The Bribery Act 2010: post legislative scrutiny Contents

Chapter 3: The offences of bribery and being bribed (sections 1 and 2)

The offences

39.As detailed in the previous chapter, one of the primary objectives of the Bribery Act was to reform and update bribery and corruption legislation, and sections 1 and 2 of the Act represent one aspect of this reform, moving away from a principal/agent model. Instead, they created the crimes of giving and receiving bribes.

40.The offence of bribery is described in section 1 as occurring when a person offers, gives or promises to give a “financial or other advantage” to another individual in exchange for “improperly” performing a “relevant function or activity”. Section 2 covers the offence of being bribed, which is defined as requesting, accepting or agreeing to accept such an advantage, in exchange for improperly performing such a function or activity. The “relevant function or activity” element is explained in section 3—it covers “any function of a public nature; any activity connected with a business, trade or profession; any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment; or any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons whether corporate or unincorporated”. Section 1, 2 and 6 offences carry the same maximum penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine for individuals, and an unlimited fine for a company.

41.The Act has a very broad territorial scope, which has implications for businesses in or associated with the UK. The jurisdictional scope of the offences in sections 1, 2, 6 and 7 covers acts of bribery (or the failure to prevent bribery) which took place partly, or even entirely, outside the UK, provided that the alleged perpetrator is a British citizen or deemed to have a “close connection” with the UK. This includes citizens of British Overseas Territories and companies incorporated in the UK. This aspect of the law is largely in accordance with pre-existing bribery legislation,46 and the only significant extension is that the Act now also includes foreign nationals who are ordinarily resident in the UK.

Prosecutions

42.We heard a range of views as to whether the Act was being adequately enforced. A number of witnesses highlighted the generally positive assessment of the UK by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Transparency International’s assessment of the UK as one of the few “active enforcers” of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, alongside the United States, Germany and Switzerland.47 However, it should be noted that the OECD Convention applies primarily to the enforcement of foreign bribery cases, and is less concerned with domestic cases of bribery.

43.Other witnesses argued that, given the paucity of data in this area, it was very difficult to say whether bribery was being investigated and prosecuted at a rate commensurate with actual offences. Dr Lord noted the difficulties of determining the level and type of offences under the Act, given the absence of a specific category in the Office for National Statistics recorded crime data, and the apparent discontinuation of the Public Sector Corruption Index, which required all forces to report allegations of corruption to the Metropolitan and City Police Company Fraud Branch.48 Data on bribery seems to be inconsistently recorded across police forces and courts, and no publicly available source of data on prosecutions and convictions under the Bribery Act appeared to have been collated until we ourselves requested this data at the start of our inquiry.

44.Further complicating factors include the long duration of many bribery investigations (dealt with below), which means that long after the Bribery Act came into force, a majority of bribery-related cases are still being prosecuted under earlier laws. Indeed, between 2014 and the second quarter of 2018, the CPS has launched 107 proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, compared with around 42 for all offences under the Bribery Act.49

45.According to one academic analysis of police statistics, 25 police forces in England, alongside the Ministry of Defence Police and Serious Fraud Office (SFO), have recorded 138 cases over a six-year period (fewer than 23 a year on average), with a large proportion handled by a small number of forces, while a significant minority of forces have never handled a bribery case under the Bribery Act. This is in line with previous trends prior to the Act; Dr Nicholas Lord cited research which suggests that the number of cases handled under bribery legislation “shows no significant increase or decrease since 1964”.50

46.As can be seen in the figures below, there is a low rate of cases proceeded with under section 1 and 2 of the Bribery Act; this, as is the case with most crimes, is considerably lower than the number of cases investigated by police for a variety of reasons.51

Table 1: Defendants proceeded against at magistrates’ courts and found guilty and sentenced at all courts, for offences under Section 1 of the Bribery Act 2010, England and Wales, 2011 to 2017

Outcome

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Proceeded against

1

1

4

2

2

5

7

Found guilty

-

1

2

2

2

4

3

Sentenced

-

1

2

2

2

4

3

Of which

Absolute discharge

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Conditional discharge

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Fine

-

-

-

-

-

-

Community sentence

-

-

-

-

-

1

-

Suspended sentence

-

1

-

-

-

-

2

Immediate custody

-

-

2

2

2

3

1

Otherwise dealt with

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Compensation

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Source: Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act 2010: Post Legislative Scrutiny Memorandum, Cm 9631, June 201852: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/713452/bribery-act-2010-post-legislative-scrutiny-memorandum.pdf [accessed 4 March 2019]

Table 2: Defendants proceeded against at magistrates’ courts and found guilty and sentenced at all courts, for offences under section 2 of the Bribery Act 2010, England and Wales, 2011 to 2017

Outcome

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Proceeded against

-

-

2

1

-

1

9

Found guilty

-

1

1

5

1

-

6

Sentenced

-

1

1

5

1

-

5

Of which

Absolute discharge

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Conditional discharge

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Fine

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Community sentence

-

-

-

1

-

-

-

Suspended sentence

-

-

-

-

1

-

4

Immediate custody

-

1

1

4

-

-

1

Otherwise dealt with

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Compensation

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Source: Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act 2010: Post Legislative Scrutiny Memorandum, Cm 9631, June 2018: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/713452/bribery-act-2010-post-legislative-scrutiny-memorandum.pdf [accessed 4 March 2019]

47.There are a number of factors which explain why the number of prosecutions has been low. As previously noted, bribery has historically been prosecuted at a relatively low rate, and there are inherent difficulties in detecting a crime in which victims may well be unaware that an offence has been committed against them. In practice, most cases of bribery appear to be detected only if the crime is unsuccessful (as, for example, when a bribe is rejected and the attempt is then reported to police), when a whistle-blower, often at substantial personal risk, reports suspicious occurrences within their own organisation, or when a company self-reports. As Commander Baxter made clear:

“it is a very private offence, where those offering the bribe and those receiving it are completely satisfied with that arrangement. Therefore, the victim, who is generally in another business or a member of the public, is often unaware that the bribe and an offence has taken place.”53

48.Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) offer an additional tool for detecting bribery. This system requires certain businesses and individuals to submit reports to the NCA if they know or suspect that a person may be engaged in money laundering or dealing in criminal property. While not specifically concerned with the detection of bribery, as a formalised mechanism mandating the reporting of intelligence relating to financial crime, they could assist in this area. Indeed, when the CEO of Skansen self-reported an act of bribery to the City of London Police, he also submitted a SAR to the NCA.54 However, Pinsent Masons were critical of their use for these purposes to date, explaining that:

“In our experience, suspicious activity reports to the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) concerning suspicions of bribery that arise in the context of corporate transactions rarely result in any form of follow up investigation by the police or other agencies, although we understand there have been a number of enhancements in how this intelligence gathering is disseminated across agencies.”55

49.This is supported by the NCA’s annual report on SARs for 2018, which states that the 22,619 Defence Against Money Laundering (DAML) SARs (a form of pre-clearance, in which permission is requested from the NCA to proceed with a deal which the requestor suspects could have money laundering implications), resulted in only 40 arrests, across 28 cases, and £51,907,067 in money prevented from going to suspected criminals.56 There was a 20% increase in the number of DAML SARs compared with the previous year. In total 463,938 SARs were received by the NCA between April 2017 and March 2018, which was an increase of 10% on the previous year.

50.When we asked the NCA what role SARs played in the detection of bribery, and how many cases had been detected in this way, Donald Toon, the Director of Prosperity (Economic Crime and Cyber Crime) at the National Crime Agency, confirmed that they provide a “valuable source of intelligence for law enforcement agencies”, and that they contribute to tackling “a range of threats, including bribery”.57 However, he did not provide any figures or examples of situations in which an incident of bribery had been detected through the SARs regime.

Reporting mechanisms

51.Evidence suggests that the means for reporting bribery offences to police are not always clear. As the City of London Police informed us, there is “no single law enforcement or intelligence body within England and Wales [which] leads on routinely receiving information relating to bribery and corruption activity”, and it is “not clear to the public who corruption and bribery should be reported to”.58

52.No single centralised mechanism exists for reporting bribery offences (although there are means to report online through the SFO and NCA websites),59 as there is with fraud through Action Fraud, which may contribute to the low rates of prosecutions. As Commander Baxter of the City of London Police, who help to run Action Fraud, explained, they “have learned much from being the lead force on Action Fraud”, including the various risks and issues associated with it.60 They emphasised that, while the system helps them to investigate cases, it also provides a wealth of intelligence with which they can actively help businesses better protect themselves against these crimes in the first place. She noted that while they had recently applied to the Home Office for £1.2 million in order to extend the Action Fraud database and reporting mechanisms to include bribery and corruption, this bid was not successful.

53.The Home Office has however committed to launching a new reporting mechanism for allegations of bribery and corruption, in line with the Government’s Anti-Corruption Strategy, and is currently investigating the options. The Government’s first annual update on its Anti-Corruption Strategy, published in December 2018, describes this as an ongoing commitment, with scoping work having been undertaken during the course of the year.61

54.We commend the Home Office’s decision to look at options for a centralised reporting mechanism for bribery.

Alternative offences

55.Bribery may also be prosecuted under a range of offences besides the Bribery Act, or its antecedent Acts. For example, misconduct in public office, a common law offence which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, appears to be preferred by prosecutors in cases where a public official is involved. In recent years the charge has undergone something of a modern revival, and is presently used far more often than the Bribery Act—in 2017/18 alone there were 106 misconduct in public office prosecutions, up from just two in 2005.62 This is despite CPS guidance which advises that “where there is clear evidence of one or more statutory offences, they should usually form the basis of the case, with the ‘public office’ element being put forward as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes”.63

56.Other potential charges include fraud by abuse of position under the Fraud Act 2006, the use of money laundering provisions under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and more specialist legislation such as the Offender Management Act 2007, for use in relation to prisons.64 Furthermore, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has the capacity to impose fines on regulated companies for lax procedures in relation to bribery and corruption, under section 206(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.65 It has done so on several occasions in the last eight years, although as Mark Steward, Executive Director of Enforcement and Market Oversight at the FCA, was keen to emphasise to us, these measures are primarily aimed at prevention, while they have standing arrangements with the NCA, City of London Police, HMRC and the SFO to ensure they identify relevant cases.66

57.We did not receive enough evidence one way or the other to say whether it would have been preferable to substitute charges for offences under the Bribery Act for any of these charges. However, the evidence we have received suggests the choice may come down to convenience or habit over reasoned consideration. Commander Baxter said that “a bit like muscle memory, people tend to go back to misconduct in public office rules as opposed to using what is perceived as the newer legislation”, and that with time and further training, greater use of the Bribery Act would be seen.67

58.Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) reported that it had never seen an instance of the Bribery Act used to prosecute prison officers. While noting that the CPS, rather than the HMPPS, decides on the charges to be brought, they suggest that it is generally easier to prove offences under the Offender Management Act or misconduct in public office, which is why they are used instead:

“If a member of staff is paid by a prisoner to perform an official function or activity improperly (e.g. not to conduct searches of prisoners, prison cells, visitors etc. at all or to the required standard), this is arguably a bribe. However, our understanding is that it is much more difficult to prove this as an offence under the Bribery Act 2010. The common law offence of Misconduct in Public Office can more easily be proven and does not need to show that a member of staff was offered or accepted a bribe.” 68

59.Nevertheless, the Law Commission, which has been examining misconduct in public office for several years now, has observed that it has been subject to extensive criticism by the Government, the Court of Appeal, the press and legal academics, and their recent consultation found that a majority of respondents believed it was in need of reform.69 While their final report is still pending, they have made clear that “it would be undesirable either to retain the existing offence or to attempt to codify it in statute”, and they expect to recommend abolishing the offence and replacing it with more precisely defined statutes.

60.The appropriate use of misconduct in public office charges is a separate issue being considered by the Law Commission, and we make no recommendation on this. However we believe that conduct which constitutes an offence under the Bribery Act should not be prosecuted as the common law offence of misconduct in public office.

Minor offences

61.The relative sparsity of cases appears to have much to do with the kinds of cases which are investigated and brought to trial. As can be seen in Box 1, most of the earliest cases brought under the Bribery Act were of a relatively minor nature, involving bribes of less than £10,000, and in many cases less than £1,000. However, since then these appear to have been displaced by larger corporate cases, usually involving far greater sums of money.

Box 1: Early prosecutions under the Bribery Act 2010

The first conviction under the Bribery Act 2010 came shortly after the Act came into force, when a court clerk at Redbridge Magistrates’ Court was sentenced to three years for bribery and six years for misconduct in a public office, to be served concurrently, after he pleaded guilty to accepting a £500 bribe in exchange for nullifying a speeding ticket. His sentence was reduced on appeal to four years.70

In the second case prosecuted under the Act, an individual attempted to persuade a local council official to alter the result of a test to obtain a taxi driving licence, with offers of £200 and £300. He received a two-month prison sentence, suspended for 12 months, and a two-month curfew order.71

In 2013 a postgraduate student at a UK university who failed to pass his dissertation was prosecuted for offering his professor a £5,000 bribe, which was refused. After pleading guilty to bribery and possessing an imitation firearm,72 he was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay £4,800 in prosecution costs.73

Section 13 defence

62.In their written evidence, Transparency International UK highlighted section 13 of the Bribery Act 2010, subsection (1) of which states:

“It is a defence for a person charged with a relevant bribery offence74 to prove that the person’s conduct was necessary for—

(i) the proper exercise of any function of an intelligence service, or

(ii) the proper exercise of any function of the armed forces when engaged on active service.”

63.The section 13 defence does not apply to the section 6 offence of bribery of a foreign public official for a business purpose,75 or to an offence under section 1 which would also be an offence under section 6. The defence is therefore of limited applicability, but it would for example apply if a bribe was offered to a foreign official to reveal security information.

64.Transparency International UK argued that “section 13 is not required, and its current drafting is too broad and open to abuse”, as other mechanisms exist to protect military and intelligence personnel in exceptional circumstances where bribes may be necessary to their work. They also argued that due to the “large number of secondments that occur between the UK defence and arms export departments and defence companies exporting to high corruption risk countries”, this defence could be used to protect corrupt defence company personnel.76

65.When asked whether there was evidence that section 13 had ever been used as part of a legal defence, Susan Hawley, speaking on behalf of Corruption Watch, said there was not.77 However, she maintained that it was possible this had not entered the public domain. Ben Wallace MP, Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime at the Home Office, seemed to confirm that this was indeed the case, stating:

“It will have been used … We do not comment publicly on how many times and how it is used, or on what issues. That is obviously in the nature of our intelligence services. The Intelligence and Security Committee has the ability to scrutinise and ask the intelligence agencies about how many occasions they have used it and why. I think it was in the law for a good reason: to make sure that our Crown servants, in carrying out their most important duty of protecting this country, have the facility to do what they need to do to keep us safe.”78

66.In supplementary evidence to the Committee, the Government stated that the section 13 defence has “not been used in any cases conducted by or on behalf of the MOD. Likewise, the SFO has not seen the use of Section 13 in any of its cases to date.” They further said:

“The defence is tightly constrained in that it is only available to members of the intelligence services; members of the armed forces engaged on active service; or civilians subject to service discipline when working in support of members of the armed forces engaged on active service. In other words, the defence is not available to the defence industry so it is difficult to see how it could discourage prosecutions relating to that industry.”79

67.We invite the Intelligence and Security Committee to take evidence on the extent to which the section 13 defence is being used, and whether its use can in each case be justified; and, if they think fit, to make recommendations for the amendment or repeal of the provision.

Enforcement agencies

68.The agencies concerned with investigating acts of bribery include local police forces, the City of London Police where more complex financial activities are involved, and the National Crime Agency when a case is national in scope or connected to organised crime. The CPS is primarily responsible for prosecuting these cases, while the Serious Fraud Office, following the Roskill model, integrates both the investigation and prosecution of the largest and most complex cases. Many of our witnesses felt that even if enforcement agencies were prosecuting bribery offences sparingly, they were relatively effective when such cases did emerge.80 However, delays, and the potential under-resourcing of the relevant agencies, were raised as persistent issues.

Delays

69.Particular criticism was reserved for the SFO’s handling of cases, with many witnesses criticising the time it takes for charges to be brought and cases to reach trial. The law firm Baker McKenzie stated that, based on their experiences and on information in the public domain, SFO bribery investigations take an average of four and half years, while Clifford Chance noted that they could take five or six years to conclude.81 Sean Curran, a solicitor with experience in this area, highlighted the lack of updates which clients often faced when dealing with the SFO, while property seized from companies could often take “well over a year” to be returned.82 Neil Swift, a partner at Peters and Peters, said he had clients “who are interviewed and then will not hear anything from the SFO for 12, 15 or 18 months,” while Amanda Pinto QC, then Vice-Chair Elect of the Bar Council and now Vice-Chair, concurred, with some of her clients “left adrift literally for years”.83

70.Criticisms about the lengthy nature of investigations were not limited to the SFO though, and several witnesses told us of equivalent delays in investigations and prosecutions conducted by the police and the CPS.84 For example, Ian Pigden-Bennet, the former CEO of Skansen, explained to us that despite taking the decision to self-report the company to the City of London Police in March 2014, 21 months elapsed before the company was informed that it might have contravened section 7 of the Bribery Act.85 It took a further 14 months before a company shareholder and a non-executive director were cautioned and interviewed, and only in March 2017—around three years after the initial self-report—was the company formally charged under section 7.

71.As Clifford Chance emphasised in their written evidence, these delays could impose a significant “financial and operational burden” on companies, as well as a personal impact on individuals being investigated.86 Several witnesses argued that the excessive duration of these investigations pointed towards fundamental issues within the SFO, such as a lack of effective systems for keeping investigations on track, or a lack of resources.

72.When we raised these criticisms with the relevant agencies, they denied that the slow pace of investigations was in any way indicative of internal issues, and instead told us that they resulted from the often large and complex nature of bribery cases. In particular, the extraordinary quantities of evidence which often have to be examined and disclosed were highlighted—the Metropolitan Police Service told us that “due to the lack of technical solutions, documents require manual analysis and with hundreds of thousands of documents in each case this review can take over 18 months to complete.”87 Lisa Osofsky, Director of the SFO, highlighted the Rolls-Royce case, in which 30 million documents had to be analysed,88 and in a more recent speech mentioned a case in the pipeline involving more than 100 million documents.89 The SFO have, however, begun to experiment with the use of artificial intelligence for document sifting, with a pilot system used during the Rolls-Royce case, which was able to scan documents for legal professional privilege content 20,000 times faster than a human lawyer and led to savings of 80% in the area in which it was used.90 The SFO is now deploying this and other AI-powered systems across its new casework. The use of this complex and sometimes opaque technology will require careful and considered oversight to ensure that new issues, such as unforeseen biases in algorithms, do not inadvertently cause problems for investigations. Nevertheless, we find developments in this field encouraging, and believe this technology will provide substantial assistance in speeding up complex bribery cases in the future.

73.Cases can be further delayed by a variety of other factors. Those with an international element may involve lengthy communications with foreign agencies.91 Once an investigation has been completed, it can often be difficult to secure scarce court time in order to actually try a case—Corruption Watch observed that the SFO often has to wait over a year just to get a court slot for one of its cases to be heard.92

74.However, there were internal issues within the SFO and the CPS which were brought to our attention. We received evidence regarding the impact of relatively low salaries for lawyers and investigators at the SFO and the CPS, by comparison with their private sector counterparts. Peters and Peters noted that the SFO were often losing staff to city law firms, while Louise Hodges, a partner at Kingsley Napley, told us that “there is an issue about whether you can pay for the quality of people that you may want to investigate and deal with [bribery] cases”.93 When we asked the SFO about the potential impact of staff turnover on casework, Ms Osofsky noted that while “there will be a number of staff changes during the life of a typical SFO investigation”, this is not unique to the SFO, and she did not accept that casework “has ever been significantly reduced or adversely affected by turnover of staff”.94 Turnover since 2012 has remained consistent at around 14% of permanent staff, and they expect this to remain the case for 2018/19. Despite this assurance, we believe turnover must be a significant factor behind the slow pace of SFO investigations, which should be investigated further.

75.Max Hill QC, Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), downplayed the issue when asked whether the requirement to seek the personal consent of the DPP for every bribery prosecution (dealt with later in this chapter) might be a factor behind the delays:

“… we reserve to ourselves the right, in general crime and in specialised areas such as this, to say to the investigator, whoever that might be, that a little more work needs to be done before we reach the charging point. That is not delay. It is certainly not a bottleneck. It is the prosecuting authority taking care to ensure that in each case where personal consent is granted, as here, the case is really ready to run.”95

76.The slow pace of investigations, and in particular the failure to update companies on their progress, is a matter of concern to us. Investigations of this nature can place a significant burden on companies in terms of the co-operation required of them by the authorities, the amount of scarce senior management time consumed in handling the issue, and the anxiety and loss of reputation they suffer in the meantime. This is especially the case for SMEs, which may lack the resources to cope. We appreciate that there will always be some cases which are more complex or involve international elements which will slow down investigations, but the evidence we have received suggests that there are excessive delays even in the majority of more straightforward domestic bribery investigations.

77.It is therefore of the utmost importance that the SFO, the police and the CPS do everything in their power to ensure that bribery cases progress as quickly as possible, and we are not convinced that this is currently occurring. The relevant agencies should consider the pace at which their investigations are conducted, and the frequency with which updates are provided to the concerned parties, and consider all appropriate means for speeding this process up. Improving the management of cases should be a priority.

78.We recommend that the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions publish plans outlining how they will speed up bribery investigations and improve the level of communication with those placed under investigation for bribery.

Financial resources

79.As can be seen in Figure 1, overall funding for the SFO has increased since the Bribery Act came into force, and last year there was a significant shift in the way this funding is allocated. Historically, the SFO received a set amount of ‘core’ funding every year, and was then required to apply to the Treasury to secure additional ‘blockbuster’ funding for expensive cases. This used to apply in any case which was forecast to cost more than 5% of the core budget, as, for example, with the Rolls-Royce investigation. This system drew criticism, including from the OECD, on the basis that a conflict of interest could arise if the Government did not want a prosecution to be pursued, although to date the Treasury has never refused this form of funding.96 A 2016 report by the CPS Inspectorate recommended that the SFO could provide better value for money if its core funding was increased and it was made less reliant on blockbuster funding.97

Figure 1: SFO Funding 2010–2018

Line chart showing funding to SFO from 2010-2018 (£m)

Source: SFO, ‘Changes to SFO funding arrangements’ (19 April 2018): https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2018/04/19/changes-to-sfo-funding-arrangements/ [accessed 4 March 2018]

80.In response to these criticisms, and a request from Jeremy Wright QC MP, the then Attorney General, to look into the matter, the Government announced in April 2018 that the SFO’s core budget would be increased from £34.3 million, as originally earmarked for this year, to £52.7 million.98 Under the new arrangements, the SFO can still call on the Treasury for blockbuster funds to cover costs above £2.5m on a single case in a given year, but it is expected that there will be less need for this with an increased core budget, and the SFO accordingly expects these changes to be fiscally neutral in practice.99

81.Contrary to the claims of some of our witnesses,100 Ms Osofsky made clear to us that she did not consider funding to be an issue at present:

“We have not faced the sad day when we cannot bring a case because we do not have the money. I would not want that to happen in my lifetime. Given the [new] funding structure, I am confident that I will not face that. At this point, my sense is that we have the finance that we need—for now, provisionally.”101

Training

82.We received evidence from the City of London Police which suggests that comprehensive training on the Bribery Act may be lacking in many police forces. In their written evidence to us they explained that:

“Following the implementation of the Bribery Act very few police forces were given training and advice so knowledge of legislation was low. This resulted in a slow start for prosecutions and continued use of Fraud by Abuse of Position, where a bribery charge might have been more appropriate.”102

83.Anti-bribery training is provided to police officers as part of professional standards training provided by the College of Policing—however, this appears to be focused primarily on preventing internal police corruption, rather than in the use of the Act for investigations. The City of London Police have developed a five-day training course in bribery and corruption investigations, but this is not a standard course, and is therefore “subject to policing priorities and budgets of individual forces”.103 The City of London Police said that since 2013 they have trained over 130 delegates across 12 of the 43 police forces in England and Wales. The NCA also cited the City of London Police’s assistance in training officers in the International Corruption Unit.104

84.As noted earlier in this chapter, a lack of familiarity with the Act may in turn contribute to a tendency to use alternative charges, like misconduct in public office or fraud, instead of sections 1 and 2 of the Bribery Act. In many cases these alternative charges may be more appropriate. But every force in the country should have officers available who fully understand the Bribery Act.

85.A lack of awareness of and training on the Bribery Act may be a contributing factor in the lack of bribery prosecutions. The Government should provide the resources for the City of London Police’s Economic Crime Academy to expand its anti-bribery training programme, and should ensure that every police force has at least one senior specialist officer who has undertaken the training.

Interagency co-operation

86.Following the agreement of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997, a four-phased international inspection process was introduced, overseen by a Working Group on Bribery (WGB). In its Phase 3 Report for the UK, the WGB expressed concerns about co-operation between enforcement agencies with regard to corruption.105 In particular, it highlighted issues surrounding the assignment of cases between the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (which until 2013 regulated financial conduct, before being replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)) and the SFO, and the SFO’s reluctance to pursue parallel criminal proceedings where the FSA had already brought a civil action. They concluded that “the SFO and FSA should conduct coordinated enforcement actions where appropriate [as the] FSA’s fines … may not fully reflect the gravity of the criminality in a case”.

87.Their subsequent Phase 4 Report, published in 2017, suggests that this situation has not sufficiently improved, noting a “limited level of mobilisation in the FCA in relation to foreign bribery-related offences”.106 However, the report does note that several agencies, including the FCA, the NCA, the City of London Police and the SFO, had updated their Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with regard to corruption investigations, and that a further MoU was being prepared at that time. This would include HMRC and the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (which is now part of the NCA). When we heard from France Chain, Senior Legal Analyst at the Anti-Corruption Division of the OECD, she re-iterated the OECD’s assessment as of 2017, but could not comment on any further progress the UK may have made since then.107 At the time of writing, a further update from the OECD on this is due this month.

88.When we put the OECD’s assessment to Mark Steward, Executive Director of Enforcement and Market Oversight at the FCA, he made clear he did not accept that it was accurate, and said that the FCA would be writing to the OECD for clarification on this.108 Hannah von Dadelszen, Head of Fraud at the SFO, concurred on this point.109 Edward Argar MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice, also rejected the OECD’s assessment on this point, and stated that he believed “there are effective intelligence-sharing mechanisms in place between the enforcement agencies, including the SFO and the FCA.”110

89.The National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) was cited by several witnesses as one of the principal ways in which the Government and law enforcement agencies are aiming to improve co-operation with regard to economic crime, including bribery.111 This was announced alongside the Government’s Anti-Corruption Strategy in December 2017, with the aim of coordinating the national response to economic crime, and “will draw on expertise from across government, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, as well as new resources provided by the private sector”.112 It formally began operations on 31 October 2018, with approximately 55 staff members and a budget of around £6 million. While being based within the NCA, it also draws on resources from HMRC, the City of London Police, the Home Office, the FCA and other relevant agencies.

90.However Ben Wallace MP also accepted “there is not enough intelligence on bribery” and “our knowledge of that landscape is not good enough”, which is why the Government is also establishing a National Assessment Centre (NAC) for economic crime, including bribery, to facilitate improved intelligence sharing.113 Ministers stated that this will provide all the co-operation that is needed.

91.The Phase 4 Report also identified problems in the working relationship between law enforcement authorities in England and Wales, and in Scotland:

“Scottish law enforcement officials appeared to have limited involvement and expertise on foreign bribery issues. They were not aware of the MOU which regulates foreign bribery case attributions [i.e. the Memorandum of Understanding to which COPFS, CPS, FCA, SFO and others are party], even though COPFS is a party to it, or of the regular meetings to discuss cases … This lack of awareness of Scottish law enforcement authorities and their absence in the Clearing House discussions is regrettable, particularly given that Scotland has a growing economic presence and Scottish industries operate internationally in industrial sectors sensitive to corruption, such as mining, and oil and gas.”114

92.When we asked Gillian Mawdsley, Secretary of the Criminal Law Committee of the Law Society of Scotland, for her views on this, she acknowledged that “communication is something we could all look at, on both sides of the border”.115 She suggested that the MoU which covers cross-border jurisdiction in terrorism cases might be a model for improvement, as it is “a public document and is clear for everybody”.116 James Wolffe QC, the Lord Advocate, told us he could not comment on the accuracy of claims by the OECD that Scottish prosecutors had not been in attendance at meetings of the UK Bribery, Corruption and Sanctions Evasion Threat Group and the Foreign Bribery Intelligence Clearing House at the time of their review, but stated that senior Scottish prosecutors do now attend those meetings.117 He told us he was “as confident as I can be that we have good channels of communication with our colleagues and counterparts in other parts of the UK”.

93.The OECD has criticised a lack of co-operation and co-ordination between the many different bodies involved in the investigation and prosecution of bribery. We wait to see whether the National Economic Crime Centre will provide the necessary central focus. The Scottish prosecution authorities should have a permanent presence.

Consent to prosecution

94.Section 10 of the Bribery Act provides that no proceedings for an offence under the Act may be instituted in England and Wales except by or with the consent of the DPP, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, or the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions. There is an equivalent provision for Northern Ireland. There are further detailed provisions requiring such decisions to be taken by the Directors in person, and specifying the very limited circumstances in which a decision can be taken on their behalf by a person authorised by them.

95.This differs from the norm in England and Wales, where the general provision for prosecutions is section 1(7) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 which allows any Crown Prosecutor (not just a Chief Crown Prosecutor) to give consent on behalf of the DPP, though they must exercise their powers under the direction of the DPP.118

96.Before the Bribery Act, all previous bribery legislation required that the consent of the Attorney General should be obtained before a prosecution could proceed.119 The decision to lower this level of consent to the level of the respective prosecutorial directors was not without controversy—the Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill discussed this proposal at length, noting the need to strike a balance between prosecutorial independence on the one hand, and parliamentary accountability on the other.120 They also noted the broader context of the time, in which the powers of the Attorney General more generally were being reconsidered by the Government, and the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill had earlier rejected the Government’s proposal to remove the Attorney General’s power to direct prosecutions.121

97.Ten years after the requirement for prosecutorial consent was changed from the Attorney General to Director level, some witnesses told us that the level was still too high, and should be brought into line with general provisions for prosecution. Mike Betts of the City of London Police told us that in practice, “the Bribery Act is perceived to be for use only at the highest echelons, because of the consent that is required”, and this was similarly the case with previous legislation.122

98.When we asked Mr Argar what the Government’s view on this was, he rejected any suggestion that the high level of authorisation required was limiting prosecutions, and said that “the bar is probably correctly set and operating in a way that allows it to be used efficiently”.123 Ben Wallace MP also emphasised that there were questions of national security and the public interest in at least some bribery cases, and the DPP “is therefore perfectly positioned” to be able to make those decisions.124

99.Ms Osofsky explained that, due to the serious and high level nature of the SFO’s cases, all of them require her personal consent in order to proceed to prosecution, but this is an administrative matter, which does not require any statutory provisions.125 When we asked Mr Hill about the consent question, while acknowledging that it did require him to personally sign off every bribery prosecution, regardless of the seriousness of the case, he denied that it created any bottleneck in the process, partly because the number of prosecutions was so low.126 However, when questioned further, he was open to the idea of a “more flexible regime” which did not require his personal consent, and suggested that in low-level cases, the authorisation of a regional Chief Crown Prosecutor might be appropriate.

100.We believe the statutory requirement is inflexible and unnecessary. There will of course be situations (for example, section 6 offences, or those involving foreign powers) where the DPP may wish to reserve to himself particular categories of offence, and this is entirely appropriate. This can however be done without a statutory provision.

101.The current requirement for prosecutions to be initiated only with the written consent of one of the Directors is too rigid. Subsections (3) to (7) of section 10 of the Act should be repealed and replaced by a provision allowing the Directors to delegate the power to initiate proceedings to officials, as they see fit. Subsections (8) to (10) should be repealed and equivalent provisions substituted for Northern Ireland.

102.There are no provisions in the Act for consent to prosecution in Scotland. We deal with the position there in Chapter 9.127

Vicarious liability

103.A number of witnesses called for the replacement of the identification principle in English law with a vicarious liability regime, as is the case in the United States.128 The identification principle is a central feature of English corporate law, which requires that any successful prosecution of a business needs to demonstrate that the controlling minds of the business (usually the board of directors) were aware of the criminal actions, and possessed the necessary mens rea. A number of witnesses argued that this model is inherently disadvantageous to SMEs, compared with large companies (especially transnational corporations), as it is much easier to identify the controlling minds of a small company and hold them responsible.129

104.Transparency International UK advocated the US approach to corporate liability, in which a corporation is liable for the acts or omissions of an employee which take place in the course of that employee’s employment (vicarious liability).”130 In their view, “this new statutory form of vicarious liability should retain the ‘adequate procedures’ defence in order to incentivise prevention of bribery as part of corporate good governance.”

105.The SFO told us that reliance on the identification principle:

“leads to the inequitable position that it is far easier to fix small, owner-managed companies with the requisite knowledge and intent than large, multi-national corporations. The practical reality is that in a multi-national company, the few people who could embody the ‘directing will and mind’ of the company will not necessarily involve themselves in the company’s operations in the same way as a director of a smaller, family-run enterprise. Therefore and perversely, larger companies, which have the potential to cause greater harm, are less likely to be found criminally liable for their wrongful acts.”131

106.Successive directors of the SFO have long argued in favour of adopting vicarious liability, and Ms Osofsky made clear to us that she shares this view. She said that, if a vicarious liability regime were to be introduced,

“we might find ourselves less hamstrung by the identification principles. We might make better progress against some of the larger, fair-fight opponents of the SFO. I am willing to take them on. I wish the law was completely in my court, because I would like to be able to show just how much that is a challenge I welcome. But for now it is harder.”132

107.However, a number of our witnesses were vigorously opposed to any move to introduce vicarious liability into English corporate criminal law. Eoin O’Shea, a Partner at Reed Smith and Chair of the Corporate Crime and Corruption Committee of the City of London Law Society, emphasised that the identification principle was “a hugely difficult topic” that has been the subject of considerable debate over the years. He argued that in his experience, the idea that “big companies are aware of the nature of the identification principle and so organise their affairs in such a way as to insulate senior management from any identified decision-making, and therefore the company from criminal liability” was not a widespread reality.133 Amanda Pinto QC told us she personally would be “very unhappy” if the law ever moved towards vicarious liability in corporate cases, and questioned what the purpose of such a move would be—”if it is to get money back by confiscation and compensation” alone, then “that does not seem the right reason for criminalising” corporations vicariously.134 Neil Swift, a partner at Peter and Peters, concurred, explaining that one of the main problems with vicarious liability as a model is “that it puts too much of a focus on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, so it would be up to the SFO whom it decides to prosecute”.135

108.Ultimately a majority of witnesses believed that section 7, which allows companies to be prosecuted if they fail to prevent bribery by their employees, and which we discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, was a reasonable compromise.136 We are of the opinion that section 7 deals more than adequately with the question of corporate responsibility for offences committed by the servants or agents of companies, without the potential unintended consequences of a shift to a vicarious liability regime, which would represent a major shift in corporate law more generally.

109.There are arguments for amending the general law to make corporations vicariously liable for offences committed by their employees and agents. However this goes beyond offences under the Bribery Act. We do not make any recommendation for a change in the law.

The Government’s Anti-Corruption Champion

110. The role of Anti-Corruption Champion has existed since 2004, is a personal appointment of the Prime Minister, and has had seven incumbents: Hilary Benn MP, John Hutton MP (now Lord Hutton of Furness),137 Jack Straw MP, Kenneth Clarke MP, Matt Hancock MP, Eric Pickles MP (now Lord Pickles) and John Penrose MP, appointed in December 2017.

111.A 2017 Government submission described Mr Penrose’s job as:

112.The role is supported by a small team of civil servants, the Joint Anti-Corruption Unit (JACU). The Government explained that JACU was:

“a joint integrated unit, co-ordinating anti-corruption work across government, representing the UK at international anti-corruption fora and providing support to the Anti-Corruption Champion. It is also responsible for developing strong relationships with business, civil society and foreign governments.”139

In particular, it noted that the JACU meets with the Champion on a weekly basis to discuss the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy, in particular the 134 actions which are identified as areas of concern.

113.JACU was initially located in the home department of the minister in question (respectively the Department for International Development, Business, the Ministry of Justice, and Business again), before moving to the Cabinet Office, and since December 2017 is now in the Home Office. The Government told us that the most recent shift was to “enable better co-ordination of domestic and international anti-corruption efforts and to promote stronger links between anti-corruption and other economic and organised crime”.140

114.The role was originally attached to a Cabinet Minister, before moving to a former Cabinet Minister. At the time of his appointment, and when he gave evidence to our Committee, Mr Penrose was a backbench MP, although he has since been appointed as a Minister of State in the Northern Ireland Office. When we asked whether this growth in responsibilities for Mr Penrose might detract from his work as Anti-Corruption Champion, we were assured that he remains “fully committed to his role”, and cited the capabilities of the JACU in supporting the Champion.141 As well as providing a private office function, this support included:

“arranging and briefing the Champion on meetings with key stakeholders both inside and outside government, developing policy initiatives in conjunction with and on the request of the Champion, providing expert policy advice, supporting the Champion at international fora and organising the Inter-Ministerial Group which the Champion co-chairs alongside the Security Minister.”142

115.Ensuring that the Government’s Anti-Corruption Champion is a sufficiently high-level office-holder, with appropriate access to other ministers and senior officials, is crucial for ensuring that decisions relating to corruption are acted on and seen through to completion. We believe that the right individual should be a minister to have the necessary influence to act as the Government’s Anti-Corruption Champion, and should be provided with the appropriate support and resources.


46 The scope of UK bribery law was first extended by sections 108–110 (now repealed) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which was intended to bring the UK into compliance with the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

47 Compared with five signatories who were judged to be moderate enforcers, eight with little enforcement, and 22 with “little or no enforcement”. Written evidence from Monty Raphael QC (BRI0016), Control Risks (BRI0014), Edmund Malesky and Nathan Jensen (BRI004), Dan Hough (BRI0021).

48 Written evidence from Dr Nicholas Lord (BRI0019)

49 Supplementary written evidence from Nicola Hewer and Michelle Crotty (BRI0049)

50 Written evidence from Dr Nicholas Lord (BRI0019)

51 These can include insufficient evidence or evidential difficulties, a lack of suspects, pending decisions, a victim or witness withdrawing their support, or a case being proceeded against under alternative charges (for example, fraud or misconduct in public office).

52 The number of defendants found guilty in a particular year may exceed the number proceeded against as the proceedings in the magistrates’ court took place in an earlier year and the defendants were found guilty at the Crown Court the following year; or the defendants were found guilty of a different offence to that for which they were originally proceeded against. This also applies to Table 2.

53 Q 106 (Commander Karen Baxter)

54 Written evidence from Ian Pigden-Bennett (BRI0053). See Chapter 6, para 220, Box 4.

55 Written evidence from Pinsent Masons LLP (BRI0041)

56 National Crime Agency, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Annual Report 2018 (December 2018): http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/suspicious-activity-reports-sars/992-2018-sars-annual-report/file [accessed 12 February 2019]

57 Supplementary written evidence from Donald Toon, NCA (BRI0061)

58 Written evidence from City of London Police (BRI0022)

59 Supplementary written evidence from National Crime Agency (BRI0052)

60 108 (Commander Karen Baxter)

61 HM Government, United Kingdom Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017–2022, Year 1 Update (December 2018), p 44: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/769403/6.5128_Anti-Corruption_Strategy_Year1_Update_v7_web.pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]

62 Q 106 (Commander Karen Baxter); Law Commission, Misconduct in Public Office Issues Paper 1: The Current Law (January 2016): http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/app/uploads/2016/01/misconduct_in_public_office_issues-1.pdf [accessed 4 March 2019]

63 Crown Prosecution Service, Legal Guidance, Misconduct in Public Office (July 2018): https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/misconduct-public-office [accessed 4 March 2019]

64 Written evidence from Dr Nicholas Lord (BRI0019) and Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (BRI0050)

65 Written evidence from Dr Nicholas Ryder (BRI0010)

66 113 (Mark Steward)

67 Q 106 (Commander Karen Baxter)

68 Written evidence from Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (BRI0050)

69 Law Commission, Reforming Misconduct in Public Office: A Consultation Paper (September 2016): https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2016/09/cp229_misconduct_in_public_office.pdf [accessed 21 January 2019]

70 ‘Freedom of Information request shows more Bribery Act 2010 prosecutions’, Jonathan Armstrong, Cordery Compliance Ltd (14 May 2015): https://bis.lexisnexis.co.uk/blog/posts/anti-bribery-and-corruption/freedom-of-information-bribery-act-2010-prosecutions [accessed 4 March 2019]

71 Ibid.

72 As the individual put the money away, a loaded air pistol fell out of his pocket.

73 ‘Freedom of Information request shows more Bribery Act 2010 prosecutions’,Jonathan Armstrong, Cordery Compliance Ltd (14 May 2015): https://bis.lexisnexis.co.uk/blog/posts/anti-bribery-and-corruption/freedom-of-information-bribery-act-2010-prosecutions [accessed 4 March 2019]

74 That is, an offence under section 1 which is not also an offence under section 6; an offence under section 2; and inchoate offences relating to those: see section 13(6) of the Act.

75 We consider the section 6 offence in Chapter 5.

76 Written evidence from Transparency International UK (BRI0003)

77 Q 39 (Susan Hawley)

78 Q 197 (Ben Wallace MP)

79 Supplementary written evidence from Government Ministers (BRI0059)

80 Written evidence from Stewarts Law (BRI0043), Monty Raphael QC (BRI0016), Peters and Peters Solicitors LLP (BRI0028), Greenberg Traurig (BRI0026)

81 Written evidence from Baker McKenzie LLP (BRI0030) and Clifford Chance LLP (BRI0036)

82 Written evidence from Mr Sean Curran (BRI0048)

83 Q 164 (Neil Swift and Amanda Pinto QC)

84 Written evidence from the Metropolitan Police Service (BRI0035), Stewarts Law (BRI0043), Corruption Watch (BRI0039), Law Society of England and Wales, the City of London Law Society and the Fraud Lawyers Association (BRI0025)

85 Written evidence from Ian Pigden-Bennett (BRI0053) See further Chapter 6, paras 218–26.

86 Written evidence from Clifford Chance LLP (BRI0036)

87 Written evidence from Metropolitan Police Service (BRI0035)

88 Q 157 (Lisa Osofsky). The figure given by Hannah von Dadelszen, the Head of Fraud at the SFO, was 40 million, see Q 117..

89 Serious Fraud Office, Speeches, ‘Ensuring our country is a high risk place for the world’s most sophisticated criminals to operate’ (3 September 2018): https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2018/09/03/lisa-osofsky-making-the-uk-a-high-risk-country-for-fraud-bribery-and-corruption/ [accessed 4 March 2019]

90 Serious Fraud Office, News Releases, ‘AI powered ‘Robo-Lawyer’ helps step up the SFO’s fight against economic crime’ (10 April 2018): https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2018/04/10/ai-powered-robo-lawyer-helps-step-up-the-sfos-fight-against-economic-crime/ [accessed 12 February 2019]

91 Written evidence from Metropolitan Police Service (BRI0035)

92 Written evidence from Corruption Watch (BRI0039)

93 Peters & Peters Solicitors LLP (BRI0028), Q 138 (Louise Hodges)

94 Supplementary written evidence from the Serious Fraud Office (BRI0051)

95 Q 156 (Max Hill QC)

96 Q 19 (Michelle Crotty)

97 HM Crown Prosecution Inspectorate, Inspection of the Serious Fraud Office governance arrangements (May 2016), p 2: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmcpsi/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/05/SFO_May16_rpt.pdf [accessed 3 January 2019]

98 Caroline Binham, ‘SFO core budget boosted by 50% after funding criticism’, Financial Times (19 April 2018): https://www.ft.com/content/a5830aa8-43ec-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b [accessed 4 March 2019]

99 Serious Fraud Office, Statements, ‘Changes to SFO funding arrangements’ (19 April 2018): www.sfo.gov.uk/2018/04/19/changes-to-sfo-funding-arrangements/ [accessed 4 March 2019]

100 Written evidence from Law Society of England and Wales, the City of London Law Society and the Fraud Lawyers Association (BRI0025), Baker McKenzie (BRI0030), Fraud Advisory Panel (BRI0020), Monty Raphael QC (BRI0016)

101 Q 157 (Lisa Osofsky)

102 Written evidence from City of London Police (BRI0022)

103 Ibid.

104 Q 189 (James Mitra)

105 OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United Kingdom (March 2012), pp 29–30: https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/UnitedKingdomphase3reportEN.pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]

106 OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report: United Kingdom (2017), p 30: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/UK-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]

107 Q 100 (France Chain)

108 Q 116 (Mark Steward)

109 Q 116 (Hannah von Dadelszen)

110 Q 198 (Edward Argar MP)

111 Q 195 (Ben Wallace MP), Q 187 (Donald Toon), Q 108 (Commander Karen Baxter), written evidence from SFO (BRI0018)

112 Home Office, ‘Home Secretary announces new national economic crime centre to tackle high level fraud and money laundering’ (11 December 2017): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-secretary-announces-new-national-economic-crime-centre-to-tackle-high-level-fraud-and-money-laundering [accessed 15 January 2019]

113 Q 195 (Ben Wallace MP)

114 OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report: United Kingdom (2017) p  31: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/UK-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf [accessed 9 January 2019]

115 87 (Gillian Mawdsley)

116 Q 89 (Gillian Mawdsley)

117 146 (James Wolffe QC)

118 There are other statutes where consent is required for the commencement of prosecutions (not always from the DPP), including the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, section 18; the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, sections 3, 155, 173, 196 and 224; and the Data Protection Act 2018, section 197.

119 Q 192 (Edward Argar MP)

120 Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill, Draft Bribery Bill (First Report, Session 2008–09, HC 430, HL Paper 430), pp 58–60

121 Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill (Report of Session 2007–08, HC 551, HL Paper 166), pp 34–37

122 Q 106 (Mike Betts)

123 Q 192 (Edward Argar MP)

124 Q 193 (Ben Wallace MP)

125 Q 156 (Lisa Osofsky)

126 Q 156 (Max Hill QC)

127 Paras 354–59

128 Written evidence from Serious Fraud Office (BRI0018), Transparency International UK (BRI0003), Corruption Watch (BRI0039), Lord Garnier QC (BRI0038)

129 Written evidence from Serious Fraud Office (BRI0018), Corruption Watch (BRI0039), Q 136 (Rodney Warren and Louise Hodges)

130 Written evidence from Transparency International UK (BRI0003)

131 Written evidence from the Serious Fraud Office (BRI0018)

132 Q 157 (Lisa Osofsky)

133 Q 136 (Eoin O’Shea)

134 Q 165 (Amanda Pinto QC)

135 Q 165 (Neil Swift)

136 See paras 170–171.

137 A member of this Committee.

138 UK Submission to the UN Convention against Corruption, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: United Nations Convention against Corruption 24 November 2017, pp 7–8: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/SA-Report/2018_01_09_UK_SACL.pdf [accessed 4 March 2019]

139 Supplementary written evidence from HM Government (BRI0059)

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid.

142 Ibid.




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