Chapter 6: External actors
Relations with the US
317.The US defines its “vital national interests in Afghanistan” as ensuring “that Afghan territory is never again used as a safe haven from which terrorists can attack the United States, our Allies, or our interests abroad”.515 It supports “a durable political settlement that ends the war and mitigates terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan”.516
318.Falanx Assynt said the US was also motivated by Afghanistan’s “geostrategic setting” between Iran, China and Russia, and Afghanistan’s “largely untapped mineral resource wealth” (discussed in Chapter 4).517
Policy of the Trump Administration
319.Ms Miller said that President Trump’s Administration had come “to have grave doubts” about the possibility of finishing the war militarily.518 US officials had long “realised that winning the war was not feasible at any acceptable cost”.519
320.The US showed “signs of mounting frustration” with infighting in the Afghan government (see Chapter 3) and had cut US$1 billion in aid in March 2020 when President Ghani and Dr Abdullah refused to work together. The US–Taliban deal (discussed below) demonstrated that the US was “increasingly willing to sideline Kabul” in its pursuit of withdrawal from Afghanistan.520 The possible approach of President-elect Biden’s Administration is discussed later in this chapter.
US–Taliban agreement
321.On 29 February 2020 the US and the Taliban signed an Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America.521
322.The agreement is summarised in Box 9.
Box 9: The US–Taliban agreement
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US commitments:
Taliban commitments:
Both sides expressed willingness to “seek positive relations” with each other and expressed hope that future relations between the US and the future government of Afghanistan, “as determined by the intra-Afghan dialogue”, would be “positive”. |
Source: US State Department, Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America (29 February 2020): https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf [accessed 5 January 2021]
323.Professor Maley and Dr Ibrahimi said that the agreement was “an ‘exit agreement’ rather than a ‘peace agreement’.”522 It had significant omissions and problems.
324.First, it imposed no conditionality on the Taliban. Mr Haqqani said that the US “made all the major concessions up front”.523 The US had conceded to a withdrawal timetable at the beginning of negotiations, which had been the Taliban’s main demand.524 The Taliban understood that the US was “eager to withdraw” and so the Taliban was “negotiating the withdrawal of foreign forces for the restoration of the status quo ante when it rules Afghanistan as an Islamic emirate”.525
325.There were no conditions linking the withdrawal of US troops to progress in the “intra-Afghan negotiations”.526 Lord Houghton said the withdrawal of troops was “an element of leverage in any peace process” and had to be “harmonised with the progress of that process”.527
326.There was also no explicit obligation on the Taliban to protect democratic processes in Afghanistan, including respect for human rights or the rights of women.528
327.The agreement lacked mechanisms to monitor the Taliban’s compliance;529 Ms Miller said the US had “reserved to itself the right to define the conditions as it goes along and determine whether those conditions have been satisfied”.530
328.A second problem was that the Afghan government and NATO Allies were not parties to the agreement but were within its scope.
329.Professor Maley and Dr Ibrahimi said the US “had no right whatsoever to make a commitment that the Afghan government would release prisoners in its custody, and no reason whatsoever to be surprised when this became a point of contention.”531
330.The US had made commitments on the withdrawal of troops which affected NATO Allies and “all non-diplomatic civilian personnel, private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting services personnel”.532 It was not clear whether the UK “or any other Allied government with personnel deployed in Afghanistan” had agreed that the US could make such a commitment on their behalf.533
331.Ms Miller said the US took “it for granted that NATO will follow whatever the US decides”; it was “presumptuous” to assume that the US spoke for the whole Alliance in its talks with the Taliban.534 However, NATO Allies had “gone along with” the US deal “without loud objections”, which “suggested that they wanted to “find a way out of Afghanistan”.535 Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO, welcomed the announcement ex post facto on 21 February 2020;536 he said it was a “step towards peace”.537
332.Mr Dobbins was “disappointed” at the “Trump Administration’s treatment of NATO”, but thought Europeans troops “will leave if the US leaves”.538
333.Third, the agreement lacked provisions for “any kind of ceasefire in Afghanistan”.539 This would “be an item on the agenda of the intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations”.540 The agreement created a “perverse incentive for violent behaviour by the Taliban whose bargaining power at the stage of intra-Afghan negotiations would be enhanced by control of more territory”. Taliban-led violence against the ANSF and local government institutions beyond Afghanistan’s cities had “continued unabated”. There had been “a spike in the number of targeted assassinations of Afghan religious leaders, human rights activists, civil society actors, and women members of the Afghan security forces in Kabul and other urban centres”.541
334.Fourth, Professor Maley and Dr Ibrahimi said the agreement did not confront Pakistan’s support for the Taliban.542 Pakistan had supported the US–Taliban negotiations “behind the scenes”.543 The agreement lacked a guarantee that the Taliban would operate independently of Pakistan’s security services. Meanwhile, the perception that the agreement was a victory for Pakistan “would likely be seen as a threat by other countries in the region, mostly notably India”544 (discussed later in this chapter).
335.Fifth, the agreement succeeded in enhancing the reputation545 and “political influence”546 of the Taliban, and weakening the Afghan government.547
336.Sixth, the agreement raised “major concerns” over future counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. The total removal of US and NATO forces would “greatly hamper counter terrorism efforts and may leave Western powers reliant on the Kabul government, the Taliban and regional powers for assistance in this regard”.548
337.Ms Miller concluded that “there will be no peace in Afghanistan as a result of implementation of the US–Taliban deal”.549
338.Professor Maley and Dr Ibrahimi said the Trump Administration appeared to be “firmly set” to exit Afghanistan without regard for “the potential costs to stability in Afghanistan and the wider region”.550 On 18 November 2020 the US Department of Defense said the US would reduce troops by a further 2,500 by 15 January 2021. Reacting to this news, Jens Stoltenberg said “the price for leaving too soon or in an uncoordinated way could be very high”.551
339.There is now uncertainty over this planned withdrawal in January 2021. Section 1215 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, passed by the US Congress in January 2021, overriding a Presidential veto, constrains the US Administration’s ability to withdraw troops unilaterally. No funds can be used for the withdrawal until the Department of Defense submits additional reports to relevant congressional committees explaining why those reductions are in the US national security interest. These reports would have to include assessments of the impact on the US counterterrorism mission, the NATO mission in the country, and the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces to operate on its own.552
340.The agreement negotiated between the US and the Taliban was a withdrawal agreement not a peace agreement. The US was driven by its determination to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan.
341.The US appears not to have consulted NATO Allies when negotiating with the Taliban, although the final agreement covered NATO personnel. This has risked undermining NATO unity.
342.The commitment by the Taliban in its February 2020 agreement with the US on terrorism is obscure, imprecise and fragile. It will be important that any settlement which emerges from the Doha talks firms up that commitment, and enlists the support of the whole international community and of Afghanistan’s neighbours in its enforcement.
343.We regret President Trump plans to withdraw a further 2,500 troops from Afghanistan by 15 January 2021. The withdrawal of these troops has the potential to further destabilise the security situation in Afghanistan at a critical moment for the peace talks. We note that the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 are likely to constrain the Trump Administration’s ability to withdraw these troops before the end of his term.
344.It will be important for the Government to engage with the incoming Biden Administration from the outset on the definition of its policy towards Afghanistan. One objective should be more collective management of policy on Afghanistan among NATO Allies; another should be to give more emphasis to the conditions-related implementation of commitments entered into by all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan.
Possible policy of President-elect Biden
345.“Very little” had been said about Afghanistan during the US election campaign,553 but witnesses expected President-elect Biden to continue with the withdrawal of US troops.554 Dr McSweeney said he had been “outspoken” about this “during the presidential campaign and during his tenure in the Obama administration”.555 He had long argued for “a limited military commitment in Afghanistan, focused on counterterrorism not counterinsurgency”.556
346.Witnesses identified some likely differences to President Trump’s approach.
347.First, Ms Miller anticipated President-elect Biden’s Administration to be “somewhat more inclusive, co-operative and engaged with Allies and partners”.557
348.Second, President-elect Biden had “spoken about potentially leaving some counterterrorism forces behind”.558 Dr McSweeney thought that “special forces will continue to conduct missions on the ground and American drones will continue to fly through Afghan airspace for a long time to come”.559
349.Third, Professor Maley and Dr Ibrahimi said President-elect Biden “may be amenable to offering ongoing air support”, which might be contrary to the wishes of the Taliban.560
350.Fourth, Falanx Assynt thought he was “likely to delay the pull-out beyond the stipulated 14-month timeframe” to analyse its security implications.561
351.The incoming Biden Administration is expected to continue with plans to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan. There is a possibility, however, that it will give more weight to the conditions on the ground, and the impact of withdrawal on the Afghan peace talks than the Trump Administration. It is likely to consult NATO Allies more closely on the withdrawal.
Afghanistan’s neighbours
352.Dr Avinash Paliwal, Associate Professor and Deputy Director, South Asia Institute, SOAS, said the role of Afghanistan’s neighbours in its “day-to-day political and security life” was “essential”, “structurally unequal” and “interventionist”.562 Figure 4 shows Afghanistan’s neighbourhood.
Figure 4: Map of Afghanistan’s neighbourhood
Source: The Economist, ‘Afghanistan and its neighbours: The perpetual vortex’ (27 September 2001): https://www.economist.com/taxonomy/term/140?page=5 [accessed 5 January 2021]
Pakistan
353.Dr Quie and Mr Hakimi said that the foreign and security policies of Pakistan were controlled by its “military/political complex”, “particularly in relation to neighbouring countries”. The civilian administration had “marginal capacity” to change this.563
354.Witnesses said Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan was driven by three principles: the perception that India’s relations with Afghanistan are a threat; securing Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan; and maintaining the status quo.
355.First, Pakistan viewed India’s role in Afghanistan as a threat. Pakistan saw “the balance of its own interests in Afghanistan against those of India in zero-sum terms”. Islamabad’s “primary objective” was building a bulwark against “Indian encirclement”.564 It wanted to prevent a close relationship forming,565 and keep India’s presence minimal.566
356.Mr Haqqani said this “desire not to have any tolerance of any Indian role in Afghanistan” was “unrealistic”.567
357.Second, witnesses discussed contention over the border between two countries, set along the so-called Durand Line (see Figure 5 and Box 10).
Figure 5: Map of the Durand Line showing the area inhabited by the ethnic Pashtun
Source: Abhiruchi Chowdhury, ‘Durand Line and its implication on Pashtuns’ The Kootneeti (26 August 2020): https://thekootneeti.in/2020/08/26/durand-line-and-its-implication-on-pashtuns/ and University of Texas ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan border’: http://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghan_paki_border_rel88.jpg [accessed 5 January 2021]
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The Durand Line is the boundary established in 1893 to divide Afghanistan and British India. It was named after Sir Mortimer Durand, who convinced the then Emir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, that the line should run through the tribal areas inhibited by the ethnic Pashtun.568 It marks the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.569 No Afghan government has recognised the legitimacy of the Durand Line, which runs through mountainous terrain and remains largely unpoliced.570 |
358.Dr Siddiqa said the Durand Line was not recognised in the same way as an “ordinary international boundary”.571 In Afghanistan’s view, the Durand Line was not a “legitimate indicator” of where the border should be.572 Meanwhile, Islamabad feared that Pashtun nationalist movement with links on both sides of the border could “override Pakistani nationalism”.573
359.Third, witnesses suggested that Pakistan wanted to maintain the status quo. Islamabad was interested in upholding a “frozen conflict”, as it helped it to address the challenge of Pashtun independence movements and pursue various economic interests, including securing energy supplies.574
360.Dr Quie and Mr Hakimi said that Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan was contradictory: Pakistan hosts the biggest number of Afghan refugees and at the same time foments “the conflict and instability that drives emigration”.575
361.Lord Ahmad said that the UK Government recognised the influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan and continues “to work very closely with Pakistan in that respect.”576
Links with the Taliban
362.Pakistan recognised the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government in the 1990s and was its key ally. After 11 September 2001, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence covertly supported a proxy war in Afghanistan and maintained links with Taliban factions, “most notably, the Haqqani Network”577 (see Chapter 5). The Taliban’s Shura Council, its highest decision-making body, was based in Quetta.578
363.Pakistan “effectively provided ‘safe haven’ … for the Taliban to operate relatively freely, and to return to Pakistan for military, financial, and other support in its battle with the government in Kabul”.579 The Taliban took advantage of the relationship, as it amplified its “logistical capacities for attacks on Afghan cities”.580
364.As discussed in Chapter 5, the Taliban representatives who participated in talks with the US and in the Afghan peace talks travelled from Pakistan. Pakistan’s objectives for the Afghan peace talks are discussed in Chapter 8.
365.Pakistan saw the Taliban’s presence in its country as “a strategic asset”, although it was both “a burden and a cost .581 Mr Haqqani said it “has influence with the Taliban but, for fear of losing that influence, it does not exercise it”;582 it was “unwilling to threaten the end of the safe haven to ensure Taliban compliance with its directives”.583 Falanx Assynt said that Pakistan feared that any attempt to exercise pressure on the Taliban could “jeopardise” its “strategically advantageous connection”.584 This allowed the Taliban to maintain “a degree of autonomy” and to remain “independent of Pakistan”.585
366.Without a commitment from Pakistan to stop support for the Taliban, including closure of its sanctuaries, it was “highly likely that the war in Afghanistan will continue”.586 Mr Haqqani thought support for the Taliban would “come back to bite” Pakistan.587
367.Pakistan is the most important external actor in Afghanistan. We welcome the Government’s engagement with Pakistan on Afghanistan and hope it will continue to press Pakistan to support a negotiated settlement.
368.Pakistan appears to have considerable influence over the Taliban, even if the relationship has changed since 2001. However, it appears to be unwilling to use this influence.
369.Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan is driven by its tense and volatile relationship with India.
India
370.Dr Paliwal said India was a “relatively peripheral player” in Afghanistan. It wanted “assurances from Western partners that the achievements of the past two decades will not be lost and that the potential challenge of an Islamic republic will be addressed”, and was “invested in supporting the Kabul government.588
India’s priorities
371.We heard that India’s policy on Afghanistan was driven by three principles: balancing Pakistan’s influence, addressing potential security threats and taking advantage of Afghanistan’s geographical position to build economic links with Central Asia.
372.First, Dr Paliwal said the aim of ensuring a “strategic balance” with Pakistan would not change “even in a post-US scenario”.589 India was “adamant about having a footprint in Afghanistan”.590 It wanted to achieve this balance by strengthening the Kabul government, through a combination of investments in infrastructure and humanitarian aid.591
373.Dr Paliwal said India had “invested about $3 billion in aid in Afghanistan over the past two decades”.592 It was Afghanistan’s largest regional donor of development assistance (and fifth globally), with over 400 development projects.593 It had invested in the parliament building in Kabul, connecting the Delaram–Zaranj highway to Iran and creating the Salma dam, known as the Afghan–India Friendship Dam.594
374.The FCDO said India was “likely to continue to play a crucial role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction”.595 It was expected to “step up development support and investment”, especially humanitarian aid and infrastructure.596
375.In addition to aid, New Delhi provided scholarships for young people to study in India.597 Mr Haqqani said India’s “good English education for a lot of Afghan elites” brought “Afghanistan and India together”.598
376.Witnesses said that bilateral trade was relatively small, worth about $1.5 billion annually.599 India was important to Afghanistan as an export market, but Pakistan had often stopped Afghan exporters crossing the Wagah border into India.600
377.India’s second interest was addressing potential security threats. It saw Afghanistan as a possible “safe haven for terrorists targeting India”.601 More explicitly, Dr Paliwal said India thought Pakistan might use Afghanistan to train militant groups to target Kashmir.602 India also feared the potential involvement of Afghan-based ISIS militants in Kashmir.603
378.Its third interest was building trade and energy links with Central Asia. India’s policies in this respect have proven unsuccessful. The Afghanistan–Pakistan transit trade agreement, developed with support from the UK, collapsed because of Pakistan’s refusal to let Afghans cross the border and sell their products in India.604 Construction work on the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India gas pipeline had not started, due to a lack of security on the ground.605
379.India had invested in Chabahar port in Iran. Falanx Assynt said that India was “partially motivated by a desire to operate trade routes northwards into Afghanistan” in response to a Chinese agreement to co-operate with Pakistan on Gwadar port.606
Relations with the Taliban
380.Dr Paliwal described India as “the odd entity … not talking to the Taliban when the whole world is talking to the Taliban”.607 There was an “ongoing debate in India’s power corridors” over whether India should hold direct talks.
381.In this respect, its relations with Iran and Russia were important, as they had had “some degree of linkage and tie with the Taliban over the past two decades”, and their ambitions were similar to India’s: to balance the influence of Pakistan.608
382.India’s involvement in Afghanistan, particularly in respect of trade, is heavily dependent on the goodwill of Pakistan. India is, however, Afghanistan’s largest regional donor of development assistance.
Iran
383.The Human Security Centre said Iran’s “strategy and interests” in Afghanistan were “ambiguous”,609 as Iran could benefit from three different, and contradictory, scenarios. First, by supporting the Taliban it could hope to overthrow the government in Kabul, perceived as a US client.610 Second, by supporting a political settlement “which leads to a more federal Afghanistan” it could “carve out its own sphere of influence” in Hazarajat, Herat “and other Tajik and Persian speaking communities”.611 Finally, it could support the status quo, which allowed it to “continue to swell the ranks of its volunteer forces, such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade, for which it recruits in Afghanistan and has deployed to fight on its behalf in Syria”.612
384.Iranian officials engaged with Afghan parties associated with the Tajik minority613 and with Hazara politicians,614 and had played a role in developing an agreement between President Ghani and Dr Abdullah “to ensure a united national government and to support the start of the talks”.615 At the same time, Iran cultivated close links with the Taliban (discussed further below).616
Iran’s priorities
385.Witnesses discussed five priorities influencing Iran’s policy on Afghanistan: historical links with Afghanistan, concerns over the Shia minority, Afghans living in Iran, Tehran’s security concerns and economic interests.
386.First, three western Afghan provinces—Herat, Nimruz and Farah—were historically part of the Persian empire. Iran had “tended to view” this part of the country as “an area of its backyard over which it has some degree of control”.617 Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Adjunct Associate Professor, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, and Institute for Political Studies, Sciences Po, said that this did not mean that Iran had territorial claim, but influenced Iran’s perception that the two countries shared “culture, language and ethnicity”.618
387.Second, Iran considered itself a protector of Afghanistan’s Shia community, approximately 10–15% of the population.619
388.Third, there were 1–3½ million Afghans living in Iran.620 Iran “utilises the refugee issue as a mechanism for gaining political leverage within the international community”.621 Afghan migrants were used by Iran “in armies” and “for pressure”.622
389.Fourth, Dr Tadjbakhsh defined Iran’s security concerns relating to Afghanistan as: “extremism, terrorism and separatism for the Sunni minorities, narcotics trafficking and … water sharing”.623 She said that Iran had become a transit and consumer of narcotics from Afghanistan (see Chapter 4), and combating this trade was an area of “potential convergence between the UK and Iran”.624
390.Fifth, Iran had economic interests. It needed the Afghan market “especially because of [international] sanctions”.625 Trade between Iran and Afghanistan is around $2.8 billion.626 Afghanistan was an important part of Iran’s ambitions of establishing trade links with Central Asia.
Relations with the Taliban
391.Mr Watkins said that in the last 10 years the Taliban had “cultivated stronger, closer ties with Iran”.627 There were reports that Mohammad Ibrahim Taherian, Iran’s special representative to Afghanistan, had regular contact with Taliban leaders.628 Iran had provided “logistical, financial and materiel support to Taliban fighters” to undermine the government in Kabul, to weaken the Islamic State operating in Farah province, bordering Iran, and to challenge the US’s anti-Taliban campaign.629
392.Iran sought influence over the possible outcomes of the Afghan peace talks, especially “over some of the people who would eventually enter a power-sharing government”. It wanted assurances that the Taliban would honour the rights of Shia and Hazara minorities.630
393.Falanx Assynt said that this relationship had been “facilitated by the Taliban’s shift away from attacking Afghanistan’s Shia minority in recent years”.631
394.Iran has a highly flexible strategy when it comes to Afghanistan and appears to be willing to work with all actors to secure influence and achieve its aims, particularly stability on its border.
395.The Government should engage more systematically with Iran on Afghanistan than has been the case in the past, recognising that on policies encouraging greater stability and security and on interdicting drug trafficking, UK and Iranian interests could coincide.
Conclusion on Afghanistan’s neighbours
396.The future security and stability of Afghanistan and the well-being of its citizens will depend crucially on reducing, and if possible eliminating, the intervention in its affairs of its neighbours. An objective of UK policy should therefore be to establish as binding as possible a commitment by its neighbours to non-interference and positive support for a stable Afghanistan, and to encouraging economic co-operation. This objective may be best pursued by discussions at the UN.
The Gulf states
397.Dr Jackson said the Taliban was “a hostage to regional dynamics” in the Gulf, especially the relationship between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. 632
Saudi Arabia
398.Mr Haqqani said that “until very recently” Saudi Arabia and the UAE “tied their policy” on the Taliban “with that of Pakistan”.633 A change of Saudi policy started in 2001, and accelerated with the appointment of Mohammed bin Salman as Crown Prince in 2017. This policy was “primarily intended to undermine Tehran and Doha and to strengthen Saudi ties to the US”.634 It had “increased its criticism of countries that continue to provide a level of support for the [Taliban]—chiefly Iran, Qatar and Pakistan”.635
Qatar
399.Falanx Assynt said that Qatar maintained “the strongest influence in Afghan affairs” of the Gulf states.636 Described by Mr Haqqani as a “major player”637 in Afghanistan, it allowed the Taliban to open a political office in Doha in 2013.638 Many Taliban leaders had moved their families from Pakistan to Qatar. He said Qatar would continue to have an influential role as “the facilitator of the end-of-conflict settlement”639 (see Chapter 8).
400.Falanx Assynt said Qatari efforts were partially aimed at maintaining US support given the “economic and diplomatic blockade by other Gulf countries”. Qatar’s position had increased in spite of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to undermine it. It had “facilitated backchannel—and later open—discussions between Kabul, Washington and the Taliban since 2016”, and proved to be “a credible mediator, which the Taliban considers more neutral than other regional actors”.640
401.The role and influence of the Gulf states in Afghanistan has changed. Saudi Arabia’s influence has waned, while Qatar’s has increased significantly.
China
402.We heard different views on China’s influence in Afghanistan. Lord Sedwill said that in the past five years Chinese influence in Afghanistan had increased,641 while Falanx Assynt said it had “remained cautious not to involve itself substantially in Afghan affairs, having seen successive interventions by foreign powers lead to protracted, unpopular and resource-heavy engagements”.642
403.Witnesses identified two priorities: economics and national security.
404.Lord Sedwill said that China was driven by “its interests in Afghanistan’s raw materials”643 (see Chapter 4). China had become the largest foreign investor in Afghanistan, focused on energy and infrastructure projects.644 Shabnam Nasimi, British Afghan social and political activist, said that China was interested in oil and gas transiting from Central Asia through Afghanistan.645 China planned to expand the China–Pakistan economic corridor “to Afghanistan and beyond into central Asia, especially Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan”.646
405.This would ensure “China and Pakistan controlled the connectivity of Afghanistan and its central Asian neighbours to the rest of the world”.647 Pakistani ports in Karachi and Gwadar were “expected to be pivotal in that strategy of being the dominant nation in central and south-west Asia”.648
406.On the other hand, Sir Richard Stagg said China had “abandoned its [earlier] interest in big commercial gains”, including investments in oil, gas and copper mines.649 Now “its main goal” was “to have a neighbour that does not cause it problems”650 and “does not represent a threat to China’s interests”.651
407.Chinese security concerns in Afghanistan focused on militant Uighur groups.652 Afghan security forces had “identified Chinese Uighur Muslims as suspected militants in the eastern border province of Badakhshan—and … China has reportedly established a military outpost there”.653
408.The stability of Afghanistan appears to be China’s main priority. Possible threats from Uighur militant groups based in Afghanistan are a concern to China. It is interested in exploring Afghanistan’s raw materials; however, this appears to have become secondary to its security concerns.
409.Pakistan is an important regional ally for China. Beijing’s policy on Afghanistan is, to a large extent, a by-product of its relationship with Islamabad.
Russia
410.Russia has historically seen Afghanistan as its “southern flank”, an area of its influence and “a theatre in which to compete against the West”,654 although it no longer has a direct border with Afghanistan.655
411.Witnesses had different views about the level of Russia’s involvement in Afghanistan. Sir Richard Stagg said that Russia’s role was smaller than “they would like to suggest”;656 all it wanted was to avoid instability on its southern flank.657 Russia no longer had “meaningful influence”658 in Afghanistan, particularly since the fall of the pro-Soviet government in Kabul in 1992.659
412.Mr Haqqani said Russia would like to have a role, and “nothing would be better than giving the Americans a bloody nose just like the Russians got in the 1980s.”660
413.In contrast, the Human Security Centre said Russia played a “sophisticated hybrid warfare strategy” in Afghanistan that aimed at the erosion of “Western credibility and reputation in Afghanistan”. Russia wanted to undermine the West’s objectives. Russia also sought to prevent links between terrorists based in Afghanistan and Islamic terror groups in the Caucasus.661
Relations with the Taliban
414.Mr Watkins said that Russia had “an open relationship” with the Taliban.662 It had increased its diplomatic engagement with the Afghan government in November 2018 and hosted a delegation of the Taliban in 2019.663
415.Russia sought to use the Taliban “as a dampener on terror groups that may threaten Russia” and “as a tool to curb the production and trafficking of drugs, most saliently opium/heroin”.664
416.In June 2020 there were media reports that the Taliban had received bounties from Russia in exchange for targeting US-led coalition troops. The Taliban denied this.665
417.Russia is no longer a major actor in Afghan affairs, but the US’s ongoing engagement means it retains an interest, and it has cultivated relations with the Taliban.
515 US Department of Defence, Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, (June 2020): https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/01/2002348001/-1/-1/1/ENHANCING_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY_IN_AFGHANISTAN.PDF [accessed 5 January 2021]
516 Ibid.
517 Written evidence from Falanx Assynt (AFG0005). The United States Geological Survey has concluded that Afghanistan may hold 60 million metric tons of copper, 2.2 billion tons of iron ore, 1.4 million tons of rare earth elements, and veins of aluminium, gold, silver, zinc, mercury, and lithium. Ahmad Shah Katawazai, ‘Afghanistan’s mineral resources are a lost opportunity and a threat’, The Diplomat (1 February 2020): https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/afghanistans-mineral-resources-are-a-lost-opportunity-and-a-threat/ [accessed 5 January 2021]
521 On the same day, the US signed a Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan. It specified four elements necessary for a sustainable peace agreement: guarantees to prevent the use of Afghan soil for terrorism, a timeline for the withdrawal of all US and Coalition forces, “a political settlement resulting from intra-Afghan dialogue and negotiations between the Taliban and an inclusive negotiating team of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, and “a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire”. Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan (29 February 2020): https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf [accessed 5 January 2021]
532 Ibid.
533 Ibid.
535 Ibid.
536 NATO, ‘Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Afghanistan’ (21 February 2020) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_173858.htm?selectedLocale=en [accessed 5 January 2021]
537 NATO, ‘Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at a ceremony marking the Joint Declaration between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and signature of an agreement between the United States and the Taliban’ (29 February 2020) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_174024.htm [accessed 5 January 2021]
540 US State Department, ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America’ (29 February 2020): https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf [accessed 5 January 2021)
542 Ibid.
545 Ibid.
551 BBC News, ‘US troops in Afghanistan; Allies and Republicans alarmed at withdrawal plan’, (18 November 2020): https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-54980141 [accessed 5 January 2021]
552 ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021’, section 1215, Limitation on use of funds to reduce deployment to Afghanistan, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr6395/text [accessed 5 January 2021]
554 Q 39 (Laurel Miller), written evidence from Dr Terence McSweeney (AFG0002), Professor William Maley and Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi (AFG0004) and from Falanx Assynt (AFG0005)
568 Britannica, ‘Durand Line’ https://www.britannica.com/event/Durand-Line [accessed 5 January 2021]
569 Ibid.
570 Vinay Kaura, Middle East Institute, ‘The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan-Pakistani Relations’ (27 June 2017) https://www.mei.edu/publications/durand-line-british-legacy-plaguing-afghan-pakistani-relations [accessed 5 January 2021]
583 Ibid.
600 Ibid.
605 Ibid.
608 Ibid.
620 Q 100 (Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh), written evidence from Falanx Assynt (AFG0005) and written evidence from Dr Marissa Quie and Hameed Hakimi (AFG0024)
626 Ibid.
635 Ibid.
636 Ibid.
645 Ibid.
647 Ibid.
648 Ibid.
650 Ibid.
651 Ibid.
657 Ibid.