Chapter 3: External and internal context
40.We do not seek to offer a comprehensive vision of the external and internal context facing the Union, but to rank key external priorities and to pinpoint internal dynamics that a new strategy must take account of. The current challenges facing the Union—in particular terrorism and the refugee crisis—have been unexpected, and have caught the Union unprepared.
External security context
41.Witnesses painted a bleak picture of security in the neighbourhood and the direct impact on the EU. For Mr Wilkinson, the world was not getting more dangerous per se, but the countries in the “worst shape” were in the European neighbourhood or periphery.35 Foreign policy challenges in the neighbourhood were “of a very different nature and magnitude” from those of a decade ago.36 Professor Smith concurred that the neighbourhood was an “arc of crisis” surrounding the EU.37
42.We consider below Russia and the rise of geopolitics, the fragile states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and terrorism. We then consider the handling of the migration and refugee crisis in 2015, and the role of the US in EU security.
Russia and the return of geopolitics
43.In its eastern neighbourhood, the Union faces a more aggressive and nationalist Russia, which increasingly views itself as antagonistic to Europe and the West. The illegal annexation of Crimea and the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty have redrawn the European map and led to the resurgence of power politics on the European continent. This Committee considered these issues in depth, in our report The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (February 2015).38
44.Russia’s actions have dramatically changed the strategic landscape in the shared neighbourhood. Sir Robert Cooper found Russia’s breach of the “fundamental rule” that political international stability was based on territorial sovereignty “frightening.”39 For the Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, the Russian intervention in Ukraine, particularly the annexation of Crimea, was “not a precedent that we can simply sit back and pretend has not been set.”40 The Minister for Europe and Mr Matthew Rojansky, Director of the Kennan Institute, Wilson Centre, agreed that it was not clear that Russia genuinely recognised the right of sovereign countries that were once part of the Soviet Union to decide their own futures.41
45.Russia has been disengaging from the West. Mr Lidington stated that “the Government of Russia have chosen to treat Europe more as a strategic adversary than as a strategic partner”, and suggested that the gradual integration of Russia into a rules based order could not be taken “for granted at all”.42 Mr Rojansky also noted that Russia had been actively reducing its economic interdependence with Europe and EU sanctions had reinforced that process.43 Dr Karl-Heinz Kamp, President of the Federal Academy of Security Policy, Berlin, agreed that the Russian attack on Ukraine “ended, once and for all, the partnership with the West”. In his view this was not a “bad-weather period but a fundamental climate change.”44
46.It became clear in the course of our inquiry into EU-Russia relations that the current confrontation is driven both by Russian domestic and political considerations and the geopolitical ambitions of the current Russian administration. Even a settlement in Ukraine will not guarantee that the Union will be able return to harmonious relations with Russia. Therefore, the future of EU-Russia relations, the security of neighbours such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, as well as the long-term alignment of countries such as Azerbaijan and Armenia—neither of which, in the words of Professor Elena Korosteleva, Mr Igor Merheim-Eyre, Ms Eske Van Gils and Ms Irena Mnatsakanyan, Global Europe Centre, University of Kent, “enjoys very close relations with the EU”—remain in the balance.45
Fragile states in the Middle East and North Africa
47.Two trends have led to a combustible MENA region, with direct security consequences for the Union: the weakening of state structures and the rise of non-state actors. Dr Henökl characterised the MENA region as containing “ungoverned spaces”—areas where the state lacks administrative capacity to exercise effective control within its own borders.46 Dr Shepherd noted that such “ungoverned spaces” were “conflict prone.” He concluded that it was a key strategic interest of the EU to prevent, manage and resolve these conflicts.47
48.It is widely accepted that weak governance and widespread economic and political grievances in the region provide the conditions in which extremism and violent non-state actors can flourish.48 Mr Lidington reinforced this point: a “well governed and prosperous” country would “find it easier to prevent and defeat terrorism and extremism” and would be “much less likely than a failing state to find that many of its citizens want to get out at almost any cost.”49
Terrorism
49.A major security threat facing the EU today, and for the foreseeable future, comes from decentralised jihadist and extremist affiliates, most notably the so-called ISIL, also known as Daesh. Witnesses reminded us that the jihadist threat was not confined to Syria and Iraq. Mr Vimont said that ISIL was acting in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and was “slowly moving into other parts of the Sahel or the Horn, and probably Yemen.” He warned that “very close to our own territory, we have a major security threat”—a danger also highlighted by Mr Wilkinson.50
50.Terrorism affects both the internal and the external security of the Union. Dr Henökl explained that Syria had become “a pole of attraction for radicalized youth from Europe to join the jihad under the banner of Daesh, the Islamic State, as foreign fighters”.51 The internal threat was underlined during our inquiry: on 13 November 2015, Paris suffered a significant terrorist attack with 130 fatalities.52 The perpetrators are alleged to have been citizens of the EU, and some individuals may have served with ISIL in Syria and returned to Europe.53
51.Support for security and stability in the MENA will be fundamental to both combating terrorism and delivering a sustainable response to refugee and migration flows. We turn to the EU’s role in building better governance in Chapter 5.
The refugee and migration crisis: an inadequate response
52.The unprecedented refugee and migration crisis that developed in 2015 has become one of the most pressing challenges for the EU.54 This crisis illustrates the capacity of external insecurity and conflict in the MENA region to degrade the internal security of Europe. The EU response, in turn, has demonstrated polarisation among Member States and the inadequacy of the Union’s crisis management capacities.
53.Dr Rosa Balfour, Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, said that divisions between Member States had undermined the ability of the EU to address the challenge of refugees and migrant inflows.55 Mr Marc Pierini, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe, and former EU Ambassador to Turkey, Tunisia and Libya, Syria and Morocco, described a “flurry of uncontrolled events in the east and in the south”, to which the EU had “tended to be reactive more than organised.”56 Professor Charles Tripp FBA, Professor of Politics with reference to the Middle East, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, said that Member States had been “scrabbling around both individually and in concert”.57 Mr Rojansky reflected that the EU had “been caught, relatively speaking, unprepared”; the EU should ask itself what capacities it needed to deal with a “real security and humanitarian crisis” on its doorstep.58
54.Dr Balfour summarised the lesson of the refugee crisis:
“Perhaps never before has the evidence for the need for a stronger EU in the international arena been so compelling. Similarly, the domestic consequences of insufficient collective European capacity to respond to international crises have rarely been so evident.”59
The United States
55.The posture of the US has shifted. Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, and Mr Witney wrote that a “combination of fatigue, of increasingly insular public opinion, and of diminishing resources [had] undermined US willingness to act as a global policeman.”60 Professor Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics, Tufts University, agreed that the US was no longer hegemonically powerful and needed the EU “more than it did perhaps 15 or 20 years ago.”61 The US’s strategic priorities had also shifted toward Asia.62
56.Professor Menon and Mr Witney, as well as Professor Drezner, agreed that the US wanted and needed Europe to take on a greater role as an international and regional security provider.63 According to Professor Menon and Mr Witney, the US was “anxious that its allies take over more of the burden of maintaining security in their own backyards.” Washington had come to believe increasingly that Europeans would “need to work together more effectively within the EU.”64 Mr Lidington too noted a shift: on Libya and Mali, the US had been ready to say: “this is not going to be an issue where we are the first ones to step forward.” He also described a “growing sense of resentment in the United States” at the perception of “Europe consuming security … paid for by United States taxpayers.”65
57.Dr Kamp agreed with this assessment: there had been a “fundamental change on the other side of the Atlantic”, from suspicion of the EU developing its own military capacity to the current position, whereby the US was now unconcerned if the Europeans strengthened their defence capacities at the EU or NATO level—what mattered was that it happened at all.66
Conclusions and recommendations
58.The strategic review must recognise that the external security context surrounding the Union has deteriorated significantly. The US has long urged Europe to take more responsibility for its own security. The US has now become more open to the EU as a security actor distinct from NATO.
59.Migrant and refugee inflows are likely to remain a long-term challenge for the Union. So far, Member States have not agreed a collective response to this issue at the EU level. The fractious and polarised debates have battered the reputation of the EU and resulted in a muted response to a pressing security and humanitarian crisis. These internal divisions are likely to undermine Member States’ ability to achieve unity on foreign policy issues.
Internal context: economic weakness and internal tensions
60.The current internal context of the Union also has implications for the drafting of the new strategy on foreign and security policy and the capacity of the Union as a foreign policy actor.
Eurozone crisis and economic power
61.Power rests on economic success. Ernest Bevin is said, apocryphally, to have given a very practical example: “Our fighting men will not be able to achieve their purpose unless we get an adequate supply of coal.” President Obama has also emphasised the dependence of power on economics: “Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy.”67 This is particularly the case for the EU, which has relied on access to the single market as a source of its power.
62.A notable difference between the EU and the US is that the EU has never converted its considerable economic weight into effective hard power, in particular because many Member States have been opposed to that step. In contrast, the EU’s use of its economic strength in pursuit of foreign and security policy goals, and the demonstrable effect this can have on other countries, has been evident in its use of sanctions against Iran and Russia.
63.The travails of the Eurozone crisis have been well documented. As this Committee noted in its report, Euro area crisis: an update (April 2014), although the crisis has stabilised, significant economic weaknesses remain in the Eurozone countries, with consequences for all Member States. We explained that the crisis laid bare numerous divisions between Member States and provoked significant internal political conflict.68
64.There have also been consequences for EU foreign policy. Professor Smith said that the Eurozone crisis had “been incredibly diverting of the attention of key players”; there appeared to have “been a lack of appetite for engaging in hard discussions about foreign policy.”69 While Mr Sainty saw no “obvious direct link” between the Eurozone crisis and the strategic review itself, he acknowledged that when EU leaders were “preoccupied by a difficult internal debate” there was “much less time and inclination to focus on foreign and security policy questions.” Throughout this period, however, the EU had “forged and maintained unity on sanctions against Russia”, and “contributed to successful outcomes in Iran”.70
65.Several witnesses argued that the EU’s economic difficulties have had a negative impact on the perception of the EU by third countries. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. wrote that the Eurozone crisis had “damaged the EU’s standing and credibility in the eyes of many observers around the world”, although the Union still benefited from considerable soft power.71 Professor Drezner added that the continued debility of the Eurozone and the European economy had been a “turn-off” for countries considering joining the Union, and that this represented “a blow—an erosion of the EU’s normative power.”72 In contrast, Dr George Kyris, Lecturer in International and European Politics, University of Birmingham, did not believe that the Eurozone crisis had weakened the appeal of the EU as an important international actor.73
Internal tensions
66.The Eurozone crisis has been accompanied by a rise of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties across the EU, giving rise to damaging internal challenges to the Union. Dr Federica Bicchi et al. wrote that that this “current internal contestation of the EU (in many EU Member States) is damaging to its influence abroad”.74 Professor Drezner said that the “greatest existential threat to the European Union” was “the Hungarian Prime Minister’s articulation of the notion that liberal democracy as we know it is a failed model.”75
67.For Dr Kyris, these trends “might pose obstacles to common foreign policy objectives”.76 Professor Smith agreed that the “increase in contestation of the European Union from within” made it more difficult for Member States “to achieve unity to deal with the diffusion of international power.” She said that the decrease in internal support for the EU—both public and governmental—”also deprives it of legitimacy and ultimately decreases its soft power”.77
Conclusion
68.The EU’s foreign policy has been built on its economic strength. The Union’s credibility and capacity as a foreign policy actor have been weakened and tarnished by the Eurozone crisis, persistent low levels of economic growth and the internal tensions of the European project. This will be an ongoing constraint on the EU as a foreign policy actor.
Primacy of Member States
69.Witnesses were clear that European diplomacy remained primarily a national affair.78 Member States have retained most of their sovereign rights in foreign policy: votes on foreign and security policy are mainly by unanimity, Member States have retained their national representations, and they have not transferred their military capabilities to the European level.
70.Despite decades of working together, Member States remain far apart in their threat perceptions, priorities and proficiencies. Our witnesses highlighted three critical divergences.
- First, divisions over whether the EU should be a geopolitical actor at all.79 Dr Duke sensed “profound ambiguity” on this from the UK and France, which retained “pretensions towards a global foreign and security policy.”80 In contrast, Professor Smith explained that small Member States “have traditionally seen the EU as a good power multiplier. It is extremely useful to them.”81
- A second division was the geographical outlook of Member States. Mr Lidington said that some Member States had a narrow focus—for example, central European countries saw Russia and the eastern neighbourhood as the priority, while the Mediterranean countries looked south to Africa and the Near East, and others, such as France, the UK and Germany, had a more global outlook.82
- A third difference—not necessarily determined by the size of the state—was the capacities that Member States brought to the table and their appetite for foreign policy. This, for Mr Vimont, was the key distinction between Member States: those “with diplomatic capacity and resources and whether they have [an] active diplomacy”. In this context, he included, alongside France, the UK and Germany, countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Denmark, which undertook an “active diplomacy” and wanted “a very active European Union in the field of foreign policy.”83
71.Divisions and disagreements among Member States have not receded. From the PSC Ambassadors of Germany, France, Italy and Poland, we heard that an enlarged European Council allowed for greater debate, but challenges and divisions remained unchanged—for example on controversial dossiers such as Russia and the Middle East Peace Process. Indeed, while Member States had always had different security interests, the crisis in Ukraine had shown that these might be more significant strategic differences.84
72.We note that it also remains the case that some Member States, often those with a more global outlook and capable foreign policy instruments, are sceptical about the desirability of an EU global foreign policy.
Conclusions and recommendations
73.The starting point for a new strategy must be to recognise the ultimate authority that Member States retain over EU foreign and security policy, and to acknowledge their priorities.
74.Member States have not always formulated the necessary collective positions on key foreign policy dossiers, provided the necessary strategic direction or awarded the requisite resources to the EU.
75.The strategy should provide the overarching framework for where Member States could act more collectively at the EU level, and where the EU could support closer alignment between the foreign policies of Member States.
76.Member States and the High Representative must not allow the current crises and internal fissures to dilute the strategic review into a ritual exercise. Our impression is that the necessary rigour and political will are not yet in evidence, either at the Member State or at the EU level.
The ‘herbivorous’ power: political reluctance and reduced capability
77.The EU is a weak military actor. National security and military and defence capacity are the responsibility of Member States, while the NATO alliance remains the cornerstone of European defence. Professor Drezner noted that on the military side, the EU “punches far below its weight.”85 Dr Duke agreed that one of the “main credibility challenges for the EU lies in its reluctance to embrace its hard security elements”.86
78.Witnesses also expressed concern about Member States’ investment in their military capabilities. Mr Rojansky described military capacity and planning as largely absent from European countries’ security and defence strategies: “step two in the plan right now is ‘call Washington’”.87 Member States have not been investing in their military capacity and as a result have not been meeting their commitments to NATO. Mr Lidington confirmed that roughly 70% of the NATO budget was funded by the US.88
79.In September 2015, after decades of decline in military spending, many European states pledged to increase defence spending towards 2% of GDP over the next 10 years.89 The UK confirmed this pledge in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in November 2015, and also committed to spend £178 billion over the next decade equipping and improving the armed forces.90
80.Witnesses doubted that the 2% pledges would have a meaningful effect. General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE, former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO, pointed out that many Member States had already been weakened by long-term under-investment in defence capacity; if the “European nations really want to deliver an effective deterrent capability, there is a very strong case that they need to increase defence spending [to] quite a lot more than 2% of GDP.”91
81.Dr Kamp pointed out that while “six European countries have increased their defence spending … six have cut it further”—including eastern European and Baltic states.92 General Sir Richard Shirreff agreed that many Member States “are still way below the 2% limit.”93
82.The data are revealing. Among the Baltic states, Estonia alone already meets the 2% target. In 2015 Latvia pledged to reach the 2% target by 2020, up from the current defence budget of approximately 1% of GDP. Lithuania has pledged to meet the NATO target by 2020, whereas it currently only spends 0.8% of GDP on its military.94 It should be noted that both Latvia and Lithuania cut their defence budgets dramatically in the period of austerity following the financial crisis. Latvia cut its defence budget by 38% in 2009 and 16% in 2010, while Lithuania cut its military spending by 17% in both 2009 and 2010.95 In 2015, of the EU Member States which are also NATO members, only Estonia, Greece, Poland and the UK met the NATO commitment to spend 2% of their GDP on defence.96 Russia spends consistently between 3 to 4% of its GDP on the military.97
83.We consider the possibilities for leveraging military capabilities—both EU and NATO—in Chapter 5.
Conclusion
84.In the new geopolitical context, reduced military capacity and the unwillingness of Member States to underpin foreign policy with the legitimate use of force undermine the Union as a foreign policy actor. This climate hollows out both the collective military capacity of the EU and that of Member States, endangering the security of EU citizens.
Germany: a reluctant leader
85.Leadership on the Eurozone crisis, the response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and the refugee crisis have propelled Germany into a leadership role—a role not sought, but one reluctantly accepted by Chancellor Angela Merkel.98 Professor William Paterson ascribed Germany’s increased role to the “declining capacity and will of France and the UK to play an active foreign policy role which potentially puts Germany in ‘the last man standing role’.”99
Mr Rojansky suggested two reasons why, on Ukraine, the Germans had been “extremely reluctant, and in almost all respects [were] still reluctant, to respond in a decisive fashion”. The calculated reason was that Ukraine was “a mess” and, therefore, a considerable responsibility. The moral consideration was: “how can Germany, politically, morally and in every other way, choose to fight against Russia given its history?”100
86.Germany assumed a leadership role on Ukraine and in response to the refugee and migrant inflows, two crises which had a clear domestic impact. Germany has also been proactive on enlargement to the Western Balkans—another issue with domestic ramifications. Dr James Ker-Lindsay, Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science, and Research Associate, Centre of International Studies, University of Oxford, told us that Germany was the “key actor in the European Union” on enlargement—a role which would have been played by Britain five or 10 years ago. British and French absence in the Balkans had “created a vacuum which Germany has moved into, very effectively”.101 Mr Vimont saw “much more active German diplomacy”, prepared to act alone or with one or two other Member States.102
87.There has been an expectation from the US that Germany would assume a leadership role, and in particular the role of the German Chancellor in foreign affairs has come to the fore. Professor Drezner and Mr Rojansky agreed that the answer to Henry Kissinger’s question—’who do I call if I want to call Europe?’—was now clear:103 the “answer is now Angela Merkel”.104 In the Ukraine crisis, “President Obama made it clear that he expected Germany to do the heavy lifting.”105
88.Dr Kamp sensed a slight shift in the German political and public mood to one more accepting of a German role in military conflict.106 In 2014 Germany—breaking with a 70-year-old tradition—sent arms to a live conflict in support of the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters opposing ISIL. In November 2015 the German parliament voted to support the military campaign against ISIL by deploying Tornado reconnaissance jets, refuelling aircraft and a frigate to the region.107 The German government will commit further resources to defence: in March 2015, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyden announced plans for a 6.2% defence spending increase over the period 2016–19.108
89.However, the overriding and habitual instinct among German leaders has been to resist the use of force even under multilateral auspices.109 The constraint on the use of military force is embodied constitutionally. It is also driven by a great reluctance amongst the German public to exercise military power.110 Therefore, while “Germany has been more assertive, it also has a clear set of policy preferences that are probably distinct from those of Great Britain and France, particularly with respect to the use of military force.”111
90.This posture restricts the fuller exercise of German foreign policy leadership. The reaction of some Member States to the German assumption of leadership on the refugee crisis—by offering asylum in Germany to refugees and leading a policy at the EU level for mandatory quotas for refugees and shared funding—could also deter further proactive steps: “Most of Europe seems to resent Germany’s decision.”112 Any future German leadership could be more contested both within Germany and among other Member States “precisely because of the degree of political blowback both within Germany and among other EU Member States”.113
91.Mr Vimont also made the point that the UK and France were likely to remain important players in foreign and security policy, as permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and countries with significant military capabilities and wide-ranging diplomatic networks.114
92.The importance of leadership and engagement from large Member States on foreign policy dossiers is discussed in Chapter 5.
The United Kingdom
93.The strategic review is taking place concurrently with the likely timetable for a referendum on the UK’s membership of the Union. The Prime Minister has stated his intention to negotiate reformed terms of membership for the UK and then to recommend these to the British people as a basis for remaining in the Union.115
94.This report does not take a position on the forthcoming referendum. The Select Committee will produce a report in due course scrutinising the Government’s vision for Europe. In this report we have sought only to assess UK engagement on EU foreign policy dossiers and the consequences for both the EU and UK of a UK exit from the EU.
95.Witnesses indicated to us that the UK was engaged with the strategic review process. Mr Sainty said the FCO would “continue to engage fully and positively, including with this review”.116 Dr Westcott agreed that the “prospect of a renegotiation has not had any significant impact on the UK’s ability to input substantively to the strategy.”117 Witnesses in Brussels also assured us that British diplomats were robust in their defence of British interests and continued to contribute on foreign and security policy issues. The issue of the referendum had been separated from discussions on the strategic review.118
96.On the other hand, evidence on the UK’s engagement on major EU foreign policy dossiers was varied. Mr Rojansky and General Sir Richard Shirreff described the UK as almost absent from the discussions with Russia on Ukraine. General Sir Richard Shirreff had picked up a “sense of surprise, disappointment almost, that Britain appears to be taking a back seat and not stepping up to the mark as a leader”.119 Looking more broadly, Mr Rojansky said the UK had “largely muddled around as part of a European consensus, occasionally as a critical voice in it, but mostly sowing confusion rather than increasing clarity.”120
97.Mr Pierini noted that a “lot less” had been heard from the UK “in the foreign policy area in the EU since the debate on the referendum started”, but cautioned: “Who am I to establish a link there?”121
98.On the other hand, we heard that the UK had played a significant role on the negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme in the format of the so-called E3+3.122
99.For Professor Drezner, if the UK were to leave the EU, the “weight that … Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] would carry would be considerably less.”123 Dr Lars-Erik Lundin, Distinguished Associate Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and former EU Ambassador to the International Organisations in Vienna, had understood that Germany would “see the EU as much, much weaker after a UK exit.”124 For Dr Kamp, the implications of a British exit would be “severe”, not only for EU-NATO co-operation—it could lead to an “overall weakening of Western … security and defence”.125
100.We also heard that a UK exit would have an impact on the UK’s own foreign policy: the UK and EU’s strategic interests are closely aligned and the EU is an important forum for protecting the UK’s strategic interests.126 Dr Federica Bicchi et al. argued that “outside of the EU, the UK would find it extremely challenging to protect its interests in a world that is increasingly multipolar.”127
Conclusion
101.The UK is an important player in international affairs, and the EU has the potential to enhance UK influence. A UK exit would significantly limit the UK’s international reach, not least by removing the UK’s influence over, and access to, the Commission’s instruments of foreign policy. It would also diminish the foreign policy of the EU.
38 European Union Committee, The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (6th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 115)
48 For example see Robert Rotberg, State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Cambridge, Mass: Brookings Institution Press, 2003)
52 ‘Paris attacks: Who were the victims’, BBC News (27 November 2015): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34821813 [accessed 1 February 2016]
53 ‘Paris attack: The latest on what we know about the suspects’, Financial Times (18 November 2015): http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/22a0f686-8c74-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b.html#axzz3wBOWcGhu [accessed 1 February 2016]
54 Unprecedented numbers of migrants and asylum seekers travelled to European shores in 2015. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), by 29 December 2015 around 1,000,573 people had reached Europe across the Mediterranean: http://www.unhcr.org.uk/news-and-views/news-list/news-detail/article/over-one-million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-in-2015.html [accessed 1 February 2016]
62 Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘The American Pivot to Asia’, Foreign Policy (11 December 2011): http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/21/the-american-pivot-to-asia [accessed 1 February 2016]
67 Quoted in Prof Daniel Drezner, ‘Does Obama have a grand strategy? Why we need doctrines in uncertain times’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2011): https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011–06-17/does-obama-have-grand-strategy [accessed 1 February 2016]
68 European Union Committee, Euro area crisis an update (11th Report, Session 2013–14, HL Paper 163)
75 Q 134 We note that the election victory of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland in October 2015 is another recent example for the rise of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties. Witold Waszczykowski, the foreign minister of Poland, has spoken of “curing” the country of “diseases” after “25 years of liberal indoctrination” ‘Haben die Polen einen Vogel?’, Bild (3 January 2016): http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/ausland/polen/hat-die-regierung-einen-vogel-44003034,var=a,view=conversionToLogin.bild.html [accessed 1 February 2016]
78 Q 130 Prof Daniel Drezner related the memoirs of Richard Holbrooke. When he was negotiating the Dayton Accords, Member States urged him not to talk to the EU. Things have “changed somewhat but not that much”, he judged.
84 Appendix 4: Evidence taken during visit to Brussels
89 NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government (5 September 2014), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm [accessed 1 February 2016]
90 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161, November 2015, p.27: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf [accessed 1 February 2016]
94 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database [accessed 1 February 2016] and Gerard O’Dwyer, Defense News, Rising Tensions Boost Nordic, Baltic Spending (27 June 2015): http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/2015/06/27/finland-sweden-russia-nato-baltics-tensions-budgets-gdp/29289941/ [accessed 1 February 2016]
95 Richard Milne, ‘Baltic states pledge more defence spending as US presses allies’, Financial Times, (27 March 2014): http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f5342e40-b5ae-11e3-81cb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3yqXYOIPo [accessed 1 February 2016]
96 NATO, Defence Expenditures Report (2008–2015), http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_160128-pr-2016–11-eng.pdf#page=7 [accessed 3 February 2016]
97 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database [accessed 1 February 2016]
99 William Paterson, ‘From Political Dwarf to Potential Hegemon? German Foreign Policy in Transition’, Germany and the European Union by Simon Bulmer and William Paterson (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016)
105 William Paterson, ‘From Political Dwarf to Potential Hegemon? German Foreign Policy in Transition’, Germany and the European Union by Simon Bulmer and William Paterson (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016)
107 Reuters, Germany to support military campaign against IS after French appeal (26 November 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-germany-france-idUKKBN0TF0ZU20151126 [accessed 1 February 2016]
108 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2015: The Annual Review of World Affairs, (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), p 148
110 William Paterson, ‘From Political Dwarf to Potential Hegemon? German Foreign Policy in Transition’, Germany and the European Union by Simon Bulmer and William Paterson (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2016)
118 Appendix 4: Evidence taken during visit to Brussels