Brexit: the future of financial regulation and supervision Contents

Chapter 5: Alignment and market access

Developments in the Government’s negotiating position

122.Our December 2016 report, Brexit: financial services,232 analysed the EU’s passporting and equivalence regimes, alongside the models for market access then under consideration. In particular, it assessed and compared the features of the EEA (‘Norway’) model, the customs union, a free trade agreement, EFTA membership and bilateral agreements (the ‘Swiss model’), and trade on WTO terms (the ‘no deal’ option). While this report does not seek to cover the same ground, some aspects of the debate have now moved on, making it appropriate to reconsider them.

123.The Prime Minister stated in her Lancaster House speech in January 2017 that the UK would be leaving the Single Market and therefore appeared to rule out EEA and EFTA membership.233 The Secretary of State, the Rt Hon David Davis MP, restated this policy on 7 September 2017, when he told the House of Commons that “The simple truth is that membership of the European Free Trade Association, for example, which would be one way to retain EEA membership, would … keep us within the acquis, and it would keep us within the requirements of free movement, albeit with some limitations, but none of those have worked so far. In many ways, it is the worst of all outcomes.”234

124.Instead, as the City Minister told us: “The Prime Minister has set out the Government’s intention for a free trade agreement on goods and services.”235 In other words, of the models for the future relationship analysed in our December 2016 report, all but two—a free trade agreement, or the ‘no deal’ option—have been ruled out by the Government.

125.This section therefore outlines the current state of play with respect to regulating future market access, on the basis of the Government’s stated intentions.

Equivalence and its limitations

126.The Commission’s existing arrangement for the recognition of third-country financial services is by means of a so-called ‘equivalence’ regime. Our December 2016 report covered in some detail the origins and shortcomings of the equivalence regime. In brief, equivalence provides a means for the EU to recognise third-country regulatory regimes in particular sectors, in order to reduce overlaps in regulatory compliance for the firms concerned (and for their supervisors); reduce the burdens of the prudential regime on EU firms with respect to their exposures to third countries; and provide EU firms and investors with a wider range of services, instruments and investment choices originating from third countries that can satisfy regulatory requirements in the EU.236

127.The EU does not regard equivalence as a means primarily of providing market access: a Commission Staff Working Document, published on 27 February 2017, stressed that “equivalence decisions in a few areas may enhance the possibilities of doing business in the EU (e.g. investment firms under MiFID II), but the equivalence as such serves primarily prudential regulatory purposes and is a tool to reduce overlaps in compliance in the interest of EU markets”. As such, “Equivalence is not a vehicle for liberalising international trade in financial services, but a key instrument to effectively manage cross-border activity … with third-country jurisdictions that adhere to, implement and enforce rigorously the same high standards of prudential rules as the EU.”237

128.In contrast to the current passporting regime for EU-based firms, equivalence does not offer comprehensive cross-border access to the EU’s markets. As Lloyd’s concluded, “In general, [equivalence] provisions do not provide market access to third country undertakings.”238 This is in part, as Simon Gleeson told us, because “Europe does not have an equivalence doctrine at the moment. It has a fragmented set of equivalence provisions put into different directives for different purposes.”239 Sir Jon Cunliffe agreed, adding that “for the main banking services, there is no equivalence. There is only the passport.”240

129.As of 31 December 2016, 37 countries were the subject of equivalence determinations across the 13 pieces of legislation that provide for third country regimes. These are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1: Third country equivalence provisions

Name of overarching regulation

Type of equivalence determination

Number of countries with determination

Prospectus (Regulation and Directive)

Equivalence of prospectuses


Third country GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) with IFRS


Transparency Directive

Third country GAAP with IFRS


Third country GAAP with IFRS transition


General transparency requirements


Accounting Directive

Country-by-country reporting


Credit Rating Agencies Regulation (CRA III)

Legal and supervisory frameworks


Statutory Audit Directive

Adequacy of competent authorities


Equivalence of audit framework


Equivalence of audit framework: transitional period


European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)

Central banks and public bodies exemption


Regulated markets


Transaction requirements




Trade repositories


Central Securities Depository Regulation (CSDR)



Securities Financing Transaction Regulation (SFTR)

Central bank exemption


Trade repositories


Transaction requirements


Benchmarks Regulation (BMR)

Requirements for benchmark administrators


Specific administrators or benchmarks


Short selling Regulation (SSR)

Requirements for markets


Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)

Exemption for monetary and public debt management activities


Exemption for climate policy activities


Solvency II Directive

Third-country reinsurers in the EU


EU insurers in third countries


Third-country insurers in the EU


Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) and Directive (MiFID II)

Central bank exemption


Derivatives: trade execution and clearing obligations


Trading venues for the purposes of clearing access


Trading venues and CCPs—access to benchmarks and licences for the purposes of clearing and trading obligations


Investment firms providing investment services to EU professional clients and eligible counterparties


Trading venues for the purposes of trading obligations for shares


Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)

Credit institutions


Investment firms




Exposures to central governments, central banks, regional governments, local authorities and public sector entities


Credit institutions


Investment firms


Source: European Commission, ‘Equivalence/Adequacy Decisions taken by the European Commission as of 9 January 2018’: [accessed 19 January 2018]

130.If the UK ultimately has to rely on equivalence, there will be particular concern over continuity, and over the risk of a gap between EU membership ending and equivalence determinations being reached and thereafter maintained. This delay may be significant: the Investment Association noted, for example, that “the European Commission took four years to determine that US regulation of CCPs was equivalent to EMIR. This is despite the differences between US and EU regulation being confined to relatively minor technical issues and the existence of a long-standing forum for regulatory discussions between the EU and US.”241

131.A further issue is the possibility of the UK being compelled, by virtue of the equivalence regime, to adopt rules that do not fit its domestic market. As Julian Adams of Prudential noted, “Equivalence, as distinct from a bespoke mutual agreement/recognition treaty, runs the risk that we become a rule-taker rather than looking at whether our frameworks deliver broadly equivalent outcomes.”242 Andrew Bailey was even more emphatic: “Let me be clear that, if it is a rules-based equivalence, we have the problem that, subject to the institutional arrangements that exist, we would be more of a rule-taker at that point. That is a pretty problematic world to end up in.”243 Barnabas Reynolds agreed that “we do not want to end up a rule-taker”. He believed that the reason for the UK’s success was its “very subtly crafted laws and regulations for financial services that facilitate dynamic enterprise and competition—the continuation of the City’s success. Anything that fetters that would be a trade-off.”244

132.Witnesses also noted that the terms under which equivalence determinations are rendered are not always clear. Deloitte commented: “There are no detailed rules on how closely a non-EU country’s regulation will need to match the EU’s in order to obtain equivalence or gain market access. Ultimately much of this will come down to the political will between the parties involved.”245 The insurer Aviva noted the Commission’s position (contained in the Staff Working Document) that “it is the equivalence of regulatory and supervisory results that is being assessed, not a word-for-word sameness of legal texts”.246 Richard Knox, of HM Treasury, adopted a similar line:

“Equivalence is not necessarily rule-taking … Obviously they do not rely on exactly the same rules at a granular level, because the EU and the US rule books are very different. What they provide for, and this is set out in the legislation, is an assessment of whether the rules are equivalent that is based on outcomes rather than line by line.”247

133.Professor Niamh Moloney, in contrast, doubted whether equivalence would be this flexible in practice: “The EU works on precedents and templates … It is very difficult for it to move from that way of doing business. Having invested in an equivalence system that is predominantly rules-based, although it is moving more into outcomes, it is hard to see how it will shift away from that.”248 This problem is compounded by the nature of the decision-making process, which lies entirely in the Commission’s gift, and, as we noted in our December 2016 report, is frequently politicised.249 Barclays observed that “the UK should encourage the de-politicisation of the equivalence process, or consider alternative mechanisms for future alignment”.250

134.This raises the question of how far the UK could diverge from the EU’s standards under an equivalence framework without the Commission withdrawing the determination. UK Finance were relatively sanguine: “Since, to our knowledge, third country equivalence under EU financial services legislation has never been withdrawn, it is hard to say with certainty what the threshold for its withdrawal is or will be; it is unlikely to be the same in all contexts.”251 Neena Gill MEP, on the other hand, told us:

“There will be limited scope [for the UK] to amend its regulatory framework if it wants to remain equivalent. Every divergence has to be negotiated with the European Commission which can withdraw equivalence at any moment … The most probable scenario is that the UK will either be obliged to keep implementing EU law, or it will need to maintain regulation that is close enough to EU standards to enable the UK to achieve positive equivalence assessments from the EU.”252

UK Finance also argued that the Commission’s ongoing review of equivalence “will result in a more stringent approach”.253 The outcomes of the review are still unknown, but the uncertainty underlines the risk inherent in equivalence.

Conclusions and recommendations

135.The EU’s equivalence regime is patchy in composition, and too politically insecure for firms to feel confident in making use of its provisions. It would not allow the highly integrated web of financial services within the EU to persist in anything like its current form. Equivalence provisions are currently undergoing a review; depending on how equivalence is in future interpreted, there is a serious risk that it may leave the UK a rule-taker. And if the UK is no longer able to influence the composition of EU laws, these rules could increasingly become unsuited to the UK financial services sector, which is the largest provider of such services in the EU.

Political possibilities for a free trade agreement

136.The EU’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, in a press conference on 18 December 2017, commented on the UK’s preference for a free trade agreement, saying that the UK had “to realise there won’t be any cherry picking … There is no place [for financial services]. There is not a single trade agreement that is open to financial services. It doesn’t exist.” He said this outcome was a result of “the red lines that the British have chosen themselves. In leaving the Single Market, they lose the financial services passport.”254 John McFarlane confirmed that he had “spoken to some of the people in the EU who are involved in the negotiations and to some of the countries. It has been made very clear that, if you are not a member, you cannot keep the same terms. That has been quite clear. Therefore, there will be less, and we have to work out what that is.”255

137.In response, the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, David Davis, in an article on 2 January, challenged Mr Barnier’s position: “Given the strength and breadth of our links, a deal which took in some areas of our economic relationship but not others [i.e. excluding financial services] would be, in the favoured phrase of EU diplomats, cherry picking.”256 It will be crucial for businesses to gain insight as soon as possible into the desired scope of this overall agreement, and the place of financial services within it, given the existence of an alternative, unsuitable regime for financial services in the form of equivalence.

138.In its current form, passporting is a function of the Single Market, in that harmonised prudential requirements and the mutual recognition of licences allow banks in the EU to provide services throughout the Union (a right established for banking in 1989 as a result of the second Banking Directive).257 Sir Jon Cunliffe commented that “I do not think the Bank of England ever assumed that passporting would continue”, but added that various possibilities were under consideration, including, at the more comprehensive end of the spectrum, “end states in which the passport might continue, or something like the passport might continue, or in which there is regulatory and supervisory equivalence between the UK and the EU that allows the current level of financial services trade to continue afterwards”.258 Dr Kay Swinburne MEP went further, explicitly challenging Michel Barnier’s restrictive understanding of free trade agreements:

“When we looked at where the TTIP [the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership] discussions were going with the US early on, it was fairly obvious to us that Michel Barnier, when he was Commissioner for Internal Market and Services from 2009 to 2014, drafted a chapter specifically on financial services to be included in TTIP. Indeed, it was the US that said that it did not want to include financial services in that trade and investment partnership. We already have what I would consider a template, written by former Commissioner Barnier himself … I would suggest that, rather than his words of last week … his own chapter on financial services for TTIP might be where we want to look when we start negotiating on financial services in a free trade deal.”259

139.Various witnesses saw benefit for the EU in adopting an imaginative approach to financial services. Professor Eilís Ferran argued that the gaps in the existing equivalence regime would “have potentially adverse effects for the EU as well as for the UK … there is incentive on both sides to make sure that we can replicate as much as possible of the existing access arrangements”.260 The ICAEW emphasised “that every trade has two sides, so EU-27 consumers of UK services and markets will lose as well as UK providers of those services if their efficacy or availability is impaired. Given the size of the UK markets and financial services sector any such losses will be substantial for both sides.”261

140.But even though the fragmentation of markets would cause economic damage, there could be political motives for pursuing such an objective. Andrew Bailey told us that “for some countries more than others, this is a cake-cutting exercise in getting business”.262 Professor Moloney said that “we know from reading the newspapers the play France is making in this direction. It is very clear that, politically, there are incentives to bring business, and that is simply a reality.”263 Stephen Jones added: “We detect some degree of political will in certain parts of continental Europe in order to reclaim what they perceive might be 20 years of lost wholesale financial services to the London market.”264

Mutual access and alternatives to equivalence

141.We heard significant evidence on the appeal of mutual access, or mutual recognition, as an alternative to equivalence. Rachel Kent, of Hogan Lovells, who worked on an IRSG report on a possible legal framework for a mutual access regime,265 stated that “a bespoke agreement would provide the most optimal outcome for financial institutions on both sides of the border”. Such a regime “would provide mutual access, EU firms into the UK and the UK into Europe, continuing the existing regime. That would obviously avoid the relocation cost and the potential double hit on capital, which would be very inefficient, so critically it provides access.”266

142.Although the Government is well aware that there is no precedent among existing free trade agreements for such an ambitious mutual recognition regime, covering both financial and non-financial services, there is not a general understanding of this point. The Prime Minister’s Florence speech highlighted the limitations of existing models such as the EU-Canada FTA (CETA), concluding that “compared with what exists between Britain and the EU today, it would nevertheless represent such a restriction on our mutual market access that it would benefit neither of our economies”; she therefore urged negotiators not merely “to adopt a model already enjoyed by other countries”, but to “be creative as well as practical in designing an ambitious economic partnership which respects the freedoms and principles of the EU, and the wishes of the British people”.267

143.The difficulty of extending the principles of mutual recognition to services is widely acknowledged. John McFarlane, Chairman of Barclays, stated: “You are correct about financial services not being in trade agreements; for example, Switzerland has well over 100 trade agreements with the EU, but not one of them is on services.” This was a matter of particular concern to the UK: “Services are 80% of this economy. Financial services and related professional services are about 10% of GDP. We are dealing with quite an important matter for the United Kingdom, and I would have thought that should be a priority.”268

144.References to ‘mutual recognition’ or ‘mutual access’ regimes in respect of financial services are thus necessarily speculative. Stephen Jones of UK Finance distinguished mutual recognition from the EU’s existing equivalence regime: “Equivalence can result in an asymmetric approach where you become a rule taker. From our perspective, a mutual recognition model is one where you have a symmetric approach where both parties are submitting themselves to mutual scrutiny of one another’s proposed regulations”, and the consequences of regulatory divergence would include the possibility of dissolution of the agreement.269 Several industry bodies have put out proposals on what such a mutual recognition regime might look like from the perspective of financial services, including UK Finance and the IRSG.270

145.Some witnesses suggested that international standards might form the basis of a mutual access regime. The Minister argued that “international standards … provide the framework through which we can look at an ambitious deal between the UK and the EU”.271 Barnabas Reynolds agreed: “Where there are international standards, we would take those to be the defined outcomes. Both the EU and the UK would apply them anyway; we have been party to developing them in international fora.”272 Professor Eilís Ferran was more cautious: “The suggestion that we could move to higher-level international standards and benchmarks for checking parity is interesting. I could see it working in some areas where we have international standards that are reasonably well developed; in other areas … it is harder to see a standard that is fit for purpose in that respect.”273

146.An alternative suggestion, made to us by Barnabas Reynolds, was a regime founded on ‘enhanced equivalence’. This would involve adapting the EU’s current equivalence framework by developing a generalised concept of equivalence. Equivalence judgements would then be based on outcomes (as is the case in MiFID II), rather than rules. Mr Reynolds told us: “That would be for the benefit of the EU, effectively, because it is still incomplete; there are gaps in it and some things that can be rationalised. We would then provide for two-way certainty between the EU and the UK.” Additional elements would then be dealt with through “a bilateral deal between the UK and the EU that would be entered into on Brexit, and would provide for procedural certainty in March 2019”.274

147.Such an approach would require the EU to legislate in order to implement such a regime before the UK’s exit. From Mr Reynolds’ perspective, this was an advantage: “If we went down the enhanced equivalence route, it would involve the EU making a new regulation, which the UK could help to pilot through the Council, under QMV, and the European Parliament, where a majority is required, before Brexit … As long as that was achieved by Brexit, it would come into the UK system automatically through the [Withdrawal] Bill, providing the same framework on both sides, effectively.”275 He felt this would be more achievable than an FTA. Mark Hoban was more doubtful, describing the need to secure legislative agreement as “challenging”. He also noted that if enhanced equivalence were to be pursued, “it would not just be a bespoke UK model, so there would be some resistance perhaps to creating a model that would apply to the US, to China, to Japan et cetera.”276

148.Simon Gleeson of Clifford Chance, took a step back, suggesting that the focus on mutual equivalence versus mutual recognition was misplaced, in that both could allow for the same outcome: “It is important to avoid getting bogged down in legal technicalities. There is no practical difference between a mutual recognition agreement and a mutual equivalence arrangement; they are functionally identical.”277 Each would be put into law in different ways, but Mr Gleeson was sanguine that both could deliver comparable degrees of market access. Mark Hoban, however, argued that there was a distinction, in that “with enhanced equivalence, it would still be within the control of the Commission to determine equivalence, and it would be subject to the ECJ”.278

Conclusions and recommendations

149.There are various legal means by which to facilitate mutual access. Equivalence, as currently framed under EU law, would not be sufficient, but could, with political will, potentially provide a basis for negotiating a more comprehensive agreement in the form of an ‘enhanced equivalence’ regime. A free trade agreement, or a separate bilateral agreement on mutual market access, would achieve a similar result.

150.An agreement granting secure, symmetric access would be to the mutual economic advantage of both the UK and the EU, but significant political hurdles remain. The Government, in approaching the next phase of negotiations with the EU, must work to foster the goodwill and understanding necessary to achieve this goal.

Divergence and the architecture of market access

151.The Prime Minister stated in her Florence speech that “We start from an unprecedented position. For we have the same rules and regulations as the EU … So the question for us now in building a new economic partnership is not how we bring our rules and regulations closer together, but what we do when one of us wants to make changes.”279 The management of divergence will be the crux of the future relationship. The other side of the coin is regulatory alignment, which in financial services serves to facilitate limited access for third countries under the EU’s equivalence regimes, and could potentially provide the foundation for a more far-reaching agreement.

152.While the UK is currently fully compliant with EU financial services law, the issue after Brexit will be how divergence is managed. Jonathan Herbst argued that “if one can come to some core standards that are recognised as the basis for equivalence, it is fine if there is then divergence to a higher standard”.280 Simon Gleeson, on the other hand, warned of “the risk … that you get divergence for good reasons with good faith on all sides, which ends up with each side accusing the other of having different standards”.281 The UK may, post-Brexit, wish to set its own course in areas where EU rules have not proved themselves particularly suitable to the UK’s domestic market (see Chapter 7). The EU may also initiate divergence, for instance by advancing regulatory initiatives designed for the EU-27, such as Capital Markets Union.

153.Any mechanism designed for managing divergence (other than equivalence, which is arbitrated by the Commission) would need to be anchored by a form of dispute resolution.282 Such a mechanism may be unique to financial services, or more broadly applied across the whole of a mutual access regime. In the Prime Minister’s Florence speech, she stated that dispute resolution “could not mean the European Court of Justice—or indeed UK courts—being the arbiter of disputes about the implementation of the agreement between the UK and the EU … But I am confident we can find an appropriate mechanism for resolving disputes.”283 Rachel Kent noted that “free trade agreements frequently have dispute resolution mechanisms. They are frequently an independent body. They are not normally the ECJ.”284 Andrew Bailey agreed: “If there is, let us say, some form of mutual recognition agreement between the UK and the EU that governs open markets and financial services, which I think would be a good thing, there will need to be a form of dispute resolution.”285

154.Neena Gill MEP argued that “consideration could be given to a European Free Trade Area (EFTA) Court as an ad-hoc international court which has jurisdiction with regards to EFTA States that are parties to the EEA agreement (at present Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway)”.286 This option appears, however to have been ruled out by the Government, at least as a basis for the future relationship.287

155.An essential backstop to dispute resolution will be supervisory cooperation (see Chapter 6). In the words of Rachel Kent of Hogan Lovells: “We heard strongly from regulators on both sides that there is no point in having regulatory alignment without having supervisory co-operation.”288 Sir Jon Cunliffe agreed that “we have to have both high-quality regulation and the comprehensive supervisory co-operation”.289 Andrew Bailey developed these points:

“The assumption is that the UK is not subject to ECJ rule at that point. At a lower level, it would need to replicate the type of mediation arrangements that we are currently subject to in the European Supervisory Authorities, where there is binding and non-binding mediation. It is not used very often, but it is an important thing to have.”290

156.Jonathan Herbst, on the other hand, saw supervisory cooperation as distinct from any free trade agreement:

“We are talking about two different things. There is the international supervisory co-operation that happens already between EU jurisdictions and those outside. That will and should carry on. Then there is what we might be talking about in a free trade agreement, which will be much deeper and more legally based because there will be real sharing of power. They are two quite different things. The first can be achieved through supervisory relationships and MoUs; the second will need something more hard coded in law.”291

Conclusions and recommendations

157.We conclude that the current equivalence regime would fail to provide the level of market access for financial services that both sides require, and that it would inhibit the UK from developing an appropriate regulatory framework. The Government should not settle for an agreement based on equivalence without securing substantial changes to that regime.

158.There are various possibilities for a future agreement covering financial services. These include a free trade agreement to include services, a standalone mutual recognition regime, and possibly some form of so-called ‘enhanced equivalence’. We do not come to a view on which of these would be preferable, although all would be more satisfactory than equivalence. However, it has to be acknowledged that free trade agreements take time, sometimes years, to agree, and there is no precedent for an agreement on the scale that the Government seeks.

159.Whichever option is pursued, it will be vital to put in place a robust dispute resolution mechanism, which is as yet undetermined. This may require new institutions to arbitrate such matters, or involve existing courts. The Government should make clear which arrangements it favours, given its well-publicised red line on the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

160.We recognise that the EU, or individual Member States, may be politically motivated to reject a bespoke agreement regarding future access. However, such an agreement would be in the overriding economic interest of all sides. Without it, EU counterparties stand to lose the substantial benefits that come from being able to draw on the services offered by the UK. The EU has in the past shown ambition and imagination in seeking to include financial services in the TTIP free trade negotiations. We urge all sides to show similar imagination in negotiating the future UK-EU partnership.

232 European Union Committee, Brexit: financial services (9th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 81)

233 Rt Hon Theresa May MP, speech on ‘The Government’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU’ (17 January 2017): [accessed 18 January 2018]

234 HC Deb 7 September 2017, col 286

236 European Parliament, Third-country equivalence in EU Banking legislation (12 July 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018]

237 Commission Staff Working Document: EU equivalence decisions in financial services policy: an assessment SWD (2017) 102 final

238 Written evidence from Lloyd’s and the Lloyd’s Market Association (FRS0028)

241 Written evidence from the Investment Association (FRS0029)

245 Written evidence from Deloitte (FRS0016)

246 Written evidence from Aviva (FRS0032)

249 European Union Committee, Brexit: financial services (9th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 81)

250 Written evidence from Barclays (FRS0040)

251 Written evidence from UK Finance (FRS0044)

252 Written evidence from Neena Gill MEP (FRS0013)

253 Written evidence from UK Finance (FRS0044)

254 Jennifer Rankin, ‘UK cannot have a special deal for the City, says EU’s Brexit negotiator’, The Guardian (18 December 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018]

256 David Davis, ‘How we will deliver the best Brexit in 2018’, The Daily Telegraph (1 January 2018): [accessed 12 January 2018]

257 European Parliament, Third-country equivalence in EU Banking legislation (12 July 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018]

261 Written evidence from ICAEW (FRS0046)

265 International Regulatory Strategy Group, A new basis for access to EU/UK financial services post-Brexit (September 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018]

267 Rt Hon Theresa May MP, speech on ‘a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU’ (22 September 2017): [accessed 17 January 2018]

270 Written evidence from UK Finance (FRS0044); see also IRSG, A new basis for access to EU/UK financial services post-Brexit (September 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018] and UK Finance, Supporting Europe’s economies and citizen’s: a modern approach to financial services in an EU-UK trade agreement (September 2017): [accessed 16 January 2018].

279 Rt Hon Prime Minister Theresa May MP, speech on ‘a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU’ (22 September 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018]

282 The EU Justice Sub-Committee is currently undertaking an inquiry on dispute resolution, announced 6 December 2017. For this reason, we have refrained from assessing dispute resolution mechanisms in detail. See EU Justice Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: enforcement and dispute resolution inquiry’: [accessed 12 January 2018]

283 Rt Hon Prime Minister Theresa May MP, speech on ‘a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU’ (22 September 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018]

286 Written evidence from Neena Gill MEP (FRS0013)

287 Rt Hon Prime Minister Theresa May MP, speech on ‘a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU’ (22 September 2017): [accessed 12 January 2018]

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