The UK and Afghanistan Contents

Chapter 3: The Afghan state and government

The Afghan government

50.Afghanistan held its most recent presidential election in September 2019. Turnout was reported to be as low as 25% of eligible voters.96

51.Both candidates, Dr Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah, claimed victory. Official results were delayed for months as electoral bodies conducted recounts and audits. In February 2020 the incumbent, Dr Ghani, was declared the winner, with just over 50% of the vote.97 Dr Abdullah, who held the role of ‘Chief Executive’ in the previous power-sharing administration, did not concede. Months of negotiations led to agreement on a power-sharing deal in May 2020. The agreement stated that Dr Ghani would be the president and Dr Abdullah would lead peace talks with the Taliban on behalf of the government, as the Chair of the High Council for National Reconciliation, and make appointments to the cabinet.98

52.Ms Clark described the relationship between the two men, and between their teams, as “horrible”.99 Time had been wasted on “constant internal arguments” over matters such as “who sits in which office”.100 Their dispute continued “to severely undermine domestic governance”, including delaying the appointment of cabinet members and provincial government roles.101

53.Falanx Assynt said Dr Abdullah retained presidential ambitions and would be likely to seek “to minimise Ghani’s role in intra-Afghan talks”.102 Ms Clark said that there was “in no way …. a united front”.103

54.Sir Richard Stagg, however, thought Dr Abdullah and President Ghani had “found a modus vivendi”.104 President Ghani had been able to centralise power and “sideline Abdullah to a large extent compared to 2014”. He had not been offered the role of Prime Minister, and President Ghani had brought in younger people and recruited Afghans with foreign passports as advisers and appointees.105

55.Sir Richard Stagg said the two men had “very different backgrounds”. President Ghani was “technocratic”, while Dr Abdullah was “a more natural politician”.106 Dr Ayeesha Siddiqa, Research Associate, South Asia Institute, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, said that while much was made of their differences, these were “not ideological” but “about very real-term interests … They want a position in the power structure.”107

Spoils, warlords and strongmen

56.Witnesses said that politics in Afghanistan was a source of spoils. Afghanistan’s “politicians do not represent the public”, as a result of the “financial autonomy” generated by “unearned income” from spending by foreign armies and aid.108 Politicians did “not have to be bothered about what the people think. They are bothered about who gets what slice of the pie.”109

57.It was “a very stuck system”:110 “Most of the people … catapulted to power in 2001 by the Americans … were military men, many of whom had fought each other in the past … the commanders, civilian officials of factions, and warlords”.111 Shaharzad Akbar, Chairperson, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, said the “war on terror mentality” had resulted in foreign investment in individuals as allies.112 The system was “underpinned by patronage”: “the central government … paid off warlords and powerbrokers by tolerating corruption and not enforcing [the] rule of law”.113 All political actors had “a vested interest” in the system.114

58.Erica Gaston, Non-Resident Fellow, Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, said “warlords and strongmen, militias and other forces” were now “state actors”, but “retained … command networks and militia structures in the security forces”.115 Their “source of power and influence” was their ability to provide their followers with state salaries and positions.116 There were also links between certain provincial governors and local armed groups.117

59.A “degree of popular support” for some warlords and commanders conferred some legitimacy.118

60.State office provided control of territory and smuggling networks, and influence over land, mining rights and “trade revenues, licit and illicit”.119 This source of income “compromises taxation and thus the solidity of the state”.120 Ms Gaston said many militias and warlords had a “stake” in the opium trade.121 It was “a key mechanism of keeping … actors anchored in the political system”.122 The illicit drugs trade is discussed in Chapter 4.

61.Power in Afghanistan remains personalised, factionalised and mired in corruption, despite some moderate improvements in recent years. Government appointments are regarded as a source of spoils, and warlords and militia leaders retain roles inside the state. Many are involved in the illicit economy, leveraging their access to state resources.

62.We request that the Government provides us with information on the support it has given to strengthen Afghanistan’s democratic processes, particularly its elections.

Centralised political system

63.Laurel Miller, Director—Asia Programme, International Crisis Group, and former Acting US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, described the Afghan constitution as “winner-take-all” and “extraordinarily centralised”: “the President appoints not only a large portion of the parliament but every governor, every district governor and every chief of police, as well as senior positions within the administrative structure and the executive branch”.123

64.Historically, Afghanistan had a decentralised system of government.124 Sir Richard Stagg said there was “scope” for a more decentralised approach to “work reasonably well”. He thought that “in the south and east, the rather patriarchal Pashtun society may be content with a more Islamic style of governance than we would think ideal, whereas in Mazar-i-Sharif or Herat you may find a rather different way of running the country”.125 He said that this could be achieved by reaching an agreement on the interpretation of the constitution between the Afghan government and the Taliban126 (see Chapter 8). Lord Houghton said there was “an inevitability about a return to power and authority being more dispersed”. This would put “localised power in the hands of local power brokers, who I fear will in turn have fingers in the pies of drugs, corruption, extortion, violence and politics”.127

65.James Dobbins, Senior Fellow and Distinguished Chair in Diplomacy and Security, Rand Corporation, and former US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Ms Miller did not see prospects for constitutional change.128 At the Bonn Conference in 2001 “the Afghans themselves were very insistent on a unitary government and a strong executive”.129 Ms Miller said there was “not majority support for the changes that would reduce the degree of centralisation”.130

66.Afghanistan’s system of government is highly centralised, but in practice there are regional and ethnic loyalties. Whether amendments to the constitution are required to address this important matter will be a matter for the Afghans themselves to decide, whether in the peace talks in Doha or thereafter.

Ethnicity in Afghan politics

Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution recognised 14 ethnic groups.131 Box 3 gives information on ethnic groups, religion and language.

Box 3: Ethnic groups, religion and language

Ethnicity

Minority Rights Group International notes that “no reliable current data on ethnicity in Afghanistan exists”.132 It cites the following percentages as estimates (with the other groups combined accounting for 8%).

  • Pashtun 42%
  • Tajik 27%
  • Hazara 9%
  • Uzbek 9%
  • Turkmen 3%
  • Baloch: 2%
  • Nuristani
  • Pamiri
  • Arab
  • Gujar
  • Brahui
  • Qizilbash
  • Aimaq
  • Pashai133

Languages134

  • Dari (Afghan Persian) 50%. An official language, and generally considered the lingua franca
  • Pashto 35%. An official language.
  • Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 10%.
  • Up to 30 other languages.135

Religion

99% of the population identify as Muslim. Around 85% are Sunni and 14% are Shia. The remaining one per cent consists of Christians, Sikhs, Hindus and Baha’i.136

67.President Ghani is Pashtun. Lord Sedwill said that there are “essentially two big federations” within the Pashtun ethnic group: the Durranis, who “have traditionally provided the ruling class in Kabul”, and the Ghilzais, from which significant Taliban leaders have emerged.137 The Taliban’s ethnic support base is discussed further in Chapter 5.

68.Dr Abdullah is of mixed Tajik and Pashtun heritage, but is often regarded as Tajik, as a result of his association with the Northern Alliance.138

69.The FCDO said Afghanistan “continues to operate as a multi-ethnic state, with minority groups represented at all levels of government”.139 The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) said the 2004 constitution “favours the Pashtun majority in terms of the election of President”. It was “difficult to ensure diverse ethnic representation” under these arrangements.140 Uzbek and Tajik leaders had “criticised Ghani’s previous administration for allegedly prioritising Pashtun interests”.141

70.Falanx Assynt said that President Ghani’s appointments reflected “little commitment to improving the balance of ethnic political representation”. Three key figures in the government—President Ghani, Dr Abdullah and Marshal Rashid Dostum142—had “strong Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbek political support bases, respectively”. There was “an enduring risk that each of these key figures will prioritise appealing to their own supporters”.143

71.The Hazaras, Afghanistan’s third-largest ethnic group “remain significantly underrepresented at a national level”; Falanx Assynt said this was likely to continue.144 The Hazaras have a long history of suffering state persecution on both ethnic and sectarian grounds.145 The human rights of minority communities are discussed later in this chapter.

72.Ms Gaston said it was possible to “sometimes overstate … ethnicity” as a factor at a national level, although some factions were aligned with ethnic groups. For example, the influence of the “Tajik-dominated Jamiat network” over the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan police remained disproportionate.146 Dr Antonio De Lauri, Research Professor, Chr Michelsen Institute, Bergen, too tended “to disagree when I hear analysts talking about ethnic conflict … the situation is more complex”.147 Ms Gaston said that there was, however, “a stronger ethnic allegiance at a provincial level”.148

73.Ethnicity remains a potent political factor in Afghanistan, particularly at a local level, although its significance can be overstated. The Pashtun majority is largely dominant in politics, while the Hazara community and other minorities remain marginalised.

Corruption

74.Deborah Lyons, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), described corruption as a “silent terrorist”, which “removes money that should be directed to services for the Afghan people” and undermines their confidence.149 A recent report by UNAMA stated:

“Afghanistan has been consistently ranked among the ten most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International, except for a brief moment in 2015 and 2016 when it rose into the bottom 20. It has been consistently mentioned by Afghans in popular surveys as one of the biggest frustrations of their daily lives.”150

Corruption remained “endemic” particularly in the police, the courts, educational institutions and the Ministry of Health.151

75.Ms Clark said this in part stemmed from international involvement.152 The UK and US’s engagement had “turbo-charged corruption”, with “huge sums of money… suddenly being poured into the economy”.153 Afghanistan’s reliance on international donors is discussed in Chapter 4.

76.Foreign income undermined accountability: “the people in charge have financial autonomy from the [Afghan] people”. Afghan citizens lacked “representation” and “agency” as a result.154 Graft had “essentially insulated the elite … from holding themselves accountable to the public”.155

77.Sir Richard Stagg thought corruption might lessen as Western engagement decreases.156

Action to combat corruption

78.Ms Lyons said there had been “encouraging signs of increased accountability” by the President and the Cabinet. For example, “all senior political figures and civil servants must register their assets and identify their financial holdings”. However, this was not enough.157

79.The government had “established institutions and mechanisms” to curb corruption but “prosecuted few cases”.158 The ODI recommended that the Afghan government should “staff anti-corruption institutions, improve investigative capacity and competence” and “strengthen the Attorney General’s Office”. There were “longstanding concerns over major procurement and financial cases” which had “been outstanding since 2016”.159

80.Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown, Director, the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors, and Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution, said President Ghani’s administration had “not managed to significantly curtail corruption” and had become “increasingly dependent for its survival on … very problematic powerbrokers”.160

International and UK anti-corruption efforts

81.Ms Lyons said donors needed to demonstrate that they were focused on tackling corruption. The UK and EU ambassadors in Kabul co-chaired an anti-corruption committee, which had “been a driving force in working with the Afghan government”. The UK and EU had proposed establishing an anti-corruption commission, and urged the Afghan government to ensure the 2017 anti-corruption strategy was renewed.161

82.Dr Felbab-Brown said that there had been “steady pressure from donors” on corruption and accountability. However, “the international community” had “never adequately prioritised acting against … the predatory economic activities of powerbrokers”. Donors “systematically under-resource and sometimes altogether ignore” the illicit activity of government elites.162

83.Corruption remains endemic in Afghanistan. It has been significantly exacerbated by foreign funding. While the Afghan government under President Ghani has committed to tacking corruption and taken some steps, little progress appears to have been made.

84.The Afghan government’s accountability to its citizens is limited by its reliance on international military spending and aid, and very low reliance on taxation. This insulates the elite.

85.We welcome the UK Government’s efforts to combat corruption in Afghanistan, including work with the EU in Kabul on this agenda. As a major donor of on-budget support to the Afghan state, the UK should be willing, with its international partners, to call out the corrupt practices of individuals within the government and others in positions of influence.

Human rights

86.Witnesses first discussed improvements to human rights in the country. Ms Clark said that, “particularly in urban areas, Afghanistan has changed since 2001”. There was “a measure of free speech and free association” and the state “does not clamp down on women’s rights or minority rights”.163

87.Issues specific to the rights of women and girls are discussed in a separate section below.

88.Ms Akbar said there had been progress in the legal framework including combating torture, freedom of expression and press freedom. The Afghan government discussed “international commitments to human rights as well as commitments to Islam”.164

89.The FCDO and the BBC World Service pointed to improvements in media freedom.165 The constitution allowed for “freedom of the press and of expression”, and private media had “boomed” since 2001, with “approximately 60 private TV channels and 175 radio stations”.166 The Mass Media Law prohibited censorship and Afghanistan had signed the Global Pledge on Media Freedom.167

90.The ODI said that “the most significant progress on rights and freedom of expression” had been through the Freedom of Information Act”.168 Afghanistan “tops the Global Right to Information Rating”.169

91.Witnesses said that that some of the progress that had been made on human rights could endure. Sir Richard Stagg thought “that the Afghan people, having had some chance of a say in their country’s governance, will be reluctant to see that removed from them”.170 Ms Clark said that people were “used to these freedoms”. Many were “internal changes to do with aspirations and expectations”; should the Taliban return to power in some form, it would “have difficulty trying to impose its rules and its idea of what a good society is on many Afghans”.171

92.However, others said that gains in human rights were “fragile”.172

93.First, Human Rights Watch said that “too often” protections were “laws on paper only”.173 Reforms to the judicial system had been delayed.174 Human rights training had “not been accompanied by measures to hold accountable those who have committed serious violations”.175

94.The issue was not lack of “training, or capacity, but political will”;176 there was “a strong culture of impunity”.177 Afghan governments since 2002 had “very seldom prosecuted cases of torture and extrajudicial killing”, “particularly … when cases have involved senior officials”. As a result, “abusive police and militia forces” had “little reason to change their behaviour”.178 Ms Gaston said powerbrokers protected their networks from disciplinary action.179 Calls from civil society for warlords and militia leaders to be held accountable had “gone largely unheard”.180

95.Dr De Lauri said that there was an external dimension: “CIA sponsorship” of militias had resulted in “virtually no public oversight … or accountability for human rights violations” by these groups, including “numerous extrajudicial killings of civilians”.181

96.Second, the Shia Hazara minority were “regularly subjected to targeted killings, violence, and discrimination based on their ethnic and religious identity”. The Afghan government and the international community’s response had “been largely inadequate or missing altogether”.182

97.Third, in spite of progress on media freedom (see above), the Afghan government had “failed to investigate and prosecute dozens of cases of violence against journalists by security forces”.183 In 2018, Reporters Without Borders cited Afghanistan as the world’s deadliest country for journalists.184

98.Fourth, the ODI said the Afghan government’s approach to civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was “increasingly hostile”; planned NGO regulations185 “would cause the closure of many organisations”.186

99.There has been significant improvement in human rights in Afghanistan in the past two decades, particularly in Kabul and other urban areas. Witnesses highlighted improvements in women’s rights, freedom of speech, freedom of association and access to information.

100.Our witnesses said the expectations of Afghan citizens about human rights and participation in governance had changed for the better, making any future attempt to roll back these freedoms more difficult.

101.However, significant human rights challenges remain as a result of weakness in the rule of law and a lack of political will to enforce legislation which protects human rights. We are particularly concerned by reports of the lack of accountability, and sometimes impunity, of senior officials, militias and security forces, and ongoing threats to minorities, journalists and human rights defenders.

The UK and human rights in Afghanistan

102.Ms Akbar said the UK had “been one of the advocates of the human rights agenda in Afghanistan”, and had engaged with Afghan civil society and human rights institutions.187 Afghanistan’s donors, including the UK, had supported programmes such as training on open media, and reforms to improve education and access to justice. These had “had significant impact in fostering a more open society and building awareness about human rights”.188

103.On media freedom, the FCDO said the British Embassy in Kabul provided “capacity-building for Afghan government communicators and programming to promote open debate”. In 2019–20, it “implemented projects worth around £300,000 to improve access to information, journalist safety and support female journalists”. The Embassy maintained “a regular and honest dialogue with government “ on media freedom.189

104.The BBC reached “more than 50% of people in Afghanistan every week” and delivered “impartial trusted news and information to the population”. BBC Media Action projects “help to strengthen local media”.190

105.However, the impact of donors’ projects had been “limited”: “urban Afghans have benefitted disproportionately from donor assistance, and donor support has had little effect in curbing systemic human rights violations or ensuring that government officials adhere to the rule of law”.191 The ODI described “efforts to build and strengthen Afghanistan’s institutions (including the judiciary and the rule of law)” as “amongst the least successful areas of international engagement.192

106.The UK, along with other donors involved in the military campaign, had “seldom called out widespread abuses by Afghan National Security Forces they partnered with and trained, or the failure of Afghan judicial institutions to address impunity”. The “military effort” had taken “priority”, and “the UK failed to deliver a clear message that Afghan government institutions needed to address human rights abuses”.193

107.Ms Akbar said there had been “a decrease in UK funding to human rights in Afghanistan … in the past 10 years” and “recently there has been a considerable reduction in direct support to human rights institutions, and to the human rights agenda as a whole”.194 Lord Ahmad however said the UK was “absolutely committed to supporting projects on human rights” in Afghanistan; it was “an FCDO human rights priority country—it appears in our annual human rights report”.195

108.Witnesses made recommendations to the UK and other donors. First, Ms Akbar said “we expect our international partners to be strong advocates for human rights values”.196 The UK should: press for the enforcement of legal prohibitions of coerced confessions; call for the investigation and prosecution of allegations of the recruitment and sexual exploitation of children; and “invite the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to visit Afghanistan”.197

109.Second, the UK “must pressure and support the Afghan government to better protect its ethnic and religious minorities”. The UK had “the capacity to be a global leader … and promote the rights of persecuted minorities”, such as the Hazaras.198

110.Finally, Ms Akbar said the UK needed to investigate “its own soldiers causing civilian casualties in Afghanistan”, in order to “demonstrate to the Afghan public the UK’s commitment to the human rights of all Afghans”.199

111.We welcome the UK’s support for civil society and human rights institutions in Afghanistan, which have contributed to fostering a more open society and greater media freedom.

112.We welcome the BBC World Service’s provision of impartial news and information in three languages in Afghanistan.

113.We regret that UK efforts to improve the rule of law and judicial institutions appear to have had limited impact. We request that the Government provides its assessment of why this is, and how limited progress in Afghanistan compares with the output of similar UK programmes to support the rule of law in other countries.

114.The UK must be willing to speak out on human rights abuses. We are concerned by reports that the UK has turned a blind eye to abuses by the Afghan security forces and militias.

115.The UK should publicly champion the rights of minority communities, such as the Hazaras.

Rights of women and girls

Current situation

116.Dr Sima Samar, Special Envoy of the President and State Minister for Human Rights and International Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, said there was “no doubt that the participation of women and progress on women’s rights in Afghanistan” was “remarkable”.200

117.First, girls now accounted for “between 37% and 40% of the children attending school”. There were “between 25% and … 33% of girls participating in higher education”.201 Mark Bowden, Senior Research Associate, ODI, said there was “strong and increasing local demand for girls to stay in education”.202

118.Second, Dr Samar said women were trained as doctors and midwives.203

119.Third, women were active in business.204

120.Fourth, there were “more women in the judicial system”. One hundred and seventy female judges had been appointed in different provinces and there were female prosecutors. A special prosecutor’s office for the elimination of violence against women had been established.205

121.Fifth, there were “more than 3,000 women police” and around 1,800 women in the army.206

122.Sixth, women were active in politics. There was a 25% quota in parliament, although most female MPs were “ethnically or politically connected or related”.207. Dr Samar said “a woman sitting beside a warlord in parliament is itself a big achievement.”208 President Ghani had “created positions in the provinces for women deputy governors” and appointed a woman as permanent representative to the UN.209

123.However, there remained many problems.210

124.First, lack of security was “one of the worst failures”.211 The “pull-out of Western forces” had led to increasing areas of Taliban control, and “where the Taliban has more control, progress for women will have slipped backwards”.212 Women were “threatened and assassinated”.213 As a result of security issues, many female judges appointed in different provinces had to stay in Kabul,214 and a large number of girls schools were closed in provinces such as Ghazni and north Faryab.215 Around 2.2 million girls are out of school.216

125.Second, there was “a persistence of traditional norms across the country” including “child marriage and virginity tests; and sex outside marriage being a sin for women”.217 Female politicians’ participation was restricted by “male domination and patriarchal ideology”, and “the misuse” of culture, tradition and religion.218

126.Third, there was a high drop-out rate of girls from schools; the average length of time for those attending was 5.6 years.219 Factors included a lack of facilities,220 a lack of female teachers,221 resulting from corruption,222 and the “patriarchal, male-dominated mentality in areas under the control of the Taliban”.223

127.Fourth, there were issues with the institutional framework to protect women’s rights. Dr Ashley Jackson, Co-Director, Centre for the Study of Armed Groups, ODI, said that while the Afghan constitution was often cited as upholding women’s rights, it contained contradictions.224 Dr Samar said the “elimination of violence against women law”, introduced by President Karzai by decree in 2009, had still not been approved by Parliament. It was “enforced in some parts of the country, but wherever a judge does not believe in it … he does not apply the law of the country”.

128.Fifth, many women did not know their rights,225 which meant “local justice is able to prevail.” There were “still reports of women being stoned to death for adultery or being made to marry their rapist to maintain family honour”.226

129.Sixth, women’s dependence on men hampered their ability to seek legal recourse. Dr Samar said:

“when a woman complains about the violence done to her by a partner, father-in-law, brother-in-law or someone … he might be jailed for three or six months, but the problem is that she depends economically on that person. She usually takes back her claim … because who is going to feed her and her children?”227

130.Finally, witnesses said the situation varied in different regions. Legal freedoms for women were curtailed by the limited reach of the Afghan government.228 There had been progress on women’s rights and participation in Bamiyan:229 the Hazara community in this province had “much more of a tradition of encouraging women into society”.230 However, most of the women facing violence were in rural areas, beyond the reach of the special prosecutor’s office for the elimination of violence against women.231

International work to improve the rights of women and girls

131.Dr Samar said international partners had been “key for the promotion of women’s rights and our achievements”. However, this had “slowly … fallen from the agenda”. The majority of “ambassadors or … people dealing with aid to Afghanistan” were men, and their Afghan interlocutor was always a male minister. “Not enough attention, or equal attention, is paid to gender issues in general.”232

132.At international conferences on Afghanistan “women’s issues are side events”, and the needs of women were not considered “in designing … the policy and the projects”.233

133.Lord Ahmad outlined the UK’s contribution.234 First, the UK and Afghanistan had “launched the Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan” at the UN.235 This aimed “to empower and recognise the central role of women in the future of Afghanistan”.236

134.Second, the UK provided “funding for projects … focused specifically on women”.237 For example, the Girls’ Education Challenge fund had “helped over 300,000 girls to attend primary school since 2013”, and in 2019 the UK “supported over 70,000 marginalised girls in accessing primary and secondary education, skills and training”.238

135.Some witnesses were sceptical about the impact of work by the UK and its partners in this area.239 Dr Jackson said that “time and time again, from the number of maternal deaths in childbirth to the number of girls’ schools built, the advances have been inflated, fabricated and revealed to be false”.240

136.Voices for Creative Nonviolence said the “classic example” was the claim that “some 4 million Afghan girls” had been educated. It said that the rate of women’s illiteracy in Afghanistan was “84% which, after 18 years of foreign support and millions of dollars, is still the worst in the world”. The enrolment numbers of female pupils “vary considerably” between the Afghan government and the US Special Inspector General on Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which “ in 2015 estimated that $769 million had gone to ‘Ghost Schools’, wherein administrators collect salaries for absent student bodies.”241

137.Investments for Afghan women had “been driven by donor political prerogatives, flawed ideas, and lack of consultation with Afghan women as to what they need or want or what will work for them”.242 Insufficient work had been done by the UK to understanding local norms or listen to women.243

138.Witnesses suggested areas where donors including the UK should focus. A first priority was community midwives and maternal health: Dr Jackson said the “number of maternal deaths” was “shocking”, particularly after “so much investment”. She said the UK should focus this provision on Taliban-controlled areas.244

139.A second area was girls’ education, “particularly community-based education programmes”.245 Dr Jackson said that Taliban-controlled areas should be the focus: “we know that it will accept community-based education where women from the community teach in a discrete setting, usually someone’s home”. Dr Jackson questioned why there was not “massive British investment” in this “to ensure that every girl … learns to read and have some level of numeracy”.246

140.Lord Ahmad acknowledged “a shift in Taliban support for education and health support and provisions for citizens in Taliban-controlled areas” over the past five years.247 In December 2020 an agreement was reached between the UN and the Taliban leadership to establish up to 4,000 informal schools in Taliban-controlled territory. This will be funded by the UK and US-backed Global Partnership for Education.248

141.Third, Baroness Hodgson of Abinger, Co-Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Women, Peace and Security, called for UK work to strengthen “institutions for women” including “better resourcing for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs”, and support for the scrutiny of legislation and “building and resourcing [of] women’s networks … especially at grass-roots level”.249

142.There has been considerable improvement in the participation of women in Afghan society, politics and the economy since the fall of the Taliban administration in 2001, particularly in urban areas. Progress has been impeded by a range of factors including the security situation, the limited reach of the Afghan government into rural areas, the persistence of misogynist norms, unwillingness to enforce legislation protecting women and a culture of impunity for cases of violence against women.

143.We were concerned to hear that the promotion of women’s rights appears to have become less of a priority for international donors to Afghanistan. We were reassured to hear from ministers that this remains a key UK priority.

144.The increasing number of girls in education is often cited as a success for the US-led coalition’s engagement in Afghanistan. There has undoubtedly been a large increase in the number of girls enrolled in school, but we are concerned at the disparity between enrolment figures and both the number of girls who complete their schooling and the female literacy rate, which is just 16%.

145.We recommend that the Government undertakes greater consultation with Afghan communities over its provision of education for girls and maternal health programmes, to ensure these are driven by grassroots priorities.

146.The UK should put particular emphasis on funding women’s health programmes across Afghanistan.

147.We would welcome further information on the UK’s work to challenge early and forced marriages across Afghanistan, and their effect on the education and future of Afghan girls and women.

148.While providing services in Taliban-controlled areas presents considerable challenges, improving the lives of women and girls in rural areas is critical to achieving development in Afghanistan. We would welcome further information on the UK’s policy on such support.

Refugees and internally displaced people

149.Amnesty International UK said that “conflict and persecution in Afghanistan” remained “the cause of one of the world’s largest and longest current forced displacements of people”.250 This was a longstanding phenomenon: following the Soviet invasion in 1979, more than a quarter of the Afghan population had left the country.251 The scale of displacement within and beyond Afghanistan’s borders had “risen steadily” in recent years252 (see Table 1).

Table 1: Afghan refugees and internally displaced persons

Year

Refugees and asylum seekers

Internally displaced persons

End 2015

2,925,146

1,174,306

End 2016

2,870,402

1,797,551

End 2017

2,958,269

1,837,079

End 2018

2,991,389

2,106,893

End 2019

2,979,900

2,553,390

Source: Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023)

150.Afghans account for the second largest number of refugees in the world.253 The “overwhelming majority”—95%—are hosted by Pakistan and Iran.254 The most recent available figures from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) put the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan as 1,422,588 (August 2020)255 and the number in Iran as 951,142 (February 2015)256. There are also an estimated 100,000 Afghan refugees in European countries, accounting for the second largest refugee group in the region.257

151.The circumstances of many refugees in Pakistan and Iran was “insecure”. Both countries’ governments had “periodically threatened the Afghan government with the prospect of forced mass returns”, and “forcibly returned or pressured Afghans to return”.258

152.The ODI said Afghanistan had “one of the world’s largest internally displaced populations”. There was “little hope of reintegration or return”.259

Returns

153.Dr Orzala Nemat, Director, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, said that, “even though the violence has still not ended”, many Afghan refugees were returning.260

154.The concept of “return” was “often a misnomer”, as displacement could “span several generations”.261 Amnesty International UK said there were “no immediate prospects of safe and sustainable returns for the vast majority” of Afghan refugees. Afghanistan “remained a place of instability, conflict and persecution”.262

155.Refugees returned to “impoverished communities with scant resources”;263 many ended up in internally displaced persons camps “for lack of better alternatives”.264 They faced “stigmatisation and exclusion” and some faced “debts incurred to facilitate migration” and “lack of employment opportunities”, which could leave them “vulnerable to criminal networks and extremist groups”.265

The UK and Afghan refugees

156.The UK is “a modest recipient” of asylum claims from Afghanistan compared with other European nations. Over the last 10 years, the number of UK asylum applications from Afghan nationals “fluctuated between 1,000 (in 2012) and 2,332 (in 2016)”. The UK had “resettled only a very small number of Afghan refugees”.266

157.Over the past decade there had been “a sharp decline” in forced returns from the UK and “a steady decline” in voluntary returns.267 Voices for Creative Nonviolence called for “a moratorium on all deportations to Afghanistan”.268

158.Dr Marissa Quie, Fellow and Director of Studies in Human, Social and Political Science, Lucy Cavendish College, and College Lecturer in Politics and Director of Studies in Human, Social and Political Science, Magdalene College, University of Cambridge, and Mr Hakimi said UK policy should emphasise support for “regional solutions”. Host countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, faced strains on natural resources and basic provision, including education, health and urban infrastructure.269

159.The UK is one of the core group of states supporting the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries, developed between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan with UNHCR support.270 The UK should “more closely scrutinise implementation” of this strategy, and “exercise its influence on Pakistan and Iran to ensure that Afghan refugees are subject to the universally binding, customary law rule of non-refoulement”.271

160.Depending on the outcome of the Doha talks and the prospects for peace and stability in Afghanistan, the UK Government may need to recognise that the circumstances permitting returning asylum seekers to Afghanistan no longer exist.

161.Decades of war and instability have resulted in large Afghan refugee populations in Iran and Pakistan, and one of the largest numbers of internally displaced persons in the world. Ongoing violence and poverty pose a significant challenge to safe and sustainable returns.

162.As one of the core group of states supporting the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees to Support Voluntary Repatriation, Sustainable Reintegration and Assistance to Host Countries, the UK should consider what further influence it can bring to bear on Pakistan and Iran on the protection of Afghan refugees’ rights. We would be interested to receive further information on what role the UK’s significant aid programme to Pakistan might play in facilitating resettlement.


96 Q 2 (Kate Clark) and Al Jazeera, ‘Voter turnout falls sharply in Afghan presidential election’ (29 September 2019): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/29/voter-turnout-falls-sharply-in-afghan-presidential-election [accessed 5 January 2021]

97 Emma Graham-Harrison, ‘Ghani declared winner of Afghan election—but opponent rejects result’, The Guardian (18 February 2020): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/18/ashraf-ghani-wins-afghan-presidential-election [accessed 5 January 2021]

98 Al Jazeera, ‘Afghanistan: Ghani and Abdullah sign power-sharing deal’ (17 May 2020): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/17/afghanistan-ghani-and-abdullah-sign-power-sharing-deal [accessed 5 January 2021]

99 Q 6

100 Q 2 (Hameed Hakimi)

101 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt (AFG005)

102 Ibid.

103 Q 6

104 Q 21

105 Q 6 (Hameed Hakimi)

106 Q 21

107 Q 54

108 Q 2 (Kate Clark)

109 Q 6 (Kate Clark)

110 Q 2 (Kate Clark)

111 Q 6 (Kate Clark)

112 Q 7

113 Written evidence from Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown (AFG0027)

114 54 (Husain Haqqani)

115 Q 55

116 Q 56 (Erica Gaston). Ms Gaston said there were a range of security actors in Afghanistan with some form of connection to the state. These included three “quasi-state groups” (the Afghan Local Police—disbanded in September, the Afghan National Army Territorial Force—attached to the Afghan army in 2018, with around 20,000 soldiers, and a “loosely tethered group of forces … called the uprising forces or the patsunians”), and “auxiliary forces or militias … working alongside predominantly US military and intelligence officers”.

117 56 (Dr Antonio De Lauri)

118 Ibid.

119 Q 56 (Erica Gaston)

120 Q 56 (Dr Antonio De Lauri)

121 Q 56

122 Written evidence from Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown (AFG0027)

123 Q 43. Also see written evidence from Shabnam Nasimi (AFG0029).

124 Q 29 (Sir Richard Stagg) and Q 87 (Lord Houghton)

125 Q 23

126 Q 29 (Sir Richard Stagg)

127 Q 87

128 Q 43

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Australian government, DFAT country information report Afghanistan (27 June 2019) p 9: https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/country-information-report-afghanistan.pdf [accessed 5 January 2021]

132 Minority rights Group International, ‘World directory of minorities and indigenous people’: https://minorityrights.org/country/afghanistan/ [accessed 5 January 2021]

133 Ibid.

134 There are some issues with the accuracy of statistics on ethnic groups and spoken languages in Afghanistan. This accounts for some inconsistencies in the data for ethnicity and language.

135 All figures are approximate. Australian government, DFAT country information report Afghanistan (27 June 2019) p 9: https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/country-information-report-afghanistan.pdf [accessed 5 January 2021]

136 Ibid.

137 Q 87 (Lord Sedwill). He said this was an “oversimplification for brevity”.

138 BBC News, ‘Who is Abdullah Abdullah? Afghanistan’s three-times presidential contender’ (27 September 2020): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27138728 [accessed 5 January 2021]

139 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011)

140 Written evidence from the ODI (AFG0028)

141 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt (AFG005)

142 A former warlord appointed as Marshal by President Ghani. Emran Feroz, ‘Afghan warlord’s promotion highlights the bankruptcy of America’s longest war’, Foreign Policy (17 July 2020): https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/17/afghan-warlord-abdul-rashid-dostum-power-sharing-war/ [accessed 5 January 2021]

143 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt (AFG005)

144 Ibid.

145 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt (AFG005) and the Hazara Research Collective (AFG0008). The Hazara were persecuted during Taliban rule, and remain under attack by Islamic State Khorosan Province (see Chapter 5) and the Taliban.

146 Q 56

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 Q 14

150 UNAMA, Afghanistan’s fight against corruption: Crucial for Peace and Prosperity (June 2020): https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghanistans_fight_against_corruption_crucial_for_peace_and_prosperity_english.pdf [accessed 5 January 2021]

151 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

152 Q 5

153 Q 22 (Sir Richard Stagg)

154 Q 6 (Kate Clark)

155 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

156 Q 22

157 Q 14

158 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

159 Written evidence from the ODI (AFG0028)

160 Written evidence from Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown (AFG0027)

161 Q 14

162 Written evidence from Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown (AFG0027) Much of the aid provided by donors is on-budget assistance (see Chapter 4). OECD guidance defines assistance as on-budget/direct budget support when the fund disbursed is managed according to the national budget/treasury procedures of the partner country. This includes both general budget support (discretionary) and earmarked assistance. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, ‘Budget Hearing’: http://www.budgetmof.gov.af/index.php/en/2012–12-10-12-13-57/faq/194-what-is-on-budget [accessed 5 January 2021]

163 Q 3

164 Q 5

165 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011) and the BBC World Service (AFG0015)

166 Written evidence from the BBC World Service (AFG0015)

167 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011)

168 Written evidence from the ODI (AFG0028)

169 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011)

170 Q 22

171 Q 3

172 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011)

173 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

174 Q 94 (Dr Sima Samar)

175 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

176 Ibid.

177 Q 5 (Shaharzad Akbar)

178 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

179 Q 56

180 Q 56 (Dr Antonio De Lauri)

181 Q 57

182 Written evidence from the Hazara Research Collective (AFG0008)

183 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

184 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011)

185 The proposed Law on Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would regulate the registration, establishment and monitoring of NGOs in Afghanistan. According to Amnesty International, it “infringes on human rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and association, guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Afghanistan is a state party”. Amnesty International, ‘Afghanistan: Draft NGO law threatens civil society organization in Afghanistan’ (27 June 2020): https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa11/2599/2020/en/ [accessed 5 January 2021]

186 Written evidence from the ODI (AFG0028)

187 Q 8

188 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

189 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011)

190 Written evidence from the BBC World Service (AFG0015)

191 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

192 Written evidence from the ODI (AFG0028)

193 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

194 Q 8

195 Q 130

196 Q 8 (Shaharzad Akbar)

197 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

198 Written evidence from the Hazara Research Collective (AFG008)

199 Q 8

200 Q 92

201 Ibid.

202 Q 32

203 Q 92

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.

206 Q 92

207 Q 97

208 Q 92

209 Q 92 (Baroness Hodgson)

210 Q 92 (Baroness Hodgson and Dr Sima Samar)

211 Q 92 (Baroness Hodgson)

212 93 (Baroness Hodgson)

213 Q 92 (Baroness Hodgson)

214 92 (Dr Sima Samar)

215 Q 93 (Baroness Hodgson)

216 Q 95 (Baroness Hodgson)

217 Q 92 (Baroness Hodgson)

218 Q 97 (Dr Sima Samar)

219 Q 95 (Baroness Hodgson)

220 Q 95 (Dr Sima Samar)

221 Q 95 (Dr Sima Samar) and written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

222 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

223 Q 95 (Dr Sima Samar)

224 Q 70

225 94 (Dr Sima Samar and Baroness Hodgson)

226 Q 94 (Baroness Hodgson)

227 Q 94

228 Q 70 (Andrew Watkins)

229 Q 93 (Dr Samar and Baroness Hodgson)

230 93 (Baroness Hodgson)

231 Q 92 (Dr Sima Samar)

232 Q 99

233 Ibid.

234 Q 115 (Lord Ahmad)

235 Written evidence from the FCDO (AFG0011)

236 Afghanistan Mission to the United Nations, ‘Launch of the Group of Friends of Women in Afghanistan, (19 November 2019): https://afghanistan-un.org/2019/11/launch-of-the-group-of-friends-of-women-in-afghanistan/ [accessed 5 January 2021]

237 Q 130 (Lord Ahmad)

238 Q 132 (Lord Ahmad)

239 Q 70 (Dr Ashley Jackson) and written evidence from Voices for Creative Nonviolence (AFG0016)

240 Q 70

241 Written evidence from Voices for Creative Nonviolence (AFG0016)

242 Q 70 (Dr Ashley Jackson)

243 99 (Baroness Hodgson)

244 Q 70

245 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

246 Q 70

247 Q 132

248 The agreement covers education for boys and girls and would start with classes for the first three grades of primary school. UNICEF estimates that the number of Afghan children out of school is around 3.7 million. It hopes that the initiative will reach 120,000 children. Ben Farmer and Sami Yusufzai, ‘UN secures deal to set up thousands of schools in Taliban territory’, The Telegraph (17 December 2020): https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/12/17/un-strikes-agreement-taliban-leaders-set-thousands-schools-insurgent/ [accessed 5 January 2021]

249 Q 99

250 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023)

251 Written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024)

252 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023)

253 Written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024)

254 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023)

255 UNHCR, ‘Registered Refugees from Afghanistan, last updated 31 August 2020’, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan [accessed 5 January 2021]

256 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023). Amnesty International UK said that both figures were a significant underestimate, and both countries hosted “a population of undocumented Afghan people that is either close to or exceeds the size of the documented Afghan refugee population”.

257 Written evidence from Voices for Creative Nonviolence (AFG0016)

258 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023)

259 Written evidence from the ODI (AFG0028)

260 Q 30

261 Written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024)

262 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023)

263 Written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024)

264 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (AFG0022)

265 Written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024)

266 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023) The UK made 6,109 grants of asylum to Afghans from 2008–19, and 3,460 grants of humanitarian protection/discretionary leave. Home Office, Immigration statistics (August 2020): https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/936688/outcome-analysis-asylum-applications-datasets-sep-2020.xlsx Tab Data-Asy-D04 [accessed 5 January 2021]

267 Written evidence from Amnesty International UK (AFG0023)

268 Written evidence from Voices for Creative Nonviolence (AFG0016)

269 Written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024)

270 UNHCR, Progress report 2014: Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (2014) p 4: https://www.unhcr.org/en-ie/562a44639.pdf [accessed 5 January 2021]

271 Written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024). Non-refoulement is not sending refugees or asylum seekers back to a country in which they are liable to be subjected to persecution.




© Parliamentary copyright 2018