. told us: “If Europe is to be relevant in the future international context, it is because it has better ideas and better ideas necessarily rely on information and political analysis.”

255. In order to build a tailor-made approach to the southern neighbourhood—what Professor Tripp called a “research base at the country by country level”—or to understand the depth of some of the long-standing Russian resentments against Western policy, the EU will need a deep and profound understanding of those countries and regions. Such an understanding will be based on the politics, people and culture, and language skills will be a pre-requisite.

256. In the UK context, the FCO’s renewed emphasis on language skills, in conjunction with the work of the Defence Academy’s Centre for Languages and Culture, is very welcome. We believe it is also important that the UK remains engaged in EU diplomacy and present within the EU institutions. Dr Westcott reflected that relatively few FCO officials “have felt like volunteering to come into the EAS for a four-year period at the moment” though steps were being taken to encourage FCO officials to apply. He added that Britain was also under-represented in the Commission.

257. Mr Wilkinson asked a broader question “if the EU is really going to engage in a more robust external affairs approach, does it have adequate assessment capability to understand what is going on around it and to configure and adjust the strategy as it goes along?” A more sustainable path would be for the EU to “dedicate resources to understanding better the world in which it is operating.” Mr Sainty said that the Government would “certainly accept and agree” that the EEAS should “focus heavily on the neighbourhood and develop the right assessment and analytical capacity to be able to do that.”

258. Mr Mesdoua also highlighted the necessity of “co-ordination and intelligence sharing, along with the provision of data in real time”. He said that the political dialogue did exist at a “very high level” between individual Member States, but argued for a new framework to make sharing and co-ordination

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329 Q 23
330 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)
331 Q 40
333 Q 93
334 Q 3 (Henry Wilkinson)
335 Q 34
336 Q 44
more “concrete and effective day to day.” Dr Federica Bicchi et al. cautioned that “intelligence sharing between 28 Member States is a huge task and confidentiality is constantly at risk.”

259. Witnesses also pointed out that the quality of intelligence and political analysis varied between Member States. Smaller Member States tended to “rely on the EU for the provision of political analysis and intelligence (based on the elaboration mainly of open sources)”. Larger Member States, on the other hand (including and especially the UK), “have often been tempted not to engage in conversations that would entail sharing information.” Furthermore, the flow of information was “largely a one-way street” from the EU to the Member States.

260. Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven, told us that limited resources have had a deleterious impact on the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of both the EU and Member States. EU diplomatic capabilities were “seriously constrained” by “budgetary and other constraints which particularly the large Member States, including the UK, impose on the EU.”

Conclusions and recommendations

261. **Strong analytical capabilities at the EU and Member State level are essential for policy planning and the effective and robust defence of the EU’s interests in foreign and security policy.**

262. **We recognise that the intelligence and political analysis provided by individual Member States to the EU can be quite bland. Nevertheless, the new strategy should seek to strengthen the assessment and policy planning capabilities of the EEAS.**

263. **The discipline of compiling a common strategic assessment at the EU level would offer significant benefits to Member States in terms of strategic thinking and forward planning.**

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337 Q 44
338 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (ESP0006)
339 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (ESP0006)
340 Written evidence from Dr Stephan Keukeleire (FSP0018)
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategy making in the European Union

Drafting a new strategy

1. The consultation phase of the new strategy has been open and transparent, with a high degree of participation by academics and think-tanks. (Paragraph 15)

2. Once the new strategy has been agreed at the European Council, the High Representative and the EEAS should reach out to the European Parliament and national parliaments to ensure they are informed and engaged. European legislatures could play an important role in reviewing the new strategy and ensuring coherence across EU external policy. (Paragraph 16)

3. It is regrettable that the review of the ENP was out of step with the strategic review process. In her dual role as Vice-President of the Commission, the High Representative should ensure that a foreign and security policy strategy acts as a political framework to guide the policy and implementation of the ENP. (Paragraph 17)

What type of strategy?

4. A new EU foreign and security strategy should introduce the overall strategic rationale for EU and Member State action. It should help the EU prioritise, and not seek to offer prescriptive policy suggestions on every issue. The goal should be to guide policy-makers to make better decisions on specific issues. (Paragraph 24)

5. The strategy must also take a comprehensive view of EU foreign policy instruments, in particular of how the resources and instruments of the Commission can support the foreign policy objectives of the Union. Military capabilities should not be ignored. We hope that the strategic review will also stimulate a discussion on how the EU and NATO can work together more effectively. (Paragraph 25)

6. We recognise that Member States will continue to undertake their own sovereign foreign policies, but where appropriate they should use the new strategy as a framework to influence their policies. (Paragraph 26)

7. We hope that the current level of engagement of Member States with this review means that national and EU foreign policy priorities should align more closely. (Paragraph 27)

8. We suggest that a review should be undertaken every five years, in line with the term of the High Representative, in order to keep the strategy current and relevant to fluctuations in the EU’s strategic environment. (Paragraph 28)

9. Clear goals and a more focused framework for action should build a more resilient EU. However, we acknowledge that crises intrude, events happen and plans fail. Member States will continue to face unexpected events, and their actions will have unpredictable consequences. The Union will not be able to predict the future, but the strategy should enable it to be flexible, agile and adaptable. (Paragraph 29)
A focus on the neighbourhood

10. The strategy is an opportunity to reflect on the EU’s international role and set its level of ambition. The Union has global interests and, therefore, a global foreign policy, but a realistic assessment must recognise that the Union is not a global security provider. A new strategy should draw that distinction. (Paragraph 37)

11. The current security imperative is the pursuit of stability, security and prosperity in the wider neighbourhood. We recommend that a new strategy—formulating the objectives for the Union in the medium-term—should focus on the neighbourhood. (Paragraph 38)

12. A foreign and security policy in the wider neighbourhood must be supported by clear political will and exercise of action by Member States. Moreover, the execution of policy will require significant resources and more command power, including the civilian and military tools of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). (Paragraph 39)

External and internal context

External security context

13. The strategic review must recognise that the external security context surrounding the Union has deteriorated significantly. The US has long urged Europe to take more responsibility for its own security. The US has now become more open to the EU as a security actor distinct from NATO. (Paragraph 58)

14. Migrant and refugee inflows are likely to remain a long-term challenge for the Union. So far, Member States have not agreed a collective response to this issue at the EU level. The fractious and polarised debates have battered the reputation of the EU and resulted in a muted response to a pressing security and humanitarian crisis. These internal divisions are likely to undermine Member States’ ability to achieve unity on foreign policy issues. (Paragraph 59)

Internal context: economic weakness and internal tensions

15. The EU’s foreign policy has been built on its economic strength. The Union’s credibility and capacity as a foreign policy actor have been weakened and tarnished by the Eurozone crisis, persistent low levels of economic growth and the internal tensions of the European project. This will be an ongoing constraint on the EU as a foreign policy actor. (Paragraph 68)

Primacy of Member States

16. The starting point for a new strategy must be to recognise the ultimate authority that Member States retain over EU foreign and security policy, and to acknowledge their priorities. (Paragraph 73)

17. Member States have not always formulated the necessary collective positions on key foreign policy dossiers, provided the necessary strategic direction or awarded the requisite resources to the EU. (Paragraph 74)

18. The strategy should provide the overarching framework for where Member States could act more collectively at the EU level, and where the EU could
support closer alignment between the foreign policies of Member States. (Paragraph 75)

19. Member States and the High Representative must not allow the current crises and internal fissures to dilute the strategic review into a ritual exercise. Our impression is that the necessary rigour and political will are not yet in evidence, either at the Member State or at the EU level. (Paragraph 76)

*The ‘herbivorous’ power: political reluctance and reduced capability*

20. In the new geopolitical context, reduced military capacity and the unwillingness of Member States to underpin foreign policy with the legitimate use of force undermine the Union as a foreign policy actor. This climate hollows out both the collective military capacity of the EU and that of Member States, endangering the security of EU citizens. (Paragraph 84)

*The United Kingdom*

21. The UK is an important player in international affairs, and the EU has the potential to enhance UK influence. A UK exit would significantly limit the UK’s international reach, not least by removing the UK’s influence over, and access to, the Commission’s instruments of foreign policy. It would also diminish the foreign policy of the EU. (Paragraph 101)

*The foreign and security policy objectives of the Union*

*Case study: EU policy on Turkey—strategic disarray*

22. The EU’s adoption of the EU-Turkey Action Plan, in response to the refugee and Syria crises, fails to disguise the lack of consensus among Member States on their objectives and tactics on Turkey. (Paragraph 117)

23. Member States have long been divided in their vision for Turkey, have not articulated the end goal of the EU-Turkey relationship, and have not assessed the threats inherent in their current policy. The EU has not demonstrated a credible commitment to Turkey’s accession, nor has it defined an alternative relationship. (Paragraph 118)

24. We consider that the EU should revisit the whole EU-Turkey relationship, on the basis of first principles. This should be a priority for the new strategy on foreign and security policy. (Paragraph 119)

25. We urge the UK, as a supporter of Turkish accession to the EU, to initiate a review process at the EU level—perhaps led by the High Representative—with a view to reinvigorating relations with Turkey and setting the partnership on a more strategic footing. (Paragraph 120)

*The balance between a transformational or transactional foreign policy*

26. We recognise that there is no easy and entirely happy balance to be struck in promoting values in foreign policy. Even well-meaning intentions and actions can have adverse consequences. Moreover, in order to defend its interests, the EU will have to continue to engage with the political structures that are in place. (Paragraph 136)

27. A more pragmatic approach could focus on supporting good governance in the political, economic and judicial sectors in the wider neighbourhood.
This would go some way to marry the EU’s strategic interests with a reform agenda that benefits the citizens of those countries. (Paragraph 137)

28. The values of the Union are also an important dimension of the Union’s power to persuade and dissuade, and of its authority as a trusted and reliable international actor. We recognise that some decisions are a function of strategic necessity, and that the promotion of values outside the EU is likely to be selective, but as far as possible the Union, in particular Member States, should seek to exemplify its values. (Paragraph 138)

**EU policy on Russia: in need of a strategy**

29. The West’s relations with Russia are currently led by the US, but the EU must be more engaged. The High Representative should devote particular attention to the issue of EU policy on Russia in the new strategy. (Paragraph 150)

30. The EU and Member States should pursue a dual-track policy to Russia. Sanctions must be embedded into an overall strategic approach. In the short-term, the EU and Member States must be coherent and credible in their response to Russian breaches of international law, and reflect on what sanctions are achieving. The Union must also be open to cooperation and dialogue with Russia on areas of shared interest, for example, Russian influence on the Syrian regime and broader Middle East issues. (Paragraph 151)

31. Member States must endeavour to put forward a positive agenda with Russia where it is possible to do so. A renewed discussion on European security, in the format of the Helsinki Accords could be a useful starting point. (Paragraph 152)

32. On the other hand, should Russian actions or the action of Member States, whether that is by inertia or active decision, lead towards confrontation, then the Union must also be prepared for that scenario. (Paragraph 153)

33. EU and NATO deterrence in the Baltic States and the Black Sea should be strengthened. Credibility is central to deterrence: Member States must be willing, and convincing in their willingness, to act in defence of the Union. While it is likely that sanctions have deterred Russian action beyond Ukraine, it is not clear that Russian military action in the Baltic states would be met with a forceful response by European states. (Paragraph 154)

**Eastern neighbourhood: clarify the policy on enlargement**

34. The prospect of EU membership for the countries of the Eastern Partnership is ambiguous. Enlargement cannot be an effective tool if the final objective is not clarified. (Paragraph 161)

35. EU policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries is couched in vague and diplomatic terms. In the absence of a viable and realistic timetable for these countries to accede to the Union, Member States should define their interests and objectives in the region and communicate these clearly to partner countries. (Paragraph 162)

**Southern neighbourhood: the golden thread of good governance**

36. The key external security risk in the southern neighbourhood is the existence of fragile states, leading to challenges such as terrorism and refugee flows. This must be addressed as a priority in the new strategy. (Paragraph 167)
37. The EU needs to move away from trying to fix as many problems as it can in as many countries as it can, and instead determine which risks are vital security threats, and where the EU can make a meaningful difference. (Paragraph 168)

38. The agenda in the southern neighbourhood should focus on the ‘golden thread’ of economic reform and good governance in the political, judicial and security sectors, which could contribute to the stability of the region. (Paragraph 169)

**The ways and means of a strategy**

*Flexible, decisive and timely action: ad hoc groups of Member States*

39. *Ad hoc* groups are the most useful available format for rapid, decisive and ambitious action by Member States, which can then become the wider EU position. We recommend that, in order to gain the widest possible support among Member States, *ad hoc* groups should include the High Representative. (Paragraph 188)

40. The new strategy should explore how the instruments of the EU—the Commission and EEAS—can be mobilised to support such groups, for instance by supplying them with the logistical support that is required for these groups to function. (Paragraph 189)

*Case study: Syria—an ad hoc group?*

41. The EU’s limited role in the Vienna political process is a function of the divisions between Member States and of the fact that the EU is not a security provider in the region. (Paragraph 193)

42. The EU has a direct interest in the resolution of the conflict in Syria, not least because of the flow of refugees from Syria to the EU. Member States must seek to define a coherent position internally, and seek a more central role. The EU will be essential in order to deliver a credible sanctions package, should that prove necessary, and could offer important international support to a political solution. (Paragraph 194)

43. There is also a potential role for EU on the ‘day after’, which must be grasped. Member States should mandate the High Representative and the EEAS to explore measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, manage regional and local ceasefires, strengthen local authorities and establish forums for dialogue. The aftermath of the war will be a critical time for Syria, and the EU has the tools to play an important and constructive role. (Paragraph 195)

*Improved decision-making: recalibration of the EU institutions*

44. Unanimity among Member States is often too high a bar for EU foreign and security policy: it acts as a strait jacket on the ambition and agility of EU foreign policy. The provisions of the TEU offer Member States opportunities to act within the EU but without consensus. Member States should take advantage of these opportunities. (Paragraph 201)

45. We recommend that the foreign and security policy should give high-level political guidance on when these more flexible mechanisms might be used, and—in order to reassure Member States—when they would not be acceptable. (Paragraph 202)
Co-ordinating the Commission instruments: the role of the European External Action Service

46. European Commission instruments need to be co-ordinated and aligned with the priorities of Member States—the means better aligned with the objectives. The EEAS has a critical role to play here. (Paragraph 211)

47. The EEAS should not be constrained by rigid working practices. The High Representative, in her dual role, should streamline and simplify its working practices to allow briefings to be produced in a timely manner. (Paragraph 212)

Using the Commission instruments strategically

48. Commission instruments have been used in too diluted and disparate a manner. The Commission must do less, and do it better. Member States must provide the necessary guidance. (Paragraph 224)

49. Commission instruments have a potentially valuable role to play in securing the conditions that underpin the long-term security, prosperity and stability of the Union and third countries. However, at the moment, Commission instruments are too isolated from the EU’s foreign and security policy objectives. (Paragraph 225)

50. We recommend that the new strategy should review how Commission instruments can more effectively support the foreign and security policy objectives of the Union. Trade agreements and technical agreements should be pursued when it is clear that they will deliver leverage in third countries and promote security, stability and prosperity in both the partner country and the EU. (Paragraph 226)

51. Steps should be taken to align the priorities and strengths of Member States and the Commission. The strategic review should consider how Member States and the Commission can work together more coherently both at the level of programming and implementation on the ground. (Paragraph 227)

52. Commission instruments should only be used in countries where there is local support and political acceptance for the EU’s approach. Tunisia meets these criteria. Libya, under a new Government of National Accord, may also do so. (Paragraph 228)

Case study: Tunisia and Libya—security sector reform

53. The EU can play a valuable role in security sector reform, but actions to support a country’s security capabilities must be undertaken with care. There is a risk of militarising security and reinforcing authoritarian power structures. The role and capability of the Commission to support security sector reform should be bolstered. (Paragraph 234)

54. The danger is that Member States neglect countries where they can make a long-term impact, focusing instead on solving short-term crises, to the detriment of strategic planning. We are concerned that this could be the case for Tunisia and Libya. (Paragraph 235)

EU-NATO co-operation

55. A key challenge in building better EU-NATO co-operation is the fundamental nature of the two organisations: NATO is a military alliance, with defence
as its core business, which for the EU is a peripheral activity. This leads to a fundamental difference in culture and attitude between the two institutions. While steps such as joint programming and institutional and operational reform are useful, what is required is a change in the political and strategic culture of the organisations. (Paragraph 242)

56. Such a cultural transformation and reorientation is enormously difficult to effect. Mechanisms such as joint scenario planning and shared exercises could help foster a closer cultural convergence and more formal and regular meetings of defence ministers would also be useful. Without such a convergence, the EU’s ability to exercise hard power will remain inchoate. (Paragraph 243)

The Common Security and Defence Policy

57. The CSDP adds value to the efforts of Member States and complements the role played by Member States on an independent basis or within NATO. (Paragraph 248)

58. The CSDP should be directed towards managing crises in the wider neighbourhood: the capacity to restore security, support our regional partners and secure the EU border is a clear priority. (Paragraph 249)

59. The new strategy—in its reflection on EU capabilities—should review the CSDP as a tool of crisis management in the wider neighbourhood. We urge the High Representative to initiate a debate on the overall purpose of the CSDP as a tool of crisis management, the balance of capabilities and resources required, the necessary institutional resources within the EEAS and Commission, and the cost implications. (Paragraph 250)

Analytical and assessment capabilities

60. Strong analytical capabilities at the EU and Member State level are essential for policy planning and the effective and robust defence of the EU’s interests in foreign and security policy. (Paragraph 261)

61. We recognise that the intelligence and political analysis provided by individual Member States to the EU can be quite bland. Nevertheless, the new strategy should seek to strengthen the assessment and policy planning capabilities of the EEAS. (Paragraph 262)

62. The discipline of compiling a common strategic assessment at the EU level would offer significant benefits to Member States in terms of strategic thinking and forward planning. (Paragraph 263)
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

Members

Rt Hon. the Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top
Lord Balfe
Baroness Billingham JP (resigned 25 January 2016)
Baroness Coussins
Lord Dubs
Lord Horam
Earl of Oxford and Asquith OBE
Lord Risby
Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC
Baroness Suttie
Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)
Lord Triesman

Declarations of interest

Rt Hon. the Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top
No relevant interests

Lord Balfe
Vice-Chair, APPG for Australia and New Zealand, APPG on Foreign Affairs, APPG for Turkey, Britain-Bermuda APPG, British-Canada APPG, British-German APPG, British-Montserrat APPG, British-Pacific Islands APPG, Indo-British APPG, Pitcairn Islands APPG, United Kingdom Overseas Territories APPG
Treasurer, Holy See APPG, Syria APPG

Baroness Billingham JP
No relevant interests

Baroness Coussins
Vice-Chair, APPG on the British Council, APPG on the United Nations

Lord Dubs
No relevant interests

Lord Horam
No relevant interests

Earl of Oxford and Asquith OBE
Group DF
Hansa Trust Plc

Lord Risby
Chairman, The British Ukrainian Society

Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC
Periodic participation in Anglo-Israeli security discussions
Periodic participation in Anglo-Omani security and foreign policy discussions

Baroness Suttie
Associate, Global Partners Governance with respect to their project in Jordan

Lord Tugendhat (Chairman)
Chairman, Advisory Council, European Policy Forum

Lord Triesman
Executive Director, Group Board, Salamanca Group Holdings Merchant Bank
The following Members of the European Union Select Committee attended the meeting at which the report was approved:

- Rt Hon. the Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top
- Lord Blair of Boughton QPM
- Lord Boswell of Aynho
- Rt Hon. the Earl of Caithness
- Lord Davies of Stamford
- Baroness Falkner of Margravine
- Lord Green of Hurstpierpoint
- Lord Jay of Ewelme GCMG
- Rt Hon. the Baroness Prashar CBE
- Baroness Scott of Needham Market
- Lord Trees
- Lord Tugendhat
- Rt Hon. the Lord Whitty

During consideration of the report the following Members declared an interest:

- Baroness Falkner of Margravine  
  *British Member, Anglo-German Conference (Koenigswinter)*
- Lord Green of Hurstpierpoint  
  *Chair, International Advisory Council, British Chambers of Commerce*  
  *Vice President, Iraq-British Business Council*
- Lord Jay of Ewelme GCMG  
  *Vice Chairman, Business for New Europe (BNE)*  
  *Member, Senior European Experts Group*
- Rt Hon. the Baroness Prashar CBE  
  *Deputy Chair, British Council*  
- Lord Tugendhat  
  *Chairman, Advisory Council, European Policy Forum*


Dr Kai Oppermann acted as a Specialist Adviser for this inquiry and declared no relevant interests.

**Hospitality received**

While in Brussels, the Committee attended a working dinner hosted by the UK Ambassador to the PSC of the EU. The Members of the Committee who visited Brussels are listed in Appendix 4.
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Evidence is published online at [http://www.parliament.uk/review-eu-foreign-policy](http://www.parliament.uk/review-eu-foreign-policy) and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074).

Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked with a ** gave both oral and written evidence. Those marked with * gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.

**Oral evidence in chronological order**

** Professor Karen Smith, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science  
QQ 1–10

* Mr Henry Wilkinson, Head of Intelligence and Analysis, The Risk Advisory Group  
QQ 1–10

* Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO, former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union  
QQ 11–20

** Mr Chris Sainty, Head of EU External Department, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
QQ 21–34

* Mr Richard Lindsay, Head of Security Policy Department, Defence and International Security Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
QQ 21–34

* Mr James Watt CVO, former British Ambassador to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon  
QQ 35–45

* Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Professor of Politics with reference to the Middle East, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London  
QQ 35–45

* Mr Imad Mesdoua, Political Analyst, Africa Matters Limited  
QQ 35–45

* Mr Marc Pierini, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe and former European Union Ambassador to Turkey, Tunisia and Libya, Syria, Morocco  
QQ 46–57

* Mr Hans Wessberg, Member, European Court of Auditors and former State Secretary, Swedish Prime Minister’s Office  
QQ 58–66

* Mr Peter Eklund, Head of Private Office, European Court of Auditors  
QQ 58–66

* Mr Pierre Vimont, Senior Associate, Carnegie Europe and former Executive Secretary-General, European External Action Service  
QQ 67–76
As part of the inquiry the Committee visited Brussels, 19-20 October 2015. Evidence was taken from the following witnesses:

* Mr Alessandro Cortese, Italian Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the EU
* Mr Michael Flügger, German Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the EU
* Mr Philippe Setton, French Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the EU
* Mr Maciej Karasiński, Head of CSDP Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU

A note of this evidence is provided in Appendix 4.

Evidence was also taken from the following witness off the record:

* Mr Pedro Serrano, Deputy Secretary General - CSDP and Crisis Response, European External Action Service
Alphabetical list of all witnesses

Dr Rosa Balfour, Senior Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States  
Dr Federica Bicchi, London School of Economics and Political Science  
Professor Steven Blockmans, Head of EU Foreign Policy, CEPS (Brussels) and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam  
Dr Laura Chappell, University of Surrey  
Dr Nicola Chelotti, London School of Economics and Political Science  
Sir Robert Cooper KCMG MVO, former Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (QQ 11–20)  
Mr Alessandro Cortese, Italian Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the EU  
Professor Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics, Tufts University (QQ 124–137)  
Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration  
Dr Spyros Economides, London School of Economics and Political Science  
Mr Peter Eklund, Head of Private Office, European Court of Auditors (QQ 58–66)  
Professor Adam Fagan, Professor of European Politics, Queen Mary, University of London (QQ 138–149)  
Mr Michael Flügger, German Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the EU  
Dr Catherine Gegout, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Nottingham  
Dr Roberta Guerrina, Reader in Politics, University of Surrey  
Dr Amelia Hadfield, Director of the Jean Monnet Centre for European Studies (CEFEUS) Politics & IR Programme, Canterbury Christ Church University  
Mr Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission  
Dr Thomas Henökl, Senior Researcher, German Development Institute
Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Associate Professor, Centre on Conflict, Peacebuilding and Development, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

Professor Knud Erik Jørgensen, Yaşar University

* Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp, President of the Federal Academy of Security Policy, Berlin (QQ 161–174)

* Mr Maciej Karasiński, Head of CSDP Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU

* Dr James Ker-Lindsay, Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science and Research Associate, Centre of International Studies, University of Oxford (QQ 138–149)

Professor Dr Stephan Keukeleire, Professor in European Foreign Policy, University of Leuven

Professor Elena Korosteleva, Director of the Global Europe Centre (Professional Studies), Global Europe Centre, University of Kent

Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham

* Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe (QQ 175–188)

* Mr Richard Lindsay, Head of Security Policy Department, Defence and International Security Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 21–34)

LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science

* Dr Lars-Erik Lundin, Distinguished Associate Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and former EU Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna (QQ 124–137)

Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London

Mr Igor Merheim-Eyre, Global Europe Centre, University of Kent

* Mr Imad Mesdoua, Political Analyst, Africa Matters Limited (QQ 35–45)

Ms Irena Mnatsakanyan, Global Europe Centre, University of Kent

Dr Maria O’Neill, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee

Quaker Council For European Affairs
* Mr Marc Pierini, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe and former European Union Ambassador to Turkey, Tunisia and Libya, Syria, Morocco (QQ 46–57)

* Mr Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute, Wilson Centre (QQ 150–160)

** Mr Chris Sainty, Head of EU External Department, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 21–34)

* Mr Pedro Serrano, Deputy Secretary General—CSDP and Crisis Response, European External Action Service

* Mr Philippe Setton, French Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the EU

Dr Alistair Shepherd, Senior Lecturer in European Security, Aberystwyth University

* General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO (QQ 109–123)

** Professor Karen Smith, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science (QQ 1–10)

Dr Anna Katharina Stahl, Research Fellow, EU-China Research Centre, College of Europe

Mr Ueli Staeger, Centre on Conflict, Peacebuilding and Development, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

* Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Professor of Politics with reference to the Middle East, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (QQ 35–45)

Ms Eske Van Gils, Global Europe Centre, University of Kent

* Mr Pierre Vimont, Senior Associate, Carnegie Europe and former Executive Secretary-General, European External Action Service (QQ 67–76)

* Mr James Watt CVO, former British Ambassador to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (QQ 35–45)

Dr Carol Weaver, Lecturer, De Montfort University

* Mr Hans Wessberg, Member, European Court of Auditors and former State Secretary, Swedish Prime Minister’s Office (QQ 58–66)

* Dr Nicholas Westcott CMG, Managing Director, Middle East and North Africa, European External Action Service (QQ 92–108)
* Mr Henry Wilkinson, Head of Intelligence and Analysis, The Risk Advisory Group (QQ 1–10)
Dr Neil Winn, Senior Lecturer in European Studies, School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds
Mr Nick Witney, Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations
Ms Katharine Wright, University of Surrey
APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

The House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee, chaired by Lord Tugendhat, has decided to conduct an inquiry into the strategic review of the EU’s foreign and security policy. The Sub-Committee seeks evidence from anyone with an interest.

Written evidence is sought by Sunday 11 October 2015. Public hearings will be held from September 2015 until the end of November 2015. The Committee aims to publish its report, with recommendations, in early 2016. The report will receive responses from the Government and the European Commission, and will be debated in the House.

The December 2013 European Council invited the High Representative, in close co-operation with the European Commission, to “assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with the Member States.” The first phase of this work was a strategic review, which reported to the European Council in June 2015. The High Representative’s report notes that the EU is acting today in a changed global environment, which is more connected, contested and complex. The report prioritises five challenges and opportunities for the EU:

- European Neighbours
- North Africa and the Middle East
- Africa
- Atlantic Partnerships
- Asia.

The report also suggested areas for reform in the functioning of EU external policy, including in direction setting, flexibility, leverage, co-ordination and capabilities, and recommended a ‘joined-up approach’ to EU external policy.

The second phase of the review is summed up in the invitation of the June 2015 European Council to the High Representative, to “continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close co-operation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016.”

The External Affairs Sub-Committee intends, through its inquiry, to contribute to this process of strategic reflection, and thereby to the preparation of an EU external affairs strategy.

The Committee seeks evidence on the following questions. You need not address all these questions in your response.

**Changing global environment and EU interests**

- Is the High Representative’s report the right basis on which to draft the strategy proper?

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• The High Representative sets out a changed and more threatening global environment. In this new environment, what are the EU’s strategic interests? Do they coincide with the UK’s strategic interests?

• Is the EU ready and capable to respond to the new security environment? What are the opportunities that it presents for the Union?

• The High Representative, endorsed by the European Council, calls for an “EU global strategy on foreign and security policy.” Is the EU a global power? Is the High Representative too ambitious and if so, where, and on what, should the EU focus?

Neighbourhood policy
• Should the EU focus its resources more closely on its own neighbourhood? What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing so?

• How would you assess EU policy in the neighbourhood? Are the foreign policy instruments in the neighbourhood fit for purpose? Should enlargement remain the major tool of in the EU foreign policy toolkit in the neighbourhood?

• What are the implications for the EU’s foreign and security policy of the Greek crisis?

Upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa
• What are the EU’s interests in the MENA region? How effective have the EU and Member States been in promoting them? What have been the obstacles to effective EU action in the region?

• Member States and the EU have been calling for a policy to address the “root causes” of insecurity and to offer “tailor made responses” to the countries in the region. What would that involve? Does the EU have the foreign policy toolkit to deliver on this policy?

Capabilities and Capacities
• What are the EU and Member States’ most effective and useful foreign policy instruments? Are they fit for purpose? Are they being used effectively? What structural reforms are required in order to make the EU’s foreign policy work more effective?

• What additional capabilities, if any, are required for the EU and Member States to act effectively in the new security environment, for instance in response to emerging threats to its cyber-security?

• How can the EU most effectively maximise its power—both hard and soft—in international affairs?

Is the EU an effective multilateral player?
• How would you assess the diplomatic and intelligence capacities of the EU and Member States? Does the Union have the expertise and capacity within its institutions and national foreign services to respond to a more complex and complicated security environment?

Member States and the EU
• How can the interests of Member States be more effectively translated into EU action? How can the links between national capitals and the EU be strengthened in external affairs?
• Is the practice of *ad hoc* groupings of Member States leading on foreign policy dossiers (as in the E3+3 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme) a useful template for future EU foreign policy? How could it be strengthened? What are the disadvantages of this approach?

• How would you assess the flow of information between Member States and between national capitals and the EU? What are the hurdles to deepening intelligence sharing within the Union?

**Process**

• How should the High Representative conduct the review? What would be the most useful outcome? How should the UK feed into the review?

• How should the review address the resourcing of the EU’s foreign policy strategy? Should the High Representative also outline the operational plans for advancing the EU’s foreign policy strategy?

**Case Studies**

• Can you give examples of where EU foreign policy has succeeded and when it has struggled? What are the causes in each case?
APPENDIX 4: EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE VISIT TO BRUSSELS

On 19 and 20 October 2015, eight Members of the Committee (accompanied by the Clerk, the Policy Analyst and the Specialist Advisor) visited Brussels in order to discuss the inquiry with EU policymakers, national representatives and the foreign affairs community.


In attendance: Eva George (Clerk), Roshani Palamakumbura (Policy Analyst) and Kai Oppermann (Specialist Advisor).

Day One: Monday 19 October

Briefing with UK government officials

The Committee had an off the record dinner with Angus Lapsley, UK Ambassador to the PSC of the EU and Sir Adam Thomson, UK Permanent Representative to NATO.

Day Two: Tuesday 20 October

Political and Security Committee Ambassadors

The Committee had breakfast with Mr Alessandro Cortese, Italian Ambassador to the PSC, Mr Michael Flügger, German Ambassador to the PSC, Mr Philippe Setton, French Ambassador to the PSC and Mr Maciej Karasiński, Head of CSDP Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU.

A note of the meeting, taken under the Chatham House Rule, is below.


In attendance: Eva George (Clerk), Roshani Palamakumbura (Policy Analyst) and Kai Oppermann (Specialist Advisor).

The witnesses stated that the High Representative’s approach to the new foreign and security strategy was good, and had its basis in the paper presented to the European Council in June 2015. Different Member States had been more and less keen to see a new strategy developed, but were now engaged in the process. There was recognition that the landscape had changed since the 2003 strategy, particularly in view of developments in the neighbourhood, and the fact that newer members had not been included in the 2003 drafting process. A new strategy was required for these reasons, and also because the EU had new instruments at its disposal which should improve the capacity of the EU to deliver on its external goals.

The High Representative had demonstrated a clever way of reaching out to Member States, but keeping the design in her hands. The witnesses expressed support for the High Representative taking the lead: unlike Council Conclusions, the text of a strategy could not be negotiated between 28 states. The High Representative had also engaged with civil society and parliaments.
Member States had both fed in to the paper for the European Council, and met informally with the High Representative and her team, who had been reaching out. PSC Ambassadors had also been requested to identify contact points in their home ministries, such as policy planners and European correspondents. There had been opportunities to send staff to work with Nathalie Tocci (Special Adviser to Federica Mogherini).

Currently the EEAS was leading the process and engaging the Member States. The Commission was engaged but not dominating the process. Attendees indicated that the High Representative valued her role as Vice President of the Commission, harnessing the comprehensive approach and soft power of the Union, which could be argued to be the EU’s best instruments.

Phase one of the strategic review had involved wide consultation. Phase two would be more concrete, focusing on process and design matters. Thorough consultation of Member States would be essential, through bilaterals and contact groups. Witnesses noted that, as the strategy should guide the EU, Member States should continue to be brought in to the process.

The issue was now scope and content. The High Representative had changed the scope from a security strategy to a global strategy. The European Council had agreed this, but some questions remained about what a global strategy would look like. Some Member States still preferred a narrower focus on security, while others supported a more global approach, for example reflecting the importance of Asia. It was also suggested that a global strategy would not necessarily need to be conceived in geographical terms, but could instead refer to global common goods such as climate change and energy. There was agreement amongst witnesses that the neighbourhood should be a priority: Russia was the EU’s immediate neighbour; Turkey had been in a long accession process; and there were a range of challenges to the south which the strategy should not shy away from.

Witnesses suggested that UK diplomats had been effective in engaging with the strategic review process, and such input had been valuable. The issue of the UK referendum had been separated out from discussions on the strategy. However, it was also observed that that–beyond the area of foreign and security policy–the UK had been increasingly willing to opt out and take a UK-first approach, and its separate approach to migration had been visible. Witnesses noted that if the UK had been absent from foreign policy discussions, this would have been a choice of the Government, but some developments had also been circumstantial. For example Chancellor Merkel’s relationship with Putin influenced how the issue of Russia was approached by the EU. In contrast, the UK had been fully engaged in the Iran negotiations in a constructive way behind the scenes.

Witnesses noted that Member States had always had different security interests, but the Ukraine crisis had made clear that these might be more significant, strategic differences. The aim of the strategy should be to define the EU’s common security interests. On the other hand, the experience of standing united over Russia and demonstrating real leverage had been positive. There was now a greater recognition of the value of a united position: unity was the EU’s greatest strength, and its value had been demonstrated on Russia, Mediterranean naval operations, the Sahel and Central Africa, issues where some Member States had no direct interests. There is leverage when the Member States are united. Witnesses stated that some difference of emphasis between Member States could be accommodated in a new strategy.
Witnesses noted that the dialectics had changed within the European Council. An enlarged Council allowed for greater debate and articulation of views, but challenges and divisions were in some ways unchanged, for example over Russia and the Middle East peace process. The issues that had been sensitive for 15 Member States were still sensitive for 28. Divisions between Member States and reluctance to give additional responsibilities to the Commission were also not new issues. A further challenge was that even if the moment of synthesis could be reached, the level of ambition between Member States varied. Unity and solidarity remained desirable but challenging. There was not a clear split between small and large countries.

Witnesses noted that Member States wanted a peaceful and stable neighbourhood, and that democracy and the rule of law were the most viable and stable systems to secure that in the long term, though quasi-dictators might stabilise countries in the short term. Over the long term, the EU’s approach should therefore be democracy and values based.

Witnesses noted that it was important to maintain pressure until Russia stopped its current activities in Ukraine, but also that the maintenance of some channels of communication was valuable. For example Russia had retained its ambassador to NATO and was an important partner in negotiations with Iran. The witnesses also noted that strategies remained for the Balkan countries and Turkey, but that while partnership was a vision shared by all, the endgame of further enlargement was not endorsed by all witnesses.

Concluding the session, witnesses agreed that a successful outcome of the strategic review would be the development of a political framework: an operational document rather than an academic exercise. It would be beneficial if it led to policies elaborating the instruments and how to enhance the EU’s capabilities. As all Member States would have to subscribe to it, the strategy should reflect all Member States. The strategy should be a guide for Member States and it was therefore critical that all Member States should identify with it.

Carnegie Europe

The Committee took evidence from Mr Marc Pierini, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe and former Ambassador to Turkey, Syria and Tunisia.

A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.

European Court of Auditors

The Committee took evidence from Mr Hans Wessberg, member, European Court of Auditors and Mr Peter Ecklund, Head of Private Office, European Court of Auditors.

A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.

Carnegie Europe

The Committee took evidence from Mr Pierre Vimont, Senior Associate, Carnegie Europe and former Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS.

A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.
The Committee took evidence from Lawrence Meredith, Head of Unit, Strategy and Turkey and Martin Hetherington, Policy Officer, Strategy and Turkey.

A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.

European External Action Service

The Committee took evidence from Dr Nicholas Westcott, Managing Director, Middle East and North Africa, EEAS.

A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.

European External Action Service

The Committee took evidence from Pedro Serrano, Deputy Secretary General - CSDP and Crisis Response, EEAS. The evidence was taken off the record.
### Table 1: CSDP Military Operations 2007–2015: UK Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate summary</th>
<th>Mandate dates</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>UK personnel/national resources</th>
<th>Total Annual Budget (UK contribution to Military Common Funding is approx. 15%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA</td>
<td>Provides Capacity Building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</td>
<td>from Dec 2004, current mandate to 2016</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>1 x Intermediate Reserve Company (up to 120 personnel); 6 x staff officers</td>
<td>€14.1m (€2.2m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR ATALANTA (Operation Atalanta)</td>
<td>Protects vessels of the World Food Programme, African Union Mission in Somalia; deters and disrupts piracy and armed robbery at sea and monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.</td>
<td>from Dec 2008, current mandate to Dec 2016</td>
<td>c. 1051</td>
<td>Hosts Operational Headquarters (Northwood); Operation Commander Maj Gen Martin Smith RM and core OHQ staff</td>
<td>€7.4m (€1.2m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate summary</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Contributes to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia.</td>
<td>from Apr 2010, current mandate to Dec 2016</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1 x Logistics Officer; 1 x MA to Somali CHOD; 1 x Civilian Security Sector Reform Advisor</td>
<td>€11.3m (€1.8m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>Trains and advises the Malian Armed Forces (MAF).</td>
<td>From Feb 2013, current mandate to May 2016</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>3 x Force HQ staff; 27 x Training Team personnel; 2 x Civilian Humanitarian Law trainers</td>
<td>€15.0m (€2.4m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMAM RCA</td>
<td>Plays a role in strengthening the security sector in close co-operation with the UN.</td>
<td>from Apr 2014, current mandate to Dec 2016</td>
<td>c. 700</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€29.6m (€4.4m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Med (Op Sophia)</td>
<td>Contributes to disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean.</td>
<td>from June 2015, current mandate to June 2016</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>2 x Royal Navy Vessels; core OHQ staff (subject to review 30 November)</td>
<td>€7.5m (€1.2m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), November 2015. (The mandates of the missions has been abbreviated from the original evidence provided by the FCO)
Table 2: CSDP civilian operations 2007–2015: UK contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate summary</th>
<th>Mandate dates</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>UK Personnel</th>
<th>Total Annual Budget (UK contribution to CFSP budget that funds civilian missions is approx. 16%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan,</td>
<td>Supports the Afghan government to establish sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements.</td>
<td>from 2007, current</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€57.75m (€9.24m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTs</td>
<td>mandate to Dec 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah, OPTs</td>
<td>Provides border assistance and monitoring at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border.</td>
<td>from 2005, current</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>€1.27m (€0.2m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mandate to Jun 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS, OPTs</td>
<td>Contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership.</td>
<td>from 2005, current</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€9.18m (€1.5m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mandate to June 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>Rule of law mission to monitor, mentor and advise national authorities with regard to Police, Justice and Customs.</td>
<td>from 2008, current mandate to June 2016</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>€77m (€12.3m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
<td>Monitors compliance with 2008 6-point plan agreement between Georgia and Russia.</td>
<td>from Oct 2008, current mandate to Dec 2016</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>€18.3m (€2.9m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>Contributes to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services.</td>
<td>from July 2014, current mandate to Nov 2016</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>€13.1m (€2.1m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Nestor</td>
<td>Capacity building. Regional approach in the Horn of Africa and Western Indian.</td>
<td>from 2012, current mandate to Dec 2016</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€17.9m to Dec 15 then €12.1 m to Dec 16 (€2.9m, then €1.9m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>Provides advice and assistance on Defence Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo.</td>
<td>from 2005, closes Sept 2016, handing over to European Development Fund.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€2.7m (€0.4m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td>Capacity building, through training and advising, to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces.</td>
<td>from Jul 2012, current mandate to July 2016</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€9.8m (€1.6m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td>Capacity building to enable Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order.</td>
<td>from Jan 2015, current mandate to Jan 2016</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€5.5m (€0.9m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate summary</th>
<th>Mandate dates</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>UK Personnel</th>
<th>Total Annual Budget (UK contribution to CFSP budget that funds civilian missions is approx. 16%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>Supports the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of Libya’s land, sea and air borders.</td>
<td>from May 2013, current mandate to Nov 2015, likely to close.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€26.2m (under-spend is currently funding a 6-month extension) (€4.2m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), November 2015. (The mandates of the missions has been abbreviated from the original evidence provided by the FCO)*