

HOUSE OF LORDS

Select Committee on International Relations

3rd Report of Session 2017–19

The NATO Summit 2018

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Select Committee on International Relations

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See Appendix 1.

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Committee staff

The current staff of the committee are Eva George (Clerk), Joseph Dobbs (Policy Analyst) and Sophie Jade Taylor (Committee Assistant). The staff who worked on this inquiry were James Whittle (Clerk), Eva George (Clerk), Joseph Dobbs (Policy Analyst) and Sophie Jade Taylor (Committee Assistant).

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The NATO Summit 2018

1. The NATO Summit 2018 will be held on 11 and 12 July in Brussels. The International Relations Committee took evidence about the Summit from:
 - James Appathurai, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, NATO; and
 - Angus Lapsley, Director Defence, International Security and Southeast Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
2. The transcripts of the evidence sessions held on 18 April are on the Committee's website.¹
3. This report has been produced to inform the House, and to raise questions for the Government to address in advance of the NATO Summit.

Priorities for the Summit

4. Mr Appathurai outlined the likely main themes for discussion at the Summit:
 - Deterrence and defence;
 - Institutional adaptation;
 - Russia;
 - Challenges from the south; and
 - The 2% spending target.
5. Mr Lapsley said the Government saw the Summit as an “important moment to demonstrate that the Alliance has a coherence and a unity of purpose” to address the international issues it faced. He said the Government hoped the Summit would demonstrate that the “process of reform and adaptation that was kick-started by the Ukraine crisis in 2014 ... is on track and is being delivered”. He hoped the Summit would recognise that the reform process needed to go further “because there are still lots of things that NATO needs to improve on.”²
6. The Summit also provides an opportunity for the UK to demonstrate its commitment to European security in the light of Brexit. Mr Lapsley said “it is quite an important moment to reaffirm the UK's message that we are absolutely still at the heart of NATO and remain deeply committed to its objectives ... leaving the European Union does not mean that we are any less interested, engaged or involved in European security.”³

Deterrence and defence

7. Whereas the previous Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 had concentrated on creating an enhanced NATO presence in the Baltic states, the 2018 Summit would focus on readiness and reinforcement.⁴ This would include consideration of “the Supreme Allied Commander's ability to move forces

1 Oral evidence taken on [18 April 2018](#) (Session 2017–19)

2 [Q 7](#) (Angus Lapsley)

3 *Ibid.*

4 [Q 1](#) (James Appathurai)

around NATO” and assessment of the “number of major naval combatants, air combatants and manoeuvrable battalions” available and their readiness to deploy.⁵

Institutional adaptation

8. Mr Appathurai said there was “an extensive amount of work going on within NATO ... to improve decision-making.” The intention was to accelerate the pace of decision-making to what he referred to as “the speed of relevance.”⁶
9. Mr Lapsley agreed with this priority: “we very strongly support the agenda of making NATO decision-making faster and more responsive to the kinds of crises we might now face ... The Secretary-General is trying to grasp that nettle and we would like to give him some support on that at the Summit.”⁷
10. This work fell under the heading of “institutional adaptation” comprising three strands:
 - Amendments to the command structure to establish an “Atlantic command”, a “European logistics command” and a “cyber defence operation centre”;⁸
 - A “functional review” of NATO headquarters to explore “what NATO is required to do and see whether it is fit for purpose”;⁹ and
 - Efforts to improve the “governance of the way in which we acquire equipment”.¹⁰

Financial management

11. In a presentation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on 24 March 2018, Mr Herve Adrien Metzger, Chairman, International Board of Auditors for NATO, identified a number of “challenges and scope for further improvements” relating to financial management of the organisation, including that:
 - there is “no common internal control and network”;
 - there are “recurrent and persistent weaknesses of the current internal control systems in most entities”;
 - there are “difficulties in accepting/developing the identification and accounting of tangible property, plants and equipment and intangible assets”; and,
 - there is a “lack of support and even opposition, both internally and externally, to the study of the financial consolidation and the creation of a chief financial officer”.¹¹

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*

7 [Q 7](#) (Angus Lapsley)

8 [Q 2](#) (James Appathurai)

9 *Ibid.*

10 *Ibid.*

11 Herve Adrien Metzger, Chairman, International Board of Auditors for NATO, ‘Presentation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’ (24 March 2018)

12. There have, for example, been significant delays to the development of the new NATO headquarters, following the decision of the NATO Heads of State and Government to build a new NATO headquarters in 1999. The North Atlantic Council approved the design in 2003, and handover of the site was originally planned for August 2015. Allies only began moving into the new headquarters in March 2018, a delay of over two and a half years.¹²
13. We asked NATO for a response to the findings of the International Board of Auditors for NATO. We regret that NATO did not reply to the Committee in time for inclusion in this report.

Russia

14. NATO's response to Russia will be a substantial topic for discussion at the Summit. Mr Appathurai described NATO's current approach as being one of "deterrence and defence" and dialogue:

"On the one hand we have been strengthening our defence, but on the other we have been strengthening our outreach to Russia to try to have a regular dialogue on issues of common concern."¹³

15. On deterrence and defence, he said that this went beyond the Enhanced Forward Presence agreed at the Summit in 2016:¹⁴

"it is important to highlight everything that comes behind the Enhanced Forward Presence. The Enhanced Forward Presence is what gets the headlines, certainly in my country [Canada] and I think here, too, but these are actually relatively small formations—just battle groups. But what comes behind them is the NATO Response Force. We have tripled that in size in the past few years, so it now consists of 40,000 troops on short notice to move. Behind that come all the follow-on forces, potentially more than 1 million. The challenge with the follow-on forces is getting them there and having the right ones, and that is the focus of this summit."¹⁵

16. On dialogue with Russia he said NATO aimed to have open constructive conversations with Russia. Some success had been achieved:

"We have gotten our top general to talk to their top general a couple of times—getting those meetings to happen is very difficult; the Russians have cancelled repeatedly but one has just taken place, and that is good—so that we can establish a top-level relationship for taking forward military-to-military contact."¹⁶

17. However, despite such efforts, there remained "a sense of frustration that the dialogue aspects have not been fruitful".¹⁷

18. Mr Appathurai said the challenge of managing relations with Russia was that NATO wanted "transparency and predictability in military activities ... [but] Russia has embraced unpredictability, ambiguity, deception and pre-

12 Written Answer from Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon on 5 March 2018 ([HL5732](#))

13 [Q 1](#) (James Appathurai)

14 The Enhanced Forward Presence comprises four multinational battalions deployed in the four NATO members judged most at risk of a possible Russian attack: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

15 [Q 3](#) (James Appathurai)

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

emption—what it calls strategic surprise... they take that approach because they perceive a conventional advantage on the side of NATO and this is their way of getting around it: ambiguity and pre-emption.”¹⁸

19. Mr Lapsley did not think the fact that Russian behaviour remained challenging meant NATO’s approach to Russia needed to change: “if anything it reinforces the importance of dialogue for de-escalation ... [and] for calling out what has happened ... it underlines how important it is to get this right.”¹⁹

A new Cold War?

20. Addressing a UN Security Council debate on the situation in the Middle East, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, said “the Cold War is back with a vengeance”.²⁰

21. Mr Appathurai agreed that NATO’s relations with Russia were difficult, but commented:

“NATO does not see the threat of a massive Russian military invasion of any NATO country, or certainly of NATO countries as a whole. So we do not have 10,000 main battle tanks lined up on the inner German border or any border, or regular training to defend against a massive Russian assault. We do not see that coming, we do not think Russia intends it, and we do not think it is necessary to do that.”²¹

22. He agreed that it was necessary to ensure NATO’s posture to Russia was proportionate to the threat:

“There is a natural discussion to be had about the extent to which we need to design the enhancements of our deterrence and defence in such a way that they are proportionate and sufficient for deterrence and defence but do not contribute to an unintended escalation on both sides. That discussion was had during the Cold War, and it is an even more complicated discussion to be had now.”²²

23. Mr Lapsley said that the current situation was in some ways “as serious as the Cold War period.”²³

Challenges from the south

24. Mr Appathurai said a topic for discussion at the Summit would be the challenges of operations to the south of the NATO area “which NATO never really had to focus on before.” These included “setting up a mission in Iraq, providing more support to the states neighbouring the crisis zones, providing more counterterrorism support to countries right across Europe, and increasing our presence in Afghanistan.”²⁴

18 *Ibid.*

19 [Q 8](#) (Angus Lapsley)

20 United Nations Security Council 8231st Meeting Coverage, *Secretary-General Warns Security Council to Swiftly Unite on Syrian Conflict, Preventing Dangerous Developments from Worsening*, SC/1329313, April 2018: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13293.doc.htm> [accessed 01 May 2018]

21 [Q 3](#) (James Appathurai)

22 *Ibid.*

23 [Q 8](#) (Angus Lapsley)

24 [Q 3](#) (James Appathurai)

25. Mr Lapsley also noted this challenge. He said “NATO has a 360-degree view on the world ... NATO also needs to be relevant and to build security as it looks south. So there is a Mediterranean dimension to this. There are theatres such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibly some others, where we need to show that NATO can offer something relevant.”²⁵

Burden sharing: 2% target

26. The target of NATO members spending 2% of GDP on defence, formally agreed at the NATO Summit in 2014, would be discussed. Mr Appathurai said that “Allies in general have moved in the right direction ... in part because of US pressure but in part because they recognise, as the UK has recognised, that the international security environment is not what it was 10 years ago and they need to spend more.”²⁶
27. Mr Appathurai said the target had been “crucial in focusing the minds of political leaders”.²⁷ Mr Lapsley agreed, saying the target was “a galvanising political point”. He said the UK was “absolutely committed to the 2% target, and, indeed, slightly exceed it, and we expect other Allies to meet it as well.”²⁸
28. Both witnesses said that beyond “the headline”²⁹ there remained matters for debate, for example, there is the question of what should be considered defence spending within the 2% target. Mr Appathurai said:

“NATO defence planning division, which conducts this work, has a very clear list of what is in and what is out. Allies sometimes debate that and say, “No, we want to include this”. For example, in some countries the coastguard is a military function; in other countries it is not a military function and should not be counted against the defence budget. There are many blurred lines and of course all countries want to show their best in these statistics. But the bottom line for NATO is: we have a definition of what is in and what is out, and that does not change.”³⁰

29. He also noted points made by some Allies that contributions to deployments should be considered: “Other countries such as my own [Canada] will say that yes, it is true that they are not meeting the 2%, but they are one of the four countries that has put a battle group into the Baltic states, which has cost us a lot, and we are contributing there and in other places.”³¹

Cyber and hybrid threats

30. The security challenges facing NATO members has changed with the advent of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare. The alliance had recognised this changing security landscape and had “come a long way in the last couple of years”.³² Mr Appathurai referred to NATO establishing:

- “rapid response teams” to liaise with industry;

25 [Q 7](#) (Angus Lapsley)

26 [Q 3](#) (James Appathurai)

27 *Ibid.*

28 [Q 9](#) (Angus Lapsley)

29 *Ibid.*

30 [Q 3](#) (James Appathurai)

31 *Ibid.*

32 [Q 5](#) (James Appathurai)

- “cyber as an operational domain, like air, sea and land” and now working on rules of engagement for that domain; and
- a “mechanism for the integration of voluntary sovereign cyber offence into alliance operations” allowing nations to take sovereign decisions to use their own offensive cyber capabilities for NATO purposes, within the laws and requirements of their nations.³³

31. He said that the key focus was on attribution:

“Knowing what is happening and being able to demonstrate what is happening so that no one can deny it is essential”. A new joint intelligence division had been established to focus on “the attribution of hybrid attacks—to share and allow our Allies to share among themselves attribution of hybrid pressure.”³⁴

32. Mr Lapsley also noted the importance of attribution, particularly with reference to Russia: “part of the problem of talking to Russia about cyber is that it denies that any such thing exists. It is by its nature a form of confrontation that is meant to be unattributable and covert”.³⁵

NATO expansion

33. Based on Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO has an ‘open door’ policy, with membership “open to European democracies and where that contributes to European security.”³⁶ There are currently four aspirant countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia and Ukraine.

34. Mr Appathurai said that “NATO really does not recruit” but had a “treaty obligation” and a “political obligation to consider a country’s membership if it meets the more technical standards and aspires to NATO membership, and where that membership would contribute to wider Euro-Atlantic security.”³⁷

35. He added that a further consideration would be “what are the implications of doing it? The implications are in part about how Russia would react, but they are also about the basis on which we want to build Euro-Atlantic standards, security and relations.” This was “very much the discussion that is taking place around both Ukraine and Georgia”.³⁸

Western Balkans

36. Mr Appathurai said that “In the recent past, both the EU and NATO could have done more in the Western Balkans ... Both the EU and NATO are just now refocusing.”³⁹

37. However, there were challenges to countries in the region joining NATO. Mr Appathurai said:

- “the speed of reform in some countries is not what we would like it to be”;

33 *Ibid.*

34 *Ibid.*

35 [Q 8](#) (Angus Lapsley)

36 [Q 3](#) (James Appathurai)

37 *Ibid.*

38 [Q 4](#) (James Appathurai)

39 [Q 3](#) (James Appathurai)

- “there is increased Russian activity in the western Balkans; for example, in a stronger relationship between Moscow and Republika Srpska in Bosnia, which is not helping Bosnia’s political unity or ability to make decisions”; and
 - there were “certain pockets of rising extremism.”⁴⁰
38. He was clear that NATO did not consider a close relationship with Russia to be a barrier to NATO membership, providing that relationship did not prevent a country from making its own decisions about its security arrangements (as provided for in the Helsinki Final Act of 1976). NATO’s concern was that increased Russian involvement in the region aimed “to stop countries’ movement to the West; because the reform process seems to have stalled in some cases”.⁴¹
39. Mr Appathurai said the experience of previous accessions of “countries that are sensitive for Russia” was that it had allowed those countries to “engage in a constructive way with Russia because they are, in a sense, equal in size and power because of NATO membership and not in an inferior position”. This had led to “better relations with Russia”.⁴²
40. Ultimately, though there may be “a Russia factor”, membership of the Alliance was a question for NATO to decide. He noted that the accession of Montenegro in 2016 in the face of Russian opposition “demonstrated that we will take our own decisions for ourselves.”⁴³
41. On the issue of the potential membership of Macedonia, in evidence to this Committee on 1 November 2017 Mr Lapsley told us that “the change of government in Macedonia raises the prospect that they might be able to reach an agreement with Greece on the name issue, and the Greek Foreign Minister himself has recently said that there may be a window of opportunity”.⁴⁴ We hope the Government will give full encouragement to clearing a way for Macedonian membership.

Greece and Turkey

42. There has been a long history of tension between Greece and Turkey, both NATO members. Mr Appathurai said that their being NATO Allies had been “absolutely essential in preventing those two countries from going to war, over and over again”.⁴⁵
43. Moreover, he said that being NATO members had allowed the two countries to work together to address the migrant crisis:

“The EU operations were, by definition, ending at Greek territory, which was creating a division between Greece and Turkey in addressing a challenge across the Aegean. As many of you have seen, I am sure, it is a tiny little strip of sea, and you can see from one country to the other. But having this political line between these two countries was

40 *Ibid.*

41 *Ibid.*

42 *Ibid.*

43 *Ibid.*

44 Oral evidence taken on 1 November 2017, (Session 2017–19) [Q 56](#) (Angus Lapsley) and see our report, International Relations Committee, *The UK and the future of the Western Balkans* (1st Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 53).

45 [Q 2](#) (James Appathurai)

not helpful to addressing this situation. Having the NATO framework allowed us to deploy forces there, which Turkey could of course then feel itself part of, and helped to defuse this challenge and, frankly, control what was a political crisis for Europe as well.”⁴⁶

NATO–EU cooperation

44. Mr Appathurai said that NATO was supportive of EU efforts to be more active in defence matters, such as the initiation of Permanent Enhanced Structured Co-operation (PESCO) which provides for EU member states to develop defence capabilities jointly and make them available to EU military operations:⁴⁷

“We support it for a couple of reasons. One is that if the EU is more capable, those capacities will be available also in large majority for NATO operations, because they will be nationally led. So NATO members that are in the EU can also use them for NATO.

The second reason is the political reason that you hinted at. If the EU can do more, it is a better contribution to burden sharing across the Atlantic. There is more than enough to do, and it cannot just be for the US, or coalitions led by the US or NATO, to do it. The EU wants to do more, so that is good.”⁴⁸

45. Mr Lapsley made similar points: “if these initiatives generate more European capability ... and if that capability is then available to NATO or to the UN or national or EU operations, fundamentally that is a good thing and we should support it.”⁴⁹
46. He said it was “intrinsicly difficult to get two multilateral organisations, both of which are understandably focused on internal coherence and getting consensus, to match their decision-making.”⁵⁰ Nonetheless, although there were “sensitivities that can flare up quite quickly”, the EU–NATO relationship was “incomparably better than it was 10 years ago”. However, there remained a “legitimate set of questions about whether this tighter EU-sponsored co-operation makes it harder for non-EU NATO Allies to co-operate”. It would be concerning if there were a “situation where there was competition and rivalry between the EU and NATO over who does what in theatre.”⁵¹
47. Mr Appathurai particularly noted greater EU–NATO cooperation on cyber security. He said “Our two cyber centres are exchanging early warning and the tracking of malware. We have also created the new cyber operations centre as part of the command structure.” This greater cooperation had come about because both organisations recognised that neither had “the full spectrum of tools at sufficient capacity to defend against hybrid attack, but that together we do.”⁵²

46 *Ibid.*

47 European External Action Service, ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)—Factsheet’, 5 March 2018: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en [accessed 10 May 2018]

48 [Q 6](#) (James Appathurai)

49 [Q 11](#) (Angus Lapsley)

50 *Ibid.*

51 *Ibid.*

52 [Q 5](#) (James Appathurai)

US commitment to NATO

48. The rhetoric of the Trump administration regarding NATO and the omission of a reference to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty⁵³ in President Trump's first address to a meeting of NATO leaders in 2017 had led to concerns that the US's commitment to NATO had lessened.
49. Mr Lapsley said that the Government's view was that "the United States remains the most important NATO Ally. Nothing has changed in that respect. I think sometimes we forget just how far American military and political engagement underpins NATO's core capabilities." He said, for example, that US spending on its military presence in Europe had increased and Secretary of Defense Mattis had been instrumental in ensuring NATO's decision-making was under discussion. He concluded that the American calls for other Allies to meet the 2% target was no different to the positions of previous presidents and concluded that there was not "any less American leadership and engagement in NATO" than in the past.⁵⁴

Conclusions

50. **The NATO Summit takes place at a time of unparalleled international volatility and instability, some of it in or close to the NATO area, some of it further afield. The Summit in July 2018 is an opportunity for the alliance to discuss and clarify some of the key questions facing it.**
51. **By the time the Summit takes place there could be further developments on a number of issues which are likely to be relevant to the discussions, in particular:**
- (a) **Possible further contacts between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;**
 - (b) **The US decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;**
 - (c) **Any additional information on direct Russian state involvement in the nerve agent attack in Salisbury; and**
 - (d) **Any additional information on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.**

Management of NATO

52. **We are concerned by the findings of the International Board of Auditors for NATO relating to financial management of the organisation. We regret that NATO did not provide us with a response on these important issues. We recommend that the Government should raise these issues urgently with NATO management and other NATO Allies.**

US commitment to NATO, Article 5 and cyber-threats

53. **The degree and credibility of the US commitment to the principle of collective defence that underpins NATO remains uncertain. We note Mr Lapsley's points about the US's continued engagement in Europe but President Trump's rhetoric and the omission of a reference**

53 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty enshrines the Allies' commitment to collective defence.

54 [Q 10](#) (Angus Lapsley)

to Article 5 in his 2017 speech mean there remain concerns to be addressed.

54. To what extent and in what ways should Article 5 operate in relation to cyber-attacks where attribution is uncertain? Although NATO has come a long way in its response to cyber-threats, it remains unclear what the threshold for a NATO response under Article 5 should be.

Adapting to Russia's techniques of aggression

55. To what extent is NATO's approach to Russia right in the light of their use of hybrid warfare? We note the frustrations about the lack of progress and, although Mr Lapsley concluded this did not mean a change of strategy was needed, it may be useful to review the approach.

Defence and deterrence in the face of new forms of security challenge

56. As a military alliance, what should NATO's defence and deterrence role be in an era of cyber and hybrid warfare and increasingly active transnational terrorist groups? NATO's response to the security challenges its members face cannot be effective if it remains focused only on conventional warfare assumptions.

Relations with Russia

57. We endorse the view that NATO needs to match a firm deterrent stance with a willingness to engage in dialogue and show greater understanding of Russia's concerns. We believe NATO ought to be able to work with Russia on areas of common concern, including strengthened measures of arms control and counter terrorism.

Defining defence spending for burden sharing

58. What should be included in the 2% of GDP target and should the target be increased? The value and credibility of the target will diminish if confusion and debate about what constitutes defence spending continues. This is exacerbated by the changing nature of the threats facing NATO members and, therefore, their approaches to defence spending. If the definition of defence spending is broadened to meet a wider range of threats it may be necessary to increase the target.

NATO expansion

59. What relationship should NATO have with countries that aspire to membership? To what extent should the "Russia factor" referred to by Mr Appathurai influence consideration of the current aspirant countries? The decision to accept new members into NATO should be based on how their membership will contribute to European security.
60. We hope it may be possible to resolve the problem preventing Macedonia's accession to NATO.

NATO, Brexit and future defence co-operation

61. What approach should NATO take to greater EU defence co-operation? NATO is the bedrock of the UK's defence. NATO-EU co-operation has been suboptimal in the past, and we welcome evidence of more

effective collaboration. We share the concerns highlighted by Mr Lapsley that greater EU defence co-operation should not be allowed to make it harder for non-EU NATO Allies to work with EU NATO Allies.

Turkey and the south-eastern flank

62. **What should NATO's role be in ensuring the foreign and defence policies of Allies, such as Turkey, do not undermine the collective positions of the Alliance? Steps should be taken to ensure the unilateral positions of Allies do not weaken the alliance collection positions.**

Chemical weapons

63. **In the light of recent evidence of the use of chemical weapons, we believe it would be valuable for NATO, all of whose members are signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to make a continued commitment to that Convention and to the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.**
64. **We recommend this report to the House and urge that it be debated ahead of the forthcoming NATO Summit in July.**

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

Members

Lord Balfe
Baroness Coussins
Lord Grocott
Lord Hannay of Chiswick
Baroness Helic
Baroness Hilton of Eggardon
Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman)
Lord Jopling
Lord Purvis of Tweed
Lord Reid of Cardowan
Baroness Smith of Newnham
Lord Wood of Anfield

Declarations of interest

Lord Balfe
None relevant to the inquiry

Baroness Coussins
None relevant to the inquiry

Lord Grocott
None relevant to the inquiry

Lord Hannay of Chiswick
Member of the advisory board, Centre for European Reform

Baroness Helic
Member of the advisory board, Centre for Women, Peace and Security

Baroness Hilton of Eggardon
None relevant to the inquiry

Lord Howell of Guildford (Chairman)
None relevant to the inquiry

Lord Jopling
Member (and former Vice President), NATO Parliamentary Assembly
Former Chairman and current rapporteur, Committee on the civilian aspects of security

Lord Purvis of Tweed
None relevant to the inquiry

Lord Reid of Cardowan
None relevant to the inquiry

Baroness Smith of Newnham
None relevant to the inquiry

Lord Wood of Anfield
Chair, United Nations Association UK

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Evidence is published at www.parliament.uk/intlrelations and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 3074).

Alphabetical list of all witnesses

Mr James Appathurai, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, NATO [QQ 1-11](#)

Mr Angus Lapsley, Director, Defence, International Security and Southeast Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. [QQ 1-11](#)