Chapter 2: The causes of nuclear risk
14.Witnesses discussed the current level of nuclear risk. Dr Perry said that when he left office in 1997 he “believed we were well on our way to lowering the nuclear dangers that we faced during the Cold War.” But he thought that the situation was now “as dangerous as” that period.19 Jessica Cox, Director of Nuclear Policy, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), said that, while she did not want to give “the impression that … nuclear use is imminent”, the Euro-Atlantic theatre was “closer to military conflict than at any time since the end of the Cold War.”20
15.Andrey Baklitskiy, Consultant, PIR Center, thought “the current level of risk of nuclear use” was “still quite low” but the “growing” trend of an increasing emphasis of nuclear weapons [in states’ military doctrines] was “disturbing”. He noted that the “ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan” demonstrated that “possession of nuclear weapons does not preclude military conflicts”, and these conflicts come with “the possibility of escalation to the nuclear level.” A serious military confrontation between North Korea and the US, China and the US, India and China, or NATO and Russia, would “inevitably have a nuclear dimension”.21
16.Lord Browne acknowledged that “dramatic language” was used about nuclear risk, but his “assessment of the current level of risk posed by nuclear weapons” was nonetheless that it was “worse than it was.” He said “we have created an environment where miscalculation, an accident, a mistake, or catastrophic terrorism are most likely to be the catalysts for nuclear use”.22
17.Sir Alan Duncan KCMG MP, Minister for Europe and the Americas, FCO, however, thought it was not “as straightforward or simple” as saying whether nuclear risk had increased. There was “always concern where there are heightened tensions between two nuclear powers … there are always risks, which must be managed on a daily basis and with a proper understanding of any potential geopolitical developments and undercurrents”.23
18.Sir Simon Gass said that while tensions were high, there had “been other times in our history when the causes for concern have been greater.”24 Sarah Price, Head of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, FCO, said that the global security environment was “not as good as it was 20 or even 10 years ago”,25 but many of the major nuclear “threats” facing the international community were not recent phenomena. For example, negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear programme began in 2003, and North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006.26
19.Dr Ritchie concluded that nuclear risk was “very difficult to estimate”, as any assessment would be “inherently subjective”. However, a degree of risk was “permanent”, given that “the risk of nuclear use” was “inherent to the practice and logic of nuclear deterrence”, in that the “efficacy and credibility of a nuclear deterrent threat requires there to be some possibility of those nuclear weapons actually being used”27 Dr Tong Zhao, Fellow, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, said “the continuous existence of nuclear weapons” created “as many security problems as it seems to solve … it very much complicates—and in many cases worsens—the international security environment.”28
20.Ms Fihn said that, although nuclear weapons had not been used “in warfare” since 1945, this did not mean that “no one has been killed by nuclear weapons in 74 years”. More than 2,000 nuclear tests had been carried out, “with devastating consequences for local communities.”29 Scientists for Global Responsibility said that there was “a marked complacency among the Nuclear Weapon States … about the existential threat that these weapons have to human civilisation and natural ecosystems.”30
21.The level of nuclear risk has increased, in particular since the decline in relations between Russia and the West from 2014. There is a danger that misunderstanding, miscalculation or mistakes could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Steps to manage and reduce this risk should be of the highest priority for the Government.
22.While preventing the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to Non-Nuclear Weapon States must remain a priority, the principal cause of increased risk is the continued and at times expanding reliance of nuclear possessor states on their nuclear weapons.
23.Witnesses identified four main factors in the intensification of nuclear risk: increasing multipolarity and inter-state competition; the threat of non-state actors; technological development, including the development of new nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities; and digital communication and irresponsible rhetoric. These are explored below.
Multipolarity and inter-state competition
24.Dr Ritchie said that “the risk of nuclear use” was “symptomatic of … underlying hostilities”. He said that “levels of hostility, particularly between the US and NATO on the one side and the Russian Federation on the other” have been seen to “ratchet up” since the “mid-2000s or so”.31 Ms Cox attributed the cause of this heightened risk to “Russia’s continuing belligerent behaviour”, and cautioned that “with increased tensions between the US and Russia” there was “a real threat of great power conflicts with a nuclear dimension.”32 François Heisbourg, Special Adviser, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, and Senior Adviser for Europe, International Institute for Strategic Studies, thought that the “post-Cold War era” had come to an end following the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and a new era had begun, one “in which nuclear weapons [were] a substantial part of the security equation in Europe.”33
25.Rear Admiral John Gower CB OBE, former Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological), Ministry of Defence, said “one of the largest changes” in international relations was the “position of the Russian Federation”. It had “suffered a massive dip in status and position” but was “now … attempting to reassert itself.”.34
26.The Minister, however, said that this behaviour did not necessarily contribute to the risk of nuclear use: while Russia had been willing to act in a way that threatened its neighbours and while the Government deplored Russia’s actions towards Ukraine, “whether this increases the prospect of nuclear use” was “utterly debatable”.35
27.Beyond the US–Russia relationship, Dr Ritchie cited tensions in the US–North Korea, US–China and India–Pakistan relationships as contributing to the risk of nuclear use.36 Dr Zhao too thought the “growing nuclear competition among some Nuclear Weapon States, especially the United States, Russia, and China”, was “making that risk greater”.37
28.Witnesses drew attention to South Asia, which Alexander Kmentt, former Director, Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, described as a “potential nuclear hotspot”.38 Tensions between India and Pakistan increased during our inquiry, with both sides launching airstrikes against each other. Dr Rishi Paul, South Asia Analyst, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), said “we are currently trapped in a situation that is slowly but inexorably sliding towards increased risk of nuclear exchange”.39 The Minister said that there was “a potential nuclear threat” from these tensions.40
29.Rear Admiral Gower told us that a return to a bipolar balance of power, such as that of the Cold War, was unlikely: it was necessary to “seek a stability” that was “multipolar”. This would be hard. Even reaching international agreement on what constituted “strategic stability” was “most difficult”.41 Dr Oliver Meier, Deputy Head, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, said that while there was “70 years of experience in managing the bilateral nuclear relationship between Russia and the United States”, there was “little experience” of managing nuclear relationships in the context of increasing multipolarity.42
30.The world is increasingly multipolar, which means approaches to managing nuclear risk cannot focus only on the US, NATO and Russia. Efforts must also include states such as China, as well as nuclear possessor states outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Dialogue and communication
31.Bert Koenders, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands, said that “at a time of neo-nationalism, big man politics and technology … communication channels and understanding the need to talk are crucial.”43 Ms Nakamitsu said the UN was “repeatedly sending … [the message] that differences should be resolved by dialogue and negotiation.”44
32.Professor Gareth Evans, Chancellor, Australian National University, and former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, believed that the US and Russia were “equally … unreceptive” to dialogue under their respective leaderships.45 Rear Admiral Gower said that during the Cold War “although we had huge ideological differences with the Soviet Union, many of those were set aside for discussions between the two superpowers on nuclear arms reduction.” The difference today was that all issues in Russia–West relations—including human rights, election interference and sanctions—were seen as linked, which meant progress on nuclear issues was “much less likely”.46
33.Following the invasion of Crimea, NATO’s policy had been not to return to ‘business as usual’ with Russia until it “demonstrates compliance with international law”.47 Mr Koenders said it was not possible to have a strategy of deterrence without dialogue. It was in NATO’s “self-interest to keep talking” with Russia about “the risk of miscalculation”.48 Lord Browne said there was an “urgent and immediate requirement to restore dialogue and rebuild US–Russian relations”. He believed “dialogue should not be treated as a bargaining chip” by NATO: the “US, NATO and Russia should revive and strengthen all channels of communication between political, military and intelligence leaders … to avoid the risk of conflict and miscalculation.”49 Mr Koenders thought the Alliance had “failed” on this to date.50 Rear Admiral Gower said both sides should make clear there are some issues that are so “important” they “should have dialogue” on them regardless of their “other differences”.51
34.This is consistent with the conclusion in our 2018 report, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order, that the UK must remain open to dialogue with Russia on issues of common concern”.52
35.Notwithstanding current tensions, the Government should be prepared to talk to Russia about nuclear strategic stability. The risks of miscommunication, misperception and miscalculation are too grave to allow other aspects of Russia’s behaviour to preclude talks on nuclear issues.
36.It is also important that NATO has a dialogue with Russia on nuclear issues as part of an effort to take all steps to reduce the risk of nuclear use. One way of doing this would be to reinvigorate dialogue within the NATO-Russia Council.
37.We do not regard such contacts, which took place even at the height of the Cold War, as constituting ‘business as usual’.
Non-state actors
38.Witnesses raised the risk of nuclear use by non-state actors. The Executive Committee of British Pugwash said that non-state actors “would not be deterred from using nuclear weapons by the taboo or cost/benefit calculations that deter the nine possessor-states”. This made the risk that nuclear weapons would be used, if they got hold of them, higher than for a state.53 Dr Christopher Hobbs, Reader in Science and Security, King’s College London, said it was not just terrorist groups that presented a threat: “Organised crime and individuals can and have been motivated by financial gain, disgruntlement and other reasons to steal and illicitly traffic nuclear materials and sabotage facilities.”54
39.Rear Admiral Gower said the “risk of non-state actors gaining access to a nuclear weapon” would be likely to come “through a current” nuclear possessor state. There were two possibilities: a nuclear-weapon state might choose to give a weapon to a non-state actor, or a non-state actor might take advantage of weaknesses in a state’s nuclear security.55 Dr Nick Ritchie thought that “a government deciding to clandestinely arm a non-state actor to act as their surrogate” was “highly unlikely”.56
40.Dr Ritchie said the “acquisition of weapons-usable or weapons-grade fissile material” by a non-state actor was “possible”, but it was “more implausible that a terrorist group would be able to develop a workable primitive basic nuclear device and be able to detonate it”.57 Rear Admiral Gower said the risk of a non-state actor “producing a nuclear weapon” was “very low”. This was partly as a result of the impact of measures such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (discussed in Chapter 3).58
41.Mr Koenders thought “some progress” had been made to mitigate the risk of the use of nuclear material by non-state actors.59 Recent efforts have included the Nuclear Security Summit process led by the United States during the Obama Administration.60
42.We welcome international efforts to increase the security of nuclear and radioactive materials and thus reduce the risk posed by non-state actors. The security of nuclear stockpiles and measures to prevent proliferation must remain a priority for the Government.
Technological development
43.Witnesses described several technological developments affecting nuclear stability. Some of these risks, such as the development of so-called tactical nuclear weapons and dual-capable systems, were related to the increasing reliance on certain existing technological capabilities. Others could be considered emerging technologies, the impact of which was not yet certain. Another factor was nuclear modernisation programmes and their effect on nuclear risk.
‘Tactical’ nuclear weapons
44.Several witnesses discussed the development, both in terms of doctrine and capabilities, of lower yield ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons differ from strategic nuclear weapons in that they are envisaged to be used in fighting and winning a war, as opposed to strategic nuclear weapons, which are used to deter conflict.61 Ms Nakamitsu noted that while these bombs are lower yield, they are “still much bigger than” the bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.62
45.Some witnesses noted this was not an entirely new development. Dr Ritchie said that “planning to fight and win nuclear wars was always a part of the doctrine”.63 He questioned whether it was possible to have a ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon: “today every nuclear weapon is a strategic weapon, even if it were a nuclear hand grenade, because it breaks the nuclear taboo.”64
46.Dr Jenny Clegg, former Senior Lecturer, University of Central Lancashire, said the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) had suggested “including low-yield tactical nuclear weapons” to the US arsenal.65 The NPR justified this in part due to what the US believed to be Russia’s nuclear doctrine, stating:
“Russia considers the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be the principal threats to its contemporary geopolitical ambitions. Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms [favourable] to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.”
It went on to say Russia’s doctrine was based on the “mistaken assumption of Western capitulation” in the event of a Russian first use of nuclear weapons.66
47.In response to this assessment of Russia’s doctrine, and its development of low-yield nuclear capabilities for warfighting, the US would expand its “flexible” nuclear options. The NPR argued this would preserve “credible deterrence” and “raise the nuclear threshold”.67
48.Dr Zhao told us that “Russia and China tend to reject the [US] argument that [its] efforts to re-emphasize the role of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons are aiming at deterring limited nuclear use by other countries.”68
Dual-capable systems and entanglement
49.‘Dual-capable’ weapons systems, which can deliver both conventional and nuclear payloads, are being developed by some states. Mr Koenders said one of his “biggest worries” was this “blurring between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons”.69 The FCO cited these systems amongst the technologies with potential to undermine the security environment.70 Ms Cox said, from NATO’s perspective, “dual-capability systems” were “clearly a threat”.71
50.Ms Cox said dual-capable systems reduced the “ability to determine what is coming at us”, and made it “more difficult for us to determine an appropriate and proportionate response.”72 The issue was the ‘entanglement’ between nuclear and non-nuclear systems, where previously there was a clear distinction. Dr Ritchie said that this could “increase the misunderstanding, misjudgement or misperception of an adversary’s actions in a particular context”. He said that “command and control systems for conventional weapons” could “provide exactly the same infrastructure that is necessary for the command and control of nuclear forces”, with the result that “you may think that you are attacking conventional weapons but in fact you are attacking the adversary’s nuclear weapons”. In a crisis, this “could lead to different types of escalation which could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons and then retaliatory nuclear strikes.”73
Emerging technologies
51.In our report, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order, we discussed the transformative impact of new technology on international relations.74 In its response to our report, the Government told us that “Emerging technologies could be considered a ‘disruptor’ to traditional power structures and traditional foreign policy actors.”75
52.Ms Cox said that “the advancement of new technologies … poses inherent risks to nuclear deterrence and the way we conduct our nuclear business.”76 The FCO said “the development of new and novel offensive and defensive weapons technologies, both nuclear and non-nuclear” had “the potential to diminish the security environment”.77
53.Rear Admiral Gower said that from the “beginning of the atomic age” until “20 or 30 years ago”, states did not have any conventional capabilities “that could deliver the effect at range with the accuracy and the impact of a nuclear weapon.” That was “no longer the case”, and while the impact was “still different from a nuclear weapon” it was now possible to have a “strategic effect” with sophisticated conventional capabilities.78 There were potential positives to this, “because it means that in conflict [a nuclear possessor state] might not resort to nuclear weapons as early as they would have done before.” On the other hand, he was concerned about the “entanglement between conventional … and nuclear” command and control.79 Ms Cox said entanglement was a threat in the context of emerging technologies. She was concerned that “with the increasing capabilities of cyber, space domains and lethal autonomous weapons”, we would “start to see entanglement … between these systems”.80
54.Witnesses considered the effect of new non-nuclear capabilities on nuclear deterrence. Franklin Miller KBE, former Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, White House National Security Council, said “emerging trends in cyber weapons, space weapons and advanced conventional weapons have the potential to destabilize relations among the Great Powers”.81 Dr Zhao told us that new “non-nuclear technologies greatly undermine the stability of mutual deterrence relationships between nuclear armed states”. He included in his list of such technologies missile defence (discussed in Chapter 4), conventional precision strike weapons (discussed later in this chapter), advanced space-based sensors and surveillance technologies, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence and unmanned systems.82
55.The FCO said some emerging weapons technologies, including dual-capable systems and advanced conventional capabilities, “may create over-confidence in the mind of a strategic competitor that it can use novel non-nuclear weapons to attack a Nuclear Weapon State without passing the threshold for a nuclear response”. It was concerned that “these technologies could raise the potential for miscalculation by a threatened state, given the uncertainty over the likely impact of such an attack.”83
56.Ms Nakamitsu told us that technological development might affect “how decisions are made on the potential use of nuclear weapons.” The speed at which decisions were taken in the context of new technologies “could potentially contribute towards states having a ‘use it or lose it’ mentality”.84 Tom Plant, Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said that, taken together, “all the advances in cyberspace, AI and … to some extent, micro-drone technology” act together to “reduce decision-making time in a crisis”.85
Threats to nuclear command and control
57.Lord Browne said “the emergence of cyber and other technology” was “a threat to strategic warning systems and to nuclear command and control.”86 BASIC said “technological advancements” posed “the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation as they could increase the effectiveness of non-nuclear attacks against key nuclear command, control and communications centres.”87
58.Rear Admiral Gower, however, thought that “at the moment the risk of a cyberattack on nuclear capabilities” was “extremely low, largely because most of those nuclear capabilities were conceived and built before cyber, and certainly in the United Kingdom there is no connection between the internet and our nuclear command and control.”88 Lord Browne said that it was unwise to think that because the UK’s nuclear weapons system is submarine-based it is “air gapped” (the term for operating systems that are not connected to the public internet). He noted that there had been examples of ‘jumping the air-gap’, for example in Iran.89
Nuclear modernisation and risk
59.All Nuclear Weapon States renew and modernise aspects of their nuclear weapons, some on a continuing basis, others, such as the UK, on a cyclical basis. Some witnesses believed nuclear modernisation programmes decreased risk. Mr Plant gave an example: “If I had a rifle here and I put a safety catch on it, I have modernised that weapon in a way—I have improved its capability—but I have also made it safer.”90 Dr Sarah Tzinieris, Research Fellow, King’s College London, said “risk-reduction and improvements in the safety of nuclear weapons, making them less prone to accident or malfunction” were “important benefits”.91
60.On the other hand, Dr Tzinieris considered how modernisation programmes could increase risk. China, the US and Russia’s “relentless modernisation … of nuclear capabilities and their delivery systems” was “exacerbating tensions on the international stage”.92 Dr Tong Zhao said modernisation could cause “cascading reactions in adversarial countries”: “modernisation begets more modernisation.”93 Ms Nakamitsu described this as the start of a “potential new arms race”.94
61.Modernisation programmes, and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States’ response to them in the context of the wider non-proliferation and disarmament regime, are discussed in Chapter 3.
Managing technological change
62.Ms Cox believed the risks of technological development were “manageable”. It was necessary to “make smart decisions about business practices, and make substantial investments in protecting critical capabilities.”95 Ms Price said the Government looked at the cyber risk to nuclear systems “very carefully” and took “every measure possible to ensure that our assets are protected.”96 NATO was seeking “to prevent any vulnerability to our nuclear command and control as well as our nuclear weapons infrastructure.”97
63.Regarding cyber threats to nuclear command and control, Lord Browne said the “first step towards solving any problem” was “admitting that there [was] one”. He could find “no instance of a Cabinet-level Minister … ever mentioning cyber in the context of a report about [the UK’s] modernisation programme … no debate about this issue … [no] select committee that has looked at it.” In the United States, by contrast, there was “an openness about this challenge”.98 He cited a US Department of Defense report that had said that “the United States cannot be confident that our critical Information Technology … systems will work under attack from a sophisticated and well-resourced … ‘full spectrum’ adversary”. The same report also noted that this was true for the US’s allies.99
64.Rear Admiral Gower proposed that Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States should pursue a “code of conduct” with “a formal agreement … [to] refrain from any kind of targeting or degradation of the satellites and the command and control infrastructure, so there is not a risk of misinterpretation.”100
65.Nuclear possessor states are developing more sophisticated capabilities, utilising new technologies, and there is increasing ‘entanglement’ between conventional and nuclear weapons. These developments increase the possibility of miscalculation and the speed of decision-making, both of which could result in an escalation of hostilities.
66.The Government should review the resilience of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and associated systems in the context of emerging technologies, in particular cyber capabilities. It should report its key findings to Parliament.
Digital communication, rhetoric and risk
67.A final factor in the growth of nuclear risk is the development of digital communication tools, social media and irresponsible rhetoric, issues we noted were having a significant impact on international relations in our report UK foreign policy in a shifting world order.101 Dr Meier said:
“The line between responsible and irresponsible Nuclear Weapon States has been shattered, if it ever existed. Leaderships in some Nuclear Weapon States, including in the United States and Russia, are ignorant of nuclear dangers and talk about these weapons irresponsibly, also with a view to increasing domestic support.”102
In their assessment of “heightened risk” the Northern Friends Peace Board cited “aggressive rhetoric … [and] nationalism pandered to by both democratic leaders and dictators to strengthen their popularity and support”.103
68.The Northern Friends Peace Board cited “ill-considered communications by social media” as a risk factor.104 A similar point was made by Rear Admiral Gower, who considered social media might cause misunderstanding of the “signals that the other country is sending”. He gave an example: “President Trump is tweeting, ‘I’m going to blow you up’, and someone sends a missile over because they think he actually means that at that time”.105
69.The Minister said there was “no doubt that the language has become looser when talking about” nuclear issues. This could be equated “with greater risk and danger”, or it was possible to say it was a “change in the nature of political behaviour.”106
70.Reckless nuclear rhetoric in an era of digital communications potentially increases the risk of misperception and thus nuclear use.
Nuclear doctrine and declaratory policy
71.We considered the nuclear doctrines of nuclear possessor states and how these doctrines related to nuclear risk.
Box 1: Nuclear possessor states’ declaratory policies
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Nuclear possessor states’ declaratory policies All nuclear-armed states except Israel have made declarations on the circumstances in which they would or would not use nuclear weapons. These can be positive—when a state would use nuclear weapons—or negative—when a state would not use nuclear weapons. They are considered by nuclear possessor states to deter attacks against them and to assure some other states of their safety. First use Most nuclear-armed states reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, while some declare that they will use nuclear weapons only in retaliation. Sole use A ‘sole use’ policy is one in which a country commits to use nuclear weapons only to deter or respond to a nuclear threat, thus, for example, ruling out using nuclear weapons in relation to the use of other weapons of mass destruction.107 The UK The UK detailed its nuclear doctrine in its 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. It set out that: “Only the Prime Minister can authorise the launch of nuclear weapons, which ensures that political control is maintained at all times. We would use our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies. While our resolve and capability to do so if necessary is beyond doubt, we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use, in order not to simplify the calculations of any potential aggressor.”108 China China maintains a no first use policy. A 2016 defence white paper stated: “China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.” China has called for an “international legal instrument”109 to prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons. France The 2017 Strategic Review of Defence and National Security maintained France’s ambiguous position. It stated that France’s nuclear deterrent: “protects [France] from any aggression against our vital interests emanating from a state, wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take … The use of nuclear weapons would be conceivable only in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defence”.110 Russia Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine stated that Russia reserved the option to use nuclear weapons in response to an attack using any type of weapon of mass destruction, and in response to a conventional attack that placed the “very existence of the state … under threat.”111 The United States The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the US did not maintain a no first use policy, which was justified by a need to remain flexible to deter both nuclear and non-nuclear attacks. The “extreme circumstances” in which the US would consider the use of nuclear weapons included “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” against “US, allied or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on US or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”112 India India has a declared policy of no first use. Pakistan Pakistan has issued negative security assurances to non-nuclear-armed states. Israel Israel has not acknowledged its nuclear possession, due to a policy of ‘opacity’ (discussed in Chapter 3). It has thus never made aspects of its nuclear doctrine public.113 North Korea North Korea has publicly declared a policy of no first use “as long as the hostile forces for aggression do not encroach upon its sovereignty.” Pyongyang has regularly threatened to use its nuclear weapons against neighbours and the United States. |
Source: Arms Control Association, ‘Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Negative Security Assurances’: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/declaratorypolicies [accessed 14 March 2019]
72.The Minister described the UK as a “responsible Nuclear Weapon State”. The UK had taken “taken a number of unilateral actions that both build confidence and reduce tensions,” including having not “targeted” nuclear missiles “at any state since 1994”, Trident-capable submarines being at “several days’ notice to fire” and “political control” being “maintained at all times”.114 The UK’s nuclear deterrent is outlined in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The UK’s nuclear deterrent
Source: HM Government, ‘National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015’: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015 [accessed 26 March 2019]
Ambiguity
73.Witnesses considered the use of ambiguity in nuclear declaratory policy. Rear Admiral Gower said there was a “spectrum of ambiguity from, ‘We will attack anybody at any time if we believe we are threatened’ to, ‘no first use’.”115
74.The UK maintains a “deliberately ambiguous” nuclear declaratory policy.116 The Minister said “We have never said that there will be no first use, and nor should we”. He confirmed that the Government reserved the right to strike a country with nuclear weapons before it had attacked the UK. NATO too had a “deliberately ambiguous” policy.117
75.James Franklin, Deputy Director, Defence Nuclear Policy, Ministry of Defence, believed the UK’s ambiguous declaratory policy was necessary, as the Government did not want “to make the calculation a simple one for our adversaries”. By “being more ambiguous, others do not know, and cannot get to a point at which they can see, when nuclear weapons would be used”. Mr Franklin questioned how “rigid” other states’ no first use policies would be, and “in what circumstances” they would hold. Ambiguity reinforced deterrence and reduced “the risk of nuclear weapons being used.”118
76.Rear Admiral Gower took a different view. While ambiguity complicated “the mind of an adversary”, it added “to the chance of misinterpretation”. He judged that “by reducing the amount of ambiguity in certain areas” the UK could “show restraint”.119 BASIC made a similar point: “too much ambiguity is reckless and irresponsible. Specific nuclear assurances can have benefits increasing confidence between states as well as strengthening deterrence postures.”120
77.As set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the UK is willing to commit that it “will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party to the [NPT]” provided that state is not “in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations”. However, the Government reserves the right to “review this assurance” if a state were to develop threatening non-nuclear WMDs, “such as chemical and biological capabilities”.121 Therefore, the UK does not maintain a policy of sole use.
78.The ambiguity retained by the “US, and to a certain degree the UK,” with regard to “sorts of non-nuclear attacks against which … we would respond with a nuclear weapon” was challenged by Rear Admiral Gower. He said it was “extremely unlikely” a state would respond to a non-nuclear attack with a nuclear weapon, and adversaries would be able “work that out”.122
Misinterpretation of doctrine and miscalculation
79.BASIC warned of “the increased risk of inadvertent nuclear use through misperception and miscalculation of nuclear doctrine.”123 A possible example of this was evident in disagreements between witnesses on the nature of Russia’s doctrine.
80.The US 2018 Nuclear Posture review said that Russia’s military doctrine implied that it would be willing to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to win that conflict.124 Some witnesses drew a similar conclusion. Mr Koenders said Russia’s “at least hints at the early use of nuclear weapons to stop a possible conflict at an early stage”, and added that if “that threshold has gone we have a major issue.”125 Mr Miller said “Russia’s military and civilian leaders” appeared “to believe that they could use low-yield nuclear weapons in small numbers to cement victory in a landgrab against NATO”.126
81.This analysis of Russia’s nuclear doctrine was not shared by all witnesses. Dr Ritchie said it was “contested as to whether talk of using small, limited tactical nuclear warheads to de-escalate a conflict is an accurate representation of Russian doctrine”; he believed that “was not an accurate representation of the current Russian nuclear posture.”127
82.Mr Baklitskiy said that, “contrary to what some Western experts claim”, Russia has not adapted its doctrine to lower the threshold for nuclear use. Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine used the same wording as the 2010 doctrine to state that it would use nuclear weapons in “response to [the] use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia and its allies”, or “when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”. This meant that Russia did “not have [an] ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy’.” Nuclear weapons were being relied on by Russia less according to Mr Baklitskiy, because Russia was “getting more comfortable with its conventional capabilities”, which he argued had been “demonstrated in [the] Syrian campaign and regular large-scale exercises.”128
83.Dr Zhao said the US believed China had “moved towards a policy of using nuclear weapons first and early in a conventional war”. There were “reasons why” the US believed so, but Moscow and Beijing viewed this as “a major … misunderstanding of their policies, or worse, a deliberate US effort to misportray their policies”.129 Lord Browne believed the “narrative” of a Chinese nuclear threat was “generated” in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, because the review “had a determined end and needed an excuse”.130
84.In contrast, Dr Zhao said Russia and China had concluded that it was the US that intended to “develop nuclear warfighting capabilities and to intentionally lower the threshold of nuclear use”.131 Mr Baklitskiy thought the US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review included capabilities that would allow the US to “confront Moscow at lower rungs on the escalation ladder”.132
85.Dr Zhao thought Russia and China’s interpretation of US intentions could “drive these countries to respond by developing their own capabilities and readjusting their nuclear postures in ways that emphasise rapid response and flexible nuclear employment options.” This could “increase the chances of nuclear use.”133
86.We are concerned by the lack of understanding by nuclear possessor states of their respective nuclear doctrines and declaratory policies. Misunderstanding of these policies could increase the risk of use of nuclear weapons.
The Reagan–Gorbachev doctrine
87.Rear Admiral Gower said what began as a quote in President Ronald Reagan’s 1984 State of the Union speech became the Reagan–Gorbachev doctrine,134 that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. Ms Nakamitsu told us she had “appealed to all Nuclear Weapon States bilaterally” to uphold this “principle”.135 Dr Ritchie said states “should reiterate repeatedly [this] mantra”; it was “essential messaging.”136
88.The importance of the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” has not diminished. The Government should publicly endorse this principle and encourage all nuclear possessor states to do the same.
34 Q 77. In our report, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order, we concluded that Russia’s behaviour stemmed from Russia being “a declining power”; it was “increasingly willing and able to use both traditional and new capabilities … to act as a disrupter in international relations”. International Relations Committee, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order (5th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 250)
47 North Atlantic Treaty Organization , Nato-Russia Relations: Background, April 2018: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_04/20180426_1805-NATO-Russia_en.pdf [accessed 14 March 2019]
48 Q 146. In the House of Lords on 2 April 2019 Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, former Secretary General, NATO, said “Resuming the formality and depth of the NATO-Russia Council would not in any way be seen as a concession to wholly unacceptable Russian behaviour in Ukraine, Crimea and Salisbury; instead, it would be a recognition that, in a hair-trigger nuclear world, we need to talk about what we agree on as well as why we disagree on other matters.” HL Deb, 2 April 2019, col 126
52 International Relations Committee, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order (5th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 250)
57 Ibid.
60 Arms Control Association, ‘Nuclear Security Summit at a Glance’: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NuclearSecuritySummit [accessed 14 March 2019]
61 Q 84 Rear Admiral John Gower noted that the UK “got rid” of its last “so-called tactical weapon” in 1994.
66 United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (February 2018): https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF [accessed 14 March 2019]
67 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
74 International Relations Committee, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order (5th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 250)
75 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Government response to UK foreign policy in a shifting world order: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/International-Relations-Committee/foreign-policy-in-a-changing-world/Government-Response-UK-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Shifting-World-Order.pdf [accessed 3 April 2019]
78 Q 82. Rear Admiral John Gower referred specifically to “precision-guided long-range conventional weapons” and the “targeting of cyber”, both of which are discussed in more detail later in the report.
89 Q 51; see also written evidence from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (NPT0022). In 2010 it was revealed that computers at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in Iran were infected with a virus known as Stuxnet, and that the virus had undermined the plant’s effectiveness. These computers were ‘air gapped’, meaning that they were not connected to the internet. It is thought that the virus was deployed using an infected USB drive. Kim Zetter ‘An unprecedented look at Stuxnet, the world’s first digital weapon’, Wired: https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ [accessed 27 March 2019]
99 Defense Science Board, United States Department of Defense, Resilient Military Systems and the Advance Cyber Threat (January 2013): https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-081.pdf [accessed 14 March 2019]
101 International Relations Committee, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order (5th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 250)
107 Arms Control Association, ‘Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Negative Security Assurance’: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/declaratorypolicies [accessed 14 March 2019]
108 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous Kingdom Cm 9161, November 2015, p 35: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf [accessed 14 March 2019]
109 People’s Republic of China Mission to the United Nations, Statement by H.E. Ambassador Li Baodong Head of the Chinese Delegation at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (4 May 2010): https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/china_en.pdf [accessed 14 March 2019]
110 La délégation à l’information et à la communication de la Défense (DICoD), Strategic Review of Defence and National Security 2017: Key Points (October 2017): https://otan.delegfrance.org/2017-Strategic-Review-of-Defence-and-National-Security [accessed 14 March 2019]
111 The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’: https://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 [accessed 14 March 2019]
112 United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (February 2018): https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF [accessed 14 March 2019]
121 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous Kingdom, Cm 9161, November 2015, p 35: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf [accessed 14 March 2019]
124 United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (February 2018): https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF [accessed 14 March 2019]