Chapter 6: Accountability and justice
307.A further theme of our inquiry was ensuring accountability of offenders and justice for victims and survivors. This Chapter looks at: evidence gathering and documentation; capacity building for national judicial systems; violent non-state groups (VNSGs); and remedy and reparation. The issue of holding peacekeepers accountable is addressed in Chapter 7.
Documentation and evidence gathering
Importance and purposes
308.There was consensus on the importance of documentation. We agreed with His Honour Judge Jonathan Carroll, a civilian member of the UK Team of Experts (ToE), who said: “[D]ocumentation is at the heart of how we produce some kind of accountability”.466
309.We were told that documentation served at least three purposes: creating a historical record; advocacy and awareness raising; and for the criminal justice process. Judge Carroll warned, however, that the “level, style and quality” of documentation could be very different depending on those three tasks. He said it was essential for those involved in documentation to be clear about what they were hoping to achieve before they started.467
310.The documentation of sexual violence could be simply about getting the historical record right. Documentation could involve the recording of events for that society so that it has its own post-conflict understanding of what happened and potentially also allow for the identification of patterns.468 ABColombia said that the construction of a historical memory was also a way of raising awareness about the experiences of victims and helping to “restore their dignity”.469
311.A number of witnesses commented on the advocacy element of documentation. We were told that part of what victims wanted was to be acknowledged.470 In describing her experience in the former Yugoslavia and Liberia, Dr Shana Swiss said that documentation itself was “extremely empowering” for the survivors.471
312.Documentation was also regarded as an important way to address the under-reporting of male victims of sexual violence. Dr Chris Dolan, for example, said that the current approach to documenting sexual violence in conflict had “contributed a lot to a culture of impunity” because it did not sufficiently address the issue of men.472 Ms Niamh Hayes, Head of Office at the Institute for International Criminal Investigations, subsequently advocated the need to keep documenting the levels of sexual violence in conflict committed against male victims because “the process has never existed before”.473
313.One of the fundamental purposes of documentation is evidence gathering for criminal prosecutions. Madame Zainab Hawa Bangura said that the international community needed to work harder with groups on the ground, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other countries to make sure the evidence collected could be “presented successfully in a court of law” to enable prosecutions.474
314.Furthermore, Ms Widney Brown said that absent evidence in criminal processes could result in victims being denied reparations and support services, such as healthcare. She highlighted a research project in northern Uganda which found that nearly 10 years after the peace process, women who were sexually enslaved by the Lord’s Resistance Army were still excluded and barely survived because of a “lack of a justice process”.475
315.During our visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ( Appendix 6), we visited a special police unit in Goma which responded to victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The unit’s main work was to carry out investigations and gather evidence. The UK had been assisting with neighbourhood policing and funded an SMS (Short Message System) support system (and training for officers on how to use the system), which was an important part of data collection. In highlighting the success of these units, we heard that out of 593 suspected perpetrators of rape investigated by the unit, 204 had been convicted—this was regarded as significant progress compared to previous years. Although 11 such units existed across the province, we were told that many in the DRC wanted to the units expanded across the country, with new legislation to formalise their role. For example, during our meeting with the North Kivu Province Chief of Police, General Awachnago Vital, he said he wanted these units to be rolled-out everywhere, including rural areas.
316.To assist with the documentation process, those giving evidence stressed the importance of building the capacities of local organisations and people.476 We earlier noted how local organisations are often in situ before, during and after a conflict. As a consequence, local groups working on the ground would have better access.477
317.However, we were told that the problem would not be addressed solely by providing more data. Instead, data needed to be more robust and reliable. Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom said that the UK could support better data collection and analysis by funding longer-term research programmes and addressing significant data gaps in legal institutions (international and domestic criminal courts).478
318.Mr David Hammond agreed: “It is not a quick fix and HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] should take a long-term view of influencing attitudes to law and justice”. He said the issue of enhancing accountability should be viewed in terms of a generational change.479 Taking a longer-term view of this issue is consistent with a message we heard repeatedly throughout our inquiry: that addressing sexual violence is a long-term endeavour.
319.Documentation and evidence gathering of conflict-related incidents of sexual violence serve many important purposes, including creating a historical record, advocacy and awareness raising and facilitating the criminal justice process itself.
The International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict
320.Our evidence also commented on the Preventing Sexual Violence Initative’s (PSVI) International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict.480
321.The Protocol was developed “in collaboration with a range of global experts and practitioners” and first launched at the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict in June 2014. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) written submission provided more detail as to the Protocol’s purpose.481
322.There was widespread praise and recognition that the Protocol had made an important contribution to improving documentation and providing uniform guidelines.482 The Protocol was particularly welcomed given that it incorporated so many of the lessons learned from other criminal investigative and prosecutorial bodies, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Dr Ingrid Elliott described it as “an excellent collection of standards and tools for best practice”.483
323.The unique nature of the project was also highlighted. Judge Carroll said that sexual violence in conflict historically had been significantly underrepresented in post-conflict justice mechanisms, and that “the current endeavours to build a body of criminal justice standard documentation to remedy that past defect has not been attempted before”.484
324.A significant reason why crimes are not prosecuted is that the evidence is difficult to obtain or preserve. As a result, the Protocol was described in the joint submission by Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Ms Harriet Moynihan as significant in that it provided a set of “practical guidelines for those working to document incidents of sexual violence”.485
325.The International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict makes an important contribution by setting out good practice for documenting crimes of sexual violence in conflict. Even if prosecutions take time (for example, with regard to crimes being committed in Iraq and Syria), the Protocol plays an important role in the gathering and collection of data and evidence that might be available for the judicial process in the future.
326.Despite general praise for the Protocol, a number of suggestions were made as to possible improvements.
327.We are unsure as to how much awareness there is of the Protocol. Its dissemination and usage med patchy. Indeed, one suggestion was that the Protocol should be more widely translated and disseminated.486 It was said that implementation of the Protocol had been limited to only a few countries. This meant there was reduced awareness of its existence. Widows for Peace through Democracy said: “When we were in Syrian Kurdistan, barely any of the women’s organisations or women’s committees in Rojava had heard of the Protocol”.487
328.We were told that wider translation and dissemination would help increase efforts to gather documentation and evidence on conflict-related sexual violence and therefore potentially lead to increased prosecutions. Lord Hague of Richmond agreed with this when he said: “[I]f the Protocol that we have devised is widely disseminated, translated and employed by prosecutors, there can be a great many more prosecutions and we will start to tackle impunity”.488
329.The need for further training to support the Protocol was also identified. We were told that for the Protocol to have a greater impact there needed to be regular training (including follow up) by competent trainers to groups such as local organisations and NGOs.489 Citing a joint Department for International Development (DfID)-FCO ‘lessons learned’ exercise, Dr Elliott said that building local capacity required more than “one-off trainings or training of trainer (ToT) weeks”, but rather, ongoing iterative trainings, mentoring and partnerships to build and share skills sets.490 War Child UK advocated the UK hosting annual training on the Protocol for NGO persons and those operational in conflict contexts.491
330.Other evidence said that future iterations needed to include increased guidance on male victims and children. The Refugee Law Project said that additional guidance should be included on investigating sexual violence crimes against men and boys, although it acknowledged that “this has already been prepared with PSVI funding support”.492 In respect of children, War Child UK noted that while the Protocol outlined how to interview vulnerable adults, very little of it covered children “and the safeguards that need to be in place to reduce trauma to child survivors”.493
331.Use of the Protocol would be improved with wider translation and dissemination, the inclusion of further guidance on male and child victims, and regular and ongoing training for those who use the document.
332.Although a series of suggested improvements were made, we also heard that the effectiveness of the Protocol could not be fully assessed in the short term. The Protocol has only existed since June 2014. Judge Carroll said that by definition “it is not a quick endeavour”, and that the quality of the Protocol could not be tested “until after the conflict and some form of criminal justice process has been put in place”.494
333.Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom agreed that it was too early to assess its effectiveness and usefulness. It said that for the Protocol to be useful and effective it should be “approached as a living document … trusted on the ground, contextualised within certain circumstances and significantly further developed”.495
334.The Government told us that it had always n the Protocol as a ‘living’ document. Mr Paul Williams, Director of the Multilateral Policy Directorate at the FCO, noted that it had already changed in slight ways—for example, by its translation into several other languages.496 He went on to stress that the Government was “keen to get feedback from the groups, NGOs and so on” who used the Protocol in the field. Mr Williams said that the Government had already had some feedback and wanted to take that information on board in order to revise the document further.497 Mr Tom Woodroffe, Head of Office of the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, summarised that there would be an “ongoing process of review”.498 In subsequent evidence, the Government said that in 2016 it would carry out a review of the Protocol and was “discussing with experts how to monitor the impact that this methodology has on documenting and investigating these crimes and the judicial and other outcomes for survivors”. This process would include consultation with “a number of organisations that have either used the Protocol or trained on its use”.499
335.On the subject of training, the Government said it had developed a set of training materials “to support its use”, regional training modules on how to implement the Protocol “in different local contexts” and a series of “bespoke training packages”. It said it had begun a programme of implementation and training in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, the DRC, Nepal and Uganda, as well as of Iraqi and Syrian activists. Training plans for 2016 were still being developed.500
336.We are mindful that the Protocol is relatively new, having existed for less than two years. The Government therefore needs to continue to gather evidence from those who use it and to evaluate its practical application and effectiveness. We endorse the Government’s approach in viewing the Protocol as a ‘living document’.
337.We urge the Government to ensure the review process for the Protocol remains ongoing and agile to reflect improvements promptly. The review process must continue to incorporate feedback from users, including local organisations, NGOs and activists. Furthermore, it must be adequately resourced and be subject to a peer review process to ensure usability and up-to-date good practice.
338.The Protocol is a comprehensive and lengthy document. While we welcome the training materials and programmes the Government has already produced, we recommend that a short user manual be produced for operatives in the field.
Truth and reconciliation commissions
339.We received limited evidence on truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs).501 The Guatemalan and Liberian TRCs were identified as positive examples, but there was a lack of consensus as to the wider value of TRCs.
340.Dr Chaloka Beyani said that on sexual violence in conflict, TRCs were “very weak” as “they appear to be friends of the system until they begin to operate, and when they are begin to operate effectively they are immediately side-lined”. Dr Beyani thought there was “a lack of clarity about what happens in the course of their work or after they finish”. He said there was a particular problem with prosecutions, either because commissions lacked the necessary powers, or those in authority did not follow up any recommendations to prosecute that were made by the TRC.502 In the case of Liberia, Dr Swiss said that the TRC’s report had “not been implemented”. This was partly because the report “recommended prosecutions of specific people, so the legislature did not act”.503
341.Judge Mary McGowan Davis, former acting Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, said that while she thought TRCs were “very appropriate and useful”, they were not an effective means of achieving prosecutions and accountability (in the formal sense).504 Instead, she said their value was in “setting out the evidence of what happened”.505 Dr Swiss also agreed that TRCs could assist with creating historical records.506 She said that the Liberian TRC was “terrific in the way it really put women and children forward in the gathering of information”,507 and had “some excellent things in place”, such as a gender committee and a gender policy.508 Ms [Niamh] Hayes agreed, and said that in some conflicts, a truth and reconciliation commission was “essentially the only historical record … you are going to get”.509
Capacity building for national judicial systems
342.We discussed in Chapter 2 that the state where a crime is committed has responsibility for investigating and prosecuting crimes. Where the capacity or will to do this is lacking, international justice can step in. However, the ICC is a court of last resort (the ‘principle of complementarity’) ( paragraph 78).510
343.Our evidence agreed on the importance of capacity building for national judicial systems. Multiple reasons were given as to why emphasis should be placed on such programmes.
344.Ms Lauren Wolfe said governments and international NGOs placed too much emphasis on finding justice at the international level, such as through the ICC. She said that local activists were “not interested in the ICC”, but were instead more interested in “local justice”, which needed to be the priority.511 Judge Davis made a similar point. She said that mass rape and impunity had a “trickle-down” effect on the rest of the civilian community and led to the “normalisation of rape”. As a result, Judge Davis said it was necessary to build up the local justice system to enable the prosecution of perpetrators that were “closer to home—in the sense of everybody’s lives”.512
345.From a slightly different perspective, Madame Bineta Diop emphasised that there were some practical limitations in accessing international justice. She said that there was a need to reform the judicial process at a national level, because “not everybody can go to the ICC”.513
346.However, we heard that to improve the capacity of individual states to hold perpetrators accountable, barriers at the national level needed to be addressed first.
347.One of the main barriers in this regard was inadequate domestic legislation. Several witnesses agreed that it was important to ensure that domestic legislation was consistent with international law and allowed victims to come forward safely.514 A key aspect of ending impunity is the need to expand the capacity at the domestic level for accountability for conflict-related sexual violence. This is because impunity cannot be ended unless all states have national laws reflecting and implementing their “willingness and ability” to prosecute rape as a crime against humanity, war crime, or element of genocide.515
348.Enacting legislation at the domestic level first requires political will. In a number of countries, this is often lacking. For example, International Alert noted that the Violence Against Persons (Prohibition) Bill in Nigeria languished for 13 years before being passed as an Act. It said that “cultural and societal gender inequalities” had hindered progress.516
349.The second step is implementation. Global Justice Center noted that while many of the states who endorsed the General Assembly’s Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict517 had ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC—which criminalises sexual violence as a war crime and crime against humanity, and provides thorough definitions of sexualised crimes—the majority had not implemented the Rome Statute’s crimes into their own domestic law.518 We agreed with REDRESS and the International Federation for Human Rights:
“Ratification of a treaty without implementing the obligations and ensuring respect for its provisions is practically meaningless. As a first step, states must therefore ensure that the crimes outlawed under the treaty are considered ‘criminal’ and can be prosecuted and punished under their domestic law.”519
350.The lack of parity between domestic legislation and international law could negatively impact victims and survivors of sexual violence in conflict from accessing justice. On one hand, Track Impunity Always (TRIAL) said that both in Nepal and Bosnia and Herzegovina domestic legislation was “at odds with international law” and contained “discriminatory provisions” that disproportionally affected female victims, especially in matters related to compensation and the applicable statutes of limitation with respect both to reporting the offence and to claiming redress.520
351.On the other hand, we also heard that domestic legal systems afforded very little protection to male victims. The Refugee Law Project said that 90% of men in conflict-affected countries were in situations where the law provided no protection for them if they became victims of sexual violence: 62 states (representing almost two-thirds of the world’s population) only recognised female victims of rape; 67 states criminalised men who reported abuse committed against themselves; and in 28 states only males were recognised as perpetrators of sexual violence.521
352.A second barrier at the national level was that state institutions often lacked the necessary resources to investigate and prosecute conflict-related sexual violence. REDRESS cited eastern DRC as an example. It said that the prosecution of cases was “very much dependent on external funding from the UN [United Nations] or other organisations”.522 REDRESS said that the cases which eventually proceeded to a judgment were all backed by international organisations.523 Additionally, there may be a lack of protection for witnesses coming forward to assist with prosecutions. Some of our evidence highlighted the need for increased witness protection—particularly for victims of sexual violence who were king justice.524
353.The primary responsibility for dealing with crimes of sexual violence in conflict lies with the state in which the crime occurs. Strengthening the legislation and capacity of national justice systems is vital if states are going to be able to hold perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict accountable. States may have inadequate domestic legislation, political will to address this may be lacking or social attitudes may prevent reform. Even if the appropriate domestic legislation is enacted, implementation is a further challenge. We believe the UK has an important position in assisting other states build the capacity of their national law enforcement and judicial systems.
354.Peacekeeping and post-conflict work should incorporate a review of local legislation. For example, in countries where common law is practiced, the Bar Associations of both the UK and US could be asked to assist in this process.
355.The Government also recognised the importance of capacity building for national judicial systems. DfID’s written submission highlighted the increasingly important function of security and justice (S&J) programming in the UK’s aid portfolio. At the time of its submission, DfID was supporting S&J programmes in 21 countries, with 86% of the programmes operating in fragile and conflict-affected states. In 2013/14 Government spend on S&J programming was £95 million. DfID said that with the advent of the new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), Government spend on S&J assistance was likely to increase substantially.525 DfID’s approach also appeared consistent with the calls made in our evidence, insofar as focusing on tackling barriers at the national level—particularly in addressing the challenges faced by state institutions.
356.Whereas DfID’s programming med to focus more on addressing institutional barriers, the FCO’s reforms appeared to address the other main barrier, that of domestic justice systems. As we have already noted, the FCO suggested it was too early to assess the full impact of its work on national justice programmes.526 Nevertheless, it said there were a number of positive indicators ( Box 5).
Box 5: Impact of FCO national justice programmes
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In its written evidence, the FCO outlined its evaluation of the effectiveness of its national justice programmes to date:
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357.There was limited comment on the effectiveness of the Government’s programmes conducted overseas to build the capacity of national judicial systems. Evidence focused instead on the longevity of the task.
358.It was noted that reforming national justice programmes was a long-term endeavour. Influencing attitudes to law and justice in other countries where established local legal systems are often embedded is a considerable challenge.528 Ms Wilmshurst and Ms Moynihan said: “There is no one simple measure that will improve prosecution at the domestic level; it will require multiple levers applied over time.”529
359.Consequently, Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom recommended the development of a systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of such programmes and review of priority areas. It said that the use of “ad hoc short-term projects based on consultancies” was not helpful for ensuring sustainable reform.530
360.We commend the Government for the programmes it already carries out overseas to build the capacity of national judicial systems. As with addressing the gap in documentation, tackling the barriers that hinder accountability at the national level requires long-term commitment. We therefore hope that support for such programmes will continue.
The Team of Experts
361.We received a number of detailed pieces of evidence on the work of the ToE, which is a key mechanism for the UK’s further efforts on capacity building for national judicial systems.
362.The FCO set out the role and remit of the ToE, which is part of the wider Civilian Stabilisation Group that was created to deploy expertise on conflict, stabilisation and security issues at short notice to conflict-affected states:
“The ToE currently consists of 74 experts (of which 43 are women), including police, lawyers, psychologists, doctors, forensic experts, gender-based violence experts and experts in the care and protection of survivors and witnesses. Since 2012 there have been 65 deployments from the PSVI ToE to 13 countries in support of 17 projects. Each deployment is tailored to local needs and circumstances. The ToE do not collect evidence or investigate sexual violence. Deployments are designed to complement and reinforce the work of others, including governments UN and NGOs. These deployments have been critical in building local, national, regional and international capacity to respond to sexual violence, highlighting UK subject matter expertise and demonstrating publically the strength of our commitment … In addition, the PSVI ToE is helping to build the capacity of HMG on conflict-related sexual violence. This support includes deploying as gender advisers on UK and NATO military exercises, ensuring PSVI is integrated into the scenarios and providing thematic advice during the exercises; and developing a generic training manual on conflict-related sexual violence for the MOD and FCO to be used by the UK military”.531
363.Evidence was submitted by a number of current and former members of the ToE.532 In oral evidence, Judge Carroll gave an example of the nature of the ToE’s work in capacity building for national judicial systems. In Syria he was involved in a criminal justice project that involved teaching international standards—”the essential, gold-plated standards”—to those who could hold themselves out as expert witnesses in due course.533
364.As in other areas, it was noted that assessing the effectiveness of the ToE was very difficult. Dr Michael Korzinski, a former member of the ToE, said that the absence of agreed metrics made it difficult to assess effectiveness. He therefore suggested that the Government should reach out to the jurisdictions to which the ToE teams had been deployed and “request their feedback”, including from a range of NGOs.534
365.Questions were also raised about whether there was a need for long-term commitment or re-commitment, and how intelligence and learning could be effectively gathered and disseminated. Dr Korzinski commented on the short-term nature of engagements and lack of follow up. In his experience there had been little follow-through with participants—with either those deployed or ‘service users’. Dr Korzinski said he would have valued “continuing joint working, including debriefing”, but that instead, any follow up work he conducted was done on a voluntary, unpaid basis. He added that none of the follow-through in his experience had been systematic, and he was not aware of “any opportunity for individuals and teams deployed to different areas to share views and build on their individual work for the benefit of the Initiative”.535 This would appear to be a lost opportunity in terms of sharing experiences and good practice.
366.The work conducted by the Team of Experts (ToE) must be a long-term endeavour. We note with concern the current short-term nature of engagements, and believe that it would be beneficial if there were a degree of continued engagement and re-engagement of members to capture their knowledge and experiences.
367.A further lost opportunity could be the perceived limited involvement of ToE members in the development of projects and deployments. The Government’s written evidence and our discussion with the Minister made it clear that the ToE did not have a role in the formulation of policy. Baroness Anelay of St Johns said: “The Team of Experts is a group that assists and advises. They do not take action, they do not set policy, they do not monitor, they do not criticise.”536 Although Sir Simon McDonald said that the plans were developed “in the knowledge of the skills of our experts”, he agreed that “perhaps it would be better to involve them earlier in the process”.537 Given that members are ‘experts’ in their fields, it is problematic that they do not play a greater role in the formulation of policy.
368.The knowledge and expertise of members recruited to the ToE could be used more effectively in the formulation of policy.
369.Addressing the needs of children and male victims has been raised consistently throughout our report. In the context of the ToE, War Child UK said that members had not received any child safeguarding or protection training, including responding to sexual violence against men and boys. It said that deployments “must each include individuals with experience of child rights and protection” and “of interviewing and engaging with girls and boys”. War Child UK therefore recommended that personnel received pre-deployment child protection training.538
370.We are concerned that the ToE has not received child safeguarding or protection training, including responding to sexual violence against men and boys.
371.In addition to its above recommendation, War Child UK suggested that the concept of the ToE be expanded into other countries. It said this would ensure “a broader roster of expertise in child protection and scale-up in-house training”.539 Although War Child UK was speaking about increasing the availability of expertise in relation to children, this could be applied to all categories of expertise. The ToE currently has only 74 experts; given the global scale of sexual violence in conflict, this is a very small number.
372.Current requests for support from the ToE outweigh its capacity. There should be greater use of the ToE model in other countries to provide a broader roster of available expertise.
373.We earlier recommended that the PSVI needs to establish a strategic plan and operational road map. The ToE needs to be incorporated into the delivery of this strategy. As we have mentioned elsewhere, the Government must heed its own assessment that mitigating and eliminating sexual violence in conflict is a long-term endeavour. The ToE therefore requires suitable funding and flexibility in deployments for re-engagements and longer-term support.
374.We further recommend the following with regard to the ToE:
(a)That the Government should establish a formal process to make use of and disseminate the learning and experience generated by the members of the ToE;
(b)That the knowledge and expertise of members of the ToE should be used earlier in the development of deployment policy;
(c)That it should be mandatory that all members of the ToE complete pre-deployment child safeguarding and protection training, including responding to sexual violence against men and boys; and
(d)That the Government should work to expand the capacity of the ToE so that it can undertake more deployments and have greater flexibility as to the length and nature of these. We would like to the UK partnering with other states (for example, states that are the ‘friends of the PSVI’) to expand the capacity of the ToE.
Violent non-state groups
375.This section considers the issue of accountability and justice for VNSGs.540 It is important to note that not all VNSGs are armed groups. For instance, international crimes could be committed by civilian leaders of a VNSG or civilians themselves.541 Our views on the international criminal law framework, including bodies such as the ICC and international tribunals (for example, the ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) are addressed in Chapter 2.
376.Sexual violence in conflict is not committed solely by state agents. The scale of sexual violence perpetrated by VNSGs has received considerable global attention in recent years, particularly as a result of groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Dr Elliott said that the “gravity of the scale, nature and organisation” of Daesh in particular was “unprecedented”.542
377.We were told that many VNSGs used sexual violence as a deliberate tactic.543 Madame Bangura said that where Daesh was concerned, sexual violence “is not accidental”. She said that sexual violence was used actively for multiple reasons, such as to entice young men to join, or to raise money (for example, by auctioning women in open markets).544
378.Given the scale and impact of VNSGs in using sexual violence, we thought it important to consider ways in which they might be held accountable and brought to justice. There was, however, limited evidence on how this might be achieved.
Challenges in holding violent non-state groups accountable
379.There are a number of challenges associated with holding VNSGs accountable. In the first instance, there are questions about the applicability of international law to VNSGs. Dr Jill Steans said that research demonstrated that the problem of impunity was “not just a failure of political will”, but the result of the “structural weaknesses of international law”.545
380.Human rights law regulates the behaviour of the state with respect to individuals within its territory and jurisdiction, and is primarily constituted through international conventions to which only states can become parties. Accordingly, VNSGs cannot become parties to human rights treaties. Furthermore, the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) concept and UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict stress that the primary responsibility for human rights protections rests upon the government.546
381.The challenges of VNSGs extend beyond the application of international law. Madame Bangura provided a detailed analysis of the “extreme challenge” posed by VNSGs. She said that since the UN was created, it had developed “mechanisms and tools” to engage with state agents; however, a similar policy did not exist for VNSGs.547 In order to address this, Madame Bangura stressed that the international community needed to broaden its knowledge of VNSGs. She highlighted a variety of challenges in addressing this knowledge gap: there had been a growth in VNSGs, with some becoming bigger than states; their size varied; accessibility was restricted; many of them had limited contact with NGOs and UN entities and could not be dealt with directly; they did not necessarily have the same structures and institutions as a state; and many of them did not have respect for international law and or international borders (such as Daesh).548
382.Madame Diop provided an example of how the African Union (AU) had attempted to address the problem of crimes committed by VNSGs:
“I recently convened a committee at the Kofi Annan centre in Accra. I invited women from northern Nigeria but also from Somalia and other parts where we are likely to terrorist acts. We had a discussion and shared experiences. One of the actions that we are looking at is how women who are members of the intelligence services can have the tools to act on the information that we can . When you go to Somalia and ask the people in the villages about al-Shabaab, we know that they are in the community. So we need to know how to generate and gather information, but we also need to make sure that women are part of that process of identifying those who have infiltrated the communities.”549
383.As a result, Madame Bangura said it was a mistake to engage Daesh using “our own international standards”, as a VNSG such as Daesh “does not respect international law”. She said that the international community needed to think “outside of the box” as it was not possible to use existing tools, such as sanctions and travel bans.550
384.There are considerable legal and practical challenges in holding VNSGs to account. The body of knowledge of VNSGs is sparse and more urgent research is necessary; they are not a homogenous group, and should not be treated as such.
The Government’s approach
385.In Chapter 3 we discussed preventing VNSGs from committing sexual violence in conflict, including the Government’s policy for responding to VNSGs ( paragraphs 140–146). This rightly placed a considerable emphasis on prevention. However, we noted a lack of detail in relation to its approach to holding VNSGs accountable.
386.The FCO said it was determined that “all perpetrators should be held accountable”. It recognised, however, that there was no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and that the diversity of VNSGs required a similarly diverse range of measures that were “tailored to specific actors in specific contexts”.551 Limited information was provided on these measures. We were told they included working at the international level—such as on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda at the UN—or focused more directly at country level in support of organisations with better access to VNSGs.552 It did make reference to the specific example of the work carried out by the NGO Geneva Call, which is discussed in paragraphs 392–393 below.
387.DfID’s written submission was similarly sparse, with even less detail on holding VNSGs accountable.553
388.There was a similar lack of detail during our oral evidence sessions with the Government, which also focused specifically on addressing Daesh. As with its written submissions, discussions focused on prevention—including the Government’s “communications strategy” that was being used to expose and counter Daesh propaganda—and support for survivors. Mr Chugg nevertheless reiterated the Government’s view that the perpetrators must be brought to justice. He said that documenting evidence now was important so that it could be used in the future.554
389.Following this exchange, we asked for supplementary evidence from the Government on how it would go about prosecuting groups such as Daesh. Addressing Daesh in Iraq and Syria is covered in paragraphs 395–409 below.
Methods to hold violent non-state groups accountable
390.There was little evidence on practical methods to hold VNSGs accountable. Evidence which discussed responding to VNSGs generally focused on strategies to counter their ideologies and expansion.555 There was only one convincing approach suggested to address the current lack of accountability for VNSGs.
391.Previously, it has been possible for some VNSGs to make commitments through unilateral declarations, ad hoc agreements, codes of conduct or even internal regulations accepting all or part of international humanitarian law (IHL). For example, in 1995 the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) issued a declaration stating:
“In its conflict with the Turkish State forces, the PKK undertakes to respect the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the First Protocol of 1977 regarding the conduct of hostilities and the protection of the victims of war and to treat those obligations as having the force of law within its own forces and the areas within its control.”556
392.Such methods can still work. A few submissions highlighted the work of the NGO Geneva Call.557 Geneva Call is an organisation that has been engaging with certain non-state actors—including VNSGs—to help prevent and prohibit sexual violence in conflict and to “increase the prospects that perpetrators are sanctioned”.558 It developed a ‘Deed of Commitment’559 which allows signatories who cannot become parties to international treaties to undertake to respect international standards. Geneva Call supports and monitors implementation of the Deed of Commitment and also works with community-based organisations to build their capacity to monitor the commitments.560
393.The FCO said that it had funded Geneva Call’s work in Burma, where it provided education and training to various local VNSGs on the protection of women in armed conflict. It said that some of the local VNSGs had signed the Deed of Commitment.561 Ms Wilmshurst and Ms Moynihan similarly highlighted the work of Geneva Call. Although they cautioned that such deeds “are not legally binding” and “have inherent limitations”, they said overall there was reported to be a high level of co-operation and compliance.
394.We received limited evidence on practical methods to dissuade VNSGs from sexual violence in conflict and to hold them accountable. We were encouraged, however, by the work being conducted by the NGO Geneva Call. Their ‘Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination’ allows signatory non-state actors—including VNSGs—to undertake to respect international standards. Although there are limitations to this approach, such as its credibility and it not being legally binding, it has already yielded some positive results. Such an approach is also important given the obvious limitations associated with the Government’s ability itself to engage directly with VNSGs.
Iraq and Syria
395.The current situation in Iraq and Syria was widely referred to in evidence. The Syrian government, anti-government armed groups and Daesh are in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.562 Securing accountability for these crimes is difficult.
396.The situation in regard to VNSGs and IHL is complex ( Chapter 2 for a full discusison of this point). In regard to Iraq and Syria there are also jurisdictional issues. A number of witnesses highlighted the difficulties of establishing a tribunal with jurisdiction over members of VSNGs such as Daesh, as well as the lack of ICC jurisdiction in Iraq and Syria.
397.The submissions from Dr Elliott, and Ms Wilmshurst and Ms Moynihan outlined the limitations of ICC jurisdiction. The ICC may take jurisdiction over a situation only: where the state where the crime was committed—or the state of nationality of the alleged offender—is a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC; where the state where the crime was committed has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction for the particular situation; or where the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, has referred the situation to the ICC.563
398.As neither Iraq nor Syria is a party to the Rome Statute,564 the ICC has no jurisdiction over sexual atrocities committed by Daesh (or other perpetrators) in those states unless: the perpetrator is a national of a state party (for example, if the perpetrator was a UK national); the state of nationality or the state where the crime was committed accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC in respect of the specific situation; or the UN Security Council—without encountering a veto by a Permanent Member565—refers the situation to the ICC.
399.It has been suggested that acts of genocide have been committed by Daesh. The Government’s position is that “any resolution declaring genocide [by Daesh] is a matter for the judicial system rather that the Government”.566 However, it did not believe that an international court or tribunal was a realistic prospect. It said that whilst it had advocated the referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC, and had supported the UNSCR calling for this in May 2014, this Resolution had been vetoed by Russia and China.567 Neither did the Government believe that Syria or Iraq would sign the Rome Statute: “Syria will not, of course, and Iraq will almost certainly not, as its security forces would be in scope [for prosecution] too”.568
400.Consequently, the Government said it was looking to whether there were other ways that it could use international law to prosecute Daesh. However, with regard to Iraq, the Government said that the Iraqi court system “might be better placed” to deal with some of the crimes perpetrated by Daesh.569 It said that it was documenting cases of sexual violence that could be used to bring cases before the Iraqi justice system.570
401.The Government did not propose a solution for dealing with perpetrators in Syria. Instead, it said its focus was on the gathering and preservation of evidence until such a time when “an international or Syrian accountability process is established, post conflict”. To support this, the Government said it was considering what capacity building it could provide Syrian lawyers, judges and activists.571 This included spending £5 million on building local capacity to document sexual violence crimes and other human rights abuses and to fund evidence collection. It said a further £2 million was being programmed to continue delivering this work.572
402.Ms Wilmshurst and Ms Moynihan said that efforts would be best expended encouraging states particularly affected by sexual violence in conflict to sign up to the Rome Statute. They said that if Iraq was to become a party to the Rome Statute, or at least to accept the ICC’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the specific conflict, the ICC would have jurisdiction “in respect of the horrendous crimes of sexual violence reportedly being committed in the conflict in Iraq, both by ISIL and other actors”.573
403.An alternative mechanism would be a hybrid international criminal court that was constituted by the UN, with the agreement of the Iraqi government to consider serious violations of international law over a defined period. However, it ms likely that the government of Iraq would resist accepting international jurisdiction given that allegations of sexual abuse have also been made against the Iraqi authorities and security forces.574
404.We agree with Ms Wilmshurst and Ms Moynihan that it would be preferable for Iraq to be encouraged to sign up to the Rome Statute. We believe that the UK has the influence to attempt this. The Government told us that the British Embassy in Iraq was a member of Iraq’s UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan Committee in Baghdad. It said that the British Embassy was “the only diplomatic mission” to be invited to sit on the committee as the UK was viewed by the government of Iraq as “a key partner” on preventing sexual violence in conflict.575 The Government clearly has a degree of influence it could exert.
405.Although this would not be practicable for all VNSGs, such as Daesh, the Government should extend further support to the work of Geneva Call. Where possible it could encourage other, similar initiatives.
406.We recommend that the government of Iraq should be encouraged either to ratify the Rome Statute or to invite the ICC to prosecute cases of sexual violence committed within Iraq’s jurisdiction. We believe that the UK should use its influence to achieve this.
407.We accept that, ultimately, it is for courts, not governments, to determine responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including sexual violence in conflict, torture and genocide that have allegedly been committed in Syria and Iraq. However, we believe that, so long as access to international jurisdictions such as the ICC is blocked, the Government should make it clear that, in its view, there is prima facie evidence that such crimes have been committed and that those who committed them must, in one way or another, be brought to justice.
408.Evidence suggests that many parties to the conflict in Syria are committing acts of sexual violence. Although it is outside of our remit to offer any recommendations on a solution to the Syrian crisis, we urge that any resolution to the conflict should include provision for securing accountability for the prosecution of these crimes.
409.In respect of Syria (and elsewhere), the Government should resist any peace settlement that sanctions or approves the use of amnesties for sexual violence in conflict, and ensure that there is an accountability mechanism to bring to justice all those that have perpetrated sexual violence in Syria. Any peace process needs to include the participation of women.
Remedy and reparation
410.A range of evidence cited the importance of reparations.576 Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom said: “Of all the mechanisms for dealing with the past that are put in place in a post-conflict setting reparations have the most transformative potential on the lives of women”.577
411.The significance of reparations is that it means victims and survivors can receive acknowledgement for the crimes that have been perpetrated against them. Professor Doris Schopper told us that part of what victims wanted was “for it to be acknowledged” that sexual violence had happened to them and “that it was a wrongdoing—more perhaps than the prosecution of the perpetrators”.578
412.Reparations were described as playing a part in encouraging survivors to come forward and participate in the justice process. World Vision UK said that survivors conducted a “cost-benefit analysis” before deciding to report crimes made against them. It said that currently, the benefit of perpetrators being held to account did not outweigh the personal cost to survivors.579 Widows for Peace through Democracy made a similar argument, saying that for victims to be encouraged to speak out about “the most private and intimate areas of their lives”, they would have to be assured that at the end of the process, they would receive reparations.580
413.However, the purpose of reparations extends beyond acting as a means of justice. We were told that survivors often found themselves in financially precarious situations because of their experiences. For example, REDRESS highlighted the experience of Ugandan women who had been abducted as young girls and forced to become ‘wives’ of rebel combatants. After years in captivity, they returned to their communities as single mothers without education and employment opportunities. Consequently, REDRESS said that court-awarded reparations, including monetary compensation, could “help SVC [sexual violence in conflict] victims rebuild their lives”.581
414.A number of references were made to recent rulings where victims of sexual violence in conflict had been awarded reparations.582 The Government highlighted examples from 2015 in the western Balkans:
- The governments of Croatia and Kosovo revised their laws in order to allow victims of sexual violence from the conflict in the 1990s to access compensation, state support and benefits (including pensions);583 and
- In a landmark ruling, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina awarded compensation to the victims of sexual violence committed during the war,584 setting an important precedent for future cases.585
415.In a similar landmark ruling, we heard that the Cantonal Court in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, granted ‘civil war victim status’ to a male survivor of sexual violence for the first time. The victim will consequently receive compensation from the state. The FCO said that this ruling set “an important precedent”.586 As discussed earlier in Chapter 5 ( paragraphs 230–249), raising awareness about the status of men as victims can play an important role in tackling stigma.
416.The UK Government was credited with being partially responsible for these rulings. A number of submissions highlighted the UK’s support for these efforts by way of an FCO grant to the Swiss-based advocacy group, Track Impunity Always (TRIAL).587 The International Truth and Justice Project—Sri Lanka called on the Government to fund similar litigation or other accountability processes in other countries.588
417.The importance of reparations for victims has also been reflected at the international level. On 16 December 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.589 This resolution recognises victims’ rights to benefit from remedies and reparation and reaffirms that states should ensure access to “adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate remedies, including reparation”, as required under international law.590
418.Furthermore, the establishment of the ICC in 2002 also resulted in the creation of the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV).591 Article 79 of the Rome Statute stated that a Trust Fund would be established for “the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the [International Criminal] Court, and of the families of such victims”.592 The TFV has two mandates: reparations and assistance.593 In oral evidence Mrs Fatou Bensouda explained the importance of the TFV:
“You have n that even prior to Lubanga—the first case for the ICC—being concluded, work was already being done in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo by the Trust Fund for Victims. Because victims are so central to the work of the ICC … the Trust Fund for Victims has been working a lot … to ensure that some form of help or assistance is provided to the victims, even prior to a case being completed by the ICC … The Trust Fund for Victims is playing a crucial role with regard to reparations”.594
419.Remedies, including financial compensation, for victims and survivors of sexual violence in conflict are an important element of justice and form part of the recovery process. Not only do they assist reintegration, they also provide recognition for the survivors against whom a crime has been committed. In some circumstances such remedies can encourage survivors to come forward to pursue criminal prosecutions.
420.We commend the Government for the support it provided to help secure the landmark rulings for victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
421.We hope that the Government will continue to support and contribute towards the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims.
467 Ibid.
468 Q 15 (Professor Lisa Davis and His Honour Judge Jonathan Carroll), Q 78 (Ms Yanar Mohammed), Q 112 (Dr Shana Swiss) and Q 115 (Ms Niamh Hayes)
478 Written evidence from Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (SVC0015)
480 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict: Basic Standards of Best Practice on the Documentation of Sexual Violence as a Crime under International Law (June 2014): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/319054/PSVI_protocol_web.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
481 Written evidence from the FCO (SVC0011): “The International Protocol serves as a set of practical guidelines for actors working to document incidents of sexual violence in conflict-affected areas and is particularly focused on embedding protection strategies throughout investigations to ensure survivors receive sensitive and sustained support should they choose to come forward. Since its launch at the Global Summit we have translated the International Protocol into five languages (French, Spanish, Bosnian, Arabic and Nepali) and provided training to governments, the judiciary, police, military and civil society to gather evidence and strengthen the prosecution of sexual violence in Bosnia, Colombia, the DRC, Nepal and Uganda”.
482 Q 3 (Lord Hague of Richmond), Q 15 (Professor Lisa Davis), Q 70 (Mr David Mepham), Q 81 (Madame Bineta Diop), written evidence from Track Impunity Always (TRIAL) (SVC0002), Asylum Aid (SVC0004), REDRESS (SVC0022), War Child UK (SVC0032), Amnesty International UK (SVC0048), Survivors Speak Out (SVC0052) and Dr Jill Steans (SVC0060)
487 Written evidence from Widows for Peace through Democracy (SVC0003): “We would like to the International Protocol more widely disseminated, translated and distributed, so that countries like Sri Lanka, that has the most well documented evidence of sexual violence spearheaded by the government, brought into its orbit.”
489 Q 11 (Professor Lisa Davis), written evidence from Track Impunity Always (TRIAL) (SVC0002), World Vision UK (SVC0006) and REDRESS (SVC0022)
495 Written evidence from Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (SVC0015)
496 Q 122 (Mr Paul Williams). also supplementary written evidence from the FCO (SVC0067): “To date, we have translated the Protocol into French, Spanish, Bosnian, and Arabic. We are also translating the Protocol into Burmese, Nepali, Albanian, Serbian, Swahili, Lingala and Kurdish.”
497 Q 122 (Mr Paul Williams). also written evidence from the FCO (SVC0011): “The FCO continues to identify further implementation and training opportunities and to encourage the UN, AU and other international organisations to promote its use. The International Protocol has been welcomed by a number of organisations that are using it in the field. The FCO will work with them to incorporate feedback on its efficacy and suggestions for how future versions may be improved, in line with the commitment periodically to revise the text.”
501 Truth and reconciliation commissions are a form of transitional justice mechanism tasked with discovering and revealing past wrongdoings by a government—or, depending on the circumstances, non-state actors also—in the hope of resolving conflict left over from the past. They appear under different names, and are occasionally set up by states emerging from periods of civil unrest, civil war or other forms of conflict. Countries where truth and reconciliation commissions have been established include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, the DRC, East Timor (Timor-Leste), Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Tunisia, the US and the former Yugoslavia.
506 Q 112 (Dr Shana Swiss): “It [the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission] took about 21,000 written testimonies and about 500 public testimonials. Half the written testimonies and about 40% of the public testimonials were from women. The Commission was also able to document male sexual abuse … This is another way of getting documentation without having continually to interview women for that information if what we want is an historical record”.
508 Q 116 (Dr Shana Swiss): “… for example, every woman who testified, in all of the 15 counties, got six weeks of follow-up in groups with psychosocial support … The groups themselves said they had 100% participation in those groups. It was done in a truly respectful, supportive and empowering way for the women who participated in it”.
510 The principle of complementarity: “Complementarity is one of the foundational principles of the Rome Statute system. What was envisioned by the drafters of the Rome Statute was not simply a self-standing Court, but rather a comprehensive system of international justice, where the duty on States Parties to investigate and prosecute international crimes is clearly reinforced. Consequently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a court of ‘last resort’ and will step in where national jurisdictions have failed to address international crimes.” Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ‘Complentarity’: http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=complementarity [accessed 14 March 2016]
514 Q 105 (Professor Doris Schopper), written evidence from Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (SVC0015) and Amnesty International UK (SVC0048)
517 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (24 September 2013): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274724/A_DECLARATION_OF_COMMITMENT_TO_END_SEXUAL_VIOLENCE_IN_CONFLICT.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
519 REDRESS & International Federation for Human Rights, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the European Union: A Study of the Laws and Practice in the 27 Member States of the European Union (December 2010): http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_In_the_27_Member_States_of_the_European_Union.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
522 Written evidence from REDRESS (SVC0022). also International Center for Transitional Justice, The Accountability Landscape in Eastern DRC—Analysis of the National Legislative and Judicial Response to International Crimes (2009–2014), (July 2015): https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-DRC-Accountability-Landscape-2015.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
523 Written evidence from REDRESS (SVC0022). table of cases in: International Center for Transitional Justice, The Accountability Landscape in Eastern DRC—Analysis of the National Legislative and Judicial Response to International Crimes (2009–2014) (July 2015), p 41: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-DRC-Accountability-Landscape-2015.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
524 Q 46 (Ms Pramila Patten), written evidence from Track Impunity Always (TRIAL) (SVC0002), Gender and Development Network (SVC0034), Survivors Speak OUT (SVC0052), Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Ms Harriet Moynihan (SVC0059)
527 Written evidence from the FCO (SVC0011). It should be noted that we received evidence disputing the FCO’s engagement and effectiveness in Burma. For example, written evidence from Burma Campaign UK (SVC0023): “The British government is not implementing PSVI effectively in Burma. It is deliberately avoiding the fact that the biggest perpetrator when it comes to rape and sexual violence in Burma is the Burmese army.”
530 Written evidence from Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (SVC0015)
535 Ibid.
538 Written evidence from War Child UK (SVC0032). Note: in its evidence, War Child UK refers to the Team of Experts as “Deployable Civilian Experts”.
540 VNSGs are sometimes referred to as non-state actors or non-state armed groups.
541 In population-based investigations of wartime sexual violence that look beyond war rape committed by combatants, many victims report that the perpetrator was an intimate partner, acquaintance, or other noncombatant. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report: Wartime Sexual Violence—Misconceptions, Implications, and Ways Forward (February 2013): http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR323.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
546 The ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P): R2P is a proposed norm that sovereignty is not an absolute right, and that states forfeit aspects of their sovereignty when they fail to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations (namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing). also UN, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml [accessed 14 March 2016]
548 Ibid.
552 Ibid.
553 Written evidence from DfID (SVC0019): “In the last year, DFID ensured coherent UK wide messaging on sexual violence, including condemning the use of sexual violence in by ISIL in northern Iraq and Syria. DFID also coordinated with the FCO and the Stabilisation Unit to support expert missions to the region during the roll out of the International Protocol on the Investigation and Documentation of Sexual Violence in Conflict.”
556 ‘Lessons for the law of armed conflict from commitments of armed groups: identification of legitimate targets and prisoners of war’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93 no. 882 (June 2011): https://www.icrc.org/spa/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-882-sivakumaran.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
557 Geneva Call: http://www.genevacall.org/ [accessed 14 March 2016]
559 Geneva Call, Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination: http://www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2013/12/DoC-Prohibiting-sexual-violence-and-gender-discrimination.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
561 Ibid.
562 UN Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic (3 February 2016): http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-31-CRP1_en.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
563 Written evidence from Dr Ingrid Elliott (SVC0026) and Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Ms Harriet Moynihan (SVC0059)
564 Middle East and North African states which have (a) signed and ratified the Rome Statute: Djibouti, Jordan and Tunisia; (b) signed but not ratified the Rome Statute: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Yemen; and (c) not signed the Rome Statute: Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and West Bank and Gaza.
565 The Permanent Members of the UN Security Council—also known as the Permanent Five, Big Five, or P5—are: China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. If any one of the five Permanent Members casts a negative vote on non-procedural matters in the 15-member Security Council, a resolution or decision is not approved. UN, ‘Voting System and Records’: http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml [accessed 14 March 2016]
566 HL Deb, 15 March 2016, cols 1733–1737. The US House of Representatives agreed a resolution on 14 March 2016, “that those who commit or support atrocities against Christians and other ethnic and religious minorities and who target them specifically for ethnic or religious reasons, are committing, and are hereby declared to be committing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide”. US Congress, H.Con.Res.75, 114th Congress, 2nd Session (2015–2-16) (14 March 2015):
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/75. A similar resolution was passed by the European Parliament on 3 February 2016. European Parliament, European Parliament resolution on the systematic mass murder of religious minorities by the so-called ‘ISIS/Daesh’ (2016/2529(RSP)) (3 February 2016): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+P8-RC-2016–0149+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
568 Supplementary written evidence from DfID and the FCO (SVC0062). Dr Ingrid Elliott (SVC0026) largely agreed with the Government’s position on this: “For crimes on Syrian territory by non-State Party nationals, given the grave international crimes committed by the Assad government, there is unlikely to be any acceptance of ICC jurisdiction by the state until after a transition. Other unlikely routes would be a UNSC referral (almost certainly vetoed again since it would also apply to regime crimes)”.
574 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2015: Iraq’: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/iraq [accessed 14 March 2016]
576 Q 46 (Ms Pramila Patten), Q 83 (Madame Bineta Diop), Q 111 (Dr Shana Swiss), written evidence from Widows for Peace through Democracy (SVC0003), Survivors Speak OUT (SVC0052) and Ms Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Ms Harriet Moynihan (SVC0059)
577 Written evidence from Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (SVC0015). It qualified, however, that reparations would only be transformative if they had an “explicit gender dimension” and were “planned and carried out in a way that is sensitive towards the complexities of the country in question”.
580 Written evidence from Widows for Peace through Democracy (SVC0003). In addition to reparations, it said that victims would also need to be assured that they received “restorative justice, to rebuild their lives, which mean land, housing, training for income, protection, and pensions, rather than simply the punishment and imprisonment of their abuser”.
582 Q 4 (Lord Hague of Richmond), written evidence from Track Impunity Always (TRIAL) (SVC0002) and Goldsmiths, University of London and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (SVC0015)
584 ‘Bosnia rape victims may claim compensation for first time’, The Guardian (30 June 2015): http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/30/bosnia-victims-compensation-landmark-ruling [accessed 14 March 2016]
586 Ibid.
587 Written evidence from Women for Women International UK (SVC0018) and the International Truth and Justice Project—Sri Lanka (SVC0024)
589 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RemedyAndReparation.aspx [accessed 14 March 2016]
590 Ibid., Part 1, 2(c)
591 The Trust Fund for Victims: http://www.trustfundforvictims.org [accessed 14 March 2016]
592 International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002), Article 79: http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf [accessed 14 March 2016]
593 Reparations: implementing awards for reparations ordered by the Court against a convicted person. Assistance: using other resources (voluntary contributions and private donations) to provide victims under Court jurisdiction with physical rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation, and/or material support. The Trust Fund for Victims, ‘The Two Roles Of The TFV’: http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/two-roles-tfv [accessed 14 March 2016]