Summary of conclusions and recommendations
Evaluating UNCLOS
1.Enforcement is a weakness of international law, and is a particular challenge on the high seas. While UNCLOS attempts to address this via the use of flag states, issues related to enforcement capacity and the widespread use of flags of convenience has led to a jurisdictional vacuum on the high seas. (Paragraph 41)
2.The signing of UNCLOS in 1982 was a fundamental step forward for the governance of the oceans. It has been largely successful, and despite the shortcomings explored later in this report, any renegotiation would be dangerous. However, it is clear that in light of its gaps and modern challenges, including human rights at sea, rising sea levels, new technologies and the quest for ever more resource, its provisions need updating and supplementing. It will be important to do this in a way which does not undermine the convention. (Paragraph 53)
3.The Government should use its influence and voice within the International Maritime Organization to explore ways it can update and amend the existing law to address concerns, including maritime autonomous vehicles and human rights at sea. (Paragraph 54)
4.The UK should reconsider its position that annual meetings of the States Parties to UNCLOS are not an appropriate forum to discuss substantive issues. There is scope for these meetings to be used to come to agreement amongst states on the interpretation of UNCLOS’s provisions in the light of emerging challenges. To make the most of this, the UK must ensure it invests in preparatory diplomacy and engagement with likeminded states. (Paragraph 55)
5.The UK, with its strong maritime interests and history, should take on a global leadership role in developing and enforcing the law of sea. The Government should increase its engagement with states and other actors especially in developing areas of the law of the sea, such as human rights at sea, climate change and new maritime technologies. The Government should assist initiatives that further this aim, especially those with connections to the UK. (Paragraph 59)
6.The Government should aim to increase the presence of British judges on institutions like ITLOS, and British personnel in roles in related international institutions. This will show that the UK is committed to upholding the provisions of UNCLOS and the international rule of law. (Paragraph 60)
Maritime security
7.While exclusive flag state jurisdiction is an important principle of the law of the sea, the widespread use of flags of convenience poses a particular challenge for maritime security and the enforcement of laws on the high seas. (Paragraph 77)
8.The use of flags of convenience is a major barrier to the enforcement of rules on the high seas. Often flag states with the largest registered tonnage do not have the capacity or inclination to fulfil their obligations in terms of management, control or enforcement of their registered fleet. The Government should take a leadership role and work with others to ensure the link between vessels and the state in which they are registered is genuine and substantial. (Paragraph 78)
9.The Government should commit to tightening the criteria of its own ship registry, to act as an example to other states. (Paragraph 79)
10.It remains unclear why the UK Government has not signed the 1986 Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, and we regret that this has not happened. We ask that the Government includes in its response to this report more detail on the review they have commissioned into this, including its remit and when it will report. (Paragraph 80)
11.We welcome the increased appetite for strengthening port state controls, and the International Maritime Organization should be commended for its efforts in this regard. (Paragraph 81)
12.UNCLOS and related instruments have generally been successful at tackling piracy, but there remain challenges. Acts of piracy often originate from the land and cannot be solved by agreements focused only on the sea. However, supplementary agreements including the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation have enhanced the provisions of UNCLOS, and operations combating piracy along the coast of Somalia provide an example of how piracy can be successfully addressed in practice. The Government should further enhance its capacity building activities to assist other coastal states to maintain the good order of the oceans and suppress maritime security threats, including piracy and armed robbery at sea. (Paragraph 91)
13.The advent of maritime autonomous vehicles provides a direct challenge to UNCLOS, which assumes vessels are crewed and cannot be operated remotely. The Government should monitor such developments carefully, and advocate for a clarification of the existing rules if there is an increase in the use of autonomous vehicles for piratical acts. (Paragraph 92)
14.The UK should become an advocate and champion of developing and island states with regard to the protection of their coastal waters, exclusive economic zones, and the resources that they hold. (Paragraph 96)
15.We ask that in its response to this report the Government sets out more detail about the kind of support (both in terms of capacity building and resources) the UK provides to developing countries to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement within their waters. (Paragraph 97)
16.The Government should consider noncompliance with UNCLOS as a fundamental violation of the international rules-based order. Such violations should give cause for the Government to consider its relationship with noncompliant states. (Paragraph 107)
17.China’s actions in the South China Sea directly undermine and are at odds with the principle of freedom of navigation provided for in UNCLOS. (Paragraph 108)
18.Evidence suggests that it is highly unlikely that China will decide to change its policy of claiming exclusive jurisdiction over the majority of the South China Sea and will continue to reject the principles of freedom of navigation and freedom of innocent passage as outlined by UNCLOS. (Paragraph 109)
19.China’s stance poses a challenge to international law. The UK Government should continue to work with its partners and allies to protect and preserve the principles of freedom of navigation not only in South China Sea, but in every region where it is challenged. (Paragraph 110)
20.Climate change is likely to lead to additional maritime security challenges, particularly in the Arctic. We ask that in its response to this report the Government provides us with information about how it is monitoring security-related developments in the Arctic. (Paragraph 113)
Climate change and the environment
21.Sea levels will continue to rise over the coming century as a result of climate change. This will have significant impacts on the traditional mechanisms of establishing maritime entitlements for coastal and island states. In particular, it will impact low-lying and small island states, which face an existential threat. The UK and its Overseas Territories will also be affected by this issue. (Paragraph 125)
22.The Government should take a formal position that baselines should remain fixed in their current position. This would ensure that no states, including the UK and its Overseas Territories, lose their current maritime entitlements. The Government should work with partners to advance agreement amongst States Parties to UNCLOS and create supplementary legal mechanisms that secure maritime baselines and entitlements. (Paragraph 126)
23.We are encouraged that the Government recognises that climate change will become a significant driving factor for migration, but ask that it provides further detail in its response to this report on the ways in which the UK is preparing to support these people in light of the real risk some may lose their territories and statehood. This is an immediate and growing problem which needs global leadership and political will. We ask that the response includes details of those territories most likely to be at risk and the number of people likely to be adversely affected. (Paragraph 129)
24.UNCLOS places states under an obligation to “prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment” from all sources, including greenhouse gas emissions. This obligation is increasingly important because of the inter-related nature of climate change and environmental degradation, including via ocean acidification and the displacement of marine species. Despite success in managing marine sources of pollution, there has been less attention paid to the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change on the oceans. In part, this results from a lack of coordination between the UNCLOS and UNFCCC processes. The Government should continue to push for recognition of the oceans within the UNFCCC, and for greater coordination between the UNFCCC and UNCLOS processes. (Paragraph 143)
25.The obligations in UNCLOS and related instruments to protect the marine environment relating to land-based sources of pollution are weaker than those relating to marine-based pollution, which is successfully managed by the MARPOL treaty. Strengthening the duties relating to land-based sources of pollution will require greater cooperation between the UNFCCC and UNCLOS processes. The UK Government should aim to be a leader in this regard. (Paragraph 144)
26.The UK should continue its efforts to be an international leader in net zero shipping, and work through the IMO to get multilateral agreement on more ambitious measures. (Paragraph 145)
27.Climate change is already altering the distribution of fish stocks in the global ocean and will continue to do so. This creates the potential for disputes, as fish stocks move away from traditional fishing grounds. (Paragraph 152)
28.Cooperation with partners, especially neighbouring states, will be crucial to manage the implications of changing distributions of fish stocks. (Paragraph 153)
29.The Arctic is a fragile and valuable marine environment that is facing significant climate change impacts. It is vital that the increased economic opportunities are not prioritised over protecting the marine environment. (Paragraph 159)
30.We welcome the recent 16-year international agreement banning commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean. The UK, in its role as an observer at the Arctic Council, should continue to advocate for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the Arctic Ocean, and for the establishment of marine protected areas. (Paragraph 160)
31.The Government should continue to support the ongoing negotiations for the BBNJ Agreement and work to ensure that the obligations of states are not diluted. This will be vital for ensuring the 30by30 target can be met. The Government will need to engage with states which are reticent to expand the marine protected area network. (Paragraph 171)
32.We commend the Government for the Blue Belt Programme, but it should provide further support for those Overseas Territories more reliant on marine resources for their economies, not least in the areas of control and enforcement. (Paragraph 172)
Human rights and labour protections at sea
33.UNCLOS has little to say about human rights. Nonetheless, it is clear that international human rights law applies to people at sea. But there are barriers to the application of human rights at sea in practice. The Government acknowledged the existence of these barriers, but did not say how it intended to address them. (Paragraph 190)
34.We ask that in its response to this report, the Government confirms that it considers international human rights law to apply equally at sea as it does on land, and to commit to taking a clear and unequivocal position on this both domestically and internationally. (Paragraph 191)
35.We urge the Government to acknowledge that human rights at sea include a wide range of rights, and not just those pertaining to labour conditions, important though these are. In its response to us, we ask that the Government sets out what it considers its obligations to be concerning human rights at sea, including with reference to human trafficking and modern slavery. (Paragraph 192)
36.The principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction and the issue of flags of convenience poses a challenge to the effective monitoring and enforcement of human rights at sea. We reiterate our request for the Government to provide more detail on its review of this issue. (Paragraph 193)
37.Migration at sea is increasingly undertaken by vulnerable groups, including refugees and asylum seekers, in unseaworthy vessels which frequently need emergency assistance. Under UNCLOS states have a duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea, but this obligation is increasingly side-lined by security and immigration policies. (Paragraph 204)
38.Despite the Minister’s assurances, we are not convinced that provisions relating to maritime migration and ‘turnaround tactics’ in the Nationality and Borders Bill are compliant with the UK’s duties under UNCLOS, in particular Article 98. We therefore ask that in its response to this report, the Government provides us with a full assessment of the compatibility of the provisions in the Nationality and Borders Bill dealing with so-called forced turnarounds with the UK’s international responsibilities under Article 98 of UNCLOS. (Paragraph 205)
39.Forced labour and excessive working conditions are increasing concerns for those working at sea in the fishing and shipping industries. While there are international agreements for the protection of labourers’ human rights, the flag state system again stymies their enforcement and realisation in practice. (Paragraph 214)
40.Victims of human rights abuses at sea, including victims of physical and sexual crimes, do not have sufficient access to timely or effective justice. Their situation is exacerbated by complex questions concerning legal jurisdiction and the flag state’s responsibility to investigate and prosecute human rights abuses committed at sea. The obligations of third states to exercise jurisdiction over these abuses and crimes are also not clear: states appear to use the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction to avoid intervening on behalf of victims, even if the abuse takes place within their maritime jurisdiction. As a result, victims of human rights abuses at sea are denied access to an effective remedy. (Paragraph 219)
41.The increased use of privately contracted armed security personnel has been effective at deterring piracy, but there have been examples of these contractors harming and killing fishers and alleged pirates. Privately contracted armed security personnel are poorly regulated, and individuals are rarely held accountable for such crimes. (Paragraph 220)
42.There are a range of mechanisms the Government should investigate for addressing human rights abuses at sea, including port state controls, sanctions, and private arbitration systems. The Government must also ensure that its own domestic legislation fully reflects its obligations under international human rights law, in particular, the Nationality and Borders Bill. (Paragraph 231)
43.Piecemeal solutions will not be sufficient. We call on the Government to work with likeminded partners to advance a unified approach to human rights at sea. This will need to draw together practical solutions to challenges including mass migration, forced labour, physical and sexual crimes, and crimes committed by privately contracted armed security personnel, and must lead to the creation of new mechanisms to address the issue. (Paragraph 32)
Maritime autonomous vehicles
44.The Royal Navy is currently adopting a “principle of equivalence” approach to determine how maritime autonomous vehicles can fit into the existing legal regime. In the absence of international agreement, and as one of the leaders in the development of this technology, this seems a sensible approach and the Royal Navy should be commended for its careful consideration of these issues. The Government should monitor other state’s responses to the Royal Navy’s treatment of its maritime autonomous vehicles, and work with partner states to ensure the changes under discussion at the IMO reflect the sensible approach adopted by the Royal Navy. (Paragraph 244)
45.Whether maritime autonomous vehicles can be classified as warships or not will have significant implications for their use, including their protection from seizure by other states. In the absence of international regulation, the Royal Navy’s practice has been to register vessels in such a way to emphasise they are state owned and operated, providing them with sovereign immunity while ensuring the state can be held accountable for their actions. As other states begin to develop and use maritime autonomous vehicles, it will be important for the UK to work with like-minded partners to regulate these technologies with reference to these principles. Once again, the Royal Navy’s practical approach to ensuring equivalency with the provisions of UNCLOS is sensible and to be commended. (Paragraph 249)
46.Criminals are already making use of maritime autonomous vehicles, and in the absence of updated and specific regulation on their use, it is difficult to determine culpability for such acts. The principle of equivalency is a good starting point but there will be circumstances which warrant new regulation. As well as developing international regulations, states will need to ensure the use of maritime autonomous vehicles for criminal purposes is included in domestic legislation. We ask that the Government provide us with information in its response to this report on whether maritime autonomous vehicles have been used for criminal activities in British waters to date, and whether domestic legislation has proved adequate to tackle such breaches. (Paragraph 256)
47.The UK is a leader in the use of maritime autonomous vehicles and is in a position to set a strong international example. Domestic legislation and state practice, including through the Royal Navy, will be important for establishing customary rules about the use of MAVs. These will be important for guiding the work of the IMO on maritime autonomous vehicles. We ask that the Government updates us in its response to this report on the outcome of its ‘Future of transport regulatory review’ and provides a timeline for the development of domestic legislation. (Paragraph 264)
48.In order to contribute effectively to the IMO’s new code for maritime autonomous vehicles, it is important that the UK Government comes to clear positions on issues including how terms such as ‘crew’ and ‘master’ can be applied to autonomous maritime vehicles. The Royal Navy’s practice provides a sensible example of how this can be done. (Paragraph 265)
49.We urge the Government to be vigilant to cybersecurity issues relating to maritime autonomous vehicles which might cause serious operational and accountability issues. (Paragraph 266)
Regulation of access to economic resources
50.Where there are overlapping claims to territorial seas and exclusive economic zones, UNCLOS includes provisions for delimiting them, but these were the result of considerable compromise and in reality, they are vague. Nonetheless, the majority of maritime boundaries between states have been agreed. In some instances where agreement has not been reached, dispute settlement is needed, but as the 2013 arbitration brought by the Philippines against China shows, states may not cooperate with the findings of dispute settlement mechanisms. This repeats the need for states to engage in dialogue with each other and work together to resolve difficulties peacefully. (Paragraph 276)
51.We would like to hear more about the FCDO’s evidence review of the potential risks and benefits of deep seabed mining, and would like further detail on what the Government is doing to assure that ISA’s regulation on deep seabed mining is evidenced and supported by science. We would also like to hear what assessment the Government has made of the potential future risk of disputes over deep-sea resources. (Paragraph 289)
52.Deep-sea mining should only be authorised when the minerals in question cannot be recovered in sufficient quantity from existing products, as in a circular economy model, and when the deep-sea mining of those minerals is less environmentally damaging than extraction on land. We therefore welcome the Government’s cautious position and ask that it continues to encourage other states to do the same in order to ensure protection of the marine environment. (Paragraph 290)
53.UNCLOS and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement require states to cooperate to ensure the effective management and conservation of fish stocks that are migratory or straddle exclusive economic zones and the high seas. Many Regional Fisheries Management Organisations have been formed, but they do not cover all fish stocks. There are also examples of failed management, including in regional fisheries management organisations the UK is party to. (Paragraph 301)
54.We urge the Government to mark the 40th anniversary of the Falklands War with a serious effort to establish a regional fisheries management organisation that would address the current fishing challenges in the waters between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. (Paragraph 302)
55.We ask the Government to confirm why it is yet to ratify the 2019 Protocol to the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. (Paragraph 303)
56.The Government should be a leader in strengthening the management and enforcement powers of regional fisheries management organisations. This would apply for both signatory states and those non-signatory states that fish in the area of the RFMO or fish the species covered by an RFMO. (Paragraph 312)
57.Illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing is one of the biggest threats to the effective management of fish stocks and a major cause of overfishing. We ask the Government to provide us with more detail on the actions it is taking to address IUU fishing, particularly in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations of which the UK is a member. (Paragraph 313)
58.Subsea cables are a critical element of the UK’s communications infrastructure. While UNCLOS places obligations on states to allow for the laying and repair of such cables, these are not always followed in practice. It is crucial that the laws are clear where responsibilities lie for the maintenance and protection of subsea cables. The international regulatory regime is unclear, and this must change, considering their significance. The Government should work with partners and others to address this. The UK should work to improve domestic legislation for cables in the UK’s territorial waters, as well as working with partners to strengthen the international regulatory regime. (Paragraph 328)