239.We heard different views on the extent of the Taliban’s control of territory (see Figure 3). Mr Hakimi said the Taliban claimed to control 70% of the country but this was “incorrect”: Afghanistan’s geography was “very ragged”, and there was “a nuance between [control of] population centres” and elsewhere. Areas under the Taliban’s control were mainly remote and rural; they were generally among the poorest areas of the country.
240.Our witnesses’ assessments ranged from half to 66% of Afghanistan’s territory. According to the BBC World Service’s 2017 study, the Taliban had full control of 14 districts and a physical presence in 263. The Taliban had subsequently taken control of several north-western and north-eastern provinces, and the Afghan government claimed to have regained control over 13 districts. These changes did not alter its overall assessment.
241.Falanx Assynt said that the release of almost 5,000 Taliban prisoners by the government in Kabul at the end of February 2020, as a result of the US–Taliban deal (see Chapter 6), had probably strengthened the group. The number of violent incidents was the highest in five years, and the number of successful attacks and casualties was the highest since collection of such data began in 2010.
242.It is difficult accurately to assess the scale of the territory controlled by the Taliban. Experts differ in their assessments, and ongoing clashes between the Afghan National Security Forces and the Taliban suggest that the situation remains fluid.
243.Sir Richard Stagg said the Taliban was a diverse group of “different factions and tendencies”, making it “difficult to be sure that it has a coherent view”. There were “different currents of thought” and differences between members. Its political commission had shifted “towards recognising the different environment” since 2001, but this “did not necessarily” reflect “grass-roots attitudes”.
244.Mr Andrew Watkins, Senior Analyst—Afghanistan, International Crisis Group, said that there were differences between the younger and older generation of Taliban members. These stemmed from the fact that the young grew up “in a country and in a context that is markedly different to the one which the old school Taliban came to power in”.
245.The younger members were not more “progressive and more liberal” in the Western sense but were “fundamentally a different group of people”. Veteran Taliban fighters had “been exiled … travelled … developed links” and “been educated in various ways”. Their “outlooks have changed”, and they had become “elder statesmen” with “a longer-term vision for the Taliban, a more worldly vision of what they want their political movement to be”.
247.Sir Richard Stagg said that the West had made a mistake in seeing the Taliban as a “small collection of fanatics rather than a group that represents one strand of genuine opinion in Afghanistan”. The Taliban represented a “particularly radical conservative Islamic ideology”, but the majority of Afghan society had “highly conservative … cultural norms”. The way the Taliban ruled “seems quite reasonable for some parts of rural Afghanistan”.
248.Lord Sedwill said that the Taliban was primarily a “Pashtun tribal phenomenon”. It represented “one strand of Pashtun opinion”. As discussed in Chapter 3, Lord Sedwill said there are two tribal federations within the Pashtun ethnic group, the Durranis and the Ghilzais. The Taliban had “managed to restart the civil war in Afghanistan in the mid-2000s because of resentment among the Ghilzai-affiliated tribes that they did not have access to political power, patronage, resources” and “the Western intervention was providing resources to their tribal rivals”.
249.Since 2001 the Taliban’s “networks, ethnicity, tribal alignments and geographic strongholds have … changed”. Although it remained a largely Pashtun movement, it had “broadened its outreach and its appeal in many ways”, and Tajik and Uzbek groups had joined the network. Fighting against foreign troops’ presence in Afghanistan had become a motivation for the Taliban (discussed below).
250.The Taliban reflects the views of a section of largely rural Afghan society on issues including women’s rights and human rights. Although still predominantly Pashtun, it has become more geographically diverse.
251.Dr Jackson said that the ideology of the Taliban was “not … more or less conservative than in the past, but simply different”. In the 1990s it aimed to purify Afghanistan after the civil war. It has changed to be a body fighting against foreign occupation, and for the restoration of Islam and rejecting Western immorality.
252.Falanx Assynt said the Taliban wanted to promote senior religious figures as “key political leaders in society”, replacing tribal elders. Older clerics and former fighters were in the Taliban negotiating team in Doha.
253.It had “co-opted” the use of Western innovations, such as social media. Mr Haqqani, however, said that the Taliban’s ideology had not changed, even if its tactics had.
254.The Taliban has adapted since 2001, but it has not necessarily become less conservative. The extent to which the Taliban has moved away from its previously ideologically hidebound agenda is unclear.
255.Mr Watkins said that the Taliban had “very rarely, if ever, bent or caved into international pressure”. No external actor—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar or Iran—had “sufficient influence over the group” to make it change its approach. In the 1990s Pakistan had learned that it was “difficult to dominate the Taliban”, which “would listen but then not listen to Pakistan”.
256.Mr Watkins said that in the past Pakistan had been a sanctuary for the Taliban. While “circles of some several dozen of the Taliban’s most senior commanders” still live in Pakistan, “when we talk about those who command and lead the fighting of this movement we mean that they reside and operate in Afghanistan and conduct their business there”. This meant that Pakistan’s “influence on a practical level” had “evolved and has certainly trended in the direction of the Taliban’s self-reliance”.
257.Nonetheless, Pakistan retains close links to the Taliban. All the Taliban representatives who attended the talks in Doha had “either flown on Pakistani aircraft or travelled on Pakistani passports”. A Taliban negotiator in Doha, Mullah Baradar, was freed from jail in Pakistan following the intervention of Ambassador Khalilzad, the US Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation. Dr Nemat argued that the Taliban was “not a grass-roots, rural movement”: the resources it used, “the new 4x4s, the weaponry or the explosive material” were not Afghan products and came “through outside support”.
258.Pakistan’s objectives in engaging with the Taliban are discussed in the next chapter.
260.Mr Watkins said the Taliban had “leadership by shura or a council system”. This “consultative system” “increased buy-in from … different wings”, which reflected the ethnic and geographical diversity of the Taliban.
261.The council system had “top leadership circles” reminiscent of the Soviet politburo. The Taliban had moved from “personality-centric networks” to institution-building, although this was “a continual process and one that is mediated by military demands on the ground”. Mr Watkins said that in most cases Taliban governance remained highly militarised; it had little interest in “shifting itself out of the martial law that one justifies during a state of war and into a state of normal governance”.
262.The Shura council oversaw “nine commissions similar to the ministries that were in place during the Taliban’s prior rule”. These focused on areas including economics, health and education. It operated “a shadow government through three administrative organs”, and its “military commission appoints shadow governors and commanders for each province”.
263.Dr Jackson said that the Taliban was “centralised enough” to initiate offensive military actions across the country and “co-ordinated enough” to be able to execute country-wide ceasefires. At the same time, it had an internal monitoring system to identify internal divisions and possible disintegration.
265.Witnesses discussed the Taliban’s ‘shadow government’ in areas it controls. First, Dr Jackson said it had “co-opted the schools and health clinics funded by the international community and run by the government”, “through parasitic and coercive means”. This had “been quite successful”, and “allowed it to experiment and build its own capacities”.
266.The FCDO said the Taliban oversaw “some basic service delivery”, but there was “limited provision for women and minorities”. Human Rights Watch said that “access to education for girls varies, but seldom includes secondary or higher education”.
267.Second, the ODI said that the Taliban offered its own justice system as an answer to the immediate needs of communities and as a response to government corruption. It used this court system, “operating at the doorstep of Kabul”, “to delegitimise the state and erode state justice provision, and to disempower and replace customary dispute resolution”.
268.Third, it levied taxes (discussed below).
269.Dr Jackson said the Taliban had “positioned itself as a government in waiting.” By providing services and maintaining “a parallel administration” it aimed to “portray itself as legitimate alternative government”.
270.The Taliban had in some cases adapted in response to pressure from local communities. Its approach to governance was a mixture of continuity, with “social norms and codes … strictly enforced”, and “responsiveness”. When “local communal demands have been made for increased access to education or a demand for better quality healthcare, or … the use of social media and modern technologies”, the Taliban had in some cases “changed and accommodated the wishes of the local communities that it requires sanctuary and support from”. The growth and expansion of the Taliban was, in large part, a consequence of this flexible approach.
271.Ms Clark said that “things have changed … in the areas under Taliban control”. Education for boys was “now seen as quite a normal thing and is expected by parents”, and “primary education for girls is expected by many people”.
272.This flexibility was, however, limited. Human Rights Watch said “‘morality’ officials—known as ‘vice and virtue’ police when the Taliban were in power in the 1990s—continue to operate”. They “patrol communities to monitor residents’ adherence to Taliban-prescribed social codes regarding dress and public deportment, beard length, men’s attendance at Friday prayers, and use of smartphones or other technological devices.” There was “very little free speech”. The Taliban remained “an authoritarian movement that does not brook protest”, and there were “really key differences, not just for Afghan women but for Afghan society in general.”
273.The Taliban has developed parallel government structures in the areas it controls, providing basic services to local communities and further undermining the institutions of the government in Kabul.
275.Ms Gaston said that much of what drove the Taliban was “interior to the political economy in Afghanistan”. According to UN Security Council estimates, the Taliban earns “between hundreds of millions of dollars to $1.5billion a year through illicit means—mining, taxation, extortion” (the illicit economy is discussed in Chapter 4).
276.Dr Felbab-Brown said the Taliban’s income was diversified. Activities taxed by the Taliban included government grants to local areas, and “legal and illegal mining and logging, legal agriculture, cell phone tower operators”. It also generated income “from protection rackets and capture of local governance resources”.
277.Opium trafficking is the Taliban’s biggest source of income, contributing approximately 65% of its income. The Drugs and (dis)order Research Group said that the estimated value of drug trade was “approximately US$250–400 million per year”.
278.The Taliban also continued to raise funds in Pakistan and countries in the Middle East, but “Gulf powers have much less time and resources to devote to Afghanistan than they did several decades ago”. External powers’ engagement with the Taliban is considered in the next chapter.
279.Opium remains the main source of income for the Taliban, accounting for up to 65%. The Taliban also profits from the taxation of economic activities, and other illicit trades, including illegal mining and logging.
280.The Taliban retains connections to terrorist groups and other non-state actors. Witnesses said this included the Pakistani Taliban, Uzbek movements, al-Qaeda and Chechen fighters. Dr Jackson said it seemed to think maintaining these relationships was necessary “lest disaffected Talibs join splinter movements”.
281.Members of the Taliban had shown “sympathy, if not … affiliation” to other groups operating in south and central Asia, including “groups from Uzbek or Tajik areas” and “Chinese Uighurs.”
282.Mr Watkins said that the Taliban valued its cohesion and unity. While there had been “indications from US negotiators and policymakers that there may be a willingness in the Taliban to work very quietly to assuage counterterrorism concerns”, either “open and public denunciation of these groups or the pursuit and targeting of some of these groups” was unlikely.
283.The principal groups, and their links to the Taliban, are discussed in turn below.
285.Dr Jackson said that the information available on terrorist organisations in Afghanistan, including their size, was “flawed and questionable”. There was a paucity of information “even among national intelligence gathering services and the work of the UN and other international institutions” about links between the groups.
286.In 2018 the Afghan government identified 21 militant groups operating in the country. Of these, the Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan, the Turkistan Islamic Party, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union and Hezb-e-Islami are considered terrorist organisations by the UK Government. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is not on the UK Government’s list of proscribed terrorist organisations, in contrast to similar US, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand lists. We raised this issue with Lord Ahmad, who said that terrorist listings were kept under review.
287.Beyond the Taliban, “the two highest profile non-state actors” were al-Qaeda and Islamic State Khorasan Province. The FCDO said they were “responsible for most violence against Afghan civilians and pose the most significant security threats to the UK and our allies”. These groups and the Haqqani Network are considered below.
289.We are surprised that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is not included in the Home Office’s list of proscribed terrorist organisations. The UK is the only country among the ‘Five Eyes’ group not to proscribe ISKP. We recommend that this matter be reviewed urgently.
290.Box 6 gives background on the Haqqani Network.
The Haqqani Network is a Sunni Islamist militant organisation.
It was founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, an Afghan warlord and insurgent commander during the anti-Soviet war. Jalaluddin allied with the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s and was a known associate of Osama Bin Laden.
Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin’s son, currently leads the day-to-day activities of the group, along with several of his closest relatives. Sirajuddin was named as a deputy to Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansur in August 2015.
The Haqqani Network is primarily based in North Waziristan, Pakistan. It conducts cross-border operations into eastern Afghanistan and Kabul.
291.Dr Jackson said: “at the top of the Taliban is an emir and beneath him two deputies. One of those seats is filled by the leader of the Haqqani network, so it is very involved in Taliban decision-making”. Ms Gaston and Falanx Assynt, however, said the Haqqani Network had a level of autonomy from the Taliban.
292.Falanx Assynt said that the group was not interested in a pragmatic relationship with the US, which made it “less averse to provocative attacks” than the Taliban. It had been responsible for “some of the bloodiest attacks in Afghanistan”, including an attack on Kabul’s diplomatic quarter in 2017 in which 90 people were killed.
293.The Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda (discussed below) maintain strong links. Haqqani Network members “consulted directly and personally with Ayman al-Zawahiri [the head of al-Qaeda] in February 2020, to ask his views on the Doha Agreement” between the US and the Taliban. The UN Security Council had “named Yahya Haqqani as having been the ‘primary Haqqani Network focal point for liaison with Al-Qaida since mid-2009’”. The groups have reportedly discussed the formation of a new joint unit of 2,000 fighters.
294.The Haqqani Network maintains links with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The Afghan government “refers to ISKP as the ‘new face’ of the Haqqani network and believes that it is … providing the necessary assistance to enable ISKP to carry out attacks”.
295.The Haqqani Network has “strong transnational ties”, including with the Pakistani security services; members of the network have “personal investments in property and business” in Pakistan.
297.Box 7 gives background on al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda is an international Islamist terrorist organisation.
It was established in 1988 by Osama Bin Laden and Arab fighters who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
It aims at the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, unification of all Muslims in a fight against the West (and the US in particular) and overthrow of all pro-Western regimes in the Muslim world.
It was responsible for the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and the United Kingdom on 7 July 2005.
Al-Qaeda operates in Afghanistan, with affiliates in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
298.Falanx Assynt said that assessing the size of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was difficult. The US thought it had 50–100 fighters in 2010 but “this was shown to be significantly conservative after a joint US–Afghan military raid on a base in Kandahar in 2015, during which US officials estimated more than 160 members of the group were killed”.
299.The US military suspects that the emir of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, may be based in eastern Afghanistan.
300.Mr Watkins said al-Qaeda “predates the Taliban in Afghanistan”. It was created from foreign fighters before the Taliban unified into a more coherent organisation. Its “standing and … reputation … among certain members of the Taliban is decades old, longer than international intervention in Afghanistan”. These relationships were “ill-defined” and “poorly” understood.
301.There were “strong religious and ideological ties” between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which included “an established relationship” between their leaders. The Human Security Centre said when Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada had become the leader of the Taliban, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri had “reaffirmed his support for the Taliban and formally swore Bay’ah, a formal Islamic oath of allegiance, to Akhunzada, which he accepted”.
302.The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in 2020 reported that the groups maintained regular contact throughout the US–Taliban negotiations.
303.Falanx Assynt said al-Qaeda and the Taliban had common interests: the withdrawal of US troops and the return to “political dominance” in Afghanistan by the Taliban. The Human Security Centre said that the US–Taliban agreement was “welcomed by al-Qaeda as a “great victory for the Taliban over America and its allies”. It hoped the Taliban would allow it “to use the country as a safe haven from which to support the activities of its global affiliates and branches, including the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”.
304.Falanx Assynt said that the Taliban was, however, “no longer fully supportive of al-Qaeda’s global jihadist agenda” and “unlikely to support its use of Afghan territory to co-ordinate attacks in the West”. The Taliban might therefore be “willing to conduct limited operations against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan … to further its agenda of forcing a US withdrawal and securing its own future as a political group.”
305.The Human Security Centre, however, thought that the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban was “strengthening”: it was “likely that the situation in Afghanistan will return to the status quo ante prior to 2001, wherein the Taliban will offer shelter to and co-operation with al Qaeda”. The Taliban was believed to be sheltering al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in Afghanistan.
306.The FCDO said al-Qaeda was less active in Afghanistan than before 2001, but it had never “ceased to exist and remains a threat”. The planned US withdrawal increased the risk that al-Qaeda would rebuild itself in Afghanistan. Lord Sedwill was “less worried about al-Qaeda reviving” because this group could be “contained by the local tribal leaders, if they are willing to do so”.
Islamic State Khorasan Province is a Sunni Islamist militant organisation.
It aims for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of Central Asia, countering Western influences and Shia Muslims.
It has strongholds in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces (near the Afghan–Pakistan border), with pockets of support throughout Afghanistan.
308.Ms Gaston said ISKP rose to prominence in eastern Afghanistan and “at its peak had captured some 8 to 10 different districts in Nangarhar province”. The Afghan government considered it “a serious threat” because of its ties to ISIS.
309.The FCDO said that ISKP “poses a persistent threat in Afghanistan”; there was “potential” that in the long term it may threaten the UK. Dr John Manza, Assistant Secretary General for Operations, NATO, said it was “a concern”, especially as increasing numbers of young and educated Afghans were being radicalised and joining ISKP.
310.The ODI said that ISKP was a particular concern in Nangarhar, Jalalabad and in Kabul. Mr Watkins said it had “attracted both membership and the capability to carry out incredibly violent, brutal attacks in Kabul”. Falanx Assynt said that it “maintains offensive capabilities” in Kabul and is capable of “periodically launching” attacks against military and civilian targets.
311.ISKP is also a threat to the Taliban. ISKP “was seriously eroding [the Taliban’s] control of a number of districts and territory and messing up a lot of its transit lines”. Falanx Assynt said that the strategies of the two organisations were at odds: both wanted to “establish direct control over territory”. ISKP sought to recruit more radical members of the Taliban, “and its success doing so has contributed significantly to its capabilities, particularly in Kabul”. Mr Watkins said that Taliban actions against ISKP were in part in response to the need to protect its own legitimacy.
312.For this reason, “there was a sort of tacit co-operation going on where as long as the Taliban was fighting only ISK[P], Afghan forces were not going to attack them”. The Taliban tended to prioritise its fight with ISKP over clashes with foreign troops. It had “spent a countless … resources and its own fighters” in clashes with ISKP.
313.Professor William Maley, Professor of Diplomacy, Australian National University, and Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Lecturer in International Relations, La Trobe University, said that the idea that the Taliban could be a “useful partner” in addressing the threat of ISKP was “a dangerous assumption” which “overlooks the complexity of the relations between militant and radical groups, which can oscillate between competition and co-operation”. The ODI said there were “recent NGO reports of the two working more closely together in Badakhshan”, which might be a consequence of local ties.
314.Mr Watkins said ISIS had never succeeded in becoming “an organic insurgent movement” in Afghanistan. It was “a foreign-seeded organisation” with “global aims”, which “attempts to solicit and reach out to any global networks possible”. Falanx Assynt said that ISKP maintained links with militant groups operating in western Pakistan and that US military withdrawal could lead to it increasing its capabilities.
315.Falanx Assynt thought the US’s “enduring concerns” about ISIS in Afghanistan meant it was “likely to attempt to secure an arrangement” for a small military contingent to remain in Afghanistan.
385 Written evidence from the FCDO ()
386 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch ()
387 Written evidence from the BBC World Service (); Written evidence from the ODI () and (Dr Antonio De Lauri)
388 Written evidence from the BBC World Service ()
389 This map is a snapshot as of 31 May 2020. Control of territory changes.
390 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
391 (Deborah Lyons)
392 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
394 (Kate Clark)
395 (Mark Bowden)
397 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
401 (Lord Sedwill)
402 (Kate Clark)
404 (Sir Richard Stagg)
405 (Lord Sedwill)
406 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
411 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
412 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
413 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
417 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
418 (Dr Ayeesha Siddiqa)
422 (Husain Haqqani)
423 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
426 (Andrew Watkins)
427 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
429 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
434 Written evidence from the FCDO ()
435 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch ()
436 Written evidence from the ODI ()
437 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
438 Written evidence from ODI ()
439 (Charles Davy)
441 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
442 (Andrew Watkins, Dr Ashley Jackson)
443 (Andrew Watkins)
446 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch ()
447 (Kate Clark)
449 (Hameed Hakimi)
450 Written evidence from Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown ()
451 (Erica Gaston)
452 (Dr Antonio De Lauri)
453 Written evidence from the Drugs & (dis)order Research Project, through the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group ()
454 Written evidence from Dr Vanda Felbab-Brown ()
455 (Andrew Watkins)
456 Written evidence from the Human Security Centre (), (Dr Ashley Jackson) and written evidence from the ODI ()
457 (Dr Ashley Jackson)
458 Written evidence from the ODI ()
460 (Andrew Watkins). The Uighurs are a Muslim minority group, mostly located in the Xinjiang province in north western China. China has imposed a brutal crackdown on its Uighur population. During the Taliban’s rule (1996 to 2001), some Uighur militants were given shelter in Afghanistan, and a number of Uighur militant groups continue to operate from the country. Vanda Felbab-Brown, A BRI(dge) too far: the unfulfilled promise and limitations of China’s involvement in Afghanistan, The Brookings Institution p 3: [accessed 5 January 2021]
463 (Andrew Watkins)
464 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
465 Home Office, ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisations’: [accessed 5 January 2021]
467 US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’: [accessed 5 January 2021]
468 Government of Canada, ‘Currently listed entities’: [accessed 5 January 2021]
469 Government of Australia, ‘Listed terrorist organisations’: [accessed 5 January 2021]
470 New Zealand Police, ‘Designated terrorist entities’: [accessed 5 January 2021]
471 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is itself listed.
473 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
474 Written evidence from the FCDO ()
476 and written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
478 Written evidence from the Human Security Centre ()
481 (Dr Antonio De Lauri)
482 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt () and written evidence from the Human Security Centre ()
483 (Dr Ayesha Siddiqa)
484 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
486 (Andrew Watkins)
487 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
488 Written evidence from the Human Security Centre ()
489 UN Security Council, Letter from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council (19 May 2020): [accessed 5 January 2021]
490 Written evidence from the Human Security Centre ()
491 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
493 Written evidence from the Human Security Centre ()
494 Written evidence from the Human Security Centre ()
495 Written evidence from the FCDO ()
496 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
500 Written evidence from the FCDO ()
501 also see (Andrew Watkins)
502 Written evidence from the ODI ()
503 (Andrew Watkins)
504 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
505 (Erica Gaston)
506 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()
508 (Erica Gaston)
509 (Andrew Watkins)
510 Written evidence from Professor William Maley and Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi ()
511 Written evidence from the ODI ()
513 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt ()