The Licensing Act 2003: post-legislative scrutiny Contents

Chapter 7: The Off-Trade


278.The Licensing Act 2003 was enacted at a time of high profile problems related to on-trade sales, such as aggressive drinks promotions, which linked the on-trade with public concerns surrounding ‘binge drinking’. In 2005, the year in which the Licensing Act 2003 came into force, the majority of beer sales still took place in the on-trade. Even then though, the overall balance in alcohol sales was already shifting decisively in favour of the off-trade, which represented 58% of all alcohol sold, with the on-trade making up the other 42%. By 2015, when more beer was sold off-trade than on-trade for the first time, the quantity of all alcohol sold in the off-trade dwarfed that of the on-trade, by 69% to 31% respectively.

Figure 4: Volume of pure alcohol sold in England & Wales: proportion sold through the on-trade and off-trade, 1994–2015

Line graph of pure alcohol sold in england and Wales proportion sold through on and off trade 1994 to 2015

Source: NHS Health Scotland, ‘Alcohol retail sales dataset 1994 to 2015’ (May 2016):–01-alcohol-retail-sales-dataset-1994-to-2015-may-2016.xls [accessed 10 March 2017]

279.As at March 2016, of the 174,400 premises licensed to serve alcohol in England and Wales, 38,600 were licensed only for on-sales, 55,700 were licensed only for off-sales, and 80,100 were licensed for both on- and off-sales of alcohol.256 The number of off-trade only premises has increased by 30% in the past 30 years.257 The increase in off-trade premises partially reflects a shift away from larger, out of town supermarkets, towards smaller, more numerous local or express branches of supermarkets in town centres over this period.258

Figure 5: Premises Licences by Type, 2008–2016

Line graph showing number of premises licences, both on- and off-sales, off-sales only and on sale only from 2008 to 2016

Source: Home Office, ‘Alcohol and late night refreshment licensing England and Wales’ (31 March 2016): [accessed 12 January 2017]

280.We received much evidence from those who argued that regulation needs to be adjusted to reflect this shift in the market, with more restrictions placed on off-trade premises. The basis for these arguments was that on-trade premises provided supervised places for the consumption of alcohol, and often, in the shape of community pubs and venues, possessed intrinsic cultural value; elements which off-trade premises lacked. Prices in off-trade premises are also on average significantly cheaper than in on-trade premises, which many respondents argued was encouraging people to drink more.259

281.A number of public health experts also highlighted the steady shift from on-trade sales to off-trade sales. Professor Sir Ian Gilmore of the Alcohol Health Alliance observed that the UK had become a “home-drinking nation” in the last 10 to 20 years.260 Professor Colin Drummond explained that those who are “very heavy drinkers and are alcohol dependent tend not to drink in pubs; they would not be able to afford to do that for the amount they consume, so they get their alcohol from off-sales. They tend to trade down in the cost of the products they choose”.261 However, others, such as Nick Grant, Head of Legal Services for Sainsbury’s, argued that the use of terms such as “home drinking”, were unhelpful and pejorative: “It implies a whole set of images about what it means, but the last time I had a dinner party with a bottle of wine, or there was a barbecue, I did not regard myself as home drinking. We have to be wary of overloaded terms.”262

282.Within some parts of the on-trade industry there was a perception that the smoking ban, which came into force in England and Wales in 2007, had been one of the biggest factors driving the shift in custom from the on-trade to the off-trade. George Dawson, President of the Working Men’s Club and Union Institute, told us that for clubs, “the biggest decline [in trade] … was when the smoking ban came in.”263 The Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers and Admiral Taverns also pointed to the smoking ban as a major factor in the decline of the on-trade and the corresponding rise in the off-trade.264

283.The sale of alcohol online is a further emerging development in the world of off-trade sales. We heard evidence suggesting that verifying the age of purchasers of alcohol online, both from supermarket chains with online sales and from more specialist online retailers, could be challenging.265 Some respondents expressed uncertainty about the legal position when, for example, an individual under the age of 18 took receipt of a mixed delivery of shopping which included alcohol on behalf of their parents, who legally purchased the alcohol.266 However, it appears that supermarkets, especially the larger operators such as Sainsbury’s and Ocado, have sensible policies in place, such as age-verification at the door and the withholding of alcoholic products or entire deliveries if this is failed.267 While we do not believe this is currently a substantial problem, online deliveries will only increase, and online sales and delivery of alcohol should be closely monitored in future.


284.There was also much discussion concerning the apparent rise in pre-loading, where individuals consume cheaper off-licence alcohol at home, before continuing on to on-licence premises. The nature and extent of the problem remains unclear. Some, such as the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers (which represents on-licence premises), claimed that surveys of 3,000 18–24 year olds, covering a period from 2009/10–2011/12, demonstrated that “the prevalence of pre-loading has increased significantly over the last three years, with 83% of 18–24 year olds admitting to pre-loading on supermarket alcohol”, up from just 53% in 2009.268 The Association of Convenience Stores on the other hand pointed to a different poll conducted by YouGov in 2015, which suggested that only 35% of the 2,000 adults polled had pre-loaded in the previous year, and that of those, 42% said that the alcohol they consumed before a night out was only a small proportion of the alcohol they drank that same night.269

285.When appearing before the Committee, the Home Office initially claimed to be unaware of any evidence relating to pre-loading. However, in supplementary evidence they provided us with some details of two studies on the subject. They explained that:

“One study involved a group of young men between 17-30 years old that had been arrested in an unnamed city in England. Around two-thirds of the group claimed to have ‘pre-loaded’ before a night out. A second study found that individuals who had ‘pre-loaded’ were around two-and-a-half times more likely to be involved in violent incidents than other drinkers.”270

However, they were also keen to emphasise that the “extent of the research is limited and cannot be generalised to the wider population, and will need to be read within the context of reduced consumption of alcohol, particularly among young people, changes in the balance of alcohol purchased in the off- and on-trades, and falls in alcohol-related violence.”271

286.There was also disagreement among witnesses as to whether pre-loading was causing serious problems. A number of respondents, including Alcohol Concern, the British Hospitality Association and Plymouth City Council linked pre-loading with increased alcohol-related crime and disorder on Britain’s streets.272

287.However, others, generally representing off-trade businesses, argued that there was very little hard evidence to suggest that pre-loading was a serious problem. For example, James Brodhurst-Brown, representing Waitrose, claimed he had “seen no evidence to suggest that pre-loading is actually an issue”, and noted that ‘home drinking’ had become “standard for anybody who buys something to drink before they go out”, irrespective of whether this was indeed a problem at all.273 Nick Grant, Head of Legal Services at Sainsbury’s, and Gill Sherratt, director of Licensing Matters, expressed similar opinions.274

288.Representatives of the off-trade expressed the view that, beyond education, there was little that could meaningfully be done to regulate how people consumed alcohol purchased from off-trade premises. Other witnesses we heard from did however make a number of suggestions. The most common suggested interventions included:

In the following paragraphs we examine each of these proposals in turn.

Super-strength schemes

289.We heard a great deal about ‘super-strength’ alcohol, and the schemes developed by both central government and some local authorities to try to reduce its availability. The term is most commonly used to describe alcoholic drinks which are both high-strength and low cost. While the definition of ‘high-strength’ alcohol varies, it normally encompasses very cheap beers and white ciders of 6.5% alcohol by volume (ABV) and above, and in particular those of 8–9% ABV, where a single 500ml can of beer may contain over four units of alcohol.275 It is not uncommon to find three litre bottles of 7.5% ABV cider being sold for £3.50, which is slightly over 15p a unit, while 500ml cans of 8% ABV beer are often sold for £1.45 to £1.79, equating to 36p and 44p a unit respectively.276 Many respondents who discussed super-strength alcohol were however careful to distinguish these products from specialist craft and Belgian beers, which tend to be sold at a significantly higher price.277

290.The Local Government Association (LGA) defines a street drinker as an individual “who drinks heavily in public places and, at least in the short term, is unable or unwilling to control or stop their drinking, has a history of alcohol misuse and often drinks in groups for companionship”. The LGA also claims that street drinkers are associated with an increased risk of causing harm to themselves or others, homelessness, and may be involved in begging and rowdy drunken behaviour.278 The health problems associated with super-strength alcohol are those associated with serious alcohol dependency. These include liver disease, as well as conditions such as Korsakoff Syndrome, a form of alcohol-related brain damage.279

291.We heard evidence from many respondents who linked super-strength alcohol, which is almost exclusively sold at off-trade rather than on-trade premises, to problems of anti-social behaviour and street drinking in their areas. Lambeth Borough Council explained that “in boroughs like ours we have problems with street drinkers and we find it difficult to prove that one premises is particularly responsible, yet the activities of street drinkers are directly linked to anti-social behaviour and often crime and disorder.”280 Paddington Waterways and Maida Vale Society similarly linked street drinking in their area to “the purchase of super strength alcohol, and the associated problems of litter, public urination and general anti-social behaviour”.281

292.Medway Public Health explained that, based on interviews with owners of smaller off-trade premises, the sale of super-strength products “is vital to their business model, and it is not unknown for shops to close when they stop selling these products as they cannot make a profit without these sales”. Many of these shopkeepers “feel they have no choice but to stock super strength beers and ciders due to market forces, as so many of their competitors stock them and their businesses are so reliant on the profit from the sales”, despite “knowing they are selling to people who are alcohol dependent”.282

Responsibility Deal

293.The Coalition Government sought to reduce the availability of some forms of super-strength alcohol through its Public Health Responsibility Deal, first launched in March 2011. This consisted of a voluntary code of conduct which both manufacturers and retailers were encouraged to pledge support for. The earliest version contained a pledge to reduce the strength of alcoholic products in general, while a revised deal in 2014 included a Responsible Can Packaging Pledge. This included a pledge that read:

“To support our pledge to remove a billion units of alcohol sold annually from the market, we will carry out a review of the alcohol content and container sizes of all alcohol products in our portfolio. By December 2014 we will not produce or sell any carbonated product with more than 4 units of alcohol in a single-serve can.”283

294.However, according to the Department of Health’s Responsibility Deal website, only eight companies signed up to this.284 Of these, only three were manufacturers rather than retailers. Of the three manufacturers who signed up, SABMiller plc claimed they did not sell any cans containing four or more units of alcohol, even before the introduction of the Pledge. AB InBev UK, despite noting that they did not “believe that targeting individual products will tackle problem drinking”, agreed to withdraw their 9% ABV 500ml can of Tennent’s Super Lager by the end of 2015.285 Carlsberg, while agreeing to reducing the strength of its Special Brew cans of lager, shortly after appeared to withdraw from their pledge, on grounds reproduced in Box 5. There appear to have been no further updates or commitments since 28 January 2015.

Box 5: Carlsberg’s 30 April 2015 update on its Responsibility Deal Pledge

“At the end of 2011, in an effort to demonstrate our own commitment and leadership on responsible drinking, we committed to reviewing our portfolio in order to not sell any carbonated product containing more than four units of alcohol in a single-serve can. Our commitment is to implement this across our portfolio during 2015 and this process is now underway.

This commitment was made with the intent that key stakeholders recognise the change, and that these products should now be seen as ‘socially responsible’. This has yet failed to materialise and any further delivery, over and above our initial commitment, will remain subject to that recognition and that local regulators cease in banning these products following implementation of the changes being made.”

Source: Department of Health, ‘Public Health Responsibility Deal: Carlsberg UK Ltd’ (30 April 2015): [accessed 15 March 2017]

295.It should also be noted that, as a result of the pledge’s focus on cans, large multi-litre bottles of strong cider were excluded. As Leeds City Council pointed out to us, many of the most pernicious problems with super-strength alcohol come in the form of large bottles of high-strength white cider, with a three litre bottle containing around 22 units of alcohol and costing around £3.50.286 They note that “anecdotal evidence from people in treatment services informs us that once they remove the top of the bottle, they will drink it all, despite their best intentions”.

296.In their view it was “a misconception that restricting the ability to sell single cans will stop dependent drinkers from buying alcohol”. They highlighted the fact that at least “the sale of single cans means that a dependent drinker can self-dose the alcohol they need to consume to keep them from becoming ill, without putting temptation in front of them to drink more than they need to”. In their view it is important that “any restriction on alcohol is designed in such a way to assist rather than hinder people’s ability to overcome their addiction”, and they and some others suggested focusing on pack size—especially larger three litre bottles of white cider—rather than on ABV.287

297.The overall assessment of the Coalition Government’s Responsibility Deal among our respondents was not positive. While the LGA welcomed “the decision of some producers who have voluntarily withdrawn these products from the market after seeing the harm that they can cause”,288 most appeared unaware that such a scheme had ever even existed.289 The Police and Crime Commissioner for Devon and Cornwall argued it had had “little impact”, had only “limited take up”, and that the four-unit limit per can “does not affect most of the current products considered to be ‘very high strength’”.290

Local schemes

298.With the lacklustre success of central government approaches towards super-strength alcohol, many local authorities have devised policies of their own. ‘Super-strength’ schemes or ‘Reducing the Strength’ schemes refer to local authority approaches which attempt to establish voluntary agreement from all off-trade premises in a particular area not to stock super-strength products.

299.The first example of a super-strength scheme was in Suffolk in 2012, and since then between 25 and 100 local authorities have introduced their own.291 These are, according to the LGA, “of varying degrees of formality and complexity; conditions are also used to address this on individual applications where appropriate”. However, the LGA emphasises that they predominantly “rely on retailers accepting the evidence that specific products are linked to alcohol-related harm and voluntarily withdrawing those products”, and that retailers have “the right not to participate in a voluntary scheme”.292 However, evidence we have received does show that many local authorities have adopted stricter approaches, as can be seen in Box 6.

Box 6: Examples of super-strength schemes currently in operation

  • Bedford City Council: beers and ciders with an ABV of above 6.5% cannot be sold in any off-licences in the restricted alcohol zone in the city centre; further licensing conditions restrict the sale of beers or ciders above 5.5% ABV, considered to be ‘super strength’.
  • City of London Council: reserves the right to impose conditions to restrict the sale of beer and cider above 5.5% ABV, and to restrict the sale of single cans or bottles of beer.
  • Worthing and Adur Councils: reserve a right to impose conditions on new applications when requested by police to restrict the sale of any beers, lagers or ciders over 6% ABV.
  • London Borough of Islington: runs a best practice scheme which involves off-licences committing to not selling beer and ciders above 6.5% ABV. Membership of the best practice schemes can qualify premises for a 30% reduction on the Borough’s Late Night Levy annual fee.

Source: Written evidence from CAMRA (LIC0121)

300.A number of witnesses wanted broader powers to impose bans across several premises simultaneously. Cornwall Council’s Licensing Authority, for example, claimed that they sometimes experienced “problems with national chains being reluctant to join a voluntary scheme”, and therefore wanted powers for licensing authorities to be able to “bring in an Order in areas where it is necessary to make this mandatory rather than voluntary”.293 They suggested these powers could be linked to Cumulative Impact Policies (CIPs) (see Chapter 9), although their proposal would also be met by proposed Group Review Intervention Powers (GRIPs) (considered later in this chapter).

301.The Institute of Licensing noted that “there is a feeling amongst some that this is an area which would benefit from central rather than local control”, and indeed, a number of local authorities wanted a complete ban on super-strength alcohol, rather than the strengthening of powers to be used on a local level.294 Ashford Borough Council similarly believed “in order to prevent further complexity to the Act that these controls need to be implemented nationally”. This could, they believed, work best as a “national standard that may be adopted by Local Authorities where they consider this applicable to their area”.295

302.However, there was also much criticism of super-strength schemes, concerning both their current operation, and the possibility of putting them on a statutory footing, or attempting to ban all forms of super-strength, low-cost alcohol.

303.Both CAMRA and the Society for Independent Brewers (SIBA) opposed super-strength schemes on principle, arguing that they restricted consumer choice and did not address the real issues. CAMRA claimed it was “discriminatory that higher strength cider and beer products are subject to local bans when no issue has been taken with the sale of low cost spirits and wines, which are far higher in alcoholic strength”. They were particularly opposed to the use of “mandatory licensing conditions which set a very low ABV% point to be considered super strength’”, on the grounds that this can “severely impact on consumer choice”. SIBA argued a similar point, and in their view “it is quite wrong that these bans typically apply only to beer and cider and not to wine and spirits, despite their higher strength”.296

304.Scarborough Borough Council Licensing Committee argued it was “fatuous to suggest that there should be control over “super strength” alcohol because it will not address the issue”, pointing to “very strong French and Belgian Trappist beers that have been brewed at 7% to over 9% for a few hundred years”, and have not caused problems with street drinking or pre-loading, yet might well be caught out by new legislation.297

305.A number of respondents also noted that existing schemes could often be legally questionable, as efforts by local councils to collectively coordinate the withdrawal of particular products from the market could lead retailers to fall foul of competition law. The Association of Convenience Stores told us that they advise their members “to assess each individual scheme on its merits and be mindful of certain practices that put them in breach of competition law, or because they are unconvinced that the schemes are tackling street drinking in an effective and holistic way supported by strong evidence”.298 Alcohol Research UK also noted that any attempt to introduce statutory restrictions on the sale of super-strength alcohol would “require legislation that avoided challenges on the ground of restricting competition” which they believe would be difficult to achieve “given the stringent limitations set out by the Competition and Markets Authority”.299

306.Indeed, the LGA’s “Reducing the Strength” guidance makes clear that while local councils are themselves unlikely to fall foul of competition law, local retailers who co-operate are at risk, and warns that “they must, therefore, ensure that they are not engaging in anticompetitive behaviour otherwise they could face significant penalties, including significant fines”.300 They emphasise to councils that “the easiest way to avoid this risk is to engage bilaterally with individual retailers, rather than with groups of retailers together” so as to ensure that sensitive commercial information is not discussed between competitors. However, it is not difficult to see why retailers would not be reassured by this guidance.

307.Even some local councils who used voluntary schemes were not keen that they be placed on a statutory footing. Broxtowe Borough Council, for example, argued that “local schemes are more effective and are better able to target the offending products”, and that more formal mandatory controls risked catching out specialist craft ales and beers.301

308.In their evidence to us, the Home Office noted the need for a holistic approach to super-strength products, which put as much emphasis on treatment as it did on restricting access to particular products. They said:

“… banning these products alone may not be effective and individuals may resort to other, more harmful products.  Examples from some areas in England and Wales, most notably in Ipswich, have shown that other measures, such as getting individuals into treatment to address their alcohol dependency are as important as removing ‘super-strength’ products from sale as treatment seeks to change the behaviour driving the dependency.  The Government continues to encourage local authorities to provide effective alcohol-treatment services in order to respond effectively to the needs of those with alcohol dependency problems”.302

309.We have heard evidence suggesting that some super-strength schemes pursued at a local authority level and targeted at retailers have worked. However, the effectiveness of this approach remains largely unproven. We do not recommend that powers to ban super-strength alcohol across many premises simultaneously be granted to local authorities.

310.The Coalition Government’s Responsibility Deal on alcohol did not achieve its objectives, and appears to have been suspended. We believe much more still needs to be done to tackle the production of super-strength, low-cost alcoholic products. If and when any similar schemes are developed in the future, there must be greater provision for monitoring and maintaining them, and greater collaboration between all parties involved, including both public health experts and manufacturers. They should also account for the realities of super-strength alcohol, with particular focus on, for example, ABV rather than the specificities of packaging.

Group Review Intervention Powers (GRIPs)

311.Group Review Intervention Powers, as proposed in the Government’s Modern Crime Prevention Strategy of March 2016, would “enable licensing authorities to consider the licensing conditions of a group of premises to address problems in a specific location”.303 Detailed plans as to how these would work have yet to be released.

312.Some local authorities have requested powers of this type which would allow them to apply conditions banning the sale of super-strength products across several premises at the same time. The LGA and Broxtowe Borough Council in particular welcomed the proposals,304 apparently believing them to be potentially more workable alternatives to Early Morning Restriction Orders (EMROs).305

313.The Association of Convenience Stores was opposed to the concept of GRIPs, stating that “licensing conditions are meant to be tailored to individual premises. Proposals to implement group conditions would place additional burdens on both on and off trade premises in a specific area”.306

314.Evidence relating to measures such as EMROs has highlighted to us the inherent problems associated with the imposition of blanket conditions on all licensed premises in a particular area, and this measure seems likely to run into the same legal challenges.

315.It is also unclear what they are intended to achieve, especially as the Modern Crime Prevention Strategy itself notes that where there are “serious concerns about individual premises”, the existing review system remains more appropriate.307 Indeed, the GRIPs would not appear to provide local authorities with any substantive new powers to impose conditions on premises; rather they would provide local authorities with a blanket, and presumably less closely scrutinised, means for doing so across several premises simultaneously. If the condition in question would not be appropriate for one of the sets of premises individually, we do not see how it would become appropriate for those premises as part of a group.

316.We believe that proposed Group Review Intervention Powers, which would give local authorities the power to introduce mandatory blanket conditions on all premises in a particular area, should not be introduced. As a blanket approach to problems which can normally be traced back to particular premises, they are likely to suffer from the same problems as Early Morning Restriction Orders, and the same results can be achieved through existing means.

Restrictions on off-trade alcohol retailing in Scotland

317.While legislation in England and Wales has not changed to reflect the shift from on-trade sales to off-trade sales, in Scotland the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010, which came into force in 2011, introduced a range of new measures targeted specifically at the off-trade. The provisions relating to supermarkets and off-licences were:

(a)restrictions on multi-pack pricing, which prevent any form of multi-buy offer relating to alcohol;

(b)a ban on ‘buy one, get one free’ offers, or any other offer including free alcohol;

(c)restrictions on the advertising of drinks promotions, restricting them to specific designated alcohol display areas in off-licence premises;

(d)a requirement that all premises introduce a ‘Challenge 25’ policy as standard. 308

318.Research conducted by NHS Health Scotland and the University of Glasgow suggests that this Scottish legislation was associated with a 2.6% decrease in off-trade sales in Scotland. In particular, it was associated with a 4% drop in wine sales (equivalent to 4.5 million bottles), and an 8.5% decrease in the sale of pre-mixed alcohol.309 These declines were not observed in England and Wales, and other possible factors were taken into account. In their evidence, Alcohol Focus Scotland argue on the basis of this research that “it stands to reason that similar measures, if implemented, could have comparable results elsewhere in the UK”.310 Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems argued that “although perhaps moderate, these impacts are nonetheless significant”, and that the legislation had also”contributed to a shift in knowledge and attitudes”, precipitating “increased agreement that alcohol is the drug that causes the most harm in Scotland”.311

319.A note of caution on the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 was sounded by the Institute of Alcohol Studies, which noted that other research had found that “the ban had changed shopping habits, causing people to buy fewer products per shopping trip, but to buy beer and cider more frequently, leaving the overall amount bought unchanged”. This was however based on “a panel survey method, which is known to be less accurate than sales data (which was the basis of the first piece of research)”.312

320.When asked whether the Government would consider introducing Scottish-style legislation specifically aimed at off-trade premises, Sarah Newton MP said:

“I believe that the Act gives flexibilities for local communities to address any harms or crime that arise from perceptions about people purchasing alcohol in those outlets, whether it is pre-loading or the sorts of multipack offers that you mention. We are seeing some really good examples, through the alcohol partnerships you will be aware of. Hopefully you have seen evidence from those. In communities experiencing anti-social behaviour or violence associated with alcohol, where people feel that it is to do with off-trade access to alcohol, they have come together to tackle that, including voluntary bans on multipack promotions, putting alcohol at the back of the store and limiting the hours when supermarkets or other outlets are open.”313

321.While there appears to be some merit to a few voluntary schemes, the majority, and in particular the Government’s Responsibility Deal, are not working as intended. We believe there are limits to what can be achieved in this way, and many of the worst operators will probably never comply with voluntary agreements. We strongly believe that the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 offers a proportionate and practical basis for measures specifically regulating the off-trade.

322.We recommend that legislation based on Part 1 of the Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 should be introduced in England and Wales at the first available opportunity. In the meantime, the section 182 Guidance should be amended to encourage the adoption of these measures by the off-trade.

257 DCMS, ‘Aggregate tables from bulletin’, Liquor Licensing Statistics Historical Time Series (11 January 2011): [accessed 10 March 2017];

Home Office, ‘Alcohol and late night refreshment licensing England and Wales’ (31 March 2016): [accessed 10 March 2017]

258 Written evidence from Balance North East Alcohol Office (LIC0023)

259 For example, written evidence from Alcohol Concern (LIC0085), Alcohol Health Alliance UK (LIC0078), Alcohol Research UK (LIC0022), Association of Directors of Public Health (LIC0064)

260 Q 108 (Prof Sir Ian Gilmore, Chair, Alcohol Health Alliance)

261 Q 108 (Prof Colin Drummond, Chair of the Faculty of Addictions Psychiatry, Royal College of Psychiatrists)

262 Q 158 (Nick Grant, Head of Legal Services, Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd)

263 Q 172 (George Dawson, Union President, Working Men’s Club and Institute Union)

264 Written evidence from ALMR (LIC0150) and Admiral Taverns (LIC0124)

265 Written evidence from Citizens Advice Westminster (LIC0132), Alcohol Health Alliance UK (LIC0078) and Middlesbrough Council (LIC0073)

266 Written evidence from Cambridge City Council (LIC0108), Central England Trading Standards (LIC0021) and Q 58 (John Miley, National Chair, National Association of Licensing and Enforcement Officers)

267 Q 159 (Nick Grant Head of Legal Services, Sainsbury’s Supermarket Ltd) and Q 160 (Mark Bentley, Customer Operations Director, Ocado)

268 Written evidence from the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers (LIC0150). The provenance of this data is, however, difficult to trace, and appears to date from 2013, based on a very similar submission by the ALMR to Newcastle City Council as part of a late night levy consultation.

269 Written evidence from Association of Convenience Stores (LIC0086)

270 Supplementary written evidence from Home Office (LIC0063)

271 Supplementary written evidence from Home Office (LIC0063)

272 Written evidence from Bath City Centre Action Group (LIC0036); British Hospitality Association (LIC0149); Ealing Civic Society (LIC0129); Plymouth City Council (LIC0048); Alcohol Concern (LIC0085); Alcohol Health Alliance UK (LIC0078)

273 Q 159 (James Brodhurst-Brown, Manager, Regulatory Affairs and Trading Law, Waitrose)

274 Q 159 (Nick Grant, Head of Legal Services, Sainsbury’s Supermarkets Ltd); Q 65 (Gill Sherratt, Director, Licensing Matters)

275 Written evidence from Medway Public Health (LIC0066)

276 Ibid.

277 Written evidence from Broxtowe Borough Council (LIC0138); National Association of Licensing and Enforcement Officers (LIC0148); TLT Solicitors (LIC0112)

278 LGA, Reducing the Strength: Guidance for councils considering setting up a scheme (January 2016): [accessed 10 March 2017]

279 Alcohol Concern, All in the Mind: Meeting the challenge of alcohol-related brain damage (March 2014): available at: [accessed 10 March 2017]

280 Written evidence from London Borough of Lambeth (LIC0134)

281 Written evidence from Paddington Waterways and Maida Vale Society (LIC0144)

282 Written evidence from Medway Public Health (LIC0066)

283 Department of Health, ‘A8(b). Responsible can packaging’: [accessed 10 March 2017]

284 Department of Health, ‘Carlsberg UK Ltd’: [accessed 10 March 2017]

285 Although they did not produce any further updates for the Responsibility Deal, Tennent’s Super Lager is no longer available from UK retailers.

286 Written evidence from Leeds City Council (LIC0034)

287 Ibid.

288 Written evidence from LGA (LIC0099)

289 At least two respondents believed a voluntary scheme for encouraging manufacturers to withdraw super-strength products should be introduced, apparently unaware of the Responsibility Deal.

290 Written evidence from the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Devon and Cornwall (LIC0153)

291 It remains unclear why there should be such a wide range of estimates; the Local Government Association believes there to be 25–30 schemes currently in operation, whereas the Society for Independent Brewers cited a much higher number of 100.

292 Written evidence from LGA (LIC0099)

293 Written evidence from Cornwall Council Licensing Authority (LIC0069)

294 Written evidence from Institute of Licensing (LIC0126)

295 Written evidence from Ashford Borough Council (LIC0016)

296 Written evidence from Society of Independent Brewers (LIC0093)

297 Written evidence from Scarborough Borough Council Licensing Committee (LIC0145)

298 Written evidence from Association of Convenience Stores (LIC0086)

299 Written evidence from Alcohol Research UK (LIC0022)

300 LGA, Reducing the Strength: Guidance for councils considering setting up a scheme (January 2016): [accessed 10 March 2017]

301 Written evidence from Broxtowe Borough Council (LIC0138)

302 Written evidence from Home Office (LIC0155)

304 See paragraphs 306–307. Written evidence from LGA (LIC0099); Broxtowe Borough Council (LIC0138)

305 We discuss EMROs in paragraphs 451 et seq.

306 Written evidence from Association of Convenience Stores (LIC0086)

308 The Alcohol etc. (Scotland) Act 2010 also introduced a range of other provisions, including the Social Responsibility Levy, although this has, thus far, not been brought into force.

309 Mark Robinson, Claudia Geue, James Lewsey, et al. ‘Evaluating the impact of the alcohol act on off-trade alcohol sales: a natural experiment in Scotland.’ Addiction, vol 109 (2014), pp 2035–2043: [accessed 10 March 2017]

310 Written evidence from Alcohol Focus Scotland (LIC0127)

311 Written evidence from Scottish Health Action on Alcohol Problems (LIC0032)

312 Written evidence from Institute of Alcohol Studies (LIC0047)

313 215 (Sarah Newton MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Vulnerability, Safeguarding and Countering Extremism, Home Office)

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