279.In this chapter we consider how UK policy should respond to the unravelling of states; to one very significant sub-state actor—the Kurds; and to the persistent threat of terrorist actors. The overriding theme of the evidence we received has been that in this complex and blurred scene, UK diplomacy will have to be flexible and pragmatic.
280.There is some structural weakening of sovereign states in the Middle East. Dr Renad Mansour, Asfari Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House, explained that in the 20th century “central governments were able to dominate all the space”, but “they are no longer able to do that”.382
281.Lord Williams of Baglan predicted that it was “difficult to see nation states … in control of all their territories, coming back in future years”.383 The writ of central government in many states is receding. Borders, Dr Mansour reflected, are “redefined, and different borders are stronger”. Informal borders such as that between the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] and Iraq are “a lot stronger than that between Iraq and Syria”. As Dr Mansour pointed out “[i]f you want to talk about the Kurds in Iraq, you do not go to Baghdad”.384 The approach where “states are the main actors in international affairs is no longer that relevant” he added.385
282.Syria and Iraq, riven by conflict, are the most vulnerable. Yet our witnesses said that calls for these countries to be partitioned along ethno-sectarian lines raised practical and strategic questions. Mr Ayham Kamel, Director, Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia Group, said that in Syria civil war “cannot be resolved just by creating smaller pieces of Syria, as the problems that we see in Iraq today would just be replicated on a much larger scale in Syria”.386
283.Mr Haid Haid, Associate Fellow, Chatham House agreed that one of the “main misconceptions” amongst Western experts and governments was that dividing Syria would be a solution.387 Carving up Iraq, Mr Hayder al-Khoei, Research Director, Centre for Shia Studies judged, would open up a “Pandora’s box” with partitions along ethno-sectarian lines driving a “race to the bottom in each individual canton over who is more Sunni, who is more Shia, who is more Kurdish”.388
284.Both Mr al-Khoei and Mr Haid agreed that decentralisation in Iraq and empowering local governance in Syria could be helpful measures.389 In the case of Iraq, that should be facilitated through the central government said Mr al-Khoei.390 In Syria, Mr Haid set a high standard in the current context; it was critical that any political solution should be “fair, just and accepted by all groups”.391 However, Ms Mina Al-Oraibi, Senior Fellow, and Ms Clare Lockhart, Director and Co-Founder, Institute for State Effectiveness, said the “idea that decentralisation is a panacea is false”: it can “lead to the fragmentation of problems, especially those of corruption and lack of competence”.392
285.There are important constituencies in both Syria and Iraq who support the unitary state. The Syrian regime, said Mr Kamel, is “very centralist” and its “willingness to accommodate different groups, including the Kurds, is only temporary”.393 None of the different parties—whether opposition groups, Kurds or regional actors—wanted a divided Syria. Mr Haid explained that the “discussion when it comes to dividing Syria is not coming from inside Syria”.394 Dr Mansour explained that Iraqi Arabs, whether Sunni or Shia, “both want to be part of Iraq” and both “sides believe they are Iraqi”.395
286.The diffusion of power may be undesirable and undesired, but it is taking place. Mr al-Khoei informed us that maps in the region will not be agreed by “white men in suits meeting in London and Paris and drawing lines on a piece of paper and imposing them” but by “young, angry armed men on the ground who will impose, change or redraw those lines with their blood”.396 Dr Mansour pointed out that the “reluctance to recognise new states in fear of a breakdown of world order” has been leading to “de facto changes of states without this format aspect”.397
287.New actors—sub-state and non-state actors—have been carving out a role, a development which is both a symptom and a cause of the weakening of states. Dr Mansour offered an explanation:
288.The picture is complicated further when entities morph from non-state actors into sub-state actors into state actors. Hezbollah, for example, is now part of the government of Lebanon. The “key is legitimacy” explained Dr Mansour: the “local population in Lebanon view Hezbollah as their government, or as their state provider of services”.399 Definitions also depends on the vantage point: therefore, as Mr al-Khoei explained, the Syrian Kurds and their allied parties were viewed as “terrorists on one side of the border and freedom fighters on the other”.400
289.The UK’s approach has been to engage without formally recognising the de facto changes. Mr Crompton acknowledged that in “many different contexts we cannot simply have a conversation with a capital anymore”. Therefore, in Iraq, the UK “tried to maintain a close relationship with central government” while talking to “different communities and leaders of different political parties” and maintaining “relationships with regional governors”. In Syria, the UK was trying to “maintain a close political dialogue with the Syrian opposition”. In Libya, the UK was trying to deal with a “range of different actors”, including “different faction leaders and sometimes different militia leaders” while making efforts to “form a cohesive central Government”.401 Mr Haid thought that in Syria the UK was playing an “important” role, trying to “empower” local actors in rebel-held areas in order that they can “provide sufficient services to stabilise their areas and encourage resistance against extremist groups”.402
290.Dr Haass advised just such a flexible approach. He told us that it was not in the
“vital national interest of the United States … to make all countries in the Middle East whole … We have to be prepared to live with de facto arrangements of de facto sub-state entities, of borders that are not necessarily borders and of federalism of all sorts”.403
291.It is not a specifically UK interest that countries of the Middle East remain centralised, unitary states. The UK should not devote political will or resources to deliver the goal of unitary and fully-functioning states where this is unattainable, as could well prove to be the case in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen.
292.Neither should the UK actively support this process of state unravelling. It should, however, be prepared to live with de facto arrangements and de facto sub-state entities. The problem of weak states is likely to remain part of the landscape, and often what happens at the national level has little impact at the local level.
293.The Government has to deepen its engagement beyond the state, using all the instruments available to do so. It should be a priority of UK policy to build local ties and seek the broadest range of relationships, with a range of sub-state actors. This must be a coherent Government effort, not just one undertaken by the Foreign Office.
294.Throughout 2015 and 2016, in Iraq and Syria, Kurdish forces won victories against Da’esh, which increased their legitimacy in the West and enabled them to expand the areas under their control, and consolidate their aspirations for greater autonomy. Dr Mansour explained that, for the Kurds, the fight against Da’esh has been “a really important moment because they are on the international scene”.404
295.Witnesses made two points about the Kurds. First, the Kurds are far from achieving their ultimate political aspirations of independent statehood, and they recognise that fact. Mr Kamel very much doubted that there will be a “Kurdistan in the region as a unitary state that combines the Kurdish people across the land. The Kurds are deeply divided”.405 Most of the Kurdish political leadership are “pragmatic” explained Ms Jane Kinninmont, Deputy Head, Middle East and North Africa, Chatham House: “They do not see that a Greater Kurdistan project is attainable, even in 10 years, and their focus is on trying to have a better life—more autonomy and more rights—at least for now”.406
296.Second, witnesses pointed to the divisions and drew distinctions between the political trajectories of the different Kurdish groups.407 It was critical, said Dr Mansour, to distinguish between the factions in Iraq, Syria and Turkey as there is “no one set of Kurds”.408 Mr Tom Pravda, Head, HM Government’s Da’esh Taskforce and Head of Iraq Department, FCO, noted the “great divisions among different Kurdish groups”.409
Source: Derived from the Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The Time of the Kurds’, July 2015: https://www.cfr.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/time-kurds/p36547 [accessed 24 April 2017]
297.There is a particular distinction to be drawn between the Iraqi Kurds and the other groups in Syria and Turkey. 410 In Iraq, the Kurds have made progress in their political ambitions, while in Syria the Kurds have also declared their own autonomous region within Syria—Rojava—but they are far from being able to hold or govern territory. Their aspirations have also been constrained by Turkish opposition: Turkey views the Syrian Kurds as closely connected to their own domestic Kurdish terrorist group (PKK). Turkey, said Professor Umut Özkirimli, Professor of Political Science, Lund University and Senior Fellow, Sabanci University, “seems to have only one red line, which is possible or potential Kurdish autonomy in Syria”.411 The Kurds in Turkey have political representation but there also remains a militant arm, which is proscribed as a terrorist organisation.
298.The focus in this chapter is on the Iraqi Kurds who have proven to be an inseparable part of the politics of the region, intimately connected to regional power struggles, and whose political ambitions can no longer be ignored.
299.The Iraqi Kurds (and their military arm, the Peshmerga) have proven to be the most effective fighting force against Da’esh. In the wake of Da’esh’s attacks against the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2014, and the push back by the Kurdish forces, a new 1,000-kilometre front was formed between Da’esh and the Kurdish Peshmerga in the disputed territories.412
300.The Kurds have been able to trade their military victories for more diplomatic recognition and financial support.413 In 2015 and 2016, President Masoud Barzani, KRG, visited Riyadh, Turkey and Washington.414 Under the auspices of the fight against Da’esh, 62 countries supplied military support to the KRG and seven of those countries took a direct role in the ‘equip-train’ programme of the Peshmerga.415
301.There is, said Mr Crompton, a “strong international view” that the Kurds should “enjoy good autonomous governing arrangements within existing borders, and Turkey, Iran and other players are comfortable with that”.416 Ms Kinninmont pointed to the practicality of regional powers; those with Kurdish factions within their local populations, like Turkey and Iran, have built good working relations with the KRG. The Turks, said Ms Kinninmont, have a “very good working relationship” with the KRG because they think they “will focus on their own autonomy and not cause trouble in Turkey”.417
302.The Iraqi Kurds have successfully exploited this moment to build more political autonomy. Dr Mansour explained that the Kurds have “built a de facto state that has been recognised by not only the local population but the central government of Baghdad”.418 Mr Kamel thought it possible that there could be “greater Kurdish autonomy inside Iraq” which could “allow them greater control of their resources, and a legitimisation of that, with the aspiration that over the long term that could translate into independence”.419
303.The UK calibrates its engagement with the Iraqi Kurds via the central government in Baghdad. The Kurds, said Mr Pravda, are an “Iraqi actor and part of the Iraqi effort against Da’esh specifically”. The UK is “very clear about the primacy of the government in Baghdad as the sovereign government for the whole country of Iraq”.420 Mr al-Khoei warned the UK Government of the dangers of appearing to support “one man and one party in Kurdistan”. It seems as if President Barzani “has been given a blank cheque” by Western states, he added.421
304.We recognise that there is a balance to be drawn between engaging with sub-state actors, and avoiding the risk of undermining the central state. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Kurds are a valuable ally, and the UK should support the Kurdistan Regional Government financially and its Peshmerga forces with military capacity. The UK should not, however, support attempts by the Iraqi Kurds to seek independence.
305.The rise of non-state actors and the unfolding insurgencies in the region form a growing trend, but no regional or external power appears to have an innovative or constructive response. In Syria, Iraq, Libya and Egypt there is evidence of local insurgencies developing, driven by local grievances, which then often ally with Da’esh, the most prominent and ambitious international non-state actor.
306.While Da’esh is exceptional amongst non-state actors, its trajectory and development, and the response required, is representative. Da’esh emerged, said Mr Crompton, from the “sectarian politics in Iraq that had alienated the Sunni community”.422 The Minister, Mr Stewart, explained that the UK was clear that Da’esh was not a state but, by December 2014, it had succeeded in “controlling territory” that encompassed 7 million people, taken over the civil service, and “delivered water, electricity and sanitation, and ran a government taxation office”.423 Mr Crompton told us that there is a “military component” to the fight against Da’esh but, ultimately, the response must “resolve the underlying political problem”.424 Insurgent groups emerge rapidly, and it is “difficult to provide … countries with structures resilient enough to prevent that happening” said Mr Stewart.425 The political solutions will not be achieved rapidly.
307.Western policy, said Mr Oliver McTernan, Director, Forward Thinking, should engage with “groups that are grievance-driven but have a religious underpinning to their actions”. Mr McTernan reminded us that the key lesson from Northern Ireland, which Western nations “have failed to integrate into our current policy is engagement without preconditions”.426
308.Mr McTernan surveyed examples of where Western policy had had an opportunity to engage with Islamist, non-state actors that had gained power via elections—the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (2011–2012), and Hamas in the Palestinian legislature (2006)—and in both cases judged Western policy unsuccessful.
309.The Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt) were “learners in how to govern” but they were “given no opportunity” to address any mistakes they might have made. Western policy, said Mr McTernan, had left “political Islam out there in the wilderness to find its own way and we will have to face the consequences in the future”.427
310.The UK has not designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation but the question whether, and if so, how the UK should engage with the Muslim Brotherhood is a contentious matter. During their tenure in office, actions that occurred in Egypt, such as defying the Supreme Constitutional Court’s ruling and reinstating the Islamist-dominated Parliament (10 July 2012), and issuing a decree that gave the President considerable power while also curbing the powers of the courts (21 November 2012), but later rescinded (8 December 2012), have been pointed out by critics as examples of the Brotherhood’s lack of respect for judicial independence and checks and balances within a political system.428
311.Hamas, the Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist organisation, and its military arm, has been listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU (2001). Looking at Western policy towards Hamas at the time of its election to the Palestinian legislature (2006), Mr McTernan judged that “[n]o one could accept the preconditions” that were set.429 Western policy, said Mr McTernan, was seen as “not expecting a result in favour of an Islamic party” and being “afraid of the consequences for the region”.430 Mr Levy thought it would be “wise” to “revisit the position on contacts with Hamas”. He did not think “anyone, including the Israelis actually, benefit from the position that has been taken on Hamas”.431
312.Within the range of non-state jihadist actors, a distinction must be drawn between Da’esh—millenarian and brutal—and other sectarian groups that are fed by local grievances, desire power and can win electoral successes. There is an important distinction between being prepared to talk to individual members of such groups and being prepared to negotiate with them. The latter should be dependent on their willingness to renounce violence.
313.We recommend that the UK Government should be cautious in its engagement with Islamist groups. There are practical benefits to talking to those who have influence and power in the region.
410 On the Kurdish questions see Q 13 (Renad Mansour), Q 48 (Jane Kinninmont), Q 48 (Ayham Kamel), Q 110 (Umut Özkirimli), Q 128 (Hayder al-Khoei), Q 128 (Haid Haid) and Soli Özel and Arzu Yilmaz, The Kurds in the Middle East, Stockholm Institute of Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2016
412 Soli Özel and Arzu Yilmaz, ‘The Kurds in the Middle East’, Stockholm Institute of Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 2016
414 Soli Özel and Arzu Yilmaz, op. cit. and website of the White House: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/05/readout-president-and-vice-presidents-meeting-iraqi-kurdistan-region-pre [accessed 21 April 2017]
415 Soli Özel and Arzu Yilmaz, op. cit.
428 Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Political Islam’, and the Muslim Brotherhood Review (Sixth Report of Session 2016–17, HC 118)