480.There are a number of pressing and long-term challenges to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa, many of which are interrelated and underpinned by the economic issues outlined in Chapter 4.
481.The ongoing significance of the continent’s colonial legacy was set out by Dr Westcott, who said that “almost all” the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa since decolonisation had been “civil conflicts”. Many colonial territories “were carved up fairly arbitrarily”, leaving different groups of people to “find a way to get on together”. In the absence of the “uniting factor” of opposition to a colonial power, a “political balance” was needed, giving “rise to quite a lot of internal conflict”. Some countries had “emerged into quite robust and stable democracies” while in others the balance was “still being found”.
482.Dr Westcott said that the number of conflicts in Africa was “going down” but the remaining conflicts were “intractable”. Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa was not necessarily characterised by the “emergence of new conflicts” but by the “reoccurrence of [old] conflicts … birthed out of old grievances.” Search for Common Ground said that “very few countries” had transitioned “out of active conflict” in recent decades.
483.While post-colonial conflicts in Africa had been largely internal, Baroness Amos and said that the “nature of conflict” had changed considerably; Dr Ero said this was particularly true of the last five to 10 years. Conflict in the region had become “more transnational”; “conflicts bleed into one another.” Professor Murithi said that when thinking about security in the region, “the unit of analysis” was “no longer the nation state.” This was echoed in the Government’s analysis: “many of the challenges to stability and prosperity” did “not respect borders”.
484.The change in the nature of conflict has had profound consequences for traditional approaches to conflict management, including peacekeeping (discussed later in this chapter). Dr Tchie said there was an “increasing threat” from terrorist groups that were “embedding” into civilian communities and “linking with … local and global agendas” of jihad. For example, terrorists who had fought with jihadist groups in Yemen, Iraq and Syria were “relocating” to Africa. “New involvement from regional and international actors” had encouraged or created proxy wars. While not all existing conflicts involving non-state armed groups were caused by international networks, they were often “seen and tackled as part of the global terrorism narrative”.
485.Figure 5 shows conflicts in Africa involving non-state actors.
486.Dr Tchie said that terrorist groups were often embedded in “fragile and conflict-affected areas where the government presence is weak or … non-existent.” General Sir Richard Barrons said that in some cases local populations considered the arrival of such groups “not entirely a bad thing”. They provided “order, security, sensible taxation and access to justice,” and removed “the predatory effect of the police force, the army and the local government.” Local people often said “What we had was terrible and what we have now is frightening, but at least I can go about my business with greater confidence than I did before”. Specific examples of this phenomenon are discussed later in this chapter.
487.Witnesses said poverty was a driving factor in conflict. Andrew Mitchell MP said “very poor people” were “prone to exploitation, including by terrorism”. Dr Tchie said that “unequal economic growth in many African countries as well as [issues relating to] structural wealth distribution”, notably “land rights”, were also factors driving conflict.
488.There had been an increase in challenges to maritime security and of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in west Africa. The levels of piracy now exceeded the levels seen off the Somali coast”.
489.Witnesses said that demographic change and climate change, issues discussed in chapters 1 and 4, were also linked to increasing insecurity. First, Baroness Amos said rapid population growth and urbanisation were contributing factors. Dr Tchie noted a link between “rapid urbanisation” and a “lack of security and governance”, making socially deprived communities more vulnerable. Dr Westcott said there was a “degree of conflict risk” associated with population growth because “unemployed young men … tend to get violent.” This reinforced a need to create “more jobs”. Dr Tchie said that youth unemployment remained “a driver for extremist recruitment”, with young people feeling “they have no … choice but to join groups because of the lack of education or … access to jobs”.
490.Second, Baroness Amos said there was “growing conflict as a result of climate-related emergencies”, giving the example of water scarcity. Dr Westcott said the “red zones where conflicts are greatest”—from the Sahel to Somalia—included the “zones of greatest environmental stress.” These areas are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
491.Where there was good governance, climate stress had been managed well; Dr Westcott gave the example of Ethiopia. Where governance was poor, such as in South Sudan, it was “very violent”. General Sir Richard Barrons likewise noted that the “conflict in Darfur arose out of desertification”. The role of climate change in driving insecurity in the Sahel is considered later in this chapter.
492.Several witnesses discussed the role of ideology as a potential driver of conflict. Dr Tchie said that, while it was a factor, the emergence of terrorist groups across parts of Sub-Saharan Africa was “less about ideology” and often “driven by local issues like security, access to infrastructure, economic deprivation and health care and unresolved grievances.” Dr Westcott said there was a “fundamental, underlying economic issue”. The Coalition for Genocide Response, however, thought that many attacks in countries such as Nigeria and the Central African Republic were ideological in nature.
493.There remain significant challenges to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa. These challenges are likely to be exacerbated by wider trends affecting the region, including population growth, weak states, violent ideologies and the climate crisis.
494.Dr Okonjo-Iweala said the COVID-19 pandemic posed “a very serious problem”, particularly in places with significant “security concerns”. Fragile and conflict-affected parts of the continent posed a challenge for delivering COVID-19-related services. She singled out the Sahel and Somalia as particular areas of concern. The World Food Programme said the virus and its effects could have a “devastating impact on already highly vulnerable communities” in the Sahel.
495.A similar issue had been seen in previous public health crises. Dr Okonjo-Iweala gave the example of outbreaks of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where “because of” conflict it had not been “easy to fight” the virus. “More lives” could have been “saved” “if there had been no conflict going on”.
496.Witnesses raised a number of cases of conflict insecurity that were of particular concern, in the Sahel, Somalia, Nigeria and Cameroon. These are addressed in turn.
497.Dr Ero said that the Sahel was “at the top of the list” of areas of insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that it was “right” that the Government had “singled out this region as a priority” (see Chapter 2).
498.Witnesses discussed the factors driving conflict in the Sahel. The first was climate change. Professor Chafer said that in Mali there was increased resource “competition” resulting from “accelerating desertification”. This, combined with “increased economic competition” had encouraged a “retrenchment into community-based self-defence groups” to help families protect themselves and their land. This in turn had increased a second factor, “intercommunal tensions”. Dr Gaulme described “rampant ethnic tensions, mostly between herders and farmers”.
499.In turn, this provided “fertile ground for … jihadists”, a third factor. Islamist fundamentalist groups were often “the only source of protection” for vulnerable people.
500.The World Food Programme London Office emphasised the urgency of the crisis. The recent “dramatic increase in violent conflict” in the Sahel was “leading to massive displacement and pressure on already vulnerable host populations.”
501.Within the Sahel, witnesses singled out Mali. Jihadists and local separatists had been active in northern Mali from the mid-2000s. Following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011, “fighters and weapons” moved south into Mali and jihadists “took control”.
502.General Sir Richard Barrons said that in late 2012 there had been “a sense that Bamako might fall”, and that Mali might be overrun by Islamists. France “responded to this challenge … remarkably quickly”. It had a “major security concern”: that “counterterrorism and the spread of violent religious extremism … would grow within” the wider region” and Europeans would “see the consequences on [their] streets”.
503.France’s initial operation in Mali (Operation Serval), its subsequent regional operation (Operation Barkhane) and the UN’s mission (MINUSMA) are outlined in Box 22.
In March 2012 the Malian military conducted a coup against the government of Amadou Toumani Touré. A coalition of ethnic Tuareg separatists and militant Islamists then pushed the army out of the north of the country.
In December 2012 the UN Security Council authorised the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). AFISMA was organised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and composed of troops from Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad.
In January 2013 the rebels unexpectedly pushed southwards, potentially threatening the capital, Bamako, and raising fears the entire country could fall.
On 11 January 2013 France launched Operation Serval, a military intervention to stop and roll back the rebel advance. Chad committed additional troops to the conflict in Mali, which were integrated into the French command structure. The UK provided logistical and tactical support.
Operation Serval was deemed a success. France officially ended the operation on 15 July 2014.
In June 2013 a ceasefire agreement was achieved between the Malian government and the most prominent Tuareg nationalist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. Presidential elections were held in August, resulting in a victory for Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who remains in office.
In April 2013 the United Nations Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission to Mali, and in July the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) was established. MINUSMA took over from AFISMA, and initially had up to 11,200 troops and 1,440 police officers.In January 2020 the UK announced it would deploy 250 troops to join MINUSMA.
On 1 August 2014, following the end of Operation Serval, France launched Operation Barkhane. Operation Barkhane is an anti-insurgency operation across five countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—and involving the governments of each.Since 2019 the UK has provided three Chinook helicopters for non-combat assistance to Operation Barkhane.
504.Dr Gaulme said Operation Serval was “launched very much in a hurry”, and directly “contradicted” President Hollande’s October 2012 “commitment … to limit French action in the Sahel to … financial, logistical and technical support” for African-led forces. From a “purely military point of view”, it had succeeded in preventing the “threatened takeover of the capital”. French and Chadian forces “repelled the Islamist offensive and disbanded the rebels”.
505.The Operation was declared a success and a peace agreement was signed in 2015 between the Malian government in Bamako and the northern rebels. Although the “implementation” of this agreement had “been very slow”, it had brought a “degree of security … to the north of the country”.
506.Professor Chafer said Operation Barkhane was established in 2014 in recognition of the “broader, regional” nature of the threats facing the Sahel: “Islamist extremism, transnational crime and migration”. In Operation Barkhane France had found itself “in a quagmire with a spiralling insecurity situation”, “not only in Mali but across much of the western Sahel”. Dr Gaulme noted growing local criticism of France, which had strained the relationship between Paris and “the political and social elite in Sahel countries”.
507.Paul Melly, Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, said that, despite “significant international security engagement, violent instability” in the Sahel had “become more widespread and complex”. Professor Chafer said that since the launch of Operation Barkhane “security in both Mali and the surrounding states” of Burkina Faso and Niger had “deteriorated markedly”. Dr Gaulme said that France and its partners were “conceptually and operationally unable” to stop most of the region’s conflicts.
508.Witnesses discussed the limitations of the “predominantly military response” in the region. It had “been criticised by observers for producing new breeding grounds for violent extremism”. There had been a “growth in the capacity of existing jihadist groups and [the] establishment of new groups”, principally defined by their allegiance to two larger international terror networks: al Qaeda and Islamic State.
509.As the focus in Mali had moved from the north to the more populated centre of the country, there was a reluctance to engage in “large-scale military operations”, where there could be an “unacceptable loss of civilian life”.
510.There was “no clear end to the violence in sight”. If “sustainable peace” was “to be achieved”, it would have to “address the fundamental underlying issues of governance and development”. This was acknowledged by “external state and international actors”, including the French and Sahelian states—known as the G5—who agreed on the “need … to tackle the economic and social pressures that push young people into criminal trafficking, banditry or jihadist groups.”
511.The World Food Programme London Office said that “resilience-building interventions at the community level” contributed to “addressing the drivers of social instability”, building “social cohesion” and contributing to “reducing inter-communal violence.”
512.Witnesses said that tensions between regional institutions were a factor preventing progress. Dr Gaulme said French support for the G5 was “poorly planned” and done without consideration of its duplication and potential rivalry with ECOWAS, the local regional economic community. France had since made efforts better to integrate non-G5 countries into its approach to the Sahel. Professor Chafer said that ECOWAS’s “track record on promoting good governance and democracy within the region” was “crucial alongside military efforts”.
513.General Sir Richard Barrons said that the Government had quickly offered France help in 2013, but “the very clear sense was that this was a French-led intervention.” He noted “nervousness” about being drawn “incrementally into something where [the UK] did not know where it would lead”, following the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq. UK support focused on strategic air transportation and the training of Anglophone partners.
514.Professor Chafer said the Government’s decision to send three Chinook helicopters to support Operation Barkhane, and its decision to deploy 250 soldiers to Mali in support of MINUSMA in January 2020, sent “a strong political signal” of support. Dr Gaulme said this was well received by France; its military was “at the end of [its] tether in the Sahel and in dire need of … support”. Professor Chafer said the UK’s “pivot to the Sahel” should be understood as the Government wanting to show support for European allies as the UK withdrew from the European Union. General Sir Richard Barrons described the UK’s deployment of 250 military personnel in Mali as a “token”, and told us that “these minor contributions … are not in support of a strategy of any kind other than ‘we should do a bit more UN peacekeeping’”.
515.Witnesses had concerns about the UK entering such a “congested space”. First, Dr Tchie had questions about the efficacy of a security-focused international effort. The approach lacked “synergy, communication” or “end mission or goal”.
516.Second, the UK was “not taking sufficient account of the needs of local and regional partners”. It should “add value” by better engaging local actors. There were tensions between regional institutions and the UK’s “good relations with Nigeria and the other Anglophone members of ECOWAS” made it “potentially well placed to help facilitate” a stronger role for this body.
517.Third, the UK still had “lessons to learn from Iraq and Afghanistan”, including those relating to equipment, regional understanding and engagement with local counterparts.
518.Fourth, Dr Tchie said the UK’s lack of history and cultural connection with the region would leave British troops “reliant on the French perspective and narrative of Africa, which may not serve them well”.
519.Fifth, the involvement of the UK could see countries more closely linked with the UK—such as Ghana and Nigeria—“dragged into new forms of conflicts” in a similar way that France’s partners have been involved in its intervention in Mali.
520.Finally, Dr Tchie considered the repercussions that UK intervention would have on “the way terrorist groups … view the UK overall”.
521.Insecurity in the Sahel threatens the welfare of millions of people across the region, and risks spilling over into neighbouring countries. We welcome regional and international efforts to stabilise the region.
522.It is vital that the international response to instability in the Sahel is not overly focused on conflict management, nor overly securitised. To achieve a lasting peace, it will be essential to address the underlying causes of conflict, including climate change and economic inequalities.
523.We welcome the UK’s increased attention to instability in the Sahel, and the Government’s decision to contribute UK troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. However, the Government’s wider strategy in the Sahel is unclear and the UK risks being unable to add value in a highly contested space. We would welcome further information from the Government on its objectives in the Sahel.
524.General Sir Richard Barrons described Somalia as “a deeply broken place” with extreme poverty, corrupt and inefficient governance, and “significant economic shortcomings that partly led to and fuelled the problem of piracy, and a major challenge from al-Shabaab”, an Islamist militant non-state armed group in east Africa (see Figure 5).
525.Box 23 outlines the history of conflict in Somalia.
The Somali civil war began from opposition to the regime of President Mohamed Siad Barre in the 1980s. When he was ousted in 1991, a power struggle between rival warlords killed and wounded thousands.
In 1992 the United Nations established its first operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1). UNOSOM 1’s duties were taken over by the US-led and UN-sanctioned United Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992. A second UN operation in Somalia (UNISOM II) took over from UNITAF in 1993.International troops left Somalia in 1995, having failed to achieve their mission.
Following continued instability and a growing militant Islamist threat, the AU began a UN-sanctioned Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. AMISOM remains operational.
526.Dr Westcott said that there was now “a sort of diffused governance arrangement” in Somalia, which had reduced the conflict. However, al-Shabab was still active.
527.Dr Ero said it was “very resilient and agile”. It was “feeding off people’s grievances and the difficulty of providing law and order in large parts of the country.” The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, said that “abuses” by the Somali National Army had been “a big recruitment tool” for al-Shabab. Civilian deaths caused by AU peacekeepers in AMISOM had turned “many Somalis against” the AU mission.
528.Dr Tchie said regional tensions about access to natural resources contributed to instability in the Horn of Africa. Somalia had, to an extent, been drawn into competition in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and into “disagreements between Turkey, Qatar”, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Dr Westcott said that Gulf countries were “paying different sides in Somalia”.
529.Dr Ero described 2020–21 as “critical” for Somalia. The country would hold its first general election since 1969.
530.The UK is the UN Security Council penholder for Somalia. Ms Mathews said the UK worked with UN Security Council partners to maintain “unanimity”, which Ms Mathews said the UK had been able to achieve. A Joint Somalia Unit had been established to co-ordinate the UK’s Somalia policy across Whitehall.
531.As the UN Security Council penholder for Somalia, the UK has a position of particular influence, supported by its provision of aid and active diplomacy in support of stability. The UK should continue to support preparations for Somalia’s first one-person-one-vote elections this year—although there is doubt as to whether these elections will now be held—and to engage with its international partners in support of AMISOM.
532.Dr Modupe Oshikoya, Department of Political Science, Virginia Wesleyan University, said that Nigeria’s size meant its “security and stability” were vital to other countries in the region. There were four security challenges facing Nigeria. First, Boko Haram (see Box 24) continued to “wreak havoc” in the north east of the country. Its use of “guerrilla tactics” had seen it attack institutions, target young women and girls, and forcibly conscript young boys and men.
Boko Haram is a Sunni Islamist terrorist group principally active in north-east Nigeria. It was formed in 2002 to reject the secular aspects of Nigerian society, in particular Western education. Its first leader was Mohammed Yusuf.
Boko Haram carried out its first attack in 2003. Its violent activity increased significantly following a violent clash between Boko Haram militants and the Nigerian police in 2009. A subsequent uprising was quashed by Nigerian security forces and Yusuf was killed.
Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram carried out attacks between 2010 and 2014, including targeting inauguration of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and the UN office in Abuja.
In 2014 Boko Haram came to greater international prominence following its kidnapping of 300 girls from a secular school in Chibok. While many of the girls have since been rescued, over 100 remain missing.
In 2015 Boko Haram declared its allegiance to the so-called Islamic State.
In 2015 the AU-endorsed Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), including troops from Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Benin, was deployed.
In 2019, together with the breakaway Islamic State in West Africa group, Boko Haram was responsible for 765 violent events in the Lake Chad Basin region (including Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon). This represented a 35% increase in the number of attacks from 2018. The combined fatalities—3,225 people—represented a 4% increase from 2018.
Source: Center for International Security and Cooperation, ‘Boko Haram’: [accessed 24 June 2020] and Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Threat from African Militant Islamist Groups Expanding, Diversifying’ (18 January 2020): [accessed 24 June 2020]
533.The Nigerian government and regional partners have had some “success in countering the insurgency” and “recapturing swathes of territory”. However, despite that, Boko Haram still posed “a security threat to Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region.”
534.Second, Dr Oshikoya discussed the “settler/herder conflict” in central Nigerian Plateau state. There were “land disputes” between ‘settled’ farming communities—considered to be indigenous—and “semi-nomadic … herders”. Being classified as “indigenous to a state” gave the ‘settlers’ preferential treatment, including better land rights and access to employment and resources. The “scarcity” of land, the “depletion of arable land due to climate change” and spillover from the insurgency in the north east had “led to an increase in violent confrontations”. Dr Oshikoya described the Nigerian government’s response as “ineffective at best”, “fomenting violence and killing ordinary civilians”.
535.Dr Westcott said that “internal conflicts” were “seriously exacerbated by resource scarcity in the middle belt” of Africa, with “herders … coming down from the Sahel” into northern Nigeria. These migrants—who had a focus on pastoral farming—were coming into conflict with a growing number of arable farmers in Nigeria. The overspill from the Sahel had “not yet registered” as a “very serious cause of instability”.
536.Third, Dr Oshikoya raised the issue of violence in the Niger Delta. The 1970s oil boom had “vastly increased the opportunities for corrupt personal wealth accumulation” by the government and had been “exploited by the Northern Hausa ruling political elite”. This had led to “discontent amongst the civilian population”, including “non-violent opposition to oil exploration” by the Ogoni ethnic group. Dr Oshikoya said the Nigerian government had “responded with a massive onslaught of violence”.
537.Fourth, there was “piracy in the Gulf of Guinea”, which was “so prevalent” that it was “compromising the economic development of the region” and had become a “growing international security concern.”
538.Several witnesses considered the role of identity issues in Nigerian conflicts. The Coalition for Genocide Response said that the settler/herder conflict was “presented as a clash over grazing land”, but had an “underlying” religious and ideological nature. Ms Mathews said there was a “strong religious dimension” to some of the insecurity, and the International Organisation for Peace and Social Justice said that north-east Nigeria was “increasingly uninhabitable for Christians”.
539.On the other hand, Elizabeth Donnelly, Assistant Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House, said Nigerian conflicts were “increasingly and reductively described in ethnic and religious terms”, when they were in fact “rooted in mismanagement of rural land and resources”, as well as “environmental degradation”.
540.The UK and Nigeria signed a security and defence partnership in 2018. This was “largely focussed on equipment and training to combat Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa … in Nigeria’s North East” and also included provisions on policing, reducing piracy and organised crime and corruption. Ms Donnelly said that the UK should “ensure that through this defence partnership specific reforms in the security sector can be carried out to ensure better outcomes—and avoid treating consequences rather than causes”.
541.The Minister said that the Prime Minister had “discussed UK support for fighting terrorism in Nigeria with President Buhari” at the UK-Africa Investment Summit in January 2020. The Government was “committed to upholding human rights for all” and condemned “the appalling abduction and continued captivity of Leah Sharibu and other Christian and Muslim school children by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa”. The UK had “offered assistance and expertise to help the Nigerian Government in their efforts to recover the missing girls”.
542.Nigeria faces multiple security challenges. The UK should explore how its security and defence partnership with Nigeria, agreed in 2018, can be utilised to best support stability in Nigeria and the wider region.
543.We welcome Minister’s condemnation of the abduction and continued captivity of Leah Sharibu and other Christian and Muslim school children by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa, and his assurance that the Government will continue to engage with the government of Nigeria to support urgent action to secure the release of all those abducted by insurgent groups in Nigeria.
544.Cameroon was raised as a country of particular concern by several witnesses. Tensions between the ruling Francophone elite and Anglophone regions are known as the Anglophone crisis.
545.The Coalition for Genocide Response said that the Anglophone crisis began in 2016, but was “grounded in long-standing and unresolved issues surrounding the political, economic, and social marginalisation of the Anglophone minority community”—approximately 20% of the country’s population. The crisis began after the decision of the Francophone-led government to introduce French-language procedures in the Anglophone region’s courts and schools.
546.The crisis is outlined in Box 25.
Following the First World War, the German colony of Kamerun was divided between the British and French. During the process of decolonisation in the 1950s and 60s, a federal Cameroon was formed. In 1972 the federal agreements were scrapped by the Francophone-dominated central government.
Anglophone Cameroonians have long argued they are economically, politically and linguistically marginalised. There have been calls for the independence of the two Anglophone regions, known as the North West and South West Regions.
In 2016, the appointment of French-educated judges to the courts of Anglophone Cameroon triggered a crisis. Lawyers and teachers launched a campaign of strikes and demonstrations. The authorities in Yaoundé responded with force.
On 1 October 2017, the anniversary of Anglophone Cameroon’s independence from the UK, separatists declared unilateral independence. Subsequent demonstrations were met with force by the Francophone-led government. It is estimated that 17 people were killed.
The re-election of President Paul Biya—who has been the president since 1982—in October 2018 was boycotted by many voters in Anglophone regions.
The International Crisis Group estimates that the conflict between the central government and Anglophone separatists has killed 3,000 people and seen a further 600,000 displaced. It estimates that 800,000 children are out of school. One in three Anglophone Cameroonians are in need of aid.
547.The crisis was particularly acute in the opening months of 2020. Dr Ero said there had been an “up-tick in atrocities”, with 24 people—”mainly women and children”—killed on 14 February. This was the “worst” atrocity since 2018.
548.Cameroonian government forces have been accused of extrajudicial killings, “disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force”, torture, “forcible displacement”, and the use of “rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war”.
549.The Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon said that the Anglophone crisis was particularly relevant to the UK, as the former colonial power, and the country on whose legal and education systems the Anglophone regions modelled themselves.
550.It proposed international action to resolve the crisis. International pressure had pushed the Cameroon government to hold a “Major National Dialogue” in October 2019, but the resulting “special status” for the Anglophone regions had been dismissed by separatists and had “not been implemented by the government”. Proposed talks hosted by the Swiss Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue were “the best way forward”. It said the UK should encourage the government of Cameroon to participate.
551.The Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon said that the government of Cameroon had “largely avoided international scrutiny due to its usefulness”: Cameroon was “fighting … Boko Haram rebels” in the north of the country and hosted “350,000 refugees fleeing the violence in the Central African Republic and Nigeria”. It said that “when the international community ignores … atrocities of the kind happening in Cameroon, it often ends up paying a massive bill.”
552.Dr Tchie said that the AU’s Peace and Security Council had “remained silent on the conflict”. Professor Murithi described the AU in relation to Cameroon as “almost impotent”, arguing it was “neutralised” by the practice of “always” seeking “the permission of the Government of the day before intervening”.
553.Lord Boateng said the Government’s “humanitarian and diplomatic response to the appalling human rights abuses” had “been hampered by an undue deference to the French interest.” Ms Mathews described cooperation with the French and the UN Security Council on the issue of Cameroon as “outstanding”.
554.We are concerned by reports of a deteriorating security situation in Cameroon and of human rights abuses against the Anglophone community, in addition to the closure of schools for four years and the displacement of civilians by the conflict.
555.The UK should work within the international community, including regional and sub-regional bodies, to promote an approach which would ensure the restoration of the long-standing autonomous rights of Anglophone Cameroonians and the end of human rights abuses. Such an approach would need to enlist the backing of key stakeholders, including France.
556.The FCO said that conflict and humanitarian crises resulted in “flows of refugees and immigrants across borders”. This migration was primarily to neighbouring countries.
557.Dr Jones said most migration was not caused by conflict, although security was a factor. Despite a “continent-wide decrease in intra-state and inter-state violence” since the 1990s, there had been a dramatic rise in African migration. Conflict-driven migrations were, however, “particularly unmanageable, particularly brutal in terms of human suffering, and particularly destabilising to the regional theatres in which they occur.”
558.Dr Jones said that where migration was caused by insecurity, it was often “temporary”. For example, Somalis in Kenya moved “in large numbers back and forth” across the border “as conditions of physical safety and labour demand” waxed and waned.
559.Conflict-driven migration could lead to attempts to move to Europe and North America. The key driver in this kind of migration was not changes in migrants’ “home” countries, but “worsening conditions” in countries of residence in the region. As a result, support for “hosting countries in Africa” was the “simplest, cheapest, and most effective way to decrease onward migration.”
560.Conflict-driven migration, often from countries already hosting migrants, has a particularly high human cost. The high number of refugees hosted in the region, often for long periods, pose significant challenges for development and stability The Government should continue to explore how it can support Sub-Saharan African countries which host significant migrant communities.
561.Several witnesses said that the experience of insecurity and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa was gendered. Dr Georgina Holmes, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, referred to the “landmark” UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, which acknowledged “that armed conflict” had “a differential and disproportionate impact on women”.
562.Dr Peace A. Medie, Senior Lecturer in Gender and International Politics, University of Bristol, said that women “participated in armed conflict in a variety of ways”, while also being “key actors in combating conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
563.First, women were victims of violence perpetrated in conflict. Second, women and girls participated in combat. Women were “combatants within non-state armed groups” in conflicts, including in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Some had leadership roles. Women and girls had also, for example, been “deployed … as suicide bombers” by Boko Haram (see Box 24).
564.Third, they played “support roles in conflict”, including “cooking, cleaning, farming, and serving as porters”. Fourth, while “in the minority and typically not occupying leadership positions”, women were represented in national armed forces as part of peacekeeping missions and in combat. Women represented 4.7% of military personal and 10.8% of police personnel in UN peacekeeping missions in 2019.
565.The role of women in conflict differed across Sub-Saharan Africa. Witnesses cited “coercion”, “ideology”, survival”, “economic security” and “political activism” among the factors contributing to women’s participation.
566.Dr Ero stressed the need to “see women not just as peacebuilders but as political agents”. Women might be “forced into militancy, through family pressure or other pressures”, or “have chosen to go into militancy because there is no other survival route for them” in countries “where the state is either absent or predatory.”
567.Agencies such as the AU and UN needed to “grapple with” this issue. Initiatives to support women affected by conflict offered “very generic solutions” with “little bearing on the reality faced by some of these women who have been stigmatised by association with jihadi groups or insurgencies”. There had been an “excessive focus on so-called deradicalisation efforts”; these focused heavily on issues such as “religious ideology”.
568.Dr Ero said women and girls were “fundamental” to efforts to “bring … crises to an end”. Dr Medie said that at “the sub-national, national, and international levels, women have advocated for and worked towards the prevention and resolution of conflicts”. This made women “key actors in combating conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Dr Holmes said women’s “long history of political activism spanning colonial and postcolonial eras” underpinned their role.
571.The House of Lords Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict published a report, Sexual violence in conflict: a war crime, in 2016. Dr Holmes said that while “battle age” men were “more likely to be killed”, women and children were “more vulnerable” to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). This was principally a result of “prevailing structural gender inequalities”. Such violence could be “strategic or opportunist” and was often both.
572.Dr Medie said that violence, including sexual violence, was widespread in non-state armed groups.
573.Dr Holmes said that women “across the African continent” had been “at the forefront of campaigning to prevent and end CRSV … for over five decades.” They had “drawn attention to these issues and placed them on the agenda” of the UN and the AU, and “developed instruments that urge state and non-state actors to address gender-based violence and other problems that confront women and girls in conflict-affected countries.” The UN’s ‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS) agenda had “been a major development”.
574.Dr Holmes said there had been “continued strengthening of the UN’s normative framework” on women, peace and security. However, divisions within the Security Council threatened to undermine the agenda; for example, the US opposed the inclusion of “important language on provisions on sexual and reproductive health rights of survivors” of sexual violence in conflict as part of UNSCR 2467 in 2019.
575.Dr Medie said that “more research” was needed to assess the impact of international efforts to combat sexual violence in conflict, but there were “indications that some of these measures have led to changes in conflict-affected countries.”
576.Dr Holmes said the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) had been a “high-profile, cross-governmental initiative” established in 2012 and given greater prominence in 2014 under the leadership of the then Foreign Secretary, now Lord Hague of Richmond. Dr Medie said the PSVI had “contributed to advancing the UN’s WPS agenda”.
577.In January 2020 the Independent Commission for Aid Impact published its report on The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative. It reported waning “political leadership”, falling levels of funding, and the absence of a “theory of change” or “overarching strategy”.
578.Dr Holmes said the UK’s programming was “fragmented”. It was “not fully aligned to the African Union’s own WPS agenda”, which was “working towards … a cross-continental approach to the eradication of structural gendered inequalities and all forms of discrimination” and “emphasising the critical role of African women as agents of change.”
579.Witnesses made four recommendations to enhance work to prevent sexual violence in conflict. First, Dr Medie said there should be investment in “programs that have the potential to generate long-term impact” over “temporary initiatives”.
580.Second, work was needed to “address … global political and economic factors”—“macroeconomic policies, global capital accumulation, and trade liberalisation”—that “contribute to the perpetration of sexual violence and negatively impact the experiences of survivors.”
581.Third, countries should “invest time and resources in conflict prevention”, to “address underlying issues … that render women and men insecure.” Finally, Dr Ero said “we should not lay the burden of finding the solution at the doors of women only”.
582.The UK has been a leader in international efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict. This work has, however, suffered from a lack of senior political leadership in recent years. The Government should review its work in this area and consider carefully the issues raised in the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s recent report.
583.The UN and the AU have a number of active peacekeeping missions in Sub-Saharan Africa. We consider here the role of these organisations in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in the region.
584.As discussed earlier in this chapter, Dr Ero said it was crucial to “appreciate … that the nature of conflict” had “changed tremendously”—becoming more regionalised—which was a challenge for traditional peacekeeping missions focused on single states.
585.Figure 6 shows AU, REC and UN peacekeeping operations.
586.General Sir Richard Barrons said the UN had “a very well-structured peacekeeping operation”, with half of its “live operations” in Africa. While it was “used to running large-scale enduring peacekeeping operations” the UN’s mandates tended to be narrow “because it is driven by consensus.”
587.Dr Ero recognised the “limits of the UN”. It was “questionable how much difference the UN” had “made in some crises”, with Mali being one example.
588.The AU leads a mission in Somalia (AMISON, discussed above and in Box 23) and has a hybrid mission in Darfur with the UN (UNAMID). AMISOM is the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.
589.Dr Ero said that not all AU member states “necessarily” saw the AU as “the go-to institution” in a crisis. Often the RECs were seen “as the first point of contact”. The relationship between the AU and the RECs was “not always seamless”, as discussed in Chapter 3. Dr Westcott said that the RECs remained “in some ways more influential on security issues”.
590.The AU’s influence was dependent on “unity of purpose” amongst its members. Dr Westcott said when that was the case, such as with Somalia, the AU’s role was “critical”. Where the AU was divided, particularly countries neighbouring a conflict, the AU’s influence was limited. This was the case with Burundi and South Sudan.
591.Professor Murithi said that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had “led the process leading to a peace agreement” in South Sudan in 2011. When there had been a “breakout of violence” in 2013 and 2015, the AU “struggled to relate” to IGAD and was not influential.
592.Progress has been made on relations between the AU and the RECs. There had been “much better movement” recently, in particular with a 2019 decision to arrange an AU “co-ordination and implementation summit … working directly with the” RECs.
593.The AU’s underlying principles and doctrines affect its role in peacekeeping and conflict management. First, Professor Murithi said that the founding Constitutive Act of the AU empowered the AU “to intervene when it perceives a crisis”. This had led to a plan to develop a “robust African Standby Force … made up of five continental brigades”. The Force was originally “due to be launched in 2010”, was subsequently delayed to 2015 and had now “pretty much fizzled out”.
594.Second, there is the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ policy, agreed in 2013, which declared its:
“determination to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa, to make peace a reality for all our people and to rid the continent of wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters and violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide.”
595.Dr Ero said that the “idea of ‘Silencing the Guns’ by 2020 was never a realistic proposition”. By giving “itself just seven years in which to end wars … and prevent genocide” the AU “set a high bar”. The agenda was “one of those grand gestures” that contributed to “perceptions that the African Union does not achieve its goals.”
596.Dr Ero said the organisations relied on each other. The UN derived “its political legitimacy on the continent from the African Union most of the time”. Similarly, the “AU depends on the UN”, with it being “hard to ignore the fact that” the AU “needs the UN and the financing that comes from it”.
597.Dr Ero said that there had been some recent “improvements” in the “still … awkward” relationship. She praised the relationships between the AU Chairperson and the UN Secretary General, and between the UN’s Chief of Peace Operations and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. Despite this, Dr Ero said there remained a perception, “real or perceived, that the UN still treats the AU like the … junior partner, despite the amount of heavy lifting [the AU] does and the great sacrifice that a lot of African troops contribute to … matters of international peace and security”.
598.Burden-sharing, both between the AU and its non-African partners, and between the AU and the UN, was discussed by several witnesses. Dr Ero said Africans and the AU were asked “to fill the gaps … where the UN is reluctant to go” and that it was “paying a heavy price” for this. For example, “one of the most dangerous peacekeeping missions on the continent today is Mali, a mission that is predominantly filled by African troop-contributing countries”.
599.General Sir Richard Barrons said that “many of the major troop contributors to the UN”—both African and non-African countries—had “made it pretty clear” they would not continue to support a situation in which they provide the “soldiers on the ground who are doing the doing and the dying while” other countries “provide the commanders and staff officers”.
600.Equipment was also an issue in terms of burden-sharing. General Sir Richard Barrons said while there was “no shortage of … young men and women who want to be soldiers and are good at it” in Sub-Saharan Africa, their governments often “cannot afford to equip [their] own armed forces”. (The UK’s support for Sub-Saharan African militaries is considered later in this chapter.)
601.Professor Murithi raised the issue of resourcing in the context of the AU. The AU’s partners should emphasise “increased … capacity that is homegrown and located on the continent”, which would be a “win for everyone”—for example, NATO would not be required “to airlift on the hoof” and the Russians wouldn’t need to “come in with their Antonovs and lift troops” across the continent.
602.An issue of contention in the AU–UN relationship is financing. General Sir Richard Barrons said AU peacekeeping was “substantially cheaper than a UN solution.” Dr Ero referred to negotiations between the UN and the AU for the latter to pay 25% of the cost of Security Council-authorised missions and the UN to pay the remainder with assessed contributions. She said concern that the AU could not afford this was “central” to the dispute.
603.The Government supported “in principle” the “AU’s efforts to secure UN assessed funds for AU-led peacekeeping and enforcement operations”. The All-Party Parliamentary Group for Africa urged the Government to continue this support.
604.We welcome the Government’s support of the use of UN-assessed contributions to fund AU-led peacekeeping missions. We would welcome more information on how the Government plans to use the 2019 UK-AU Memorandum of Understanding to support further security co-operation.
605.Some witnesses questioned the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Dr Ero said the UN and the AU needed to “assess their own performance” in the context of missions that had not produced meaningful progress.
606.What the UN was good at, according to General Sir Richard Barrons, was “not making [a] problem worse”, but not necessarily “making the problem any better”. If there was “a peace to keep, having an awful lot of quite basically trained soldiers doing interposition between armed forces” would “work”, but it could “freeze the conflict for a generation”.
607.The “reluctance to see UN forces [in Africa] that are not African” was “good” and “bad”. On the one hand, it meant that “soldiers on the ground” had “a better sense of what is going on”. On the other, it resulted in “many African countries” sustaining their “armed forces on the back of” the UN paying “them to do peacekeeping”. This meant that some armed forces in the region did “not have a huge interest in [peacekeeping] finishing”.
608.Search for Common Ground said there was “over-reliance on … militarised actions”. Peacekeeping missions had “undoubtedly contributed to the protection of civilians and the improvement of fragile situations”, but it was “impossible to look at ongoing violence” in some countries with peacekeeping missions and “believe that the situation is … the future envisioned twenty years ago”. There was “a need to move away from reactive responses to conflict and move towards long-term prevention-focused efforts.”
609.Dr Tchie said that African and international responses to the security challenges facing parts of Sub-Saharan Africa were “hampered by a prevailing focus [on] ongoing criminality, violence, conflicts and terrorism rather than on their prevention”. Dr Ero said the need to focus more on prevention had been recognised by the AU. The Chairperson of the AU, Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa, had used the 2020 AU Summit to propose an “extraordinary meeting to focus on conflict prevention.”
610.General Sir Richard Barrons said there were “many Anglophone countries in Africa that” looked “to the UK as a source of guidance, wisdom, inspiration and money”, and as a “military reference point”. The UK’s response to the “warmth” shown by African militaries had been “threadbare”.
611.He praised the UK’s work to “impart … a really high standard of basic infantry skill”. However, there were a number of issues with the UK’s approach. First, the UK “never bought [Sub-Saharan African militaries] any equipment”. Second, the UK had failed to “build institutions”. The UK had focused on “low-level training” and not supporting ministries of defence or military staff capability.
612.Third, the UK was not willing to “accompany” partner militaries in battle. The UK was good at training, advising and assisting, but “entirely political reasons” meant British troops ‘waved’ off their partners “at the camp gate”. This was not always the case in non-African theatres: the UK had managed to accompany partner troops successfully in Afghanistan.
613.Fourth, the Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, said that it was unclear how the Government built feedback from its Sub-Saharan African partners into planning and strategy making in Whitehall. It was concerned that the UK was presenting “‘ready made’ plans” for military training, not taking account of the local situation.
614.Witnesses said that there were risks associated with training state militaries in the region. The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, said that since 2007 “23% of violent incidents against civilians recorded were perpetrated by state forces”. The appropriate response was not always to train national security forces, as this could serve to build “the capacity of predatory armed forces”.
615.Dr Tchie said the training of state forces risked exacerbating internal tensions, including between ethnic groups. Once trained, groups “associated with the centre of power” often went on to inflict “large amounts of indiscriminate violence against civilians”. The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, said it was vital that the UK built on “its ability to recognise when local governments and state forces” were the “drivers of instability and violence”.
616.General Sir Richard Barrons said that, unless the UK spent its resources “very differently”, it was beyond the Government’s ability to tackle security challenges alone. France (discussed earlier in this chapter) was a particularly important partner. The United States, on the other hand, had a “light … security footprint” in Africa, focused on counter-terrorism; this was by design. The grounds for UK–US co-operation were “limited” and the US could not be expected to “carry all the water”.
617.The UK’s contribution to African and international peacekeeping was considered by several witnesses. Ms Mathews said the UK sought to “build up African capability”, including “training and improving peacekeeping capability”. Dr Ero said the UK deserved “a lot of credit” for its “renewed engagement” in UN peacekeeping. In particular, the UN Secretariat spoke “highly” of the UK’s “role as a partner in Mali”.
618.Dr Ero said there were “tremendous opportunities” for the UK in conflict prevention and resolution, citing South Sudan and Somalia. The UK should use its “considerable influence … on the UN’s development agenda and on the World Bank … in terms of how money is deployed to serve conflict-related issues and making sure that the money is wisely deployed to appropriate places to shape conflicts.” Ms Mathews said the Government was “going right back to the beginning on the causes” of conflict, “through to mediation and early intervention.”
619.The UK and its international partners have too often focused on addressing the immediate consequences of conflict, to the detriment of efforts to tackle the underlying conditions that allow conflict to emerge. The Government should, in its Integrated Review, consider how the UK can best use its resources and influence to develop longer-term strategies to prevent conflict, and above all to prevent genocide, and support regional partners.
620.As part of efforts to support regional partners to take the lead in conflict prevention, management and resolution, the Government should review its approach to military training. It should consider whether the British Army should accompany the militaries it is training on some missions. The Government must be mindful that militaries in the region themselves sometimes contribute to instability and human rights abuses.
621.We reiterate the conclusion of the 2016 report of the International Relations Committee, The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General, on the “critical” importance of pre-deployment training to improve operations and “act as a preventative measure against misconduct”. This is relevant to training for the UK’s partners in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the context of UN missions.
623.The FCO said that it worked closely with DfID, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Home Office on conflict and stability issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, thought there had been “real improvements” since the 1990s: the National Security Council was playing a valuable role and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (see Box 26) had improved in-country co-ordination.
The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) is “a cross government fund which supports and delivers activity to tackle instability and to prevent conflicts that threaten UK interests.”
It was launched in 2015 and has an annual budget of £1.26 billion. This budget is split between ODA and other funds. It is used by 12 Government departments and operates in 70 countries.
It is accountable to the National Security Council through the Cabinet Office.
624.However, “enduring challenges” continued to “hinder” co-ordination between MoD and the FCO. Lord Boateng said that “closer co-operation across government departments” had “not happened”.
625.Witnesses considered the rules on ODA spending agreed by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (see Chapter 5).
626.General Sir Richard Barrons said the MoD had “no money but … many challenges”. On the other hand, while DfID had “a lot of money”, it could not, “by law”, spend it on defence-related issues. This was a matter of “grave disappointment” to the UK’s African counterparts; British troops turned up “well-equipped and well-fed” and gave them “very little—almost nothing in some cases.” Ms Edmondson said there was “a lot” the Government could “do within DAC rules to support peacekeeping and good practice”, but there were “limits”.
627.Baroness Amos was not opposed to “a review of the DAC rules”, but said it was important such a review took place for the right reasons. She was “against” other departments trying to “grab a bit” of the UK’s 0.7% commitment. Part of the “strength” of the UK’s “development agenda” had been that the UK was “very clear” about what its resources were spent on. She would be “loath” to “see ODA money being used on military resolution to conflict.”
628.Lord Boateng said the Government had “consistently underfunded” and “paid too little regard” to the UK’s “military diplomatic effort in underpinning peace keeping and stability” in Sub-Saharan Africa. He said MoD and FCO budget cuts, and the failure to share “resources” in a way that could be legitimate under current rules, had weakened the UK’s efforts.
629.In February 2019, DfID responded to a Henry Jackson Society report, Global Britain: a twenty-first century vision, which called for the UK to gain “the freedom to define aid as it sees fit” and allow “more spending to be channelled through” the FCO and the MoD. The Government said “international rules set by” the DAC “ensure aid spending is genuinely focused on poverty reduction in developing countries.” There were areas where it considered the rules “outdated” and in which it had “led the way in pushing for reforms.” It gave the example of the UK having “secured an increase in the proportion of aid spending which can be contributed to peacekeeping missions.”
630.Revisions to the Development Assistance Committee’s rules on ODA to help support peacekeeping efforts have been helpful. There could be value in further revisions to support work on addressing the underlying causes of insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the Government should be careful in proposing further changes to ensure that the function of ODA remains supporting poverty reduction in developing countries.
747 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
748 Written evidence from Search for Common Ground ()
752 Written evidence from the FCO ()
753 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
754 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
757 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
758 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
760 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
762 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
767 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
769 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response ()
771 Written evidence from World Food Programme London Office ()
774 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer () and written evidence from the World Food Programme London Office ()
775 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
776 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme ()
777 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (). Also see written evidence from Dr François Gaulme ().
778 Written evidence from the World Food Programme London Office ()
779 Written evidence from Paul Melly ()
781 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, , 8 June 2016
782 UN, ‘Security Council Authorizes Deployment of African-Led International Support Mission in Mali for Initial Year-Long Period’ (20 December 2012): [accessed 24 June 2020]
783 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, , 8 June 2016
784 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, , 8 June 2016
785 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, , 8 June 2016
786 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, , 8 June 2016
787 UNSCR, ‘UNSCR Resolution 2100 (2013)’ (23 April 2013): [accessed 24 June 2020]
788 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: UK troop deployment’, , 29 April 2020
789 South Front, ‘French Anti-terror Efforts in Africa’s Sahel Region’ (6 April 2016): [accessed 24 June 2020]
790 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: UK troop deployment’, , 29 April 2020
791 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme ()
792 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
793 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
794 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
795 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme ()
796 Written evidence from Paul Melly ()
797 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
798 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme ())
799 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
800 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
801 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
802 The G5 Sahel (also known as the G5S) is an institutional framework for coordinating regional development and security policies between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It was established in 2014.
803 Written evidence from Paul Melly ()
804 Written evidence from World Food Programme London Office ()
805 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme ()
806 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
808 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
809 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme ()
810 Written evidence from Professor Andrew Yaw Tchie ()
812 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
813 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
814 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer ()
815 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
816 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
817 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
818 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
820 BBC News, ‘Somalia profile—Timeline’ (4 January 2018): [accessed 24 June 2020]
821 UN, ‘Somalia—UNOSOM I’: [accessed 24 June 2020]
822 BBC News, ‘Somalia profile—Timeline’, (4 January 2018): [accessed 24 June 2020]
826 (Dr Nick Westcott)
827 Written evidence from Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group ()
828 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
831 Security Council Report, 2020 Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Penholders (14 May 2020): [accessed 24 June 2020]
833 Dr Modupe Oshikoya said that Boko Haram refers to itself as “Jamã’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihãd [JAS], which in Arabic means ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad’”: Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya ()
834 Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya ()
835 Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya ()
836 Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya ()
838 Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya ()
839 Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya ()
840 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response ()
841 . She also said “there are many other layers” to the conflict.
842 Written evidence from the International Organisation for Peace and Social Justice (PSJ UK) ()
843 Written evidence from Elizabeth Donnelly ()
844 Written evidence from Elizabeth Donnelly ()
845 Written evidence from James Duddridge MP ()
846 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response ()
848 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response ()
849 Written evidence from the camp for Peace and Justice in Cameroon ()
850 Written evidence from the Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon ()
851 Written evidence from the Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon ()
852 The standing decision-making organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.
853 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
855 Written evidence from Lord Boateng ()
857 Written evidence from the FCO ()
858 (Dr Nick Westcott)
859 Written evidence from Dr Will Jones (). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a third of the world’s 68 million forcibly displaced persons are in Africa. This includes 6.3 million refugees and asylum-seekers and 14.5 million internally displaced persons. Franck Kuwonu, ‘Ending forced displacement in Africa, a collective effort’, UN Africa Renewal: [accessed 24 June 2020]
860 Written evidence from Dr Will Jones ()
861 Written evidence from Dr Will Jones ()
862 UN, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted on 31 October 2000: [accessed 24 June 2020]
863 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
864 Written evidence from Dr Peace A Medie ()
865 Written evidence from Dr Peace A Medie ()
866 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
867 Written evidence from Dr Peace A Medie () and United Nations, ‘Women in Peacekeeping’: [accessed 24 June 2020]
868 Written evidence from Dr Peace A Medie ()
869 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
871 (Dr Comfort Ero)
873 Written evidence from Dr Peace A. Medie ()
874 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
875 Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict, (Report of Session 2015–16, HL Paper 123)
876 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
877 Written evidence from Dr Peace A. Medie ()
878 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
879 Written evidence from Dr Peace A. Medie ()
880 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
881 Written evidence from Dr Peace A. Medie ()
882 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
883 Written evidence from Dr Peace A. Medie ()
884 ICAI, Report: The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (9 January 2020) [accessed 24 June 2020]
885 Written evidence from Dr Georgina Holmes ()
886 Written evidence from Dr Peace A Medie ()
887 Written evidence from Dr Peace A Medie ()
888 Written evidence from Dr Peace A Medie ()
893 Written evidence from the FCO ()
896 . Dr Ero said that the AU had achieved unity and played an important role in Somalia, where the AU led the peacekeeping mission. . Professor Murithi said the AU had, however, “not been effective in consolidating peace, securing a platform for stability … or national reconciliation”.
900 AU, 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration (26 May 2013): [accessed 24 June 2020]. A joint Small Arms Survey-African Union study published in 2019 found that civilians in Sub-Saharan Africa—including rebel groups and militias—hold more than 40 million small arms and light weapons. Government-related entities hold fewer than 11 million. Zipporah Musau, ‘Silencing the guns in Africa by 2020’, Africa Renewal (23 December 2019): [accessed 18 June 2020]
910 Written evidence from the FCO ()
911 Written evidence from the APPG for Africa ()
916 Written evidence from Search for Common Ground ()
917 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
922 Written evidence Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group ()
923 Written evidence Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group ()
924 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie ()
925 Written evidence Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group () In considering UN peacekeeping missions, the International Relations Committee’s report, The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General, noted the importance of pre-deployment training in improving missions and acting as a preventative measure against misconduct. Select Committee on International Relations, (1st Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 60)
927 Written evidence from General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE ()
933 Written evidence from the FCO ()
934 Written evidence from the Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group ()
935 Written evidence from the Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group ()
936 Written evidence from Lord Boateng ()
941 Written evidence from Lord Boateng ()
942 Bob Seely MP and James Rogers, Henry Jackson Society, Global Britain: A Twenty-First Century Vision, Henry (February 2019) p 8: [accessed 24 June 2020]
943 DfID Media Team, ‘Spending 0.7% on UK aid—and in the national interest’ (11 February 2019): [accessed 24 June 2020]