The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General
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Evidence is published online at [http://www.parliament.uk/new-un-secretary-general](http://www.parliament.uk/new-un-secretary-general) and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7129 3074).

Q in footnotes refers to a question in oral evidence.
THE UK AND THE UN: PRIORITIES FOR THE NEW SECRETARY-GENERAL

SUMMARY

The United Nations is today more than ever the indispensable forum for addressing, where possible ameliorating, and resolving the great global issues of our times. From the perspective of the UK, facing changed circumstances as it plans its EU exit, we see its value and relevance, while long recognised, becoming even more important.

Yet the UN and its numerous agencies are operating in a world transformed by a revolution in communications and connectivity, filled with unprecedented threats and disfigured by violence and human suffering on an intolerable scale. A new injection of organisational vigour and leadership is needed to meet these formidable challenges.

We recognise that a new Secretary-General alone cannot possibly achieve change on the scale demanded, and some aspects of reform remain clearly outside his powers, such as the continuing anomaly of the Security Council permanent membership. But he can both identify the priorities, invigorate the agents of change and set the overall tone and vision.

We therefore set out, for the new incumbent, António Guterres, what we believe should be the main items in his in-tray, both immediate issues to be tackled, some of them in parallel, and longer term goals requiring firm strategic guidance.

First, he should pursue the institutional reforms which we see necessary to overcome the fragmentation and incoherence of the past and position the UN to face the new conditions.

Second, he should encourage the upgrading of UN peacekeeping operations, including their preparation and resourcing.

Third, he should take steps towards forging a new global consensus on handling the unprecedented volume of refugees and migrant movements worldwide.

Fourth, he should drive forward the commitments on the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement.

Finally, we conclude with a chapter on the UK and the UN, on the consequences of Brexit and the best ways in which the UK can build on partnerships and alliances for progress in upholding the effectiveness of the UN institution in the 21st century.
The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Purpose and scope of the report

1. Our aim in conducting this inquiry has been to formulate and clarify what we consider, from the point of view of wider UK interests, should be the priority tasks for the incoming Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN).

2. On 7 September 2016, the UN Security Council agreed that António Guterres, the former Prime Minister of Portugal, should be recommended to the General Assembly as the new Secretary-General of the UN. The General Assembly appointed Mr Guterres on 13 October. Mr Guterres will take up the post in January 2017.

3. Mr Guterres will be working, from the outset, in a radically transformed global context. The mass movement of people—refugees and economic migrants—will be an urgent and immense challenge for the incoming Secretary-General. He will take up his post alongside pivotal political events: a new US President is due to be inaugurated; Russia has reverted to an increasingly assertive posture in foreign policy; China is proclaiming a more independent global role; and the UK faces a turning point in its foreign policy, as it prepares to exit the European Union (EU), which itself is facing significant change. The Middle East continues to be turbulent and violent, with the civil war in Syria entering its fifth year, with estimates of over 400,000 Syrians dead and over 11 million Syrians either refugees or internally displaced.

4. Furthermore, broader political and economic transformations have challenged the legitimacy and efficacy of state-based institutions. Bitterness and disillusion among some states with the UN has led to an examination of its authority. Threats today—terrorism, disease, proliferation of weapons and climate degradation—cross borders and state boundaries. The UN, like other global institutions, has to adjust to revolutionary changes in communications patterns which are affecting the whole character of international relations. Technology has fostered economic, social and cultural links across borders that would have been unimaginable at the inception of the UN at the end of World War II. Finally, civil society networks have emerged as a powerful complement to multilateral tools.

5. The scale of the challenges and the task facing the international community and the new Secretary-General are immense. The UN cannot do everything, nor does our report attempt to survey all the challenges facing

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the international community. We have chosen some key priorities which we consider to be of urgent importance and where we believe the UK and the new Secretary-General can make a practical impact. Our proposals range from long-term ambitions on which the new Secretary-General can begin the process, to more immediate goals, which could be delivered within one or two terms, provided there is sufficient leadership and commitment by the incumbent and support from member states.

6. We intend that the evidence we present and the conclusions and recommendations we draw should inform the House, the Government and will be of use to the new incumbent. We hope our report will make a timely contribution to the public and political debate on the role of the UN Secretary-General, the future of the UN, and the UK’s place therein.

Structure of the report

7. Our report first surveys the new context in which the UN finds itself (Chapter 2). It then considers the role of the Secretary-General (Chapter 3) and internal reform of the UN (Chapter 4). The report then proceeds thematically: in Chapter 5, we address UN peacekeeping; in Chapter 6, we turn to the movement of people—refugees and economic migrants—and next, development (Chapter 7). In a final Chapter, we consider the future role of the UK within the UN (Chapter 8).

8. The inquiry that led to this report was carried out by the International Relations Committee, whose members are listed in Appendix 1. The Committee was established in May 2016 and this is its first report. A full list of witnesses is printed in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 is the Call for Evidence. We are grateful to all those who assisted us with this inquiry.

9. We make this report to the House for debate.
CHAPTER 2: THE UNITED NATIONS IN A NEW CONTEXT

Value of the UN

10. The UN was founded in 1945, in the aftermath of World War II. At its inception, the UN had 51 member states; there are currently 193. Its mission is guided by the principles contained in the founding Charter.3

11. In the year of its 70th anniversary, our witnesses were convinced of the UN’s continued value. Mr Paul Williams, Director, Multilateral Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), noted that global challenges presented the UN with a “formidable agenda” but it remained the “best global vehicle … to address many of these challenges”.4

12. The UN aims to uphold international peace and security. Professor Oliver P Richmond, Research Professor of International Relations, University of Manchester, judged the UN to be an “indispensable organisation” able to “exercise legitimate authority in crisis situations, and to endorse high standards of state behaviour”.5 E3G told us that “(a)midst multiple crises the UN is more important than ever in providing a constant which upholds peace, rights and security”.6

13. It also provides a forum to negotiate global agreements. For Dr David Curran, Research Fellow, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, University of Coventry, the UN was a “genuinely global organisation” representing “fundamental international values, treaties, and agreements”.7 Ms Natalie Samarasinghe, Executive Director, The United Nations Association-UK (UNA-UK) said the UN had “unique legitimacy”; international agreements such as those on climate change and global development could “happen only at the UN”.8

A new political and economic context

14. It cannot, however, be business as usual. The UN, said Mr Williams, had to “adapt to the new challenges of the 21st century”.9 The institution needed a vision “tempered with a lot of realism”, said Ms Samarasinghe.10 E3G found the UN to be “enveloped in a cycle of managing interconnected and prolonged crises” while its peace and security apparatus struggled “to keep pace”.11

Transformation of power

15. Global power is transforming radically: it is shifting geographically from West to East; it is dispersing from state to non-state actors; and the authority and legitimacy of international and central governance structures is under challenge.

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4 Written evidence from FCO (PSG0015)
5 Written evidence from Professor Oliver P Richmond (PSG0006)
6 Written evidence from E3G (PSG0012)
7 Written evidence from Dr David Curran (PSG0011)
8 Q 10
9 Q 1
10 Q 10
11 Written evidence from E3G (PSG0012)
16. China has enjoyed four consecutive decades of rapid economic growth. According to some estimates, China will overtake the US as the world’s biggest economy in 2024 in terms of nominal GDP.\textsuperscript{12} On the other hand, China’s economic growth slowed to 6.5% in 2016 amidst warnings of stress in the housing and banking sectors.\textsuperscript{13} Professor Kerry Brown, Professor of Chinese Politics and Director, Lau China Institute, King’s College London, explained that the world will have to deal with the “current economic vulnerability of China” and its compensation for that economic vulnerability with a “strong sense of historic mission, of creating a China at the centre of its region but also internationally absolutely respected”.\textsuperscript{14}

17. The “impetus is towards a more independent Chinese position at the UN” said Lord Malloch-Brown KCMG, former UN Deputy Secretary-General and former Chief of Staff to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The Chinese are “now a significant contributor of peacekeepers” and on African disputes “where they have investments around natural resources, proving to have a bit of an independent voice”.\textsuperscript{15}

18. Russia’s increasing assertiveness presents significant challenges which will need to be addressed. Under President Vladimir Putin, there has been a reassertion of the mindset that NATO poses an existential threat to Russia and a more nationalist foreign policy has challenged the international rules-based system.\textsuperscript{16} Fierce mutual recriminations between Russia and many western powers have replaced a period of cooperation after the fall of the Soviet Union.

19. Lord Malloch-Brown discussed the diffusion of power. He said the UN faced a world where “civil society has gotten a much larger voice … the social media revolution has swept much before it”. Furthermore, there has been a “dispersal of power to a lot more regional and even sub-regional actors”. Some non-state actors were “battling to control territory or to mount terrorist or other movements at a regional or global level”.\textsuperscript{17}

20. Finally, Baroness Amos, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, diagnosed an eroding public confidence in established hierarchies: “(P)eople are much less respectful of their Governments and what their Governments are seeking to do”.\textsuperscript{18}

21. These transformations of power question the legitimacy of a state-centric organisation. Lord Malloch-Brown told us that the old model, of managing the world’s problems “through the prism of traditional interstate relations … has really been pushed aside”. The world requires a UN that “knows how to deal with, manage and find consensus within a … multi-stakeholder world”.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{14} Q 31
\textsuperscript{15} Q 50
\textsuperscript{17} Q 44
\textsuperscript{18} Q 59
\textsuperscript{19} Q 44
Technology

22. Technology has had a profound impact on people’s political, social and economic lives. It has altered the way people access information, build social movements and catalyse political movements. Technology has energised communities to demand more representation from their local and national governments. It has also changed how people interact with politics. Lady Amos noted that while the UN was an intergovernmental organisation, the world was “much more about citizens communicating directly with each other, through social media”.

Conclusions and recommendations

23. This report is based on our firm conviction that the UN remains more than ever an essential global institution and a lynchpin of a rules-based international order. The UN possesses unique legitimacy as a place to mediate between states. When the interests of the permanent five members align, the Security Council plays an indispensable role in promoting peace and security and preventing war. The nuclear deal with Iran is one such recent example.

24. There is also a particular legitimacy that the UN bestows when it speaks to an issue of global concern; the recent multilateral deals on development and climate change have demonstrated the convening power of the institution.

25. The UN, has however, been buffeted by systemic geopolitical shifts. Fractures between states must not mean that the UN is allowed to drift into irrelevance.

26. Making the UN relevant and fit for the future will be a critical task of the new Secretary-General. He will need to build political support amongst the member states, change the institutional culture and steer radical reforms through the Organisation. We do not underestimate the scale of the task, nor the shared responsibility of the member states.
CHAPTER 3: SECRETARY OR GENERAL?

27. There is a considerable weight of expectation on the Secretary-General. We draw on the evidence to consider the key attributes of the role. First, we consider the innovations that have characterised the appointment process of the new incumbent.

Selection process for the ninth Secretary-General

28. In past selection processes, deliberations took place behind the closed doors of the Security Council, with a candidate emerging, who was then presented to the UN General Assembly for approval.

29. By contrast, the selection of the ninth Secretary-General has been characterised by unprecedented transparency and inclusivity. A ‘1 for 7 billion’ campaign, led by civil society organisations and supported by the UK Government, has put forward a platform to reform the appointment process of the Secretary-General. Reforms which have been delivered include:

- Candidates declared themselves publicly and were listed on the UN website;
- All the declared candidates appeared for public hearings at the General Assembly; and
- A timetable was set out which added a measure of predictability to the process.\(^{21}\)

30. Ms Samarasinghe, whose organisation UNA-UK supported the ‘1 for 7 billion’ campaign was “delighted”; there had been a “very transparent, public process at the General Assembly” and “civil society [had] been able to ask questions”.\(^{22}\)

31. Three major proposals of the ‘1 for 7 billion’ campaign have not been addressed: appointment to a single, non-renewable term rather than a potentially renewable two five-year terms; a choice of two or more candidates presented to the General Assembly for appointment; and a commitment to rule out backroom deals.\(^{23}\)

Informal criteria

32. Two informal criteria have also been advocated. First, that the new Secretary-General should be a woman. Ms Samarasinghe noted the “much stronger language on encouraging women to be put forward for the role”.\(^{24}\) The view of The Elders, said Mr Andrew Whitley, Interim Chief Executive Officer, was that it was time for a woman but that “consideration should be overruled by the credentials and the leadership” of the next Secretary-General.\(^{25}\) The UK’s view was that “all things being equal, it is time for a woman to be elected” but ultimately “it is all about the best person for the job”.\(^{26}\) Second, Mr Williams noted that a number of countries believed it was “Eastern Europe’s turn … because as a regional area it has not had a Secretary-

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21 Q 4 (Paul Williams) and Q 12 (Natalie Samarasinghe)
22 Q 12
23 1 for 7 billion campaign: [http://www.1for7billion.org/why/](http://www.1for7billion.org/why/) [accessed 22 October 2016]
24 Q 12
25 Q 37
26 Q 5 (Paul Williams)
General before”. The Government disagreed, saying that “nationality [was] not a factor”.27

Conclusions and recommendations

33. The Government is to be congratulated on its support for a more transparent and inclusive appointment process for the new Secretary-General. The innovations should become permanent.

34. We recommend that the UK should initiate a process to critically examine the selection process for future UN Secretaries-General, addressing further possible improvements. Discussions could focus on producing explicit criteria and qualifications for the role and consideration of the merits of a single seven-year term.

35. The informal practice of regional rotation is a limiting convention. We welcome that the appointment of António Guterres has not been hindered by that consideration.

Relations with the Security Council 28

36. The UN is a political institution, and the incumbent cannot escape the power politics at its heart. Lord Malloch-Brown said that the incumbent will have to make sure that all “three constituencies”—the General Assembly, the non-permanent members and the permanent members of the Security Council—believe that they “each own” him or “a part of” him.29 The Secretary-General “can never be entirely insulated from global power politics” and must know “how to navigate [that] system” said Mr Williams.30

37. A good working relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council, particularly its five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—the ‘P5’) will be essential for the incumbent to be effective.31 It is a “prerequisite”, said Mr Whitley that the Secretary-General should “be able to work with the P5”.32 Sir Emyr Jones Parry GCMG, former UK Permanent Representative to the UN, advised the new Secretary-General to expend “more effort” trying to “establish a common agenda, a vision” with the P5.33 He explained further that working closely with the P5 “should not mean that you are seen to be subservient or in anyone’s pocket”. It was important to both “work with” the P5 but also to “distance yourself sufficiently from it”.34

27 Q 5
28 We explore in more detail the role of the Secretary-General in navigating great power conflicts in Chapter 4.
29 Q 49
30 Q 5
31 The Security Council is composed of five permanent members along with ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. The ten non-permanent members are (with end of term date): Angola (2016); Egypt (2017); Japan (2017); Malaysia (2016); New Zealand (2016); Senegal (2017); Spain (2016); Ukraine (2017); Uruguay (2017) and Venezuela (2016). UN Security Council website: http://www.un.org/en/SecurityCouncil/members/ [accessed 29 October 2016]
32 Q 37
33 Q 49
34 Q 49 (Sir Emyr Jones Parry)
The new incumbent will have to negotiate the different expectations of the P5 members, on whether they want a leader—a general—or a manager and administrative officer for the UN—a secretary. The UK, said Mr Williams, erred towards “the ‘general’ end of the spectrum” but no incumbent could “ever be 100% general in the system”. Someone who just “barks orders and...
ignores” member states would not achieve anything in the system. Mr Williams clarified that by leadership he meant “pulling the system together and using their voice (for) greater efficiency and effectiveness”. This, we note, does not seem to include leadership on political issues.

With the US serving as the UN’s largest funder, accounting for more than 20% of the UN’s budget in 2016 and by far one of the world’s largest military spenders, no Secretary-General can succeed without its support. The new Secretary-General will assume office at the same time as a new US President, either Donald Trump (Republican Party) or Hillary Clinton (Democratic Party). Sir Emyr Jones noted that whichever candidate won the election, the “politics will be difficult in any circumstance”, because the “UN is not widely supported in Congress” and he did “not think that public opinion in the United States is hugely in its favour”.

Within the Security Council, relations between Russia and the Western Council members have deteriorated. The UN authorised intervention in Libya (2011) and its aftermath, Russia’s military action and annexation of Crimea by military means (March 2014), intervention in Eastern Ukraine and its policy towards the civil war in Syria have fuelled profound disagreements between Russia and the Western Council members. Russian actions, in particular its use of its veto, have put the legitimacy of the Security Council and the rules-based system at risk. Between October 2011 and October 2016, Russia (sometimes alongside China) used its veto powers five times to block resolutions on Syria. In that same period, it has also used its veto powers twice to forestall any discussion in the Security Council on Ukraine.

**Convening power**

A unique quality of the UN is its ability to convene member states, through formal or informal mechanisms. The capacity of the Secretary-General to use that convening power, and thereby influence international norms, was highlighted by witnesses.

A “particularly important” skill said Sir Emyr Jones Parry was the “convening power—someone who can develop consensus amongst the different players”, member states, regional organisations or parts of the UN organisation. Ms Samarasinghe said the Secretary-General “can start conversations, provide some thought leadership” and “give priorities to certain issues”. Mr Williams said that the current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in his report on countering violent extremism had been “able to use two of the functions of the UN, as a convenor, as a global voice, but also as a norm setter”.

**Strategic communicator**

The Secretary-General is the public face of the Organisation and the incumbent must be able to communicate its values and aims. The job of the Secretary-General, said Sir Adam Roberts, Professor of International

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36 Q 5
37 Q 4
38 Q 48
40 Q 45
41 Q 17
42 Q 1
Relations, University of Oxford, was to “articulate globally a vision of what the United Nations stands for” and to “speak intelligently about the unavoidable selectivity” of its work.43

44. In a world where, nearly 45% of the population—more than 3 billion people—today are aged under 25, Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia and Chair of the International Commission on Multilateralism, has said that young people must “have their voices heard at the center [sic] of the UN’s councils, not simply as a paternalistic afterthought”.44 Lady Amos agreed that the UN “has to make its case with young people, who do not necessarily remember the history of why the United Nations was formed in the first place”.45

45. There are currently 10 million non-governmental organisations (NGOs) worldwide.46 While they may not represent the interests of member states, they are often significant actors delivering political, social, and humanitarian programmes. The UN has multiple structures in place to facilitate civil society engagement.47 Lady Amos, however, questioned the quality of that engagement; although the UN had a “very elaborate system of consultation with civil society” that does not “really represent what is happening with people across the world”.48

46. There is evidently an appetite to engage with the work of the UN; and social media and online tools have been able to harness that interest. Over 20,000 questions were submitted from over 160 countries for the civil society debates with the candidates for the post of Secretary-General.49 The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) informed us that “more than 7 million people were consulted” on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) via an online survey. “A very high bar has been set … the UN can never conduct its business without wide consultation again—this is the new norm.”50

Conclusions and recommendations

47. The incoming Secretary-General will take up his tenure during a period of strained relations between the permanent members of the Security Council. Perceptions of a Security Council impasse are profoundly undermining the legitimacy of the UN. The new Secretary-General will need to work to diminish tensions between the Security Council members, in particular reducing no-go areas and use of vetoes.

43 Q 37
45 Q 59
48 Q 59
50 Written evidence from ODI (PSG0013)
48. While, the UN already has structures in place to engage with formal regional organisations, the new Secretary-General should begin a process to agree, alongside member states, a strategic approach to build strong ties and coalitions with new inter-regional and local organisations.

49. A core priority for the new Secretary-General will be to develop a communication strategy, to engage extensively with civil society organisations and young people. The UK should support a review of the current communication strategy ensuring that it is sufficiently sensitive to new media and online platforms as well as judging its penetration to more disenfranchised communities and smaller organisations.

50. A distinct communication strategy focused entirely on young people is particularly important. The new Secretary-General should review how the UN engages with young people, going beyond explaining the work of the UN to building mechanisms to regularly consult them on the work of the UN.
Figure 2: The UN System

The organogram is a reflection of the functional organisation of the UN system. It does not depict all offices or entities of the system. Adapted from the UN, ‘The UN System’: http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/UN_System_Chart_30June2015.pdf [accessed 23 October 2016]
Challenge of internal reform

51. Internal reform of the UN institution is high on the UK’s political agenda. The UK vision for the UN, explained Mr Williams, was “a modern, global organisation”. The UN must become “more efficient and effective as an organisation” making “itself fit for the 21st century”.

52. The challenge, the evidence demonstrates, is that the Secretary-General has limited authority over many aspects of institutional reform. There is a distinction to be drawn between reform of the UN system and reform of the UN Secretariat. Past secretaries-general, from Dag Hammarskjöld to Kofi Annan and even Boutros Boutros-Ghali, recognized the need to adapt the UN system. Unfortunately, many agencies, posts and programmes have their own advocates among member states, making it very challenging to rationalise. On the other hand, by the authority vested in his role as the Chief Administrative Officer, the incumbent may have more scope to improve the functioning and coherence of the UN Secretariat.

53. We consider two areas—rationalising the UN budget and improving the leadership within the Organisation—where change is warranted and may be feasible.

Rationalising the UN budget

54. The Secretary-General will find his scope to rationalise the UN budget sharply circumscribed. He has only limited authority over the size of the budget. He could “propose a lower or higher budget” but is “guided on that by a resolution” of the member states. So, as with “everything at the UN, it is the member states that ultimately decide and guide”, said Mr Williams.

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52 We do not address the question of reform of the Security Council. Although, it is a stated UK priority and there have been a number of proposals for reform, there has been no consensus within the Security Council. There is, therefore, little possibility of progress on this issue in the term of the new Secretary-General.

53 Written evidence from FCO (PSG0015)

54 Q 1

55 Q 5
### Figure 3: UN Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Regular Budget</th>
<th>The Peacekeeping Operations Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>$5.4 billion</strong> in 2016–2017</td>
<td><strong>$7.9 billion</strong> in 2016–2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This budget, financed through assessed contributions, is an operating budget, used to fund the administrative costs of the UN Secretariat and certain funds and programmes.</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operations are financed through compulsory contributions by Member States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main contributors and P5 Members</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main contributors and P5 Members</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States 22%</td>
<td>United States 28.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan 9.68%</td>
<td>China 10.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China 7.92%</td>
<td>Japan 9.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 6.39%</td>
<td>Germany 6.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 4.86%</td>
<td>France 6.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 4.46%</td>
<td>United Kingdom 5.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation 3.09%</td>
<td>Russian Federation 4.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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A more detailed explanation of the UN budget can be found in Appendix 5.
55. Operational flexibility to allocate the budget is also restricted. Even when making minor decisions on fiscal resources, the Secretary-General must defer to the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Lord Malloch-Brown explained about the: “extensive committee structure, which literally ticks the box on every single post and expenditure line … gives very little flexibility for shifting resources between them”.

56. His advice was to “[p]ull back those committee structures and make them much more results-focused rather than process-focused”. A reactionary force against change, however, was the member states with their “large delegations of second secretaries sitting on different management and administrative committees” with “massive vested interests in keeping these structures”.

57. The current approach does not work, explained Sir Emyr Jones Parry: member states are “interfering so much, but there is no actual accountability”. The Secretary-General, Lord Malloch-Brown argued, must be given the “space to manage” and then be held “accountable for results”.

Reforming the leadership of the Organisation

58. The Secretary-General, as Chief Administrative Officer of the UN, oversees the UN Secretariat, one of the main organs of the UN, organised along departmental lines, based in New York, Geneva and duty stations around the world. As of 30 June 2016, the UN Secretariat comprised over 40,000 staff of all categories (permanent, fixed-term and temporary, recruited both internationally and locally) with just under 6,400 based in New York.

59. The Secretary-General does not have authority over the placement of all staff across the Organisation, but the hiring of under-secretaries for the heads of UN agencies and programmes is his responsibility. Under-Secretaries-General are appointed by the UN General Assembly on a recommendation of the Secretary-General. This role can be impeded with member states lobbying for their own nationals.

60. Witnesses suggested that improving the quality of the leadership of the UN should be a priority. Lord Malloch-Brown judged that the “process of building a genuinely first-class team is probably the single most critical objective” in the incumbent’s first days. It was, he feared, “very easy to end up with a cabinet of Under-Secretaries-General” imposed by governments “who will completely handicap [the] first term”. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with the support of Lord Malloch-Brown, had asserted the principle that the Secretary-General’s office would “retain control of which individuals got each job” and if “governments nominated people they would be on a shortlist, but others would be interviewed too”.

61. This principle is not always respected by member states. Sir Emyr Jones Parry informed us that member states, including the UK, have often said this “is our candidate and we insist that we have that post”. An improvement

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57 Q 51 (Lord Malloch-Brown)
58 Q 51
59 Q 51
60 We consider reform of the UN Development System in Chapter 7.
62 Q 46
was the approach of the French government, which offered two or three nominations for a particular post allowing the Secretary-General to "at least … appear to be exercising some degree of choice".63

62. A range of UN leaderships are due for selection. Ms Samarasinghe told us that about “20% of staff are going to reach mandatory retirement age in the next three to five years, including a huge proportion of senior staff”.64 She explained that there was no systematic or transparent recruitment process: “Sometimes posts are advertised, sometimes they are not. Sometimes there are shortlists, sometimes there are not.” There was room for the Secretary-General to manoeuvre here but there was also a role for member states, to put forward “good shortlists of names, which should include women” and to “move away from the system of certain posts being naturally allocated to certain countries”.65

63. This concurs with the findings of the report Effective Leadership in International Organizations (2015). Many international agencies, including UN agencies, when choosing their leaders, do not publish job criteria nor are the ethical standards publicised. The appraisal process is not rigorous either: often performance expectations are not set and annual performance appraisals are not held.66

Conclusions and recommendations

64. The Secretary-General has the scope to rationalise the UN Secretariat. We urge him to review its functioning, in order to promote a lean and efficient organisation. In particular, he must seek to build more coherence between its various departments and offices.

65. Within the Secretary-General’s first term, a range of leaderships in the UN Secretariat and UN agencies will come up for selection. This is an opportunity for the UN to build on the momentum of the Secretary-General’s appointment to inject more transparency and accountability into the UN system of appointments. Strengthening the quality of leadership within will, we judge, improve the functioning and credibility of the Organisation.

66. We urge the UK to propose a more rigorous and competitive selection process for the leadership positions of UN agencies. Member states, including the UK, should agree the criteria, seek expressions of interest, put forward more than one candidate and finally, set performance expectations.

67. In order to strengthen accountability, we recommend that the Secretary-General should institute a mechanism whereby the top tier of senior leaders are annually appraised.

68. The UK should support a review of the current systems of oversight. The Secretary-General must be allowed more autonomy to administer the organisation, which includes managing the budget, and then be held accountable.

63 Q 51
64 Q 17
65 Q 18
CHAPTER 5: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

The United Nations was not created to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.”

69. The UN was founded to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Our witnesses agreed on the centrality of the peacekeeping mandate. The “primary task” of the UN, said Mr. Whitely, was the “prevention of conflict and maintenance of peace”. If the UN was seen to be failing in its capacity to address conflict, it would be in “serious trouble”, judged Sir Adam Roberts.

70. UN peacekeeping was conceived soon after the establishment of the Organisation: unarmed observers monitored the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This was later supplemented with armed battalions in 1956 to address the Suez Crisis. By 1960, with the establishment of the UN Operation in the Congo, peacekeeping evolved dramatically from monitoring to providing a substantial array of technical assistance. In 1988, UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

71. UN peacekeeping has done distinguished service. In Cambodia (February 1992–September 1993), the UN was able to facilitate a nation-wide free election after a new government replaced the Khmer Rouge. Between 1999 and 2005, in Sierra Leone, UN peacekeepers monitored a shaky ceasefire, oversaw the peace and supported the transition to democratic governance. Other successful missions also include the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (1991–1995); UN Operation in Mozambique (1992–1994); UN Observer Mission in Liberia (1993–1997) and UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (1989–1990). The latter was established to assist Namibia’s transition to independence and carry out fair elections. Namibia joined the United Nations in early 1990.

72. It has also proven helpless. In Rwanda (1994), the UN’s mission failed to stop the massacre of some 800,000 of the Tutsi minority. Despite the presence of a UN mission in the town of Srebrenica, some 8,500 Bosnian Muslims were massacred at the hands of Serbian forces.

73. In 2016, the UN has over 100,000 peacekeepers deployed in the field across 16 missions, with contributions from 123 countries.

Role of the Secretary-General

74. The role of the Secretary-General in UN peacekeeping includes the following:

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67 Daj Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary-General (1953–1961), Address at University of California Convocation, Berkeley, California, 13 May 1954
69 Q 36
70 Q 36
• **Good Offices.** As part of his ‘good offices’, the Secretary-General can use the authority invested in the office to negotiate, rally governments and act as a mediator between parties in conflict.

• **Article 99,** Chapter XV of the UN Charter states that the Secretary-General “may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. Article 99 could be a useful tool of conflict prevention, allowing the Secretary-General to warn the Security Council of impending conflicts.

• **Influence the international discourse.** Dr Norrie MacQueen, Honorary Research Fellow, School of International Relations, University of St Andrews, pointed to the “authority to either undertake or commission major enquiries”. This can offer Secretaries-General an opportunity to shift the international discourse. Daj Hammarskjöld’s 1958 Summary Study into the lessons learnt from the Suez operation asserted “the fundamental rules of early peacekeeping”. Kofi Annan developed the concept of “responsibility to protect”, which was endorsed by member states in 2005.

**New security context**

75. The UN must prepare itself for an evolving security context:

• An increasing threat posed by non-state actors—criminals, terrorists and extremists—acting inside and outside of state structures, beyond international governance and unfettered by agreements made between states;

• The resurgence of state-based threats. Not only the competition between states but also the risk of powerful member states, including the P5, carving out zones of influence, eroding the jurisdiction of the rules-based international order; and

• The impact of technology, especially cyber threats from state and non-state actors.

76. Witnesses judged that the UN’s peace and security apparatus was not ready for the task. Mr Whitley informed us that the UN had “increasingly been marginalised in recent years, both as a forum for debate and as an instrument to bring conflicts to an end”. The main challenge for the new Secretary-General, he said, will be to restore the “authority and legitimacy of the United Nations as the place to deal with conflict”. Mr Williams told us that “challenges go across all three of [the UN’s] pillars”—peace and

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75 Written evidence from Dr Norrie MacQueen (PSG0014)


77 Q 36
security, development and human rights—and therefore, the Organisation must “get better at coordinating its work across those three pillars”.

77. We have identified four key priorities for the new Secretary-General in peace and security:

- Reaffirm the primacy of international law;
- Strengthen the practice of conflict prevention;
- Reform the operations of UN peacekeeping; and
- Stamp out sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.

78. We address each in turn.

**Reaffirm the primacy of international law**

79. From its very inception, the UN, and the Secretary-General, has been paralysed when the P5 disagree amongst themselves or when a P5 member asserts a national or territorial interest brooking no interference by international institutions.

80. Three conflicts demonstrate this: Russia’s aggression against the sovereign state in Ukraine, covert support of eastern separatists and its continued occupation of Crimea; China’s repudiation of the UN’s Permanent Court of Arbitration on the territorial dispute between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea; and finally, the civil war in Syria continues in its fifth year without leadership by the Security Council.

81. Mr Whitley noted the “unfortunate reality” that “certain conflict areas have become no-go areas for the Security Council”. This had happened, he believed, because of the inability of the Secretary-General “to find consensus” and by “virtue of the unwillingness on the part of certain major countries to tackle particular issues”.

82. On global confrontations where the “big powers are locking horns”, Lord Malloch-Brown said it was “hard for Secretaries-General to be effective”. “One needs to accept that the UN operates within certain limitations”, said Sir Adam Roberts. He explained that it was a:

> “condition of the existence of the UN—and it has been a condition of its success—that it is so structured as to be acceptable to the major powers of the day.”

83. Nevertheless, some of our witnesses did foresee a restraining and moderating role for the Secretary-General. The Rt Hon Baroness Anelay of St Johns DBE, Minister of State, FCO, said that while the Secretary-General “does not have the authority to direct states” he has to be “persuasive in enabling states to work within the UN”. Lord Malloch-Brown agreed that the Secretary-General must insist that the processes for resolution remain within the UN and the legal channels. On the dispute between China and the Philippines,
Lord Malloch-Brown advised the Secretary-General not to “get into the rights and wrongs” of the issue but try to “insist on a legal as against some kind of military solution”.83 A Secretary-General, believed Lady Anelay, can “assist the P5 in thinking again and having conversations”.84

84. Our witnesses further advised the Secretary-General to make judicious choices about where he interceded. Lord Malloch-Brown pointed to conflicts where the member states would “not only make way for UN leadership” but “welcome it, because it lessens the diplomatic traffic for them”.85

85. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and South Sudan, said Lord Malloch-Brown, are three such conflicts that “will need occasional, decisive interventions” from member states but the “bulk of the work should be put on the shoulders of the UN”.86 For Mr Whitley, South Sudan was a country which would benefit from “more proactive leadership from the Secretary-General” who “has not been using his good offices as fully and effectively as he could”.87

Conclusions and recommendations

86. The Secretary-General will not be able to force member states to do the right thing but he can use the Article 99 powers invested in his role by the Charter to elevate issues of peace and security to the attention of the Security Council, compelling their attention and insisting that the Security Council continues to engage. This will assist the process of encouraging member states to resolve their disputes through UN processes and within legal channels.

87. The public platform of the role should be used to make breaches of international law, or the neglect of humanitarian duties, manifestly evident.

Strengthen conflict mediation and prevention

88. Lady Amos informed us that significantly “more attention needs to be paid to prevention and peacebuilding”.88 For Dr Alex Vines OBE, Head of Africa Programme, Chatham House, many peacekeeping missions were not tied to an “effective strategy for conflict resolution”. Deployments have been “instruments of damage limitation, just to stabilise the situation and freeze it but not transform it”.89

89. The capacity of the ‘good offices’ have atrophied. Lord Malloch-Brown described the “good offices, the proactive mediation” as having “withered on the vine in the last few years”. He judged that there was “not enough empowered, ambitious, creative political mediation and diplomacy coming out of the UN at the moment”.90

90. Witnesses suggested reforms that could bolster the ‘good offices’ of the Secretary-General:
Dependable and greater financing: Effective good offices require “dependable and predictable funding, which is problematic within the UN system”, said Dr Vines.91 Lady Amos provided the figure: “About $600 million a year is spent on political prevention, including mediation”. (In comparison approximately $8 billion is spent annually on peacekeeping.) This was a “drop in the ocean”.92

Empower the Secretary-General to talk to all parties, including non-state actors, when appropriate. When states find it challenging to talk to non-state actors, there could be a useful role for the Secretary-General of the UN. Lady Amos saw “absolutely no reason for the UN not to talk to non-state actors”. There was only a small list of UN sanctioned individuals and countries, and for those with International Criminal Court warrants against them, a case could be made and dispensation agreed with the Court.93 This is a controversial issue at the UN, with debates on the wisdom of talking to terrorist groups such as Hamas, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Conclusions and recommendations

91. The UN needs to invest more in conflict prevention. Member states should consider awarding more financial resources, intelligence and analytical capacity to support the ‘good offices’ of the Secretary-General. The UK should take the lead in this field.

92. The Secretary-General must exercise his Article 99 Charter powers. In the case of Syria, the Secretary-General should raise their obligations under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine with the Security Council. There may be a political deadlock, but there is an urgent and internationally agreed humanitarian duty.

93. As part of an enhanced policy of conflict prevention and increased use of his Article 99 powers, the incoming Secretary-General should undertake a review of the principal focus and implementation of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which goes beyond military intervention to encompass the obligations of states to protect people from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, with a view to making it more effective in this field.

Reform of UN peacekeeping operations

94. Sir Emyr Jones Parry explained the “traditional role” for UN deployments; peacekeeping is based on the assumption that there is a Security Council resolution, a “peace agreement and consent of all the parties” and resourced by the “provision of troops generated by the UN system”. That needed “looking at desperately”. He also questioned the value of some missions. For example, there had been a UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus for 42 years, which he doubted was justified.94

95. Improving the performance of UN peacekeeping deployments is a UK priority. At the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial, in London, 5–6 September 2016, the UK set out ambitious commitments organised around
‘Three Ps’—planning, pledges and performance. The FCO explained that UN missions must be based on clearly prioritised objectives and benchmarks for success, the UN must seek pledges to fill capability gaps as well as develop a “pool of capabilities available to deploy if gaps arise or crises occur,” and peacekeepers should be “well trained and effectively led”. All “instances of poor performance and misconduct should be dealt with quickly, robustly and transparently”.96

96. The UK’s agenda adds to a lacklustre history of attempted reform of UN peacekeeping. Three Secretaries-General have suggested ambitious reforms of UN peacekeeping without succeeding in delivering meaningful change. Dr MacQueen explained that some members remain wary of UN peacekeeping’s lack of a “clear location in international law” and of the role of a supranational organisation in this field. Furthermore, a “certain sluggishness and uncertainty in mission formation” is welcomed by countries providing “space for autonomous decision-making after testing political and public reactions to the prospect of participation”.98

97. There is another factor—the cost. During his tenure at the UN, Lord Malloch-Brown attempted wide-ranging reforms of UN peacekeeping including “better training, better unitary command … quicker mobilisation of forces, more opportunity for leave” aiming to deliver a “more trained and better behaved and disciplined force”. “It all costs money. It did not go anywhere” he said. The UK was one of the countries opposed, he added.99

Pre-deployment training

98. Pre-deployment training could deliver qualitative improvements to UN peacekeepers’ performance. By changing the culture of the troops, it might also be possible to make progress in reducing sexual exploitation and abuse. Lady Anelay judged that pre-deployment training was “essential and a priority”.100 She said that the UK had taken the lead in promoting “compulsory” pre-deployment training. UN peacekeepers must be “trained before they go on deployment and after they have arrived in preventing sexual violence in conflict”.101

99. The need for pre-deployment training is not universally accepted amongst contributing countries. Lady Anelay had heard caveats from some of the troop contributing countries. She added that countries had said that they could “not force people to go through the pre-deployment training”.102

Foster better leadership

100. Leadership of UN peacekeeping missions, said Dr Vines, was “absolutely strategic and central” but repeatedly there were “mistakes—and sometimes
it is a bit of a lottery”. There were “no proper systems in place” and a “lot of patronage politics that occurs”. He advocated a “more accountable process of decision-making for these appointments”. Ms Samarasinghe believed the idea of a panel of experts who would filter nominations and advise the Secretary-General on appointments was an “excellent” one.

101. The Secretary-General has the facility to foster better leadership in the field of UN peacekeeping, with key appointments under his direct authority. The Secretary-General appoints a Special Representative to direct a peacekeeping mission, the peacekeeping operation’s Force Commander and senior civilian staff. The Secretary-General also directly appoints special envoys and representatives.

102. The London Communiqué offers the Secretary-General a framework for change. It called on the Secretary-General to “improve and strengthen the competitive assessment methodology” to select candidates for senior leadership positions and to ensure “a transparent selection process based on merit, competence, and the needs of individual missions”.

Pledges

103. There is scope for optimism on the matter of pledges of personnel. In September 2015, at the Leaders’ Summit on UN Peacekeeping, hosted by President Obama, member states pledged an extra 40,000 troops on top of the 100,000 already serving in the field. In 2016, at the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in London (September 2016), 30 new pledges were made including by the UK.

104. The Chinese contribution of 8,000 peacekeepers has substantially boosted the numbers. China’s contribution is primarily focused in Africa where they have strategic interests. Dr Vines explained that Chinese peacekeepers are active in South Sudan because it is the only country “where Chinese companies produce oil in Africa”. Chinese engineers were sent to Liberia in 2003 as a reward because Liberia “had changed recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China”.

105. For Lady Anelay the test would be if the pledges were delivered, and delivered in a way that was “more accountable and more transparent”. The next step would be to hold the countries to account. She informed us that the French would be hosting a meeting in autumn 2016 to do exactly that.

106. On the other hand, UN peacekeeping is under-funded with many member states not delivering their financial pledges. On 30 June 2016, about $1.6

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103 Q 24
104 Q 18
108 Q 64
109 Q 21
110 Q 22 (Dr Alex Vines)
111 Q 64
billion in contributions was outstanding. Some UN peacekeeping missions have had to undertake significant cuts, and have responded by abolishing posts or reducing the number of military contingents.

**The UK’s role in UN peacekeeping**

107. Under Prime Minister David Cameron, the UK committed to double its contribution of military personnel to UN peacekeeping. The UK pledged an increase of “45 to 70 troops in Somalia and up to 300 in South Sudan”. These deployments have started.

108. Witnesses noted that the numbers of personnel were small but praised the UK’s specialised assistance. Dr Vines pointed to the “considerable gaps in specialist capabilities” of some UN deployments and therefore, “very patchy delivery”. The UK could “contribute relatively few people but to great effect”. This had happened with the UK’s provision of “logistics support for AMISOM” (African Union Mission in Somalia) which had included “repairing vehicles, providing backroom support and getting the logistics right”.

109. Providing training to troop contributing countries is another UK contribution. Dr Vines pointed us to the UK’s support of the EU training mission for AMISOM peacekeepers, the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone, training Gambian troops who are now contributing to UN missions in Darfur and Sudan and the work of the British Peace Support Team in Kenya.

110. Dr MacQueen agreed that the UK’s contribution should focus on added value rather than simply an increase in personnel. Further options for enhanced UK support were:

- A bridging role: The UK could provide “rapid ‘holding’ responses in sudden and rapidly developing crises by deploying limited but highly trained forces pending the establishment of a full-scale UN mission”;
- A stand-by role: Britain might provide a “back-stop presence (perhaps employing Special Forces) to provide critical support to UN operations or to cover emergency extraction of UN personnel as and when necessary”;

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115 Q 68 (Paul Williams)
116 Q 20 (Dr Alex Vines)
117 See Q 20 and written evidence from Dr Norrie MacQueen (PSG0014)
118 Q 23
119 Q 20
120 Q 27. Dr Vines did qualify that in the case of Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Defence was “extremely anxious about how the Sierra Leone defence forces performed” in Sudan and Somalia.
• The UK might provide “greater and more systematic general and
specialist training, which could be expanded to special training” to
address the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.¹²¹

Conclusions and recommendations

111. We urge the Secretary-General to develop a more rigorous appointment
process for senior leadership positions in UN peacekeeping, which are
within his purview. An advisory panel could be instituted, comprised
of former force commanders and special representatives, who would
filter nominations and offer a shortlist to the Secretary-General.

112. The UK should support a new Secretary-General in a policy
of rationalisation of UN peacekeeping missions, including the
possible abolition of those missions that are no longer required or
not performing. This could initiate a more strategic approach to
peacekeeping missions, considering when they should be deployed.

113. Pre-deployment training is critical. It has the capacity to improve
the functioning of UN operations and act as a preventative measure
against misconduct. The UK is a leading proponent of this policy. We
urge the Government to lead a process to consider how pre-deployment
training could become mandatory and financially sustainable. Many
troop contributing countries are financially constrained, therefore,
countries like the UK should consider undertaking more specialist
training for UN deployments.

114. UN peacekeeping operations need more specialised equipment,
including helicopters and non-kinetic drones for example. This is
also a critical element of pledges by member states. The UK should
consider how it can add value to the range of capabilities available to
UN peacekeeping.

Combating sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers

115. The UN and its member states have not succeeded in decisively combating
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers.¹²² On 11 March
2016, the UN Security Council adopted its first ever resolution focused solely
on addressing sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers. Security Council Resolution
2272 expresses “deep concern” about the serious and continuous allegations
and under-reporting of SEA. It notes that the primary responsibility lies with
the troop contributing countries to investigate and prosecute their nationals.
Further, the Resolution requests that the Secretary-General should replace
all members of a military or police unite from a troop contributing country
if allegations are not properly investigated.¹²³

116. The UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Communiqué (September
2016) reiterated its commitment to a “zero tolerance policy” on SEA and

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¹²¹ Written evidence from Dr Norrie MacQueen (PSG0014)
¹²² Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Sexual Violence in Conflict: A War Crime, (Report of
Session 2015–16, HL Paper 123)
underlined the importance of the Security Council resolution on the matter
but did not impose any further obligations on the member states.124

*International tribunal*

117. The House of Lords report on *Sexual Violence in Conflict* noted that there
had been insufficient progress on tackling SEA by UN peacekeepers. The
report judged the current approach towards securing justice to be “woefully
inadequate”.125 It recommended an international tribunal “light” model, an
international court with a standing roster of judges and staff, convoked when
required, without a permanent residence.

118. The Government are not in favour. An international tribunal is not
the “magic bullet” said Lady Anelay. She was concerned “that a new
international court would be too distant and too slow, and not have that real
bite”. A further challenge, she said, was that troop contributing countries
would be unwilling to submit troops who would then be accountable to that
tribunal.126 Dr MacQueen pointed us to a further pragmatic and political
reason: UN officials have tried to deal with these issues “with minimum
public attention in order to minimise the danger of conflict between TCCs
[troop contributing countries] and the UN”.127

119. The solutions, the Government believe, lie more in ensuring the quality
of the pledges and that they were trained—to “ensure that there is not the
commission of the offence in the first place”—and then if necessary holding
the troop contributing countries accountable.128 Lady Anelay pointed to
progress with countries—South Africa and Uruguay—holding on-site courts
martial.129

120. We recognise the Government’s reservations but there still remains a
Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping
Operations* (the Zeid Report) has pointed out that criminal accountability
is too dependent on the willingness and capacity of the troop contributing
countries to undertake a prosecution and on factors highly unlikely in war-
torn countries. For example, whether the state has a functioning legal system
or if not, whether another state could hold jurisdiction over their nationals,
whether those states meet basic international human rights standards and
whether sufficient evidence can be gathered.131 The Zeid Report judged that
“(w)hether those factors combine to enable prosecution is fortuitous”.132

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124 Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial:
defence-ministerial-london-communique [accessed 23 October 2016]

125 Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, *Sexual Violence in Conflict: A War Crime*, (Report of
Session 2015–16, HL Paper 123) para 435

126 Q 67

127 Written evidence from Dr Norrie MacQueen (PSG0014)

128 Q 67 (Baroness Anelay of St Johns)

129 Q 67

130 Oral evidence taken before the Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 1 December 2015
(Session 2015–16), Q 138 (Professor Patricia Sellers)

131 United Nations General Assembly, *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and
org/article%5Bf%5D7B65BF0C9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF6FP9%7D/SE%20A%2059%20710.pdf
[accessed 29 October 2016]

132 Ibid, p 29
121. The Zeid Report acknowledged the complexity of the legal and political issues and suggested that the Secretary-General should convene a group of experts to “consider whether it would be feasible to draft an international instrument” and explore the best way to proceed.133

*The role of women*

122. Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security has underlined the explicit role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, stressing the importance of “equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security”.134

123. Dr MacQueen pointed to the recent development of involving women in “specially created oversight units” which could become a “standard fixture” of peacekeeping operations.135 Ms Samarasinghe saw a role for the Secretary-General to improve the balance of women in UN peacekeeping: “Women head just five of the 16 peace operations” and only “eight of the 39 special representatives … are women.”136 In a debate in the House of Lords, it was suggested that the UN should commit to the formal inclusion of women negotiators in peace processes and the Government was asked to reaffirm its support for that policy.137

124. As of 30 June 2016, the percentage of female staff of the UN was 34.8%, with 48% in non-field operations (departments/offices, commissions and tribunals) and 21.6% in field operations, including peacekeeping operations.138

*Conclusions and recommendations*

125. **Tackling sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers must be a priority for the incoming Secretary-General.** Holding peacekeepers accountable is not always a matter of political reluctance but can also be hindered by a lack of capacity within troop contributing countries or peace operations working within fragile contexts.

126. **There are complex challenges surrounding the creation of an international instrument to hold UN peacekeepers criminally accountable.** Nevertheless, the Secretary-General should convene a group of experts to consider the feasibility of an international instrument to hold peacekeepers accountable for sexual abuse and suggest the best way to proceed. We urge the Government to support this process.

127. **Increasing gender parity is at the heart of Security Council Resolution 1325.** The UK and incoming Secretary-General must actively promote the integration of women into the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping, including into leadership roles, peace negotiations and mediation processes and especially within specially created sexual exploitation and abuse oversight units.

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133 Ibid, p 30
135 Written evidence from Dr Norrie MacQueen (PSG0014)
136 Q 17
137 HL Deb, 10 October 2016, col 1751
128. The movement of peoples is already one of the most significant challenges facing the UN. We recognise the scale of the challenge and the complex economic and political difficulties of resolving the issue—the evidence we received made that clear. Nevertheless, the international response so far has been hindered by a lack of a global strategy and effective institutional capacity and the UN provides a legitimate and valuable forum to convene states and negotiate a sustainable international response.

129. We turn to the role of the Secretary-General in both convening the global debate and helping formulate an equitable global response.

**Trends: forced displacement and migration**

130. Global forced displacement increased in 2015 to record-high numbers. By the end of the year, an estimated 65.3 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict or human rights violations. This is 5.8 million more than the previous year (59.5 million). Of that 65.3 million, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) categorises 21.3 million as refugees (16.1 million under UNHCR’s mandate with the other 5.2 million Palestinian refugees), 40.8 million as internally displaced persons and 3.2 million as asylum seekers. The major countries of origin for refugees are Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.139

131. The second trend is that the number of international economic migrants—persons living in a country other than where they were born—reached 244 million in 2015, an increase of 71 million, or 41%, compared to 2000.140

**UN Summit**

132. The UN Summit on Refugees and Migrants took place in New York on 19 September 2016. The New York Declaration has set the international community the task of addressing the root causes of the movement of people, supporting frontline states, creating an international framework and protecting the rights and wellbeing of migrants and refugees.141 The Summit will work on the stated commitments in the New York Declaration for two years, in time for an international conference in 2018.

133. The Minister, Lady Anelay, said there would be two different strands of work: “to look first at refugees” and second “at illegal, irregular migrants” in order to consider “individual states’ and the UN’s responses”.142

134. As the UN begins its work, the evidence suggests that the framework for international governance of refugees must be reviewed, and a more equitable global response must be formulated. We consider these in turn.

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142 Q 70
International governance

The Refugee Convention

135. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), signed in 1951, defined the term refugee and outlined the rights of the displaced as well as the obligations of states to protect them. The 1967 Protocol removed the geographical and time limits that were part of the 1951 Convention. These limits initially restricted the Convention to persons who became refugees due to events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951.

136. The Government agreed that the 1951 Convention was “fit for purpose”. Prime Minister Theresa May has stated that the Convention and its Protocol “remain the bedrock” of the international response. Mr Edward Hobart, Migration Envoy, FCO, expected the summit to “call on all states to apply the 1951 Convention and share those responsibilities globally”.

Forced displacement

137. Forced displacement caused by environmental disasters and the consequences of climate change are likely to increase. The unilateral management of water resources for example, has the capacity to trigger forced displacement. For example, the plans for the Ilisu dam on the Tigris River could submerge much of the town and agricultural land along the basin, displacing the communities living there.

138. The consequences of climate change are likely to increase. E3G told us that in 2014, “17.5 million people were displaced by weather related disasters” with the figure set to rise with “projections of an increase in the intensity and frequency of weather related disasters”. Ms Samarasinghe predicted that “climate displacement” would become a “huge issue”.

139. A gap exists in international law with regard to cross-border movements of people attributed to environmental disasters and the effects of climate

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Article 1A (2) of the Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him—or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution.

The rights of refugees include, amongst others, the right not to be expelled except under strictly defined conditions (Article 32), the right not to be punished for illegal entry (Article 30), the right to work (Article 17), the right to housing (Article 21) and education (Article 22) and access to the courts (Article 16).

144 Ibid

145 Q 6 (Edward Hobart)


147 Q 6


149 Written evidence from E3G (PSG0012)

150 Q 15
change. Such displacements are not covered by the definition of a refugee as set out in the Refugee Convention.\textsuperscript{151}

140. Norway and Switzerland have been leading the international approach to address the rights of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change—the so-called Nansen Initiative.\textsuperscript{152} The Nansen Initiative produced a “protection agenda” in October 2015, which was endorsed by 109 states. To continue the work, the Platform on Disaster Displacement was formed in July 2016 to address the “protection and assistance needs of people displaced across borders” by disasters and climate change, and to identify “humanitarian measures” and “effective practices that States …. can apply”.\textsuperscript{153}

141. The UK has not endorsed the Platform on Disaster Displacement but it has been welcomed by many Commonwealth states and the EU is a member of the Steering Group.

\textbf{A comprehensive global plan}

142. Peace-building and linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation must be strategically aligned to craft a sustainable and effective response to the mobility of people. That is the Government and the UN’s stated approach.\textsuperscript{154}

143. Lady Anelay was pleased that the New York Declaration was clear that economic migrants and refugees were a “global problem”. “It is not a Western Europe problem; it is not a UK problem. It is global.”\textsuperscript{155} She stressed that it “was important that all states recognised they have a role to play in this”.\textsuperscript{156}

144. The view from the other members of the UN was that it was indeed a global problem but it was the West which had not demonstrated the necessary solidarity. There was concern at the UN that “standards that were fine until Europe had to apply them have been dropped as quickly” when it is Europe that has to accept the case-load, said Lord Malloch-Brown.\textsuperscript{157} Ms Samarasinghe agreed that many countries had been hosting refugees for a number of years and the approach of the West had been:

“‘Thank you very much. We’re glad that you’re hosting them and they’re not coming over here.’”\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{151} In 2011, the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, raised this very issue with the Security Council. He said that climate change was fuelling the scale and complexity of global displacement and urged the international community to formulate and adopt a set of principles to help people displaced by catastrophic environmental events but who may not qualify for refugee status under international law. This was not taken up any further by the Security Council and the process moved to a tangent of the UN. António Guterres, Statement for UNSC Briefing, \textit{Maintenance of International Peace and Security: New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention}, (23 November 2011): \url{http://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/4ee21edc9/statement-mr-antonio-guterres-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html} [accessed 20 October 2016]

\textsuperscript{152} The Nansen Initiative: \url{https://www.nanseninitiative.org/} [accessed 20 October 2016]


\textsuperscript{154} See New York Declaration and \textbf{Q 7} (Edward Hobart)

\textsuperscript{155} Q 70 (Baroness Anelay of St Johns)

\textsuperscript{156} Q 70

\textsuperscript{157} Q 46

\textsuperscript{158} Q 15
145. A focus of UK policy is to ensure that refugees stay in the region of displacement. Mr Hobart said the UK wanted to avoid “mass displacement from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, for example, or from south Asia to Europe”. The UK wanted to protect people “as close as possible to the place from which they have moved”. The Prime Minister has advocated three “fundamental principles” at the heart of a new approach towards managing migration: “First... ensure that refugees claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.” Second, improve the ways refugees and migrants are distinguished. Third, introduce a “better overall approach” to managing economic migration which recognises “that all countries have the right to control their borders”.

146. In 2015, developing regions hosted 86% of the world’s refugees. Middle East countries—Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Ethiopia and Iran—hosted the largest numbers. The Least Developed Countries provided asylum to just over 4 million refugees or about 26% of the global total. By comparison, 2.2 million refugees were hosted by developed countries.

147. The role for the Secretary-General, Lady Anelay believed, was to “lead by example”, demonstrating “the kinds of activities that he … would welcome”. Ms Samarasinghe saw the need to “create a different conversation” as a role for the new Secretary-General.

Conclusions and recommendations

148. The New York Declaration gives the UN and the Secretary-General an explicit mandate to address the issue of refugees and economic migrants. This is an area where the convening power of the Secretary-General can be put to good effect. The Declaration offers the UN a two year window to review current international policies on refugees and economic migrants.

149. The Refugee Convention should not be reopened, risking a dilution of its protections. The scale of the challenge, however, means that the definitions within the Convention and its application must be reviewed.

150. The UN must maintain a clear differentiation between refugees and economic migrants, distinguishing between the phenomena, their causes and the response by states.

151. The factors, however, driving the movement of people have become more complex and the current international definitions no longer accurately represent the blurred reality between refugees, economic migrants and people forcibly displaced for economic or other reasons. As part of its review of international policies, the UN should reconsider the definitions of an economic migrant and a refugee. It must also consider what additional protections might be required

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159 Q 7
162 Q 71
163 Q 15
to strengthen the international response to people displaced by the consequences of disasters and climate change.

152. The absence of any international agreement on the long-term policy on the resettlement of refugees and management of the movements of economic migrants, and the lack of a global framework for equitable burden sharing amongst states, is destabilising and puts an unfair burden on the developing world, in particular countries in the Middle East.

153. Therefore, the second strand of work on the UN’s agenda must be on the practical questions of how states meet their commitments, how the responsibilities of the international community can be equitably shared and how civil society organisations can be more effectively engaged into a comprehensive global plan for refugees and economic migrants.

154. A critical role for the Secretary-General will be to raise political and public attention to these issues, embedding the process within the UN, and securing the support of the member states.

155. The UN Secretary-General should, simultaneously with the work on the New York Declaration, start a review to align UN resources—development and humanitarian—more strategically to address the challenge of refugees and economic migrants.
CHAPTER 7: DEVELOPMENT: AN INTEGRATED MODEL

156. The mandate of the UN Charter to “promote social progress and better standards of life” remains as much in demand as ever.\(^{164}\) We turn to two key priorities for the Secretary-General in this field and consider what internal reforms will be required of the Organisation.

Implementation of international agreements

157. 2015 was a watershed year for international agreements including:

- The Sendai Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (March 2015);
- Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda) (July 2015);
- The Sustainable Development Goals/Agenda 2030 (September 2015); and
- The Paris Climate Change Accord (COP21) (December 2015).

158. The watchword for the Secretary-General will be implementation. A “specific priority”, said Mr Williams, will be to “drive implementation of these (SDGs and COP21) historic agreements”.\(^{165}\) E3G agreed that implementation “will be key to maintaining credibility in the Agenda 2030, Paris Agreement and the UN itself”.\(^{166}\)

159. ODI wrote that implementation will be challenged by “significant political and economic challenges, including new fiscal crises”. They suggested that the UN Secretary-General could set goals to be achieved in the “first 1,000 days” of the SDGs. In the longer-term, the UN could convene a summit in September 2019 “to share learning, change direction if necessary and monitor progress”. Progress could be monitored by a “series of ‘stepping stone’ targets, set every three to five years”.\(^{167}\)

160. ODI also pointed out that the private sector has been playing a key role in poverty reduction through job creation in China and India, “paying taxes and investing”. The new Secretary-General “should make private sector engagement a priority”, promoting the SDGs as the “most significant opportunity for market transformation and inclusive growth”.\(^{168}\)

Conclusions and recommendations

161. The role of the new Secretary-General will be to ensure that the international agreements of 2015 are placed on a surer footing, sustaining political and public attention on these issues.

162. The new Secretary-General will also have to ensure that sufficient financing is available to meet ambitious commitments, that member states are corralled, that the private sector meets its share of the burden and that robust mechanisms are developed to monitor progress.


\(^{165}\) Written evidence from the FCO (PSG0015)

\(^{166}\) Written evidence from E3G (PSG0012)

\(^{167}\) Written evidence from ODI (PSG0013)

\(^{168}\) Written evidence from ODI (PSG0013)
**A coordinated development model**

163. The agreements above, as a body of work, acknowledge that many development challenges are rooted in a mix of exclusion and oppression of people, poverty, corruption, and governance failures. Furthermore, that an increasing depletion of natural resources and the consequences of climate change could have an adverse impact on the security and stability of fragile and conflict-ridden states. An international response to development challenges must, therefore, link its peace, security, development and humanitarian strands of work.

164. We consider what reforms will be required of the UN system in order to deliver this ambitious and integrated development model.

*The humanitarian system: “broken not just broke”* 169

165. Witnesses told us that humanitarian assistance has been consistently under-funded. Mr Whitley said that the “humanitarian budget of the UN is under serious stress at the moment”. 170 In 2014, the gap between what the UN “asked for and what it received was $7.5 billion” said Lady Amos. 171 In 2015, UN coordinated appeals for humanitarian funding totalled $19.9 billion but by 30 December, the UN had raised only 52% of this. 172 In September 2016, the Prime Minister noted that responding to refugees and migration has put a burden on the humanitarian system: “UN appeals are underfunded” and “host countries are not getting enough support”. 173

166. More money is indeed necessary but it is only partly the answer. A more strategic response would be to consider the sequencing and interaction between development and humanitarian assistance. Lady Amos informed us that the “humanitarian phase of a crisis goes on way too long in some places” which makes it “harder and harder to raise money”. There had to be a much closer alignment between the humanitarian, development and peacekeeping work: “To look at humanitarian financing completely separately from development financing will not work.” She added that the way in which “crises have an impact in these countries is … all joined up”. 174

167. In his evidence to the International Commission on Multilateralism, which has been considering the future of the UN, David Miliband, President of the International Rescue Committee, has explained the dilemma with reference to refugees; the current humanitarian system is designed for short-term aid but conflicts last a long time, the humanitarian sector is designed around delivery to poor countries but many refugees are in countries not designated as poor. There is a distinction between humanitarian assistance and development aid but considering the evolving nature of conflict, people

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170 Q 40

171 Q 55

172 Kevin Rudd, op. cit, p 54


174 Q 55
now find themselves in need of humanitarian assistance for long periods of time.\(^{175}\)

168. The International Commission on Multilateralism recommended that a new position of deputy secretary-general (humanitarian support) should be established. It would reflect the centrality of humanitarian work to the UN.\(^{176}\) The role of the new deputy secretary-general could include agreeing common goals with member states and civil society, defining protocols for cooperation between UN and non UN humanitarian agencies and encouraging coherence within the UN strands of work.\(^{177}\)

*Coherence within the UN Development System*

169. Delivering a strategic response to integrated development challenges requires coherence among the diverse entities of the UN Development System (UNDS). This is not present at the moment.

170. The UNDS is a bewildering and fragmented system of semi-autonomous programmes, funds, committees, commissions and agencies, comprising some 30 agencies, only lightly coordinated by the UN Development Group as well as the intergovernmental bodies that provide guidance and oversight, such as the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).\(^{178}\)

171. There can be a tragic cost to systemic inefficiencies. In 2015, a Harvard and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine study considered the international response to the Ebola epidemic, in which just over 11,000 people died and which wreaked considerable economic damage to the countries concerned. It found that the epidemic “exposed deep inadequacies in the national and international institutions” in the field of global health. The report said that “Ebola exposed” the World Health Organisation “as unable to meet its responsibility for responding to such situations”.\(^{179}\)

172. Reform of the UNDS was highlighted as a key priority for the new Secretary-General. The “top priority” that UNA-UK would pick would be “development reform”. Reform could mean “merging some agencies and some mandates, downsizing some agencies and scrapping some agencies”.\(^{180}\) Sir Adam Roberts reflected on the “dead wood” within the UN system. Visiting the headquarters of UNCTAD [UN Conference on Trade and Development] was:

> like visiting the cathedral church of a failed faith … but, as with any failed faith, it has fervent adherents and it would be very difficult to abolish”.\(^{181}\)

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\(^{176}\) *Ibid*, p 54

\(^{177}\) *Ibid*, pp 54–55


\(^{180}\) Q 10

\(^{181}\) Q 38
In the context of the adoption of the SDGs, the UN initiated a process of introspection. The Council convened an intergovernmental dialogue on reform of the UNDS. In June 2016, the ECOSOC Dialogue on reform of the UNDS presented options for discussion by member states on what changes would be necessary for the UNDS to meet the commitments set out by the SDGs. Recommendations included joint planning between the national and UN level, increasing non-earmarked contributions, simplification of business practices and rationalisation of office presences in-country, amongst others. The acceptance of these recommendations, and their implementation, remains to be seen.

Member states retain the initiative. Lady Amos said that the incoming Secretary-General will not “necessarily have a huge amount of control over the development side of the system”. Funds and programmes “have separate boards that determine their priorities” and they “see themselves as slightly separate from the overall UN system”. Efforts to reform the UN development agencies have foundered because some member states and a number of UN organisations do “not want their power … to be affected by coordination and leadership by somebody else”, Sir Emyr Jones Parry told us.

Mr Whitley agreed that there was “far too much overlap” between agencies but a “proper rationalisation” was “easier said than done”. Looking at UNCTAD for example, he added, that there were “powerful lobbies, notably the G77 and the non-aligned movement, which have consistently blocked” its abolition.

Conclusions and recommendations

The UN Development System must become leaner and more coherent but the initiative and power lies with the member states. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General has a limited but important role in delivering reform. The incumbent must offer leadership on this issue and suggest creative policy initiatives to the member states.

A new role of Deputy Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs could be a useful innovation. The position, however, must be given the resources commensurate to the task.

The Secretary-General can use the convening power of the role to institute a review of humanitarian assistance, exploring suggestions that humanitarian and development assistance must be synchronised and work complementarily. This may go some way to easing the financial burden on humanitarian assistance, which is currently enduring too long and beyond its remit.

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183 Q 54
184 Q 51
185 Q 38
CHAPTER 8: THE UK AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The UK and the EU at the UN

179. The UK is one of the founding members of the UN.186 It was the sixth largest contributor to the UN’s regular budget, contributing 4.7% of the budget in 2016.187 In 2016, the UK was the sixth largest contributor to the UN’s peacekeeping budget, paying 5.8% of $8bn.188 As a member of the Security Council, the UK has a particular responsibility for upholding peace and security.

180. The EU has had enhanced ‘observer status’ at the UN since 1974. UN General Assembly Resolution 65/276, adopted on 3 May 2011, granted the EU enhanced participation rights allowing the EU representative to present common positions, engage in debates amongst representative and states, submit proposals, propose amendments, raise points of order and circulate documents.189

181. Article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union states that EU member states “shall coordinate their action in international organisations” and uphold “common positions”. France and the UK, as permanent members of the Security Council, “will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defense of the positions and interests of the Union”.190

182. Collectively, the EU and its member states are the single largest financial contributor to the UN system. In 2014, the sum of the contributions of the 28 EU member states amounted to 30.38% of the UN regular budget and 33.17% of the UN peacekeeping budget. The EU (institutions and member states combined) was one of the world’s largest donors of humanitarian assistance, providing 56% of global development aid in 2014.191

Consequences of Brexit

183. When the UK leaves the EU, the “UN is going to become an even bigger part of [the UK’s] world view than it was before” said Mr Williams.192 Sir Adam Roberts agreed that the UK’s “window on the world will be now even more through the UN”.193

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186 On 14 August 1941, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed a set of principles for international collaboration on peace and security. The so-called Atlantic Charter was later endorsed by the 26 Allied nations fighting against the Axis powers. In 1943, the UK, US, China and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) agreed to form an international organisation that would seek to fulfil this aim. In 1945, 50 countries met in San Francisco to draw up the UN Charter. UN, ‘History of the UN’: http://www.un.org/en/sections/history/history-united-nations/ [accessed 20 October 2016]


192 Q 7
193 Q 40
Witneses were divided on the impact of Brexit on UK influence at the UN. The Government was sanguine. The UK, said Mr Williams, “always will have a place at the heart of the UN, even after it leaves the European Union”. It had proven its worth as a “significant player on the world stage” and as a “very active member of the P5”. The Minister believed that in forging alliances with regional blocs, UK officials will “just have to be more agile, and work harder and faster”.

Not all our witnesses shared the Government’s optimism. The impact, witnesses informed us, would be in the multilateral fora of the UN, where the UK would no longer automatically be included in the internal EU coordination mechanisms. Professor Karen E Smith, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Professor Katie Laatikainen, Professor of Political Science Adelphi University, have explained that for decades EU member states have “sought to coordinate their views and seek support for their common position on a range of issues at the UN”. Leaving the EU would have a “negative impact” on the UK’s influence “because it would find itself outside this key group”. Dr Megan Dee, Associate Research Fellow, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, agreed that leaving the EU would “critically remove the UK from a group of some importance within the UN context”.

There could also be an impact on the UK’s weight in the Security Council. Sir Emyr recalled that the weight of EU representation at the UN was “a wonderful basis for starting any discussion in the Council”. Lady Amos said that the UK helps to:

“interpret to the rest of the world what is happening in the EU, and the rest of the world expects us to have a huge, positive influence on that. We will lose that.”

Lady Amos feared that there may be “more interrogation of that (UK-US) relationship in multilateral fora” and the UK could be “seen as followers, rather than partners, in our relationship with the US”.

The cohesion and influence of EU states varies according to the issue. On global environmental politics, international development and human rights, the EU is a significant economic contributor and actively engaged. Therefore, according to Dr Dee, while the UK can be expected “to remain an important player within the UN as a result of its status within the P5”, its exit from the EU would have an impact on “its overall leverage” in these specific areas.

The UK also adds weight to EU influence at the UN. Dr Tim Oliver, Dahrendorf Fellow for Europe-North American relations, London School of Economics, has written that “Brexit would remove from the EU one of its

194 Q 3
195 Q 2
196 Q 72
197 Karen E. Smith and Katie Laatikainen, ‘Without EU clout, how would the UK fare at the United Nations?’: [http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/03/08/without-eu-clout-how-would-the-uk-fare-at-the-united-nations] [accessed 29 October 2016]
198 Written evidence from Dr Megan Dee (PSG0009)
199 Q 50
200 Q 57
201 Written evidence from Dr Megan Dee (PSG0009)
two military powers capable of operating and thinking on a global scale”.

Professors Smith and Laatikainen pointed out that at the UN “the UK plays a crucial role in shaping decisions. Indeed, without British agreement, the EU could not act at all in the UN”.

**UN groups**

189. Dr Dee pointed out that groups are increasingly important at the UN. As a consequence of its exit from the EU, she advised the UK to “give urgent consideration to other groups with whom it might work”. She recommended other possible groups such as non-EU European states like Norway, other developed nations such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada who were already active within the UN, and working bilaterally with EU member states.

190. Our witnesses informed us that the Commonwealth was not a promising potential group. Dr Dee said that the majority of the Commonwealth countries allied with other developing countries such as the African Union and Non-Aligned Movement. She judged it unlikely that a “Commonwealth Group” would evolve in which the UK were to take on a leading role. Furthermore, Lady Amos told us, that Commonwealth countries “operate within their regional groups, not within Commonwealth groups”. Finally, Lady Amos pointed to their lack of resources. She judged that the Commonwealth “has little or no visibility” at the UN.

191. Nevertheless, Lady Anelay intended that the UK should be “agile” in its engagement with the Commonwealth countries. She intended to seek the views of Commonwealth representatives on how the UK could “best work with them at the UN”. The Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal QC, the new Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, pointed out to us the influence wielded by these countries when they were united. Both the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change were “mirror” agreements of the strategic plans put forward by the Commonwealth countries.

**Cooperation with the EU**

192. Witnesses urged the UK to consider a close working relationship with the EU at the UN. Dr Curran saw the UN as an “increasingly important arena in which to work alongside European partners”. The Government agreed. The Minister emphasised that it was “important that we maintain extremely strong bilateral relationships” with EU countries.
mutual benefit: the UK had the “same values as our EU 27 partners on things such as efficiency and effectiveness and many country issues”. 211

193. There could also be a mutual benefit in working together on UN peacekeeping. The UK is one of the EU’s strongest military powers, adding heft to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Meanwhile, EU member states have been actively considering deeper collaboration with UN peacekeeping. Dr Curran explained that there was a “concerted effort inside the UN to enhance cooperation with the EU” and several EU states had recently indicated their willingness to “make greater contributions to UN peace operations”. 212 In turn, Dr MacQueen noted, that the UK’s contribution to UN peacekeeping has been structured around “the formulation of a distinct ‘European’ approach” which in the context of Brexit was “now highly problematic”. 213

194. The Platform on Disaster Displacement could also be an area for deeper collaboration between the EU and UK. The Commonwealth countries have been active in this area and the EU is a member of the Steering group. This is the sort of issue on which the UK could leverage its relationship with both the Commonwealth countries and the EU.

Conclusions and recommendations

195. Brexit will require the UK to reconsider its methods of operation at the UN. The UK must be resourceful and imaginative, seizing the opportunity to forge new alliances at the UN and to build a fresh relationship with other European states.

196. The UK has strong reasons to continue aligning with the EU and its member states at the UN. On issues such as peace and security, environmental standards and international law and human rights, the EU is the bloc most allied to UK interests and values.

197. We recommend that the Government should pursue close working relations with the EU and its member states at the UN. The UK should negotiate its exit from the EU bearing in mind that one of our strongest allies in international organisations will be the EU. Therefore, as part of its Brexit negotiations, the UK should aim to set up effective ways of continuing to work closely with the EU at the UN.

198. Simultaneously, the UK should seek to diversify its alliances, creatively considering new opportunities and methods of leveraging its alliances and influencing other regional blocs at the UN.

199. While we recognise that Commonwealth countries may not act as a single group in the UN, the UK should not hesitate to build on past ties and common interests to maximise good relations with its members.

Demonstrate its value

200. It is critical that the UK asserts its continued value at the UN. The UK should:

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211 Q 2
212 Written Evidence from Dr David Curran (PSG0011)
213 Written evidence from Dr Norrie MacQueen (PSG0014)
• Demonstrate its value as a responsible power. Lord Malloch-Brown explained that a basis of British power was that the UK indicated that it had “the broader interests of the UN at heart”. The tactic to preserve the UK’s preferential status would be “to redouble our efforts to show that we consider the whole UN our constituency” and that the P5 status would be wielded “beyond our own interests”.214

• Play an active role in critical UN spheres of action. In peace and security, Mr Williams viewed the hosting of the summit in peacekeeping as a “good example of [the UK] continuing to be very active” in this field.215 He also pointed to the UK’s 2% of GDP spend on defence.216 In the field of development, the UK had committed to spend 0.7% GNI on overseas development assistance and had played a “very active role in developing the Sustainable Development Goals”.217 The Prime Minister, in her speech to the UN General Assembly, reiterated her commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence and to spend 0.7% of GNI on development.218

• Review and invest in British soft power. The UK has been an influential deployer of soft power.219 The UK must demonstrate its continued ability to set the international agenda. A good example was the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2007), which was commissioned by HM Treasury.220 One more recent example is the global review on anti-microbial resistance (AMR). On 21 September 2016, UN member states committed to combat AMR and requested the relevant UN agencies to coordinate their planning and actions and report back to the UN General Assembly in September 2018.221 The UK is in a strong position to lead the process. The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, was chaired by Lord O’Neill of Gatley, and the ensuing report Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally was published in May 2016.222

Conclusions and recommendations

201. The UK must continue to play a diligent and responsible role in international organisations, proving its value as a permanent member of the Security Council, including exercising leadership in specialised fields.

202. In light of the increased importance of the UN to UK foreign policy, the Government should consider increasing the resources devoted to relations with the UN.

214 Q 50
215 Q 2
216 Q 3
217 Q 2
Human rights

203. The UK is standing for a second consecutive term of appointment to the Human Rights Council. Civil society organisations, such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the National Preventive Mechanism, welcomed that step in principle. They urged the UK to demonstrate robust leadership on human rights.\(^\text{223}\)

204. The UK, Lady Anelay assured us, was a leader in the world on human rights. It had demonstrated that it could “stand up for freedom of religion or belief”, and had “led work on eliminating violence against women and girls” and in “showing why female genital mutilation should be abolished”.\(^\text{224}\)

205. Other witnesses were more circumspect. Lady Amos suggested that in order to be a leader the UK would “have to be seen as applying the principles … very clearly and positively” within the UK. There can be a “perception of hypocrisy; that we wag the finger and do not ourselves do what we are promoting”.\(^\text{225}\) Leaving the EU could impact the UK’s voice on human rights. Professor Brown said the Chinese would not be “minded to listen to any British lobbying on human rights” which had been done “largely through the European Union”.\(^\text{226}\)

206. The space for human rights at the UN is narrowing. The position of China on human rights under President Xi Jinping, said Professor Brown, was “hardening”. Professor Brown informed us that there was “no desire particularly to engage with the world on [human rights] issues”. He added that the Chinese “tolerance for believing that the West has any right to lecture them has really gone”.\(^\text{227}\) Lady Anelay noted that on the Human Rights Council, there was “far more evidence of countries trying to close down debate using procedural methods”, using the Standing Orders to their advantage.\(^\text{228}\)

Conclusions and recommendations

207. There is a risk that the UK, when it starts raising human rights issues outside the EU will become more vulnerable to retaliatory pressures from the country in question—whether diplomatic or commercial—and may thus be inclined to be more timid. This is another reason to continue to work as closely as possible in concert with the EU.

208. Human rights abuses are often the precursor, as well as the symptom of conflicts. The incoming Secretary-General should align the work of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Regular meetings, promoting shared threat assessments and horizon-scanning exercises between the UNHCHR and the UN Secretariat could be a useful exercise. The UK is in a strong position to take the lead on this issue.

\(^{223}\) Written evidence from the Equality and Human Rights Commission (PSG0008) and National Preventive Mechanism (PSG0010)
\(^{224}\) Q 69
\(^{225}\) Q 58
\(^{226}\) Q 30
\(^{227}\) Q 32
\(^{228}\) Q 69
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United Nations in a New Context

1. This report is based on our firm conviction that the UN remains more than ever an essential global institution and a lynchpin of a rules-based international order. The UN possesses unique legitimacy as a place to mediate between states. When the interests of the permanent five members align, the Security Council plays an indispensable role in promoting peace and security and preventing war. The nuclear deal with Iran is one such recent example. (Paragraph 23)

2. There is also a particular legitimacy that the UN bestows when it speaks to an issue of global concern; the recent multilateral deals on development and climate change have demonstrated the convening power of the institution. (Paragraph 24)

3. The UN, has however, been buffeted by systemic geopolitical shifts. Fractures between states must not mean that the UN is allowed to drift into irrelevance. (Paragraph 25)

4. Making the UN relevant and fit for the future will be a critical task of the new Secretary-General. He will need to build political support amongst the member states, change the institutional culture and steer radical reforms through the Organisation. We do not underestimate the scale of the task, nor the shared responsibility of the member states. (Paragraph 26)

Secretary or General?

5. The Government is to be congratulated on its support for a more transparent and inclusive appointment process for the new Secretary-General. The innovations should become permanent. (Paragraph 33)

6. We recommend that the UK should initiate a process to critically examine the selection process for future UN Secretaries-General, addressing further possible improvements. Discussions could focus on producing explicit criteria and qualifications for the role and consideration of the merits of a single seven-year term. (Paragraph 34)

7. The informal practice of regional rotation is a limiting convention. We welcome that the appointment of António Guterres has not been hindered by that consideration. (Paragraph 35)

8. The incoming Secretary-General will take up his tenure during a period of strained relations between the permanent members of the Security Council. Perceptions of a Security Council impasse are profoundly undermining the legitimacy of the UN. The new Secretary-General will need to work to diminish tensions between the Security Council members, in particular reducing no-go areas and use of vetoes. (Paragraph 47)

9. While, the UN already has structures in place to engage with formal regional organisations, the new Secretary-General should begin a process to agree, alongside member states, a strategic approach to build strong ties and coalitions with new inter-regional and local organisations. (Paragraph 48)

10. A core priority for the new Secretary-General will be to develop a communication strategy, to engage extensively with civil society
organisations and young people. The UK should support a review of the current communication strategy ensuring that it is sufficiently sensitive to new media and online platforms as well as judging its penetration to more disenfranchised communities and smaller organisations. (Paragraph 49)

11. A distinct communication strategy focused entirely on young people is particularly important. The new Secretary-General should review how the UN engages with young people, going beyond explaining the work of the UN to building mechanisms to regularly consult them on the work of the UN. (Paragraph 50)

**An Institution Fit for Purpose?**

12. The Secretary-General has the scope to rationalise the UN Secretariat. We urge him to review its functioning, in order to promote a lean and efficient organisation. In particular, he must seek to build more coherence between its various departments and offices. (Paragraph 64)

13. Within the Secretary-General’s first term, a range of leaderships in the UN Secretariat and UN agencies will come up for selection. This is an opportunity for the UN to build on the momentum of the Secretary-General’s appointment to inject more transparency and accountability into the UN system of appointments. Strengthening the quality of leadership within will, we judge, improve the functioning and credibility of the Organisation. (Paragraph 65)

14. We urge the UK to propose a more rigorous and competitive selection process for the leadership positions of UN agencies. Member states, including the UK, should agree the criteria, seek expressions of interest, put forward more than one candidate and finally, set performance expectations. (Paragraph 66)

15. In order to strengthen accountability, we recommend that the Secretary-General should institute a mechanism whereby the top tier of senior leaders are annually appraised. (Paragraph 67)

16. The UK should support a review of the current systems of oversight. The Secretary-General must be allowed more autonomy to administer the organisation, which includes managing the budget, and then be held accountable. (Paragraph 68)

17. The Secretary-General will not be able to force member states to do the right thing but he can use the Article 99 powers invested in his role by the Charter to elevate issues of peace and security to the attention of the Security Council, compelling their attention and insisting that the Security Council continues to engage. This will assist the process of encouraging member states to resolve their disputes through UN processes and within legal channels. (Paragraph 86)

18. The public platform of the role should be used to make breaches of international law, or the neglect of humanitarian duties, manifestly evident. (Paragraph 87)

**United Nations Peacekeeping**

19. The UN needs to invest more in conflict prevention. Member states should consider awarding more financial resources, intelligence and analytical
capacity to support the ‘good offices’ of the Secretary-General. The UK should take the lead in this field. (Paragraph 91)

20. The Secretary-General must exercise his Article 99 Charter powers. In the case of Syria, the Secretary-General should raise their obligations under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine with the Security Council. There may be a political deadlock, but there is an urgent and internationally agreed humanitarian duty. (Paragraph 92)

21. As part of an enhanced policy of conflict prevention and increased use of his Article 99 powers, the incoming Secretary-General should undertake a review of the principal focus and implementation of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which goes beyond military intervention to encompass the obligations of states to protect people from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, with a view to making it more effective in this field. (Paragraph 93)

22. We urge the Secretary-General to develop a more rigorous appointment process for senior leadership positions in UN peacekeeping, which are within his purview. An advisory panel could be instituted, comprised of former force commanders and special representatives, who would filter nominations and offer a shortlist to the Secretary-General. (Paragraph 111)

23. The UK should support a new Secretary-General in a policy of rationalisation of UN peacekeeping missions, including the possible abolition of those missions that are no longer required or not performing. This could initiate a more strategic approach to peacekeeping missions, considering when they should be deployed. (Paragraph 112)

24. Pre-deployment training is critical. It has the capacity to improve the functioning of UN operations and act as a preventative measure against misconduct. The UK is a leading proponent of this policy. We urge the Government to lead a process to consider how pre-deployment training could become mandatory and financially sustainable. Many troop contributing countries are financially constrained, therefore, countries like the UK should consider undertaking more specialist training for UN deployments. (Paragraph 113)

25. UN peacekeeping operations need more specialised equipment, including helicopters and non-kinetic drones for example. This is also a critical element of pledges by member states. The UK should consider how it can add value to the range of capabilities available to UN peacekeeping. (Paragraph 114)

26. Tackling sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers must be a priority for the incoming Secretary-General. Holding peacekeepers accountable is not always a matter of political reluctance but can also be hindered by a lack of capacity within troop contributing countries or peace operations working within fragile contexts. (Paragraph 125)

27. There are complex challenges surrounding the creation of an international instrument to hold UN peacekeepers criminally accountable. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General should convene a group of experts to consider the feasibility of an international instrument to hold peacekeepers accountable for sexual abuse and suggest the best way to proceed. We urge the Government to support this process. (Paragraph 126)
28. Increasing gender parity is at the heart of Security Council Resolution 1325. The UK and incoming Secretary-General must actively promote the integration of women into the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping, including into leadership roles, peace negotiations and mediation processes and especially within specially created sexual exploitation and abuse oversight units. (Paragraph 127)

**Human mobility: a global challenge**

29. The New York Declaration gives the UN and the Secretary-General an explicit mandate to address the issue of refugees and economic migrants. This is an area where the convening power of the Secretary-General can be put to good effect. The Declaration offers the UN a two year window to review current international policies on refugees and economic migrants. (Paragraph 148)

30. The Refugee Convention should not be reopened, risking a dilution of its protections. The scale of the challenge, however, means that the definitions within the Convention and its application must be reviewed. (Paragraph 149)

31. The UN must maintain a clear differentiation between refugees and economic migrants, distinguishing between the phenomena, their causes and the response by states. (Paragraph 150)

32. The factors, however, driving the movement of people have become more complex and the current international definitions no longer accurately represent the blurred reality between refugees, economic migrants and people forcibly displaced for economic or other reasons. As part of its review of international policies, the UN should reconsider the definitions of an economic migrant and a refugee. It must also consider what additional protections might be required to strengthen the international response to people displaced by the consequences of disasters and climate change. (Paragraph 151)

33. The absence of any international agreement on the long-term policy on the resettlement of refugees and management of the movements of economic migrants, and the lack of a global framework for equitable burden sharing amongst states, is destabilising and puts an unfair burden on the developing world, in particular countries in the Middle East. (Paragraph 152)

34. Therefore, the second strand of work on the UN’s agenda must be on the practical questions of how states meet their commitments, how the responsibilities of the international community can be equitably shared and how civil society organisations can be more effectively engaged into a comprehensive global plan for refugees and economic migrants. (Paragraph 153)

35. A critical role for the Secretary-General will be to raise political and public attention to these issues, embedding the process within the UN, and securing the support of the member states. (Paragraph 154)

36. The UN Secretary-General should, simultaneously with the work on the New York Declaration, start a review to align UN resources—development and humanitarian—more strategically to address the challenge of refugees and economic migrants. (Paragraph 155)
37. The role of the new Secretary-General will be to ensure that the international agreements of 2015 are placed on a surer footing, sustaining political and public attention on these issues. (Paragraph 161)

38. The new Secretary-General will also have to ensure that sufficient financing is available to meet ambitious commitments, that member states are corralled, that the private sector meets its share of the burden and that robust mechanisms are developed to monitor progress. (Paragraph 162)

Development: an integrated model

39. The UN Development System must become leaner and more coherent but the initiative and power lies with the member states. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General has a limited but important role in delivering reform. The incumbent must offer leadership on this issue and suggest creative policy initiatives to the member states. (Paragraph 176)

40. A new role of Deputy Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs could be a useful innovation. The position, however, must be given the resources commensurate to the task. (Paragraph 177)

41. The Secretary-General can use the convening power of the role to institute a review of humanitarian assistance, exploring suggestions that humanitarian and development assistance must be synchronised and work complementarily. This may go some way to easing the financial burden on humanitarian assistance, which is currently enduring too long and beyond its remit. (Paragraph 178)

The UK at the United Nations

42. Brexit will require the UK to reconsider its methods of operation at the UN. The UK must be resourceful and imaginative, seizing the opportunity to forge new alliances at the UN and to build a fresh relationship with other European states. (Paragraph 195)

43. The UK has strong reasons to continue aligning with the EU and its member states at the UN. On issues such as peace and security, environmental standards and international law and human rights, the EU is the bloc most allied to UK interests and values. (Paragraph 196)

44. We recommend that the Government should pursue close working relations with the EU and its member states at the UN. The UK should negotiate its exit from the EU bearing in mind that one of our strongest allies in international organisations will be the EU. Therefore, as part of its Brexit negotiations, the UK should aim to set up effective ways of continuing to work closely with the EU at the UN. (Paragraph 197)

45. Simultaneously, the UK should seek to diversify its alliances, creatively considering new opportunities and methods of leveraging its alliances and influencing other regional blocs at the UN. (Paragraph 198)

46. While we recognise that Commonwealth countries may not act as a single group in the UN, the UK should not hesitate to build on past ties and common interests to maximise good relations with its members. (Paragraph 199)

47. The UK must continue to play a diligent and responsible role in international organisations, proving its value as a permanent member of the Security Council, including exercising leadership in specialised fields. (Paragraph 201)
48. In light of the increased importance of the UN to UK foreign policy, the Government should consider increasing the resources devoted to relations with the UN. (Paragraph 202)

49. There is a risk that the UK, when it starts raising human rights issues outside the EU will become more vulnerable to retaliatory pressures from the country in question—whether diplomatic or commercial—and may thus be inclined to be more timid. This is another reason to continue to work as closely as possible in concert with the EU. (Paragraph 207)

50. Human rights abuses are often the precursor, as well as the symptom of conflicts. The incoming Secretary-General should align the work of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Regular meetings, promoting shared threat assessments and horizon-scanning exercises between the UNHCHR and the UN Secretariat could be a useful exercise. The UK is in a strong position to take the lead on this issue. (Paragraph 208)
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

Members
 Baroness Coussins
 Lord Grocott
 Lord Hannay of Chiswick
 Baroness Hilton of Eggardon
 Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman)
 Baroness Helic
 Lord Inglewood
 Lord Jopling
 Lord Purvis of Tweed
 Lord Reid of Cardowan
 Baroness Smith of Newnham
 Lord Wood of Anfield

Declarations of interest
 Baroness Coussins
 Vice Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on the United Nations
 Lord Grocott
 No relevant interests declared
 Lord Hannay of Chiswick
 Joint Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on the United Nations
 Joint Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation
 Advisory Board Member, Centre for EU Reform
 Baroness Hilton of Eggardon
 Labour Party Delegate to OSCE
 Member, Royal Society for Asian Affairs
 Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman)
 No relevant interests declared
 Baroness Helic
 Business partner, UNHCR special envoy
 Special interest in the preventing sexual violence initiative
 Informally approached by two UN Secretary-General candidates
 Lord Inglewood
 Member of the advisory board, Knowledge City, Cairo, Egypt
 Lord Jopling
 Member of UK delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
 Vice-President of NATO Parliamentary Assembly
 Chairman, Democratic Sub-Committee of Civilian Aspects of Security
 Lord Purvis of Tweed
 No relevant interests declared
 Lord Reid of Cardowan
 No relevant interests declared
 Baroness Smith of Newnham
 No relevant interests declared
Lord Wood of Anfield
Chair, United Nations–Association UK

A full list of members’ interests can be found in the Register of Lords’ Interests: http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-interests/register-of-lords-interests
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Evidence is published online at www.parliament.uk/new-un-secretary-general and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074).

Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked with ** gave both oral evidence and written evidence. Those marked with * gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.

**Oral evidence in chronological order**

** Mr Paul Williams, Director of Multilateral Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  QQ 1–9
** Mr Matthew Findlay, Deputy Director, Multilateral Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
** Mr Edward Hobart, Migration Envoy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
** Ms Natalie Samarasinghe, Executive Director, United Nations Association–UK  QQ 10–19
* Dr Alex Vines OBE, Research Director for Area Studies and International Law, and Head of Africa Programme, Chatham House  QQ 20–29
* Professor Kerry Brown, Professor of Chinese Politics and Director of the Lau China Institute, Kings College London  QQ 30–34
* Professor Sir Adam Roberts, Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford  QQ 35–43
** Andrew Whitley, Interim Chief Executive Officer, The Elders  QQ 44–53
* Lord Malloch-Brown KCMG, former Minister of State for Africa, Asia and the UN, Former UN Deputy Secretary-General, former Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary-General, former CEO of the UN Development Programme and former Vice-President of the World Bank  QQ 44–53
* Baroness Amos, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, and Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies  QQ 54–61
* Rt Hon Baroness Anelay of St Johns, DBE, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  QQ 62–72
** Mr Paul Williams, Director of Multilateral Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
** Mr Edward Hobart, Migration Envoy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
### Alphabetical list of all witnesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baroness Amos, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief, and Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
<td>QQ 54–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rt Hon Baroness Anelay of St Johns, DBE, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>QQ 62–72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Kerry Brown, Professor of Chinese Politics, Kings College London, and Director of the Lau China Institute</td>
<td>QQ 30–34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr David Curran, Research Fellow, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr Megan Dee, Associate Research Fellow, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equality and Human Rights Commission</td>
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<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>Freedom Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr Edward Hobart, Migration Envoy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>QQ 1–9 QQ 62–72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Matthew Findlay, Deputy Director, Multilateral Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
<td>QQ 1–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Norrie MacQueen, Honorary Research Fellow, School of International Relations, University of St Andrews; Formerly Electoral Officer, UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste; Member of Editorial Board of The Journal of International Peacekeeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lord Malloch-Brown, former Minister of State for Africa, Asia and the UN, Former UN Deputy Secretary-General, former Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary-General, former CEO of the UN Development Programme and former Vice-President of the World Bank</td>
<td>QQ 44–53</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Preventive Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sir Emrys Jones Parry GCMG, former UK Ambassador to the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
<td>QQ 44–53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver P Richmond, Research Professor of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Manchester</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Sir Adam Roberts, Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford</td>
<td>QQ 35–43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* Dr Alex Vines OBE, Research Director for Area Studies and International Law, and Head of Africa Programme, Chatham House (QQ 20–29)

** Ms Natalie Samarasinghe, Executive Director, United Nations Association-UK (QQ 10–19)

** Andrew Whitley, Interim Chief Executive Officer, The Elders (QQ 35–43)

** Mr Paul Williams, Director of Multilateral Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 1–9) (QQ 62–72)
APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

The International Relations Committee of the House of Lords is launching an inquiry into the UK priorities for the new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General.

The background is that the successor to Ban Ki-moon, the current UN Secretary-General, will be decided over the course of 2016 and probably concluded in January 2017. The Committee intends to produce a report making recommendations to the UK to pursue with the new UN Secretary-General. The Committee is not seeking views on the individual candidates.

The Committee will explore the following issues in detail and would welcome your views on the following questions. You are not required to answer all of the questions listed here and answers to questions may be submitted separately:

1. What are the major global challenges facing the UK and the international community? Where can the United Nations add value? What criteria should guide UN action on any international issue?

2. What should be the UK priorities for the new UN Secretary-General?

3. Considering the implications of the UK leaving the EU, how should the UK configure its role at the UN and how can it most effectively leverage its influence in the UN and other multilateral organisations?

4. Is the UN, as it is currently configured, able to respond effectively to new global trends, in particular the increasing importance of Asia in global economics and politics and a more digitally connected world?
### APPENDIX 4: UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS TABLE

#### Table 1: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Total personnel (inc. Military Observers, Police, Local/International civilians and UN Volunteers)</th>
<th>Budget (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)</td>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>74,291,900*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</td>
<td>January 1949</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>19,674,100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</td>
<td>March 1964</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>52,538,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</td>
<td>June 1974</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>51,706,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
<td>March 1978</td>
<td>10,506</td>
<td>11,354</td>
<td>506,346,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>53,190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>40,031,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>3,279</td>
<td>344,712,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>2,594</td>
<td>4,602</td>
<td>402,794,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Established</td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>Total personnel (inc. Military Observers, Police, Local/International civilians and UN Volunteers)</td>
<td>Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>2,360</td>
<td>5,870</td>
<td>380,355,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union—United Nations Hybrid Operation Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>13,597</td>
<td>20,639</td>
<td>1,085,769,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>16,936</td>
<td>22,667</td>
<td>1,332,178,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA)</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>4,402</td>
<td>4,779</td>
<td>268,256,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>12,120</td>
<td>16,219</td>
<td>1,085,769,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>10,732</td>
<td>13,426</td>
<td>923,305,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)</td>
<td>April 2014</td>
<td>10,245</td>
<td>13,353</td>
<td>814,066,800</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>86,481</strong></td>
<td><strong>119,523</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Approx. 8.27 billion</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Funded by the regular biennial budget (2013–2015)

** Includes requirements for the UN Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia, the support account for peacekeeping operations, and the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy.
APPENDIX 5: THE UN BUDGET

Three instruments fund the UN:

- **The regular budget** is adopted for a two-year period by the General Assembly. The 2016–2017 regular budget amounts to $5.4 billion. The regular budget is mainly financed through assessed contributions from the member states, based on shares calculated according to a scale that reflects each state’s capacity to pay. It is primarily operating budget, used to cover core expenses of the secretariat and administrative expenses of certain funds and programs (UNEP, UN Women, etc);

- **Peacekeeping operations budgets** are financed through compulsory contributions by the member states. The amount of the contributions is based on a specific scale derived from the regular budget but with an increased contribution for the Security Council permanent members. The budget for 2016–2017 amounts to $7.87 billion;

- **Extra budgetary resources** comprise voluntary contributions from member states and finance support activities, substantive activities (in addition to the activities financed by the regular budget for example) as well as operational activities (technical cooperation). Extra budgetary resources for the 2016–2017 biennium is estimated at $18.9 billion.

Certain UN programmes and funds (UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, etc.) and the specialised agencies (World Bank, IMF, WHO, UNESCO, etc.) have their own budgets. The bulk of their funding comes from voluntary contributions of governments but also from individuals.