41.In March 2012, we published our report on Judicial Appointments.23 It examined who should be responsible for the appointment of judges in England and Wales and Justices of the Supreme Court, and what the substantive criteria governing those appointments should be. It also set out concerns about the lack of diversity on the bench and made a number of recommendations to improve the judicial appointments process.
42.Five years on, we decided it was timely to conduct a short follow-up inquiry to examine the progress that has been made. As part of our annual evidence sessions with the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, and the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court, we took evidence on these subjects.24 We also heard from the Chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission and representatives of the Law Society, the Bar Council and the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives.25
43.We expect to publish a report with our findings later in this session.
44.Our report on the Investigatory Powers Bill, published on 8 June 2016, also examined judicial issues.26 We were concerned that the Bill permitted the Prime Minister—subject to the consultation—to appoint Judicial Commissioners. Given the nature of their proposed role—and the expectation that they would be senior members of the judiciary—we questioned whether the arrangement would be consistent with the separation of powers principle, and with the constitutional interest in securing public confidence in the independence and impartiality of those who are appointed to judicial roles.
45.The Government acknowledged this argument, and during the Committee stage of the Bill in the House of Lords, tabled an amendment to the effect that the Prime Minister could only appoint a Judicial Commissioner after receiving a concurrent recommendation from the Heads of the Judiciary and the Lord Chancellor.
46.We also raised concerns about a Henry VIII power in the Bill that allowed the Government to modify certain functions of the Judicial Commissioners, and recommended that they should be limited to extending or augmenting functions to keep pace with technological change. The Government argued that, as the power was subject to the affirmative procedure, there was sufficient parliamentary oversight.27
23 Constitution Committee, Judicial Appointments (25th Report, Session 2010–12, HL Paper 272)
24 Annual oral evidence taken with the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, 1 March 2017 (Session 2016–17), QQ 1–14; Annual oral evidence taken with the Lord Chief Justice, 22 March 2017 (Session 2016–17), QQ 1–13; Annual oral evidence taken with the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court, 29 March 2017 (Session 2016–17), QQ 1–12
25 Oral evidence taken with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission, 1 March 2017 (Session 2016-17), QQ 1–10; Oral evidence taken with the President of the Law Society of England and Wales, Chairman of the Bar Council Equality and Diversity and Social Mobility Committee, Bar Council of England and Wales, and the Vice-President of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives, 15 March 2017 (Session 2016-17), QQ 21–34
26 Constitution Committee, Investigatory Powers Bill (3rd Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 24)
27 Letter from the Rt Hon. Earl Howe PC to the Chairman, 5 September 2016: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/constitution/Scrutiny/Government-response-Investigatory-Powers%20Bill-050916.pdf [accessed 27 June 2017]