• Accessibility
• Email alerts
• RSS feeds
• Contact us

Preparing for Extreme Risks: Building a Resilient Society Contents

---

Chapter 4: A whole of society approach

108.Within the Government’s Integrated Review commitment to develop a comprehensive national resilience strategy, it prioritises the establishment of “a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to resilience, so that individuals, businesses and organisations all play a part in building resilience across the UK.” 204 We welcome this approach. The current UK risk and resilience landscape is fragmented and elements such as business and industry, the voluntary sector and the public are underused.

109.The Government has established the UK Resilience Forum (UKRF) to “strengthen UK resilience by improving communication and collaboration on risk, emergency preparedness, crisis response and recovery”. It includes representatives of national, regional and local government, private and voluntary sectors.205

Whole of society approaches internationally

110.Many countries take a whole of society view of resilience. During the course of our inquiry, we took evidence from several international representatives to understand how their countries approached risk and resilience.

111.Sweden makes use of a ‘total defence’ concept which “makes peacetime emergency preparedness and resilience a basis for wartime defence planning.”206 When the highest state of alert is declared, all elements of society, including the parliament, Government, government authorities, municipalities, private enterprises, voluntary defence organisations, and individuals, are engaged in the defence effort. Our witnesses praised the Swedish ‘total defence’ model for its efforts to mobilise the whole of society in pursuit of national resilience and defence.207 Jim Kronhamn, Acting Head of the Research and Evaluation Section, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, told us:

“In Sweden, there is a strong tradition of seeing people as subjects rather than objects, as resources and not care-needing entities. We are all subjects and decision-makers who can make a difference for ourselves and the wider society. This mindset is something that I believe is a strength in our approach to managing risks”208

112.Singapore also uses a ‘total defence’ model. Peter Ho, Senior Adviser, Centre for Strategic Futures, Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, said that: “Total defence starts from the premise that it is the whole system that is being organised.”209 In Singapore, emergency exercises are regularly run at a community level to inform and train the public. Peter Ho stressed the value of these exercises, and said: “by getting the whole community involved you are not just bringing a sense of commitment to society but getting a commitment to building resilience in society”.210

113.In developing a whole of society approach to resilience, it will be important to take note of and draw on what has worked internationally. Throughout this chapter we have drawn from the experiences and views of both domestic and international partners.

The local level

The purpose and role of Local Resilience Forums

114.The UK’s approach to resilience is described as being based on the principle of subsidiarity, “where decisions and responsibilities should rest at the lowest appropriate level, with collaboration and co-ordination at the highest level necessary”.211 In England, Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) are the building block for emergency planning activities. LRFs are multi-agency partnerships who work to plan and prepare for localised incidents and emergencies, identifying risks and producing emergency plans.212 LRFs are not legal entities, but rather forums through which local responders discharge their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.213

115.Our witnesses noted that the risk landscape and expectations on LRFs have changed substantially since they were defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.214 Dr Fiona Twycross, Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience and Chair at London Resilience Forum, told us that: “It was essentially designed to deal with civil contingencies, mainly short-term emergencies, whereas the thinking has now moved to a broader resilience agenda.”215 Dr Twycross noted that:

“In some ways, it feels as if LRFs have become the default tasking mechanism in central government for anything that falls outside existing responsibilities or known routes for resolution. The Government need to determine, first, what they want LRFs to do, and then put them on the appropriate statutory footing.”216

116.This was echoed by Chief Constable Rachel Swann, Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary and Chair of Derbyshire LRF, who also called for LRFs to be placed on a more secure statutory footing.217 Stuart Marshall, Chief Emergency Planning Officer and LRF Manager, Cleveland Local Resilience Forum, also noted that LRFs are increasingly being used as responders, a responsibility which is not reflected in the Civil Contingencies Act. Stuart Marshall warned that this raised issues about the required training and potential liabilities which should be addressed.218

117.Evidence also suggested that the Civil Contingencies Act should be updated to reflect the importance of several societal organisations that are not recognised in the Act. Stuart Marshall told us that organisations such as higher education providers, the voluntary sector and social housing providers had been essential to the COVID-19 response. They are not recognised in the Act and, consequently, information sharing and co-ordination during the pandemic was done only on a best endeavours basis.219

118.An independent review of the Civil Contingencies Act and its associated regulations and guidance is being undertaken by the National Preparedness Commission.220 The Government are legally obligated to review the Civil Contingencies Act (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 quinquennially. The next review is due to be completed by March 2022.221

119.LRFs currently do not have clarity about their purpose and expected duties. The expectations of LRFs have grown and shifted over time which has not been reflected in the Civil Contingencies Act, its associated regulations or guidance.

120.As part of the quinquennial review of the CCA regulations, due to report by March 2022, the Government should clarify the purpose and duties of the LRFs and should place them on a statutory footing. If LRFs are to take a more active role in emergency response, the training required, and possible liabilities increased by this change should be addressed. The UK Government in its review of the CCA should expand the range of named category 2 responders.

Governance and engagement

121.The lines of accountability for LRFs are complex. While the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) has responsibility for the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) and associated programmes, the lead Government department for LRFs is the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities. This confusion was raised by Helen Burton, LRF support officer at West Mercia Resilience Forum, who said that: “CCS as the lead HMG Dept for the NSRA, set against [the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities]being the significant driver of the work through LRFs creates confusion and conflict.”222 John Barradell, Chief Executive at the City of London Corporation and Deputy Chair, London Resilience Forum, noted that much of the contact was driven by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities:

“The Civil Contingencies Secretariat, while driving the policy and occasionally coming to us as individuals, actually takes more of a hands-off and strategic role; the day-to-day involvement and liaison is done by [the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities].”223

122.When discussing the engagement between LRFs and the CCS, representatives of LRFs expressed a unanimous view that the current level of contact is not sufficient.224 John Barradell told us that London Resilience would “bite hands off” to get more contact with the CCS.225 Witnesses described a predominantly one-way flow of information and inconsistent engagement.

123.LRF representatives called for greater coordination and information sharing among LRFs. Stuart Marshall told us:

“Give us the opportunity to co-ordinate the work between ourselves, facilitated with the ongoing work by national government. There is often a high level of duplication. We can learn from each other, but currently that LRF-to-LRF relationship is not co-ordinated and is not structured.”226

124.The UK’s risk assessment system is too top-heavy. LRFs do not have sufficient contact with the CCS and are not viewed as trusted partners in the process. Information flow and communication is currently poor and the direction of information flow between national and local level is largely one-directional. A national system which cannot account for local knowledge is not good enough. There is a need to facilitate the sharing of expertise and information across LRFs.

125.The Government should improve its communication and engagement with local authorities and LRFs. In particular, the Government should establish a forum for the seamless sharing of information among LRFs, facilitated by central government. This forum would allow for the sharing of completed risk assessments and best practice insights both among LRFs and from LRFs to central government. This forum should meet at least twice yearly. It should be convened before the production of the NSRA to allow LRFs to contribute insights on the methodology and local risk information, and after the NSRA has been produced to allow LRFs to share local risk assessments and prevent duplication.

Funding of Local Resilience Forums

126.As noted in paragraph 119, the expectations on LRFs have increased in recent years. However, this increase in responsibility has not been matched by increased funding. A report by the National Audit Office noted that local authorities’ spending power had fallen 28.6% in real terms between 2010–11 and 2017–18, primarily driven by a 49.1% reduction in Government funding over the same period.227 This has filtered through to emergency planning, with a report by the Institute for Government finding that local authority emergency planning expenditure in 2018–19 was 35% lower in real terms than in 2009–10.228

127.Our witnesses from LRFs were unanimous in their view that LRFs need funding which is proportionate to the responsibilities placed upon them. Stuart Marshall told us: “one of the biggest obstacles is the resource at the current time. We are geared up for the Act as it was in 2004; we are not geared up for the additional guidance and depth that has now been identified.”229 Dr Twycross told us: “LRFs need the resources to operate, and that includes funding, trust and information.”230

128.It should be noted that despite their shared purpose and role, the capabilities and experiences of LRFs across England can vary significantly. This was noted by John Barradell who said: “an important distinction here is the difference in LRFs across the country. It would be difficult to draw assumptions across London, Cumbria and other LRFs, for instance. One of the defining characteristics here is difference of scale and complexity.”231 It is important that these differences be accounted for in allocating funding.

129.Expectations on Category 1 responders have increased since the CCA entered into law. The CCA was designed to respond to short-term emergencies, but the responsibilities placed on LRFs are now more in line with a resilience agenda. LRFs have become a default tasking mechanism for resilience policy at a local level. Whilst the obligations placed on LRFs have increased, local government budgets have been subjected to significant cuts. This has hampered their ability to undertake their statutory duties.

130.The Government should ensure the funds allocated to LRFs are appropriate and sufficient to allow them to carry out the full range of their responsibilities. Ring-fenced funding should be allocated to allow LRFs to operationalise the necessary capabilities and standards set out by the Government.232

Community risk registers

131.LRFs make use of the NSRA when preparing their community risk registers. However, it appears that the NSRA is produced without sufficient engagement of LRFs, undermining the validity of the assessments and threatening local preparedness. The Hampshire and Isle of Wight LRF noted that:

“Mostly we have experienced a patchy engagement with the technical risk process–with excessive changes to the risks (like incorporating all the home office risks in one go and completely changing the scoring and the weighting) without consultation and little support to enact it locally, often meaning an excess of work for local risk groups”233

132.Witnesses described serious difficulties accessing the NSRA and other information they required to assess risks. Dr Twycross said:

“The use of the National Security Risk Assessment is quite limited, given how restricted access to it is. Clearly, the information in it is very sensitive, but the documentation is not shared in a trusting capacity. It is locked down prohibitively.”234

Dr Fiona Twycross called for LRFs and their partners to be treated as “trusted partners by government”.235 Chief Constable Swann said: “It is very difficult to plan if you are not in possession of the information that you need in order to make some planning assumptions and build from that.”236

133.The format in which the NSRA is provided to LRFs was also criticised. Evidence we received from LRFs noted that information from the NSRA requires to be manually transposed from an online platform into a local risk assessment template before the local risk assessment process can begin.237This represents a significant duplication of effort, both in the creation of the templates and the transposing of data. Witnesses also said that the regular changes in methodology and increasing number of risks increases the workload for LRFs.238 Stuart Marshall suggested that more could be done nationally to prevent this duplication:

“There would be some real benefit in looking at how we get more value out of the national product—a tool or similar for Local Resilience Forums to which we could then apply local knowledge, rather than us having to spend countless hours redeveloping a tool that we know counterparts elsewhere are doing.”239

Greater engagement and communication, both between LRFs and with the CCS, would allow the creation of a risk assessment product which fits the needs of LRFs and limit unnecessary duplication of effort.

134.LRFs struggle to access relevant information to inform their risk assessments due to the current high levels of secrecy. This hampers local preparedness. LRFs also face duplicating work performed centrally or by other LRFs due to a lack of communication and coordination between groups, the lack of a single risk assessment template, and the inability to copy and paste information on risks. There is a need to facilitate the sharing of expertise and information across LRFs.

135.LRFs should be engaged in the production of the NSRA through the forum described in paragraph 125. The CCS should commit to sharing information as a default with LRFs. Information on the consequences of security threats should be provided at a minimum. Wherever possible, to prevent duplication of effort, information should be produced once at a national level and cascaded down to a local level. The Government should produce a single risk assessment template for use by LRFs to limit the duplication of effort and should ensure that information on risks can be directly copied from the NSRA into the local risk assessment.

The devolved administrations

136.Civil protection, including risk assessment and risk planning, is largely a devolved matter and arrangements differ in each of the devolved nations. In areas of devolved responsibility, the Government of the devolved administration is typically the designated lead on relevant issues. In reserved areas, the UK Government acts as the lead but works in consultation with the relevant administration. A summary of devolved and reserved powers relevant to risk and resilience can be found in Annex 1. Our witnesses from the devolved administrations, however, described the engagement they have with central government as “variable”.240

137.We were told that inconsistent understanding of devolution by those working in central government acts as a barrier to good engagement. Shirley Rogers, Director of Organisational Readiness, Scottish Government, told us that:

“There is a variable degree of understanding about what devolution settlements look like and what devolved Administrations’ powers are … My observation is partly that there is a tendency to treat us as if we are a department and consult us on the things that people think we will need to know about, rather than the totality.”241

Reg Kilpatrick, Director-General of Covid-19 Crisis Co-ordination at the Welsh Government, noted that this experience of partial engagement also extends to ministerial level: “I think our Ministers would say that they were sometimes a bit frustrated that they were invited into those meetings, rather than being there as a partner Government, if you like.”242

138.Both Reg Kilpatrick and Shirley Rogers called for an agreed set of engagement structures and processes between the UK Government and the devolved administrations at all levels, including ministerial.243

139.In particular, the NSRA was noted as an area where all three devolved nations would value greater engagement. Both Scotland and Wales use the NSRA in the production of their National Risk Registers.244 Shirley Rogers told us of the importance of early engagement in the risk assessment process to ensure consistency:

“When something is being developed at a UK level, it is really important that there is engagement from Scotland at the earliest possible opportunity, so that, where something requires us to respond in conjunction with something else, we do not find that there are gaps in that two minutes after we need it.”245

This need for greater engagement was echoed by Reg Kilpatrick who said that the Welsh Government needs more engagement in the production of the NSRA, having had little engagement around the 2019 document.246 Reg Kilpatrick also called for greater sight of information in the NSRA, saying:

“However, we would like more information about the national risks. As a devolved Administration, we hold a lot of the levers for responding to incidents and crises. Unless we have that complete information about the nature, scale and detail of the risk, it is quite difficult for us to make sure that our preparedness covers all eventualities.”247

140.Engagement of the devolved administrations by the UK Government is superficial and ad-hoc and often an afterthought, particularly on reserved matters which may have implications for the resilience systems in the devolved administrations. Resilience is a devolved capability and as a consequence a more formalised engagement process is needed.

141.The UK Government needs to produce an agreed set of communications structures at all levels of seniority, including ministerial level, to facilitate effective resilience dialogue between central government and devolved administrations. This must be done in consultation with the devolved administrations. This should define the frequency and terms of engagement, at what stage the devolved administrations should be consulted and/or informed and identify key points of contact.

Building resilient business and industry

142.Building UK resilience cannot just be an undertaking for the public sector; business and industry also have a critical role to play. While this is particularly true of the UK’s critical national infrastructure operators, many other sectors are vital to the continued smooth operation of the nation. A UK resilience strategy, if it is to be comprehensive, must take note of the role business and industry can play in building resilience and what mechanisms can be used to incentivise more resilient behaviour. Dr Justin Okoli, Senior Lecturer at De Montfort University, in reflecting on lessons from COVID-19, focused on “improving business resilience and making firms better prepared to withstand major disruptions and to thrive amidst turbulence” and recommended that “the UK government finds appropriate ways to create awareness amongst businesses regarding the various resilient-building tools that can enhance their crisis preparation efforts”.248 The Fire Industry Association summarised that “Working together in partnership with the private sector will ensure long term and robust resilience”.249 Leigh Pomlett, President of Logistics UK told us that: “It is incumbent upon us to help the industry with a set of tools it can use that will enable it, going forward, to be more resilient”.250

Insurance

143.Insurance has an important role to play in building resilience, both in helping those affected by events to recover more quickly, and in encouraging policy holders to mitigate or avoid the impact of risks.251 However, Julian Enoizi, Chief Executive at Pool Re, raised a concern that the link between insurance and the risks outlined in the NSRA is insufficient: “When you look at the Government’s National Risk Register, there is very little, if any, mention of the ability to use insurance to mitigate the risks for which the Government are essentially the insurer of last resort.”252

144.Julian Enoizi noted the difficulty faced by the insurance industry in managing catastrophic risks. They highlighted the challenges faced in modelling catastrophic risks, and noted that the size and scale of losses incurred can exceed the premiums collected or even the capitalisation of the insurance industry.253 Professor Paula Jarzabkowski, Professor of Strategic Management at the City University of London, warned that the insurance industry will struggle to cover pandemic risk in the private market, at least in the short term. Professor Jarzabkowski told us: “It will do it in different ways, either through high prices or exclusions that mean there is no meaningful product at an affordable price.”254 Kate Nicholls, CEO, UKHospitality, noted that this was already being seen by the hospitality industry: “as we come out of the Covid crisis, the impact on hospitality and tourism has been so severe that, given the appetite for risk of banks, landlords, insurance companies and utility suppliers, across the board we are having a refusal to supply to hospitality businesses.”255 Professor Jarzabkowski warned that if increasing premiums lead to decreased coverage “we end up with a bigger set of risks that sit on a government balance sheet.”256

145.Our witnesses suggested the need for closer partnerships between the insurance industry and the Government to help address the emerging gap in insurance cover and bolster national resilience. Dr Harwood argued that the Pool Re insurance model should be applied to a wide array of risk scenarios:

“given the success of this current public private model and the strength of the Pool Re culture, it would be logical to maintain existing structural arrangements and extend the remit of this successful company to cover a range of ‘catastrophic shocks’ that may occur in the UK, including for example cyber and pandemics.”257

146.Julian Enoizi also argued for the extension of the re-insurance model to other systemic risks which would help “align social and private sector objectives and integrate the insurance industry firmly into the national resilience and disaster risk-financing architecture”. 258 A re-insurance scheme for extreme risks such as a pandemic was also called for by Dr Adam Marshall.259

Box 6: Pool Re

Pool Re is a mutual reinsurance company, established in response to a market failure in the terrorism insurance market. Pool Re is owned by its members who are primarily commercial insurers. The Government have extended an unlimited, but repayable, public financial guarantee to Pool Re. This guarantee ensures that the Government will financially support Pool Re if it ever has insufficient funds to pay a legitimate claim, regardless of the scale of the claim. Pool Re pays a premium to the Government for this guarantee and would repay the money over time if it ever used this facility. In the event of a loss resulting from an act of terrorism, each member must first pay losses up to a threshold that is determined individually for each insurer. If losses exceed that threshold, the insurer can claim upon Pool Re’s reserves. These reserves have been accumulated by the members of Pool Re since its inception. It is only if these reserves are exhausted that Pool Re would draw upon Government support.

Source: Pool Re, ‘Reinsurance’: https://www.poolre.co.uk/reinsurance/ [accessed 01 September 2021]

147.The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the difficulties posed by the insurance industry in providing affordable cover for catastrophic or systemic risks. Rising premiums will impact insurance coverage and expose the Government to increased risk and damage national resilience. Public-private schemes, such as Pool Reinsurance, have helped to address market failures and distribute risk between the public and private sector.

148.The Government should work with the UK insurance industry to explore mechanisms which allow for the transfer, management and mitigation of risks which are too large for the private sector to address alone and for which the Government is the insurer of last resort, but may in fact find itself the insurer of first resort.

Regulation

149.Regulation is also a mechanism by which the Government can incentivise resilient behaviour in business and industry. The Greater Manchester Combined Authority highlighted the value of effective regulation which they said: “reduces the risk of emergencies occurring, or reduces their impact should they happen” and “provides a means for government to seek assurance that risks are being effectively managed at the local level”.260 Professor Hall echoed this, telling us: “We found that the sectors that had tighter regulations and more reporting requirements were making more progress with respect to their adaptation around climate-related risks”.261

150.Given how interconnected many sectors are, regulation cannot be conducted in siloes. Lindsey Fussell, Group Director for Networks and Communications, Ofcom, noted: “Fundamentally, telecoms depends on power and energy is ever-increasingly dependent on communication.”262 Cathryn Scott, Director of Enforcement and Emerging Issues at Ofgem, stressed the importance of cross-regulator working: “As we go into the future, as the system digitises and changes, it will become increasingly important to adopt a whole-system approach and to have more cross-regulatory engagement.”263 Lindsey Fussell, Cathryn Scott and Professor Collins all noted the importance of the UK Regulators Network (UKRN), a network formed by 13 of the UK’s sectoral regulators.264

151.Near misses265 can reveal weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a system but may go ignored if they do not result in damage or loss. Our witnesses drew attention to the value of acting promptly on near misses. Professor Richardson told us “Near-misses are where we can really learn things”.266 Dame Sue Ion agreed, telling us that an analysis of near misses can help identify systemic issues and implement improvements.267 Cathryn Scott told us that Ofgem have the powers to request information on and explore near-misses, but that operators of essential services268 are not obligated to inform Ofgem of near misses. They told us that Ofgem and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) are considering implementing a requirement on operators of essential services to notify Ofgem of near misses.269

152.The UK’s critical national infrastructure is essential for the functioning of the society and economy. Any compromise of critical national infrastructure could lead to the disruption of essential services or threaten national security, leading to a loss of life, casualties, or significant social or economic impact. Lord O’Donnell particularly drew attention to the importance of regulation in ensuring the resilience of the UK’s critical national infrastructure. They suggested that all public or private regulated bodies in the critical infrastructure space should have an audited business continuity plan and that there should be a statutory duty for that plan to be published.270

153.Regulation is crucial for bolstering national resilience, particularly for the critical national infrastructure sectors. While there is a need to balance resilience with the cost to the consumer, that trade off should not move too far away from resilience. Near-miss reporting is critical to ensure vulnerabilities are caught before they can lead to disaster. Cross regulator working is essential given the cross-sector implications of many risks and this can also help avoid siloes in business and industry. The UK Regulators Network is a valuable development in this regard.

154.A statutory duty should be placed on all public and private regulated bodies who operate critical national infrastructure to produce and publish an audited business continuity plan. We encourage Ofgem and BEIS to implement a requirement for the operators of essential services to notify regulators of near misses, with the publication of an annual summary of near miss events.

Using the voluntary sector

155.The voluntary sector is another important actor in building UK resilience, with many voluntary bodies having important roles to play in emergency responses. As an illustrative example, St John Ambulance have been a major part of the UK’s COVID-19 response. They have provided almost 700,000 hours of support for the NHS, through services such as volunteer ambulance crews, supplying volunteers to hospitals to perform nonhealthcare professional tasks, and undertaking outreach services to homeless and hard-to-reach communities. They have trained 27,500 vaccinators to support the vaccination programme.271 Adrian Clee, Emergency Response Lead at The Salvation Army, noted that:

“… the past 16 months have shown that emergency response teams and the rest of the voluntary sector have played an invaluable role and have come together like never before. To be frank, without the extra capacity that the voluntary sector has given, government at local and national level would have really struggled.”272

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the voluntary sector

156.Our witnesses told us that, particularly at a local level, the valuable contribution of the voluntary sector is not fully appreciated or used. Alistair Read, National Training Officer at Mountain Rescue England and Wales, said: “The challenge is that engaging with the voluntary sector is not a widely endorsed viewpoint, certainly in terms of responders.”273 Adrian Clee described the engagement as sporadic, and said: “Very often, when a major emergency occurs, the vital role that the voluntary sector can play in welfare and humanitarian support is still very much an afterthought rather than part of well laid-down exercise plans.”274

157.Our witnesses acknowledged that resource constraints impacted the ability of LRFs to engage with the voluntary sector.275 Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005, Category 1 responders must “have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations” in the course of carrying out their emergency and business continuity planning duties.276 We received evidence that this obligation is not sufficient. Adrian Clee said:

“The Civil Contingencies Act mentions that category 1 responders should have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations in carrying out their emergency planning. To be frank, that is pretty lame; it is a throwaway comment with no implied obligation.”277

Mountain Rescue England and Wales questioned how the clause must “have regard” is “tested and compared between different LRFs to provide assurance that a cooperative national response and recovery framework is developed and supported”.278 More generally, the British Red Cross called for the role of the voluntary and community sector to be strengthened under the Civil Contingencies Act.279

158.The voluntary sector is a rich source of information and assistance on risk and response at a local level. However, the obligation on Category 1 responders to “have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations” is unclear and interpretations vary between LRFs.

159.The Government should clarify what “have regard to the activities of voluntary organisations” means and outline what best practice in voluntary sector engagement would look like through the production of improved guidance for LRFs.

A volunteer reservist cadre

160.The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy states that the Government will consider the establishment of a “civilian reservist cadre for support in times of crisis”.280 A reservist cadre was recommended to us by several witnesses, as a means for trained members of the public to support emergency responses.281

161.However, in evidence to us the then Paymaster General and Roger Hargreaves described a much smaller body. They outlined a force of approximately 1,000 people, predominantly retirees with skills in emergency planning and response. They noted that this would reduce dependency on military planners or government liaison officers who are often called on to support local responses.282

162.We put the proposed reservist cadre, as it was outlined in the Integrated Review, to voluntary sector leaders to ascertain their views. They roundly rejected the idea that a new reservist force should be created from scratch. They urged that the existing voluntary sector should form the basis of any reservist force, with better central government coordination and facilitation. Adrian Clee said:

“Use the strength of the voluntary sector in those areas where it is established, trusted and rooted in those communities, and encourage people to volunteer for them. The creation of such a reserve could be an extremely damaging thing to those local community groups.”283

163.Richard Lee, Chief Operating Officer at St John Ambulance, echoed this, saying:

“St John Ambulance feels strongly that the answer here is a cadre of volunteers, not as a stand-alone, but as a knitted-together model of existing organisations with existing capabilities, each being given a role within that cadre so that it would be funded, prepared, exercised, tested and equipped to deliver across the country when required.”284

164.Alistair Read also agreed, noting that anything established from scratch would be unlikely to be superior to existing voluntary forces:

“… the impact might be better if the development of a volunteer civilian reservist cadre was focused on already established volunteer organisations. They have established links; they have interoperability; they have communication systems. Everything else that may have been suggested within the integrated review adds an extra layer of newness to it. That would bring additional challenges. A huge amount of our resilience-type work relies on local knowledge and connections, which take a long time to establish.”285

165.Representatives of the Ministry of Defence were cautious about these proposals. Paul Wyatt, Director of National Security in the Ministry of Defence, contrasted the proposed cadre with the current military reserves saying:

“I worry that an additional generic resilience capability would not necessarily be the way to go. It is very important to have good resilience plans and capabilities, but something that looked a bit like us, in terms of being enthusiastic but not knowledgeable, might not necessarily add value.”286

Major General Charles Stickland, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations and Commitments) at the Ministry of Defence, also cautioned that: “You have to think very carefully about its design and what it is for. From a perspective of essentially having things at readiness, the idea of people sitting about without a specific function does not sit well.”287

166.Richard Lee highlighted that an important first step towards better utilisation of the voluntary sector is mapping the existing capability: “… we simply do not have a map of the capabilities of the third sector across the country. We do not know locally what is available everywhere.”288 There already exist initiatives aimed at coordinating the voluntary sector, including the Voluntary and Community Sector Emergencies Partnership (VCSEP). Adrian Clee praised the VCESP as having “made a real difference to partnership working and coordination for the voluntary sector and across the country”.289 Adrian Clee said that “as we move out of the pandemic it is vital for the Government to continue to engage actively with that partnership, provide funding to keep it going”.290

Box 7: The Voluntary and Community Sector Emergencies Partnership

The Voluntary and Community Sector Emergencies Partnership (VCSEP) is a government-backed coalition of over 250 national and local voluntary and community sector organisations. It was formed in response to learnings from several 2017 national crises. The VCESP advocates increased collaboration between government and the voluntary and community sector in an emergency. It aims to improve responses to major emergencies by pooling resources and intelligence.

Source: Written evidence from British Red Cross (RSK0077)

167.Our witnesses noted that sometimes volunteers can have existing commitments which mean they are not able to respond to sudden emergencies.291 They welcomed any initiatives which would allow volunteers to respond at shorter notice, including leave or pay schemes modelled on the army reserves.292

168.Education is an important element of building the population’s resilience skills. Professor Brooke Rogers told us about the value of educating “schools and communities so that they have the fundamentals to deal with any risk or uncertainty and know that uncertainties can exist and how they should manage those”.293 Stuart Marshall noted the need to develop and tap into skills in the population which build resilience, particularly highlighting the value of first aid lessons in schools.294

169.The proposed reservist cadre lacks ambition and is not in line with the views of the voluntary sector. The voluntary sector should be supported to organise existing voluntary forces into a response mechanism. The Government should map existing voluntary capability and use this as the basis of any response. There should be a central coordinating point for a national voluntary response, mapping capability regularity, directing volunteers to under resourced voluntary forces and facilitating better liaison amongst voluntary groups and between the sector and the Government. The Government should be prepared to pay volunteers for days of work missed through participation in any coordinated response to risk events. The Government should consider adding emergency response skills to the post-16 curriculum, with schools and further education colleges providing volunteering opportunities to students.

The use of volunteers internationally

170.We received significant evidence on the ways in which volunteers are utilised in emergency planning and response internationally. These countries were flagged to us as examples of best practice which could be studied and borrowed to inform UK policy.

171.Professor Alexander Fekete, Professor of Risk and Crisis Management at the Technical University of Cologne, discussed the success of the German scheme Technisches Hilfswerk (THW). The THW is a civil protection organisation controlled by the German federal government. 99% of its approximately 80,000 members are volunteers. One of their duties is to provide technical relief in Germany as part of national civil protection measures.295 Professor Fekete said that: “The success story is their technical equipment and their highly skilled staff—they get training—and their long-standing good reputation.”296 They said that the THW chapters act like a local identity group and help build community resilience.297

172.The Swedish approach to emergency preparedness emphasises the contributions of volunteers as part of its whole of society approach to security and defence. In Sweden, there are 18 voluntary defence organisations tasked with recruiting and training volunteers in different fields including as logistics, transport, staff support, communications, animal disease control, and aviation. Jim Kronhamn said: “We find that volunteer engagement strengthens the resilience of the individual and contributes to building popular support as well for contingency policy.”298 They noted that an important element of the Swedish approach was ensuring their volunteer forces were diverse and that different types of volunteers are given suitable tasks and responsibilities.299

173.In the Netherlands, regional water authorities use dike armies to support the safety and security of Dutch anti-flooding infrastructure. Harold van Waveren, Chair, National Crisis Team for Flood Risk, at the Rijkswaterstaat, also noted the improved community resilience and flood awareness borne by volunteering as part of the dike armies. However, they provided two points to consider. The first was providing adequate training to ensure the safety of volunteers. The second was that volunteers may not always be available, particularly during extreme events, and that this should be accounted for in emergency plans.300

174.Simon Webster promoted the Australian model of local volunteering, the State Emergency Service. Simon Webster said: “Australian states have an immediately available body of local volunteers (State Emergency Service) to take responsibility when disaster strikes (or is threatened) and to support the full-time emergency services”.301 SRSRM Ltd, a resilience advice company, also noted the State Emergency Service as an example to be emulated.302

Mobilising the public

175.The materialisation of many of the most serious risks facing the UK would have significant impacts on members of the public and require them to undertake extraordinary measures to ensure their own safety and the safety of others. However, in spite of this, the UK population are not widely engaged in building resilience and planning for risks.

176.Professor Duncan Shaw, Professor of Operational Research and Critical Systems at the University of Manchester, said that: “we need to take a strategic approach to supporting communities, to supporting the public to prepare for and respond to emergencies, given that the public are usually the first to arrive at and the last to leave a disaster.”303 Roger Hargreaves agreed that “for most emergencies, the interaction between the authorities and the public, and the behaviour of the public, are key determining factors in the success of any response”.304 However, there is very little public communication on the topic of risk or emergency response. Roger Hargreaves said that there was a “chequered history” of public engagement in the UK and that the question of how best to engage the public in risk and resilience remained “an open policy question”.305

177.Elisabeth Braw, Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, told us that: “We are lacking any skill among the wider population … the whole population is essentially a lost opportunity, because nobody, apart from the people who have skills as part of their professional career, really knows what to do.”306 Professor Shaw warned that, “We cannot have a passive public who are waiting for everybody to come to save them.”307

178.By contrast, other countries more actively engage their populations in the resilience effort. In Sweden, for example, the public are viewed as one of the elements of the nation’s ‘total defence’ structure. Information is actively provided, and the public are encouraged to be prepared. Jim Kronhamn said: “We do not want people to be concerned, but it is important that you are aware of what can happen, how it can affect you and what you can do to affect your own safety and preparedness of the people close to you.”308

179.Another example highlighted to us is Finland’s national defence courses. These aim to “provide civilian or military persons in a leading position with a total overview of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy, improve collaboration between different sectors of society in emergency conditions and promote networking between people working in different areas of comprehensive security”.309 Elisabeth Braw described it as “a fantastic way of building cohesion within the leadership of any country”310

180.During the COVID-19 pandemic the population has shown itself to be willing, even eager, to ‘step-up’ to the challenge of risk response. Professor Shaw described the last year as a “masterclass” in communities supporting each other, managing their own preparedness and needs.311 Roger Hargreaves said that “this vast exercise in national response to the COVID crisis has hugely relied upon the actions of the public”.312 This effort should not be wasted, and this public capability must be encouraged and built on so that it is available in good times and in bad.

181.In order to improve public preparedness and bolster national resilience, the public should be supported with the information they need in an effective format. Professor Duncan Shaw, Dr Jennifer Bealt and David Powell noted that: “Encouraging preparedness at individual and organisational levels reduces the pressures on local responders and authorities, and balances out the responsibilities of risk planning between local government, their partners and individual members of the public”.313 Previous attempts have been made to share information on preparedness with the public, including the National Risk Register (NRR) and the 2004 ‘Preparing for emergencies: What you need to know’ booklet.314

182.A more considered and consistent approach to communication is needed. Our witnesses set out what information should be provided and how. Sir David Spiegelhalter said: “You have to tell people what you know, what you do not know and what you are doing about it, what people can do, what the public can do, and then you emphasise that you will come back to them and things will change.”315 Professor Rogers also stressed the need to “provide credible rationale for the guidance itself and the subsequent changes”.316 The Royal Society said that: “ensuring that decisions, and the evidence that underpin them, are transparent is key to earning public support for steps to build resilience, many of which may compete against other priorities.”317 Professor Fekete noted that there is no evidence that providing the public with information on risk and resilience leads to panic amongst the population.318

183.Misinformation poses a threat to societal resilience and could disrupt an emergency response. Our witnesses noted that a benefit of active communication is the improved ability to counteract misinformation. Sir David Spiegelhalter stressed the value of taking note of misinformation and pre-empting it early: “There is a huge need to pre-empt misinformation, to get in there first and to realise what is going on, to listen to what is circulating.”319

184.An example of best practice in encouraging preparedness is the Swedish booklet (also available in English) entitled ‘Om krisen eller kriget kommer’ (If crisis or war comes)”. It provides citizens with information about building personal preparedness and responding to crises. It prompts citizens to consider how they would be able to cope in a situation where society’s services were not working as normal, or what risks might affect them and their local area. It contains a brief guide to countering false information, how to respond in the event of a terror attack, and a guide to emergency warning signals. It also includes a checklist for home preparedness.320 Jim Kronhamn told us the brochure had been a success, being well received and the information within remembered by recipients.321

185.It is important to encourage the public to increase their preparedness and play a more active role in emergency responses. This must come with the recognition that not all individuals have the same capacity to be resilient. Linda Battarbee, Director of Operations at the Trussell Trust, said: “Although it is the same storm, we are in very different boats.”322 Matthew Gah-Kai Leung, PHD student at the University of Warwick, said that vulnerable groups may not have the same ability to weather a disaster. Matthew Gah-Kai Leung recommended that preparedness measures should target a wide array of communities to attend to their needs and that response policy must be fine-tuned to address problems specific to these groups. Leung said that “this will ensure that vulnerable groups do not suffer disproportionate burdens as a result of the catastrophe”.323

186.The UK population is not sufficiently encouraged to engage in emergency planning or build a level of personal preparedness. At present, the NRR is the primary tool for public education employed by the Government. This approach falls short and does not empower the public to make informed decisions about personal safety. There is little evidence to suggest that providing information leads to panic. Providing individuals with knowledge about how to respond in a crisis and guidance to help build personal preparedness will improve societal resilience. It should be recognised that socio-economic disparities threaten to undermine civilian resilience capability. Moreover, misinformation poses a direct risk to civil cohesion and resilience. This risk has been exacerbated by the growing influence of social media platforms. Misinformation should be identified, pre-empted and countered as early as possible.

187.The Government should commit to a biennial publication of a brochure on risk preparedness. This brochure should educate the public on general resilience principles, outline how individuals could improve their preparedness, provide guidance on what to do in an emergency, and signpost further information on resilience. This should be modelled on the Swedish brochure ‘If crisis or war comes’ and supplement the NRR.

188.The Government should consider the organisation and provision of a residential, intensive course on national security, resilience and defence for rising leaders in the public and private sectors. The Government should lay a written statement on with the findings of its consideration in both Houses within 6 months of publication of this report.

Box 8: COVID-19 Case Study

Our inquiry would not be complete without acknowledging the consequences that the COVID-19 pandemic has wrought on the UK. It was against the backdrop of the pandemic that the Liaison Committee recommended the appointment of this Committee to investigate the UK’s risk assessment and risk planning system.324 This investigation has never been an inquiry into the Government’s handling of COVID-19, but the pandemic has highlighted gaps in our risk management system. A pandemic, like any extreme risk, will challenge many of the interconnected linkages that make up our society. This case study illustrates that extreme risks must be mitigated through the whole of society approach outlined in the previous chapter. The pandemic The COVID-19 pandemic is a global pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The virus was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 30 January 2020, and later declared a pandemic on 11 March 2020.325 The first cases of COVID-19 in the UK were confirmed on 31 January 2020.326 The UK entered a nationwide lockdown on 23 March 2020. This initial lockdown ended in June, but the UK entered a second lockdown between 5 November 2020 and 2 December 2020. On 4 January 2021, the UK entered a third lockdown which was gradually eased from March 2021.327 After the first wave of the pandemic, the UK had the highest cumulative excess mortality rate in Europe.328 As of 18 November 2021, 166,730 deaths had been recorded with COVID-19 listed as the cause of death.329 UK pandemic preparedness A pandemic was a foreseeable risk, one the Government was aware of and had taken steps to address. The Government had categorised pandemic influenza as a highest priority ‘tier-1’ risk in the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) since 2010. In 2018, the Government said: “One or more major hazards can be expected to materialise in the UK in every five-year period. The most serious are pandemic influenza, national blackout and severe flooding.”330

In response to the high likelihood of pandemic threat, the UK put in place pandemic mitigation practices. In the 2019 Global Health Security Index the UK was ranked second internationally for health security capabilities.331 In 2018 the UK developed and published its Biological Security Strategy which provided a framework for understanding, preventing, detecting and responding to biological risks. The strategy is 48 pages long, with one page devoted to implementation. Dr Opi Outhwaite said, by the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2019, “very little” implementation of the strategy had taken place.332 In the 2017 National Risk Register (NRR), pandemic influenza and emerging infectious diseases were rated four out of five for likelihood of occurrence in the next five years. It was estimated that pandemic influenza would have a more severe impact than emerging infectious disease. Pandemic flu was assigned an impact threshold of up to 50% of the UK population experiencing symptoms, which had the potential to cause between 20,000 and 750,000 fatalities. Emerging infectious diseases, such as novel coronaviruses, were assigned an impact threshold of “several thousand people experiencing symptoms” with the potential for “up to 100 fatalities”.333 In 2016 the Government conducted Exercise Cygnus to simulate a pandemic event. This was a major exercise to explore the impact of an influenza pandemic on the UK. The exercised focused mainly on the healthcare impacts of a pandemic. It involved ministers and officials from central and local government, NHS organisations, prisons and local emergency response planners. Part of the report’s conclusions were that: “the UK’s preparedness and response, in terms of its plans, policies and capability, is currently not sufficient to cope with the extreme demands of a severe pandemic that will have a nation-wide impact across all sectors.”334 Dr Karen Reddin, Senior Lecturer in Disaster Management at Bournemouth University, a participant in Exercise Cygnus, said that due to the competing government priorities of the EU referendum and Brexit, there was a “lack of will” to implement the lessons of the exercise.335 Dr Reddin said that this may have contributed to the subsequent problems such as shortages in hospital surge capacity and the lack of coordination between the health and social care sectors.336

Another exercise, Exercise Alice. held in 2016, imagined a large scale outbreak of the coronavirus MERS-CoV (Middle East respiratory syndrome). It was designed to “explore existing arrangements and to scrutinise the challenges presented by a large scale MERS-CoV outbreak in the UK.”337 Many of the lessons identified have relevance to the UK’s experience of COVID-19. The lessons identified included “quarantine versus self-isolation and the clarity required about the options; PPE level and the need for instruction on use; community sampling planning and effective proportional communications to both front line staff and consistent public messaging.”338 Inquiries into the handling of COVID-19 The House of Commons Health and Social Care and Science and Technology Committees have performed an in-depth analysis of the lessons that can be learned from the COVID-19 pandemic to date. We draw attention to their findings with particular support for their recommendations relating to the UK’s risk management landscape. This includes a recommendation that the resourcing and capabilities of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat should be improved to ensure that Departments have their risk plans stress tested.339 We also draw attention to the National Audit Office report titled ‘The government’s preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk management’. It concluded that there had been: a failure to plan for many non-health consequences of the pandemic; a failure to learn lessons from exercises; limited oversight and assurance of plans; a variation in capacity, capability and maturity of risk management across government departments; a need to strengthen the end-to-end risk management process to ensure that it addresses all significant risks, including interdependent and systemic risks; a need for greater collaboration within and outside of Government; a need to define a risk appetite; and a need to strengthen national resilience.340 The UK’s Assessment of COVID-19 Prior to the emergence of COVID-19, the UK had a high degree of confidence in its assessment of, and preparedness for, a pandemic. Roger Hargreaves said that the UK found itself “very well prepared for pandemic flu and being very highly regarded internationally for our preparedness.”341 Much of the Governments’ preparedness efforts were singularly focused on pandemic influenza. As Roger Hargreaves said, “pandemic flu was the risk on which there was absolute consensus: this was the manifestation of a pandemic.”342

Our witnesses criticised this narrow focus on pandemic influenza and the Government’s confidence in its preparedness. Sir Oliver Letwin said: “Part of the problem about Covid is that we had monomaniacal attention on pandemic flu.”343 Dr Piers Millett said that senior policymakers within Government met the idea that a disease event could still happen that would lead to tens of millions of cases and millions of dead with “incredulity”.344 The UK response to COVID-19 It will be for future inquiries to undertake a comprehensive account of the pandemic and judge how successful the Government was in protecting this country from the virus. This section outlines three areas that our witnesses identified as shortcomings in the Government’s response to the virus: the machinery of government, external involvement and capabilities and powers. The machinery of government and COVID-19 Witnesses described a machinery of government as a system which could not handle the scale of challenge posed by the pandemic. Pandemics are not solely health emergencies, and the response to COVID-19 impacted every government department. However, in advance of the pandemic, many departments had done little specific planning for such an emergency.345 According to Charlotte Pickles, the Government’s use of the Lead Government Department model exposed the UK system to “a severe level of under planning” and that: “while there were fundamental flaws in the planning of the Lead Government Department for the pandemic—that is, the Department of Health and Social Care—there was almost no planning in some other government departments for risks that were well anticipated in the event of a pandemic”.346 This failure to create holistic policy also extended to the pandemic response. Alex Thomas, Programme Director at the Institute for Government, described the weaknesses of the Government’s decision-making structures during the pandemic. Alex Thomas noted that in the initial stages of the pandemic, the Cabinet Office lacked the strength to coordinate a cross-Government response: “There was not a strong enough unit in the middle of the Cabinet Office that could draw all this stuff together and serve up decisions for senior Ministers and the Prime Minister to make.”347 External input Alex Thomas also described a tendency for Government to “retrench and go back into the bowels of 70 Whitehall or Downing Street” and make decisions without adequate external input. Alex Thomas noted that decision-making during the pandemic was most effective when departments reached out to local government and the people most affected by policy decisions.348 This is consistent with the culture of secrecy described in Chapter 3.

Chief Constable Rachel Swann said that there was a lack of support offered during the early stages of the pandemic. Chief Constable Swann considered that Government Liaison Officers were spread too thinly across the country and that this had led to “a real absence of consistency and of information going both ways”.349 Capabilities and powers Witnesses also noted the absence of specific capabilities which impacted the UK’s pandemic response. The military has played a crucial role in the UK’s response to COVID-19, providing valuable skills through the Military Aid to the Civil Authority system. However, the armed forces cannot also act as a civil protection force. Paul Wyatt observed that further Government dependency on the military for enhancing resilience is not an option. Paul Wyatt said that risk management systems must be on “the right side of the line between resilience and reliance”.350 Witnesses said that during COVID-19 and other emergencies, the UK has been fortunate that defence forces have been able to meet their need for logistical support and other forms of military aid.351 The ability to test for the virus, to track its progress and isolate infected individuals has been a crucial element of the global pandemic response. Dr Cassidy Nelson said that one of the “disappointing features” of the Government’s early pandemic response was a lack of testing capacity for the virus.352 Dr Nelson argued that the necessity of community testing should have been foreseen, and that a failure to partner with more private laboratories or expand Government testing capability led to the cessation of community testing in March 2020.353 Response to risks is increasingly reliant on rapidly accessible data to help inform policymaking, but barriers to data access and sharing have hampered the COVID-19 response.354 Roger Hargreaves acknowledged that the pandemic response has shown that “Some of our systems for recording information are some way away from real time”. 355 Sir Patrick Vallance said that at the start of the pandemic “we had enormous difficulty in getting the data required in order to understand exactly what was going on.”356

As COVID-19 emerged and then spread to the UK, the UK Government opted to manage the pandemic using both existing and new legislation. Legislative power was provided by the Public Health Act (Control of Disease Act) 1984357 and the Coronavirus Act 2020.358 The Government opted not to use United Kingdom-wide emergency powers under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. An analysis of the reasons given for this choice and an assessment of the impact of these legislative choices on co-ordination of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic across the UK can be found in the report by the Constitution Committee on COVID-19 and the use and scrutiny of emergency powers.359 We draw attention to the conclusions and recommendations drawn by the Constitution Committee. In particular, we support the recommendation that the Government should review the use of emergency powers, and the scrutiny of these powers by Parliament, in advance of any public inquiry into the COVID-19 pandemic.360

Lessons learned from the COVID-19 case study

189.Many of our conclusions and recommendations apply to COVID-19 as well as other disruptive events. We wish to draw attention to two specific areas. The first is the failure to implement fully the lessons learned from Exercise Cygnus in 2016 and the second is the need for a renewed commitment to the Biological Security Strategy.

190.Exercise Cygnus should have been a unique opportunity to address known shortcomings in the UK system. Many of the lessons identified during Exercise Cygnus have come to bear during COVID-19. We had not implemented central lessons from the exercise before the start of the pandemic and as Professor Hall noted: “We have been looking back wistfully at Exercise Cygnus during this epidemic.”361 This suggests that criticism of the UK’s response to the pandemic cannot fairly be attributed to hindsight.

191.In particular, Exercise Cygnus recommended the production of a “Pandemic Concept of Operations” to assist with operationalising the response to a pandemic by clarifying the role of organisations and the rules of engagement. Based on the evidence we have received about the decision making in Government at the outset of the pandemic, it appears that this was not properly implemented prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. During the early stages of COVID-19 there was significant confusion in decision-making which hampered the UK’s response.

192.A Pandemic Concept of Operations should be produced, as well as Concepts of Operations for other major risks, to ensure that the confusion surrounding governance does not arise in future crises.

193.The Biological Security Strategy provided a framework for understanding, preventing, detecting and responding to biological risks. Dr Piers Millett told us that: “Implementing the existing national biosecurity strategy would go a long way to addressing the current gaps.”362

194.The 2018 Biological Security Strategy was a welcome development but the Government’s failure to implement it fully has rendered it ineffectual. The emergence of COVID-19 has demonstrated the importance of strengthening the UK’s biological security.

195.The Biological Security Strategy needs to be renewed, refreshed and implemented, whilst also incorporating the lessons learned from COVID-19. At present, the non-implementation of the Strategy represents a significant gap in UK preparedness and should be rectified as a priority. The updated strategy should be published alongside an implementation plan so that its progress can be tracked. Time in both Houses should be devoted to a debate on the refreshed strategy.

---

• A-Z index
• Glossary
• Contact us
• Freedom of Information
• Jobs
• Using this website
• Copyright