Regulating in a digital world Contents

Chapter 4: Market concentration

Introduction

121.Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple (the ‘GAFAs’) are sometimes known as the ‘Big Four’ as they have grown at remarkable rates.129 Microsoft is nearly 45 years old and remains a major presence online. Dr Shehar Bano said: “Over time the internet has evolved into an ecosystem dominated and controlled by a small number of large online platforms—resulting in centralisation and monopolies.”130 These platforms operate at an unprecedented scale. All five have a market value of over $400 billion. Facebook alone has 2.7 billion active monthly users across its services.131 Google argued that the position of these five companies “does not reflect a lack of innovation in that space or a certainty over what will happen going forward. We thrive on innovation and feel we are operating in a very competitive environment.”132 Table 2 shows the major services that these companies provide across several different digital markets (bold indicates the biggest services in the market).

122.The Government told us that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is reviewing “the UK’s competition tools in the context of digital markets to make sure the powers are effective in responding to the new digital challenges.”133 This is part of a wider competition law review. The review will consider “whether the current competition regime is sufficiently equipped to respond to the rapid changes taking place to business models in the digital economy. It is also seeking evidence on how it should address platforms, agglomeration, algorithms and the consolidation of competitors.” On 2 August 2018 the Government appointed Professor Jason Furman to lead an expert panel for this review.134

123.Dr Damian Tambini told us that the public-policy debate around internet regulation had come about “because these info platforms now play a crucial infrastructure role in most of our lives. Therefore they are too important and powerful to ignore.”135

Competition and digital markets

124.Competition law prohibits abuse of market dominance. While dominance by itself is not prohibited, dominant businesses have a responsibility to ensure that their conduct does not distort the market. Professor Pinar Akman did not think that “dominance and market power on their own are a cause for concern … What would be a cause for concern is if companies engage in conduct that is anticompetitive, distorts competition and ultimately harms consumers.”136 Size might be a “result of superior efficiency and being better than one’s rivals”.

Table 2: Digital markets

Google

Facebook

Apple

Microsoft

Amazon

Search

Google

Bing

Own product search

Mail

Gmail

iCloud mail

Outlook

Messaging

Hangouts

Messenger WhatsApp

iMessage

MSN Messenger, Yammer

Maps

Google Maps, Google Earth, Waze

Apple Maps

Bing Maps, StreetSide

Social networking

Google+

Facebook, Instagram

LinkedIn

Twitch/

Goodreads

Cloud

Drive, Google Cloud Platform

iCloud

Azure, OneDrive, SkyDrive

AWS, Amazon Drive

Autonomous vehicles

Waymo, Android Auto

AppleCar (software)

Software investment

Voice-activated assistants

Google Home

Messenger Bots

Siri

Cortana, others

Echo/Alexa

Advertising

AdWords, AdSense, DoubleClick, Tag Manager

In News Feed Audience Network

Bing Ads

Amazon Advertising

Source: Diane Coyle, ‘Practical competition policy implications of digital platforms’ March 2018, p 9: https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Practical_competition_policy_tools_for_digital_platforms.pdf [accessed 2 January 2019]

125.Regulators generally assess abuse of market dominance on a case-by-case basis after undertaking a detailed analysis of the market concerned. First a specific market must be identified in which a company has a dominant position.137 For the purposes of competition law, this can be a complex exercise taking account of demand-side and supply-side substitutes, so the question would always be whether the company concerned holds a dominant position in a relevant market. Javier Ruiz Diaz, Policy Director, Open Rights Group, said, “One of the fundamental problems with competition law is that we do not have a good definition of what the market is … There is no social media [or search engine] monopoly category”.138 Where there are several strong players it is more difficult to establish dominance of a single firm and collective dominance is difficult to establish.

126.Competition law focuses on maximising competition within markets to avoid economic detriment to consumers, using the ‘consumer welfare standard’—an assessment of the individual benefits derived from consumption. Traditionally, in the case of mergers for example, the analysis would consider issues such as whether efficiencies gained by dominant or merging companies would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, or whether it would still be possible for new entrants to break into the market.139

127.The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the UK regulator for competition and consumer law, told us that it did not intervene in markets unless the intervention:

128.Witnesses were concerned that traditional analyses have not been effective in responding to digital platforms. The CMA conceded that the online economy posed challenges to the use of its powers, such as:

129.In our report UK advertising in a digital age we found that the digital advertising market was opaque and dominated by Google and Facebook. We called on the CMA to conduct a ‘market study’—a broad ‘health check’ of a market—to see how it was operating and to ensure that it was working fairly for consumers and businesses.

Network effects and market share

130.Many witnesses noted that online platforms benefit from network effects. This is where the value of a service to users increases the more users it has. For example, telephones are useful only if other people have them; they are more useful as the number of other users increases. For online platforms this can lead to a ‘winner takes all’ outcome. Doteveryone warned: “Many tech companies are loss-making until they reach a critical mass of users. After this point network effects … often mean a platform can quickly become dominant in a short period of time.”142

131.As noted in the previous chapter, large online platforms control large datasets, which give them a competitive advantage. Professor Lilian Edwards told us that can lead to a virtuous circle for incumbent platforms which can build proprietary data siloes.143 The Open Data Institute were particularly concerned by the control that platforms have of large data assets and of “the attention of users who help to maintain and improve those data assets through their use of the online platform’s services. This control limits how that data is used, reducing innovation and competition.”144

132.As noted above, the largest online platforms operate across a range of markets. The British Computer Society told us that some companies sold products and services at a loss in one market to generate data that were valuable to them in other markets, as with the Amazon Echo device. It added: “The effects of combining data across different markets, and their influence on competition and consumer welfare, are not yet clear.”145

133.Many witnesses from the tech industry argued that, notwithstanding the size of online platforms, digital markets remained dynamic and innovative. Facebook told us that it was an industry “where stakeholders have an enormous amount of choice and there are constant new opportunities. We are committed to seeing a healthy ecosystem which will continue to flourish.”146

134.The Entrepreneurs Network and Adam Smith Institute argued consumer choice was not limited by the size of online platforms because they can “use multiple social networking services all at once (multi-homing) (e.g. Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, Twitter, Tumblr, and Slack)”.147 The largest online platforms offered intense competition to one another, given their pattern of venturing into markets outside their core business. For example, Google “handles 75% of global search requests but competes intensely in other markets such as the more lucrative product search markets (where Amazon has greater market share).”148

135.Witnesses said that online platforms could not take their current market shares for granted in the face of future competition. The Entrepreneurs Network and Adam Smith Institute noted that “MySpace was previously seen as an unassailable monopoly before Facebook eventually won out.”149 The British Computer Society said that, while there was a tendency for monopolies to develop online, it was not realistic at this early stage of its history to expect the internet to mature.150

136.The Entrepreneurs Network and Adam Smith Institute cited tech companies’ heavy investment in research and development as evidence of this dynamic competition: “For instance, in 2014 Facebook spent $2.1bn on research and development representing 21% of its total revenue. By way of comparison, in the same year research-intensive pharma companies such as Roche, Novartis, or Pfizer did not spend more than 19% of total revenue on R&D.151 However, it is unclear how far research and development has benefitted tech companies’ customers.

137.The British and Irish Legal Education and Technology Association cautioned that “a case can be made that it is not the GAFAs … that one should be concerned about. China’s internet giants Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (the BATs) are now taking the lead, interacting with customers beyond China’s boundaries and posing a risk to the global financial marketplace. In fact, the BATs seem to be much more active and dynamic than the GAFAs.”152

138.However, Professor Patrick Barwise believed that the position of the GAFAs had probably become entrenched because “the economic properties of platform markets are such that normal processes of competitive creative destruction may not work: data driven dominance enables social media to become entrenched and see off competitive entrants.”153

Cross-subsidisation and intermediation power

139.The two-sided nature of intermediaries allows them to shift costs from the demand to the supply side. Consumers may therefore benefit from free or discounted goods and services. Amazon told us this sort of discounting was “just retailing.”154 However, because of network effects both suppliers and consumers may be effectively locked-in to using the services of large intermediaries. Javier Ruiz Diaz of the Open Rights Group said: “Anyone who has dealt with public procurement on Oracle has horror stories about the vendor lock-in that Oracle imposes on people.”155

140.The British Computer Society provided another example of this ‘lock-in’ effect and the high costs associated with switching services. Amazon Web Services provides a computing service for app-developers which involves “software teams writing code to directly interface with the Amazon Service. To move that away from Amazon, would likely turn into a multi-year project of re-writing a significant amount of an application or service, while being at the mercy of Amazon changing things in the interim. Ultimately, there is a danger of companies being beholden to one supplier, as there is not an alternative platform that people could use.”156

141.The Law Society of Scotland said that there was a danger where an operator of a marketplace platform was a goods seller:

“This can manifest itself in a number of ways which centre around the ability to collect and manipulate data … a platform sells a particular category of consumer goods. It collects data on the preferences of those consumers which it can use to predict market trends. But it can also use that data to identify the best-selling products in that category at the current time … From a consumer perspective, this can lead to a reduction in the range of available products.”157

142.Heike Schweitzer, a Professor of Law at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, has recommended that ‘intermediation power’ should be recognised as a source of dominance. He described this as:

“the power of platform intermediaries when other firms depend on their services for access to sales and procurement markets. Whether such platforms enjoy market power should not depend on whether the platform’s activity is qualified as ‘providing intermediation services to suppliers’ or ‘demanding products or services on behalf of buy-side customers.’ The platform’s market power must be evaluated based on its concurrent roles for the different market sides that it brings together.”158

Mergers and takeovers

143.Large tech companies have been active in acquiring smaller, innovative start-ups. For example, Google has acquired more than 200 start-ups, including DeepMind, since 2001. Antony Walker of techUK said that the founders of many businesses aspire for them to be bought, and in his view there was nothing wrong with that.159 Some said that they were likely to take an ever larger share of the ‘smart’ economy and even banking.160

144.Some acquisitions can move these companies into unexpected new markets—most notably Amazon’s purchase of Whole Foods Market. The British Computer Society said that “With many services and sectors yet to be fully digitalised, there are concerns that large tech companies will gain an unfair advantage in emerging online markets.”161 Professor Pinar Akman warned that anti-competitive mergers between companies which do not appear to be competitors can escape proper scrutiny.162

145.The nature of digital markets poses a problem in applying traditional competition law on mergers and takeovers. The CMA acknowledged a global debate as to whether “authorities’ consideration of such mergers has had adequate regard to the advantage that incumbents enjoy or have been too optimistic about the prospect of new entrants disrupting the status quo.”163

146.There was concern that leading tech companies could buy up potential competition before it could grow. Alex Hern of The Guardian told us Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram was perhaps the biggest recent failure of regulation. Instagram was probably the greatest risk to Facebook’s monopoly, although it was not providing exactly the same service: “It was slicing off a part of Facebook that people engage with very strongly, which was the photo-sharing part, and creating a social network that could quite healthily run parallel to Facebook.”164

147.Dr Andrea Coscelli, Chief Executive of the Competition and Markets Authority, discussed the advantage of a public interest type test for digital mergers. He noted that there were three public interest categories for mergers: “One is media plurality, which was used in the context of the Fox-Sky review; the second is national security; and the third is financial stability. Parliament could add a fourth category, say, the creation of data monopolies.”165 He noted that there would be advantages and disadvantages to such a policy. On the one hand, it would create uncertainty around the acquisition of companies which might discourage foreign direct investment. On the other, it would give the CMA greater flexibility to make a judgement in the public interest. Whereas at present case law and the law on consumer welfare might prevent the CMA from intervening in an acquisition even if it were concerned about the accumulation of too much data by a platform.

148.A similar point was made by Dr Orla Lynskey “we should be considering whether or not to use tools that are parallel or complementary to competition tools, such as the public interest test in the context of mergers, to assess that type of transaction. That type of test is currently used primarily in the context of media mergers, but we might be able to make some sort of analogy with the data protection context and say that the economic outcome of the transaction is not the sole consideration.”166

149.Mergers and acquisitions should not allow large companies to become data monopolies. We recommend that in its review of competition law in the context of digital markets the Government should consider implementing a public-interest test for data-driven mergers and acquisitions. The public-interest standard would be the management, in the public interest and through competition law, of the accumulation of data. If necessary, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) could therefore intervene as it currently does in cases relevant to media plurality or national security.

Price and consumer welfare

150.The emergence of online platforms which do not charge for access to their services (while collecting user data) poses a challenge to traditional notions of the consumer welfare standard, which tends to focus on price.

151.Doteveryone said that platforms selling products and services pose a challenge if they “deploy variable pricing and it can be hard to gauge where this practice is fair and where it’s discriminatory. And on marketplace platforms, the price paid by a seller may differ from the amount received by a buyer and competition regulators also need to consider if all sides of this dynamic are treated fairly.”167

152.Dr Damian Tambini said:

“Consumer interests are often constructed in narrow terms and in particular in relation to price. Lina Khan points out in her excellent essay that Amazon’s long-term strategy of achieving market dominance through low price, while sacrificing short and medium term profits has had the additional benefit to Amazon of providing a good deal of immunity from competition law as it appears to regulators that Amazon’s low prices indicate the degree of consumer benefit.”168

153.Amazon’s Director of Public Policy, UK & Ireland, told us: “I do not think for a second that we have any interest in taking out competitors. That is not how it works.”169

154.Price is not the only consideration in undertaking the consumer welfare test. After all, users pay for ‘free’ services with their attention which generates data and advertising revenue. The summary of the European Commission decision on the Google Search (Shopping) case, in which Google was fined €2.4 billion, states “The conclusion holds notwithstanding the fact that general search services are offered free of charge.”170 Professor Coyle, however, argued that “Although competition guidelines often pay lip service to quality and other characteristics as features of competition, in practice there is focus on price as it is definitionally crisp and easier to measure.”171 She noted that the Competition and Markets Authority Merger Assessment Guidelines refer almost entirely to price.

155.On consumer detriment unrelated to price, many witnesses were concerned about restriction of consumer choice and lack of motivation for improvement. Sky noted a European Commission review which found the following problems which might not exist if consumers could switch services more easily: “unexplained changes in terms and conditions without prior notice; lack of transparency related to the ranking of goods and services; unclear conditions for access to, and use of, data collected by providers; and a lack of transparency regarding favouring of providers’ own competing services.”172 The British Computer Society explained that there are difficulties with predicting this: “There have never previously been so few companies with such overarching control of global communication and data. The main concern is that some platforms now control such an amount of critical infrastructure and communication systems that it stops alternatives from ever being able to succeed.”173 Doteveryone suggested:

“Taking a more holistic view of consumer welfare, considering issues such as consumer privacy, value of personal data and the ability of consumers to switch between services, can give regulators a better understanding of how consumers’ interests are affected by digital technologies.”174

156.However, Professor Pinar Akman, a competition law academic, thought that the consumer welfare standard should not expand to include non-economic concerns. She said:

“[The consumer welfare standard] is far from perfect, but, of the other options we have, it is the most concrete … If we include other concerns that might be more political or might have to do with issues that the competition authority cannot really deal with in its assessment, we turn the business environment into a very uncertain one, which will put off businesses from investment and innovation.”175

157.Professor Diane Coyle stated that many of the challenges presented by the dominance of platforms reflected a longstanding dilemma in competition assessments, which was how to weigh “static against dynamic efficiency”.176 Static efficiency was concerned with how well a market was currently functioning. Dynamic efficiency took account of the development of new products and services. Professor Coyle argued that, while the current focus of regulation was on problems associated with static competition, more attention to should be paid to “the scope for disruptive technological innovation and the dynamic consumer benefits of investment”.

Competition law responses

158.Competition law interventions rely on meticulous and cautious assessments of complex situations. Antony Walker, Deputy Chief Executive of techUK, questioned whether competition law “can keep pace and keep up. Competition law is necessarily quite slow, but innovation and companies scale incredibly quickly. We have seen that over the last few years, and the question is whether [competition law] can keep pace.”177 Doteveryone said that “Focusing on profitability as the primary indicator of market power can often mean that a regulator only intervenes after companies gain market dominance, at which point effective regulation becomes harder.”178

159.The result of this is that competition law interventions happen after problems become entrenched, rather than preventing them. Javier Ruiz Diaz of the Open Rights Group said that “the remedies for individuals can be either non-existent or difficult. They have to go through several hoops to get a benefit at the end.”179 Professor Edwards said: “Legal solutions such as competition law actions are on historical evidence, likely to be long drawn out and less successful than technical solutions, which should at least be promoted alongside.”180 We discuss these technical solutions below.

160.The modern internet is characterised by the concentration of market power in a small number of companies which operate online platforms. These services have been very popular and networks effects have helped them to become dominant. Yet the nature of digital markets challenges traditional competition law. The meticulous ex post analyses that competition regulators use struggle to keep pace with the digital economy. The ability of platforms to cross-subsidise their products and services across markets to deliver them free or discounted to users challenges traditional understanding of the consumer welfare standard.

161.In reviewing the application of competition law to digital markets, the Government should recognise the inherent power of intermediaries and broaden the consumer welfare standard to ensure that it takes adequate account of long-term innovation. The Government should work with the CMA to make the process for imposing interim measures more effective.

162.We take this opportunity to repeat the recommendation that we made in our report ‘UK advertising in a digital world’ that the CMA should undertake a market study of the digital advertising market. We would be grateful for an update from the Government and the CMA.

Other consequences of concentration

163.Market dominance can cause other, non-economic, harms to society and individuals. Dr Orla Lynskey explained:

“Competition law is relevant in so far as it is the primary legal instrument available to us to regulate and constrain private market power in any way. However, competition law is not designed with the intention of remedying human rights problems or other problems that fall outside the remit of the concept of consumer welfare.”181

164.Jamie Bartlett raised concern about the future impact on society: “Mega-tech monopolies in the next 10 years will do incredible harm to democracy but not to consumer welfare. It would be brilliant for consumer welfare but not for the health of democracy.”182

165.A number of witnesses said that online platforms had become ‘gatekeepers’, controlling access to the internet. The London Internet Exchange said:

“Almost any action or behaviour is wholly reliant on one or more intermediaries: the internet access provider, the domain name registry, the website or social media platform, the search engine etc. In the offline world, an actor can frequently act on their own, and are alone accountable for their action. In the online world, if a necessary intermediary chooses to intervene to suppress the action, the actor is sanctioned”.183

166.Dr Shehar Bano said that this may have benefits: “For example, by providing users with a convenient way to publish and discover content without bothering about the intricate technical details. But the ability of a few large players to influence information flows of billions of users over the internet threatens users’ right to free and fair access to information.”184 Dr Paul Bernal noted that the market dominance of online platforms gave them “immense power” which was coupled with power derived from the algorithms they use to “control what we see, read and hear”.185

167.As discussed in chapter 2, openness should be an essential quality of the internet and we believe that it should be a fundamental principle for regulation (including self-regulation). This is vital as the internet enables users to engage with democratic debate and exercise their rights to freedom of expression and information. Dr Shehar Bano said that online platforms should have “the responsibility to fairly offer their services to users, without any discrimination”.186

168.The role of gatekeeper has given platforms significant power over the media. The Internet Society said this had particular implications for younger people, who access much of their news from platforms. It continued:

“Concerns about media empires with too much dominance in newspapers or TV coverage, should equally apply to online platforms where it is now common for a single provider to dominate a service sector (Facebook for social networks, Google for search). As shown by Facebook’s own study (2012 US elections impact on likelihood to cast a vote), they have the power to influence voting behaviour.”187

169.Which? suggested that users view large tech companies as utilities in the sense that people feel that they have little choice but to use them.188 Professor Leighton Andrews, Cardiff Business School also suggested that online platforms may be considered as “performing a utility function”.189 He noted that Mark Zuckerberg has spoken of Facebook as “a social utility” or “social infrastructure”. This had historically been a justification for regulation. While the situation of Facebook and Google was different, they had significant market power. At the very least, he said, “Their potential for exploitation by hostile state actors, as we have seen in both the US Presidential election and in the UK’s EU referendum, means that they should be seen as critical social infrastructure.”190

170.The concentration of platforms affects how they respond to online harms. The Northumbria Internet & Society Research Interest Group referred to the significant power imbalance “where individuals are not able to negotiate the terms and there is in effect no real ‘choice’ at all.”191 All Rise Against Cyber-Abuse said, “The dominance of the online platforms and the scale of their userbase reduces the likelihood of consumers voting with their feet if they hear of, see or experience cyber abuse. With little competition, comes little motivation and little innovation in solving this problem.”192

171.Online communications platforms act as gatekeepers for the internet, controlling what users can access and how they behave. They can be compared to utilities in the sense that users feel they cannot do without them and so have limited choice but to accept their terms of service. Providers of these services currently have little incentive to address concerns about data misuse or online harms, including harms to society

172.It is appropriate to put special obligations on these companies to ensure that they act fairly to users, other companies and in the interests of society. These obligations should be drawn up in accordance with the 10 principles we have set out earlier in this report and enforced by a regulator.

Data rights, portability and interoperability

173.The internet was founded on principles of openness and interoperability. Professor Derek McAuley and his colleagues at Horizon told us that this environment was now being restricted by isolated “walled gardens” where dominant players control the software ecosystem.193 This can result in ‘lock-in’ for suppliers and end users and result in high switching costs.

174.Some witnesses suggested that the new right to data portability under the GDPR, which gives individuals the right to request access to and move certain types of personal data between organisations, may improve this situation and make digital markets more competitive. The Government told us that it had commissioned research to understand “how greater portability could make a real difference to competition, and to engage with business to understand what actions are needed to deliver these benefits”.194

175.Dr Damian Tambini told us that in practice the effectiveness of data portability will depend on a range of interpretations:

“Will it in fact be possible for you to download your entire Facebook history, photos, friends, delete them from Facebook and transplant them into a competitor social network? That is the policy solution that would fuel real competition, but it is one that Facebook and co will fight tooth and nail to prevent.”195

176.The right to data portability under the GDPR may be too limited as it applies only to data which users upload, rather than data which is inferred about them. Robert Colvile of the Centre for Policy Studies, for example, suggested that it was restrictive in not allowing users to export their “social graph” (information about their network of contacts) to another site.196

177.Professor Lilian Edwards told us that the right of data portability would not be sufficient “to limit platform power and control over user data in contexts like social networking. Users will not leave platforms where all their friends are unless they think they can continue to interact with them. What they need is data interoperability for this.” She warned that “Regulation to promote true interoperability is vital as the market alone will always reject it as a threat to proprietary advantage.”197 The Open Rights Group suggested that “platforms could be forced to maintain a greater degree of interoperability and permeability—for example, so that people outside of Facebook can contact people using Facebook.”198

178.Professor Edwards suggested that personal data containers or “edge computing” might be a solution to the problem of privacy which could improve interoperability. Instead of users contributing their data to platforms, who then provide services like search or social networking, the user keeps their own data and applies processes to it.199 Mark Bridge of The Times told us about an example of this being developed by Sir Tim Berners-Lee. He felt that it would be “fantastic” if it worked but cautioned that “The big incumbents, Facebook and Google, are so convenient. That is the thing: people will trade a lot for convenience.”200

179.It is too early to say how effective the right to data portability will be. It has the potential to help counteract the switching costs which lock users into services by giving them more autonomy over and control of their data. This will require greater interoperability. Portability would be more effective if the right applied to social graphs and other inferred data. The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation should play a role developing best practice in this area. The Information Commissioner’s Office should monitor the operation and effectiveness of this right and set out the basis on which it will be enforced.



129 Written evidence from BILETA (IRN0029)

130 Written evidence from Shehar Bano (IRN0114)

131 ‘“2.7 billion people can’t be wrong”: Here’s what Wall Street is saying about Facebook earnings’ Markets Insider (31 January 2019): https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/facebook-stock-price-earnings-revenuewall-street-2019-1-1027913555 [accessed 5 February 2019]

133 Written evidence from Her Majesty’s Government (IRN0109).

134 HM Treasury, ‘Former Obama advisor to examine digital competition in the UK’ (2 August 2018): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/former-obama-advisor-to-examine-digital-competition-in-the-uk [accessed 26 February 2019]

135 Written evidence from Dr Damian Tambini (IRN0101)

137 Diane Coyle, ‘Practical competition policy implications of digital platforms’ (March 2018): https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Practical_competition_policy_tools_for_digital_platforms.pdf [accessed 2 January 2019]

139 Diane Coyle, ‘Digital platforms force a rethink in competition theory’, Financial Times (17 August 2017): https://www.ft.com/content/9dc80408–81e1-11e7-94e2-c5b903247afd [accessed 2 January 2019]

140 Written evidence from the Competition and Markets Authority (IRN0100)

141 Written evidence from the Competition and Markets Authority (IRN0100)

142 Written evidence from Doteveryone (IRN0028)

143 Written evidence from Lilian Edwards, Professor of eGovernance (IRN0069)

144 Written evidence from the Open Data Institute (IRN0073)

145 Written evidence from Doteveryone (IRN0028)

146 Written evidence from Facebook (IRN0098)

147 Written evidence from the Entrepreneurs Network and Adam Smith Institute (IRN0070)

148 Written evidence from the Entrepreneurs Network and Adam Smith Institute IRN0070)

149 Written evidence from the Entrepreneurs Network and Adam Smith Institute (IRN0070)

150 Written evidence from BCS, the Chartered Institute for IT (IRN0092)

151 Written evidence from the Entrepreneurs Network and Adam Smith Institute (IRN0070)

152 Written evidence from BILETA (IRN0029)

153 Written evidence from Dr Damian Tambini (IRN0101)

156 Written evidence from BCS, the Chartered Institute for IT (IRN0092)

157 Written evidence from Law Society of Scotland (IRN0057)

158 Heike Schweitzer, ‘Modernising the law on abuse of market power’ (12 October 2018): https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/10/modernising-law-abuse-market-power [accessed 26 February 2019]

160 Written evidence from BILETA (IRN0029)

161 Written evidence from Doteveryone (IRN0028)

163 Written evidence from the Competition and Markets Authority (IRN0100)

164 Q 160 (Alex Hern)

167 Written evidence from Doteveryone (IRN0028)

168 Written evidence from Dr Damian Tambini (IRN0101)

170 Summary of Commission decision of 27 June 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, (OJ C9/11, 12 January 2018)

171 Diane Coyle, ‘Practical competition policy implications of digital platforms’ March 2018: https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Practical_competition_policy_tools_for_digital_platforms.pdf [accessed 2 January 2019]

172 Written evidence from Sky (IRN0060)

173 Written evidence from British Computer Society (IRN0092)

174 Written evidence from Doteveryone (IRN0028)

176 Diane Coyle, ‘Practical competition policy implications of digital platforms’ March 2018: https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Practical_competition_policy_tools_for_digital_platforms.pdf [accessed 2 January 2019]

177 Q 49 (Antony Walker)

178 Written evidence from Doteveryone (IRN0028)

180 Written evidence from Lilian Edwards, Professor of eGovernance (IRN0069)

183 Written evidence from LINX (IRN0055)

184 Written evidence from Dr Shehar Bano (IRN0114)

185 Written evidence from Dr Paul Bernal (IRN0019)

186 Written evidence from Dr Shehar Bano (IRN0114)

187 Written evidence from Internet Society UK Chapter (IRN0076)

188 ‘Control, Alt or Delete? The Future of Consumer Data’ Which? (4 June 2018) https://www.which.co.uk/policy/digitisation/2659/control-alt-or-delete-the-future-of-consumer-data-main-report [accessed 26 February 2019]

189 Written evidence from Professor Leighton Andrews (IRN0041)

190 Written evidence from Professor Leighton Andrews (IRN0041)

191 Written evidence from NINSO (IRN0035)

192 Written evidence from All Rise Say No to Cyber Abuse (IRN0037)

193 Written evidence from Horizon Digital Economy Research Institute (IRN0038)

194 Written evidence from Her Majesty’s Government (IRN0109)

195 Written evidence from Dr Damian Tambini (IRN0101)

196 Supplementary written evidence from the Centre for Policy Studies (IRN0111)

197 Written evidence from Lilian Edwards, Professor of eGovernance (IRN0069)

198 Written evidence from Open Rights Group (IRN0090)

199 Written evidence from Lilian Edwards, Professor of eGovernance (IRN0069)

200 Q 160 (Mark Bridge)




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