Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations

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SUMMARY

The UK’s departure from the EU places a question mark over its future participation in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. As an EU Member State, the UK has influenced the development and planning of all missions and operations, and has led the EU’s flagship anti-piracy operation, EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta). After Brexit, the framework for the UK to participate in these missions and operations is unclear, and subject to negotiation.

We find that CSDP missions and operations have made a significant contribution to UK foreign policy priorities and been an important channel of UK influence—from tackling piracy to promoting the rule of law to peacebuilding in post-conflict states. The highly successful Operation Atalanta has brought together EU Member States and the wider international community in combating piracy in the Horn of Africa. Perhaps most importantly, the UK has been able to use CSDP missions and operations to encourage other EU countries both to develop their defence capabilities, and to participate in crisis management and defence operations.

CSDP missions and operations are relatively limited in scale, and tend to focus on lower-intensity crisis management, such as capacity building, reform and training. Operating in challenging and unstable environments, from Somalia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, they have often been slow to produce results. Their key competitive advantage, however, when compared to those conducted by NATO or the UN, is the EU’s ability to draw together military, political, diplomatic, economic and legal lines of operation in a comprehensive approach.

The UK’s principal contribution has been strategic guidance during the planning and review of missions and operations, including filling a small number of influential roles. The UK’s contribution of personnel to date has been limited: it has accounted for just 2.3% of total Member State contributions. We recognise that this has, in part, been a result of UK defence commitments across the globe. The UK has also provided assets—including naval vessels and aircraft—and troop reinforcements on standby for CSDP operations.

The UK will almost certainly continue to derive value from participation in current CSDP missions and operations after Brexit, particularly in the Western Balkans (Operation Althea and EULEX Kosovo), and in the Horn of Africa (especially Operation Atalanta). But the existing model for third country participation does not permit a role in planning and decision-making—it would not give the UK the influence that it currently enjoys. The UK will require a high level of political control to participate in military operations where service personnel undertake executive operations—such as Operation Atalanta.

The Government has set out high-level aspirations for co-operation with the EU on CSDP missions and operations, including involvement in “mandate development and detailed operational planning”. The level of influence the Government seeks goes well beyond the scope of the existing model for third country participation. Prospects for changes to this model are uncertain. The draft withdrawal agreement excludes the possibility of the UK maintaining the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta and suggests a much more limited role for the UK than that envisaged by the Government. We are concerned that the Government has yet to explain how its high-level aspirations
could be put into practice. We recommend that it urgently develop detailed proposals for future co-operation in the area of foreign policy and defence and transmit them to the EU before the June 2018 European Council meeting.

The UK’s sophisticated defence capabilities do not necessarily translate into leverage for the UK, because most EU missions and operations are at the lower end of the crisis management spectrum, and the UK’s participation in them is currently limited. The UK must decide whether to use the leverage afforded by its significant military capabilities to negotiate modifications to the current model for third country participation.

CSDP missions and operations—like sanctions policy, which we considered in our previous report—are a subset of wider foreign policy and engagement on security and defence with the EU. As a consequence, we recommend that the UK should seek to negotiate observer status in the Political and Security Committee after Brexit. Whatever agreement on CSDP missions and operations is reached with the EU, the Government will also need to invest significant resources in Brussels and in Member States’ capitals, to maintain influence from outside the structures of the EU.
Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. The EU deploys Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations overseas in support of peace-keeping, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security. It currently has 16 missions and operations—six military and ten civilian—in eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.2

2. In her speech to the Munich Security Conference on 17 February, the Prime Minister stated: “As we leave the EU and forge a new path for ourselves in the world, the UK is just as committed to Europe’s security in the future as we have been in the past. Europe’s security is our security … the United Kingdom is unconditionally committed to maintaining it.”3 The Government’s Foreign policy, defence and development—a future partnership paper stated that “the shared threats we face mean continued close co-operation is vital to both UK and EU interests”, and co-operation “should take as its starting point both our shared interests and the degree of engagement that has evolved through our membership of the EU”.4

3. Consistent with this aim, the Government has stated its interest in continuing to contribute to CSDP missions and operations after Brexit.5 This report considers their importance to the UK’s foreign policy priorities, and how the UK could participate in and influence missions and operations after it leaves the EU. It does not consider wider CSDP activities relating to the

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1 The EU runs both CSDP missions and operations. While civilian missions are always called ‘missions’, military tasks can be called either ‘missions’ or ‘operations’, depending on whether they contain an executive mandate (in which case they are termed an operation). In this report, we use the term ‘EU missions and operations’, but our witnesses did not always make the distinction clear.

2 European External Action Service (EEAS), ‘Military and civilian missions and operations’: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en [accessed 30 April 2018] EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine is sometimes listed with CSDP missions, but is not managed or funded by CSDP structures. For this reason, it is not considered in this report.


5 Ibid.
development of Member States’ defence capabilities, such as the European Defence Agency\(^6\) or Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO).\(^7\)

4. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of CSDP missions and operations, how they compare to other international crisis management missions, how they are developed and funded, and their value. It considers as examples EUFOR Althea (Operation Althea),\(^8\) EULEX Kosovo, and the missions and operations in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Somalia, EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Somalia—Operation Atalanta).\(^9\) Chapter 3 considers the importance of CSDP missions and operations to UK foreign policy priorities, and the UK’s contribution, with a focus on the missions and operations introduced in Chapter 2.

5. Chapter 4 explores third country participation in CSDP missions and operations, how this is structured, and the level of influence available to third country participants. Chapter 5 considers UK participation in CSDP missions and operations after Brexit, including the desirability of such ongoing engagement, and the Government’s aspirations. It considers how likely these are to be realised, including the UK’s leverage, the possible frameworks for UK participation in CSDP missions and operations, and how these compare to the EU’s initial position on the negotiations. It also considers the UK’s approach to the negotiations and transitional arrangements.

6. This report is based on an inquiry undertaken from January to March 2018 by the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee, whose members are listed in Appendix 1. We are grateful to our witnesses, who are listed in Appendix 2. Members of the External Affairs Sub-Committee also visited the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta at Northwood in February 2018. The Sub-Committee’s call for evidence, which was launched on 12 January 2018, is reprinted in Appendix 3.

7. **We make this report for debate.**

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\(^6\) The EDA supports the development of defence capabilities and military co-operation among Member States, stimulates defence research and technology, strengthens the European defence industry, and acts as a military interface to EU policies. European Defence Agency (EDA), ‘Mission’: https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Missionandfunctions [accessed 30 April 2018]. See also Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency (recast) OJ L 266/55 (13 October 2015).

\(^7\) PESCO is “a Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations.” EEAS, Permanent Structured Cooperation—PESCO (9 March 2018): https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_factsheet_pesco_permanennt_structured_cooperation_en_0.pdf [accessed 30 April 2018]. See also Council of the European Union, Council Decision establishing Permanent Structured (PESCO) and the participating Member States (8 December 2017): http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32000/st14866en17.pdf [accessed 30 April 2018].

\(^8\) Hereafter, Operation Althea.

\(^9\) Hereafter, Operation Atalanta.
CHAPTER 2: CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

The development of the Common Security and Defence Policy

8. The CSDP is a subset of the EU’s wider Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Defence and foreign policy co-operation between EU Member States developed in parallel over several decades, as outlined in Box 1.

Box 1: The development of CSDP and CFSP

The idea of creating a common defence policy for European countries dates back to 1948, when the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence (‘The Treaty of Brussels’) was signed by the UK, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Following the failure of a plan to establish a European Defence Community (EDC), the Treaty of Brussels was modified in 1954 and used as the basis on which the Western European Union (WEU), an organisation created to foster co-operation on defence and security between European countries, was established. It included a collective self-defence clause (Article V of the Treaty of Brussels establishing the WEU).

In parallel, a common EU foreign policy was gradually developed. In 1970, the six Member States established the European Political Co-operation, which was a purely intergovernmental process that included regular consultation on foreign policy issues and the harmonisation of positions. In 1986, this cooperation was included in the Single European Act.


11 The European Defence Community was proposed in 1950 by René Pleven, French Premier and former Defence Minister. The so-called Pleven Plan proposed the creation of a European army, with the eventual involvement of West German units, to be placed under a single military and political European authority. Although the proposal was accepted by most Western countries, concerns about German rearmament and the supranational control of forces remained, particularly in France. The proposal was rejected by the French National Assembly in August 1954. CVCE, ‘The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC)’: https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/1c8aa583-8ec5-41c1-9ad8-73674ca7f4a7/bd191c42-0f53-4ecc-0-a60a-c33c72c747c2 [accessed 30 April 2018] and Daniel Fiott, ‘European Defence, 60 years after the Treaty of Rome’, European Defence Matters (2017): https://www.eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue13/opinion/european-defence [accessed 30 April 2018]

12 The founding members of the WEU were the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and Germany. The WEU replaced the Western Union.


14 The six Member States were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
The CSDP was formally established under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.\textsuperscript{15} It also included elements of the development of a European common defence policy: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”\textsuperscript{16}

However, any decisions with defence implications were still taken through the WEU: “The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU) ... to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.”\textsuperscript{17} The operational range of the WEU had been agreed in the so-called Petersberg tasks in 1992. They included humanitarian aid, rescue operations, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, joint disarmament operations, military advice, assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks.\textsuperscript{18}

The wording of the Maastricht Treaty was, as Lord Ricketts, former British Ambassador to France, former UK National Security Advisor, and former Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, observed, a compromise between two groups of EU Member States, led by the UK and France, respectively. The UK was against developing an EU defence capability independent of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and was in support of keeping the WEU “as the acceptable face of European defence”. France and a number of other Member States, on the other hand, were in favour of building a European defence capability separate from NATO, “reflecting long-held French reservations about the US dominance of NATO”.\textsuperscript{19}

In an attempt to avoid the recreation of structures already existing in NATO, the Berlin Agreement in 1996 established the European Security and Defence Identity to aid the preparation of WEU-led operations within NATO structures. This meant that “parts of the NATO command structure could be ‘lent’ to the WEU to plan and command European operations where the US did not wish to be involved”.\textsuperscript{20} The Berlin Agreement was upgraded to the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2003, which permitted the entire EU to use NATO structures for military crisis management operations.\textsuperscript{21}

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\textsuperscript{15} The Maastricht Treaty established the European Union, based on three pillars. The first pillar included the European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community. The second pillar was the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the third pillar covered provisions on police and judicial co-operation.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{18} ENTRi, ‘In control’: \url{http://in-control.entriforccm.eu/chapters/chapter-1/major-international-organisations/} [accessed 30 April 2018]


\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, p 32

\textsuperscript{21} The only CSDP operation to be deployed under the Berlin Plus Agreement is Operation Althea, which is discussed later in this chapter.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, included a provision that the WEU should over time be fully integrated into the EU, thus paving the way for the joint co-ordination of foreign, security and defence policy.22

In 1998, the UK and France made a joint declaration at Saint-Malo, which Lord Ricketts, then Deputy Political Director at the Foreign Office, described as “reconciling our different philosophies of European security”, which “launched the whole process that led to the institutions, doctrines and operations that have followed from it”.23 The UK “accepted that the EU should develop a real, useable military capability, and the means to plan for, and command, military operations”, and France “agreed that this would be done complementing, not competing with, NATO”.24

Following the Saint-Malo declaration, and in response to their collective failure to intervene in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, “The EU and its Member States decided that the EU should be able to plan and conduct its own missions and operations.”25 In 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was established as the predecessor of today’s CSDP. At the Cologne European Council in 1999, the EU Member States agreed to the establishment of permanent decision-making bodies which would analyse, plan and conduct military operations. These included the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, which issues recommendations to the PSC, and an EU Military Staff, including a Situation Centre.26

Based on the ESDP, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in its current form was formally established by the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty) in 2009. Article 42(1) of the Lisbon Treaty states:

“The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”27

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22 From 2000 onwards, the WEU institutions and tasks were successively integrated into the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the WEU ceased to exist on 30 June 2011. In 2011, the WEU had ten members: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EU accession candidates became observers before their joining the EU, and Iceland, Norway and Turkey were invited to become associated members of the WEU.


9. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first European Security and Defence Policy (now CSDP) mission to be deployed, in 2003. Since then, 34 operations and missions on three continents have been launched under the CSDP. 22 were civilian, 11 were military missions and operations, and one—in Darfur—was a mixed mission.28

Structure and decision-making

10. As set out by Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union, decisions relating to the CSDP are taken by the Council of the European Union by unanimity:29

“Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State.”30

11. Angus Lapsley, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), told us that, because of the structure of CSDP, the UK had “never had to do anything we really did not want to do in the CSDP, because that is just not the way it works”.31

The purpose of CSDP missions and operations

12. Mr Giles Ahern, Head of Euro-Atlantic Security Policy, Defence and International Security Directorate, FCO, said that, due to a lack of understanding of the EU, there was sometimes “criticism or very quick reporting of suggestions of [the CSDP] leading to an EU army, which clearly it is not”.32 Pierre Vimont, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe, and former Executive Secretary-General, European External Action Service (EEAS) agreed that “one should not be overambitious about what the Europeans are trying to do. It is only part of a broader picture in which NATO plays a major role with regard to territorial defence”.33

13. SaferGlobe said that EU missions and operations were in fact “rather low to middle scale and not high-end military missions”.34 Dr Laura Chappell, Lecturer in European Politics, University of Surrey, and Dr André Barrinha, Lecturer in International Security, University of Bath, told us that recent CSDP missions and operations “have focused in part on training and capacity building rather than on the deployment of force”. This “connects with the ideas of resilience and local ownership in facilitating countries to

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29 There are some exceptions, for instance when the Council adopts decisions implementing an EU decision or for some decisions relating to the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO), where decisions are taken by qualified majority voting. These cases do not apply to CSDP missions and operations.
31 Q 1
32 Q 1; see also Box 1.
33 Q 88
34 Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007). See also written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005).
provide for their own security”. 35 Agora Think Tank similarly described them as focused on “land-based civilian capacity building and public security training”, countering piracy and disrupting people smuggling. 36

14. Lord Ricketts said that the EU’s current “series of missions” were “much more in niche areas” than initially anticipated when the CSDP was established. 37

**Differences between EU missions and operations and those of the UN and NATO**

15. Our witnesses identified a number of differences between United Nations (UN) and NATO missions and operations, and those of the EU. First, considering the scope of CSDP missions and operations, the Global Europe Centre told us that “the range of [CSDP] activities, relative to those of other actors like NATO or the UN, is limited”. 38 Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha said that it was important to keep in mind that “CSDP is still a relatively recent policy area for the EU”, which, in comparison with NATO, had little experience of military operations. CSDP missions and operations had “limited ambition”, but “do contribute to international security”. 39

16. While individual EU missions and operations are of limited scope, we were told that a second difference was the EU’s comprehensive approach, combining tools such as trade and aid policies. Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha said this was the EU’s “added value in the field of security in comparison to NATO”. 40 Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London, told us:

“The great advantage that the EU has over other international organisations is that it does everything. It can do the building of security forces in Somalia and it can do the soft security in Somalia, whilst doing Atalanta off the coast of Somalia. It is the joined-up nature of what the EU can do that provides its value-added when contrasted with other international organisations.” 41

17. Dr Filip Ejdus, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, agreed: although “NATO remains a key collective defence organisation in Europe”, CSDP is “a uniquely positioned instrument to tackle a whole range of issues and insecurities such as migration, terrorism, organised crime, state fragility and piracy”. It was “of paramount importance to enabling both the EU and the UK to manage those insecurities at a distance and beyond borders”. 42 Mr Lapsley agreed that sometimes the EU was the most appropriate organisation: for example, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, “it felt right to use the European Union” to establish a rule of law mission, rather than the UN or NATO. 43

18. Third, Dr Nicholas Wright, Teaching Fellow in EU Politics, University College London, said that the EU was perceived differently to a military alliance, such as NATO. He said the EU was “for the most part, regarded as non-threatening”, enabling it to “wrap its comfort blanket of money,
capacity-building and support around any particular crisis.”44 This advantage is discussed in relation to Operation Atalanta later in this chapter.

19. A fourth aspect, compared to the UN, was the size of the EU’s membership. Mr Ahern said that “while it can still be challenging to get the agreement of the 28, that is perhaps easier than getting the agreement of 193”.45

The development of a CSDP mission or operation

20. The development of CSDP missions and operations can be divided into four stages.46 Mr Vimont told us that the first step was a “political assessment, called a political framework for crisis analysis”. This framework was “a sort of strategic assessment of the situation, to explain the need and opportunity for a European operation. Usually, it goes through the Political and Security Committee where ambassadors are in attendance.”47

21. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is “supported by a phalanx of expert committees”, including the EU Military Committee,48 the Politico-Military Group,49 and legal and financial groups.50 Mr Lapsley referred to the development of the political framework as the “key moment in this planning process”.51 After discussing the political framework, Member States “decide whether it should go ahead”.52

22. The second step is the drafting of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), a department

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44 Q 22 (Dr Nicholas Wright)
45 Q 4
46 According to the Ministry of Defence: “The EU planning methodology is very similar to that of NATO, and the outputs include a concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plans (OPLANs), and ultimately generate, direction, deployment, sustainment and recovery of a joint force. The EU process is, however, initially more ‘linear’ than NATO’s, which can conduct operations planning in parallel at various levels. This is principally due to the decision not to establish a permanent EU command structure that would duplicate NATO. Hence subordinate levels of command have to be established for a particular operation before planning in parallel can commence. Efforts to streamline the process, for example, by designating an operation commander and operation headquarters early, are used as much as possible.” Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 01—UK Joint Operations Doctrine (November 2014) p 95: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389775/20141209-IDP_01_UK_Joint_Operations_Doctrine.pdf [accessed 30 April 2018]
47 Q 89. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the CFSP, including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction. It meets twice a week, and more often if necessary. EEAS, ‘CSDP structure, instrument, and agencies’ (8 July 2016): https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en [accessed 30 April 2018] and Council of the European Union, ‘Political and Security Committee (PSC)’: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/political-security-committee/ [accessed 30 April 2018]
48 The EU Military Committee (EUMC) comprises the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States. They are regularly represented by their permanent Military Representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with “advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU”. EEAS, ‘European Union Military Committee (EUMC)’: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5428/european-union-military-committee-eumc_en [accessed 30 April 2018]
50 Q 5 (Angus Lapsley)
51 Q 5
52 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)
in the EEAS, comprising both military and civilian experts. Mr Vimont explained to us the significance of the CMC:

“To some extent, it contains the whole strategic vision and environment of what the operation could be as it moves ahead. Further on, it details what will go with the operation; the kind of assistance, co-operation or follow-up that could come after the operation; the deadline for the operation; and the kind of review that should be done on a regular basis. It already encompasses a lot of details that will be very important for the follow-up.”

23. Following further discussion and approval of the crisis management concept by the PSC, a “very firm political decision has to be taken at the Council of Ministers”. This results in a Council Decision on the establishment of a mission/operation. In the case of military missions and operations, Mr Vimont said that “the commander of the operation and where the headquarters should be” would “already have been identified” by this point. Civilian missions all share the same operational headquarters—the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability—which is part of the EEAS and operates under the control of the PSC.

24. The third stage in the establishment of a mission or operation is the ‘Concept of Operations’ (CONOPS), which is “decided by services inside the External Action Service”—either the civilian or the military department—in consultation with the operation commander. Mr Vimont said that, again, the concept “has to be approved at political level—ambassadors and Ministers”.

25. The fourth and final stage of the establishment of a mission or operation is the detailed operational planning, which includes “a lot of input from the commander of the operation” and is “a rather long process”. Major General Charlie Stickland OBE, Operation Commander, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, told us:

“I am asked to put together an OPLAN, based on strategic guidance which the EU Military Staff draft on behalf of the PSC. I then brief that OPLAN back to Brussels, and as long as Member States are content, this gives me my authority to operate from the PSC, within the mandate that they have given me.”

53 Q 89
54 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)
56 Q 89
58 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)
59 Q 89
60 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)
61 Operation Plan.
62 Q 41
Similarly, an OPLAN is developed for civilian missions by the Head of Mission.63

26. For both military and civilian missions, this stage also includes the process of ‘force generation’. This, Mr Vimont explained, means asking Member States for their contribution of expertise and equipment.64 The development of a CSDP mission or operation is finalised with a Council Decision on the launch of an operation/mission.65

27. Mr Vimont said that a military CSDP mission or operation could take “between eight and nine months” to be “launched properly with all the necessary forces”. Civilian missions could take up to a year. There were, however, “examples of the process moving much more quickly, for political reasons”, as had been the case for the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, which “was set up in about a month. We had to do it very quickly because of the situation on the ground.”66

28. The PSC—at which all Member States are represented by ambassadors—plays an important role in the process of developing a CSDP mission. Mr Lapsley told us: “At each stage of that process, the relevant decisions and texts are brought back to the Political and Security Committee, and by consensus we agree whether we are happy with what is proposed.” The process also includes “various points at which you have to go back to Ministers and to the Foreign Affairs Council and get them to sign off, politically and legally, on what you are doing”. This meant that the PSC, and with it the Member States, “has more granular control over missions than the UN does”.67

29. The Global Europe Centre described CSDP “decision-making and mission management structures” as “slow-moving and over-elaborated”, thanks to the need for consensus among Member States, and the “range of national sensitivities and sensibilities” that needed to be considered.68

Reviewing CSDP missions and operations

30. CSDP missions and operations undergo regular strategic reviews. The first strategic review usually takes place six months after the launch of a new mission or operation. There is provision for review “at regular stages” in the mission/operation documents that are adopted.69 Such reviews are produced by the CMPD—with input from Heads of Missions or Operation Commanders70—and considered by the PSC, which can lead to a “(re)evaluation of the situation and the revision of the CMC [crisis management concept] by the PSC”.71

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64 Q 89
66 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)
67 Q 5 (Angus Lapsley)
68 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
69 Q 89 (Pierre Vimont)
How costs are apportioned

31. Civilian CSDP missions are financed through the EU’s budget for CFSP. For 2018, the budget allocated to CFSP—under Heading 4 (‘Global Europe’)—is €328 million. The UK’s contribution to the overall CFSP budget is approximately 15%.  

32. Military CSDP missions and operations are financed in part through the Athena financing mechanism, which covers ‘common costs’—such as the running of the headquarters, including travel, IT systems, administration and locally hired staff—and in part by Member States. As set out in Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the ‘common costs’ for military operations are usually charged to the Member States, in accordance with a gross national income scale. All six current military missions and operations draw on Athena financing, which is estimated to cover 10 to 15% of the costs of an operation.

33. EU Member States that decide to contribute to an EU military mission or operation cover their own participation costs, on the principle that ‘costs lie where they fall’—for example, Member States bear the costs of seconded personnel. This means that the large majority of the costs of military missions and operations—85–90%—are not ‘common costs’, but rather are borne by participating Member States. This makes it difficult to estimate the overall costs of military missions and operations.

34. The UK’s contribution to the common costs of civilian and military missions and operations is discussed in Chapter 3.

The value of CSDP missions and operations

35. SaferGlobe said CSDP was “an essential tool in ensuring the security of Europe’s neighborhood” and a “cost-effective tool” for individual countries. It further stated that it “has been relatively successful in realizing the ambition in peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security especially in comparison to the modest resources given to CSDP missions and operations”. It told us that there was considerable variation between operations and missions in terms of their success; “relatively successful” was therefore “an apt characterization of EU crisis management, which makes [the] EU stand out in comparison to other international organizations.”

72 Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2018/251 of the European Union’s general budget for the financial year 2018—Title 19 Foreign Policy Instruments, 19 03 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), OJ L 57/1309 (28 February 2018)

73 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)


77 Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007)

78 Q 12

79 Q 88
In contrast, Dr Ejdus said that the CSDP had “not delivered that much on the ground; it has punched below its weight thus far”. Lord Ricketts assessed CSDP missions and operations as “very long and grinding, and slow to produce results.”

Nonetheless, he told us that the EU had “boldly gone to very many of the world’s conflict areas and set up missions of high political salience in a crisis”. CSDP missions and operations were “doing extremely difficult work in very tough countries and regions, some of which have no concept of the rule of law or indeed any administrative structures”. He thought that “where the EU can engage in such areas, particularly with mixed civilian and military missions, it is valuable”.

Our witnesses also identified two other positive outcomes of CSDP missions and operations, beyond the EU’s foreign policy priorities. First, Mr Vimont said that the EU’s missions and operations had had the effect of “very slowly building up European military capacity”. Second, they had led to collaboration between Member States. The Global Europe Centre said that despite the “modest scale” of CSDP missions, “the number of Member States who have been drawn into operations (both NATO and non-NATO members of the EU) has had the effect of creating a broad-based culture of operational collaboration”.

Witnesses highlighted a number of internal EU issues which limited the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations. First, Dr Wright said that CSDP had suffered from “a degree of apathy” that prevented action: “What might be a priority for one state may not necessarily be a priority for another.”

Second, a number of witnesses pointed to the difficulties in force generation for CSDP missions. Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, said that the EU “still suffers from unpredictability and shortfalls when it comes to the question of whether the requisite forces, skills and logistical support will be available for CSDP missions”. Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha agreed. Dr Duke said missions and operations depended on “the willingness of a Member State to become a ‘framework nation’, or the munificence of those participating in the force generation conference”—contributions were not always forthcoming. However, he said the EU was “well-aware of these shortcomings”, and they were not unique to the EU.

Mr Vimont agreed that there was “great difficulty in getting the attention of Member States on force generation for some of these missions”. He explained that “before we launch an operation, we set the threshold for the number of military people or civilian experts we need. At the end of the force generation process, we often find that we have not reached that threshold”. Mr Vimont

80 Q 70
81 Q 73 (Lord Ricketts)
82 Q 73 (Lord Ricketts)
83 Q 88
84 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
85 Q 17 (Dr Nicholas Wright)
86 Force generation is a negotiation over the resources pledged by Member States to CSDP missions and operations.
87 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
88 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)
89 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
said that the EU had usually gone ahead and launched the mission despite the lack of forces, with a smaller size and ambition.\textsuperscript{90}

42. The Global Europe Centre, on the other hand, thought that “CSDP missions and operations have suffered from a culture of ‘presentism’ where there are often a large number of member states making personnel contributions (as indicative of a desire to be committing to CSDP)”. This had sometimes been “sub-optimal for the efficiency, and effectiveness of the missions”.\textsuperscript{91}

43. Third, Dr Ejdus told us the “quality of staff seconded to CSDP missions”, was “a huge problem for CSDP”. He explained that often, “CSDP missions are not really appreciated that well back at home”, and were not conducive to career progression. This led to states not seconding “their best people”, which then “undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the missions on the ground”.\textsuperscript{92}

44. Finally, Dr Duke said there were “questions about the state of preparedness and planning” of Member States for CSDP missions and operations.\textsuperscript{93}

**Current CSDP missions and operations**

45. Figure 1 shows the 16 current EU missions and operations, as well as the UK’s contribution to them.

\textsuperscript{90} Q \textsuperscript{93}
\textsuperscript{91} Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
\textsuperscript{92} Q \textsuperscript{63} (Dr Filip Ejdus)
\textsuperscript{93} Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
Figure 1 Current CSDP missions and operations

- **EU NAVFOR Med (Operation Sophia)**
  - (6 UK personnel)
- **EUNAVFOR Med**
  - (6 UK personnel)
- **EUFOR (Operation) Althea**
  - Bosnia-Herzegovina
  - (6 UK personnel)
- **EU NAVFOR Somalia**
  - Operation Atalanta
  - (Operation Commander and 56 UK personnel)
- **EUMM Georgia**
  - (8 UK personnel)
- **EUPOL COPPS**
  - Palestinian Territories
  - (1 UK personnel)
- **EUBAM Rafah**
  - Palestinian Territories
  - (0 UK personnel)
- **EUAM Ukraine**
  - (6 UK personnel)
- **EUMM Kosovo**
  - (8 UK personnel)
- **EUBAM Libya**
  - (0 UK personnel)
- **EUTM Somalia**
  - (4 UK personnel)
- **EUCAP Sahel Niger**
  - (0 UK personnel)
- **EUCAP Sahel Mali**
  - (0 UK personnel)
- **EUBAM Rafah**
  - Palestinian Territories
  - (0 UK personnel)
- **EUTM RCA**
  - Central African Republic
  - (0 UK personnel)
- **EUBAM Libya**
  - (0 UK personnel)
- **EUTM Malawi**
  - (2 UK personnel)

**Military missions/operations**

- 6 ongoing military missions/operations

**Civilian missions**

- 10 ongoing civilian missions

More than 4,000 people currently deployed

46. Our inquiry focused on missions and operations in areas of particular significance to the UK: EULEX Kosovo, Operation Althea, and those in the Horn of Africa (EUTM Somalia, Operation Atalanta, and EUCAP Somalia). They are considered in turn in Boxes 2–4.

EULEX Kosovo

Box 2: EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo

EULEX Kosovo was established in 2008, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence. EULEX works within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

The mission consists of two main elements:

1. Monitoring, mentoring and advice (MMA) at senior management level of relevant rule of law institutions to strengthen the chain of criminal justice, with the emphasis on fighting political interference and monitoring of sensitive cases.

2. An executive function, which enables the mission to support the adjudication of constitutional and civil justice, as well as the prosecution and adjudication of selected criminal cases, including cases involving high-level corruption and war crimes. This can only be used in extraordinary circumstances, such as war crimes, terrorism, organised crime and corruption. All other criminal investigations and new criminal trials are conducted by the Kosovo authorities. EULEX Kosovo is the only civilian executive mission which can exert certain functions in substitution to the recipient state.

EULEX Kosovo is the largest civilian mission, both by budget and staff, ever launched under the CSDP. The overall number of personnel in the mission has been reduced to 419. The UK contributes eight secondees to the mission, including the Head of the Strengthening Division.

The mission’s current mandate runs until 14 June 2018. Its annual budget is €90.9 million.

47. In evaluating EULEX Kosovo’s achievements, Mr Lapsley assessed that “it is a mission that has had a tough time. Establishing the rule of law and governance in Kosovo is not an easy job.” According to Dr Ejdus, the “successes and failures” of EULEX had “to do partially with the context of Kosovo, but also partially with CSDP and how it is run”.

48. With regard to the political context of the mission, Dr Andi Hoxhaj, Teaching Fellow in EU Law, University of Warwick, said that EULEX Kosovo was “vitally important to building independent institutions” in the country. However, “powerful individuals and political parties dominate independent

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97 Personnel numbers include both international and local staff.
98 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)
99 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)
100 Q 3
101 Q 59
institutions”, which meant that in these conditions, EULEX “has had only modest success”. Similarly, Dr Ejdus said that it was important to “understand the enormous political difficulties under which EULEX has been operating”. 

Dr Ejdus noted that EULEX had “managed to achieve certain accomplishments in the field of strengthening and capacity-building”. This was the case in the EU’s “monitoring, mentoring and advising role, for the Kosovan police and also customs”. He said that “especially in the field of community policing, successes are visible”. However, he concluded that “unfortunately, all those achievements and successes have been overshadowed by very little improvement in the rule of law.”

Witnesses also considered the mandate of the mission. Mr Lapsley told us that EULEX’s “initial mandate was just too big; it had everything from customs to prisons to prosecution to police to justice”. This was “probably overambitious”. Dr Ejdus concurred, saying that “expectations were, and still are, high”. Mr Lapsley said the mission had significantly decreased in size, and would gradually hand over responsibility to the Kosovars. The mission was, however, “still valuable”.

Dr Ejdus told us that another difficulty of EULEX’s mandate was that it ran “on a very short-term basis”—as is the case for most CSDP missions and operations. Every two years mandates are extended, and every year the budget is approved.” Short-term secondments of staff meant that there was “very little continuity”.

Dr Ejdus told us the mission’s “biggest problem” was its executive mandate: “If you have an executive mission that substitutes for what the locals should be doing from the very beginning, you create a culture of dependency.” Dr An Jacobs, Senior Lecturer, Defence and International Affairs Department, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, a former secondee to EULEx Kosovo, said the mission itself had acknowledged that “it was probably a bad idea to have an executive and a strengthening mission in one”, as this made it difficult to build trust with the Kosovar leadership. Similarly, Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela, former Head of the Economic Unit, International Civilian Office Kosovo, noted that in EULEx there was “weak independence of its judges and prosecutors vis-à-vis the mission’s management, which had political interests that sometimes diverged from the mission’s mandate”.

In addition to these structural problems, Dr Ejdus told us that the mission's executive mandate had created an expectation that EULEX would “go after the big fish”. This expectation had not been fulfilled: “Unfortunately, only the secondary figures have been condemned, and the most important or biggest perpetrators of war crimes and organised crime have been immune

102 Written evidence from Dr Andi Hoxhaj (BSD0002)
103 Q 59
104 Q 59 (Dr Filip Ejdus)
105 Q 3
106 Q 59
107 Q 3
108 Q 60 (Dr Filip Ejdus)
109 Q 60
110 Ibid.
111 Written evidence from Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela (BSD0008)
to prosecution and the judicial system.” Dr Capussela concluded that, due to the difficulties surrounding the mission’s executive mandate, “it seems natural that they [EULEX Kosovo] would concentrate on the easier and far less controversial task of providing advice and capacity building to Kosovo’s law enforcement bodies”.

54. Third, witnesses considered local buy-in. Dr Jacobs pointed out that there was a lack of local ownership of EULEX’s objectives: “The Kosovo authorities felt like some of the objectives put forward were perhaps not really their priorities.” Dr Ej dus thought that “the results would have been much better” if EULEX had been developed only with the strengthening dimension, which would have enabled locals to “develop a sense of ownership early on”.

55. A fourth issue was resourcing. Dr Capussela said that the allocation of EULEX resources was not commensurate “with the rationale of EULEX’s mandate and with Kosovo’s needs”. The mission overall had “too few judges and prosecutors”, who were “irrationally distributed”.

56. Fifth, we were told that the structure of the EU was itself a complicating factor. Dr Ej dus said one issue was “definitely the lack of coherence” among EU Member States, in particular since five of them did not recognise Kosovo’s independence. Furthermore, there were “sometimes tensions between different institutions of the EU working on the ground, such as the Commission and the Council”.

57. Dr Jacobs noted that some of these issues were not unique to EULEX Kosovo, but reflected the struggles of “any international mission”, including those of the UN and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). She gave us the example of the sharing of ‘European best practice’ by the mission, when “nobody really seems to know what that means”. In the case of policing, there was “no clear definition of what good European policing looks like”. In general, however, she said “European organisational cultures of these institutions are still much closer to each other than perhaps states outside the European environment are”.

58. Another challenge was shared by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Dr Ej dus explained to us that, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, on the basis of which both UNMIK and EULEX operated, “Kosovo is still part of Serbia, and not everyone in Kosovo likes this idea. From the point of view of the Kosovar authorities, EULEX is … in a way, a burden on their claim to sovereignty”. Similarly, “UNMIK was seen as an instrument of 1244 … This severely hampered its effectiveness in Kosovo.”

112 Q 59
113 Written evidence from Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela (BSD0008)
114 Q 59
115 Q 60
116 Written evidence from Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela (BSD0008)
117 The five EU Member States that do not recognise Kosovo’s independence are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.
118 Q 61 (Dr Filip Ej dus)
119 Q 60 (Dr An Jacobs)
120 Q 61 (Dr Filip Ej dus)
59. In conclusion, Dr Ejdus said that, in a difficult operating environment “we should not attribute all the blame to EULEX alone”.121

Comprehensive approach

60. Witnesses told us that a big advantage of EULEX Kosovo was its conjunction with other EU policies on the ground. Dr Ejdus said he believed “the EU was, and still is, uniquely well positioned to deliver on a number of things in Kosovo”. One of the reasons for that was “a synergy in its policies”, which was “in contrast to the UN”.122

61. Dr Jacobs agreed that the EU’s comprehensive approach to Kosovo contributed to the delivery of EULEX. In this context, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, which started in 2011, was supported by EULEX Kosovo in the areas of rule of law, justice, security and the police.123 Although EULEX “was not really in the lead … it played quite an important role in this process”.124

62. EU enlargement also played a role in supporting EULEX’s goals.125 Dr Ejdus said that “the most important” of the EU’s instruments was “the enlargement policy, the carrot and stick, and the attractiveness of the EU’s institutions and EU membership to the Kosovar authorities”.126 However, while the prospect of EU membership had made Kosovars keen to co-operate closely with EULEX for a number of years, “in recent years, resentment against EULEX among the Kosovar elite, and among the population at large, has grown substantially”.127

63. Finally, the prospect of EU visa liberalisation for Kosovars had also supported the impact of EULEX. Dr Jacobs told us that it was something “the Kosovo institutions and the Kosovo Government really aspired to”, and that “it was a big incentive to push forward with the reform processes that were already going on”, in particular to facilitate the work of the strengthening dimension of EULEX.128

64. Reflecting on the wider EU engagement in the Balkans, Lord Ricketts said: “If the EU had not been putting in that effort in the Balkans over the last 20 years, would things have been exactly the same? No. I think they would have been worse.”129

121 Q 64
122 Q 61
123 The aim of the EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo is “to promote co-operation”, support their “progress on the path to Europe” and improve the lives of the population. The high-level dialogue is also supported by the work of experts in the tri-partite implementation working groups. EEAS, ‘Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina’ (15 June 2016): https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/349/dialogue-between-belgrade-and-pristina_en [accessed 30 April 2018]
124 Q 59 (Dr An Jacobs)
125 Ibid.
126 Q 61
127 Q 61 (Dr Filip Ejdus)
128 Q 59 (Dr An Jacobs)
129 Q 73
The military operation EUFOR Althea was launched in December 2004, taking over from NATO’s peacekeeping mission. Since 2012, its aim has been to:

- Provide capacity-building and training of the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) (non-executive mandate);
- Contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in BiH (executive mandate); and
- Contribute to the EU comprehensive approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The executive mandate is given to Operation Althea by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (currently UNSC 2384/2017), and means that the operation forces can intervene without prior permission from the BiH government. Operation Althea is the only EU operation currently deployed under the Berlin Plus Agreement, with NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe as the Operation Commander.

Another objective of the operation is “to contribute to the EU comprehensive approach in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, which means the EU’s “integrated approach between our military, economic, political, developmental and other strategies.”

Operation Althea operates mainly from Sarajevo and comprises 551 personnel from 19 nations, including 14 EU Member States and five non-EU nations. The UK contribution to this operation is discussed below and in Chapter 3.

Operation Althea’s current mandate runs until November 2018 and its annual budget (common costs) is €14.8 million.
Althea, explained that the Berlin Plus arrangements allowed the EU to make use of NATO staff, communications, support for operations, and have NATO carry out operational command. This meant “avoiding the need to duplicate structures within the EU that already exist and that are already resourced by most of the nations that are members of the EU in NATO”.

66. The Berlin Plus arrangements mean that Operation Althea is commanded by the DSACEUR, the second highest position in NATO’s Allied Command Operations. The position of DSACEUR is assigned permanently to the United Kingdom. The Operation Commander is based at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium, and his role is to give “operational direction to the theatre commander, an Austrian major general working in Sarajevo commanding the force”.

67. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw thought that the Berlin Plus arrangements worked “extremely well” in the context of Operation Althea. The EU would communicate its decisions on political and strategic requirements to NATO, which was then “more than capable of turning that into operational activity on the ground”.

68. The policy direction for the operation is provided by the PSC. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said he would report to the PSC on the progress of the operation, “how it was meeting its mandate and its objectives, and I would give military advice on the direction that [the PSC] might give”. Such feedback was very often “instrumental in tempering the direction of travel of policy at the higher level”. This also meant that DSACEUR “has considerable influence on policy”.

69. In assessing the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Sir Adrian Bradshaw told us that “until there are changes at the political level, the dangers from inter-ethnic tension remain very real”. Currently a “satisfactory equilibrium” existed, which was “necessary until there is political change”. Operation Althea was “delivered by a comparatively modest force” and “worth the money at the moment”.

70. He further argued that the security presence, delivered by Operation Althea, “acts as a deterrent to those who would resort to violence, because they know that we are on the spot and can do something about it, and it boosts the confidence of the population to know that the international community is sufficiently interested in continued security to commit our troops to that country. Everybody knows that although the force is relatively modest on the ground it can call on reinforcements very rapidly.”

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139 Q 27
140 NATO, ‘Leadership Staff’: https://shape.nato.int/page1165579 [accessed 30 April 2018]
141 Q 27 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)
142 Q 31. He did, however, point to ongoing problems between the EU and NATO, as a result of the dispute between Turkey and Cyprus. He said this situation meant that the Berlin Plus mechanism “is not allowed to be applied to future situations.”
143 Q 27
144 Q 29
145 Q 29 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)
71. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that Operation Althea’s “contribution has been extremely important in building the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly into one of the really national institutions in the country, and possibly the only one”. The operation’s contribution to capacity-building and training had “been really important in building that sense of national identity for the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina”.146

72. He told us, however, that the operation’s future was not assured: “Certain nations” had a desire “to see the operation scaled down and to see the removal of the executive mandate.”147

Comprehensive approach

73. As with EULEX Kosovo, the EU’s comprehensive approach is important to the delivery of the operation. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that although the executive peace enforcement mandate of the operation could be delivered by NATO alone—drawing on synergies with KFOR, the NATO mission in Kosovo148—this would require “people to be able to integrate military strategy with political, economic, diplomatic, developmental and informational strategies”.149 This was something the EU could do, but which NATO, as a military organisation, could not.

EU missions and operations in the Horn of Africa

74. We also considered the EU’s missions and operation in the Horn of Africa: EUTM Somalia, Operation Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia.

Box 4: EU missions and operation in the Horn of Africa

**EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia**

EUTM Somalia was launched in April 2010 to contribute to the strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia.150 Initially located in Uganda, the mission headquarters moved to Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2014.

The mission’s current mandate includes mentoring, training, and advisory activities, which aim to build long-term capability within the Somali Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Army General Staff.151

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146 Q 30
147 Q 27 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)
148 Under the authority of the United Nations (UN Security Council Resolution 1244), NATO has been leading a peace support operation in Kosovo since 12 June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the area. NATO, ‘Mission’: [https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/welcome-to-kfor/mission](https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/welcome-to-kfor/mission) [accessed 30 April 2018]
149 Q 29
To date EUTM Somalia has trained 5,700 Somali soldiers, four infantry companies, and provided advice to 29 staff of the Somali Ministry of Defence and the Somali National Army General Staff.\footnote{152}

It has eleven contributing Member States (Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Germany, the UK, Hungary, Portugal, France, Romania) and one non-Member State (Serbia). The UK contributes four personnel to the total mission staff of 189.\footnote{153}

The current mandate runs until 31 December 2018 and its annual budget (common costs) is €13.5 million.\footnote{154}

**Operation Atalanta**

Operation Atalanta was launched in 2008\footnote{155} and operates under UN Security Council Resolution 1816 to:

- Protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other vulnerable shipping;
- Deter and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea;
- Monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia; and
- Support other EU missions and international organisations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region.\footnote{156}

Operation Atalanta is widely regarded as a successful CSDP operation, contributing significantly to the reduction in piracy. In January 2011, at the height of Somali-based piracy, 736 hostages and 32 vessels were held captive. As of November 2017, no vessels or crew of International Maritime Organisation-registered vessels were being held hostage by pirates. All World Food Programme vessels delivering aid to Somalia were escorted safely.\footnote{157}

Operation Atalanta has an average of 700 staff over the year, from 19 EU Member States, and three third countries (Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Korea).\footnote{158} The UK contributes the Operational Headquarters at Northwood, as well as the Operation Commander and 56 staff.\footnote{159}

The current mandate runs until 31 December 2018, and its annual budget (common costs) is €4.7 million.\footnote{160}

\footnotesize\begin{itemize}
\item 152 \textit{Ibid.}
\item 153 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)
\item 154 \textit{Ibid.}
\item 157 \textit{Ibid.}
\item 158 \textit{EEAS, European Union Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations—annual report 2017 (2017)}: \url{https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/csdp_annual_report_2017_web.pdf} [accessed 30 April 2018]. In April 2018 it had 375 personnel. This is due to the seasonal nature of the piracy threat. The operation scales up when piracy is expected to be higher (in good sea conditions). Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)
\item 159 \textit{EEAS, ‘Mission’: \url{http://eunavfor.eu/mission/}} [accessed 30 April 2018]
\item 160 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)
\end{itemize}
**EUCAP Somalia**

EUCAP Somalia was launched under the name EUCAP Nestor in 2012 as a civilian maritime capacity building mission operating in Djibouti, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Kenya.\(^\text{161}\) It was based in Djibouti until its relocation to Somalia in 2015. In 2015, activities in all states except Somalia were phased out.\(^\text{162}\)

In December 2016, EUCAP Nestor was rebranded as EUCAP Somalia and given a broadened mandate to assist Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity. The mission provides strategic-level advice, mentoring and specialised training. It co-operates with the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as the Puntland and Somaliland authorities. EUCAP Somalia has personnel at the Mission Headquarters in Mogadishu and at the Mission Field Offices in Hargeisa (Somaliland) and Garowe (Puntland). It also maintains an administrative office in Nairobi.\(^\text{163}\)

13 EU Member States contribute to the mission. It has 80 staff in total. The UK contributes two staff members to the mission.\(^\text{164}\)

The current mandate runs until 31 December 2018 and its annual budget is €27.4 million.\(^\text{165}\)

**EUTM Somalia**

75. Brigadier General Gerald Aherne, former Commander of EUTM Somalia (2013 to 2014), said that “the fragile nature of the emerging Somali military architecture”, and “the fact that all brigades were concurrently striving to train while simultaneously being intensely operational against Al Shabaab”, made operating in Somalia particularly difficult. He added that “the continuous challenge was actually getting the troops to the training camp”, because orders to attend training within the Somali military were often “either totally or partially ignored”.\(^\text{166}\)

76. Our witnesses gave differing assessments of the mission’s successes and failures. Dr Jacobs argued that “obviously the mission has contributed to the security of Somalia”.\(^\text{167}\) Dr Kseniya Oksamytna, Teaching Fellow in European and International Studies, King’s College London, noted that besides its training of trainers, the mission had “supported the reform of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff”, and advised on the Ministry of Defence’s development of the first National Defence Strategy, which were “important contributions”. She thought that “the EU’s approach to security sector reform, which is characterised by the focus on good governance and

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\(^{163}\) Ibid.

\(^{164}\) Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

\(^{165}\) Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)

\(^{166}\) Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (BSD0011)

\(^{167}\) Q 69
democratic oversight of the armed forces”, was an advantage to EUTM Somalia, without which long-term stability in Somalia would not be possible.  

77. There were some concerns, however: Major General Stickland acknowledged that it was difficult to track Somali soldiers once they had been trained by EUTM. Dr Jacobs agreed, and said that “one of the questions” was “where all these trained soldiers are and the extent to which they are indeed protecting the government institution and Mogadishu from al-Shabaab”. There was “a concern that some of them may have returned to their clans, or even worse, they have joined al-Shabaab, this time as more proficient fighters, because they have just had a year-long training”.  

78. Dr Oksamytna pointed to the difficulties of operating in Somalia, noting that the mission’s delivery was “hampered by inter-clan rivalry, tensions between the central government and regional administrations … and corruption.”  

79. On balance, Brigadier General Aherne thought that “the military objectives of EUTM Somalia were better achieved by an EU led mission … than a UN one”. This was due to the different military command models, and the fact that “the EU military commander is the legal owner of the budget”, which “allows quicker but none the less properly accountable use of budget”. While security sector reform could also be undertaken under the framework of a UN peacekeeping mission, Dr Oksamytna argued that, “the prospects of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia are unrealistic, especially considering the controversy surrounding the failed 1990s peace enforcement operation there”.  

Operation Atalanta  

80. Major General Stickland told us that Operation Atalanta had been a success, contributing to the reduction in the number of successful Somali-based piracy attacks to zero in 2017. There were three reasons for this success. First, “counterpiracy is a non-contentious battlefield in that it has a demonstrable effect on trade and on people’s lives, so people can coalesce and co-operate very easily around it”.  

81. Second, the operation had developed “a partnership with industry”. This partnership was supported by the Maritime Security Centre—Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)—for which see Box 5. This partnership also included “industry getting involved in best management practice”, including “very simple things such as people having private security detachments on board ships, people not going through dangerous routes, people not going slowly to save fuel but going at a faster speed, and having barbed wire on the sides of their ships”.  

168 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)  
169 Q 49  
170 Q 69  
171 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)  
172 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (BSD0011)  
173 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)  
174 Q 42  
176 Q 40  
177 Q 42 (Major General Charlie Stickland)  
178 Q 42 (Major General Charlie Stickland)
**Box 5: The Maritime Security Centre–Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)**

MSCHOA is located at the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta in Northwood. MSCHOA provides 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden, and provides an interactive website to communicate the latest anti-piracy guidance to the maritime industry, on which shipping companies and operators are strongly encouraged to register their vessels’ movements through the region.

Through its website, the MSCHOA runs the Mercury Chat, through which civil merchant ships can be in direct contact with staff at the Operation Atalanta Operation HQ in Northwood. Major General Stickland told us that, through Mercury, “ships can be given threat warnings and warnings about other things that are going on at sea to try to keep up the situational awareness of ships at sea. Every month, about 14,000 ships and organisations register with MSCHOA.”

The MSCHOA has also issued a best management practices guide for protection against Somalia-based piracy, which includes information on what action to take should a vessel come under attack. A further initiative is the introduction of group transits, which means that vessels are co-ordinated to transit together through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, which makes transit safer and allows for military forces to precede the group.

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82. The third reason for the success of Operation Atalanta was “the legal finish”, which was “something that Atalanta has that others [such as the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain and the NATO counterpiracy operation Ocean Shield] do not”. This meant that “rather than capturing people at sea and then releasing them … we can now see people going through a legal process under the Seychelles government and being transferred into Somali jails”. This served as a “really powerful deterrent”, and had led to the arrests of 166 pirates since 2011. Mr Ahern agreed that the EU’s ability to use the legal finish was something NATO “certainly cannot” do, showing that there was “value to a CSDP mission”.

83. Another advantage was that Operation Atalanta was “the only operation that is allowed to operate in Somali internal waters”. This enabled Atalanta “to do capacity building and engagements on the land with coastal communities and is something that other missions do not have”. Major General Stickland thought that the EU had been able to negotiate access to Somali territorial waters.

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179 Established and operated under the auspices of Operation Atalanta (see Box 4).
180 Q 41 (Major General Charlie Stickland)
181 Q 41
183 The CMF is a multinational naval partnership and consists of 32 member nations. It mainly focuses on defeating terrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging regional co-operation, and promoting a safe maritime environment. It includes three Combined Task Forces: CTF 150 (Maritime Security Operations and Counter-Terrorism), CTF 151 (Counter Piracy), and CTF 152 (Maritime Security Operations in the Arabian Gulf). NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, which patrolled the seas off the Horn of Africa as part of a wider international effort, ran from 2009 to 2016.
184 Q 42 (Major General Charlie Stickland)
185 Ibid.
186 Q 4
188 Q 46 (Major General Charlie Stickland)
waters because the EU Delegation in Somalia could “speak with one voice for the 28 nations to the Government”. This combination of “a military and civilian political perspective” was an advantage over the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which was “very definitely a military alliance as opposed to a political alliance”. 189

84. Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha called Operation Atalanta “one of the most successful EU military operations”, which had had “a demonstrable impact on the prevalence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden”. 190

**EUCAP Somalia**

85. EUCAP Somalia, Dr Ejdus told us, “had a much more ambitious and confusing mandate” than Operation Atalanta. He told us that the mission had originally been overambitious in design and scope, and suffered from low local buy-in. 191 Mr Lapsley said it was “the least convincing of the three missions” in the Horn of Africa, and had “struggled at times to find the right role”. 192 Following the re-focusing of the mission on Somalia, the opening of new offices in Hargeisa in Somaliland and in Garowe in Puntland in 2015, and the extension of its mandate in 2016, Dr Ejdus said that EUCAP Somalia had “achieved some really nice progress”. The new mandate had achieved greater local buy-in: “Somalis do not see piracy as their own problem; it is the problem of the West”, and so the new mandate had been extended to include “a wider range of maritime security issues, such as illegal fishing or illegal waste-dumping, and a whole set of other issues that are relevant for the locals”. 193

86. Dr Ejdus said there was “very low Member State support” for the mission, giving as an example the number of advisers:

“In February last year … the mission had nine advisers in total, out of whom three were maritime advisors, which is the most important role in the mission. With three people you are trying to reform and build counterpiracy capacity in a country with 3,000km of coast. This is an extremely challenging situation, and the Member States should have provided more support.” 194

87. Dr Ejdus said that “expectations are extremely high, and Member States expect quick results”, which encouraged “staff on the ground to reach for the so-called low-hanging fruit instead of investing in long-term capacity building”. He said that “it takes probably decades to build coastguards and coastal capacity to fight against piracy,” and “all that significantly hampered the effectiveness and local impact of the mission”. Nevertheless, he commended the staff of EUCAP Somalia for their efforts, who were “really doing their best in extremely difficult conditions in a country that is at war and is a failed state, and where coastguards basically do not have uniforms or buildings. It is an extremely challenging situation.” 195

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189 Q 46
190 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)
191 Q 67
192 Q 4
193 Q 67
194 Ibid.
195 Q 67 (Dr Filip Ejdus)
The comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa

88. Dr Oksamytna said that one of the advantages to EUTM Somalia was that it was “part of the EU’s comprehensive approach” to the Horn of Africa, which included EUCAP Somalia and Operation Atalanta. The EU’s missions and operations in the Horn of Africa, the EU is a significant supporter of AMISOM, to which it “has provided €1.5 billion of financial support”. The EU has also contributed 60% of all humanitarian aid to Somalia. Mr Lapsley said that the EU’s financial contribution to AMISOM and the UN peacekeeping mission had been “more important than the missions”. It was “not unfair to say that the EU has kept AMISOM afloat financially over the last couple of years. That is the most important thing.”

89. Brigadier General Aherne, in contrast, said that “a key strategic challenge of EUTM Somalia was the non-alignment within the EU of the political, diplomatic and military aims of the Mission, both at Brussels level, within the Horn of Africa Region, and in Somalia”. In his view, this was due to the EEAS being “unwilling or unable to robustly achieve coordination of the much-vaunted EU’s Comprehensive Approach”.

Conclusions and recommendations

90. CSDP missions and operations are relatively limited in scale, compared to those of the UN or NATO. CSDP missions tend to focus on lower-intensity crisis management, such as capacity building, reform and training.

91. CSDP missions and operations have often been slow to produce results. This has, in part, been a consequence of the challenging and often unstable environments in which they operate—such as Kosovo and Somalia.

92. Nonetheless, since the first deployment in 2003, CSDP missions and operations have made a meaningful contribution to EU foreign policy priorities, including the strengthening of the rule of law, security sector reform, conflict prevention, and the tackling of piracy.

93. Participation in military CSDP missions and operations has also contributed to operational collaboration between the Member States.

94. The key competitive advantage of CSDP missions and operations, when compared to those conducted by NATO or the UN, is the EU’s ability to draw together military, political, diplomatic, economic and legal lines of operation in a comprehensive approach. EULEX Kosovo and Operation Atalanta are striking examples of this.

196 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna  
197 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna  
198 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna  
199 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne  
200 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne
Effective co-ordination both among the EU institutions and among the Member States is, however, sometimes problematic.

95. One CSDP operation has been a particular success: Operation Atalanta has contributed to the dramatic fall in piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

96. Although established by unanimity, CSDP missions and operations do not always enjoy strong support from the Member States, which have differing priorities and often look for short-term results to complex challenges. Securing the requisite number of assets and appropriately skilled personnel for missions and operations is a longstanding problem.
CHAPTER 3: THE UK AND CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS TO DATE

The importance of CSDP missions and operations to the UK

97. Mr Lapsley said that CSDP had “never been central to the UK’s defence effort. It has never been as significant as what we do nationally, through coalitions or through NATO.” In the context of “foreign policy in a broader sense”, however, CSDP had been “more significant”. He described CSDP as:

“something in the toolbox that we could mobilise to add value in a number of crisis or stabilisation situations around the world, where you needed to try to mobilise a mix of military, civilian, development, political and diplomatic tools—and it is that ability to meld tools which the European Union has been trying to develop over the past 15 years or so. Most of the missions have been valuable to the UK from that perspective.”

98. He said this was demonstrated in “stabilisation or capacity-building” missions and operations in sub-Saharan Africa, and “some of the maritime security missions, in particular [Operation] Atalanta in the Indian Ocean”. Civilian missions “tended to be about mobilising resource and expertise in areas such as the rule of law, justice, prosecution, policing, et cetera”.

99. Lord Ricketts said he would not wish to “overclaim on what CSDP has added to British foreign policy”. In his view, “the more classic foreign policy instruments of the EU, such as sanctions policy, have probably had more influence on events and the management of crises”. CSDP missions and operations nonetheless had a value: they “have quite bravely tackled some very difficult issues and are worth pursuing”.

100. Dr Wright was of a similar view. CSDP missions “form quite a small component of the UK’s broader set of objectives”, and had “been relatively small-scale, involving a relatively low commitment in both military and civilian personnel”.

101. Professor Menon told us the UK’s “engagement with CSDP had one overriding priority … pour encourager les autres”. CSDP was “a way of nudging European partners to take defence and security more seriously. That has always been an important objective of ours.” Mr Lapsley agreed that CSDP was “a way of mobilising a wider range of European countries to get involved in crisis management”. He said that “often the answer has not been that the UK needs to be doing something through the CSDP, but actually mobilising the Europeans more widely has been a key aspect of it”.

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201 Q 1. Our witnesses did not always make a clear distinction between CSDP as a broader policy area and CSDP missions and operations—a subset of this policy area. Please refer to Chapter 2 for the distinction between the two.
202 Q 1 (Angus Lapsley)
203 Q 1
204 We considered the issue of sanctions in our report Brexit: sanctions policy. European Union Committee, Brexit: sanctions policy (8th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 50)
205 Q 33
206 Q 12
207 Ibid.
208 Q 1
102. He gave the examples of Sweden, which “has used these missions to develop an out-of-area expeditionary capability and a battlegroup”, and of Ireland and Greece, which “have taken on command roles in sub-Saharan Africa in a way that would have been inconceivable 20 years ago”.\textsuperscript{209} This had also been the case for the EU’s role in Somalia, which was “a part of the world that we recognised was important”. The UK had “primarily tried to exert a leadership role on EU policy in the region … along with Italy”, and had “been able to encourage and sometimes push our European colleagues to get more involved”.\textsuperscript{210}

103. Dr Wright told us that although a similar “strategic environment” existed in NATO and other multilateral organisations, CSDP had “been quite important for the UK in seeking to set agendas and the direction of travel” among other EU Member States. The CSDP “brings the Member States together to talk about issues around security, defence, co-operation and interoperability”.\textsuperscript{211} The Global Europe Centre agreed that CSDP missions and operations had helped to advance the UK’s aim of a “capabilities-driven approach to European security”, through “the range of the operation types … and the level of EU Member State participation”.\textsuperscript{212}

\textit{Complementarity between UK foreign and security policy priorities and CSDP missions and operations}

104. In assessing the extent of complementarity between UK foreign and security policy objectives and the EU’s CSDP missions and operations, the Global Europe Centre told us that “the range of CSDP operations do not directly or comprehensively map onto the risks and threats set out in the SDSR/NSS”.\textsuperscript{213} Furthermore, the “existing set of CSDP missions” was not “embedded in a clear and coherent strategy built upon systematic threat and security analysis”.\textsuperscript{214} Mr Lapsley acknowledged that “it is probably fair to say that not all of them have been such a high priority for us”.\textsuperscript{215}

105. On the other hand, the Global Europe Centre noted that CSDP operations had “provided the UK with a low—and shared—cost contribution to the UK’s security policy objectives as set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and National Security Strategy (NSS)”, and said some of the current missions and operations included “some elements” of “UK foreign policy priorities”.\textsuperscript{216}

106. For example, Dr Duke said the UK was “particularly concerned about the protection of Sea Lines of Communication”, to which Operations Atalanta, Sophia, and EUCAP Somalia contributed.\textsuperscript{217} Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha also identified the EU’s naval operations as a UK foreign policy priority.\textsuperscript{218} Agora Think Tank told us that “contributions to maritime CSDP missions … align broadly with British foreign and security policy as well as the Future

\begin{footnotes}
\item[209] Q 1 (Angus Lapsley)
\item[210] Q 4 (Angus Lapsley)
\item[211] Q 12
\item[212] Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
\item[213] The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy.
\item[214] Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
\item[215] Q 1
\item[216] Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
\item[217] Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
\item[218] Written evidence from Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha (BSD0004)
\end{footnotes}
Navy Vision”. They were part of the “core security and prosperity agenda of the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015”.  

107. In the case of Operation Atalanta, Major General Stickland said that the “linkage” to the UK’s national security objectives was “quite profound … I believe we contribute to four of the five priorities in the National Maritime Strategy published in 2014”. These priorities were:

(a) The promotion of a secure international maritime domain, as well as upholding international maritime laws and norms;

(b) Fostering the development of maritime governance and capacity among the states in the area covered by the National Maritime Strategy;

(c) The protection of UK citizens and the UK economy, as well as support for the safety and security of ports, offshore installations, Red Ensign Group vessels and cargo ships; and

(d) Ensuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes, both regionally and internationally.

108. Witnesses also identified CSDP missions and operations in the Balkans as an area of complementarity. Dr Jacobs said that “the UK’s strategic interests in the region are very similar to what EULEX wants to do in Kosovo”. She described “the overlap in the wording” between the UK’s regional objectives and overall aims of the mission as “amazing”. In this way, CSDP missions and operations “could be a multiplier of influence and impact” for the UK. Major General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that participation in Operation Althea, in contributing to stabilisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was in the UK’s “national interest”.

109. Dr Hoxhaj added that UK participation in CSDP missions in Kosovo and Ukraine was in line with the UK’s “geopolitical and national security” interests, because “organised crime and corruption” in these two countries posed “a direct threat to the UK”. Thus EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Ukraine contributed to the UK’s priorities as set out in the UK National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2016.

110. The Global Europe Centre identified a third area of complementarity: local capacity building in Africa. It told us that EUTM Mali and EUTM Somalia were “expressly created to build local capabilities in those countries to counter violence extremism and terrorism. Importantly, the mission objectives in both cases include maintaining security and safe environments ultimately to ensure stability and build resilience as aims of UK foreign

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219 Written evidence from Agora Think Tank (BSD0006)
220 Q 45
221 The Red Ensign Group (REG) is a group of British shipping registers. Any vessel on these registers is a ‘British ship’, and is entitled to fly the British merchant shipping flag, the ‘Red Ensign’.
222 Q 45 (Major General Charlie Stickland)
223 Q 66
224 Q 39
policy. These overlaps in approaches suggest that there are advantages to UK participation in these types of military missions.  

111. Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha likewise highlighted EUTM Mali as addressing some of the UK's “key threats”. Dr Duke, however, thought African CSDP missions and operations—apart from those in the Horn of Africa and Operation Sophia—were of less interest to the UK.

112. The priorities for the UK's post-Brexit engagement on CSDP missions and operations are discussed in Chapter 5.

The UK’s quantitative contribution

Personnel

113. Dr Duke calculated that the UK had contributed personnel to 25 of the EU’s 35 past or current CSDP missions. Its average contribution per mission was 15.72 personnel. Across all CSDP missions and operations, the UK's personnel contributions amounted to 2.3% of total Member State contributions, and 4.3% of the missions and operations to which it contributed.

114. Dr Duke said that these figures were “modest in comparative terms compared to France, Germany, Italy and even Austria. They are comparable with Greece in terms of overall contributions since 2003.” The UK had “not always pulled its weight”, Mr Vimont concurred: there was “no doubt that many Member States have brought a greater contribution than the UK to the operations we have had so far”.

115. For example, Dr Ejdus said that UK secondments to EULEX Kosovo had “not been spectacular in terms of numbers”. In the case of Operation Althea, in contrast, General Sir Adrian Bradshaw told us that the UK “contributes fairly constantly to the reinforcements”. The UK had also “had a company on standby at short notice for quite a number of years. Right now, we have a high-readiness standby battalion committed to the Balkans.” This battalion was “double-hatted for NATO in Kosovo, but it also could do duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina”.

116. The Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta at Northwood is an exception: there are 104 staff, with “56 Brits in the spine”. The headquarters is “responsible for the operational design and the oversight of the activity”.

117. In summary, Professor Menon described the UK's “practical contribution in terms of personnel” as “limited”. Our witnesses considered the reasons for
this. Dr Duke said it was “an issue of (increasingly) scarce national resources and the opportunity cost of their use for CSDP operations or missions”. In the case of civilian missions, this opportunity cost is “the loss of expertise that could otherwise serve national objectives and priorities.” Lord Ricketts, Professor Menon and Dr Wright attributed the low level of UK personnel contributions to military missions and operations over the past decade to its involvement in other conflicts, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya. Professor Menon explained: “In so far as we had troops available, they were troops that were resting in between deployments and, for good reason, we did not want to deploy them.” Mr Lapsley said that the UK’s troops and assets “are often more usefully used elsewhere”, and there was “no shortage of troops or tanks or aeroplanes in Europe” to resource CSDP missions and operations.

118. A second reason for the UK’s limited contribution to military missions and operations was suggested by Agora Think Tank: the UK’s troops were “operationally oriented towards higher-intensity missions than those offered by the CSDP portfolio of engagements”, which “tend towards low-intensity … training missions.”

119. The third reason is more political. In the words of Mr Vimont: “Britain has always shown scepticism towards security and defence in the European Union” and considered it to be “a bit of a duplication with NATO”. He added that the UK had never been supportive of a European headquarters or extending the concept of common costs for military and civilian missions and operations. Lord Ricketts agreed that the Government, “perhaps particularly the Conservative Government after 2010”, had “been less willing to commit serious resources to CSDP for more political reasons.”

Costs and assets

120. While its contribution of personnel may be modest, based on the financing mechanisms laid out in Chapter 2, the UK contributes around 16% to the common costs of military CSDP missions and operations, and approximately 15% to the common funding of civilian CSDP missions. Mr Lapsley considered the UK to have made “quite a substantial monetary contribution”. The EU ‘force catalogue’ sets out the

237 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
238 Q 74 and Q 13. The UK’s engagement in these conflicts has been in partnership with its allies, for example through NATO in Afghanistan.
239 Q 13
240 Q 2
241 Written evidence from Agora Think Tank (BSD0006)
242 Q 90 (Pierre Vimont)
243 Q 74
244 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013). See also Chapter 2.
245 Q 2
246 Q 8
forces and capabilities contributed by Member States, based on the military capabilities the EU requires.  

122. Dr Duke, however, thought this was an overstatement. He said that common costs are allocated between Member States “on a sliding GNI basis”—hence the UK’s 16% share—and, “more significantly, common costs only constitute around 10–15% of the overall costs of CSDP missions and operations”. This meant that the UK’s personnel contributions “may well constitute around 20% of the force catalogue, but there is no automatic assumption of their availability for CSDP mission (as a comparison with the UK’s actual contributions shows)”. He added that while “the UK may also offer an implicit over-the-horizon backstop … no such role has appeared explicitly in the mandates of any past or current CSDP mission.”

123. Mr Lapsley said that the UK “sometimes put more serious military assets into missions”, for example “some quite capable ships that can provide niche roles” in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The UK has provided Operation Sophia with the survey vessels HMS Echo and HMS Enterprise, the air-defence destroyer HMS Diamond, the frigate HMS Richmond, and with Merlin Mk2, AW159 Wildcat and AW Lynx Mk8 helicopters. The UK has provided Operation Atalanta with vessels including UK Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship RFA Lyme Bay, and the frigates HMS Richmond (including a Merlin Mk1 helicopter) and HMS Northumberland. Military assets are provided to operations by contributing nations for a specific time period, and change regularly; they are not a permanent part of the operation.

124. Mr Lapsley also drew to our attention that the UK “sometimes” made “exceptional contributions” in support of CSDP missions and operations. For example, the UK has “put £600,000 into a fund to help to support the training of the Libyan coastguard, which is part of the Operation Sophia set-up”.

The UK’s qualitative contribution

125. Our witnesses also considered the UK’s qualitative contribution to CSDP missions and operations. Mr Lapsley said the UK’s contribution had “been more about leadership and broader diplomatic support, both personal..."
leadership but also intellectual leadership, trying to make sure that we think these missions through and get them right from the outset, and change course if we do not”.  

126. An example of this ‘intellectual leadership’ was EULEX Kosovo, where the UK had done “a lot of the driving, intellectually and politically” of the decision to establish the mission. However, the UK has “never led the mission overall. It has always been led by the French or the Italians”.  

127. Professor Menon described the UK as having “approached CSDP from the position of the ‘manager’ rather than of a ‘player’. We have been there to give guidance, we have been there to talk strategy, and we have been there, in a sense, to offer advice”. The UK was “in a very good position to do so because we are far more experienced at this than most Member States”.  

128. Mr Vimont also said that the UK was “to a large extent … more a manager than a player”. Dr Wright agreed: “We will keep an eye on it and, if we need to step in if things are not working or if they need a steer, then fair enough.” The UK had “been quite happy to let other states, particularly if there is a potential issue that they are interested in or that they want to pursue, take the lead on that”. For instance, in respect of EUTM Somalia, Mr Lapsley told us it was “excellent that countries such as Spain and Italy, which have been big contributors to that mission, have chosen to get involved in Somalia”. The UK had its own “defence capacity-building effort in Somalia”, and overall, it “supported” the mission.  

129. Another UK contribution, Mr Lapsley said, was that the UK had “progressively tried to integrate the political and the military side” into the process of planning CSDP missions. In the early stages of the CSDP, “some Member States were clear that military is military, defence is defence, and it must be kept discrete from other things”. The UK had sought to embed the approach that, instead of immediately deciding to take military action, “you crunch through whether there is any point sending a battalion unless there is some policing support—whether there is any point in training a bunch of people if no one will then fund their integration into the armed forces, in which case we will need money and so on”. He added that, “to be fair, the European Union has got much better at that now”.  

130. The UK’s ‘managerial’ approach has also been reflected in the types of role it has filled: Lord Ricketts told us that, “rather than supplying battalions of troops on the ground”, the UK had “chosen to go for strategic staff positions—staff in Brussels, staff in missions, deputy head of mission, planning, logistics, reinforcing the staff and direction for missions”. Dr Duke agreed that the UK had a “track record in leadership positions”, adding that its “operational experience and professionalism … is of enormous value”.

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254 Q 2
255 Q 3 (Angus Lapsley)
256 Q 13
257 Q 90
258 Q 13
259 Q 4
260 Q 5 (Angus Lapsley)
261 Q 74
262 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
131. Mr Vimont said that the EU was in need of “civilian experts of high quality”, and “we find a lot of them in Britain”. An example of this, said Mr Lapsley, was the UK contribution to EULEX Kosovo: the UK “chose to invest primarily in high-value secondees into the mission, such as very senior former police officers from the Police Service of Northern Ireland, who had experience of the kind of policing that Kosovo would need, or very senior judges, prosecutors, et cetera”. The UK had also “several times had the number two position within the mission”. These were examples of the UK contribution “being about strategic impact rather than numbers”.

132. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that while the UK’s personnel contribution to Operation Althea, was “very modest” in number, “through high-quality staff officers with the right sort of experience, having commanded UK forces in a variety of circumstances, the UK tends to exert influence beyond the numbers”. Brigadier General Aherne told us that he had also worked with UK military and civilian personnel at EUTM Somalia. In his view, “their contribution was at all times capable, informed and willing, if at times it could be a little overbearing in their perception of a monopoly of wisdom on issues”.

133. Mr Vimont described the UK’s provision of the Operational Headquarters in Northwood to Operation Atalanta as “an important exception” to the UK’s otherwise limited role in military missions and operations. In “most other operations”, the UK “has not played a major role”. More often France, and occasionally Germany, “take the lead” as “front-runners in operations”—the role of ‘framework nation’. Mr Lapsley told us that the role of Northwood as the Operational Headquarters for Operation Atalanta had “been really significant, both intellectually and in terms of military capability”. Major General Stickland said that “the contribution that we as the framework nation have made to Atalanta is key, such as through the innovation of the Mercury system and working with the shipping industry on best management practice”.

134. The UK, as a maritime nation, had also been “one of the first nations to look at the piracy problem”. Mr Lapsley told us that the Operation Atalanta Headquarters at Northwood “very quickly” developed a “sophisticated” approach, which included the “legal finish and how to work with the shipping industry to change its behaviours to reduce the risk”. His assessment was that “a lot of Europeans at that time were very impressed with the quality of thought leadership that came out of the UK and the contribution that we were making.”

135. Mr Lapsley said the UK’s diplomatic influence had also been instrumental to the success of CSDP missions and operations. For example, the UK worked to secure authorisation from the UN Security Council (UNSC) for CSDP missions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Missions and operations which operate under UNSC Resolutions “need renewing every year and we
are often the ones who patiently persuade the Russians or even sometimes the Americans that a mission is a good idea”. A good example of that was the annual renewal of Operation Althea.272 Dr Duke agreed that the UK’s role in the UN was important “to ensure wider support” for CSDP missions.273

136. Major General Stickland said the EU had also benefited from the UK’s diplomatic influence on Operation Atalanta: “Some of that legal finish was negotiated with Kenya and Seychelles through our UK political auspices to then enable an EU activity.” There had also been a benefit to Operation Atalanta from the deputy commander of the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain being a UK officer. In General Stickland’s view, “the very nature of that UK to UK relationship means that you can build it out to a relationship between the EU and another organisation. We have offered a number of strands through innovation, and military and diplomatic relationships, which have been key throughout.”274 Dr Oksamytna said this had also been helpful in EUTM Somalia: the participation of UK personnel “facilitates informal contacts with British personnel in other EU and international missions in the Horn of Africa as well British forces engaged in Somalia bilaterally”.275

137. Lord Ricketts thought that there was “real respect” for “what we can bring both in military assets”—such as heavy-lift helicopters—”and in diplomatic inside information, intelligence, planning, expertise and so on”.276 Dr Duke also highlighted “UK support to the analysis of intelligence” as one of “the less tangible elements underpinning” CSDP.277

138. Nonetheless, Lord Ricketts thought that the other Member States “think we are slackers”. They “think we talk a big game in Brussels and try to influence things, but on the ground we are not really contributing”.278

Conclusions and recommendations

139. CSDP missions and operations have made a significant contribution to a number of the UK’s foreign policy priorities—including tackling piracy, promoting the rule of law, and peacebuilding in post-conflict states—and have been an important channel of UK influence.

140. One of the UK’s primary objectives for the CSDP has been to encourage other EU countries to develop their defence capabilities and increase their willingness to participate in crisis management and defence operations.

141. CSDP missions and operations are agreed between 28 countries by consensus. They correspond in varying degrees to UK foreign policy priorities—the EU’s maritime operations are particularly closely aligned to UK interests, as are Operation Althea and EULEX Kosovo.

142. The UK’s personnel contribution to CSDP missions and operations to date account for just 2.3% of total Member State contributions. This has, in part, been a result of UK defence commitments across the
globe. The UK has also provided assets—including naval vessels and aircraft—and troop reinforcements on standby for CSDP operations.

143. The UK’s financial contribution to civilian missions is 15%. As 85–90% of the costs of military missions and operations are financed by the participating countries, the UK’s 17% contribution to the common costs of military missions and operations is relatively lower.

144. The UK’s principal contribution to CSDP missions and operations has been strategic guidance and advice. It has filled a small number of influential roles, and leveraged its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to secure authorisation for EU missions and operations.
CHAPTER 4: THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

145. To date, approximately 45 third countries have contributed to CSDP missions and operations.\(^\text{279}\) As of April 2018, there were 288 third country personnel,\(^\text{280}\) of a total of around 4000 overall personnel.\(^\text{281}\) Table 1 shows the current participation of third countries in CSDP missions and operations. The Global Europe Centre characterised third country contributions as ranging “from civilian to military components”, depending on “the context of the mission and the terms of the partnership”. Third countries usually provided “less than 20 staff”.\(^\text{282}\)

Table 1: Third country participation in CSDP missions and operations (April 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/operation</th>
<th>Third countries</th>
<th>Number of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military missions and operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR (Operation) Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM RCA (Central African Republic)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{280}\) Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0014)


\(^{282}\) Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
There are various reasons, sometimes overlapping, for why third countries choose to participate in CSDP missions and operations. First, for candidate countries and those in the EU’s neighbourhood, participation is an opportunity “to demonstrate solidarity with the EU”. Second, they are an opportunity for some third countries, through even a symbolic contribution, “to associate themselves with the broader international values and principles that the EU stands for”.

Third, for non-EU NATO states such as Turkey and Norway, CSDP missions and operations provide an opportunity to address shared security challenges, recognising “the role of the EU in crisis management”. Fourth, some countries have sought “to be seen as operating at the regional level” by associating with specific missions and operations, such as Brazil and South Africa in Operation Artemis. Finally, CSDP missions and operations allow third countries to acquire operational expertise—for example by gaining experience in a peace enforcement operation such as Operation Althea.

In return, third country participation has a value to the EU: it demonstrates “broader political support” for missions and operations, from outside the bloc. Third countries also provide valuable additional capacity and capabilities. Major General Stickland, for example, told us that “I will take any help I can get” to deliver Operation Atalanta, while General Sir Adrian Bradshaw and Mr Lapsley noted that Turkey was one of the main troop contributors to Operation Althea.

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**Mission/operation** | **Third countries** | **Number of personnel**
--- | --- | ---
**Civilian missions**
EULEX Kosovo | Switzerland | 2 (1 based at the Specialist Chambers in The Hague)
US | 11 (1 based at the Specialist Chambers in The Hague)
EUPOL COPPS (the Palestinian Territories) | Canada | 1
EUAM Ukraine | Norway | 3
Switzerland | 1

Source: Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0014)

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283 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
284 Ibid.
285 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
287 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
288 Q 34 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw)
289 Q 6 (Angus Lapsley)
290 Q 57 (Major General Charlie Stickland), Q 6 (Angus Lapsley) and Q 28 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw). The other two major contributors are Hungary and Austria.
149. Mr Ahern noted that there was a balance to be struck between “having more contributing nations acting together and the positive political message that that sends and ... the fact that the more parties you have, the more complicated it can get”.291

Examples of third country participation in CSDP missions and operations

Turkey

150. Mr Lapsley told us that only one operation—Operation Althea—has a sizeable number of personnel from a third country.292 Turkey is the second-largest contributor to the mission,293 with 160 personnel.294 As discussed in Chapter 2, Operation Althea is unique, as it operates through the Berlin Plus arrangements—it is “commanded at the strategic level by NATO”.295 Mr Lapsley said this allowed Turkey to have “a high degree of understanding and access to what is going on in that mission through the fact that they are also members of NATO”.296 Turkey has also been a significant contributor to EULEX Kosovo,297 although no personnel are currently deployed.298

The United States

151. The Global Europe Centre told us that the US had chosen not to participate in military CSDP missions and operations, but had contributed to civilian missions “on a case-by-case basis”.299

152. Mr Lapsley told us that the US decided to contribute to EULEX Kosovo from an early stage, “because it wanted to send quite a strong message that it supported this mission and it was a good thing for the EU to be taking on”.300 Dr Ejdus observed that “not all third parties are born equal”; in his view, the US had “probably had the biggest influence” on EULEX Kosovo. Politically, it had “influenced from within the mission, but also from without”.301 The US had had a “highly positioned political adviser in EULEX over the years”.302 Dr Jacobs concurred: the US had provided the assistant to the Head of Mission, which while “not a management position”, was “a strategic position, because that person knew everything that went in and out of the Head of Mission’s office”. The US had also had a secondee in the north of Kosovo, and had headed the Police Department, all “strategic” roles.303

153. Mr Lapsley noted that the US’s “operational contribution [to EULEX Kosovo] now is pretty small—just a couple of experts”. He did not think that the US currently expected a high level of access to or influence over

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291 Q 8
292 Q 7
294 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0014)
295 Q 7 (Angus Lapsley)
296 Q 7
298 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0014)
299 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
300 Q 7
301 Q 65 The US also runs its own rule of law operation in Kosovo.
302 Q 65 (Dr Filip Ejdus)
303 Q 65 (Dr An Jacobs)
the mission, given this limited deployment of US personnel. However, he thought that the US “probably started off with slightly higher expectations of the role it would play in the mission than turned out to be possible”. This demonstrated the “tension” faced by third countries seeking a “substantial involvement” in a CSDP mission.304

The Republic of Korea

154. Major General Stickland described the Republic of Korea (RoK) as “the most significant, third party state” in Operation Atalanta.305 For four to six days each month, “it is genuinely part of the operation”. The RoK was “also exploring whether it wants to put staff officers into the Force Headquarters or the Operational Headquarters”. He explained that, in view of “the size of the sea space and how we could use its capability”, the EU was now discussing whether the RoK could change the arrangement to provide three weeks every three months to the mission.306

Serbia

155. Brigadier General Aherne told us that Serbia had provided specialist military medical personnel and the Mission Chief Medical Officer to EUTM Somalia.307 Since 2012, this contribution has been a medical team and headquarters officers;308 currently it has six personnel in the mission.309 Brigadier General Aherne described this contribution as “valued in the extreme”.310

Existing third country arrangements

156. To participate in a CSDP mission or operation, a third country must sign either a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA), covering CSDP missions and/or operations overall, or a Participation Agreement (PA), relating to

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304 Q 7
305 Q 55. This is not displayed in Table 1, because the Republic of Korea’s contribution is not permanent, but rather four to six days per month.
306 Q 55 (Major General Charlie Stickland)
307 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (BSD0011)
308 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)
309 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0014)
310 Written evidence from Brigadier General Gerald Aherne (BSD0011)
a specific mission or operation. Major General Stickland explained that these agreements establish “the baseline arrangement to which a third state decides how they want to work with the EU”. They include command and control structures, procedures, legal aspects, and the financial commitments of the third party.

157. Mr Lapsley told us that around 18 countries have concluded “overarching” FPAs with the EU. They “are pretty much routinely asked whether they want to join missions”. Switzerland has signed a number of PAs for specific missions and operations.

158. After signing an FPA or PA, a number of “technical agreements” are then agreed between the EU and the third country, on subjects such as information exchange, planning documents and sharing confidential information including intelligence.

159. Box 6 sets out some standard elements of a FPA.

311 Letter from the Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP, Minister for Europe and the Americas, to Lord Boswell of Aynho, 27 October 2017: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/cfsp-priorities-2017/171027-cfsp-letter.pdf [accessed 30 April 2018]. For example, Switzerland has signed individual PAs with the EU on participation in EUAM Ukraine and EUCAP Sahel Mali. EEAS, ‘Participation Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)’: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=10902 [accessed 30 April 2018] and EEAS, ‘Participation Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the European Union CSDP mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)’: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=10903 [accessed 30 April 2018]. Major General Stickland additionally described two informal ways in which Operation Atalanta works with non-EU countries. We are not aware of there being such opportunities in relation to other CSDP missions or operations. First, some states, provide “associated support”. Their vessels are not formally Operation Atalanta-flagged, but if in the region of the mission, may “exchange information and, if necessary, react with that organisation if an incident was to occur.” He explained that this is a “quite a vexed issue”: “It adds a little value, but fundamentally those ships go where the individual nation wishes them to go, rather than as a core asset to an operation.” Q 46 Second, some states, such as China, work with Operation Atalanta in a way Major General Stickland described as “co-ordinated”. The mission acts as the co-ordinating authority to allocate ships to escort the World Food Programme, and can request third countries to support these vessels “under the auspices of the Atalanta footprint, but [with] no agreements.” Q 46

312 Written evidence from Major General Charlie Stickland OBE (BSD0010). These take the form of a bilateral agreement between the EU and the participating third country. They are usually dealt with under Article 37 (or Article 24) of the Treaty on European Union.

313 Global Europe described co-operation via FPAs as “loosely institutionalised” in comparison to NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005). The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among Allies and partner countries (50 in total). North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council’: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49276.htm [accessed 30 April 2018]


315 Q 6 (Angus Lapsley)

316 Written evidence from Major General Charlie Stickland OBE (BSD0010) and Q 6
Box 6: Standard elements of a FPA

- Terms for participation in CSDP missions overall, while leaving the decision on participation in any mission to be decided on a case-by-case basis;
- The agreement and the contribution of the third country to an EU crisis management operation should be “without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Union”;
- The period of the agreement and procedures for automatic extension;
- The EU will decide whether to invite the third country to participate in a mission, and will share all relevant information and assessments related to that operation. If the third country decides to propose a contribution, this will then be considered by the EU, which will take the decision on participation;
- The third country is required to “associate itself” with any Council Decisions on a mission in which it participates;
- An agreement on the status of forces/mission (between the EU and the state where the mission/operation operates) will govern any third country personnel;
- “Without prejudice” to the agreement on status of forces/mission, the third country “shall exercise jurisdiction over its personnel participating in the EU crisis management operation”—the contributing state reserves the ultimate right to stop its personnel from undertaking activities and/or to remove them from the operation;
- For both civilian and military missions, the third country “shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as the Member States of the European Union taking part in the operation”;
- The EU will take the decision on ending a civilian operation, “following consultation with” the third country;
- For military missions, “national authorities shall transfer the Operational and Tactical control of their forces and personnel to the EU Operation Commander”;
- The third party “shall assume all the costs associated with its participation in the operation unless the costs are subject to common funding”, and
- The third country “shall contribute to the financing” of the “operational budget” (civilian missions) or “common costs” (military missions), but the third country will be “exempted from financial contributions when: (a) the Union decides that the third country provides a significant contribution which is essential for that operation; or (b) the third country has a GNI per capita which does not exceed that of any Member State of the Union”.

Source: Adapted from the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Korea in European Union crisis management operations, OJ L 166/2 (5 June 2014)

318 See also Q 10 (Angus Lapsley).
319 This is consistent with the principle that ‘costs lie where they fall’ for participating Member States. This is discussed in Chapter 2.
160. Mr Lapsley explained that “third countries … do not contribute to the Athena common costs mechanism for a military operation if the European Union judges that their contribution to the mission as a whole is significant”. In practice:

“The EU has always judged that a third country’s contribution is significant, for the fairly obvious reason that if a third country offers to put some people into a mission and is then told, ‘Right, according to your GDP scale, that means you are on the hook for 10% or 15% of the overall costs of the mission’, that is a fairly powerful disincentive to make the offer in the first place.”320

Influencing CSDP missions and operations as a third party

Committee of the Contributors

161. Once a third country’s participation in a mission or operation has been agreed, and a FPA or PA signed, a Committee of the Contributors (CoC) is established by the Political and Security Committee. Box 7 sets out the role and structure of the Committee of the Contributors for a mission or operation.

Box 7: Committee of the Contributors

The Committee of the Contributors includes:

- Representatives of all Member States;
- Representatives of third countries participating in the mission and providing contributions; and
- Provision for a representative of the Commission to attend the meetings.321

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320 Q 10
Participants “are invited on a regular basis to talk about oversight of the mission”. The Committee of the Contributors is designed as a forum for discussing “all problems relating to” the mission’s “day-to-day management” with contributing third countries. The Political and Security Committee “should take account of the views expressed by the CoC”.

For civilian missions, the Chair of the Committee of the Contributors is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (or her representative). For military missions, the Chair is the High Representative (or her representative), in close consultation with the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (or with his or her representative). The PSC decisions establishing each Committee of the Contributors state that the Chair will convene the Committee regularly, and that emergency meetings can be convened on the Chair’s initiative, or at the request of a member.

162. Lord Ricketts thought the “arrangements for ... permanent and continuing consultations” were “not a bad point of departure”, and Mr Vimont told us that third countries, including the United States, Norway and Georgia, were “knocking at the door” of the EU to participate in CSDP missions.

163. Mr Lapsley, on the other hand, told us that, in practice, the Committee of the Contributors model “does not work very well”. When the model was established, “the expectation was that it would be a very senior committee and that it would meet and give real impetus and guidance on how missions were being conducted”, but “10 years on, the model has rather withered on the vine and most Member States do not take the meetings very seriously.” He concluded: “In some cases the inadequacies of that model have led third countries to decide that they are not convinced that they want to take part in missions.”

Influence at an operational level

164. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the Committee of the Contributors model, our witnesses said that at an operational level, third countries had some influence. Reflecting on EULEx Kosovo, Dr Ejdus explained that “third parties ... have equal access on the ground, and they are fully able to deliver their mandate”. Staff from Norway, Turkey and other countries had

322 Q 6 (Angus Lapsley)
325 Political and Security Committee Decision EUTM Mali/2/2013 of 12 November 2013 on the establishment of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali), OJ L 320/31 (30 November 2013). This wording is standard across missions and operations.
326 Q 76
327 Q 91
328 Q 7
“been accepted very well. They have full access … They have been treated equally as secondees of the Member States.”329

165. For military missions and operations, Mr Lapsley said that “generally, depending on the size of its contribution”, a third country “would have officers integrated into the operational headquarters for that mission”. This resulted in information sharing, and so, “through participation in headquarters, a third country can get a reasonable insight into what a mission is up to and what is going on”.330 Major General Stickland agreed: third countries were “genuinely part of” Operation Atalanta, and those with a staff officer in the Headquarters were “part of the planning team”.331

166. The positions available to third countries in CSDP missions and operations are, however, somewhat limited: SaferGlobe told us that third countries are invited “in most cases to fill gaps”.332 Dr Duke told us that after a Member State force generation conference has been held to determine the necessary assets and staffing, FPA signatories are invited to contribute personnel.333 Major General Stickland said third parties to Operation Atalanta, for example, “have second choice of vacancies and things of that nature, rather than being a core Member State”.334

167. Dr Ejdus added: “Although there are no formal obstacles to the third parties having the highest strategic management positions, there is an understanding that third parties cannot have the Head of Mission position, or some really strategic position in the mission.”335

Influencing the planning and strategy of CSDP missions and operations

168. Mr Lapsley said that the “essential difference” between the experience of Member States and third parties with respect to CSDP missions was that the latter “are not part of the political decision-making chain”.336 Dr Duke related this to the underlying point of principle, that “third state contributions are without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Union”337—as set out in Box 7.

169. This means that third countries cannot participate in the principal planning stages for new missions and operations, which were described in Chapter 2: they are excluded from drafting the Concept of Operations or the Operation Plan,338 as they are not included in the formations which plan CSDP missions, and also from the PSC, the Politico-Military Group, the Civilian Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate.339

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329 Q 65
330 Q 7
331 Q 55
332 Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007)
333 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001), see also Q 89 (Pierre Vimont).
334 Q 53
335 Q 65
336 Q 6
337 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
338 Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007)
339 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004). See Chapter 2 for how CSDP missions and operations are established.
170. Mr Vimont summarised the position as follows:

“When there are third country partners in a military or civilian operation, they usually come in at the end of the decision-making process ... We have what we call a decision-shaping process. They come and give their opinion and we exchange ideas, but at the end of the day they leave the room and the EU 28—to date—are left on their own and work on their own. Not being there is of course a bit of a problem.”340

171. Major General Stickland concurred: “Fundamentally the regulation for third party states is that you drop into the organisation and get on with the plan. You cannot decide the levers and the nature of the Operation. You are just joining it.”341 The Global Europe Centre agreed that third country contributions were therefore made “under the terms already determined by the EU”, as a result of the EU’s “internal decision-making process”.342

172. Professor Menon drew our attention to Turkey’s experience. Prior to the establishment of the CSDP, Turkey had contributed to Western European Union crisis management operations.343 When these were replaced by CSDP missions and operations, it had been “absolutely appalled”344 at the role available to third countries, and felt “maltreated by the way European security co-operation [had] developed”. This example, Professor Menon said, demonstrated that the EU’s approach of “‘You can join in once we have decided’” was “not a very attractive model”.345

Conclusions and recommendations

173. There is an established precedent for third country participation in CSDP missions and operations through the negotiation of bilateral agreements with the EU. Third countries are well integrated into the CSDP missions and operations in which they participate, and have some influence at an operational level.

174. Third countries have no formal role in decision-making or planning, and the Committee of the Contributors model—designed to facilitate consultations between the EU and contributing third countries—does not work well.

340 Q 92
341 Q 55
342 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
343 The Western European Union ran a number of crisis management operations for example in Albania from 1997–2001. It ceased to exist as a Treaty-based International Organisation on 30 June 2011. Many WEU tasks and institutions were transferred to the CSDP. Western European Union, ‘Closure of WEU organs in Paris and Brussels’: http://www.weu.int/home.htm [accessed 30 April 2018] The development of the WEU is briefly discussed in Chapter 2.
344 Q 14
345 Q 17
CHAPTER 5: FUTURE UK-EU CO-OPERATION

Desirability for the UK of continued participation in CSDP missions and operations

Civilian and military considerations

175. Dr Duke thought it “reasonable to expect” that there would be “occasions” on which the UK might wish to contribute to CSDP missions and operations after Brexit, both “financially and with staff/troops”.

176. For civilian missions, he argued that the UK might consider “whether sufficient police, rule of law and other civil administration skills are available in the EU27”. The UK might also see “benefits to associating with CSDP civilian missions, especially in those areas where there are ramifications for the EU’s internal security (counterterrorism, organised crime and cybersecurity) where the UK may wish to establish closer connections and access to vital databases”.

177. For military missions and operations, General Sir Adrian Bradshaw thought the UK “should be ready to contribute forces to future operations if they are quite obviously in our interests and in the collective interests of Europe”. Dr Duke said that the issue was not just “whether to contribute”, but also “if so in what capacity”. There might be a link between the UK’s ability to take a “leadership role” and its willingness to provide troops.

178. Mr Lapsley, of the FCO, said that there would be a difference in the level of “political accountability” required between, on the one hand, “civilian missions or military missions that do not have an executive mandate—capacity-building or training missions” and, on the other, “missions where you are actually asking service personnel to put themselves at risk or to carry out executive or kinetic operations”. He said it was “clear” that “the further down that line” an operation was, “the higher the degree of political oversight that we would need”.

179. Mr Lapsley added that the UK would need to “work through” what level of direct EU command would be acceptable, as it had done when working with the US in “coalition situations”. He noted that—as described in Chapter 4—a contributing state to a CSDP operation (whether a Member State or third country) retains “the ultimate right to stop [its personnel] doing whatever they are doing or to pull them out”.

180. Dr Duke also suggested that the UK’s decision on whether to commit to military CSDP missions and operations could be influenced by whether this might have “trade-offs for European security more generally and NATO’s role”. SaferGlobe also drew a link: it described CSDP missions and

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346 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 Q 36
350 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
351 Of the EU’s current CSDP missions and operations, six are military, of which three are training missions (EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali and EUTM RCA), and three have an executive mandate (Operation Sophia, Operation Atalanta and Operation Althea).
352 Q 10 (Angus Lapsley)
353 Q 10
354 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
operations as “closely associated with NATO co-operation”, and said they “enhance interoperability of both EU and NATO”.\footnote{Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007)} We note that this may overstate the case: only Operation Althea uses the Berlin Plus arrangements, and as we concluded in our 2016 report, \textit{Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy}, EU-NATO co-operation is relatively limited.\footnote{We concluded that there was a “fundamental” difference in the nature of the two organisations, leading to a “fundamental difference in culture and attitude” between them. European Union Committee, \textit{Europe in the world: Towards a more effective EU foreign and security strategy} (8th Report, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 97)}

\textit{Mission- and operation-specific considerations}

181. Our witnesses highlighted a number of CSDP missions and operations which they expected to remain important to the UK after Brexit, in light of their relevance to UK foreign policy goals (as discussed in Chapter 3).

182. General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said that the decision on Operation Althea was “pretty simple: if it remains in our defence and security interests to contribute, we should of course continue to contribute.” In his view, it would “self-evidently” remain so, and the UK should “continue to contribute at a similar level to today”. He added that the UK should also maintain its contribution to the reserve forces for Operation Althea: “If things started unwinding, we would want to be there very quickly and having influence on how the thing was resolved.”\footnote{Q 35 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw). SaferGlobe said that a lack of UK co-operation in CSDP missions and operations would have an impact on UK influence in NATO. Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007)}

183. He said there was “no suggestion right now that the DSACEUR will no longer be the Operational Commander” of Operation Althea after Brexit, although it “may be a subject for debate in the future”. He thought there was “no intrinsic reason why he should not continue to do so as a Brit, because he is a NATO officer in that post”.\footnote{Q 37 (General Sir Adrian Bradshaw). In 2017, there was speculation in the media that the UK might lose the role of DSACEUR as a result of Brexit. The Ministry of Defence denied these reports. George Allison, ‘MoD confirm UK will retain top NATO role after press speculation’, \textit{UK Defence Journal} (12 June 2017): https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-retain-top-nato-role/ [accessed 30 April 2018]} He was also confident that the UK would retain the DSACEUR post within NATO.\footnote{Q 76} We discuss the different possible models for UK participation in CSDP missions and operations later in this chapter.

184. Lord Ricketts agreed that UK input to Operation Althea—and EULEX Kosovo—should continue: “Clearly, we want to put political effort into maintaining slow forward movement in the Balkans, so why would we not want to continue to contribute to the EU missions that are trying to do good work there?”\footnote{Q 76} Dr Jacobs also thought it would be “in the interest of the UK to continue, if it can, to provide relatively senior-level positions” to EULEX Kosovo.\footnote{Q 66} Although noting that the future of EULEX Kosovo was uncertain, Dr Ejdus agreed that the UK “should have an interest in staying” part of it, and he “would advise the UK Government to keep its current positions, especially the north portfolio”. This was “going to be extremely important
for stability, not only of Kosovo but of the Western Balkans as a whole”, and the UK had an interest in “contributing positively to the dialogue”.362

185. Lord Ricketts also suggested that the UK should continue to contribute to the EU’s missions and operations in the Horn of Africa: “Having chosen to put effort into a region” via the CSDP, “we should sustain it”.363 Dr Oksamytna believed the UK’s interests in Somalia would continue to be aligned with those of the EU—preventing terrorism and piracy, averting humanitarian crises, and creating conditions for development.364 Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha highlighted the ongoing value of Operation Atalanta: “Overall, it is in the UK’s interests to continue to participate in this operation, and in any similar future ventures, as the Gulf of Aden is a major shipping route for the UK’s trade with the rest of the world.”365

186. Major General Stickland said that while “from a military perspective, there are some very sensible reasons why you would maintain Atalanta as it is”, he had “been asked by the EU to offer my thoughts on the things that need to be considered if it comes to a transition of command”.366 Other Member States had expressed interest in taking over the role of Operational Headquarters.367

187. Dr Ejdus said the UK should also be interested in continuing its participation in EUCAP Somalia, “not least because 65% of UK gas and oil supplies pass through the Gulf of Aden.” Participation would help to “protect this strategic line of communication for the UK”. It was “in the best interests of the UK” to make the mission “a success story from within”.368

188. Lord Ricketts suggested the UK “should keep an engagement” in the Sahel, where EU CSDP activities—EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali—support wider French engagement.369 Sir Stephen O’Brien, former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Co-ordinator, United Nations, thought that EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger’s role “in providing training and strategic advice to national security forces in the Sahel region” could in future “become even more essential”.370

189. Taking a thematic approach, Agora Think Tank suggested that the UK should consider “contributions on a case-by-case basis to maritime CSDP missions, supporting trade, maritime security and humanitarian aid operations”, as these “align well with the UK’s pursuit of its foreign policy priorities”.371 Dr Duke agreed that “the UK’s primary interest is likely to remain maritime, especially ensuring that SLOCs [Sea Lanes of Communication] are open for trade beyond the EU”. He also thought it was “likely that many of the UK’s security interests will remain in the EU’s neighbourhood area, including the EU’s candidates, if only for the simple reason that many of the EU’s members are also NATO members”.372

362 Q 66
363 Q 81
364 Written evidence from Dr Kseniya Oksamytna (BSD0009)
365 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)
366 Q 58
367 Q 94 (Pierre Vimont). See also Q 58 (Major General Charlie Stickland).
368 Q 68
369 Q 81. See also Q 93 (Pierre Vimont).
370 Written evidence from Sir Stephen O’Brien (BSD0003)
371 Written evidence from Agora Think Tank (BSD0006)
372 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
The Government’s aspirations

190. On 12 September 2017, the Department for Exiting the European Union published *Foreign policy, defence and development—a future partnership paper*.

This document set out “the Government’s vision” for the “new, deep and special partnership with the European Union”.373

191. The document stated that its proposed “ambitious new partnership would provide the opportunity for the UK and the EU to work together in CSDP missions and operations.”375 [emphasis in original] It continued:

“With this deep level of cooperation, the UK could work with the EU during mandate development and detailed operational planning. The level of UK involvement in the planning process should be reflective of the UK’s contribution. As part of this enhanced partnership, the UK could offer assistance through a continued contribution to CSDP missions and operations, including UK personnel, expertise, assets, or use of established UK national command and control facilities.”376 [emphasis in original]

192. The document concluded:

“The UK supports a future partnership with the EU unlike any other EU-third country relationship. What the UK is offering will be unprecedented in its breadth … and in its depth, in terms of the degree of engagement that the UK and the EU should aim to deliver. … It should take as its starting point the degree of existing cooperation that has evolved through the UK’s membership of the EU and be capable of adapting to the future threats and opportunities. … It is the UK’s ambition to work as closely as possible together with the EU.”377

The likelihood of the Government’s aspirations being realised

The UK’s leverage

193. Dr Duke described the aspirations for CSDP co-operation set out in the *Future partnership paper* as an “upbeat assessment”. He cautioned that, while “the UK undoubtedly puts much on the table”, there were “different perspectives … regarding the implied bargaining leverage of the UK’s security role”. It could not, therefore, be “assumed” that the *Future partnership paper* would be the starting point for UK-EU27 negotiations.378 Professor Menon likewise described the paper as having “a slight sense of ‘cake and eat it’”.379

194. We asked witnesses about areas of potential UK leverage. First, the Global Europe Centre said the EU27 would have to “plug” the gap for missions and operations, should no agreement be reached with the UK.380 Mr Lapsley told

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374 Ibid., p 1
375 Ibid., p 19
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid., p 22
378 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
379 Q 20
380 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
us that the EU27 “care about our money”, and “the scale of our financial contribution” would be part of the negotiations.381

195. As we noted in Chapter 2, there is a difference between how the costs of civilian and military missions and operations are financed. The departure of the UK would result in an approximately 15% shortfall in the current budget for civilian missions (financed through the EU’s budget for CFSP).382 For military missions and operations, however, common costs account for just 10–15% of overall costs, and the UK’s departure would result in a shortfall of around 17% of the common costs—just 2–3% of the total cost. Dr Duke saw this as a limitation on the UK’s leverage.383

196. Second, Mr Ahern, of the FCO, noted that the UK’s military capabilities account for a fifth of the forces available to the current EU28, and the EU27 would wish to maintain access to this resource.384 Dr Wright agreed that there would be appetite from the EU27, “simply because of what we bring to the table.”385 Brigadier General Aherne said that the “knowledge, experience, ability and delivery” of UK military personnel was “invaluable”.386 Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha said that although there was no precedent for a non-Member State to host an Operational Headquarters, access to Northwood could be “an important asset for the UK to include in the context of the withdrawal negotiations”.387

197. Lord Ricketts, however, thought the EU’s “red line” on decision-making would not be overcome by assertions that the UK is “a major military power”: “I do not think the EU will wear that”.388

198. The leverage afforded by the UK’s military strength is also undermined by the fact that the UK’s historic contribution of personnel has been slight. It has long punched below its weight, and so the value to the EU of its participation is limited.389 Mr Vimont said that the “difficulties” faced by the EU in recruitment to CSDP missions and operations—discussed in Chapter 2—“were there already, even with the UK being a member. I am not sure that the UK no longer being present will make much difference.”390 Nevertheless, he acknowledged that, after Brexit, the EU would “not have the possibility of looking for UK headquarters if we want to”.391 The Global Europe Centre, meanwhile, noted that, as the UK’s personnel contribution is “relatively low”, adapting to the UK’s departure “would not appear to be overly burdensome”.392

199. Third, Mr Vimont said the UK had “been sharing intelligence with its European counterparts”, which had “been very helpful”. This would no

381 Q 10
382 We note that the UK has agreed to continue to contribute to the EU Budget during the transitional period (29 March 2019–31 December 2020), and so this shortfall would not arise until after that period.
383 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
384 Q 8
385 Q 18
386 Written evidence from Brigadier General Aherne (BSD0011)
387 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)
388 Q 76
389 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001) See Chapter 2.
390 Q 93
391 Q 94 (Pierre Vimont)
392 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
longer be available to the EU “to prepare our political assessments”. The UK’s “strong assets in maritime surveillance, state-of-the-art technologies and so forth” meant that there was “real eagerness on the EU27 side to find a way of keeping close links with Britain”.  

**Options for UK participation in CSDP missions and operations after Brexit**

200. The Global Europe Centre said that “replicating the UK’s current arrangements with the CSDP post-Brexit presents significant obstacles”. As we set out in Chapter 3, the UK’s role in CSDP missions to date has been principally the provision of strategic guidance and advice. Dr Duke said it would “be unable to exercise this role as a non-member of the EU”.

201. The Government is yet to set out how it would wish to translate its aspirations for CSDP co-operation—as expressed in its *Future partnership paper*—into an operational framework. Mr Lapsley told us: “I do not think we are yet at the stage where we want to start articulating in detail exactly what would meet the kind of objective that the Government set out in that paper.”

202. Mr Lapsley said that it was “quite difficult for us at the moment to say with any great, definitive confidence” of the EU27, “‘Yes, they’re going to be up for this or that’.” He had picked up “wide interest in the idea that it would be good to be able to carry on working with the UK on CSDP missions”. No Member State had said “absolutely not” to the UK’s proposals in the *Future partnership paper*, but “I would be misleading the Committee if I said anyone was promising us that we could look at those things”. He acknowledged the EU’s concern for “the integrity and manageability of its own processes”. The Government “just [did] not know the answer” to what “kinds of parameters that the EU is prepared to work within” on CSDP missions and operations.

203. We note that on 24 January 2018, the European Commission Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU produced a document entitled ‘Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: Security, Defence and Foreign Policy’. The section on EU CSDP missions and operations is reproduced in Box 8.

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393 QQ91, 94
394 Q 91
395 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
396 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
397 Q 9
398 Q 8
399 Q 9 (Angus Lapsley)
Box 8: Extract from the European Commission’s ‘Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the framework for the future relationship: Security, Defence and Foreign Policy’

### EU CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

**Brexit impact**

- Third countries do not provide *Operation Headquarters* for CSDP operations/missions;
- Third countries cannot be *lead-nation* or have the post of the *Operation Commander* or other high level positions in operations/missions.

**Immediate implications for the UK**

- Need to transfer the Operation Headquarters of *Operation Atalanta* currently provided by the UK (Northwood);
- Need to transfer the responsibility of the Operational Command of *Althea* (currently DSACEUR);
- Need to adjust the *EU Battlegroup* roster of 2nd Semester 2019 (currently UK as framework nation).\(^{401}\)

**EU Interest**

- Continued ability to *plan and conduct CSDP missions and operation autonomously*;
- *Not disrupt EU’s relationships with third countries.*

**Future partnership**

Options:

- A *Framework Participation Agreement* (FPA) based on the model approved by the Council in 2008; or
- *Ad hoc agreements*; or
- Developing a *new and more ambitious framework* applicable for third countries?

\(^{401}\) EU Battlegroups are rapid-reaction forces of around 1,500 troops. The UK was due to act as the framework nation for the EU Battlegroup for the second half of 2019. In March, the Government withdrew from this commitment, in light of the UK’s exit from the EU on 29 March 2019. ‘Britain withdraws offer to lead EU military force after Brexit’, *Reuters* (20 March 2018): https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-military/britain-withdraws-offer-to-lead-eu-military-force-after-brexit-idUKKBN1GW1RK [accessed 30 April 2018]

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\(^{204}\) On 23 March, the European Council (EU27) adopted the ‘European Council (Art. 50) (23 March 2018) – Guidelines’, which stated:

“In view of our shared values and common challenges, there should be a strong EU-UK cooperation in the fields of foreign, security and defence policy. A future partnership should respect the autonomy of the Union’s decision-making, taking into account that the UK will be a third country, and foresee appropriate dialogue, consultation,修剪内容...

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coordination, exchange of information, and cooperation mechanisms. As a pre-requisite for the exchange of information in the framework of such cooperation a Security of Information Agreement would have to be put in place.”

205. We note that both documents are non-binding, and were produced in advance of the UK-EU27 negotiations on the issue of foreign and defence co-operation after Brexit.

**Possible formal frameworks for UK participation**

*The third country model*

206. We first considered the third country model. Our witnesses were not convinced that the existing arrangements (as set out in Chapter 4) would be acceptable to the UK. Dr Jacobs explained that “A relationship that is just another Norway … filling positions where there is no involvement in planning, and no strategic or management positions are possible—will potentially die out quite quickly”. Mr Vimont was of the same view: the UK was “not a partner of the same nature as Georgia, or even Turkey, which at the moment are some of the third country partners we have on CSDP”. Third party status would be “unlikely to satisfy Britain’s interests and strategic ambitions”; “being able to participate but not being able to shape the missions in which you are participating” was “not a great outcome”. Relying on the Committee of Contributors was “far from ideal when it comes to Britain post Brexit”.

207. This was also the view of the Government: Mr Lapsley said that “the existing way in which the European Union handles third countries would not allow us … reasonable input”. The EU would “be conscious of protecting the integrity of its own autonomy in political and legal decision-making”. The question, therefore, was what models could be developed “that would allow a third country … to contribute to an operation and to have a reasonable and proportionate degree of influence over what that operation was doing”.

208. Some witnesses raised the potential of comprehensively reforming the third country model. There was, said the Global Europe Centre, an “opportunity for a rethink of the structure of FPAs so that it integrates partner countries at every stage of the planning and implementation of CSDP missions”. We note that the European Commission’s internal document, quoted in Box 8, included the option of “Developing a new and more ambitious framework applicable for third countries?”

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403 Q 71 (Dr Filip Ejdus and Dr An Jacobs)

404 Q 71

405 Q 94

406 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)

407 Q 14 (Professor Anand Menon)

408 Q 7

409 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)

A bespoke, UK-specific, arrangement

209. An alternative approach would be for the EU to create a bespoke arrangement for the UK, as a former Member State. Mr Vimont said that “Britain would want more” than current third country arrangements, which meant that “we will have to reinvent totally new types of arrangements”. He was confident that “it can be done”.411

210. The first UK-specific option, proposed by the Global Europe Centre, was “a ‘reverse Denmark’ … outside the EU but inside the CSDP”. This could involve the UK continuing all “existing commitments to current CSDP military and civilian operations”, and participation on “equal terms” for future missions and operations. It would include “full UK participation in all relevant CSDP decision-making structures” and “involvement in the definition of CSDP missions, their mandate and political command and control arrangements”.412

211. The Global Europe Centre itself concluded that there was “no indication at the present time that the EU27 are considering this as a post-Brexit option”.413 We note that it would be problematic in the context of the institutional design of the CSDP (as set out in Chapter 2),414 and the Government has also given no indication that this is an option it is considering.

212. Dr Duke could not foresee a role for the UK in CSDP decision-making after Brexit, however this were to be structured: “Any future role will … be that of a facilitator, rather than a leader.”415 Dr Ejdus too thought a decision-making role for the UK was “an option that the EU will probably not be happy about”.416 Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha therefore thought the UK would be outside the “the nitty-gritty politics of CSDP decision-making”.417 Lord Ricketts also considered that the EU would “always draw a line at EU autonomy … If we are not in the EU, we will not be part of the decision-making”,418 a point echoed by Mr Vimont.419

213. A second possible UK-specific option was to negotiate “some sort of a privileged advisory or consultative role in the EU institutions, but no decision-making power”. The UK “would participate in the planning of the missions in the PSC”, but would not have a veto.420 Dr Chappell and Dr Barrinha said that the UK would be likely to seek observer status at the PSC, with speaking rights: “Access to the PSC” was “critically important”. The UK might contribute “technical know-how and strategic guidance when requested, and/or when its key interests were at stake”.421 Professor Menon

411 Q 94
412 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
413 Ibid.
414 Q 71 (Dr Filip Ejdus)
415 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
416 Q 71
417 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)
418 Q 76
419 Q 91
420 Q 71 (Dr Filip Ejdus). We also discussed the possibility of observer status in EU bodies such as the PSC in the context of foreign policy in our report Brexit: sanctions policy. European Union Committee, Brexit: sanctions policy (8th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 50)
421 Written evidence from Dr Laura Chappell and Dr André Barrinha (BSD0004)
said the UK “should play to be as present in as many of the rooms as possible post Brexit”. The best outcome would be:

“observer status within the European External Action Service or some form of systemic, institutionalised information-sharing that allows us … long before we are thinking of putting boots on the ground, to think about broader foreign policy priorities and to think about missions in the context of those priorities”. 423

214. In this regard, Mr Lapsley said the UK could draw, as “sources of inspiration”, on two examples—the experience of Finland and Sweden in engaging with NATO, and how the US engages with the EU. He said that “elements of both” would be valuable in the EU-UK relationship after Brexit, “if one wanted it to be genuinely load-bearing in terms of what we could do together operationally”. 424

215. Mr Lapsley said that Finland and Sweden, non-NATO countries, had “become very close partners in NATO and have been contributing to NATO operations”. They made “a broader intellectual and political contribution”, and were “in some ways … more active than some allies within NATO”. They were “regular participants” in North Atlantic Council meetings, and while they did not “have a formal decision-making role … they are often there, contributing to debate”. He added that they had “staff officers and secondees at all levels”, were “able to exchange information with NATO, including confidential information”, and took part in exercises. 426

216. Professor Menon was not convinced by the comparison: there were “real contextual differences with the Scandinavian situation in relation to NATO”, not least that CSDP missions and operations are not a response to a “clear and present threat to … national security”, making it “a lot harder to act decisively and quickly”. He did not think the UK would “necessarily find it as smooth in arriving at a situation where we work together very closely”. 427

217. Mr Lapsley also drew an analogy with the UK-US relationship. The UK had “a historically close military and political relationship with the US”, and while the US was “completely autonomous politically”, there was “a culture of co-operation and sharing of information”, and legal mechanisms allowing the secondment of staff and the sharing of sensitive information. This gave the UK “a reasonable degree of insight into American thinking quite early on”. 428

218. He clarified that in applying this model to the EU, “I would not expect us to be anywhere near” the level of investment of UK personnel in the US— 800 to 900 secondees. He said the UK “would have to reach judgments on what scale of investment in a structural presence in Brussels was needed”. There was “perhaps a difference between what you are prepared to invest in permanent structures—for example, having secondees in the European Union military staff … and putting people into a particular mission”. If

422 Q 14
423 Q 15
424 Q 9
425 The principal political decision-making body of NATO.
426 Q 9 (Angus Lapsley)
427 Q 17
428 Q 9
the UK were to have a “mission-by-mission or operation-by-operation” approach, then it could “scale it according to the level of interest”.429

219. Dr Ejdus thought that consultation without a decision-making role was the “most realistic framework”.430 Dr Duke, however, said UK proposals of a “privileged association … suggest a lack of familiarity with how the EU actually works and, it is tempting to suggest, how the UK is perceived in various Brussels quarters”.431 SaferGlobe too saw “little or no room for special arrangements for the UK”.432 Mr Vimont explained that the EU would not wish to create a precedent:

“If we create a special status for the UK, others will say, ‘Why the UK and not us?’ Of course, we could say that it is because the UK is a former member and we need to deal with it in a different way from others, but we all know how diplomacy goes. That is not an argument that will go down easily with the United States, for instance.”433

220. He thought that if the UK put pressure on the EU27 to allow it “a seat at the table during all the decision-making processes, be it the PSC or the different departments”, this would result in “a lot of resistance on the part of the Europeans”.434 Professor Menon acknowledged that the EU was reluctant to give the UK such a “special status”. He considered this view particularly “damaging” in the area of CSDP.435

221. Mr Vimont added that it was not just the PSC that mattered: “The most sensitive operations are usually, one way or another, discussed and decided at the level of the European Council itself.” This raised the question of whether, post-Brexit, the Prime Minister “should be allowed from time to time inside the European Council to discuss such matters”. It was “not easy to find the right answer because of the political considerations”.436

222. A third UK-specific option was suggested by Lord Ricketts. While he did not think the EU would go “much beyond” the standard third party model, it might “be prepared to stretch permanent and continuing consultations”, including establishing “mechanisms for us to have influence and be part of the consultative process before decisions, and obviously to participate in a Committee of Contributors”. The UK “ought to be in the thick of things in Brussels, not a member of the EU but very much involved, and therefore involved in early thinking when a crisis breaks out and the idea of an EU contribution begins to be thought about”.437

223. The “key thing” was for the UK to “show commitment to contributing and being part of missions and operations. If we do that, there will be all sorts of ad hoc possibilities for continuing regular consultations in Brussels.” The UK should be doing “more than just sitting outside the room waiting to be asked, but of course in a different position from Member States”.438

429 Q10 (Angus Lapsley)
430 Q71
431 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
432 Written evidence from SaferGlobe (BSD0007)
433 Q91
434 Q91 (Pierre Vimont)
435 Q15
436 Q92
437 Q76 (Lord Ricketts)
438 Ibid.
224. There would be “a distinct link” between the UK’s contribution and the extent of “significant consultative access” offered, and the UK should therefore consider increasing its contributions from their current level. Nonetheless, the UK would be “outside the room for decisions” and not “part of the core of the concept”.439

225. Finally, an option for crisis management co-operation outside the structures of the EU was proposed by Mr Vimont. The UK could focus on “informal agreements” with individual European states. This would be a “more convenient way of building up the kind of special partnership the UK is looking for”. It would provide “much more room for manoeuvre, because you do not have the formality of the treaty and all the institutional framework”. For example, President Macron of France has proposed a new European Intervention Initiative (EII), outside the EU,440 which the UK supports.441 This “defence cooperation framework” aims to “improve operational planning and coordination of military deployments among European partners with meaningful capabilities”.442 Mr Vimont also referred to Letters of Intent on defence-industrial co-operation that had in the past been agreed between EU Member States on a bilateral basis.443

226. Bilateral co-operation on defence was in any case a trend, said Mr Vimont, for example co-operation between Germany and the Netherlands, and Italy and France.444 Dr Duke too noted that the UK had developed “bilateral security agreements and commitments” with Poland and France, and was planning an agreement with Germany.445 Mr Vimont and Lord Ricketts highlighted the opportunity for strengthened relations with France, in lieu of CSDP co-operation, building on the Lancaster House Treaties,446 while Professor Menon noted that the eastern members of the EU also have a strong willingness to work with the UK on defence.447

227. Dr Duke was less positive: such “bilateralism (or minilateralism)” was “unlikely to be a better, or even cheaper, alternative” to a post-Brexit arrangement on CSDP between the UK and the EU.448

439 Ibid.
440 Q 91
443 Q 91
444 Q 96
445 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
446 Q 96 and Q 87. On 2 November 2010, the UK and France signed a declaration at Lancaster House, aiming to build a long-term partnership in defence and security and nuclear co-operation. Ministry of Defence, ‘UK-French defence cooperation reaffirmed on fifth anniversary of Lancaster House Agreement’: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-french-defence-cooperation-reaffirmed-on-fifth-anniversary-of-lancaster-house-agreement [accessed 20 April 2018]. Dr Wright noted that France’s existing appetite for UK-French bilateral defence co-operation itself in part stems from France’s “growing scepticism about the value of CSDP”. Q 20 Mr Vimont noted that, like the UK, France does not contribute a large number of personnel to CSDP missions. Q 93
447 Q 20
448 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
Informal influence as a non-Member State

228. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, Dr Duke thought that the UK’s “diplomatic weight and backing” would “continue to count” with the EU27 on foreign policy and defence.\(^{449}\) Lord Ricketts said that the extent of the UK’s ongoing influence would depend on what the Government’s policy of ‘Global Britain’ meant in practice.\(^{450}\) We note that this is currently the subject of an inquiry by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee.\(^{451}\)

229. Lord Ricketts believed that it was “realistic to expect to be able to have some influence on the way EU thinking develops in a crisis, if we are prepared to put in the work”—namely, “old-fashioned diplomacy and military diplomacy”.\(^{452}\) The UK would need “very good people in Brussels”, and to offer the EU27 “intelligence, diplomatic information, political will and, potentially, military contributions”.\(^{453}\) Dr Duke agreed that the UK would need to “invest in staff and financial resources in Brussels”, and perhaps also in EU27 capitals.\(^{454}\) Lord Ricketts concluded: “I think we will be listened to because we are respected.”\(^{455}\)

230. Mr Vimont took a similar view, noting, for instance, that the EEAS engaged regularly with the US beyond individual missions: “At PSC level, we have regular meetings with our American partners. Political directors from the United States come in and out; they have formal and informal meetings.” Therefore, “it should not be too difficult to set up something of the same kind for the UK, all the more so as we had natural co-operation when the UK was a European Union member.”\(^{456}\) However, he repeated that such informal arrangements would not extend to decision-making or policy formation:

“If you are not at the table it is much more difficult to understand what is going on inside and how people react to some ideas, why they come out at the end with such and such a decision and have not done what seems obvious. If you are not in the room, you miss it all.”\(^{457}\)

231. We note that this same view was given to us in evidence in July 2017 by former High Representative the Rt Hon Baroness Ashton of Upholland, who told us that the EU had a “mechanistic but important political way of operating that requires you to be in the room in order to be able to participate.”\(^{458}\)

232. Dr Wright also said that “agenda-shaping” would be the most challenging: “It is hard enough to do that when you are in the room and interacting with your partners, but if you are outside the room, that is when it becomes very complex.”\(^{459}\)

\(^{449}\) Ibid.

\(^{450}\) Q 76


\(^{452}\) Q 77

\(^{453}\) Q 77 (Lord Ricketts)

\(^{454}\) Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)

\(^{455}\) Q 77

\(^{456}\) Q 92

\(^{457}\) Q 92 (Pierre Vimont)

\(^{458}\) Oral evidence taken on 6 July 2017 (Session 2017–19), Q 11. We also reflected on this point in the context of sanctions policy in our report Brexit: sanctions policy. European Union Committee, Brexit: sanctions policy (8th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 50)

\(^{459}\) Q 17
Negotiations on CSDP

Factors affecting CSDP negotiations

233. Dr Jacobs noted that CSDP was “an intergovernmental policy domain”, which made the options for future co-operation “a lot more flexible”. She continued: “If we were talking about something that falls under the Commission, we are bound by legislation and Regulations, and it is very difficult to say, ‘We want this but not that’.” On CSDP, on the other hand, this was “possible”.460 Professor Menon too thought CSDP “relatively straightforward in many ways” in comparison to “virtually any other area of Brexit”.461

234. While it was “virtually impossible to know what the EU might offer Britain in terms of a partnership”, Professor Menon thought the EU27 “might be more flexible when it comes to defence than other sectors, because our contribution is far clearer”, and, given the intergovernmental nature of CSDP, “there is no EU law”.462 Dr Wright said there was a “tension between legal and formal structures versus pragmatism”,463 but thought there was “quite a lot of flexibility”: the EU was “very good at producing fudge”.464 Dr Jacobs too thought “all options” remained in play.465 Professor Menon hoped “that we could arrive at a solution post Brexit that works for both sides far more easily than is going to be the case in many other sectors”.466

235. Professor Menon envisaged different possible outcomes, depending on who was the negotiator on defence and security—at present, how these negotiations would be structured was “spectacularly unclear”. If the UK could agree a treaty with the Member States, perhaps with the High Representative as the negotiator, this might have a different outcome to an “omnibus” negotiation covering “trade and everything … in the same document”, negotiated by the Commissioner for Trade or the EU’s Chief Negotiator.467

236. Dr Duke, on the other hand, was not confident that CSDP could be separated from the broader negotiations: he said the UK and EU27’s “ability, or inability, to reach agreement in sensitive sectors such as aerospace will, in turn, influence the mood music when it comes to any discussions on CSDP”.468 Mr Lapsley also thought that there would “be an interaction between this part of the negotiation and the wider negotiation”.469

The approach to negotiations

237. Professor Menon was concerned that the topic of defence and security was not receiving “the level of attention that it merits”. There was a danger that defence and security negotiations would be “done at the eleventh hour because someone thinks, ‘Oh my god, we had better put a chapter in on that’”.470

460 Q 71
461 Q 11
462 Q 14. Defence co-operation would also include EU defence-industrial projects such as the European Defence Fund, which were not part of this inquiry.
463 Q 18
464 Q 15
465 Q 71
466 Q 11
467 Q 16
468 Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
469 Q 9
470 Q 16
238. Dr Wright said that the UK should take the initiative, in advance of these negotiations. The UK should apply “a bit of pragmatism in thinking about how we can add value, how we can engage with our partners and what we can get out of it”, and try to secure a strategic role.\(^{471}\) He and Professor Menon agreed that this should include structured engagement with the EEAS: “grasping the opportunity now” was preferable to “reacting later on” to EU proposals.\(^{472}\)

239. Lord Ricketts agreed that it was now “time to be putting meat on the bones of what the Prime Minister said in her Munich speech … about how we follow up the general idea of deep and structured co-operation”. He hoped that the reason the issue had not been a major feature of the negotiations so far was “because both sides assume that the answer is pretty straightforward”.\(^{473}\)

240. Dr Duke made a suggestion on tone: the UK should consider adopting “a more modest approach that recognises that the UK is the demandeur in these negotiations”\(^{474}\).

### Transitional arrangements

241. At the time of writing, the UK and the EU have agreed in principle a transitional period, from 29 March 2019 until 31 December 2020.\(^{475}\) Dr Wright thought “the only course of action” for CSDP missions and operations in which the UK is already engaged would be “to follow that through to the end during the transition period”. The UK could not “suddenly pull out and say, ‘We are not part of this anymore’” without undermining its reputation and credibility.\(^{476}\)

242. The Global Europe Centre said that in the transitional period, “UK and EU interests may be best served by continuity and with the UK continuing its participation in the existing CSDP missions and the continued provision of an OHQ for the CSDP”. This implied that the UK “would be closely associated with EU decision-making on current CSDP missions in which it continues to be a participant”.\(^{477}\) General Sir Adrian Bradshaw also could “see no particular problems in the transition process”. The UK “should continue to contribute, with a policy that is as it is today, as far as that is possible”.\(^{478}\)

243. Professor Menon agreed that CSDP “should” be included in transitional arrangements, but “whether it can be included on current terms, I very much doubt”.\(^{479}\) Mr Vimont was concerned that there was only a “very short period” of time available to “invent” transitional arrangements. It would “not

\(^{471}\) Q 15
\(^{472}\) Ibid.
\(^{473}\) Q 79
\(^{474}\) Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke (BSD0001)
\(^{476}\) Q 21
\(^{477}\) Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD0005)
\(^{478}\) Q 36
\(^{479}\) Q 21
be easy” to achieve, “because to some extent everybody is playing tactics in
the whole of the Brexit negotiations”.

244. Lord Ricketts, on the other hand, dismissed the value of a transitional
period for CSDP co-operation: rather than introduce a new arrangement
for a limited period, “We should jump straight from the full member rights
we have now to the new situation, which I hope will be extensive access and
capacity for input … sooner rather than later.” There should be a “seamless
transition” from membership to the new relationship, because “if a further
crisis blew up, and there was an issue about the role the EU should play, I
think Britain would want to be part of whatever consultations were going
on”.

245. Dr Wright highlighted the potential uncertainty over missions and operations
which might be developed during the transitional period. Mr Vimont also
said that, were a new mission or operation to be developed after 29 March
2019, the UK should make its interest known to the EU27 “very early on”,
noting that “the decision-making process would be with the EU27 on one
side, and there would be discussion and contact with the UK on the other
side, but outside the Union treaty and the CSDP”. The Global Europe
Centre said missions and operations launched after 29 March 2019 presented
“the opportunity for a precedent to be set for the nature of EU-UK co-
operation” post-transition.

246. The Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community was published on 19 March, after we had
finished taking evidence. It included content on CSDP during the transitional
period. This text was highlighted in green, meaning that it was “agreed at
negotiators’ level”, and would “only be subject to technical legal revisions in
the coming weeks.”

247. Regarding CSDP missions and operations, Article 124 sets out that the EU’s
position on possible third country participation, as discussed in Box 8 earlier
in this chapter, extends to the transition period:

“During the transition period, the United Kingdom shall not provide
commanders of civilian operations, heads of mission, operation
commanders or force commanders for missions or operations conducted
under Articles 42, 43 and 44 TEU, nor shall it provide the operational
headquarters for such missions or operations or serve as framework
nation for Union battlegroups. During the transition period, the United

480 Q 94
481 Q 79
482 Q 21
483 Q 95
484 Written evidence from the Global Europe Centre (BSD00005)
485 European Commission and HM Government, Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community
2018]. Title V of the TEU establishes “General provisions on the union’s external action and specific
provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy”. Chapter 2 sets out “Specific provisions on
the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Section 2 sets out “Provisions on the Common Security
and Defence Policy” Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (Article 122), OF C 326
(26 October 2012)
Kingdom shall not provide the head of any operational actions under Article 28 TEU.\textsuperscript{486}

248. Additionally, “Until 31 December 2020, the United Kingdom shall contribute to … the costs of Common Security and Defence Policy operations, on the basis of the same contribution key as before the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”\textsuperscript{487}

249. These provisions, however, will only apply in the absence of a subsequent agreement between the UK and the EU. Article 122 of the Draft Agreement states:

“Should the Union and the United Kingdom reach an agreement governing their future relationship in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy which becomes applicable during the transition period, Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU and the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions shall cease to apply to the United Kingdom from the date of application of that agreement.”\textsuperscript{488}

250. The text seems to imply that discussions on foreign and defence policy are yet to start, and indeed we are not aware of any detailed UK-EU discussions to date on Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP co-operation after Brexit. On 26 October 2017, in evidence to this Committee, Sir Alan Duncan told us: “We cannot point to a particular design plan” for foreign policy co-operation during the transitional period. He was sure that foreign policy would “figure in the transition plan”, but there was “no specific detail that I can honestly put before you at the moment”. He had not been “privey to” any “detailed discussions” on this matter.\textsuperscript{489} We note that Article 122 of the Draft Agreement, quoted above, suggests that separate arrangements may be developed in this area.

Conclusions and recommendations

251. The UK’s foreign policy priorities are unlikely to change significantly upon leaving the EU, in which case the UK will continue to derive value from participation in current CSDP missions and operations. In particular, the UK will continue to have interests in the Western Balkans (Operation Althea and EULEX Kosovo), and in the Horn of Africa (particularly Operation Atalanta).

252. The UK will require a higher level of political control to participate in military operations—such as Operation Atalanta—where service


\textsuperscript{487} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{489} Oral evidence taken on 26 October 2017 (Session 2017–19), Q 77
personnel undertake executive operations than to participate in
civilian or military missions, where tasks relate to training and
capacity building.

253. The UK’s role in CSDP missions and operations has been more a
‘manager’ than a ‘player’. It is unlikely that the EU27 will be willing
to allow the UK—as a non-Member State—a decision-making role on
CSDP missions and operations.

254. The existing model for third country involvement in CSDP missions
and operations would not give the UK the input and influence that it
currently enjoys as a Member State.

255. The negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU have not yet
focused on foreign policy and defence. This area of EU co-operation
is largely intergovernmental, which makes it different to areas
embedded within the acquis.

256. It is also not yet clear how negotiations on foreign policy and defence
co-operation will be structured, by whom they will be conducted, or
how far they will be separated from the negotiations on future trade
and other issues.

257. In its future partnership paper on foreign policy, defence and
development the Government set out broad, high-level aspirations for
co-operation with the EU on CSDP missions and operations. These
included a role in “mandate development” and “detailed operational
planning”. This goes well beyond the existing third country model
offered by the EU. The prospects for changes to this model are
uncertain.

258. We are concerned that the Government has yet to explain how its high-
level aspirations could be put into practice. We strongly urge that the
FCO develop and transmit to the EU detailed proposals for future
co-operation in the area of foreign policy and defence. It should do
this before the June 2018 European Council meeting, to give the EU
an opportunity to respond before any political declaration on future
UK-EU relations is finalised.

259. The UK’s defence capabilities are significant, and well-respected by
the EU27. These capabilities do not, however, necessarily translate
into leverage for the UK, given that most CSDP missions and
operations are at the lower end of the crisis management spectrum,
with a focus on training and capacity building.

260. The fallback position in the Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community
suggests a much more limited role for the UK than that envisaged by
the Government. It excludes the possibility of the UK maintaining
the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta, or Operation
Command of Operation Althea via the Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander Europe. We note that these issues are subject to
negotiation.
261. The UK must decide whether to use the leverage afforded by its significant military capabilities to negotiate modifications to the model under which it can contribute to CSDP missions and operations after Brexit.

262. CSDP missions and operations are a subset of wider foreign policy and engagement on security and defence with the EU. The UK should seek to negotiate observer status in the EU’s planning and decision-making bodies, such as the Political and Security Committee, after Brexit.

263. It is possible to influence the EU from the outside, as shown by the example of the United States. To do so, the UK will have to invest significant resources in Brussels and in Member States’ capitals, to maintain influence from outside the structures of the EU.
CSDP missions and operations

1. CSDP missions and operations are relatively limited in scale, compared to those of the UN or NATO. CSDP missions tend to focus on lower-intensity crisis management, such as capacity building, reform and training. (Paragraph 90)

2. CSDP missions and operations have often been slow to produce results. This has, in part, been a consequence of the challenging and often unstable environments in which they operate—such as Kosovo and Somalia. (Paragraph 91)

3. Nonetheless, since the first deployment in 2003, CSDP missions and operations have made a meaningful contribution to EU foreign policy priorities, including the strengthening of the rule of law, security sector reform, conflict prevention, and the tackling of piracy. (Paragraph 92)

4. Participation in military CSDP missions and operations has also contributed to operational collaboration between the Member States. (Paragraph 93)

5. The key competitive advantage of CSDP missions and operations, when compared to those conducted by NATO or the UN, is the EU’s ability to draw together military, political, diplomatic, economic and legal lines of operation in a comprehensive approach. EULEX Kosovo and Operation Atalanta are striking examples of this. Effective co-ordination both among the EU institutions and among the Member States is, however, sometimes problematic. (Paragraph 94)

6. One CSDP operation has been a particular success: Operation Atalanta has contributed to the dramatic fall in piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. (Paragraph 95)

7. Although established by unanimity, CSDP missions and operations do not always enjoy strong support from the Member States, which have differing priorities and often look for short-term results to complex challenges. Securing the requisite number of assets and appropriately skilled personnel for missions and operations is a longstanding problem. (Paragraph 96)

The UK and CSDP missions and operations to date

8. CSDP missions and operations have made a significant contribution to a number of the UK’s foreign policy priorities—including tackling piracy, promoting the rule of law, and peacebuilding in post-conflict states—and have been an important channel of UK influence. (Paragraph 139)

9. One of the UK’s primary objectives for the CSDP has been to encourage other EU countries to develop their defence capabilities and increase their willingness to participate in crisis management and defence operations. (Paragraph 140)

10. CSDP missions and operations are agreed between 28 countries by consensus. They correspond in varying degrees to UK foreign policy priorities—the EU’s maritime operations are particularly closely aligned to UK interests, as are Operation Althea and EULEX Kosovo. (Paragraph 141)
11. The UK’s personnel contribution to CSDP missions and operations to date account for just 2.3% of total Member State contributions. This has, in part, been a result of UK defence commitments across the globe. The UK has also provided assets—including naval vessels and aircraft—and troop reinforcements on standby for CSDP operations. (Paragraph 142)

12. The UK’s financial contribution to civilian missions is 15%. As 85–90% of the costs of military missions and operations are financed by the participating countries, the UK’s 17% contribution to the common costs of military missions and operations is relatively lower. (Paragraph 143)

13. The UK’s principal contribution to CSDP missions and operations has been strategic guidance and advice. It has filled a small number of influential roles, and leveraged its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to secure authorisation for EU missions and operations. (Paragraph 144)

14. There is an established precedent for third country participation in CSDP missions and operations through the negotiation of bilateral agreements with the EU. Third countries are well integrated into the CSDP missions and operations in which they participate, and have some influence at an operational level. (Paragraph 173)

15. Third countries have no formal role in decision-making or planning, and the Committee of the Contributors model—designed to facilitate consultations between the EU and contributing third countries—does not work well. (Paragraph 174)

16. The UK’s foreign policy priorities are unlikely to change significantly upon leaving the EU, in which case the UK will continue to derive value from participation in current CSDP missions and operations. In particular, the UK will continue to have interests in the Western Balkans (Operation Althea and EULex Kosovo), and in the Horn of Africa (particularly Operation Atalanta). (Paragraph 251)

17. The UK will require a higher level of political control to participate in military operations—such as Operation Atalanta—where service personnel undertake executive operations than to participate in civilian or military missions, where tasks relate to training and capacity building. (Paragraph 252)

18. The UK’s role in CSDP missions and operations has been more a ‘manager’ than a ‘player’. It is unlikely that the EU27 will be willing to allow the UK—as a non-Member State—a decision-making role on CSDP missions and operations. (Paragraph 253)

19. The existing model for third country involvement in CSDP missions and operations would not give the UK the input and influence that it currently enjoys as a Member State. (Paragraph 254)

20. The negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU have not yet focused on foreign policy and defence. This area of EU co-operation is largely intergovernmental, which makes it different to areas embedded within the acquis. (Paragraph 255)
21. It is also not yet clear how negotiations on foreign policy and defence co-operation will be structured, by whom they will be conducted, or how far they will be separated from the negotiations on future trade and other issues. (Paragraph 256)

22. In its future partnership paper on foreign policy, defence and development the Government set out broad, high-level aspirations for co-operation with the EU on CSDP missions and operations. These included a role in “mandate development” and “detailed operational planning”. This goes well beyond the existing third country model offered by the EU. The prospects for changes to this model are uncertain. (Paragraph 257)

23. We are concerned that the Government has yet to explain how its high-level aspirations could be put into practice. We strongly urge that the FCO develop and transmit to the EU detailed proposals for future co-operation in the area of foreign policy and defence. It should do this before the June 2018 European Council meeting, to give the EU an opportunity to respond before any political declaration on future UK-EU relations is finalised. (Paragraph 258)

24. The UK's defence capabilities are significant, and well-respected by the EU27. These capabilities do not, however, necessarily translate into leverage for the UK, given that most CSDP missions and operations are at the lower end of the crisis management spectrum, with a focus on training and capacity building. (Paragraph 259)

25. The fallback position in the Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community suggests a much more limited role for the UK than that envisaged by the Government. It excludes the possibility of the UK maintaining the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta, or Operation Command of Operation Althea via the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. We note that these issues are subject to negotiation. (Paragraph 260)

26. The UK must decide whether to use the leverage afforded by its significant military capabilities to negotiate modifications to the model under which it can contribute to CSDP missions and operations after Brexit. (Paragraph 261)

27. CSDP missions and operations are a subset of wider foreign policy and engagement on security and defence with the EU. The UK should seek to negotiate observer status in the EU’s planning and decision-making bodies, such as the Political and Security Committee, after Brexit. (Paragraph 262)

28. It is possible to influence the EU from the outside, as shown by the example of the United States. To do so, the UK will have to invest significant resources in Brussels and in Member States’ capitals, to maintain influence from outside the structures of the EU. (Paragraph 263)
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

Members
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top
Baroness Brown of Cambridge
Lord Dubs
Lord Horam
Baroness Manzoor (resigned 18 April 2018)
Earl of Oxford and Asquith
Lord Risby
Lord Stirrup
Baroness Suttie
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
Lord Triesman
Baroness Verma (Chairman)

Declarations of interest
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top
No relevant interests declared
Baroness Brown of Cambridge
No relevant interests declared
Lord Dubs
No relevant interests declared
Lord Horam
No relevant interests declared
Baroness Manzoor
No relevant interests declared
Earl of Oxford and Asquith
No relevant interests declared
Lord Risby
No relevant interests declared
Lord Stirrup
No relevant interests declared
Baroness Suttie
No relevant interests declared
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean
No relevant interests declared
Lord Triesman
Member of the Board of the European Leadership Network
Baroness Verma (Chairman)
No relevant interests declared

The following Members of the European Union Select Committee attended the meeting at which the report was approved:
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top
Lord Boswell of Aynho (Chairman)
Baroness Brown of Cambridge
Baroness Browning
Lord Cromwell
Baroness Falkner of Margravine
Lord Jay of Ewelme
Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws
The Earl of Kinnoull
Lord Liddle
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Lord Selkirk of Douglas
Lord Teverson
Baroness Verma
Lord Whitty
Baroness Wilcox
Lord Woolmer of Leeds

During consideration of the report the following Members declared an interest:

Baroness Wilcox

*President, National Consumer Federation*

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Evidence is published online at https://www.parliament.uk/brexit-csdp-missions/ and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074).

Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked with ** gave both oral and written evidence. Those marked with * gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.

Oral evidence in chronological order


* Angus Lapsley, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  QQ 1–10

* Dr Nicholas Wright, Teaching Fellow in EU Politics, University College London  QQ 11–25

* Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London  QQ 11–25

* General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR)  QQ 26–39

** Major General Charlie Stickland OBE, Operation Commander, EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta  QQ 40–58

* Dr Filip Ejdus, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade  QQ 59–71

* Dr An Jacobs, Senior Lecturer, Defence & International Affairs Department, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst  QQ 59–71

* Lord Ricketts, former British Ambassador to France, former UK National Security Advisor, and former Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office  QQ 72–87

* Pierre Vimont, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe and former Executive Secretary-General, European External Action Service (EEAS)  QQ 88–97

Alphabetical list of all witnesses

Agora Think Tank  BSD0006


Brigadier General Gerald Aherne, former Commander of EUTM Somalia  BSD0011
Dr André Barrinha, Lecturer in International Security, University of Bath

* General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR)

Dr Andrea Lorenzo Capussela

Dr Laura Chappell, Lecturer in European Politics, University of Surrey

Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration

* Dr Filip Ejdus, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Global Europe Centre

Dr Andi Hoxhaj, Teaching Fellow in EU Law, University of Warwick

* Dr An Jacobs, Senior Lecturer, Defence & International Affairs Department, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

* Angus Lapsley, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

* Professor Anand Menon, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, King’s College London

Sir Stephen O’Brien, former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, United Nations

Dr Kseniya Oksamytyna, Teaching Fellow, King’s College London

* Lord Ricketts, former British Ambassador to France, former UK National Security Advisor, and former Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SaferGlobe

** Major General Charlie Stickland OBE, Operation Commander, EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta

* Pierre Vimont, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe and former Executive Secretary-General, European External Action Service (EEAS)

* Dr Nicholas Wright, Teaching Fellow in EU Politics, University College London
APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions

The House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee, chaired by Baroness Verma, has launched an inquiry into possible UK co-operation with the EU on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions after Brexit. The inquiry will explore the value of CSDP missions to the UK’s pursuit of its foreign policy goals, how UK participation in these missions post-Brexit could be facilitated, what role the UK might play in the planning of missions after Brexit, and how far this would depend on the UK’s co-operation in other areas of the EU’s foreign and security policy after withdrawal.

The inquiry will consider, in particular the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo and the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia (with reference to Operation Atalanta), and may, in the course of the inquiry, also consider EU missions in Mali.

Background

Article 42(1) of the Lisbon Treaty sets out that “The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”

The EU currently has 16 CSDP missions:

Military missions:
- EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Med—known as Operation Sophia;
- EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia;
- EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali;
- EU Training Mission (EUTM) RCA;
- EU Force (EUFOR) ALTHEA; and
- EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) ATALANTA—known as Operation Atalanta.

Civilian missions:
- EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo;
- European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine;
- EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia;


• EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS);
• EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah;
• EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Libya;
• EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger;
• EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali;
• EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Somalia; and
• EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Iraq.

The Government’s paper *Foreign policy, defence and development - a future partnership paper* (September 2017) states that:

“An important element of our future partnership will be maximising the effectiveness of the UK and the EU in defence and security, whether in operational, institutional or industrial cooperation. The UK would like to establish how best to utilise UK assets, recognising the expertise and many military and niche capabilities that the UK contributes to the EU’s military ‘Force Catalogue’. **This ambitious new partnership would provide the opportunity for the UK and the EU to work together in CSDP missions and operations.**

With this deep level of cooperation, the **UK could work with the EU during mandate development and detailed operational planning.** The level of UK involvement in the planning process should be reflective of the UK’s contribution. As part of this enhanced partnership, the UK could offer assistance through a **continued contribution to CSDP missions and operations**, including UK personnel, expertise, assets, or use of established UK national command and control facilities.”

[Emphasis in original]

**The inquiry**

The External Affairs Sub-Committee intends to contribute to public debate on possible UK involvement in CSDP missions after Brexit, and to scrutinise and influence the UK Government’s consideration of this issue.

Public hearings will be held from January 2018. The Sub-Committee will publish a report, with recommendations, at the end of the inquiry. The report will receive a response from the Government, and will be debated in the House.

The Committee seeks written evidence on the following questions from anyone with a relevant interest. You need not address all questions in your response, and respondents from a particular area or sector are invited to focus on the questions most pertinent to them. Submissions are sought by 7 February 2018.

**Questions**

Please answer any or all of the following questions. We would particularly welcome examples relating to EULEX Kosovo, EUTM Somalia and Operation Atalanta.

**Specific**

1. How do CSDP missions contribute to the UK’s pursuit of its foreign policy priorities? What are the advantages and disadvantages to the UK of participation in CSDP missions? How important and closely related are the missions to the UK’s foreign policy goals?
2. What does the UK bring to CSDP missions? Does this differ between civilian and military missions, or between geographic areas? How significant would the absence of the UK after Brexit be to the delivery of current (and future) CSDP missions?

3. Would it be desirable for the UK to contribute financially, with staff, or with troops to the EU’s CSDP missions after Brexit? Please explain your reasons. Does your view differ between civilian and military missions, or between geographic areas?

4. How could post-Brexit UK participation in CSDP missions be structured? Would the UK be able to continue participation in any of the current frameworks for decision-making on CSDP missions? What additional processes and mechanisms would have to be put in place? How might these be structured?

5. What existing precedents are there of third countries participating in CSDP missions? How does this differ from participation as an EU Member State? How involved are these third countries in the (1) planning and (2) execution of CSDP missions, and what formal mechanisms of co-operation exist? How significant a contribution have third countries made to CSDP missions? To what extent have they been able to influence the design and execution of CSDP missions?

6. Would UK participation in CSDP missions depend on UK-EU co-operation in other areas of foreign and security policy after Brexit, or on the overall deal reached?

7. Would the UK ceasing to participate in CSDP missions have the consequence of requiring an increase in staff and financial resources for either the UK or the EU, and if so, where?

General

8. How successful have the EU’s CSDP missions been in realising the ambition set out in Article 42(1) of the Lisbon Treaty, to “provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets … on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security”?
## Current CSDP military missions and operations (April 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate Summary</th>
<th>Mandate Dates</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>UK Personnel</th>
<th>Total Annual Budget (UK contribution to Military Common Funding is approx. 16%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Med Operation SOPHIA (launched June 2015)</td>
<td>To provide surveillance, intelligence gathering and sharing, and assessment of smuggling activity towards and through the Southern Central Mediterranean Area, and to stop, board, search and dispose of, possibly through their destruction, trafficking vessels and assets before use and thereby contribute to EU efforts to disrupt the business model of trafficking networks</td>
<td>July 2017 to December 2018</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>5 x OHQ staff 1 x FHQ staff Naval survey ship HMS ECHO</td>
<td>€9.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
<td>Mandate Dates</td>
<td>Total Personnel</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia (launched April 2010)</td>
<td>Contribute to building up the Somali National Security Forces accountable to the Somali National Government, provide political and strategic level advice to Somali authorities within the security institutions (Ministry of Defense and General. Staff), support and advise on Sector Security Development as well as specific mentoring, advice and capacity building in the training domain.</td>
<td>December 2016 to December 2018 Pending Council Decision to renew to 31 December 2020.</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>3 x military staff 1 x civilian staff</td>
<td>€13.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali (launched February 2013)</td>
<td>To provide training to the Malian army and security forces, under control of the legitimate civilian political authorities.</td>
<td>May 2016 to May 2018 Pending Council Decision to renew to May 2019</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>6 x military staff 2 x civilian</td>
<td>€7.4m (1 Jan to 3 May 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
<td>Mandate Dates</td>
<td>Total Personnel</td>
<td>UK Personnel</td>
<td>Total Annual Budget (UK contribution to Military Common Funding is approx. 16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM RCA (launched April 2016, preceded by EUFOR RCA and EUMAM RCA)</td>
<td>To contribute to the SSR process coordinated by MINUSCA and to develop self-sustainable FACA capabilities to allow them a proper progressive development of credible, accountable, and ethnically balanced FACA under democratic control.</td>
<td>July 2016 to September 2020 Pending Council Decision to extend to September 2020</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€5.2m (1 Jan to 20 Sep 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA (launched December 2004)</td>
<td>To support Bosnia-Herzegovina efforts to maintain a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), conducts capacity building and training of the Armed Forces of BiH in order to contribute to the stability of the state.</td>
<td>From November 2017 to November 2018</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>DSACEUR is Operation Commander</td>
<td>€14.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
<td>Mandate Dates</td>
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<td>UK Personnel</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR ATALANTA (Operation ATALANTA) (launched December 2008)</td>
<td>Anti-piracy in support of UN SC Resolution, protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, protection of AMISOM shipping, protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, supports other EU Missions and International Organisations working to strengthen security and capacity in the Region.</td>
<td>December 2016 to December 2018 Pending Council Decision to extend to 31 December 2020</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>Hosts Operational Headquarters (Northwood); Operation Commander and 56 core OHQ staff</td>
<td>€4.7m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Current CSDP civilian missions (April 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mandate Summary</th>
<th>Mandate Dates</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
<th>UK Seconded Personnel</th>
<th>UK contribution to Civilian Common Funding is approx. 15%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>Rule of law mission, to monitor, mentor and advise national authorities on policing, Justice and Customs, while retaining executive responsibilities in specific areas of competence.</td>
<td>June 2016 to June 2018</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>5 in EULEX 3 at Specialist Chambers, Hague</td>
<td>€90.9m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine (launched November 2014)</td>
<td>EUAM contributes to the development of effective, sustainable and accountable civilian security services that contributes to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine, for the benefit of all Ukrainian citizens throughout the country.</td>
<td>December 2017 to May 2019</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>€20.8m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
<td>Mandate Dates</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia (launched October 2008)</td>
<td>EUMM provides civilian monitoring of parties’ actions, including full compliance with the Six Point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures on a countrywide basis throughout Georgia, including South-Ossetia and Abkhazia, working in close coordination with partners particularly the UN/OSCE and coherent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to stabilization, normalization and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia.</td>
<td>December 2016 to December 2018</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>€18.3m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
<td>Mandate Dates</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS (launched November 2005)</td>
<td>Contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership, in accordance with best international standards, in cooperation with the EU’s institution building programs as well as other international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector, including Criminal Justice Reform.</td>
<td>July 2017 to June 2018</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>€12.4m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah (launched November 2005)</td>
<td>EUBAM’s objective is to provide border assistance and monitoring at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) on the Gaza-Egypt border, mandated to verify and evaluate the professional conduct of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Border Police and Customs services and to contribute to confidence building between Israel and the PA.</td>
<td>July 2017 to June 2018</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya (launched May 2013)</td>
<td>The mission’s objective is to assist in a comprehensive civilian security sector reform planning process, with a view to preparing for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission.</td>
<td>August 2017 to December 2018</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€17m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger (launched July 2012)</td>
<td>Capacity building through training and advising, to improve the capacities of Nigerien Security Forces (Gendarmerie, National Police, National Guard) to fight terrorism and organized crime with a view to contribute to enhancing political stability, security, governance and social cohesion in Niger and in the Sahel.</td>
<td>July 2016 to July 2018</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€31m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
<td>Mandate Dates</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali (launched January 2015)</td>
<td>EU Capacity building mission aiming to allow the Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in Mali, and to restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali by means of an effective redeployment of its administration.</td>
<td>January 2017 to January 2019</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€29.7m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Somalia (launched July 2012 as EUCAP NESTOR)</td>
<td>Capacity building aiming to assist Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity in order to enable it to enforce maritime law more effectively (Council Decision 2016/2240 of 2 Dec 2016-Art.2) The Mission is complementary to Operation ATALANTA and EUTM Somalia.</td>
<td>December 2016 to December 2018</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>€27.4m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Mandate Summary</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUAM Iraq (launched October 2017)</td>
<td>The new mission will focus on assisting the Iraqi authorities in the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Iraqi security strategy. EU experts will provide advice and assistance in priority work areas responding to the needs of the relevant authorities.</td>
<td>October 2017 to October 2018</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>€14m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (BSD0013)
## APPENDIX 5: GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>The Common Foreign and Security Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis management concept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>The Combined Maritime Forces. A multinational naval partnership which consists of 32-member nations. It mainly focuses on defeating terrorism, preventing piracy, encouraging regional co-operation, and promoting a safe maritime environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in the EEAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoC</td>
<td>The Committee of the Contributors for a CSDP mission or operation, bringing together all participating countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>The Common Security and Defence Policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The DSACEUR is the Operation Commander of Operation Althea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>The European External Action Service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EII</td>
<td>The European Intervention Initiative. Proposed by President Macron of France, with the aim of improving operational planning and the co-ordination of military deployments between European countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>The European Security and Defence Policy. The predecessor to the CSDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>The EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR (Operation) Althea</td>
<td>EU Force Althea, the EU’s military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which supports BiH’s efforts to maintain a Safe and Secure Environment and conducts capacity building and training of the BiH armed forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>The European Union Military Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Med (Operation Sophia)</td>
<td>EU Naval Force Mediterranean, the EU’s naval operation in the central Mediterranean, which seeks to combat migrant smuggling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta)</td>
<td>EU Naval Force Somalia, the EU’s anti-piracy operation in the Horn of Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Somalia</td>
<td>The EU Capacity building Mission in Somalia, which assists Somalia in strengthening its maritime security capacity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EUTM Somalia The EU Training Mission in Somalia, which contributes to the strengthening of the Transitional Federal Government and the institutions of Somalia.

FPA Framework Participation Agreement, a bilateral agreement between the EU and a third country on participation in CSDP missions and/or operations.

HQ Headquarters.

ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

KFOR The Kosovo Force, the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

MMA Monitoring, mentoring and advice.

MSCHOA The Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa, based in the Operational Headquarters of Operation Atalanta.

NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NSS The UK’s National Security Strategy.

OHQ Operational Headquarters.

OPLAN The Operation Plan for a CSDP mission or operation.

OSCE The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

PA Participation Agreement, a bilateral agreement between the EU and a third country on participation in a specific CSDP mission or operation.

PESCO Permanent Structured Co-operation. A Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence co-operation among those EU Member States which choose to participate.

PSC The EU’s Political and Security Committee, an ambassador-level preparatory body for the Council of the EU.

RoK Republic of Korea.

SDSR The UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review.

SLOCs Sea Lanes of Communication.

TEU Treaty on European Union.

UN The United Nations.

UNMIK The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.


WEU The Western European Union.

WFP The World Food Programme.