224.Within this chapter we consider the impact that the Commission for Rural Communities (CRC) had during its operation, and the situation since its closure. We also reflect on the operation and closures of other bodies in recent years, consider rural policy in the current climate and provide an assessment of the extent to which ‘rural proofing’ is embedded within policy making.
225.Before discussing rural communities in detail, it is important to recognise the difference between ‘rural policy’ and ‘rural proofing’. In our estimation, rural policy can be taken to encompass those policies that affect non-land based aspects of rural life. Relevant policy areas would include communities (including market towns and villages); social exclusion and deprivation, transport, housing and, above all, the provision of support to the non-land based economy, which represents over 90% of the total rural economy.243
226.On the other hand, rural proofing is essentially “considering the likely impact of policy decisions on rural areas, and, where necessary, adjusting the policy to take into account the particular needs of those who live in, work in, or enjoy the countryside”.244 Rural proofing mostly involves those policies that have no specific geographic focus but have major rural impacts—education, health, welfare, industrial strategy, justice and even taxation.
227.A 2017 Defra report on rural proofing stated that: “Rural proofing aims to understand the impacts of government policy intervention and to ensure fair and equitable policy outcomes for rural areas. Rural proofing is about finding the best ways to deliver policies in rural areas. This could mean that implementation might need to be designed and delivered differently compared to urban areas. It is possible to overcome undesirable policy impacts in rural areas by designing and delivering proportionate solutions.”245 The OECD’s Rural Policy Review of England in 2011 argued that a rural policy which expects rural communities’ needs to be met by mainstream policies of numerous ministries can only work if “consideration of rural needs and concerns take place early and at all stages of policy development through the use of rural-proofing”.246
228.The term ‘rural proofing’ was first adopted by the Government in 2000, in the rural White Paper ‘Our Countryside: the future, a fair deal for rural England’.247
229.The CRC was formally established on 1 October 2006 following the enactment of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006.248 Funded by Government, its aim was to ensure that “policies, programmes and decisions take proper account of the circumstances of rural communities”,249 having particular regard to people suffering from social disadvantage and areas suffering from economic underperformance.
230.Part One of the NERC Act set out the remit of the CRC, which can be broadly described as follows:
231.These three functions enabled the Commission to act as a voice for rural communities. Its role as an advocate ensured rural issues were well represented before Parliament and Government, with the Chair of the CRC reporting directly to the Prime Minister, while its role as adviser ensured a degree of commitment to rural proofing by advising how policy formation and delivery could work as well for rural areas as they did for urban. Much of the CRC’s role as adviser was delivered through its up-to-date, detailed reporting on the rural economy, through its ‘State of the Countryside’ reports and through ad hoc in-depth research either commissioned by Defra or launched on its own initiative.
232.Finally, its role as watchdog enabled a longer-term view, through monitoring of the way in which policies were developed, adopted and implemented and the extent to which these policies were meeting rural needs. The CRC was able to warn Government departments and other public bodies when their policies were failing rural communities, although it did not have any enforcement or regulatory powers.
233.As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, the CRC was closed in April 2013; the abolition of the Commission had originally been announced in June 2010. The 2010 announcement led to a clear winding down in the Commission’s operations. Upon initiation, the CRC’s annual budget was over £9 million; this declined to £6 million in 2010/11 and £500,000 in 2011/12 and 2012/13, once plans for its abolition had been formalised.251 During its six and a half years of operation, the Commission spent £37.4m252 executing the three core functions listed above. By way of comparison, at its peak the budget of the Countryside Agency (the predecessor body to the CRC) was over £110m.253 It should be noted that the CRC, in contrast to the Countryside Agency, had no delivery powers. In accordance with Lord Haskins’ review, the responsibility for delivery was passed to the RDAs.
234.The view taken in 2010 was that the CRC’s functions were primarily concerned with informing and advising on policy, and that policy advice would be best placed within Government departments. Indeed, following the Commission’s closure, the Government established the RCPU within Defra to oversee rural policy and “operate as a centre of rural expertise, supporting and co-ordinating activity within and beyond Defra”.254 The RCPU was also intended to ensure that all Government departments were effectively rural proofing policies before decisions were made. The RCPU’s initial work following the CRC’s abolition was scrutinised by the House of Commons EFRA Committee.255
235.Many witnesses bemoaned the loss of the Commission. Graham Biggs MBE, Chief Executive of the Rural Services Network, told us that “you do not realise how good they are until they have gone”, going on to state that “there is no doubt in my mind that it did some very good and original work”.256 The former Chairman of the Commission, Dr Stuart Burgess CBE, told the Committee that “the most important of the CRC’s achievements was that it gave a rural voice to almost 12 million people living in rural England”.257
236.In particular, it is clear that the qualitative and quantitative research conducted by the CRC was carried out to a high standard and, subsequently, has been sorely missed.258 The Commission was known for its ‘State of the Countryside’ reports, which described the “condition of rural England through the latest available facts and figures”.259 Many witnesses spoke highly of the reports, describing them as helpful, and an essential source of rich and granular data.260 Their more specific research was also praised. The Commission reported on many issues ranging from rural broadband through to rural social housing. The Tenant Farmers Association suggested that the 2010 uplands report was one of the best pieces of work that the CRC conducted—the report received considerable praise for its breadth of engagement with rural people and its consequent reflection of their thoughts, aspirations and concerns.261
237.The research work produced by the Commission has not been matched since it was abolished. We heard that the CRC’s closure had “led to a vacuum in the commissioning and provision of independent research”262, while Rural England CIC suggested that there is now a “real dearth of exploratory research, which seeks to understand the rural implications of social and economic trends or the rural implications of public policy developments”.263
238.Dr Burgess stressed that since the CRC’s closure, emphasis on social and economic issues and the needs of the countryside was lacking, suggesting that many rural needs and concerns had been side-lined; he felt that research and analysis commissioned by Defra was being driven by political priorities and lacked the independence embodied by the Commission.264
239.Defra told us that, as a department, they do not commission extensive amounts of research. They went on to say that they do, however, analyse data and research published from independent sources.265 This was regarded as disappointing by one witness, who argued that reviewing existing evidence was not the same as Defra commissioning its own research.266
240.This predominant theme of rural research, data and insight being diminished since the abolition of the CRC was echoed throughout the inquiry by a number of witnesses. Hastoe Housing Association, for example, told us that the amount of delivery of affordable housing in rural areas is now unknown, because communities with a population of less than 3,000 are not monitored.267 This position was confirmed in a response to a Parliamentary question for written answer asked by the Bishop of St Albans in September 2017.268
241.Hastoe went on to emphasise the importance of data collection: “We need to collect data for rural communities. Not having data is not helpful”.269 This echoes an important point made by the OECD in its review of rural policy in England; effective rural-proofing requires data, information and analyses that are relevant and accurate at the lowest possible geographic level, and that are accessible and affordable to the public.270
242.An additional strength of the CRC, we were told, was its role as an advocate for rural communities. Its work in this area was regarded as valuable and was again emphasised by a feeling among witnesses that it was not being replicated since its demise. A number of witnesses missed the CRC’s ability to unite the patchwork of voices coming from different parts of rural society and speak to power with one voice, particularly with regard to the social and economic needs of the countryside.271
243.We heard that, since the closure of the CRC, the advocacy role had fallen back onto the voluntary sector. A number of bodies are now trying to fill the gap, but they are either under resourced or relying heavily on voluntary input from members. We were told that this meant the rural position was not being expressed in a co-ordinated way and, consequently, was being diminished, overlooked, and often undervalued.272 Additionally, these bodies are hampered in their ability to paint an accurate picture of rural life because of the aforementioned lack of deep, wide data on rural issues since the closure of the CRC.273
244.All this, we were told, was translating into a more urban focus on policy and potentially less of a voice for those in rural areas.274 The example of broadband was given more than once: “There is an urban metric used to understand the provision of broadband, and you need a rural voice in there to understand it”.275
245.One solution proposed by several witnesses was for the Government to commission and pay for evidence from Britain’s universities.276 This, they argued, would have the benefit of being both expert and independent, although it would not resolve the issue of the agenda being determined by the Government, and the related issue of such research being available in the public domain.
246.Although the CRC’s core functions of ‘advocate’ and ‘expert adviser’ were widely praised, we heard less praise for its third function as ‘independent watchdog’. There was a general agreement that because the Commission was only able to ‘warn’ government departments and public bodies, rather than enforce, it lacked power when seeking to implement some of its conclusions. We were told that the CRC lacked teeth,277 while the Commission’s former Chairman suggested that it would have been helpful to have the power to deliver more.278 These views were reinforced by the Countryside Alliance, who explained that the Commission did not have the power to hold government to account, adding that there was no duty on any department to consult with the CRC over the development of rural policy.279
247.The Commission for Rural Communities lacked the teeth and powers to perform a watchdog role on behalf of rural communities. The Commission did, however, play an important part in ensuring that the Government, other public authorities, and Parliament, had access to detailed and unbiased research on rural communities, informed opinion as to the potential impact of policies, and independent insight into their needs. The loss of the Commission has diminished the Government’s understanding of rural society, rural economies and rural communities, and the ability of Parliament and others to hold the Government to account.
248.Of particular concern is the loss of the CRC’s independent research capacity. The State of the Countryside reports, and other CRC research, provided a level of granularity, detail and understanding which is not being matched currently. We have consistently heard that this lack of detailed data makes it harder for the Government to design and implement policies that work for rural areas. It also makes it particularly difficult to monitor the impact of any such policies.
249.The Government should be setting the agenda for the undertaking of research and data collection that can support the development, implementation and evaluation of rural policy. This is not happening at present. We recommend that the Government should produce a statement of priorities for rural research and understanding, focused upon the social and economic needs of rural communities, and should then commission new research accordingly. The statement of priorities should be assessed and revised on a regular basis.
250.As mentioned in Chapter 1, section 26 of the NERC Act provided for some of the functions of the former Countryside Agency (which was abolished by the same Act) to be transferred to the RDAs. Dividing England into nine regions, eight of these non-departmental public bodies had been established following the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, with a ninth London Development Agency following in July 2000.280 The RDAs were intended to promote economic development and regeneration, and worked in partnership with local authorities, businesses and others. Section 4 of the 1998 Act made clear that the purposes of the RDAs applied in equal measure to both the urban and rural parts of each region.281
251.The NERC Act therefore allowed for social and economic development schemes previously run by the Countryside Agency, such as the Market Towns Initiative and the Vital Villages programme, to be transferred and continued by the RDAs. This allowed a degree of continuity but, more importantly, ensured a continued focus on the economies of rural areas that spread beyond the usual areas of agriculture and farming.
252.However, the RDAs have also now been closed down, with this decision taking effect on 31 March 2012.282 Some of the broad functions of the RDAs have been replaced by new Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), but these lack the resources, capacity, and geographical scope of their predecessors, and also tend to have a largely urban focus. While there are certain commonalities between urban and rural economies, the context within which they operate is distinct, and specific rural circumstances do need to be accounted for in the interests of economic development. These commonly include a lack of reliable broadband, lack of transport connectivity, housing issues, skills shortages and problems accessing training.
253.We were told that the universal coverage provided by the RDAs was much missed,283 and that the RDAs had achieved a fairer balance between urban and rural interests than is now found among the LEPs.284 The CLA noted that the RDAs’ effectiveness was boosted by being public bodies with actual staff, unlike the LEPs which are primarily driven by volunteers from important local industries alongside local authority representatives.285
254.The loss of the RDAs (and the CRC) is compounded still further by the abolition, in April 2015, of the Defra Rural Communities Policy Unit. This team of staff was intended to support Ministers in leading rural policy from within the department. The overall picture is one of an ever-decreasing focus upon, and capacity to support, the needs of rural communities. Staff and resources were initially lost in the transition from the Countryside Agency to the CRC; this resource was diminished still further when the CRC was abolished and the RCPU took on some of its mantle. At the same time, the economic development and regeneration capacity of the RDAs was lost, and the RCPU has subsequently been abolished too. Rural communities have not been well served by these changes.
255.While the name of the Act is the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, most of the Act’s provisions pertaining to rural communities have been annulled with the dissolution of the Commission for Rural Communities, and the abolition of the Regional Development Agencies. This has had a profound negative impact upon the way in which the Government handles rural needs but, equally importantly, has diminished the focus on the economic potential of rural areas and the level of support available to deliver that potential. The closure of the Rural Communities Policy Unit compounds the situation. Our remaining recommendations on these matters will, we believe, help to address this unfortunate situation.
256.As mentioned above, the demise of the CRC, RDAs, RCPU and various predecessor bodies has led to rural policy today being almost exclusively handled within Government by Defra. The four priorities set out in the Defra Strategy for the period to 2020 include: “A rural economy that works for everyone contributing to national productivity, prosperity and wellbeing”.286
257.In seeking to deliver against this priority Defra acts as the key representative for rural interests across Government. Much of this work is channelled through the Minister for Rural Affairs, who also holds the title of Rural Ambassador. Additionally, Defra provides funding to support Action for Communities in Rural England (ACRE), and its network of 38 Rural Community Councils. Defra also funds rural development through the Rural Development Programme for England (part of the Common Agricultural Policy), which provides financial support for farming and forestry, environmental improvements and economic development. £3.5 billion has been allocated to the Programme for the period from 2014–2020,287 the vast majority of which is directed towards farming and the environment, rather than to broader rural economies and communities.
258.The Secretary of State told us that the department had a total of 64 staff in rural teams, with 25 of those in the Defra rural policy team, five in planning and housing and 34 working on the Rural Development Programme for England.288
259.We were told that the resources of Defra were consumed with agriculture and environmental policy, and that the department had never really taken to the rural affairs element of its remit.289 This echoed a view consistently put to us, which was that rural affairs was often taken to mean “farming and land management”, both within and beyond Government.290 This interpretation of rural affairs is unfortunately mistaken, given the relatively limited role now played by agriculture within the wider rural economy. The agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors accounted for just 7.5% of rural employment in 2016/17; the same sectors also represent only 2% of GVA291 in predominantly rural parts of England.292
260.Jeremy Leggett, a Trustee of ACRE, suggested that successive Secretaries of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs had not made rural affairs a priority over many years.293 This is not a new concern; a 2007 article in Sustainable Development noted that the establishment of Defra was intended to be a “new departure in the Government’s treatment of rural policy”, with rural affairs as a central pillar among the priorities of the new department.294 In reality, however, Defra’s policy agenda had become increasingly centred on environmental sustainability and “where rural affairs and rural development were once envisaged in a central and integrating role within the new department, they have effectively been marginalized by stronger policy agendas around climate change and sustainable development”.295
261.Lord Haskins expanded upon this history of organisational tension, telling us that “Defra as an organisation was put together in the middle of the night after a general election without any thought at all to its strategic purpose”.296 He went on to suggest that the department was a “hybrid”, and that this caused significant difficulties:
“Defra’s problem is that it has to try to reconcile what are essentially tense relationships. Elsewhere in Whitehall you separate them, and they fight. MAFF was the farmers’ body. I am not saying that we should go back to MAFF at all, but the Defra agenda is too complicated”.297
262.ACRE explained that the changes brought about by the creation of Defra had actually broken the links between rural communities and central Government oversight of the local authorities tasked with delivering many key services to those communities:
“The government created the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and moved some of the old Department of the Environment’s sections into it, also placing the new Countryside Agency under its wing. The break between Government’s oversight of local government and its policy towards rural communities was made at this point. This limited the inter-relationships over rural policy and government’s mainstream tasking of local government … All of government’s policy towards rural areas—the natural environment, farming, plant and animal health, water, marine issues and flooding—now came either directly or indirectly under DEFRA. The remaining rural remit of the RDC, that which had been moved into the Countryside Agency, was probably better resourced than ever before, but with limited policy influence alongside the land-based priorities of DEFRA”.298
263.A number of witnesses told us that Defra currently had insufficient resources available to take the lead on rural policy, and that staffing numbers had diminished over time.299 Hastoe Housing Association told us:
“The closure of the Commission for Rural Communities and the introduction of a greatly reduced successor, the Rural Communities Policy Unit and its successor (Defra’s Rural Policy team), and the large cuts to Defra’s overall budget (30% from 2010 to 2015 with another 30% cut from 2015 to 2020), have all combined to leave rural businesses, organisations and communities without both a strong government department to advocate for them, and the vital independent policy and research underpinning that is necessary to inform decision-making and achieve real policy change”.300
In a similar vein, Lincolnshire Wildlife Trust suggested that the limited resources available to the rural policy team meant that any focus on rural policy issues within Government was lost within a wider emphasis on the urban growth agenda.301
264.This loss of resources and diminution of focus comes at a time when rural communities are facing real social and economic challenges. These challenges were borne out by the report of the Social Mobility Commission, published in November 2017, which found that social and economic opportunities were limited in a large number of rural areas: “Some of the worst-performing areas, such as Weymouth and Portland, and Allerdale, are rural, not urban; while some are also in relatively affluent parts of England—places like West Berkshire, Cotswold and Crawley”.302
The Commission went on to conclude:
“ … the new social mobility coldspots in our country are concentrated in remote rural or coastal areas and in former industrial areas … Perhaps unsurprisingly only 13 per cent of disadvantaged young people in former industrial areas and 14 per cent in remote rural coldspots progress to university compared with 27 per cent in hotspots. Many of these places combine poor educational outcomes for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds with weak labour markets that have a greater share of low-skilled, low-paid employment than elsewhere in England … Remote rural and coastal areas also suffer from poor connectivity by transport, restricting opportunities still further”.303
265.It is clear, overall, that rural affairs has not been a central pillar among the priorities of Defra thus far and that, since the creation of the department, focus has intensified still further on the agriculture and environmental aspects of its remit, at the expense of the rural economy and rural communities. We considered how the machinery of Government might be adjusted in order to address this situation, but first considered the potential for Defra itself to give greater attention to the wider needs of rural communities.
266.The creation of Defra, with “rural affairs” specified within the name of a key central Government department, should have given added weight to rural policy and delivered greater alignment between policies towards agriculture, the environment and the wider rural economy. In 2002 the then Government explained how this structural change was intended to “elevate” rural policy:
“A fundamental difference in the way the Government approached the delivery of rural economic and social policy was signalled by the creation of Defra, one of whose central pillars is the whole rural affairs agenda. This elevation of rural policy, with the first Government Minister for Rural Affairs, reflects the fact—confirmed by the FMD experience—that the rural economy is not a synonym for agriculture, but is now a complex mixed economy in which food production, tourism and recreation, and public and private services are all important strands”.304
267.The current Secretary of State told us why Defra was presently well suited to take the lead on rural policy within Government:
“First, every organisation that has a care for what happens in rural areas is an organisation we are more likely to talk to than other government departments at any given point. If it is the NFU, the CLA, the RSPB, those responsible for our national parks or those responsible for ensuring that in rural areas there is appropriate employment in a variety of sectors, they are likely to be people we are talking to”.305
The Rural Ambassador expanded upon this point:
“I am having meetings on well-being and vulnerability with the Rural Coalition, the Rural Services Network, the Association of Convenience Stores and the chief executive of the Post Office. In my view, that is where you get the infrastructure of rural life … there is an interconnection between food, farming and agriculture, as a backbone, and rural communities and the social services, such as health and education, with good, improving schools, that they require to have a good and prosperous life. I believe that Defra has a locus in all those things, because they need to be mainstreamed”.306
268.The work of the Rural Ambassador and the extensive engagement that he has undertaken with stakeholder groups was reflected in some of our evidence. The CLA told us that they were supportive of the current arrangements, with the Rural Ambassador being supported by a “reasonably well structured and funded team”.307 They also suggested that Defra was now engaging in a much more co-ordinated and effective manner than was the case previously.308
269.We agree that the current Rural Ambassador, alongside the Secretary of State, has shown an encouraging new focus on rural policy and a willingness to engage with stakeholders on those matters affecting rural society and the rural economy. Experience since the creation of Defra, however, has demonstrated that over time the department collectively has lacked the ability to confront the issues facing rural communities.
270.This ability will be constrained still further by the changes brought about by the departure of the UK from the EU. Agriculture, farming and the environment are all policy areas that will be affected significantly by Brexit, and we were told that this presented the risk of a further reduction in resources for wider rural policy within Defra.309 Community First Yorkshire expressed concern that the Referendum result would unduly distract Defra from other ongoing priorities for rural communities.310 A report published by the National Audit Office in December 2017 went some way towards confirming this, stating that: “Defra has de-prioritised work in some areas to accommodate EU exit activity” and confirming that “Defra is under significant strain”.311
271.Since our evidence taking concluded Defra has published a new consultation paper entitled Health and Harmony: The future for food, farming and the environment in a Green Brexit.312 The document sets out the Government’s vision for the future of farming after the UK leaves the EU but, apart from some concern for rural resilience in the uplands, there is little mention of rural communities and certainly no future vision akin to those now provided for farming and environment.
272.Taken together, these issues suggest that responsibility for rural policy would best be handled elsewhere within Government. Action with Communities in Rural England summarised the situation effectively:
“Despite the best efforts of a number of Ministers and senior officials since DEFRA’s creation, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the responsibility for a broadly based policy towards rural areas, rural people, communities and businesses needs to lie elsewhere in government. It needs to be located somewhere where its real, cross-cutting, nature can be better and more powerfully exercised”.313
273.The clear majority of our evidence supported this view. While we believe that the current Secretary of State and Rural Ambassador have been proactive in improving engagement with stakeholders in rural communities it is evident that, on balance, the rural affairs element of the departmental remit has been neglected over time. In conclusion, we believe that rural affairs has been ‘lost’ within the wider departmental focus upon agriculture, the environment, food and farming. We therefore gave careful consideration to how the rural affairs brief might best be handled within Government.
274.A number of witnesses suggested that the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) should take on greater responsibility for rural policy.314 We note, in this context, that predecessor departments to MHCLG used to have this responsibility and that, when in existence, the Countryside Agency reported to the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions.315 Additionally, local authorities are responsible for delivery of many of the essential public services that support rural vitality and the rural economy. This suggests that the Government department responsible for providing oversight to local government should have a key role to play.
275.The Landscape Institute argued that giving MHCLG responsibility for rural affairs would allow Defra to focus on the environment and sustainable food production; they went on to note that MHCLG was the lead body for sustainable development and, as such, would be well placed to deliver for rural communities.316 The potential for local authorities to take on and deliver a greater role in rural development was also highlighted, and it was suggested that moving the brief to MHCLG would be a good idea in this context.317
276.The Town and Country Planning Association noted that wider rural policy matters related more closely to the responsibilities of this department, particularly when issues such as housing, planning and service delivery were under consideration. They proposed the creation of a new Rural Policy Unit, to be placed either within the Cabinet Office or MHCLG, whose responsibilities would include developing national rural policy in the context of wider strategic policies.318 The rural economy, rural communities, rural development planning and social deprivation could, in our view, all feature within such a unit.
277.Some argued that MHCLG was the best home since communities and local development form core parts of the MHCLG remit. President of the Landscape Institute, Merrick Denton-Thompson OBE, questioned the logic of treating rural communities as fundamentally different to others:
“Why would you treat one part of society differently from another, and are you not missing a trick if you do not see the whole of society as one target audience? It is the responsible public-sector approach to ensure that the opportunities are there for everybody … It therefore seemed right and proper to us that [MHCLG] have the responsibility for rural affairs and that Defra should concentrate very much on the priorities of sustainable food production and the environment, because we think that is a challenge enough”.319
278.Although arguments were made to leave the responsibility for rural policy with Defra we support the view that it should be transferred from Defra to the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, leaving Defra free to concentrate upon its extensive farming, food and environmental remit in the face of the Brexit challenge. Rural communities should be treated in a manner consistent with the approach taken towards urban communities; the challenges facing rural housing delivery, for example, are equal to those being experienced in urban areas, and MHCLG should be giving consistent attention to these matters.
279.Responsibility for rural policy and rural communities does not sit well within Defra, with the department being predominantly focused upon the important environment, agriculture and food elements of its remit. This focus will intensify as a result of Brexit. We therefore recommend that responsibility for rural affairs should be transferred from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. This change would ensure that responsibility for rural communities sits within the central Government department that is responsible for communities as a whole as, indeed, it did prior to the creation of Defra. It would also ensure that the responsibility rested in the department which oversees local authorities, who are the key delivery agents for most services to rural communities.
280.A number of witnesses drew attention to specific challenges in the rural context, including significant infrastructure and spatial differences between urban and rural areas. These included “dispersed housing settlements, ageing or overloaded infrastructure networks and the need to maintain close links with urban neighbours and global trade routes”.320 These challenges can have an impact upon the quality of life of rural residents but, additionally, can limit the potential for growth and development in the rural economy.
281.Sparsity can be an important factor to consider when assessing the impacts of policy upon rural communities and businesses. The CLA highlighted the increased costs that can result from delivering services to more sparsely populated areas, and suggested that departments outside Defra were unwilling to incur the cost of providing equivalent levels of services to those provided in urban areas.321 They suggested that part of the challenge of rural proofing was the need to persuade Government departments that extra expenditure was required to secure universal services in rural areas.322
282.As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the Government has offered the following definition of rural proofing: “Rural proofing aims to understand the impacts of government policy intervention and to ensure fair and equitable policy outcomes for rural areas. Rural proofing is about finding the best ways to deliver policies in rural areas”.323
283.Defra told us that their role was to champion rural proofing and support departments across government, in order that policies can take account of specific challenges and opportunities for rural business and communities, and that those who live, work and travel in rural areas are not disadvantaged.324 They went on to set out a range of actions that they had taken in recent years to embed rural proofing across Government. These included:
The Rural Ambassador told us that there was a “strong drive” to ensure that rural proofing occurred at the beginning of policy processes, and that Defra worked collaboratively with other departments to seek to ensure that specific aspects of rural life and communities, such as sparsity, were accounted for properly.326
284.While many acknowledged Defra’s work in the area, and in particular the work of the Rural Ambassador,327 we were told that the various attempts to address the demand for rural proofing had been unfocused and unsuccessful. Trevor Cherrett, TCPA Policy Council Member, argued that stakeholders were “forever trying to persuade Government to take rural into account”, going on to state:
“Why would rural not be taken into account if it is 20% to 25% of the population and 80% of the land? Why do organs of government, departments and so on, not take it fully into account? We have seen a period of trying to make them take it into account through rural proofing and setting up commissions and bodies and so on. It has worked very patchily. Breaking that down into why is another big matter. It has been a real struggle, and I think it has got worse”.328
285.This view was representative of our wider evidence on rural proofing. A key issue was that rural proofing, where it happened at all, was taking place too late in the policy-making process.329 The Government’s rural proofing guidance, for example, sets out a four-stage process with no requirement to consult rural stakeholders until stage four,330 by which time urban based policymakers may already have built in features that had negative effects for rural areas. Box 2 sets out a brief case study on housing policy, highlighting two policy changes that have had particularly negative impacts for rural communities.
Rural Exception Sites Rural exception sites are small rural sites which would not otherwise be used for housing, sold by landowners at low cost to enable the construction of affordable housing in perpetuity for the local community. We heard that the delivery of housing on such sites has been jeopardised by the introduction of a “right to buy” for housing association tenants. Although currently voluntary, this policy overrides the exception site requirement that housing should be affordable in perpetuity. CPRE told us that evidence suggested that the extension of the voluntary right to buy to housing association tenants was causing landowners to hold back land that they otherwise might provide for rural affordable housing, on the basis that housing brought forward may not remain affordable for the longer term. Hastoe Housing Association informed us that: “Landowners who had made land available at below market value were angry that others might benefit financially from their generosity and many were withdrawing from new affordable schemes”. They argued that a proper, independent rural proofing process would have identified this unintended effect on rural communities “and could have challenged the Government to require changes to the voluntary agreement—for example, by recommending a clear exemption for rural communities.” Affordable housing thresholds Most housing developments are subject to local authority planning policies requiring direct provision of, or contributions towards, new affordable housing as a condition of planning permission. In 2016, the Government amended national planning guidance to prohibit affordable housing requirements for new developments of 10 units or fewer. |
This has had a particular impact in rural areas where new housing is dominated by smaller sites, which have typically provided over 60% of new affordable housing. The policy change has contributed to a situation where, according to CPRE, 16.8% of new rural homes are classified as affordable—less than half the figure in 2012. The threshold policy was described to us by Graham Biggs as “devastating to rural areas” and “a prime example of rural interests not being consulted early enough”. Trevor Cherrett argued that the change in policy was “a disaster for rural areas”, going on to suggest that “either somebody somewhere decided that supporting developers was so important that they overrode it, or they misplaced it—they did not think of the rural implications”. |
Sources: Written evidence from Hastoe Housing Association (NER0067), CPRE (NER0083), Q 132 (Graham Biggs MBE), Q 103 (Trevor Cherrett)
286.The urban background of policymakers, and a lack of understanding of rural communities in Whitehall, was highlighted as a consistent issue. We were told that “policymakers tend to think that rural communities are like urban communities but a bit smaller”,331 while the Chair of the Rural Coalition suggested that “policymakers were, on the whole, embedded in London and are very urban-centric”.332 She went on to state:
“Quite a lot of the people who are developing these policies—with the best will in the world—think of rural as farming, horticulture and environment. That is what they see. And they see the drivers of the economy as large businesses, whereas that is not always the case”.333
287.The lack of monitoring or follow-up is another reason for the failure of rural proofing. Rural proofing would work best in a context where its implementation is monitored and reported upon; we were told that “when it is known that rural proofing is an expectation, it is likely to happen”.334 However, there is currently no regular, external monitoring of rural proofing by Whitehall,335 and no enforcement measures or sanctions are applied should rural proofing fail to take place.
288.In addition, we heard that there was a view within Government that Defra dealt with “rural” matters, limiting the engagement required of other departments.336 Notwithstanding this, it was also noted that Defra had themselves been guilty of a failure to rural proof. Dr Nigel Stone told us:
“As for rural proofing, I am going to be a bit unkind to Defra here, but they did not even do it themselves. They went to ‘digital by default’ in terms of service delivery before most other departments, when most of their customers do not have broadband, a mobile signal or even much prospect of getting it”.337
289.The current structures of policy making are not, therefore, well suited to rural proofing. Rural proofing does not happen often enough; when it does, it is often too late in the policy process. There is limited monitoring or follow-up, which diminishes the emphasis placed on rural proofing. There are also examples—not limited to those presented above—of major policy changes that have had significant negative implications for rural communities. These represent a failure of rural proofing.
290.We considered possible solutions to this issue. ACRE and the TCPA both argued for the creation of a rural policy unit within the Cabinet Office which would take on responsibility for rural policy generally, and which would become the lead department for rural proofing across Government.338
291.We have already set out, earlier in this chapter, our belief that responsibility for specific rural policy should rest with MHCLG. Rural proofing, however, is not the same as rural policy, and needs to have wider application across Government. We see no reason why each and every Government department should not be required to think about the ways in which their policies affect rural people. For this reason, we believe that the Cabinet Office, sitting at the centre of Government, should take on greater responsibility for rural proofing.
292.This view was favoured by a majority—but not all—of our witnesses. The Countryside Alliance told us that embedding rural proofing within the Cabinet Office would give rural needs a greater prominence within Government than they enjoyed in the days of the CRC:
“It seems to us that the only place you can have a proper view of policy development across all departments is in the Cabinet Office … This role could sit in the Cabinet Office with a full view of policy development across the range of government and with the ability to influence that and point out to all departments that are developing policies … that may have a differential impact of rural communities. It should also head off any necessity for Secretaries of State to intervene very late in the policy process. We would like to give rural communities that independent champion, sitting within the department and the place where policy is being developed, so they can have an impact. Whatever we say about the CRC, it was not in that place, and it could not have that view”.339
293.The NFU told us that they supported this view.340 Wider support came from the District Councils Network and the County Councils Network (CCN), who suggested that the Cabinet Office has the required ability to influence at the centre of Government.341 The CCN went on to state:
“What we are trying to say is that rural England, rural communities and the people who live there, deserve to have their voice heard at the centre of government. If you are looking for the centre of government, the eye will often land on the Cabinet Office”.342
294.In a similar vein, the Rural Services Network argued that the Cabinet Office would be well placed to take on rural proofing, given its presence at the heart of Government and its ability to influence other departments and shape their output.343
295.The delivery of services can be challenging—and sometimes more expensive—in rural areas as a result of population sparsity and more limited infrastructure. Policy changes by Government departments that fail to account for these challenges can have negative impacts for rural people.
296.Each and every Government department should be seeking to take account of the circumstances facing rural communities when developing policy. At present, the responsibility for promoting rural proofing across Government rests with Defra, but Defra does not have the cross-Government influence or capacity required to embed rural proofing more widely.
297.Rural proofing should be driven and promoted from the centre of Government and, as such, it is vital that the Cabinet Office takes the lead. We therefore recommend that responsibility for promoting and embedding rural proofing across all Government departments should be clearly assigned to the Cabinet Office, within a single purpose unit with the necessary resources and breadth of experience required to exert influence on all departments.
298.Additionally, we recommend that the Government should establish a mechanism by which departments report, to the Cabinet Office, on the actions that they have taken to ensure that rural proofing takes place. The Government should revise and strengthen its rural proofing guidance, in order to facilitate much earlier engagement with rural communities and their representatives. The revised guidance should then be promoted properly, with workshops used to raise awareness across and beyond Whitehall.
243 Defra, Statistical Digest for Rural England (February 2018), pp 52–67: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/682889/02_Statistical_Digest_of_Rural_England_2018_February_edition.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
244 OECD, ‘OECD Rural Policy Reviews: England, United Kingdom 2011’ (January 2011), p 120: https://www.keepeek.com//Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/urban-rural-and-regional-development/oecd-rural-policy-reviews-england-united-kingdom-2010_9789264094444-en#page111 [accessed 13 March 2018]
245 Defra, Practical guidance to assess impacts of policies on rural areas (March 2017): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/600450/rural-proofing-guidance.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
246 OECD, ‘OECD Rural Policy Reviews: England, United Kingdom 2011’ (January 2011), p 108: https://www.keepeek.com//Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/urban-rural-and-regional-development/oecd-rural-policy-reviews-england-united-kingdom-2010_9789264094444-en#page111 [accessed 13 March 2018]
247 Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, Our Countryside: the future, a fair deal for rural England CM 4909, November 2000, p 158: http://www.tourisminsights.info/ONLINEPUB/DEFRA/DEFRA%20PDFS/RURAL%20WHITE%20PAPER%20-%20FULL%20REPORT.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
248 Commission for Rural Communities, ‘About us’: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110303155316/http://ruralcommunities.gov.uk/about/ [accessed 13 March 2018]
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 SQW, Ex-post evaluation of the CRC: Report to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (December 2014), p 33: http://www.sqw.co.uk/files/3214/5055/3302/CRC_Report.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
252 Ibid.
253 Countryside Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2004/5 (19 July 2005): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235206/0374.pdf. [accessed 13 March 2018] It is important to note, though, that some of the functions delivered by the Countryside Agency were subsequently taken on by Natural England, rather than the CRC.
254 HC Deb, 1 April 2011, cols 41–42WS
255 EFRA Committee, Rural Communities (2013): HC 602 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/environment-food-and-rural-affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/rural-communities/ [accessed 13 March 2018]
258 See written evidence from Rural England CIC (NER0006), Dr Gordon Morris (NER0018) and Lord Bishop of St Albans and Bishop of Hereford (NER0043)
259 Commission for Rural Communities, ‘State of the countryside 2010’: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110303181543/http://ruralcommunities.gov.uk/files/sotc/sotc2010.pdf
270 OECD, Rural Policy Reviews: England, United Kingdom 2011 (January 2011) p 182: https://www.keepeek.com//Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/urban-rural-and-regional-development/oecd-rural-policy-reviews-england-united-kingdom-2010_9789264094444-en#page111 [accessed 13 March 2018]
271 Q 18 (Dr Stuart Burgess CBE), written evidence from the Rural Coalition (NER0037), Town and Country Planning Association (NER0085)
276 See evidence from Lord Bishops of St Albans and Bishop of Hereford (NER0043), Shropshire Council (NER0055) and Rural England CIC (NER0006)
280 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Closing the RDAs (July 2012), p 12: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/34749/12-986-closing-rdas-lessons-from-transition-and-closure-programme.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
282 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Closing the RDAs (July 2012), p 5
287 Ibid.
291 Gross Value Added.
292 Defra, Statistical Digest for Rural England (February 2018) pp 52–67: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/682889/02_Statistical_Digest_of_Rural_England_2018_February_edition.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
294 Philip Lowe and Neil Ward, ‘Sustainable Rural Economies: Some lessons from the English experience’, Sustainable Development, Volume 15 (2007), p 310.
295 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
302 Social Mobility Commission, State of the Nation 2017: Social Mobility in Great Britain (November 2017): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/662744/State_of_the_Nation_2017_-_Social_Mobility_in_Great_Britain.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
303 Ibid.
304 HM Government, Response to the Reports of the Foot and Mouth Inquiries, Cm 5367 (2002), para 1.19, cited in Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, The potential of England’s rural economy (Eleventh Report, Session 2007–08, HC 544–II)
311 National Audit Office, Implementing the UK’s exit from the European Union: The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (18 December 2017), pp 18–20: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Implementing-the-UKs-exit-from-the-European-Union-the-Department-for-Environment-Food-Rural-Affairs.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
312 Defra, Health and Harmony: The future for food, farming and the environment in a Green Brexit, (February 2018): https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684003/future-farming-environment-consult-document.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
314 Note that much of this evidence was taken before the Department was renamed in January 2018; as such, the evidence usually cited the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) rather than MHCLG.
315 Subsequently, the Countryside Agency reported to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).
323 Defra, Practical guidance to assess impacts of policies on rural areas (March 2017), p 2: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/600450/rural-proofing-guidance.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]
333 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
344 Defra, Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, Cm 9473, July 2017, p 23: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/632026/nerc-act-2006-post-legislative-scrutiny-9473-print.pdf [accessed 13 March 2018]