On 19 and 20 October 2015, eight Members of the Committee (accompanied by the Clerk, the Policy Analyst and the Specialist Advisor) visited Brussels in order to discuss the inquiry with EU policymakers, national representatives and the foreign affairs community.
Members attending: Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top, Baroness Coussins, Lord Dubs, Lord Horam, Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Lord Risby, Baroness Suttie and Lord Tugendhat (Chairman).
In attendance: Eva George (Clerk), Roshani Palamakumbura (Policy Analyst) and Kai Oppermann (Specialist Advisor).
The Committee had an off the record dinner with Angus Lapsley, UK Ambassador to the PSC of the EU and Sir Adam Thomson, UK Permanent Representative to NATO.
The Committee had breakfast with Mr Alessandro Cortese, Italian Ambassador to the PSC, Mr Michael Flügger, German Ambassador to the PSC, Mr Philippe Setton, French Ambassador to the PSC and Mr Maciej Karasiński, Head of CSDP Section, Permanent Representation of Poland to the EU.
A note of the meeting, taken under the Chatham House Rule, is below.
Members present: Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top, Baroness Coussins, Lord Dubs, Lord Horam, Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Lord Risby, Baroness Suttie and Lord Tugendhat (Chairman).
In attendance: Eva George (Clerk), Roshani Palamakumbura (Policy Analyst) and Kai Oppermann (Specialist Advisor).
The witnesses stated that the High Representative’s approach to the new foreign and security strategy was good, and had its basis in the paper presented to the European Council in June 2015. Different Member States had been more and less keen to see a new strategy developed, but were now engaged in the process. There was recognition that the landscape had changed since the 2003 strategy, particularly in view of developments in the neighbourhood, and the fact that newer members had not been included in the 2003 drafting process. A new strategy was required for these reasons, and also because the EU had new instruments at its disposal which should improve the capacity of the EU to deliver on its external goals.
The High Representative had demonstrated a clever way of reaching out to Member States, but keeping the design in her hands. The witnesses expressed support for the High Representative taking the lead: unlike Council Conclusions, the text of a strategy could not be negotiated between 28 states. The High Representative had also engaged with civil society and parliaments.
Member States had both fed in to the paper for the European Council, and met informally with the High Representative and her team, who had been reaching out. PSC Ambassadors had also been requested to identify contact points in their home ministries, such as policy planners and European correspondents. There had been opportunities to send staff to work with Nathalie Tocci (Special Adviser to Federica Mogherini).
Currently the EEAS was leading the process and engaging the Member States. The Commission was engaged but not dominating the process. Attendees indicated that the High Representative valued her role as Vice President of the Commission, harnessing the comprehensive approach and soft power of the Union, which could be argued to be the EU’s best instruments.
Phase one of the strategic review had involved wide consultation. Phase two would be more concrete, focussing on process and design matters. Thorough consultation of Member States would be essential, through bilaterals and contact groups. Witnesses noted that, as the strategy should guide the EU, Member States should continue to be brought in to the process.
The issue was now scope and content. The High Representative had changed the scope from a security strategy to a global strategy. The European Council had agreed this, but some questions remained about what a global strategy would look like. Some Member States still preferred a narrower focus on security, while others supported a more global approach, for example reflecting the importance of Asia. It was also suggested that a global strategy would not necessarily need to be conceived in geographical terms, but could instead refer to global common goods such as climate change and energy. There was agreement amongst witnesses that the neighbourhood should be a priority: Russia was the EU’s immediate neighbour; Turkey had been in a long accession process; and there were a range of challenges to the south which the strategy should not shy away from.
Witnesses suggested that UK diplomats had been effective in engaging with the strategic review process, and such input had been valuable. The issue of the UK referendum had been separated out from discussions on the strategy. However, it was also observed that that–beyond the area of foreign and security policy–the UK had been increasingly willing to opt out and take a UK-first approach, and its separate approach to migration had been visible. Witnesses noted that if the UK had been absent from foreign policy discussions, this would have been a choice of the Government, but some developments had also been circumstantial. For example Chancellor Merkel’s relationship with Putin influenced how the issue of Russia was approached by the EU. In contrast, the UK had been fully engaged in the Iran negotiations in a constructive way behind the scenes.
Witnesses noted that Member States had always had different security interests, but the Ukraine crisis had made clear that these might be more significant, strategic differences. The aim of the strategy should be to define the EU’s common security interests. On the other hand, the experience of standing united over Russia and demonstrating real leverage had been positive. There was now a greater recognition of the value of a united position: unity was the EU’s greatest strength, and its value had been demonstrated on Russia, Mediterranean naval operations, the Sahel and Central Africa, issues where some Member States had no direct interests. There is leverage when the Member States are united. Witnesses stated that some difference of emphasis between Member States could be accommodated in a new strategy.
Witnesses noted that the dialectics had changed within the European Council. An enlarged Council allowed for greater debate and articulation of views, but challenges and divisions were in some ways unchanged, for example over Russia and the Middle East peace process. The issues that had been sensitive for 15 Member States were still sensitive for 28. Divisions between Member States and reluctance to give additional responsibilities to the Commission were also not new issues. A further challenge was that even if the moment of synthesis could be reached, the level of ambition between Member States varied. Unity and solidarity remained desirable but challenging. There was not a clear split between small and large countries.
Witnesses noted that Member States wanted a peaceful and stable neighbourhood, and that democracy and the rule of law were the most viable and stable systems to secure that in the long term, though quasi-dictators might stabilise countries in the short term. Over the long term, the EU’s approach should therefore be democracy and values based.
Witnesses noted that it was important to maintain pressure until Russia stopped its current activities in Ukraine, but also that the maintenance of some channels of communication was valuable. For example Russia had retained its ambassador to NATO and was an important partner in negotiations with Iran. The witnesses also noted that strategies remained for the Balkan countries and Turkey, but that while partnership was a vision shared by all, the endgame of further enlargement was not endorsed by all witnesses.
Concluding the session, witnesses agreed that a successful outcome of the strategic review would be the development of a political framework: an operational document rather than an academic exercise. It would be beneficial if it led to policies elaborating the instruments and how to enhance the EU’s capabilities. As all Member States would have to subscribe to it, the strategy should reflect all Member States. The strategy should be a guide for Member States and it was therefore critical that all Member States should identify with it.
The Committee took evidence from Mr Marc Pierini, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Europe and former Ambassador to Turkey, Syria and Tunisia.
A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.
The Committee took evidence from Mr Hans Wessberg, member, European Court of Auditors and Mr Peter Ecklund, Head of Private Office, European Court of Auditors.
A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.
The Committee took evidence from Mr Pierre Vimont, Senior Associate, Carnegie Europe and former Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS.
A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.
The Committee took evidence from Lawrence Meredith, Head of Unit, Strategy and Turkey and Martin Hetherington, Policy Officer, Strategy and Turkey.
A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.
The Committee took evidence from Dr Nicholas Westcott, Managing Director, Middle East and North Africa, EEAS.
A transcript was taken and is published in the evidence volume accompanying this report.
The Committee took evidence from Pedro Serrano, Deputy Secretary General - CSDP and Crisis Response, EEAS. The evidence was taken off the record.