Chapter 4: Social change, communications and demography
Two notes of optimism
107.Two particular social changes are transforming the region: the predominance of a young generation and the spread of technology, offering two rare notes of optimism, albeit ones with downside risks as well.
Communications revolution
108.Technology, and the internet, have been catalysing a revolution in communication. Mobile phone ownership in the region has surged from below the world average, at 26% in 2005, to almost 108% in 2015, above the world average. Internet use jumped from 8% in 2005 to 37% in 2015, a higher rate than the rest of the developing world and the world average, and representing an increase from 5 million subscriptions in 2000 to 141 million in 2015.117
109.Young people are as connected to information via electronic means as their peers around the world. The 2016 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey reported that 77% of Arab youth (aged 18–24) obtain their news from online sources and social media, compared with only 17% who obtain their news from newspapers. The reach of social media is significant: 62% of young Arabs use WhatsApp—the instant messaging service owned by Facebook—on a daily basis, followed by Facebook (55%), YouTube (33%) and Twitter (28%).118 The young people who participated at our roundtable told us that they moved adroitly between electronic media, sourcing their news online (international websites and blogs) and via new forms of communications (Facebook and Twitter).119
110.Technology has shifted the power balance and influence; it has informed, connected and empowered individuals but it has also reopened the fractures and divisions of the past. The uprisings of the Arab spring were not created by technology, but technology helped them spread; the new modes of communication informed people, coalesced them together and allowed them to make connections within states and across national borders. Mr Issa explained that the “internet revolution … bypassed the walls that Arab governments had used to construct closed societies” and “enabled the region’s inhabitants, fragmented by borders, to connect and cooperate”.120
111.Those “trans-regional youth networks” created during the period of the Arab spring remain active today, Mr Issa added, “manifesting in simultaneous political movements” such as Beirut Madinati in Lebanon, the secular anti-corruption movement in Iraq, the new secular Ma’an parliamentary bloc in Jordan, and similar groups in Tunisia and Egypt.121 Dr Alterman saw a “whole generation of young Arabs who have grown up interconnected with each other, interested in innovation and possibility”. There is a “certain dynamism for people with ambition and a certain sense of possibility”.122 For example, in Saudi Arabia, a young team of engineers and creative professionals have created TalentS, a firm that presents STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and maths) to young Saudi audiences in an attractive way; and locally driven start-ups like Tahrir Academy in Egypt and Edraak in Jordan provide online learning resources in Arabic to millions of students.123
112.Unfortunately, repressive governments, as well as terrorist factions, have also harnessed these tools. Technology and the internet have become instruments to discourage communication, and to suppress debate and disagreement. Young people at our roundtable told us that in many countries of the region, government-led institutions disseminate their own versions of news, set up their own social media sites, and also use the internet as a tool to monitor civil society.124
113.The capacity of states to use and misuse technology is demonstrated in Turkey. In March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan instructed internet service providers operating in Turkey, including TurkTelekom, to seal off access to social media sites like YouTube and Twitter. This action was taken in response to protestors using social media to organise.125 In July 2016, President Erdoğan was able to thwart a coup d’état by bringing thousands of his supporters on to the street through social media: his Twitter account, Facebook page and WhatsApp account. The President also sent a nationwide text, warning people of the coup and urging people to take to the streets.126
114.Terrorists have exploited the communications revolution, using the internet to preach, raise money, attract foreign fighters and disseminate propaganda. In Syria, Iraq and the UK, Da’esh’s use of messaging and propaganda is a critical component of its military capability. It sent 40,000 tweets in one day as it took Mosul (Iraq) in June 2014.127
UK policy: means to influence in a digital era
115.The new technology is changing how people experience and interact with political power; British statecraft must respond and participate accordingly.
116.Technology, said Mr Tom Fletcher CMG, former UK Ambassador to Lebanon, “completely shifts the nature of the terrain”. To influence a very connected, networked generation, the UK Government has to embrace this technological change with vigour. The UK needs to “understand it and speak the language in the way we learned to speak Arabic” said Mr Fletcher.128 In fact, the UK needs to do both, as Arabic is the fastest growing language on the internet and social media.129
117.The new tools offered diplomats “the means to influence at a much broader level the public and not just the elites” said Mr Fletcher.130 The aim should be to reach out to the:
“middle ground: the people who are at risk of radicalisation who may be curious about our approach and values, but do not always hear from us what we stand for. That is the group we need to reach in different ways. You have to use new technology to do this”.131
118.Some British Ambassadors in the region have embraced the opportunities. Mr Crompton explained that a “core function of our ambassadors’ role now is to communicate through social media with the local population”.132 Professor Umut Özkirimli, Professor of Political Science, Lund University (Sweden) and Senior Fellow, Sabanci University (Turkey), pointed out that the British Ambassador in Ankara is “very active on Twitter—he is almost a Twitter phenomenon”, trying to counter the anti-Western narrative present in the Turkish domestic political discourse.133
119.Mr Fletcher noted the debate in the FCO of whether “diplomats and public servants should have a public profile at all”. At the moment, ambassadors “have a certain amount of autonomy to promote UK messages”. He advised that social media campaigns by ambassadors in post must have “a sense of purpose” and diplomats must not see this is a “popularity contest”.134
120.In Lebanon, during his tenure as ambassador, Mr Fletcher sent 10,000 tweets, and used social media and Twitter campaigns to stimulate discussions on social issues. He highlighted the treatment of migrant workers by swapping his job with that of a domestic worker: “those pictures went viral”.135 The “matchmaking service” which used social media to connect UK businesses with Lebanese connections doubled business in three years.136
121.The UK was one of the “first movers on social media” but currently there is an “arms race” and the UK is “competing with many other hungry, agile rivals”.137 Mr Fletcher has suggested that by 2020, the FCO should ensure that all staff are “digitally fluent” and that IT training is “integrated into inductions and data, digital and IT skills should be acknowledged as core 2020 diplomatic skills.”138
122.The trend whereby ambassadors in post have active Twitter feeds and a social media presence is to be encouraged. There are two risks: that ambassadors can perhaps act too autonomously or that they are not sufficiently active. We recommend that all ambassadors should be offered guidance in advance of taking up a post, on how they can most effectively make use of social media.
123.The internet provides an abundance of information, but much of it of dubious provenance and accuracy. In an era of “fake news”, reliable and timely information is essential. Traditional sources of reliable news, such as the BBC World Service, have a critical role to play and should therefore continue to be strongly supported. In addition, how UK ambassadors can counter fake news should form part of the training.
Demographic momentum
124.The Arab region is developing a new youthful demographic profile. According to the UN Development Programme’s Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) 2016, two-thirds of the Arab region’s population is under thirty years of age. Young people between 15–29 years make up 30% of the population, or some 105 million people in the Arab states.139 Young people (aged 18–24 years) make up 200 million people in the MENA region.140
Figure 4: Demographics of the MENA and G7 countries
Source: Data from United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, DVD Edition (2015): available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ [accessed 27 March 2017]
125. The possibilities of a young, educated generation have to be tempered by the fact that young people face considerable challenges. Unemployment in the region has a disproportionate impact on them. Mr Issa informed us that the youth unemployment rate in the Middle East is 28.2% and in North Africa 30.5% which is “well above the global average of 13%”.141 According to the AHDR the region needs to create more than 60 million new jobs in the next decade to absorb the large number of workforce entrants and to stabilise unemployment among young people.142 When young people do enter the workforce, many of the jobs are insecure and/or informal. Vulnerable jobs accounted for almost 30% of the region’s employment in 2011.143
126.The young people who participated in our roundtable discussion—educated, well-connected students and professionals—were deeply frustrated by the lack of opportunities and the pervasive culture of nepotism and corruption. These burdens are exacerbated among young women who face additional burdens of gender inequality, both legislated and customary, despite the political achievements in a number of countries to legislate against inequalities.144
UK policy: education
127.Supporting educational opportunities in the region and opening up access to British educational establishments is a critical way for the UK to engage with this particular demographic. Supporting educational reform is how UK policy can contribute most positively in the region.
128.The British Council explained that young people “will need access to quality, relevant education, 21st century skills and English to meet their aspirations”. As countries such as Saudi Arabia (Vision 2030) and Jordan (National Strategy for Human Resources Development 2016–2025) actively consider how to harness this new demography, there is an opportunity for the UK education sector “to step up its engagement with the region by plugging into ambitious reform projects”.145
129.Mr Peter Meyer, Chief Executive Officer, Middle East Association, saw a role for the UK in Gulf countries, which despite their own universities, “certainly in Saudi Arabia, they are not producing people ready for the workforce”.146 The International Monetary Fund has concluded that in order for oil-producing states to diversify their economies, the “quality of education also needs to be improved and better tailored to the needs of the private sector”.147 Mr El-Idrissi told us that Gulf states “want to evolve their education systems. They want to create more universities. We have amazing universities in the UK, which can work in partnership with them”.148
130.The Ennahdha Party would be “keen to strengthen … relations with British universities”.149 Sir Derek Plumbly explained that Egypt looked “towards the UK as a primary source of partnership in education”.150
131.It is in the UK’s interests to deepen relations between young people and the UK. Young people at our roundtable (some of them recipients of Chevening scholarships and studying at UK universities) were an example of the mutually beneficial impact. “Universities, education and culture” said Professor Ali Ansari, Professor of Iranian History, Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews, are “all extremely important aspects in the exercise of Britain’s position in the outside world”.151 Mr Fletcher said that the quality of the British education system is at the “heart of our national brand”. It was critical to show that Britain was not becoming more isolationist in 2016 and “to do more to attract the world’s top students to our universities and to reduce the barriers to them attending”.152
132.There is both an opportunity and a demand for the UK to revitalise its diplomacy amongst young people of the region. Many young people desire and welcome a relationship with the UK that engages with British culture, not just politics.
133.In the longer run, it is through support for the expansion of educational opportunities that outside powers, especially the UK, may have an effective stabilising role in the region.
134.The UK should continue to welcome and encourage young people from the MENA to study in the UK, increasing our influence amongst future leaders and decision makers, and fostering a generation that could be a positive force for change.
135.There is a risk that the current anti-immigration discourse and tightening visa controls could damage the UK’s influence and standing in the region. The Government should redouble its efforts to communicate clearly that the UK is open to foreign students, and to facilitate visa access. It is in the UK’s national interest to ensure that foreign higher education students are encouraged and attracted to study in the UK.
136.As a first constructive step, the UK Government should cease to treat higher education students, for public policy purposes, as economic migrants, and should take them out of net migration calculations.153
117 UN Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality 29 November 2016, p 52: http://www.arab-hdr.org/ [accessed 24 April 2017]. The figure of 108% means that some people in the region have multiple handsets.
118 ‘Inside the Hearts and Minds of Arab Youth’, 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsterller Arab Youth Survey 2016: http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/uploads/whitepaper/2016-AYS-Presentation-EN_12042016100316.pdf [accessed 24 April 2017]
119 See Appendix 3
123 Jon B Alterman, ‘The Storm: The States of the Middle East Confront a Series of Powerful Disruptions’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 18 November 2016: https://www.csis.org/analysis/storm-states-middle-east-confront-series-powerful-disruptions [accessed 24 April 2017]
124 See Appendix 3
125 Melissa E. Hathaway, ‘Connected Choices: How the Internet is challenging Sovereign Decisions’, American Foreign Policy Interests, vol 36, no 5 (2014): http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/uafp_a_969178_hathaway.pdf [accessed 24 April 2017]
126 Merhul Srivastava, ‘How Erdogan turned to social media to help foil coup in Turkey’, Financial Times, 16 July 2016: https://www.ft.com/content/3ab2a66c-4b59-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a [accessed 24 April 2017]
127 Tom Fletcher, Naked Diplomacy: Power and Statecraft in the Digital Age (London: William Collins, 2016), p 233
129 Internet World Stats: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats19.htm [accessed 13 April 2017]
136 Tom Fletcher, Naked Diplomacy: Power and Statecraft in the Digital Age (London: William Collins, 2016), pp 193–194
138 Tom Fletcher, Future FCO Report , 9 May 2016: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521916/Future_FCO_Report.pdf [accessed 21 April 2017]
139 UN Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality , 29 November 2016: http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/AHDR%20Reports/AHDR%202016/AHDR%20Final%202016/AHDR2016En.pdf [accessed 29 March 2017]
140 ‘Inside the Hearts and Minds of Arab Youth’, 8th Annual ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey 2016: http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/uploads/whitepaper/2016-AYS-Presentation-EN_12042016100316.pdf [accessed 4 April 2017]
142 UN Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality, , 29 November 2016, p 32: http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/report/AHDR%20Reports/AHDR%202016/AHDR%20Final%202016/AHDR2016En.pdf [accessed 24 April 2017]
143 Ibid., p 32
144 Appendix 3
147 International Monetary Fund, Annual Meeting of Arab Ministers of Finance: Economic Diversification in Oil-Exporting Arab Countries , April 2016: https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/042916.pdf [accessed 21 April 2017]
153 This is also a recommendation of the Science and Technology Committee in its report, International Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) students, (4th Report of Session 2013–14, HL Paper 162) and Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, Persuasion and Power in the Modern World (Report of Session 2013–14, HL Paper 150). This amendment, to the Higher Education and Research Bill, was passed in the House of Lords (13 March 2017) and is now due to be debated in the House of Commons.