1.The House of Lords Constitution Committee is appointed by the House “to examine the constitutional implications of public bills coming before the House; and to keep under review the operation of the constitution and constitutional aspects of devolution”. Accordingly, we conduct bill scrutiny, carry out in-depth policy inquiries and hold annual evidence sessions with holders of certain public offices closely related to the constitution.
2.The aims of our sessional reports are:
3.During the 2017–19 session we published 19 reports on bills and corresponded with ministers on a further three. We continued the largescale inquiry on the Legislative Process we began in the previous session, publishing three reports, and we completed an inquiry into Parliamentary Scrutiny of Treaties. Towards the end of the session we began an inquiry exploring the effectiveness of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. We will continue this work in the new session.
4.As part of our regular programme of scrutiny, we held evidence sessions with the Chairman of the House of Lords Appointments Commission, the Minister for the Constitution, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, and the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court.
5.In 2004 we published a report examining Parliament and the Legislative Process. In 2016 we began a follow-up inquiry to explore the development and scrutiny of legislation and how the legislative process had changed since our earlier study. In session 2017–19 we published three reports as part of this inquiry.
6.This report examined the preparation of legislation before it starts its passage through Parliament, considering issues such as policy formation in government, consultations and the use of evidence, the drafting of bills and pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills. We concluded that if policies were more rigorously prepared and consulted on this would result in better legislation being presented to Parliament. We made several recommendations including: that legislation should be easier to understand; that publishing draft bills for pre-legislative scrutiny should become a regular feature of the process; that the Government should publish the evidence from which it has based its proposals, and that if evidence is not available the Government must explain why the bill is appropriate; and that the Government should pilot new policies to ensure their effectiveness. In addition, we recommended that a Legislative Standards Committee be established to ensure that all bills are sufficiently prepared prior to being presented to Parliament.
7.We also made the case for greater consolidation of the statute book in areas where the consistent application of the law was under threat from the complexity of the existing body of law. We therefore welcomed the Government’s decision to introduce the Sentencing (Pre-consolidation Amendments) Bill, which will pave the way for a Law Commission bill to create a new sentencing code.
8.This report examined the process by which bills pass through Parliament before becoming law. We considered the effectiveness of Parliament’s scrutiny of bills, the time available for scrutiny, the information accompanying bills, and public understanding of and engagement with the legislative process.
9.We concluded that the introduction of an evidence-taking stage for bills that start in the House of Commons had strengthened Parliament’s scrutiny of bills and enabled greater public engagement with the legislative process. We found that it was unsatisfactory that no such process existed for bills starting in the House of Lords and recommended that the House of Lords take evidence on bills that start there. We also raised concerns about the Government practice of adding substantial new provisions late in the process by making amendments in the Lords and proposed that when this happens the bill should be returned to its committee stage for detailed scrutiny.
10.We observed that the quality of explanatory materials accompanying bills varied considerably and recommended that the proposed Legislative Standards Committee be given the task of scrutinising such documents for their quality and consistency.
11.This report explored the seeking of delegated powers by the Government and the scrutiny of delegated legislation by Parliament. The evidence we took for this part of the inquiry was supported by our legislative scrutiny work and that of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (DPRRC). We identified an increasing, and constitutionally unacceptable, trend for the Government to seek wide-ranging delegated powers. We concluded that, when used appropriately, delegated powers allow Parliament to focus on the important policy frameworks and decisions in primary legislation, and to leave the detail of implementation to secondary legislation, but that the Government should not seek broad or vague powers simply for convenience or flexibility. We also observed that in some cases delegated powers were sought in lieu of policy detail, making it difficult for Parliament to scrutinise the purpose of the legislation. We said that Henry VIII powers, which permit changes to primary legislation to be made by secondary legislation, were a departure from constitutional principles and that compelling justification was required for such powers. We concluded that it was difficult envisage any circumstances in which skeleton bills—which contain wide delegated powers in the absence of substantive policy—are acceptable.
12.We concluded that it was important for the Government to take more account of parliamentarians’ concerns when deficiencies in statutory instruments were identified; otherwise there was a justification in exceptional circumstances for Parliament to use its power to block such instruments from coming into force.
13.The Government responded to our three reports and a debate was held on two of them during this session.
14.Many of the bills we scrutinised in this session contained broad delegated powers. This was the case not just with the Brexit legislation, described separately below, but others. For example, the Data Protection Bill created a large number of delegated powers, including Henry VIII powers, many of which were very broad. We expressed our “considerable concern” about these powers and concluded that the Government’s desire “to future-proof legislation, both in light of Brexit and the rapidly changing nature of digital technologies, must be balanced against the need for Parliament to scrutinise and, where necessary, constrain executive power.”
15.The Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration Etc.) Bill, a private member’s bill that had the Government’s support, was effectively a skeleton bill containing Henry VIII provisions and other regulation-making powers. We shared the DPPRC’s reservations about that bill and regretted that it contributed “to the trend of normalising the inclusion of Henry VIII powers in legislation.” The broad delegated powers in the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Bill we considered were constitutionally acceptable only because of the inclusion of automatic sunset clauses.
16.As well as a broad Henry VIII power, the Space Industry Bill included a catch-all regulation-making power: such regulations could make provision generally for giving effect to the purposes of the Act. We raised concern about the implications of such a broad general power and its potential to undercut the opportunity for judicial review of ministerial decisions.
17.The Rivers Authorities and Land Drainage Bill, a private member’s bill supported by the Government, sought to enable the Secretary of State to establish new public bodies known as river authorities using delegated powers. Following the conclusion in our report on The Delegation of Powers that the creation of public bodies using delegated powers was constitutionally unacceptable, we noted that rivers authorities would be significant bodies with the power to require the raising and spending of council tax monies. The Bill also did not provide for independent scrutiny of precepts issued by rivers authorities, as is the case with similar powers exercised by Police and Crime Commissioners, and there was no mechanism by which rivers authorities would be directly accountable to council tax payers.
18.A further issue arose as the DPRRC observed that the powers in the Bill may have been designed to allow ministers to create a Somerset Rivers Authority without requiring a hybrid bill, as well as potentially establishing other rivers authorities in future. The DPRRC concluded that this was an inappropriate reason to seek delegated powers and raised concern that the Bill was “an attempt, upon flimsy grounds, to set aside the procedures which Parliament has put in place to protect the interests of citizens who would be unfairly affected by legislation.” We agreed that seeking delegated powers to circumvent the hybrid bill procedure was constitutionally inappropriate. The Bill was not passed in the 2017–19 session.
19.Parliament’s scrutiny of treaties has historically been limited, despite the impact treaties can have on the UK’s domestic policy and international obligations. The impending departure of the UK from the European Union meant that there would be more scope for the Government to negotiate treaties in areas of policy previously dealt with at EU level. We undertook an inquiry to explore the current mechanisms for treaty scrutiny, ideas for reform, and the interaction between treaty-making and devolution.
20.We concluded that the current processes for treaty scrutiny, particularly the mechanisms in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, were limited, anachronistic and flawed. To address these shortcomings we recommended that House establish a new treaty scrutiny committee to sift all treaties, identify which required further scrutiny and draw them to the attention of both Houses. We also recommended that the Government should provide timely information and updates about treaties to such a committee and commit to allowing sufficient time for scrutiny and debate where required. Additionally, treaty-making after the UK leaves the EU is complicated by the expanded competence of the devolved institutions, which in a range of policy areas is shared and overlaps with the UK Parliament. As we have recommended previously, strengthening intergovernmental mechanisms would help ensure that the devolved competences are respected. We also recommended that, where appropriate, including representatives from the devolved institutions in the UK Government’s team in future treaty negotiations would respect the devolution settlements and ensure that any new treaty is fully-implemented throughout the UK.
21.These arguments were bolstered by the practical experience of the European Union Committee, which undertook to scrutinise the Brexit roll-over treaties, in its report Scrutiny of international agreements: lessons learned. The House of Lords Liaison Committee has considered the case for a treaty committee and said it will “reflect upon this issue further once there is greater clarity on our future trading and international relationships, also taking account of any additional resource demands created by these new requirements.” The Government, in its response to our report, said that the establishment of “structures within Parliament to scrutinise new international agreements” is a matter for Parliament to decide.
22.Following the result of the 2017 general election and the formation of a minority government, we sought the views of the party and group leaders in the House of Lords on the applicability of the Salisbury–Addison convention—whereby the House of Lords does not block bills implementing government manifesto commitments—when a government lacks a majority and thus cannot be considered to have a mandate from the public. We published the responses from the Leader and Shadow Leader of the House of Lords, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the Lords, the Convenor of the Crossbench Peers and the views of Professor Meg Russell, Director of the Constitution Unit at University College London, to inform the understanding of the House and the wider public of the operation of the convention.
23.This session we produced eight Brexit-related reports: two on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and six on other Brexit-related bills.
24.The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill was introduced to “repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and make other provision in connection with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU.” It was the centrepiece of the Government’s legislative programme for making the legal changes necessary to deliver Brexit. We published two reports on this Bill: an interim report in September 2017 after the Bill had been introduced to the House of Commons and a full report once the Bill was brought to the House of Lords in January 2018. These built on our report on The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers, published shortly before the end of the previous parliament, which anticipated the issues that the Bill would need to address.
25.We concluded in our interim report that the Bill failed to address many of the points we made in The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ report and that it raised several wide-ranging and interlocking constitutional concerns. Our final report explored these issues in detail, including the implications of the creation by the Bill of ‘retained EU law’, its status and interpretation, the delegated powers for ministers and the interaction of these powers with the devolved institutions and their competences. Members of the Committee and others in the House of Lords pressed the Government on these points during the committee stage of the Bill and, following negotiations with ministers, the Government brought forward amendments on a number of key issues. These included amendments to provide greater clarity on how UK courts should treat the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union; to define the status of retained EU law in relation to its future modification; and to impose greater requirements on ministers to justify and explain their use of the regulation-making powers in the bill.
26.Following the passage of the Bill we considered the Government’s proposals for handling validity challenges to EU law connected to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, highlighting the potential implications and identifying areas of uncertainty.
27.The European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill was a private member’s bill introduced in the House of Commons to seek an extension to the Article 50 process by which the UK would leave the European Union. It was fast-tracked through both Houses. In our report on the Bill we highlighted the implications of the legislation and reiterated our view that the fast-tracking of legislation is acceptable only in exceptional cases and where it does happen there is a need to ensure effective parliamentary scrutiny.
28.The purpose of this Bill was to provide a legal framework for UK trade policy after the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. We observed that, as with many of the other bills to deliver Brexit, the Bill was largely a framework measure, providing broad delegated powers to effect new trade policy. These powers included one to establish a new public body, the Trade Remedies Authority, but the Bill did not specify its membership, terms of appointment or operation, leaving all these details to subsequent secondary legislation. We concluded that while we recognised “the pressing timescales and uncertainties concerning Brexit, in constitutional terms, creating and empowering an important public body in such a manner [was] inappropriate.”
29.We observed that the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales were not recommending their respective legislatures consent to the Bill. We urged the UK Government and devolved governments to engage in constructive dialogue to achieve that consent and to agree new intergovernmental mechanisms for international relations and treaty-making after Brexit.
30.We also recommended technical improvements to the Bill, changing the definitions of retained EU law to match those in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and including in the text of the Bill the restrictions on the use of powers that were set out in its explanatory notes. While the Government accepted the former recommendation, and tabled amendments to that effect, it suggested that the inclusion of restrictions in the explanatory notes was sufficient to limit the use of the powers and that the courts would be able to look to the explanatory notes in judging whether the powers had been used inappropriately. In further correspondence we suggested that the Government had misinterpreted the principle of the case law based on Pepper v Hart (1993) and Baroness Fairhead, Minister of State for Trade and Export Promotion, ultimately acknowledged that the Government did not seek to rely on that judgment to give legal effect to the restrictions on the powers.
31.The amendments made to the Bill by the Government and others in the House of Lords were not debated in the House of Commons and the Bill fell at the end of the 2017–19 session. The Government announced a new Trade Bill in the 2019 Queen’s Speech, but this will not be introduced before the dissolution of the present parliament.
32.The Government presented the Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill as one of the measures necessary to deliver Brexit. However, the Bill itself went beyond creating a mechanism necessary for future healthcare arrangements with EU countries and provided broad powers for ministers to make new healthcare arrangements with other countries outside the EU after Brexit. We reported that, although the exceptional circumstances of the UK’s departure from the European Union might justify legislation containing broader powers than would otherwise be constitutionally acceptable, this did not extend to giving effect to new policy unrelated to Brexit. As with other Brexit-related bills we were concerned that the broad powers included in the Bill gave ministers the ability to amend primary legislation without parliamentary scrutiny and we recommended that in future the Government include sunset clauses for such powers. Following our report, amendments were passed in the House of Lords to limit the scope of the Bill to replacing existing healthcare arrangements with EU and EEA states after Brexit, and the Bill was subsequently renamed the Healthcare (European Economic Area and Switzerland) Bill to reflect those changes before it received Royal Assent.
33.The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill was introduced to provide a new legal basis for the imposition of sanctions and the tackling of money laundering and terrorist financing after Brexit. The Bill contained broad delegated powers for ministers to implement new sanctions regimes with limited parliamentary oversight. Our report concluded that it was “constitutionally inappropriate for ministers to have the power, by regulations, to create new forms of sanctions”. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee similarly raised objections to these powers. Following these reports the Government agreed to bring forward amendments to the Bill such that ministers would have to have to provide a good reason for creating a new sanctions regulation and lay a report justifying their reasoning.
34.We expressed concerns about a separate power that could be used to create an offence for which a sentence of imprisonment for up to 10 years could be imposed, as well as setting the rules on evidence and defences to such charges. While the House of Lords agreed amendments to constrain these broad provisions, they were reinstated subsequently by the Government in the House of Commons.
35.The Haulage Permits and Trailer Registration Bill was introduced by the Government to allow UK hauliers to continue to operate internationally after the UK leaves the EU. The Bill gave broad powers to the Secretary of State and provided little detail on the policies they would be used to deliver. The DPRRC, in its report on the Bill, described it as “wholly skeletal, more of a mission statement than legislation.” We shared their view and expressed concern about the Government’s practice of introducing bills that grant broad powers to ministers as they made it difficult for Parliament to scrutinise. We advised that sunset clauses should be included in the Bill to mitigate the constitutional concerns it raised.
36.The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill provided for a new customs regime after the UK left the EU. It made widespread provision for delegated powers subject to the made affirmative procedure, which we considered was permissible only in exceptional cases. In preceding Brexit-related bills where the Government had adopted this approach there had been a requirement for ministers to make a declaration justifying the use of the power and why it was urgently needed. No such provisions were included in this Bill and we concluded that this was unjustifiable.
37.The Bill allowed for legislating by public notice: the making of new law without any parliamentary scrutiny. We said that this was constitutionally unacceptable as there were no guidelines for what constituted a public notice and changes to the law could potentially be made with virtually no public knowledge.
38.We wrote to Lord Bates, Lord Spokesperson for HM Treasury, to question the wide range of delegated powers to implement and make changes to financial services legislation. We noted that while these may have been deemed necessary to deal with the UK’s departure from the EU, it should not be considered a precedent for future legislation. We observed that the policy note accompanying the Bill contained “non-legislative assurances” but questioned why these were not in the Bill. Lord Bates responded that the Government was not able to do this in a “legally robust” way but agreed to publish six-monthly reports on how the Treasury has and would use the delegated powers. Lord Bates also stated that the Government would now publish draft statutory instruments before laying them under affirmative procedure.
39.The first of these two bills was introduced in October 2018 to facilitate the formation of an Executive in Northern Ireland. It suspended the statutory duty on the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to call an election and extended the time wherein it was possible to form an Executive. The Bill also gave Northern Irish civil servants the power to make necessary continuity arrangements in lieu of ministers where there was a clear public interest.
40.We reluctantly accepted that the exceptional provision of powers was justified to protect the people of Northern Ireland from a potentially damaging impact on the provision of services given the lack of a power-sharing executive to set political direction and provide oversight. We emphasised that in any other circumstances provisions such as these which challenged established constitutional principles would not be acceptable and that no part of the Bill—nor the fast-track procedure by which it was taken through both Houses—should be taken as a precedent for future legislation. In response to our report, Karen Bradley MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said she regretted the need for the Bill and gave an assurance that it would not be used as a precedent for bills in the future.
41.In July 2019 the Northern Ireland (Executive Functions) Bill was introduced to extend again the period for forming an Executive. We were dismayed that this Bill was also fast-tracked through both Houses. In our report we concluded that it was constitutionally unacceptable, save for in exceptional and urgent circumstances, to use this procedure. As this Bill sought to permit for the fourth (and potentially fifth) extension of the period for forming an executive we said that it could hardly be argued, given the lack of progress in cross-party talks, that this was not foreseeable and that the Bill could not have been introduced to the House at an earlier date. We regretted that the Government failed to give any justification in the explanatory notes for fast-tracking the Bill, in contravention to the Cabinet Office’s Guide to Making Legislation which contains recommendations for fast-track legislation drawn up by this Committee.
42.Some of the bills we scrutinised this session, such as the Space Industry Bill and the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Relief from Non-Domestic Rates) Bill, made provision for UK ministers to legislate in devolved areas without an explicit requirement to consult or have the consent of devolved ministers or legislatures.
43.The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill included a power to amend the enactments of the devolved legislatures but imposed no requirement to consult devolved institutions before this power is exercised. We concluded that if it was “the Government’s intention that it would, in practice, liaise with the devolved administrations prior to the exercise of this power, such a requirement could be written into the Bill.” We were unpersuaded by the Government’s view that this power reflected “well-established reciprocal arrangements”. These arrangements are not fully reciprocal, as Welsh and Scottish legislation can authorise devolved ministers to amend UK legislation only within devolved competence, whereas UK legislation can authorise UK ministers to amend enactments of the devolved legislatures in ways that would trespass on devolved competence. While the Sewel convention—that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate in areas of devolved competence—does not apply to delegated legislation, we believe engagement with the devolved institutions on the use of such powers should be a requirement. We will monitor closely the provision of powers that do not observe this practice.
44.The Ivory Bill was introduced to prohibit commercial activities concerning ivory in the UK. We raised concern that it allowed the Secretary of State to empower civilian officers, rather than recognised law enforcement, to enter and search private premises and to seize items found there. We concluded that these provisions were inappropriate. Following meetings with ministers and debates in the House of Lords, the Government agreed to remove the power from the bill.
45.This Bill was designed to amend and extend certain terrorism offences; adjust the sentencing framework for terrorism-related offences, including by increasing the maximum penalty for certain offences; and extend police powers to investigate and prevent terrorism. We concluded that access to confidential legal advice—a fundamental constitutional principle, acknowledged at common law—was not adequately protected by the Bill. We recommended that the Bill be amended to require detainees to be informed of their right to consult a solicitor; to remove the power to delay consultation with a solicitor; and to remove the power to permit consultation with a solicitor to occur only in the sight and hearing of a qualified officer. The Government agreed to include the right to consult a solicitor in the Bill and accepted that it would go against legal professional privilege to direct that a detainee could consult their solicitor only in the sight and hearing of an officer.
46.The purpose of this Bill was to make greater use of technology and online proceedings in civil and family courts and the tribunal system. We observed that it conferred broad powers to ministers to limit oral hearings, replacing them with online proceedings, that could potentially contravene fundamental rights to a fair hearing. To secure appropriate control over this power, we recommended that the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, or the Senior President of Tribunals, should be required for extending online procedure rules to additional types of proceeding. We recommended that the Bill place a duty on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that provision be made for those with limited digital means or literacy to access online proceedings, and that the Online Procedure Rules Committee created by the Bill—with powers that range more widely than any of the existing rule committees—could make new procedure rules only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals. The House of Lords amended the Bill in line with some of our recommendations, but the Bill fell at the end of the 2017–19 session and did not feature in the 2019 Queen’s Speech.
1 This is the form of the Committee’s remit in the 2019 session. It reflects some minor changes resulting from the Liaison Committee’s review of select committees in the previous session. Liaison Committee, (6th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 398), para 52
2 Oral evidence from Lord Kakkar, former Chairman, House of Lords Appointments Commission, 14 March 2018,
3 Oral evidence from Chloe Smith MP, Parliamentary Secretary (Minister for the Constitution), Cabinet Office, 14 March 2018,
4 Oral evidence from the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, 9 May 2018, and 7 May 2019,
5 Oral evidence from Lord Burnett of Maldon, Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, 25 April 2018, and 3 April 2019,
6 Oral evidence from Baroness Hale of Richmond, President, and Lord Mance, Deputy President, Supreme Court, 21 March 2018, and from Baroness Hale of Richmond, President, and Lord Reed, Deputy President, Supreme Court, 21 March 2019,
7 Constitution Committee, (14th Report, Session 2003–04, HL Paper 173)
8 Constitution Committee, (4th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 27)
9 Ibid., para 147
10 Constitution Committee, (23rd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 382)
11 Constitution Committee, (24th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 393)
12 Constitution Committee, (16th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 225)
13 , 16 April 2018; , 30 January 2019; , 28 October 2019. HL Deb 12 June 2019
14 Constitution Committee, (6th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 37)
15 Constitution Committee, (17th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 279)
16 Constitution Committee, (25th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 399)
17 Constitution Committee, (2nd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 18), paras 9–10
18 Constitution Committee, (16th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 225), para 50
19 Constitution Committee, (22nd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 375)
20 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, (54th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 370)
21 Constitution Committee, (22nd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 375)
22 Constitution Committee, (20th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 345)
23 Constitution Committee, (11th Report, Session 2014–15, HL Paper 146); Constitution Committee, (10th Report, Session 2015–16, HL Paper 149)
24 European Union Committee, (42nd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 387)
25 Liaison Committee, (6th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 398), para 79
26 , 8 July 2019
27 Constitution Committee, (5th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 28)
28 Long title of the [Bill 5 (2017–19)]
29 Constitution Committee, (3rd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 19)
30 Constitution Committee, (9th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 69)
31 Constitution Committee, (9th Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 123)
32 European Union (Withdrawal) Bill [Bill 5 (2017–19)], , HL Bill 79—R—II, amendments 23–25, 83C, 83F, 83H and 83.
33 and , 23 November 2018, 28 February 2019
34 Constitution Committee, (19th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 339)
35 Constitution Committee, (13th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 193), para 12
36 Ibid., paras 16 and 18
37 Ibid., paras 7 and 10
38 Department for International Trade, , 22 January 2019
39 , 11 February 2019 and , 19 February 2019
40 HL Deb, 20 March 2019,
41 Constitution Committee, (18th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 291)
42 Constitution Committee, (8th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 39)
43 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, (7th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 38)
44 Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, (15th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 84), para 2
45 Constitution Committee, (11th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 90)
46 Constitution Committee, (10th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 80)
48 19 December 2018 ,
49 , 5 February 2019
50 Constitution Committee, (15th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 211)
51 , 4 February 2019
52 Constitution Committee, (26th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 404)
53 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (July 2017): [accessed 21 October 2019]
54 Constitution Committee, (2nd Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 18)
55 , , 12 October 2017, 6 November 2017, , 27 November 2017, , 8 December 2017
56 Constitution Committee, (8th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 39)
57 Ibid., para 7
58 Constitution Committee, (12th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 178)
59 HL Deb, 12 September 2018,
60 Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, , 17 October 2018
61 Constitution Committee, (14th Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 207)
62 Home Office, , 28 November 2018
63 Constitution Committee, (21st Report, Session 2017–19, HL Paper 373)