Chapter 3: Maritime security
61.Maritime security is a broad term which can mean “very different things” to different people.63 Professor Klein told us that it is traditionally associated with a state’s national security, but it is now considered to be a “broader concept”, relating to “the protection of a state’s land and maritime territory and the protection of its infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea”.64
62.The broadening of the definition of maritime security was influenced by particular events. Dr Galani said that 9/11 was a turning point, when traditional understandings of maritime security threats were expanded to include terrorism. Over time armed robbery, piracy, trafficking offences (including trafficking of drugs or people), terrorism, illegal fishing and deliberately harming the marine environment have also been included in its scope.65
63.Technological advancements have also changed states’ perceptions of threats. These include cyber-attacks against vessels and port systems and the use of automated systems (including drones and maritime autonomous vessels) by criminal groups for illegal activities.66
64.We heard that maritime security threats differ between countries and regions. Professor Klein told us that in Africa, for example, there is a greater focus on oil theft; in Asia on armed robbery, inter-state disputes and terrorism; in the European Union on illegal migration and the protection of underwater heritage; and in the polar regions on the consequences of melting ice.67
Does UNCLOS help or hinder maritime security?
65.UNCLOS itself does not define maritime security. Although it refers to “security”, Dr Galani said that this mostly concerns the “traditional understanding” of maritime security and not its broader understanding.68 Nevertheless, Professor Klein told us that UNCLOS provides a “starting point” in terms of maritime security, as it sets out the rights and responsibilities of states, “particularly the policing powers of coastal states”.69 The provisions of UNCLOS are supplemented by other treaties focusing on transnational crime, including the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and the 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.70 It is also supplemented by resolutions of the UN Security Council and customary international law.71
66.Despite this, Dr Galani told us that views were mixed on whether UNCLOS helps or hinders maritime security in practice. She explained that UNCLOS allows states to operate close to their shores—“they can adopt legislation to deal with maritime security in their territorial waters, for example”—but that, the further from the shore, “the less powers they have to deal with maritime security”. She thought that the “main problem … is on the high seas” which are governed by the two principles of freedom of navigation and exclusive flag state jurisdiction, which “really limit what states can do when it comes to enhancing maritime security.”72
67.Witnesses were clear that both the principles of freedom of navigation and exclusive flag state jurisdiction were important elements of the law of the sea. Sir Michael told us that exclusive jurisdiction of flag states is important as it “ensures that there is always one state responsible for the ship”, but also because it provides a mechanism for protecting freedom of navigation, as it ensures that states cannot “extend their jurisdiction to foreign ships on the high seas without the consent of the flag state”.73 However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the widespread use of flags of convenience has undermined the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction, with implications for maritime security.
Flags of convenience
68.UNCLOS provides that vessels registered to any state can enjoy freedom of navigation on the high seas. UNCLOS allows for stop and search operations only in strictly defined situations, including the ground of reasonable suspicion that a vessel is involved in illegal activity, or when the aim of the operation is to establish the flag of the vessel. Otherwise, Article 94 of UNCLOS says that concerned parties should report the matter to the flag state, which can investigate the claim and take any action it finds necessary, including physical intervention.74
69.But many ships are registered with flag states that are unwilling or unable to enforce laws on the high seas. Professor Petrig told us that the use of such flags of convenience has increased dramatically over time—in the 1950s open registries accounted for less than 5 per cent of global fleet, today the top three flag states by tonnage are flags of convenience.75 She said that states have engaged in a “race to the bottom” with increasingly “lower costs and less regulation”, leading others to follow suit. This race is further accelerated by some flag states establishing “so-called second or international registries”, intended to “to repatriate tonnage lost to flags of convenience”, but which in reality accelerate the lowering of standards.76 Dr Galani said that this practice has meant the high seas are now “an area where illegal activity thrives”.77
70.Some witnesses doubted whether the issue could be solved without addressing the root causes of flags of convenience, which are economic. Professor Klein said that: “Until we get some fundamental economic reforms, or we are willing to make some changes that might cost the industry some money, it seems very difficult to perceive how we might deal with flags of convenience.”78
71.Nevertheless, there have been attempts to mitigate the security challenges created by flags of convenience. One proposal is to strengthen the requirement for ships to have a ‘genuine link’ with the flag state, provided for in Article 91 of UNCLOS.79 This was a key impetus behind the 1986 UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships. However, the agreement has only been ratified by 14 countries—far short of the 40 needed to enter into force. The UK is not a party. Professor Guilfoyle said that other, earlier attempts to strengthen this requirement via an international treaty also failed because “anywhere you drew a line for meaningful legal supervision, the countries falling below that line objected to its being brought into a UN treaty”.80
72.Professor Guilfoyle suggested an alternative approach could be that states are permitted to refuse to recognise the flag of the vessel if they consider there is no genuine link between the vessel and the flag state. This would effectively render such ships “stateless” and would “enable them to be subjected to the jurisdiction of any warship or government vessel they encountered.”81 However, this has been rejected by ITLOS, which found that “the idea of a genuine link … does not actually provide criteria for other states to challenge the validity of a ship’s right to fly a flag.”82
73.While there is not yet international agreement on strengthening the genuine link requirement, we heard that individual states could do more to strengthen their own registries. Nautilus International told us that while the UK, which is considered a “quality flag”, requires shipowners to meet one of several criteria to establish a genuine link,83 it is a “very wide list of criteria”. They also noted that the International Transport Workers’ Federation’s list of flags of convenience include several that are overseen by the UK Ship Register.84
74.Another option is to strengthen the ability of port states to exercise jurisdiction over vessels when they come into port. Professor Barnes highlighted the Paris Memorandum of Understanding as an example of port state controls on a regional level. He said the IMO has endorsed this approach and also encouraged other regional groups to pursue similar arrangements.85
75.The FCDO recognised that there is “currently no binding international framework to regulate the registration process itself.” It noted that the 1986 UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships “has not received sufficient support from states and has not entered into force”, but it did not explain why the UK has not signed the convention.86
76.When asked, the Rt Hon Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park, Minister for Pacific and the Environment at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, told us he “did not know” why the UK did not sign up to the 1986 Convention, but that he has recently asked the Department of Transport to undertake a review into this issue. He acknowledged that: “Our job would be made easier if we saw a tightening up of the system so that there was a very clear link between the flagged vessel and the jurisdiction that owns that flag”.87 Andrew Murdoch, Legal Director at the FCDO’s Ocean Policy Unit told us that: “Part of the issue is that for this to be effective … it needs widespread support, in particular from the states with the largest registries” and highlighted that the two requirements for the convention coming into force (40 signatories and over 25 per cent of the gross tonnage) are “[nowhere] near to being met at the moment.”88 But this does not explain why the UK has not supported, or attempted to increase support for, the convention itself.
77.While exclusive flag state jurisdiction is an important principle of the law of the sea, the widespread use of flags of convenience poses a particular challenge for maritime security and the enforcement of laws on the high seas.
78.The use of flags of convenience is a major barrier to the enforcement of rules on the high seas. Often flag states with the largest registered tonnage do not have the capacity or inclination to fulfil their obligations in terms of management, control or enforcement of their registered fleet. The Government should take a leadership role and work with others to ensure the link between vessels and the state in which they are registered is genuine and substantial.
79.The Government should commit to tightening the criteria of its own ship registry, to act as an example to other states.
80.It remains unclear why the UK Government has not signed the 1986 Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, and we regret that this has not happened. We ask that the Government includes in its response to this report more detail on the review they have commissioned into this, including its remit and when it will report.
81.We welcome the increased appetite for strengthening port state controls, and the International Maritime Organization should be commended for its efforts in this regard.
Examples of maritime security challenges
Piracy and armed robbery at sea
82.Piracy is a clear maritime security challenge, but Professor Barnes said that when UNCLOS was negotiated, piracy was considered to be a “historic crime”.89 However, the emergence of piracy in the Horn of Africa, south Asia, the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Guinea has led to a renewed focus on modern piracy.90
83.Witnesses explained that modern piracy is often caused by issues stemming from a state’s territory. These range from economic challenges to lack of governance and effective rule of law, and as a result, dealing with piracy requires also addressing its root causes on the land.91
84.Some witnesses thought that UNCLOS is generally successful at dealing with piracy. Professor Barnes told us that it provides “a reasonably clear framework” and that for dealing with activities such as armed robbery at sea, it is supplemented by other international agreements such as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA convention).92 Professor Guilfoyle agreed, saying that UNCLOS’s provisions “create a broad and flexible jurisdiction to suppress piracy on the high seas and to prosecute those offences in national courts”.93 Professor Barnes noted that there are practical challenges to implementing the rules, but that these generally need to be tackled “at a level below” UNCLOS.94
85.Professor Barnes, Professor Guilfoyle and Admiral Sir Philip Jones, the former First Sea Lord, thought that the response to piracy off the coast of Somalia was successful.95 Professor Barnes noted it took “considered effort in international co-operation and huge investment in the deployment of vessels, followed up by regional capacity-building initiatives”.96 Professor Guilfoyle said that Article 110 of UNCLOS proved “sufficiently flexible to conduct those operations and to prosecute pirate financiers and kingpins who remained largely ashore but conducted acts of facilitation”.97
86.However, Dr Ioannis Chapsos, Assistant Professor at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at the University of Coventry, and colleagues thought that UNCLOS should be further refined to better address modern piracy. In their view, UNCLOS has “weakened counter-piracy activities” and there remains a lack of clarity around several issues including that of ‘hot pursuit’.98 They explained that the provisions on the right of hot pursuit in Article 111 of UNCLOS “add strict limitations on pursuing a vessel suspected of engaging in piratical acts”, including that the pursuit must end once “the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State”. This “eases the evasion of prosecution by suspected pirates.”99 They acknowledged that some limitations of UNCLOS were “partially rectified” in the SUA convention and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, but challenges remain.
87.Dr Chapsos and colleagues also noted that some of the initiatives to address the challenge of modern piracy can contravene or undermine UNCLOS. For example, many ships now use privately contracted armed security personnel when transiting through high-risk areas. This makes the enforcement of UNCLOS’s provisions even more challenging, as the convention lacks any provisions related to such non-state actors.100 Privately contracted armed security personnel are discussed further in Chapter 5 with reference to human rights.
88.We heard that the increased use of maritime autonomous vehicles (MAVs; addressed further in Chapter 6) is also a challenge to UNCLOS’s provisions concerning piracy. Professor Petrig told us that it was unclear whether attacks using MAVs, such as those that have been carried out already in the Red Sea, could be classed as piracy:
“Piracy as defined in UNCLOS requires that the act of violence is committed by the crew or the passengers of a private ship. The question is whether explicit reference to crew only covers onboard crews or also remote crews and, if a remote crew qualifies, whether that person must have direct and immediate control over the vessel through remote control or whether it could be a person simply launching a craft that will collect information on its way and take a decision in relative independence of a human.”101
Similarly, Dr Chapsos and colleagues noted that remotely hacking a MAV belonging to another state would not also legally be classified as an act of piracy, because Article 101 of UNCLOS requires the “physical boarding of the vessel to take place in the high seas for the crime to classify as piracy”.102
89.Professor Petrig added that it would also be difficult to stretch the remit of UNCLOS to activities on land even if it emerged that the operator of a MAV engaging in piratical acts was doing so remotely from there. In the case of piracy off the coast of Somalia, where operations were often conducted from land (though not involving MAVs), enforcement jurisdiction within Somalia’s territorial sea was provided to states by the UN Security Council. But Professor Petrig said that states were reluctant to act on these powers.103 She thought that the advent of MAVs required a reconsideration of how “the land and the sea are connected when it comes to the commission of crimes and jurisdictional issues”.104
90.It became clear that addressing the challenge of modern piracy cannot be addressed solely under the UNCLOS umbrella. It requires domestic legislation, regional cooperation and capacity building, especially for states lacking adequate resources to address the root causes of piracy.105 As an example, Professor Barnes suggested the expansion of ad hoc agreements at the regional level, similar to the US-led proliferation security initiatives, “which allowed for ad hoc inspection and boarding of vessels flying other states’ flags as a cooperative initiative”.106
91.UNCLOS and related instruments have generally been successful at tackling piracy, but there remain challenges. Acts of piracy often originate from the land and cannot be solved by agreements focused only on the sea. However, supplementary agreements including the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation have enhanced the provisions of UNCLOS, and operations combating piracy along the coast of Somalia provide an example of how piracy can be successfully addressed in practice. The Government should further enhance its capacity building activities to assist other coastal states to maintain the good order of the oceans and suppress maritime security threats, including piracy and armed robbery at sea.
92.The advent of maritime autonomous vehicles provides a direct challenge to UNCLOS, which assumes vessels are crewed and cannot be operated remotely. The Government should monitor such developments carefully, and advocate for a clarification of the existing rules if there is an increase in the use of autonomous vehicles for piratical acts.
Law enforcement of maritime zones
93.We heard that the zonal approach established by UNCLOS could present jurisdictional challenges, as shown by the example of provisions related to hot pursuit (see paragraph 86). However, a bigger issue is the effective enforcement of these laws. Professor Haines told us that if it were not for the presence of “enforcement potential”, many of the laws and regulations related to fisheries around the UK would have been broken. He argued that “there is a tremendous amount of stuff going on … on the oceans that will not result in a steady state of governance purely through compliance”.107
94.This is particularly relevant in the case of developing states. Professor Haines and Professor Clive Schofield, Head of Research at the WMU-Sasakawa Global Ocean Institute at the World Maritime University noted that developing states often do not have the capacity for effective surveillance and enforcement of their exclusive economic zones. As a result, these countries need support in terms of advice and resources to monitor and enforce compliance with the law.108
95.Sir Philip told us that the UK and other navies are already providing such support. He mentioned the work of HMS Trent in West Africa and support provided in terms of training and resources, such as Western navies selling or gifting older small patrol vessels to developing countries.109 Additional opportunities for enhanced enforcement may be created by the use of MAVs (discussed in Chapter 6).110
96.The UK should become an advocate and champion of developing and island states with regard to the protection of their coastal waters, exclusive economic zones, and the resources that they hold.
97.We ask that in its response to this report the Government sets out more detail about the kind of support (both in terms of capacity building and resources) the UK provides to developing countries to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement within their waters.
China’s actions in the South China Sea
98.Another category of challenges to maritime security concern instances where states interpret the provisions of UNCLOS in ways which ostensibly undermine it. Dr Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow at Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific Programme, told us these challenges come in two main forms: “long-standing claims which are at odds with the principles of the treaty, and new claims by rising powers”.111 Both of these are exemplified by China’s actions in the South China Sea.
99.China has made claims to an area of water in the South China Sea that goes beyond the 200 nautical mile EEZ provided for in UNCLOS, on the basis of what it refers to as ‘historic rights’.112 The area claimed is enclosed by a U-shaped line on Chinese charts (often referred to as the ‘nine-dash line’) and includes several island chains including the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. Dr Hayton told us that China has claimed sovereign rights and jurisdiction over these territories, as well as certain rights over the waters within U-shaped line, including fishing rights, navigation rights and priority rights of resource development.113 He said that this “represents a fundamental challenge to UNCLOS”, which was “intended to supersede all such ‘historic’ claims”, and that China’s actions “pose a threat to … the rules-based order in the South China Sea”.114 Dr Kuok added that China is also attempting to claim greater maritime entitlements by building artificial islands at Mischief Reef, a low-tide elevation in the EEZ of the Philippines.115
100.In addition, in 1996 China declared a set of ‘straight baselines’ around the Paracel Islands and claimed the area within them as ‘internal waters’. Dr Hayton told us that this is “not allowable under UNCLOS” as “only archipelagic states—countries that are entirely made up of islands …—are permitted to do this.”116 If China’s decision were to stand, it would have implications for a key aspect of freedom of navigation provided for in UNCLOS—the right of innocent passage through territorial waters. Article 24 of UNCLOS allows vessels of all flags to pass through the territorial sea of another country without its prior authorisation if they proceed without stopping or delay and “do nothing to threaten ‘peace, good order or security’ or jeopardise anyone’s safety”.117 There is, however, no right of innocent passage through internal waters.
101.China has also passed domestic legislation which Dr Lynn Kuok, Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told us is “inconsistent” with UNCLOS. In 1992 it passed the Law on the Territorial Sea, which states that “Foreign ships for military purposes shall be subject to approval by the Government of the People’s Republic of China for entering the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China”. Dr Hayton told us that: “The world now faces a situation where China makes use of the innocent passage provisions of UNCLOS abroad but denies that they apply in the South China Sea.”118
102.In 2013, the Philippines brought a legal case against China under the dispute settlement mechanism set out in UNCLOS Annex VII.119 The Arbitral Tribunal did not have jurisdiction, however, to resolve the question of sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute. But in 2016, it found that none of the disputed features were “islands” as defined by Article 121 UNCLOS and therefore none were entitled to generate a 200 nautical mile EEZ or continental shelf. It also held that China’s claims to “historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention”. China did not engage with the arbitration and has refused to recognise the ruling.120
103.The FCDO told us that the Government’s view is that freedom of navigation “must be safeguarded, as must the right of innocent passage through territorial seas, transit passage through international straits used for navigation”.121 The Government considers the preservation of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea as “essential to the UK’s economic and security interests, and that of our allies and partners”.122
104.The FCDO said that the Government is “committed to reinforcing the primacy of UNCLOS in the South China Sea and has most recently supported this position in practice through the deployment of the UK Carrier Strike Group to South China Sea in 2021”. 123 The UK has also exercised the right of innocent passage in other disputed waters, including through the territorial seas of Ukraine (Crimea) in June 2021, the international waters of the Taiwan Strait of 26 September 2021, the Gulf of Guinea in October 2021; and routine Royal Navy operations in the Strait of Hormuz.124
105.Nevertheless, witnesses suggested the UK could do more to uphold the principle of freedom of navigation. Dr Hayton recommended that the UK should consistently make it clear that UNCLOS Article 24 “applies everywhere”, including to Chinese ships:
“When Chinese warships make use of ‘innocent passage’ rules to sail near the UK, this should be publicised. The UK might want to take a view on whether its own belief in ‘innocent passage’ through the English Channel should apply to countries that don’t apply the same interpretation of international law in their own waters.”125
Dr Kuok agreed, saying that that the UK should make it clear it “does take a position on whether certain features are land features (‘islands’ or ‘rocks’) or merely low-tide elevations not entitled to an independent sovereignty claim or territorial sea”. It could do this by “sailing within 12 nautical miles of features the international tribunal ruled are low-tide elevations”, such as those at Mischief Reef.126
106.SafeSeas agreed that the UK could do more, saying that its history, expertise and network of allies and partners puts it in a strong position to “lead the collective effort towards sharing the burden and the benefits of securing the sea while maintaining freedom of navigation”. It recommended the UK builds a network of like-minded maritime nations under a “‘collective sea power’ strategy”. Initiatives under the strategy would include “confidence-building measures with allies and partners, port calls, joint naval exercises, and showing the flag in contested waters”.127
107.The Government should consider noncompliance with UNCLOS as a fundamental violation of the international rules-based order. Such violations should give cause for the Government to consider its relationship with noncompliant states.
108.China’s actions in the South China Sea directly undermine and are at odds with the principle of freedom of navigation provided for in UNCLOS.
109.Evidence suggests that it is highly unlikely that China will decide to change its policy of claiming exclusive jurisdiction over the majority of the South China Sea and will continue to reject the principles of freedom of navigation and freedom of innocent passage as outlined by UNCLOS.
110.China’s stance poses a challenge to international law. The UK Government should continue to work with its partners and allies to protect and preserve the principles of freedom of navigation not only in South China Sea, but in every region where it is challenged.
Security threats stemming from climate change
111.We heard that climate change has the potential to exacerbate maritime security challenges. SafeSeas told us that climate change is a “threat multiplier”, as the “effects of climate change on natural systems … impact negatively on human systems”, both directly (for example, via the displacement of people or the reduction and relocation of fish stock) and indirectly (for example by enhancing poverty and inequalities).128 They said that such pressures can “undermine legitimate coastal livelihoods and may provide fertile ground for the growth of blue crimes”.129
112.Witnesses identified the Arctic as a region where climate change may have significant maritime security implications.130 Dr Galani told us that the polar regions “used to be considered safe” and states did “not have to worry much about maritime security in those regions”. But ice melt has led to a “concentration of vessels and humans” in the Arctic in particular, raising concerns about “illegal fishing, human security and safety, and marine pollution”.131 There are already disagreements about which states are entitled to parts of the Arctic Ocean which historically have been ice-covered but will increasingly be open seas. These issues are discussed further in Chapter 4.
113.Climate change is likely to lead to additional maritime security challenges, particularly in the Arctic. We ask that in its response to this report the Government provides us with information about how it is monitoring security-related developments in the Arctic.
76 Q 81 (Professor Anna Petrig). Between 1984 and 1989, eleven countries have decided to open second registries, usually in their offshore dependencies (e.g., Isle of Man, the Netherlands Antilles, Spanish Canary Islands). See more: Rodney Carlisle, ‘Second Registers: Maritime Nations Respond to Flags of Convenience 1984–1998’, Northern Mariner, vol. 19(3), (2009) pp 319-340: https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol19/tnm_19_319-340.pdf [accessed 7 February 2022]
78 Q 26 (Professor Natalie Klein). See also Q 82 (Professor Anna Petrig and Professor Douglas Guilfoyle).
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Maritime and Coastguard Agency, UK Ship Register: A Guide to Registration (April 2019), p 4: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/799033/2019_April_A_Guide_to_Registration_V4.pdf [accessed 7 February 2022]
84 Written evidence from Nautilus International (UNC0024). The International Transport Workers’ Federation’s list of flags of convenience include flags which fly the Red Ensign, such as Gibraltar and Bermuda. Any vessel registered in the UK, Crown Dependency, or an Overseas Territory are allowed to fly the Red Ensign. As explained on the Red Ensign website: “Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and under international law, all ships registered within the Crown Dependencies and UK Overseas Territories are British Ships” and “All Statutory Certificates for British ships registered within the Crown Dependencies and UK Overseas Territories … are therefore issued under the responsibility of the UK.” See more at Red Ensign Group, ‘Frequently asked questions’: https://www.redensigngroup.org/about-us/frequently-asked-questions/ [accessed 7 February 2022]
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
95 Q 91 (Professor Richard Barnes), Q 79 (Professor Douglas Guilfoyle) and Q 67 (Admiral Sir Philip Jones)
98 The right of hot pursuit provides coastal states with the ability to pursue vessels that have committed illegal acts within the state’s jurisdiction. For a lawful exercise of this right, the state must meet the conditions of a lawful pursuit under Article 111 UNCLOS, crucial among them is that the pursued vessel must commit an illegal act within the state’s jurisdiction, be continuously pursued from there and receive a valid order to stop. Pursuit must cease when the pursued vessel enters another state’s territorial sea.
99 Written evidence from Dr Ioannis Chapsos, Dr James Malcolm and Dr Robert McCabe, the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University (UNC0002)
100 Ibid.
102 Written evidence from Dr Ioannis Chapsos, Dr James Malcolm and Dr Robert McCabe, the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University (UNC0002)
104 Ibid.
108 Q 6 (Professor Steven Haines) and Q 61 (Professor Clive Schofield). See also written evidence from Professor Steven Haines (UNC0037).
110 Written evidence from Professor Natalie Klein, Professor Douglas Guilfoyle, Professor Saiful Karim and Professor Rob McLaughlin (UNC0003)
111 Written evidence from Dr Bill Hayton (UNC0012). See also written evidence from Dr Lynn Kuok (UNC0044).
113 Written evidence from Dr Bill Hayton (UNC0012). See also written evidence from Dr Lynn Kuok (UNC0044).
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Permanent Court of Arbitration, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China)’: https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/ [accessed 7 February 2022]
120 Written evidence from Bill Hayton (UNC0012). See also written evidence from Dr Lynn Kuok (UNC0044).
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
128 Ibid.