Chapter 5: Interests of other countries
63.There is concern about the influence of third countries in the region. The lack of progress towards EU membership has left the region “vulnerable for other competing influence such as Russia, Turkey, Middle Eastern countries and China.”81
USA
64.The USA was considered an important actor in the region, not least because of its role in ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There were two main views about the current role of the USA in the region.
65.One view was that there was uncertainty about the USA’s commitment to the region following President Trump’s election. General Sir Michael Rose said “My worry … is that President Trump’s isolationist policies and decision to reduce the budgets that are being employed in the western Balkans at the moment will leave a vacuum that might well be filled by the Russians.”82
66.Marko Prelec said:
“United States foreign policy can now be thought of as a ship without a captain. There is, of course, a President and there is a Secretary of State, but they are not actively engaged, certainly not in this part of the world. They have no demonstrated interest in or knowledge of the Balkans … In the past, you could always say that things were looking really bad and you would get the Secretary of State or the President involved. That is no longer a plausible option. So we are essentially in housekeeping mode in the United States and are very likely to remain there for the duration of this Administration.”83
67.The other view was more positive. Laza Kekic said there was a “perception that the US has lost interest and withdrawn from the region. On the contrary and quite interestingly, on Macedonia they showed the EU up. It was American intervention that resolved the crisis there. On Montenegro, in the end there was US assent for it to join NATO and [Vice-President] Pence made a stirring visit to Podgorica to underline that. Even in Bosnia, the US has been in the forefront of slapping sanctions on Dodik. So the idea that the US is withdrawing from the region is probably not right.”84
68.The Albanian Ambassador took a similar view. He noted Vice-President Pence’s visit to Montenegro, during which he “confirmed the continuing support and engagement of the United States in the region, along with US support for the integration of the region into the European Union and NATO.”85 The Ambassador said “We had a kind of crisis in Albania before the elections, as did Macedonia and Kosovo. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the region, Hoyt Brian Yee, was very active in this process and everything was resolved in the three countries. That was thanks to the contribution of the United States. It is actively involved in the region, and we welcome its presence very much.”86
Russia
69.The influence of Russia in the region was the topic on which we received most evidence. Dr Andi Hoxhaj, University of Warwick, wrote that the UK and others should be concerned about “the increase of Russian influence meddling in the Western Balkans.”87
70.This influence was seen by many as malign. Dr Jarosław Wiśniewski, LSE, thought Russia considered the Western Balkans as Europe’s “soft underbelly. This is where Russia seeks the opportunities to exploit differences by playing the anti-Western card. It uses it in its relations to undermine the Western model and its achievements in the region”.88 Many agreed with Dr Wisniewski’s analysis; Kurt Bassuener called Russia an “opportunistic spoiler”.89 More specifically, Marko Prelec, Central European University, said that Russia’s interest in the region was to “keep NATO out”.90
71.Sir Alan Duncan, Minister for Europe, said Russia had “a very long-standing and complex relationship with the region that takes many forms—historical, cultural, political, and of course the energy influence, as well as through information campaigns and links with politicians”; it had “a broad policy of causing division where it can”.91
72.Other witnesses disagreed with this view of Russia’s involvement. Uros Delevic said:
“The influence of the Russian Federation in Balkans is often perceived as negative due to its special relations with Serbia. However, this type of relationship is well known between the UK and the US, and it should not come as a surprise that Russia attempts to maintain military neutrality in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro or FYR Macedonia. NATO has already approached Russian borders and has a strong presence in Balkans, where Albania and Croatia are full members.”92
73.Sir Adam Thomson, ELN, said:
“The Russians genuinely see it as unfair and inimical to their interests that NATO, in particular, and the EU, to a degree, should be extending their sphere of influence in the Balkans. Russian investment in Serbia, for example, is born of genuine feelings about Serb nationality, and ethnicity to a degree, as well as geostrategic interests.”93
74.Witnesses generally agreed that, whether its intentions were for good or ill, Russia did not provide the region with an alternative prospect for achieving stability and prosperity compared to EU and NATO membership. Dr Wiśniewski said “Russian strategic communications do not offer a coherent alternative to the European Union. Its media outlets may criticise Brussels and wider European politics, but they do not portray the Eurasian Union as a viable alternative for Belgrade.”94
75.Some witnesses questioned the extent of Russia’s influence in the region. For some, particularly those we spoke to in the region, it was extensive. For example, the influence of the pro-Russian news agency Sputnik was significant. Dr Wiśniewski said:
“the main agency sources of news, particularly in Serbia but also in [the Entity of] Republika Srpska and Montenegro, is Sputnik. So among what are considered respectable media outlets in the Balkans, when you look at the source of the information, not always but very often it is Sputnik because it is one of the few agencies in the region with a large number of correspondents or local stringers. Western media have a limited number of stringers and correspondents working in the region, which creates a certain imbalance.”95
76.The International Security Institute also saw Russia’s role as extensive, including substantial political interference in Macedonia and Montenegro (see Appendix 4):
“Russia’s strategic presence also provides political and strategic space to any other illegitimate influence. Russian-backed coups in Macedonia and Montenegro have failed, but Moscow still controls significant political forces in these countries. Russia is undisputed in [the Entity of] Republika Srpska … In Serbia, Russian political influence is largely represented in the National Assembly and security structures … Serbia is also one of the exporters of Russian arms, standards and politics in all conflict areas under Russian strategic influence. … The Russian so-called humanitarian center in Niš [in Serbia] is a concrete institution of strategic partnership and political influence of the Russian government and its promotion of anti-Western and anti-democratic affiliations and political arrangements.”96
77.Other witnesses concluded that “talk of a resurgent Russia dominating the region is overblown”.97 Timothy Less said that Russians were not “big hitters in the region. The reason why they have any influence at all is solely because of the power vacuum that is opening up as a result of the breakdown of the EU enlargement process and the diminishing authority of the West.”98 Laza Kekic, an independent analyst, said that Russia had “suffered some immense setbacks recently”.99 He cited Montenegro’s accession into NATO and the fall of the Gruevski government in Macedonia as examples of Russia’s interests being directly thwarted. He also noted that Russia was not a significant investor in the region; “in economic trade and investment terms, Russia is so small. It has 5% or 6% of these countries’ trade and investment, so compared to the EU it is a very small player.”100 The Albanian ambassador said there had been “zero investment in Albania from Russia in the last 27 years.”101
78.Dr Wiśniewski concluded:
“When it comes to the Balkans, Western leaders have often underestimated what Russia is doing there. At the same time, Russia should not be overestimated; it wants us to believe that its involvement in the region is bigger than it really is. There is a fine balance between what Russia is actually doing, what we think it is doing and the projection that it has in the region.”102
79.Regardless of how much influence Russia genuinely has in the region, the perception of it show that it is having some success. Tena Prelec, LSE, said that “The EU is by far the most prominent investor in the region, but in spite of this, survey evidence suggests that a majority of Serbs think that Russia is still their biggest donor.”103 Dr Wisniewski saw a similar trend in Serbia: “Far more Serbian citizens say they would prefer to be allied with Russia (67.2 percent in favour and 18.8 percent against) than say they would like to join the European Union (50.9 percent for to 38.8 percent against).”104
80.Russia has genuine influence, in Serbia at least, on the issue of Kosovo. Russia has repeatedly vetoed the recognition of Kosovo in the UN. The International Security Institute wrote that in “normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo and concluding a compromise under the auspices of the EU, Russia loses political importance for Serbia”.105 Witnesses, particularly those in the region, saw little prospect of a resolution of the Serbia–Kosovo issue. The ‘internal dialogue’ launched by President Vučić in Serbia to air the arguments about Kosovo and perhaps reach a national consensus was seen by many as insincere.106 However, Marko Prelec thought attitudes in Serbia towards Kosovo were slowly shifting:
“The extent to which people really care about this is now, I think, quite diminished. Serbia has neglected, to the point of contempt, the interests of its former clients among the Kosovo Serbs, and it has paid no significant price in popularity. The public image of the Kosovo Serbs in Serbia is that they are moochers and a drain on the state. There is not so much sympathy for them, and as time has passed people have got used to the idea that they are simply lost to Serbia.”107
81.Sir Adam Thomson, ELN, said that whatever the actual extent of Russia’s influence and intentions, “if NATO governments dwell too much on a NATO/Russia competition, they are unlikely to be doing any favours to stability in the region … NATO’s interests … need to be played in a more nuanced way than a straight black and white West/Russia competition.”108 Angus Lapsley, FCO, agreed that the UK, and others, needed to engage with Russia. He noted that there were existing formats to do so, including the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina.109
China
82.China has been investing in the Western Balkans as part of its ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative.110 The Balkans form part of the ‘16+1’ group of countries with which China is seeking to improve cooperation.111 Witnesses said that China’s interests in the area were quite different to Russia’s: “unlike Moscow, it does not oppose EU or NATO enlargement (quite the contrary as for the EU)”.112 Anthony Monckton, ViennEast, wrote that China saw the region as “a commercial opportunity to use its economic muscle to garner regional influence.”113
83.Chinese investment in the region has largely been welcomed by some. Uros Delevic said that China represented “a factor of peace and stability, it brings economic benefit and does not interfere in the internal political affairs, which is what makes China warmly welcome in all Balkan states.”114 Michal Makocki, formerly of EUISS and Mercator Institute for China Studies, said that “given the huge infrastructure deficiency, China’s overtures are seen as extremely positive as they may be a boon to the local economies.”115 Timothy Less agreed: “if China was not willing to put its money into some of these big infrastructure projects, nobody would, and the Balkans would not have the new railroads, ports, roads, factories and other investments which the Chinese are currently financing.”116
84.However, there was concern that, although investment was welcome, China’s actions were “undermining the governance reforms that we have been promoting in the Balkans” because, whereas EU funding came with conditions attached, “Chinese companies often operate with less attention paid to standards of corruption. They also operate with lower transparency standards.”117
85.Another concern was that China was providing not grants but loans, leading to rising national debt. Michael Makocki said:
“in Montenegro, one project amounted to a quarter of Montenegro’s GDP. It was also a loan, established in US dollars, which meant that with the currency exchange rate the amount of that loan to Montenegro suddenly increased by 25% … The IMF and the World Bank have already engaged all the countries in the region on the issue of Chinese lending. Serbia has also become extremely cautious in taking up other projects from China because of a warning from the IMF that its indebtedness is already reaching its ceiling.”118
86.He therefore argued that, because of the need for investment in the region, “we have to work with China in a way that addresses all the different concerns and deficits of its investment model, so that we get the best of its attention to the region”.119 Andrew Page, Western Balkans Summit Co-ordinator, FCO, described conversations he had had with representatives of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) who were “looking at how it can work with China, for instance, through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and whether the EBRD can come in as a partner with China on long-term infrastructure investment. When the EBRD comes in, that brings in a level of rigour to due diligence and conditions attached to its lending.”120
87.Most witnesses thought China saw cooperation with the Western Balkans as a long-term investment in countries that would one day be in the EU. China saw EU membership for the Western Balkan countries “as absolutely critical to the stability of the region” and took the view that “one day there will be six more friendly pro-Chinese countries represented in the EU institutions, which will lobby for Chinese political interests.”121
Turkey
88.The influence and intentions of Turkey in the Western Balkans were mentioned by some witnesses. One view was that “Turkey and Middle Eastern theocracies are attempting to control the Balkan Muslims.”122 Dr Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, LSE, had similar concerns about Turkey’s influence extending “into other spheres in areas where Muslims are in a majority. This reinforces an image of ‘silent islamisation’ in some of the communities, which is a source of concern for the non-Muslim population, and works against peace and reconciliation in the region.”123
89.One way Turkey had been seen to exert its influence was in funding new mosques or repairs to those that had fallen into disrepair. For example, the Namazgâh Mosque in Tirana, funded by Turkey, is expected to be the largest mosque in the Balkans once completed. Another source of influence had been through educational organisations, particularly Gülen schools. However, since 2013 Turkey’s attitude towards them has changed: “Turkey is now going around the world putting pressure on Governments to close down these institutions”.124
90.Some saw Turkey as hoping to “renew its traditional political and economic presence in the region as a growing regional power.”125 Dr Michael Taylor, Oxford Analytica, described this as “a kind of neo-Ottomanism” with Turkey attempting to exert influence in countries where there might still be the “nostalgia for the Ottomans which the Turks had”. However, he thought Turkey had “found that it made quite a mistake there, generating antagonism among them by running that policy.”126
91.Laza Kekic questioned how extensive Turkish investment in the region was: “even in a country such as Bosnia where there is a predisposition to welcoming Turkey, as we heard, the sum total of Turkish investment is €200 million. That is hardly anything.”127 However, he expected the potential for Turkish influence to grow in the future if the region was unable to achieve greater Euro–Atlantic integration because of the likely demographic change in the region: “If you look at the projections for 2030 or 2040, the amount of people in the region who are Muslims will be very large and I suspect that they will look towards countries like Turkey for cultural education.”128
Table 2: Muslim population of the Western Balkans
Country |
% Muslim population |
|
Albania |
57% |
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina |
51% |
|
Kosovo |
96% |
|
Macedonia |
33% |
|
Montenegro |
19% |
|
Serbia |
3% |
|
Western Balkans total |
35% |
Source: Figures derived from CIA, World Factbook Library 2017: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/ [accessed 21 December 2017]
92.Turkey’s geopolitical role in the region was also unclear. Though formally an EU candidate country, Timothy Less said that he could not be sure “whether … Turkey will definitely support the integration of the western Balkans into the EU.”129 Although Turkey is already a NATO member its “relationships with America are very strained at the moment. It is the same with a number of NATO members, most obviously Germany”,130 not least because of its purchase of the S-400 ground-to-air missile system from Russia.
Saudi Arabia and Gulf states
93.A number of witnesses referred to Saudi Arabia exporting radical Islamism in the region. Anthony Monckton said that Saudi Arabia (and Iran) were “effectively funding a growth in Wahhabism”.131 Timothy Less thought the Saudi influence was less clear-cut. While Saudi investment might promote “a culture that is enabling radicalisation … I certainly would not want to go so far as to allege that anyone in Saudi Arabia is actively promoting terrorism in the region. I just do not think the evidence supports that.”132
94.Evidence about investment from the Gulf States focused more on their economic ambitions. Tena Prelec, LSE, said that “starting from 2007, the UAE began to make commercial investments, first in Montenegro and then (from 2014) in Serbia. While they profess their government to be ‘geographically agnostic’, UAE officials do not hide a geopolitical interest (in terms of ‘making friends around the globe’) and stress the long-term character of the investments, in the hope of securing a foothold in the Balkan region before it joins a larger (EU) market.”133
95.Marko Prelec said:
“There has been a lot of talk in the Gulf mainly about influxes of populations in the form of people buying property … It is true that whole communities in Bosnia have been bought up by Gulf Arabs. My understanding is that this is simply people seeking comfortable and relatively cheap European property with a pleasant summer climate, unlike that of the Gulf, and a culturally welcoming Islamic population. There does not seem to be anything especially nefarious about it.”134
Croatia
96.Croatia was not much raised by witnesses despite it being an influential actor in the region. Croatia is an EU member state (since 2013) and a member of NATO (since 2009).
97.Diplomatic relations between Croatia and Serbia have been tense since the end of the wars of the 1990s. For example, both countries filed suits against one another with the International Court of Justice on charges of genocide (both of which were dismissed in 2015). In 2016, Serbia accused Croatia of preventing a chapter in their EU accession process being opened. Despite some periods of improved relations, such as Croatian President, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, attending Serbian President Vučić’s inauguration, relations remain difficult. President Vučić has postponed indefinitely his scheduled trip to Croatia citing a lack of mutual trust between the nations and Croatia has objected to the erection in Belgrade of a statute of Milan Tepic (a Serb soldier who blew himself up in an ammunition warehouse in Croatia during the war in 1991, killing 11 Croatian soldiers).
98.Croatia’s influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also significant. Croatia has a policy of allowing any Croats who are citizens of other countries to claim Croatian citizenship, thus giving them access to the rest of the EU. In Bosnia and Herzegovina 15% of the population are Croat135 and two of the cantons of the Federation which border Croatia, Livno and West Herzegovina, have Croat majority populations (see Figure 3 in Appendix 4).
99.General Sir Michael Rose said that if the Entity of Republika Srpska were to vote for independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina, “We would end up with the Croatian element moving across and joining Croatia, and Europe having to sustain a tiny, unworkable Muslim state in the middle”—something he described as “unthinkable”.136
100.In his 2017 report to the Secretary-General of the UN, the High Representative, Dr Valentin Inzko, referred to Croat politicians advocating reorganising the country along ethnic lines, including the creation of a Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna.137 The issue of self-rule for the Bosnian Croats has resurfaced several times since the signing of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. Some Bosnian Croat politicians have sought to make a case for a Croat-majority ‘third entity’ within Bosnia. Dragan Čović, the president of the HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has argued that the current two-entity system means that Bosnian Croats are deprived of their basic rights and subject to assimilation within the Federation (one of Bosnia’s two entities).
101.Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović has also caused controversy in Bosnia and Herzegovina by claiming that thousands of Islamist fighters were returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina from Iraq and Syria. Marko Prelec described such statements as part of “a long and well-documented history of exaggerating, if not inventing, an Islamic threat”.138 He saw such activity from Croatia as being driven by the fact that Bosnian Croats were eligible to vote in Croatia elections.
102.The countries discussed all have different interests in the region and different ways of pursuing them. Any involvement in the region which undermines progress towards stability, security, good governance and prosperity should be of concern to the UK. Post-Brexit the UK must work closely with international partners to ensure as little space as possible is provided for others to act against those objectives.
103.Russia’s influence in the region is a factor of particular concern. Its effect has been to slow progress towards good governance and the region emerging as fully democratic. While the extent of Russian interference might still be a matter of debate, the potential for it destabilising the region should not be underestimated.
100 Ibid.
106 See Appendix 6
110 This is a Chinese initiative to build networks of infrastructure and financial cooperation connecting China to markets around the world.
111 The 16 countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
128 Ibid.
135 CIA, ‘World Factbook’: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html [accessed 29 November 2017]
137 Office of the High Representative, 52nd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the UN: (11 June 2017): http://www.ohr.int/?p=98165#_edn1 [accessed 28 November 2017]