Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy Contents

Chapter 4: The foreign and security policy objectives of the Union

Clarity of purpose

102.A new EU strategy on foreign and security policy must establish priorities from a long list of potential objectives. Such prioritisation has not, in the past, been a strength of the Union. Professor Smith noted that previous strategies had tended to be “motherhood and apple pie-type things”, which “everybody could agree with”, and indeed “everybody has agreed with them, but no hard choices have been made.” Such strategies become “relatively unimportant” in policy-making.128 The Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister of Europe said the EU must avoid the “temptation to have a shopping list that grows ever longer”.129

103.There are two significant obstacles to achieving such clarity of purpose. First, Member States remain divided and averse to making difficult decisions about shared EU priorities. Mr Vimont said setting priorities “was one of the most difficult challenges for Europeans. Every Member State has its own priorities”.130 Professor Smith pointed out that hard choices had to be made, but whether “28 Member States [were] capable of doing that [was] another matter”.131

104.Second, and fundamentally, Member States have not articulated a coherent foreign policy vision for the EU. Mr Jan Techau, Director, Carnegie Europe, noted in a recent article that effective foreign policy was “not just about economic vibrancy, functioning institutions and military capabilities.” It was “also about conceptual firepower.”132 Mr Vimont has written that Member States have “never genuinely elaborated on the concept of the Union’s added value in foreign policy.”133

Case study: EU policy on Turkey—strategic disarray

105.Turkey is particularly important to the security of the Union and is a potentially valuable regional partner. Mr Lidington noted Turkey has been “a member of NATO for decades” and is a “significant player in the politics of the Near East but also a country with significant reach into Africa”.134

106.The offer to Turkey of membership of the Union has been undermined. In September 1963, the then six Members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement.135 It aimed, in part, to facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EEC at a later date. The 1999 Helsinki Council Conclusions noted that Turkey was a “candidate state destined to join the Union.”136 Accession negotiations started in 2005, but as Mr Pierini pointed out, certain key Member States, including France, were “harshly against Turkey’s accession”, for “domestic political reasons.”137 On 15 October 2015 German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated: “I have always been against EU membership, President (Tayyip) Erdoǧan knows this, and I still am.”138

107.Member States have failed to articulate what alternatives to full membership could look like. Mr Pierini told us that “for years, if not decades, we [EU and Member States] have been trapped into accession … and the Turks themselves were trapped.” This has been “detrimental to a strategic approach” and to EU leverage on Turkey: if the EU had conducted the negotiations on membership “in fairness, [the EU] would have had an influence on the shape of Turkish reforms, both economic and political.”139

108.Mr Lidington and Mr Meredith, Head of Strategy and Policy, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, disagreed. Mr Lidington characterised Turkey as both a “candidate for EU accession and a strategic partner”, and described the two roles as “complementary.”140 Mr Meredith said that accession was “the best available path for the future of EU-Turkey relations”, though there were also “other avenues to support the broader political relationship.”141

109.President Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) regained a parliamentary majority on 1 November 2015, presenting the EU with a more acute dilemma. The “liberal reform agenda” had “almost disappeared” said Professor Adam Fagan, Professor of European Politics, Queen Mary, University of London.142

110.Against this backdrop, witnesses questioned the efficacy of accession negotiations. Dr Ker-Lindsay judged that President Erdoǧan had “taken Turkey in a completely different direction”, and by “any reasonable measure, [the EU] should not be talking about Turkish membership of the European Union. It should be off the table.” He could not see how EU accession was “now going to bring about any fundamental reforms.”143 Mr Pierini agreed that accession negotiations were having little impact in securing compliance with European standards of governance. He surveyed the freedom of the press, rule of law, independence of the judiciary and the role of the President in Turkey, and concluded that “none of it is what we believe in.” The “tactical game” within accession negotiations was not working, and the EU had “to find another way to approach Turkey.”144

111.By contrast, Professor Fagan said there had “never been a more compelling time to keep EU membership for Turkey on the table”: the “gauntlet must be thrown down.”145 He saw the accession process as an effective tool to promote reform, provided that the EU was clear in its demands and chose the chapters to be opened “very carefully, in consultation with Ankara”. By doing so, the EU “could make a huge difference to instigating a liberal reform agenda”.146

112.Mr Lidington acknowledged the challenges within Turkey, but also believed that “the best way to address the issues of the rule of law and human rights” was through the EU accession process.147 While the EU “should not ignore the challenges or pretend that they do not exist”, accession was “the way forward.”148

113.The 2015 refugee and migration crisis and the rise of ISIL have brought the role of Turkey as a critical ‘buffer state’ to the forefront. In response, EU policy-makers have beaten a path to Ankara and undertaken their own individual diplomacy. Mr Pierini made a list: on 12 September Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, went to Ankara (without taking the External Action Service with him); on 18 September the German Foreign Minister, the Austrian Foreign Minister and the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg “were trampling on each other in Ankara on virtually the same day.” Next, a “high level … official mission went, last week Mr Timmermans went, together with two other Commissioners, and this afternoon [20 October] another high official mission is going. Everybody is running around.”149 That afternoon (20 October), Mr Meredith explained, his director was on a plane to Turkey.150

114.Meanwhile, on 19 October, Angela Merkel said she had reconsidered her opposition to Turkish membership and supported the acceleration of talks on accession and visa liberalisation.151 The Turks, Mr Pierini told us, were “rejoicing at this complete mess … Everybody has gone there begging.”152

115.The result of all this diplomacy was the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, agreed by the European Council on 15 October 2015. The Action Plan proposed a series of short and medium term measures to be implemented by the EU and Turkey to support refugees and their host communities in Turkey, prevent further irregular migration flows, and improve EU-Turkey co-operation in the field of migration and refugee management.153 Member States met some of Turkey’s long-standing demands: the accession process would be “re-energized” and Member States committed to “accelerating the fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap.”154 A €3 billion Refugee Facility was also promised to help Turkey to manage the presence of Syrians in Turkey.155

116.This sequence of events, in our opinion, exemplifies reactive and unco-ordinated policy-making, raising expectations on membership without unity among Member States, while possibly committing more than can be delivered—in particular visa-liberalisation and considerable financial support.156 It is also transactional: the Joint Action Plan makes no mention of the Copenhagen criteria—the accession criteria which require a state to guarantee inter alia “democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”157

Conclusions and recommendations

117.The EU’s adoption of the EU-Turkey Action Plan, in response to the refugee and Syria crises, fails to disguise the lack of consensus among Member States on their objectives and tactics on Turkey.

118.Member States have long been divided in their vision for Turkey, have not articulated the end goal of the EU-Turkey relationship, and have not assessed the threats inherent in their current policy. The EU has not demonstrated a credible commitment to Turkey’s accession, nor has it defined an alternative relationship.

119.We consider that the EU should revisit the whole EU-Turkey relationship, on the basis of first principles. This should be a priority for the new strategy on foreign and security policy.

120.We urge the UK, as a supporter of Turkish accession to the EU, to initiate a review process at the EU level—perhaps led by the High Representative—with a view to reinvigorating relations with Turkey and setting the partnership on a more strategic footing.

The balance between a transformational or transactional foreign policy

121.The tension between values and interests in foreign policy is a challenge for the Union, as for Member States and other democracies. The Union purports to have a foreign policy that actively pursues its values. Article 3(5), Treaty on European Union (TEU) states:

“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights”.158

122.We first consider a region where the EU’s promotion of its values has not been a success—the MENA—before considering the balance between interests and values in the EU’s foreign and security policy more generally.

Case study: values in the Middle East and North Africa

123.In the Middle East, Dr Westcott argued, values and interests could “pull in slightly different directions”.159 While the EU’s interests were “very closely linked” with its values, there were differences between Member States, for example on “how you deal with President Assad”. On such dossiers, Member States had to agree collectively where “the right balance” lay.160 Dr Henökl criticised the EU values agenda as only “superficially conceived, disguising … underlying interests”, including stability, security, containing illegal migration, trade and the flow of natural resources such as oil and gas.161

124.The current refugee crisis and the threat from terrorism have exacerbated the tendency of many Member States to view the MENA region through the prism of security and stability. Before the Arab Spring, Professor Smith explained, the calculation had been to “attribute stability to the lack of democracy, and therefore to support authoritarian regimes.”162 That was the “key weakness”, and she feared that the EU was “going back to that”.163 Mr Pierini traced the emphasis on stability and security to the aftermath of 11 September 2001: values had taken a back seat to “cooperati[on] with the Mubaraks, the Ben Alis, the Gaddafis and the Assads on anti-terrorism.”164

125.Professor Tripp noted that Member States had also been “complicit” in the economic conditions that had sustained the political structures which the Arab Spring had sought to overturn.165 Mr James Watt CVO, former British Ambassador to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, on the other hand, said that Western interventions to support liberal democracy were believed to be “positively dangerous” in some countries of the Arab Spring. For example, in Egypt in 2011, the “western liberal agenda was seen as supporting and empowering … [the] Islamic takeover.”166

126.Member States face a “major credibility challenge” in the region.167 Mr Pierini noted that the EU’s reputation as a values-driven actor in the Middle East had been undermined: civil society organisations in Syria, Egypt or Tunisia “will tell you, ‘Yes, EU values are all fine. That is what we want, but where were you when we were tortured?’”168

127.Mr Wilkinson stressed the importance of timing: he was cautious about the capacity of the EU to promote its values in conflict zones, because “without security nothing else really functions.”169 Mr Watt was also hesitant: while principles such as human rights and equality before law were “absolutely correct”, whether it was possible to “get there by taking a step now to majority parliamentary rule [was] another question.”170

Redrawing the balance between values and interests

128.We heard and read a range of views on how the EU should balance values and interests in its foreign policy. No witness suggested that the EU should ignore its values entirely and pursue a purely transactional foreign policy. Many argued for a more finely-tuned balance based on a sober analysis of the challenges, restricted resources and the EU’s limited ability to shape outcomes.

129.Some witnesses urged the EU to put its values at the heart of its foreign and security policy. Dr Gegout wrote that European values “stand for the respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights”, which should be “protected for both Europeans and non-Europeans.” Dr Gegout suggested that development should be central to the new strategy and, in particular, the EU should play an active role in mediating conflicts in Africa and the Middle East.171 The Quaker Council for European Affairs urged us to “consider how a safer world can be achieved with the contribution of an EU that rejects violence in favour of evidence-based peacebuilding approaches.”172

130.The EU’s values are a component of its power. Dr Lundin said that if the EU was “not seen as compassionate to normal people in other parts of the world”, its effectiveness would be “drastically reduced”.173 Dr Federica Bicchi et al. added that the EU’s foreign policies in “support of international law and multilateralism generate good will.”174

131.It was also suggested that the EU should to try to deliver the values agenda more strategically. Mr Meredith said that the values agenda remained “extremely important” and one of the EU’s “key interests.” It was “not so much a question about that as an objective”, but “about how to achieve it. The Commission was “looking at what has been best practice, where we have achieved leverage and what we can build on what we have learnt over the past 10 years”.175 Dr Duke suggested that the EU should “identify and engage its ‘strategic partners’ in those areas that are consonant with these underpinning values.” In its engagement with China, for example, the EU could cooperate on areas of shared interest such as anti-piracy operations, while areas that “[were] contrary to the EU’s core values should be de-emphasized.”176 Professor Drezner argued that “transformational diplomacy” should continue to be part of the EU’s strategy, but a “different component … a much longer-term, softer power project.”177

132.Mr Lidington suggested that it would be possible to marry the EU’s strategic interests with a reform agenda in the wider neighbourhood—focused on “securing greater prosperity and better-quality governance”—which was in the EU’s “very direct, practical self-interest.” Desirable “economic and political reform” could include the independence of the judiciary, transparency and free markets:

“One must not abandon one’s values, but actually our values can help those countries to make a transformation that will be to our mutual benefit.”178

133.No approach is entirely unproblematic: well-meaning interventions—consonant with the EU’s values—can strengthen authoritarian power structures. Professor Tripp warned of the danger that technical support “may also be the thing that reinforces pre-existing forms of power and inequality.”179 In order to achieve institutional and structural reforms, the EU would need to work with existing political structures. For example, there was an “obvious logic” to security sector reform in Tunisia, but it could also contribute to the “militarisation of security”. Often the focus of assistance was on border security, and less on ensuring that the security organs were trusted by the Tunisian people.180 This echoes Professor Smith’s point that the key weakness of EU action had been to attribute “stability to the lack of democracy and therefore to support authoritarian regimes.”181

134.Finally, Professor Tripp drew our attention to the fact that economic reforms promoted by the EU in Tunisia and Egypt “completely ignored the huge inequalities within those countries which had been the drivers of revolt.”182

135.Given the internal and external context, set out in Chapter 3, it could also be argued that Europe has been too weak—politically, economically and militarily—to promote EU values. Mr Techau argued that these weaknesses drive leaders “into policies and alliances that are morally questionable”, and make values “dispensable.”183

Conclusions and recommendations

136.We recognise that there is no easy and entirely happy balance to be struck in promoting values in foreign policy. Even well-meaning intentions and actions can have adverse consequences. Moreover, in order to defend its interests, the EU will have to continue to engage with the political structures that are in place.

137.A more pragmatic approach could focus on supporting good governance in the political, economic and judicial sectors in the wider neighbourhood. This would go some way to marry the EU’s strategic interests with a reform agenda that benefits the citizens of those countries.

138.The values of the Union are also an important dimension of the Union’s power to persuade and dissuade, and of its authority as a trusted and reliable international actor. We recognise that some decisions are a function of strategic necessity, and that the promotion of values outside the EU is likely to be selective, but as far as possible the Union, in particular Member States, should seek to exemplify its values.

A foreign and security policy in the wider neighbourhood

139.We now consider the contours of an EU foreign and security policy focused on the wider neighbourhood, including Russia, the eastern neighbourhood and the southern neighbourhood.

EU policy on Russia: in need of a strategy

140.Member States face a unique challenge with regard to Russia. This is an area where leadership must come from the EU Member States—and is also a role that the US wishes the Union to shoulder.

141.In our previous report, we argued that the EU had made a convincing use of economic sanctions in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.184 The EU imposed economic sanctions including a ban on financial instruments, an embargo on dual-use goods and technology for military use, and a prohibition on export of equipment and technology related to oil exploration and production.185 The consistency and durability of EU and US sanctions on Russia have been a considerable achievement.186

142.However, sanctions are an instrument of policy, not a strategy. Mr Rojansky explained that the “Russian economy has not collapsed; it is hurting … but right now this political experiment may be very much in Vladimir Putin’s interest.” Sanctions have allowed Russia to shift its economy to become “less dependent” on Europe for “trade, financing, technology and everything else in their economy”.187 Furthermore, sanctions have not altered President Putin’s strategic calculation in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. Dr Balfour wrote that the EU understood success through the prism of reaching unity, rather than in terms of the impact or consequence of EU action.188

143.Europe, Mr Rojansky counselled, needed to build a policy beyond “economic sanctions and isolation and wishful thinking that the Putin regime will simply disappear or transform”.189 He pointed to a window of opportunity for Europe to lead on this issue: the US was in the process of electing a new president, which gave the Union about “18 months to develop some strong European capabilities and something resembling a European strategy for the long haul with Russia.” For the EU, this was “a fantastic opportunity to engage with a new American president.” Whether that led “to something like a new Helsinki order or is more confrontational” remained a matter for Member States to decide.190

A new Helsinki dialogue

144.In our inquiry into EU-Russia relations, we heard evidence that Member States should consider renewing discussions with Russia on the European security architecture. His Excellency Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EU, believed that discussions on a new European security architecture could be a path to developing a more positive relationship between the EU and Russia.191

145.Mr Rojansky also suggested a renewed dialogue on the Helsinki Accords. He has written that the “the best hope” of repairing the damage to European security would be “likely a return to the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and through a similarly inclusive region-wide dialogue.”192 The 1972–1975 Helsinki Process was “birthed in a period of intense rivalry between the US and Soviet-led blocs”.193 In evidence, he told us that the US, Russia and Europe all had a shared interest in the renewal of such a dialogue. The role of Europe would be to “supply that motivation”, which was lacking in the US. 194

146.The UK Government, in contrast, had grave concerns. Russia had been “willing to discard” agreements on which European collective security has been based, including the Helsinki Accords:

“New structures or treaties will not address this problem, so our primary concern is to uphold the principles and values of existing mechanisms.”195

Preparing for confrontation

147.Mr Lidington told us the EU was facing a multi-dimensional threat from Russia: hybrid conflicts in Ukraine, “energy and strategic communications used as powerful political weapons”, and in the Baltics “cyberattacks and cyberthreats”.196 Mr Rojansky noted the “kinetic military actions” being taken by NATO, which included the deployment of heavy NATO equipment in countries close to the Russian border and the repositioning of US units from Germany to Hungary.197 Mr Rojansky did not perceive Western actions as “dramatically different from the use of hard power.”198 Actions—such as “levying very significant sanctions against the Russian economy” and “some of the power politics … being deployed on the Western side”—were viewed by the Russians as “acts of war”.199

148.In the case of outright military confrontation, Russia retained certain advantages, including “preparedness; of being genuinely ready as a matter of doctrine, investment and infrastructure, and with the political psychology of the people, who have been prepared for conflict”.200 In order to deter Russian action in the Baltic States, NATO would need some “form of permanently stationed forces there”.201

149.General Sir Richard Shirreff judged that even if the Baltic States were threatened, other NATO/EU members—including the UK and Germany—would be inhibited about engaging in a military conflict: “the notion of actually having to step up and fight for our freedoms is seen almost as something from another era.”202 He believed that “difficult questions would be asked about the notion of British soldiers fighting, and if necessary dying, for Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian freedom.”203 Dr Kamp pointed to another challenge—outdated equipment and operational inefficiencies. A NATO exercise to bring one brigade from Portugal to the Baltics took 21 days in order to facilitate all the customs and regulations and a further 10 days to find the trains to transport the tanks. 204

Conclusions and recommendations

150.The West’s relations with Russia are currently led by the US, but the EU must be more engaged. The High Representative should devote particular attention to the issue of EU policy on Russia in the new strategy.

151.The EU and Member States should pursue a dual-track policy to Russia. Sanctions must be embedded into an overall strategic approach. In the short-term, the EU and Member States must be coherent and credible in their response to Russian breaches of international law, and reflect on what sanctions are achieving. The Union must also be open to co-operation and dialogue with Russia on areas of shared interest, for example, Russian influence on the Syrian regime and broader Middle East issues.

152.Member States must endeavour to put forward a positive agenda with Russia where it is possible to do so. A renewed discussion on European security, in the format of the Helsinki Accords could be a useful starting point.

153. On the other hand, should Russian actions or the action of Member States, whether that is by inertia or active decision, lead towards confrontation, then the Union must also be prepared for that scenario.

154.EU and NATO deterrence in the Baltic States and the Black Sea should be strengthened. Credibility is central to deterrence: Member States must be willing, and convincing in their willingness, to act in defence of the Union. While it is likely that sanctions have deterred Russian action beyond Ukraine, it is not clear that Russian military action in the Baltic states would be met with a forceful response by European states.

Eastern neighbourhood: clarify the policy on enlargement

155.Witnesses were divided on the value of enlargement as a tool of foreign policy. Professor Fagan and Dr Ker-Lindsay supported using enlargement as a tool to engage more fully with the Western Balkans, and to deal with the declining support for EU integration. Dr Ker-Lindsay regarded the accession of the Western Balkans as the “completion of the European Union rather than enlargement … the European map is not complete without bringing in the Western Balkans.”205

156.Dr Ker-Lindsay set out the security imperative of building functioning countries in the region: the migration crisis was a very clear example of where the EU needed the “co-operation of Western Balkans countries … in order to manage these flows.” 206 A “clear policy perspective for the Western Balkans” would ensure effective co-operation between the two sides. 207

157.Dr Kyris agreed that conditionality remained “the EU’s most powerful tool in promoting security in its neighbourhood.” The “power of EU accession conditionality” was evident in the resolution of the Slovenia-Croatia border disputes, and in “the breakthrough 2013 agreement between Kosovo and Serbia”.208

158.On the other hand, Professor Smith warned that enlargement was not a “magic wand that you wave and suddenly everybody steps into line.”209 It had been “a bit of a diversion of diplomatic attention and perhaps public debate”, to such an extent that she advised taking the issue off the table entirely.210 Mr Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, wrote that accession was “not a panacea and premature promises lead to disappointment.”211

159.Looking further afield, to countries such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, Professor Fagan told us that the “golden carrot of membership” drove change.212 Therefore, the EU should put the question of membership for countries such as Georgia, where there was a high level of support for EU membership and the potential to make further progress, firmly on the table.213 The EU had “tried and tested tools of carrots and sticks” to bring about reform in these countries.214 Meanwhile, Dr Duke noted frustration among countries such countries that the development of deep and comprehensive free trade areas involved “many of the sacrifices and strictures involved in membership preparation, without the ultimate carrot.”215

160.Policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) remains couched in diplomatic, coded and vague terms. At the Eastern Partnership Summit, in Riga in May 2015, the “much-debated and carefully worded language” of the agreement recognised the “European aspirations and choices” of the partner countries.216 Mr Meredith explained that this meant that the Commission had heard those countries “signalling a clear desire to be closer and, in some cases, an expression of interest in membership” of the EU. He described the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit as “the outcome we have been able to reach at 28.”217

Conclusions and recommendations

161.The prospect of EU membership for the countries of the Eastern Partnership is ambiguous. Enlargement cannot be an effective tool if the final objective is not clarified.

162.EU policy towards the Eastern Partnership countries is couched in vague and diplomatic terms. In the absence of a viable and realistic timetable for these countries to accede to the Union, Member States should define their interests and objectives in the region and communicate these clearly to partner countries.

Southern neighbourhood: the golden thread of good governance

163.The realities of the southern neighbourhood—authoritarian regimes, economic inequalities, fragile or failing states, terrorism and ungoverned spaces—present dilemmas that cannot be solved by the EU (with the available resources and political will). Mr Sainty said the challenges were “really immense in this region and no single actor, including the EU, can do all that.”218 There may therefore be an element of wishful thinking in the suggestion that the EU can, in the words of the High Representative’s background report:

“devise policies that, without preaching, support human dignity, social inclusiveness, political responsiveness, educational modernisation and the rule of law across the region … encourage inclusive and rules-bound reconciliation in old and new conflicts embedded within a new regional security architecture in the wider Middle Eastern space.”219

164.The EU’s interests in the southern neighbourhood would be best served by efforts to improve governance in the political, economic and security sector. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon said in 2014: “Missiles may kill terrorists. But good governance kills terrorism.”220 Similarly, General Sir Richard Shirreff’s advice was that it was “much better and cost-effective to build stability through capacity-building”, rather than responding to crises and state failure. The remit of action could include building professional armed forces, “law and order, governance, education, health, tackling corruption, and having effective administrators in civil ministries.”221

165.In 2009, David Cameron, then Leader of the Opposition, referred to countries being pulled out of poverty by a:

“golden thread that starts with the absence of war and the presence of good governance, property rights and the rule of law, effective public services and strong civil institutions, free and fair trade, and open markets”.222

In a similar vein, Mr Lidington advocated both “classic diplomatic activity”—such as efforts to bring about a Government of National Accord in Libya—and “efforts to improve the quality of governance” in the southern neighbourhood .223

166.We discuss the ways and means by which the EU could improve governance in this region in Chapter 5.

Conclusions and recommendations

167.The key external security risk in the southern neighbourhood is the existence of fragile states, leading to challenges such as terrorism and refugee flows. This must be addressed as a priority in the new strategy.

168.The EU needs to move away from trying to fix as many problems as it can in as many countries as it can, and instead determine which risks are vital security threats, and where the EU can make a meaningful difference.

169.The agenda in the southern neighbourhood should focus on the ‘golden thread’ of economic reform and good governance in the political, judicial and security sectors, which could contribute to the stability of the region.

131 Q 1. See also written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002) and Dr Alistair Shepherd (FSP0007)

132 Jan Techau, ‘The moral pitfalls of foreign policy weakness’, Carnegie Europe (1 December 2015): [accessed 1 February 2016]

133 Pierre Vimont, ‘The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy’, Carnegie Europe (30 June 2015): [accessed 1 February 2016]

135 Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (1 September 1963): [accessed 1 February 2016]

136 European Council Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999, [accessed 1 February 2016]

138 EurActiv, Merkel against Turkey joining the EU (8 October 2015): [accessed 1 February 2016]

151 Euractiv, Merkel says ready to support Turkey EU accession process, (19 October 2015): [accessed3 February 2016]

153 European Commission, EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (15 October 2015): [accessed 1 February 2016]

154 European Council, 15-16 October 2015, Brussels, [accessed 1 February 2016]

155 European Commission, EU-Turkey Co-operation: A €3 billion Refugee Facility for Turkey (24 November 2015), [accessed 1 February 2016]

156 Letter from Lord Boswell of Aynho to David Lidington MP, (29 October 2015)

157 European Council Conclusions, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993,–2003/ [accessed 1 February 2016]

161 Written evidence from Dr Thomas Henökl (FSP0009)

162 Q 7 (Prof Karen Smith) and see also Q 42 (Imad Mesdoua)

167 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)

171 Written evidence from Dr Catherine Gegout (FSP0008)

172 Written evidence from Quaker Council for European Affairs (FSP0017)

174 Written evidence from Dr Federica Bicchi et al. (FSP0006)

176 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)

183 Jan Techau, ‘The moral pitfalls of foreign policy weakness, Carnegie Europe (1 December 2015), [accessed 1 February 2016]

184 European Union Committee, The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (6th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 115)

185 European Commission, EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis: [accessed 1 February 2016]

186 As we noted in our report, there have also been consequences for Member States, not only as a result of EU sanctions but also from retaliatory Russian sanctions. European Union Committee, The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (6th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 115)

188 Dr Rosa Balfour, ‘Europe’s patchwork foreign policy needs more than a few new stitches’, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (14 July 2015): [accessed 1 February 2016]

191 European Union Committee, The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (6th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 115)

192 Matthew Rojansky, ‘The Geopolitics of European Security and Co-operation’, Security and Human Rights, vol. 25, (2014), p 169: [accessed 1 February 2016]

193 Ibid., p 171

195 Government response to House of Lords EU Committee Report: The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine (6th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 115):

199 Q 153 (Matthew Rojansky)

200 153 (Matthew Rojansky)

201 Q 109 (General Sir Richard Shirreff) Matthew Rojansky also told us that Russia has “the enhanced capability of making the Black Sea into what we call an area denial zone.” He said Member States, the US and NATO needed to demonstrate to Russia that it “will not be able to deny free navigation of the Black Sea”. 158

208 Written evidence from Dr George Kyris (FSP0003)

211 Written evidence from Johannes Hahn (FSP0024)

213 Q 142 (Prof Adam Fagan)

214 Q 142 (Prof Adam Fagan)

215 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (FSP0002)

216 Q 83 (Lawrence Meredith)

217 Q 83 and European Council, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga 21-22 May 2015 available at: [accessed 1 February 2016]

219 European External Action Service, The European Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex world (25 June 2015): [accessed 1 February 2016]

220 United Nations ‘Secretary-General’s remarks to Security Council High-Level Summit on Foreign Terrorist Fighters’, New York, (24 September 2014): [accessed 1 February 2016]

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